Comments on Draft CoP16 Doc. XX re: DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM FOR A PROCESS OF TRADE IN IVORY Dan Stiles Received 27 September 2012.

Transcription

1 IUCN Tel /65 Mukoma Road P. 0. Box Nairobi, Kenya 2 October 2012 Tom de Meulenaer CITES Secretariat International Environment House 11-13, Chemin des Anemones 1219 Chatelaine Geneve, SWITZERLAND Dear Tom, Thank you for sending us the Secretariat document on the proposed way forward on the decisionmaking mechanism for a process of trade in ivory. AfESG members have been involved in reviewing multiple iterations of the consultancy report by Martin et al., and presented to the 62nd meeting of the CITES Standing Committee in SC62 Doc and its Annex. The AfESG appreciates the chance to comment on the draft document for COP16, and I have attached detailed comments from four members, Drs John Hart, Dan Stiles, Hilde Vanleeuwe, and Fiona Maisels. Unfortunately, some members who were interested in submitting comments were unable to provide a detailed review within the very short turn-around time. We look forward to continuing to engage on this important discussion. Very best, Dr. Holly T. Dublin Chair SS C Species Survival Commission INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE

2 Comments on Draft CoP16 Doc. XX re: DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM FOR A Dan Stiles Received 27 September 2012 Comments on: Considerations regarding the establishment of a decision-making mechanism for a process of trade in ivory under the auspices of the Conference of the Parties Paragraph 16. b) of the document seems to indicate, if I interpret it correctly, that the Secretariat is opposed to the creation of a new structure such as CISO and that existing CITES bodies, with necessary enhancement, should undertake the duties associated with organizing and supervising ivory trade, should it be approved. That given, we are back to square one. It would have saved a lot of time and energy had the Secretariat included this position in the ToR. I will not bother addressing specific details and mechanisms, but rather confront a much larger issue. There is no consensus amongst stakeholders on the need to establish a regulated legal regime of international trade in ivory. There is strong opposition from those who are primarily zoologists and supporters of the animal welfare philosophy of wildlife nonutilization. Elephants are not viewed dispassionately by this sector as simply an important species in need of conservation. Most of the ivory trade opponents have experience studying elephants, or at least of being associated with elephants, over long periods of time. They see many as individuals with distinct personalities and accord them names. They follow and know the personal histories of each and in some sense elephants become part of the extended family. Familiarity with one sub-population extends this feeling to all elephants. Psychologically and emotionally, discussing ivory trade is a bit like discussing whether to sell Aunt Mildred's teeth after she passes away. It is immoral to envisage it. The anti-trade lobby is well established now, due in great part to having organized opposition to the two ill-conceived 'one-off' ivory auctions from southern Africa authorized by CITES, and the lobbying against any future sales. Positions have been staked, arguments expounded, and the reputations of many elephant specialists and wildlife NGOs have been irrevocably tied to the anti-trade position. Considerable sums of money have been raised by them from the public and spent on PR advocating continuation of the ivory trade ban. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for this sector to reverse its stance on ivory trade regardless of the arguments put forth in favour. They have been very effective in rallying the uninformed public and many journalists to their cause. As a consequence, the general public equates a legal, regulated trade as the gateway to an elephant holocaust. CITES is already beginning to be pilloried by the media for its approval of the two 'one-off experiments' and for even considering normalizing international trade. The attitude of the general public, therefore, particularly in Western democracies, towards a regulated, legal trade must be taken into consideration. It would be 1

3 problematic to implement any system of regulated trade without public consensus on the need and their general support. The primary question that must be answered is: would a legal trade increase or decrease demand for ivory by traders and by consumers. The characteristics of demand by traders is different than that by consumers. The former plans ahead to ensure supply, given their assessment of the future conditions of availability. Consumers buy what is on hand at the moment. It is my belief that the recent upsurge in elephant poaching has been caused by increased trader demand (including ivory factories), not primarily by consumer demand. This increase in trader demand is a result of two main factors: (1) the decision by CITES to not allow additional raw ivory sales from Appendix II countries until at least 2017 and (2) the decision by CITES to not allow sales from Zambia and Tanzania, proposed at CoP 15. Ivory traders now believed, no doubt correctly, that no new legal raw ivory would come on the market until 2018 at the earliest, and probably later. They therefore had no alternative but to purchase illegal ivory. It is this, not the 1999 and 2008 ivory auctions that has spurred the current elephant holocaust. Unless a proper understanding of ivory trade dynamics is appreciated by stakeholders, I see little hope of stemming the current onslaught on elephants. I would rather sell Aunt Mildred's teeth after she had passed peacefully from old age than to have someone murder her for them. Dan Stiles, Ph.D. Member, IUCN/SSC AfESG Kenya 2

4 Comments on Draft CoP16 Doc. XX re: DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM FOR A Hilde Vanleeuwe Received 28 September 2012 It is very realistic, especially for Central African countries, to require proper controls on stockpiles, reinforcement of anti-poaching efforts, and monitoring of the populations to avoid phantom numbers of elephants and an unsustainable offtake of ivory. Introducing trade in Central Africa now can only lead to disaster. Corruption is a reality. One suggestion I would like to add for the existing bodies ETIS and MIKE who deliver great work is to be very careful with the appointing of government officials as focal points in developing countries of Central Africa. There exists an overall will of Central African Governments to develop Action Plans to avoid illegal trade but the implementing of Action Plans, like the implementing of existing environmental laws doesn't work largely because economic instability fuels a favor for economic incentives (also illegal) rather than conservation incentives on the ground. Apply this reality also to consumer countries and one finds that to ivory trade cannot be sustainable. Comments on Draft CoP16 Doc. XX re: DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM FOR A John A. Hart, Ph.D. Received 28 September 2012 While I think the trader consumer dichotomy may have validity, I am not at all sure these dynamics matter in the chaotic world of elephant poaching, at least as it is played out on the ground. Most poachers at least in DRC are opportunists and weigh immediate costs (and risks) with opportunity for killing elephants. These latter are often much less clear than the former, so the two sides of the decision equation are not equivalent in terms of information content and sources. What I am suggesting is that the trickle down of the effects of international trade agreements will take a long time to reach those at the source of the ivory. And these decisions may not matter. As you documented yourself, a dead elephant is also a source of meat whose sale and consumption are beyond international trade purview. Add to that, many of DRC's current poaching casualties are young animals with hardly any ivory. Elephant Poaching is a cost/ opportunity assessment by the poachers. Increased costs and risks by effective law enforcement enter their calculations...international trade decisions even as they affect what they think they might get for ivory are much less important, at least in DRC.

5 Comments on Draft CoP16 Doc. XX re: DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM FOR A Fiona Maisels, AfESG Received 01 October Having looked at the comments received from various Range States, the two donors (UK and USA) and destination states, I note the following: The only Central African range state to make comments (Central African Republic) included this in their letter: Nous estimons que le contrôle de l offre ne sera pas du tout possible considérant que les éléphants sont présents dans 37 États de l aire de répartition en Afrique, et que ces États n ont dans bien des cas pas du tout la capacité de maîtriser le braconnage et le commerce illicite de l ivoire. Par conséquent, le commerce licite permettra de laisser libre cours au blanchiment de l'ivoire illicite. Translation: We believe that the control of the supply will not be possible at all, given that elephants occur in 37 African range states, and that these states, in many cases do not have the ability to control poaching and illegal trade in ivory. Therefore, the legal trade will unleash the laundering of illegal ivory. CAR used to have a very large population of savannah elephants in the north, which brought in tourism revenue. This population has since been mostly eliminated by poachers. Their main remaining elephant tourism site is at Dzanga Bai, a mineral-rich forest clearing providing easy viewing of the forest elephant population. The wildlife director is honest enough to admit that many range states cannot control poaching. 2. I also note that none of the non-trading range States are happy with the formulation of the document, as it implies that their elephant populations would be pushed to Annex II. Secondly, I feel that not enough attention has been paid either to the demand. A suggestion that 200kg of ivory could be enough to meet the Asian demand does not take into account the increasing percentage of Chinese people that are entering the middle class (detailed in my comments to the AfESG in the last iteration of these comments) nor the new and worrying trend for ivory to be used as an investment material by speculators in China. The use of ivory as a commodity to increase personal wealth as its price increases means that there is no upper limit of the amount required at destination by individuals keen to maximise their revenue. 3. In 2011 the ERIS data showed that 24,300 kg of illegal ivory was seized. Customs tend to have a rule of thumb estimation that they catch about 10% of the real amounts being trafficked, whether that is drugs, counterfiet, etc. Thus, the 24,300kg could represent about 243 tons of ivory being trafficked in total (just over the suggested 200 tons in the report). How would the legal ivory leaving Africa replace the illegal ivory, instead of simply adding to it? 4. Finally, little mention has been made of the fact that ivory is increasingly used as an income source by largely uncontrolled and likely uncontrollable militias (such as LRA, MP3 and so on) particularly in in Eastern DRC, but also several other areas in neighboring states. Government control of large sectors of DRC is weak or completely lacking, so the elephant populations in these areas are completely vulnerable to local warlords.