Working with Power in Politics: Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in City of Semarang

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1 Working with Power in Politics: Lessons-Learned from License Reform in City of Cimahi and Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in City of Semarang Hari Kusdaryanto TALEARN Annual Workshop: Facing Shared Challenges, Advancing Collective Change Jakarta, March 12-15, 2014

2 The two case studies the Cities of Cimahi and Semarang Licensing Reform in Cimahi Newly established municipality (est. 2002), rely on service and trade, clean and smart Mayor In 2006, Asia Foundation, through local partners, B- Trust, requested by Mayor to improve business licensing services (integrated licensing service one stop shop, OSS) 84 types of business licensing issued by various technical dept(s): costly and cumbersome USAID PROMIS program in Business Enabling Environment ( ) Pro-Poor Budget Advocacy in Semarang Capital of Central Java Province, population of 1.5 m, highly urbanized, dynamic economy A corrupt and patronageseeking Mayor who lost popular support due to corruption A parliament united in their hostility to the Mayor, intent on utilizing their power to legislate Asia Foundation s local grantee, Pattiro, has an open menu : a pro-poor budget advocacy (free to choose the program) DFID -funded program in 38 cities/districts

3 Stakeholders Map Cimahi : when Mayor s commitment not shared by his lower-ranks bureaucrats Actors Pre-Facilitation Position Interests Mayor Regional Assistant for Econ Dev t Reformer (Idealist- Pragmatist) Reformer (Idealist) Wanted to make licensing transparent to control land use, wellknown at the provincial (and national) levels Idealistic and reform-minded bureaucrat, Mayor s right hand Head of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Wanted to have legacy before retiring. She was blamed for not making the OSS work Staffs of OSS Reformer (Idealist) Head of Licensing Division wanted to increase his authority and power in licensing. A young staff (moved from Spatial Planning) was idealistic, wanted to reduce corruption Mr. Y, Building Control Section Head Technical Depts (SKPDs) Heads Civil society & private sector Opponent (Wrecker) Opportunists Reform supporters Very powerful ( untouchables ), didn t want to be promoted or rotated for more than 10 years. Wanted to keep his power in reviewing Construction Permit (IMB) license applications Although they hold higher position, but didn t have real power, since they were new comers to the municipality administration Critical of the government, support reform, but too weak and disorganized

4 Power Stakeholder Map - Semarang: Allies act when Executive power is weak Mayor Sukawi - PDIP Stakeholder Map Semarang (AFTER) DPRD (Ari & Ahmadi PKS) Health Office Media Dep. Mayor Mahfud - PKB BAPPEDA - Sudarto Academics - Rahmat Pattiro Constituents Reform-mindedness

5 Working Politically strategic phases: In addition to the technical steps, local implementing partners tried to: Understand the importance of allies and coalitions Map agents and political positions at the start and seeking alliances with reformers Utilize formal and informal channel to build relationships, foster trust, and gain entre to policy making process; Use critical juncture(s): Important momentum (political events, national regulations, etc) 5

6 Then what? Cimahi: 6 The upgraded business licensing OSS was launched on March 2007, with full authorities to issue 60 types of licenses; MoHA used Cimahi s experience to formulate national guideline in 2007 In 2008 and 2009, Cimahi s OSS awarded by national government as the best business licensing OSS. Semarang: Local regulation on Poverty Alleviation passed in 2008 Municipal Poverty Alleviation Team (TKPKD) established led by Deputy Mayor City s free health care for the poor (Jamkesda) established in 2009 to expand coverage of nationally-funded Jamkesmas

7 Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming FLEXIBILITY is key Focus on objective, broadly defined, rather than programs/outputs/outcomes in narrowly defined sense Allow partners to make mistakes : messy start, trial and error Flexible budget structure: clusters of budget rather than rigid budget line items Should cover informal meetings / lobbying activities Involve substantially / hands-on during program implementation Backstop local CSOs (grantees) intensively, be a sparring partner along the way, challenge them with right questions, join in important field discussions/meetings Challenges It is more time-consuming than conventional technical assistance approach Not easy to find people with working politically mindset Not practical for a parallel sub-national program (working in tens of ) 7

8 Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (2) For CSO (grantees), being a facilitator is key factor and extremely important to have: Capability to build trust (education background, knowledge about the reform, no vested interest) Capability to think, work and act politically. The facilitators need to understand and know the actors of reform, their interests and power to support or block reform. Reform process can be facilitated even without initial commitment and buy-in of the executive leader (mayor/regent), as long as the facilitators understand the situation and develop the program based on it. Informal meetings and personal approach are often more important than formal workshops/meetings There is no formula of building alliances opponents can either be alienated (only dedicated actors) or included in the alliance ( tactical ); the alliance can be formal or informal. 8

9 Lessons Learned and Implications for Development Programming (3) Technical vs political Semarang: TA alone will not resulting in pro-poor budget allocations, extending partnerships to constituent-based organizations, and in particular Muslim mass-based organizations, can increase the political capital of advocates Cimahi: Technical aspects of reform can be supported after building alliance and converging the actors interests to support reform Reform through working politically likely be more sustainable transformative, change the incentive structure 9

10 THANK YOU 10