NEOREALISM, NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

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1 Published in: Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1993), pp NEOREALISM, NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FUTURE OF NATO Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf* The cold war is over, the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved, the Soviet Union has disappeared and what is left of it is in disarray. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, one of the most visible symbols of the cold war, is still alive. For many officials in Western governments this is not surprising. NATO has not been merely a military alliance, they contend, but a community of shared values. Many sharing this view think that NATO's continued existence is desirable 1, some argue it is also likely. 2 Others argue that the rationale for the creation of NATO and its persistence was the same that operated for all military * Gunther Hellmann is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Free University of Berlin; Reinhard Wolf is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Martin-Luther-University, Halle-Wittenberg. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 33. Annual Convention of the "International Studies Association" in Atlanta, 31 March - 4 April For their helpful comments and criticism the authors would like to thank in particular Jospeh Grieco, Isabelle Grunberg, Helga Haftendorn, Ingo Heinrich, Otto Keck, Robert Keohane, Peter Mayer, Harald Müller, Glenn Snyder, Christian Tuschhoff, Stephen Van Evera, Celeste Wallander, Kenneth Waltz, Richard Weitz, and Michael Zürn. They would also like to acknowledge financial support of the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" and the "Volkswagenstiftung." 1

2 alliances of the past: a perceived common threat. Accordingly, the alliance ought to, and will, dissolve, because the Soviet threat has largely disappeared. 3 Whether NATO will persist over the medium and long-term (say five - ten years) and in what form is significant for both transatlantic relations and European security. In thinking about NATO's future, three scenarios are a priori plausible. First, the alliance may continue to function as the major institutional framework for the coordination of the security policies of its sixteen members. NATO would not expand its membership or fundamentally alter its mandate, even though minor adaptations to the new security environment may be implemented regarding the specifics of force structure, doctrine, and so forth. Second, NATO may either break up or gradually dissolve because of differences among its members about how to organize for the common security in the post-cold war environment. Most member states would no longer rely on the alliance as the central institution for the coordination of national security policies and the institutional underpinnings of the alliance (integrated command, force planning, etc.) would gradually unravel. Whether or not an organization with the name 'NATO' still existed would be irrelevant because the defining norms and principles of the alliance would have ceased to be credible to member governments. Third, NATO may change its mission and possibly its membership. In this scenario the alliance would incorporate new security functions (such as peace keeping, peace making or other concert mechanisms) and deemphasize but not formally abolish its traditional mission as a mutual defense pact. This fundamental change, in contrast to the break-up scenario, would result from consultation and agreement among NATO member states. Obviously, any of these scenarios would carry far-reaching implications for transatlantic relations, European security, and even the international system as a whole. It is important, therefore, to examine the underlying forces that will affect the long-term future of the alliance. The future of NATO is important not only for policy. It is also relevant for international relations-theory, especially the two most prominent theoretical perspectives at the systemic level, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. 4 Both claim to offer better explanations of international cooperation, both are clearly articulated, and there also appears to be a common understanding of the basic assumptions of each theory. 5 2

3 3 There are four reasons why neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism provide a good base for deducing predictions about the future of NATO. First, both are systemic theories concerned with outcomes that are more amenable to theorizing and prediction than either foreign policy outputs or individual behavior. Since alliances are products of processes at the systemic level of analysis, NATO is an ideal subject for neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theory. Secondly, scholars on both sides of the neorealist-neoliberal debate agree that too much of the contention between the two perspectives has focused on theoretical arguments. Instead of further debating in theoretical terms the merits and shortcomings of either perspective, the authors call for more empirical research based on specific competing hypotheses and predictions with the future as acceptable as a testing ground as the past. 6 Third, making predictions also agrees with the positivist epistemology of both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both agree -- at least on a declaratory level -- on designing and carrying out hard tests in order to prove the validity of theoretical claims. 7 In this regard, NATO is a good test for both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, even though it is not the hardest test possible for either. 8 Finally and most importantly, both perspectives lead to different conclusions about how NATO will evolve in the medium and long-term. From a neorealist perspective, the break-up scenario is more likely, whereas neoliberal institutionalists would prefer either the persistence scenario or the transformation scenario. 9 It is thus appropriate to submit both theoretical perspectives to the test of the future. In this article we show why a neorealist would predict the break-up or gradual dissolution of NATO whereas a neoliberal institutionalist would assert that NATO will survive in its present form or be transformed by the consent of its members. Our argument proceeds in five steps. In the first section we briefly review the problems inherent in making predictions. While recognizing these problems, we argue that deducing predictions from neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is in line with the positivist epistemology both share and that such deductions offer important insights regarding policy making and theory building. In the second section we summarize the central assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, emphasizing points of agreement and disagreement between the two. This discussion leads to the third part of this article, in which we deduce hypotheses from both

4 4 theories regarding the origins, endurance, and decline of a particular type of international institutions - military alliances. We also highlight the areas where these theories lack clarity and show how these deficiencies may be overcome. After explaining how neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism view the persistence and potential decline of alliances, we will, in the fourth section, apply these hypotheses and formulate specific and competing predictions about the future of NATO. In the fifth section we briefly examine how neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism fared thus far in explaining the evolution of NATO since 1989/90. Finally, we summarize our argument and show how policy recommendations differ if we would base our expectations about the future of the atlantic alliance on neorealism or neoliberal institutionalism. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-THEORY AND PREDICTIONS In the theoretical international relations-literature specific (that is, potentially falsifiable) predictions are rare. 10 There is reason for this and we realize that the way we choose is uncommon and problematic. One reason why specific predictions are rare is that, from an epistemological perspective, predictions are inherently difficult because our knowledge of social phenomena is limited and our theories are accordingly "soft." 11 They are soft because social phenomena are the result of multiple causes at different levels of analysis, where it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine the weight of different causal variables. Moreover, since social systems are open rather than closed as in many natural sciences, there is always room for learning and the emergence of new behavioral patterns which may make theories obsolete. 12 Whatever the difficulties of making predictions, even scholars who point to the inherent limitations of forecasting in general and the application of international relationstheories in particular, often make explicit predictions of their own. 13 Making such predictions is understandable and desirable because it is useful for practitioners in foreign policy and because it helps international relations-scholars to refine existing theories.

5 5 An explicit attempt at forecasting based on international relations-theories, however soft, is better than a prediction based on intuition. Numerous scholars make statements that amount to implicit predictions about future developments in international relations. John Lewis Gaddis's commendation of the "insights derived from careful narration and thoughtful analogy" in illuminating "even quite distant futures" notwithstanding, however, we think that this common practice of implicit predicitions is problematic because (a) most often the everpresent theoretical basis is not explicated; and (b) many of these implicit predictions are not stated in such a way that they can be tested. 14 Such predictions, therefore, are of little use for practitioners and scientists. They are of limited use for the practitioner because he or she is left guessing as to the expert's assumptions why a certain development will take place. Thus, in choosing how to act upon the advice the practitioner is denied the opportunity to question and judge the quasi-theoretical bases of the analyst's argument. Moreover, predictions that are not stated in such a way that they can be tested do not contribute to the growth of the discipline because the scientist advocating them cannot be proven wrong. Deducing testable hypotheses and predictions helps practitioners and scientists. It may help the scientist in improving existing theories, especially if the credibility of a particular theory is increased as a result of empirical research. The past and future provide laboratories with different advantages and shortcomings for theory building. One of the advantages of deriving specific predictions from international relations-theories is that we may be able to check their accuracy and, therefore, the explanatory power of the theory, against the historical record at some specified point in the future. From a scientific point of view, whether a prediction turns out to be right or wrong hardly matters. We may even be able to learn more from theory-based predictions that turn out to be wrong than from those that are right. In any event we will be in a better position to point to the strengths and weaknesses of the respective theories and be able to refine or even reject a theory. The formulation of theory-based predictions is not only useful to the scientist. Contrary to claims by those who criticize theory as "irrelevant to praxis," we think that theory-based predictions are much more useful to the practitioner than hidden, non-falsifiable predictions because they enable policy-makers to make an informed choice. 15 If we clearly state the assumptions underlying our analysis and the reach of our predictions,

6 6 the practitioner will be able to make an informed choice why he or she agrees or disagrees with the scientist. More important, if he or she agreed with the assumptions and reasons underlying a specific prediction, and if the scientist had taken care to point out how the predicted event may still be prevented or promoted, the practitioner would be in a position to act upon it. In sum, we have consciously chosen this path, knowing that the future is inherently unpredictable but realizing at the same time that in shaping this future practitioners and scientists base their judgement on some more or less intuitive understanding of the underlying forces of history. "Predictions can inform policy discourse. They help even those who disagree to frame their ideas by clarifying points of disagreement." 16 Therefore, in order to render predictions useful for practitioners and scientists they ought to be made explicit. NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism disagree about the chances for international cooperation. The basic disagreement between the two schools concerns the nature of the interaction between states. While neorealists argue that "states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and... often fail to cooperate even when they have common interests," 17 largely because "self-help systems do make the cooperation of parties difficult," 18 neoliberals contend that these pessimistic assumptions about cooperation are unfounded arguing that neorealists underestimate the impact of international institutions. 19 To the neorealists' argument that international institutions affect the behavior of states only marginally because they are not an independent force, 20 neoliberals reply that international institutions do not just reflect temporary interests of states but also shape those interests and the practices of states. 21 Unlike neorealists, neoliberals claim that institutions can continue to promote international cooperation even when the state interests which led to their initial creation no longer exist. 22 Despite these conflicting predictions, neorealism and neoliberalism share some fundamental assumptions. Both schools assume that regularities of international behavior

7 7 are best explained by the nature of the international system. 23 Both theories assume that states are the major players in world affairs and that they are rational unitary actors trying to promote their national interests. 24 Finally, both schools agree that anarchy is one of the underlying forces of the international system because there is no central authority that could force states to comply with international agreements. 25 Because of these commonly held assumptions, neoliberals and neorealists agree that even if states have interests in common, international cooperation is difficult because anarchy allows states to defect from international agreements. Neoliberals claim that states can solve this problem successfully by establishing international institutions that diminish the incentives to cheat and increase the attraction of compliance. 26 According to neoliberals, institutions do so primarily by distributing information more evenly among potential collaborators, by reducing the costs for monitoring individual compliance, and by making it more cost-effective for states to sanction non-compliance. 27 Thus, neoliberals argue that international institutions can often overcome the basic obstacle to international cooperation, claiming that states attach great importance to the existence and functioning of international institutions and try to preserve them even when this implies some opportunity costs. Neorealists argue that neoliberals underestimate the impediments to cooperation because they fail to grasp the full implications of international anarchy. According to neorealism, there are two basic factors which increase the risks of cooperation among states: States have to worry not only that others would cheat but also that their partners will gain more from cooperation than they themselves would. In other words, states care not only about absolute but also about relative gains. From a realist point of view, states are not rational egoists whose utility functions are independent of one another, but "defensive positionalists" who seek to prevent a decline in their relative capabilities. 28 Accordingly, when states are confident about their partners' compliance, they may still forgo gains resulting from cooperation if they expect different gains to shift the relative distribution of capabilities in favor of their partners. Indeed, if a state believed a proposed arrangement would provide all parties absolute gains but would also generate gaps in gains favoring partners, greater certainty that partners would adhere to the terms of the arrangement would

8 8 only accentuate its concerns about relative gains. For such a state, greater certainty about the faithfulness of partners might induce a lower, rather than a higher, willingness to cooperate! 29 This diminishes the value that states attach to the functioning and endurance of international institutions. While neoliberals admit that sometimes states pay more attention to relative gains than to absolute gains, they claim that states do so only when they "expect all others to be hostile and deceptive, and when states' margins of survival are small." 30 States can afford to focus on absolute gains under conditions in which substantial mutual gains can be realized through cooperation and in which governments do not expect others to threaten them with force. Such statements are not false in every case, but they are conditional on the nature of prevailing rules and expectations - that is, on international institutions..." 31 Institutions thus create and maintain the preconditions of their own existence. Neorealists and neoliberals thus agree that there is a causal link between the importance of relative gains considerations and the functioning of international institutions, but they emphasize different aspects of that causal connection. Neorealists focus on relative gains considerations as an independent variable because, for them, such considerations crucially affect the relevance and effectiveness of international institutions. Strong relative gains considerations inhibit cooperation and as a result make institutions irrelevant. 32 Neoliberals place more emphasis on international institutions as an independent variable that determines to what extent relative gains considerations matter. Stable institutions make states worry less about who gains more. 33 Neorealists and neoliberals place different emphasis on the causal relation between international institutions and relative gains considerations because they have different views regarding what determines state interests. For neorealists the relative distribution of national capabilities in the international system largely determines how states conceive of their interests. In anarchy, security is the overriding aim of states. The most important determinant of a state's security is its overall capability in comparison to the capabilities of

9 9 other states. States regard capabilities as the ultimate basis for their security since they are unable to predict the intentions of other states. The relative size of national capabilities is decisive because under anarchy states can only rely on themselves. 34 States thus determine their national interest on the basis of relative capabilities "because for each state its power in relation to other states is ultimately the key to its survival." 35 This importance neorealists attach to the distribution of capabilities has profound implications for their views on international institutions in general and alliances in particular. First, neorealists conceive of alliances as responses to threatening capabilities. It is to a large degree the changes in the distribution of capabilities that determine the fate of alliances. Although realists concede that an alliance between states entails an institutional element - otherwise one should only talk of alignment - they maintain that alliance evolution is primarily affected by common interests resulting from the structure of the international system and specific conflicts. 36 Second, because states ultimately rely on the distribution of capabilities rather than on their ability to predict intentions, they must always guard against a relative decline of their national capabilities: This is likely to hold even in interactions with allies except in the face of clear, immediate threats. This, again, is because the state may believe the possibility always exists that, were friends to become relatively stronger by virtue of their enjoyment of disproportionate gains from joint action, they might use that relatively greater power to seek to restrict its independence or to force it to accept a progressively less favorable set of terms in the joint arrangement. There is even the danger, however remote, that today's ally will become tomorrow's enemy. 37 Third, because states cannot rely on the benevolent intentions of other states they try to "retain a margin of independence even from the closest of allies." 38 Thus states seek to avoid any division of labor even if doing so would increase overall efficiency. Moreover, they are loath to having their national capabilities controlled by other states or by supra-national institutions. 39

10 10 In accounting for the calculation of state interests neoliberals come to different conclusions. They assume that states calculate their interests not only on the basis of the international distribution of capabilities but also with a look to international institutions. According to neoliberal theory, international institutions affect a state's interests in two closely interrelated ways: they alter incentives and they influence expectations of other states' behavior by making it less attractive to cheat and therefore less risky to cooperate. The rules, procedures and information channels of institutions reduce the costs of cooperative behavior and increase the costs of defection. 40 More importantly, each state is aware that its partners' incentives are affected in the same way. Therefore, institutions enhance a state's capacity to predict the behavior of other states. "Insofar as states regularly follow the rules and standards of international institutions, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation, and therefore reinforce expectations of stability." 41 Because of this improved ability to predict other states' intentions, states have to pay less attention to the distribution of capabilities and their changes through unequal gains when they calculate their interests. The neoliberals' view that the interests of states are affected not only by the distribution of capabilities but also by agreed norms, rules, and procedures, provides them with a different perspective on institutions such as alliances. First, unlike neorealists, neoliberals believe that the evolution of alliances is considerably shaped by their institutional characteristics. 42 Second, neoliberals challenge the neorealist argument that states pay much attention to relative gains even if they cooperate in the framework of stable institutions. Thus, neoliberals do not agree that strong international institutions necessarily collapse when gains are unevenly divided. 43 Finally, neoliberals also disagree with the neorealist proposition that states seek to maintain their independence and try to avoid entangling institutions. Instead they argue that states often choose to trade part of their autonomy for the benefit of international cooperation. "Sovereign nations have a rational incentive to develop processes for making joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common aversion. In these contexts, self-interested actors rationally forgo independent decision making and construct regimes." 44 Moreover, when joining an international institution governments sometimes welcome its constraints because they limit the autonomy of a future administration which otherwise might reverse the current administration's foreign policies. 45

11 11 WHY ALLIANCES FORM, HOW THEY EVOLVE AND WHEN THEY BREAK DOWN: COMPETING HYPOTHESES BASED ON NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM Neorealism and the Evolution of Alliances According to neorealism, "[defensive] alliances are a means to security against adversaries." 46 Under conditions of anarchy states have to provide for their own security. Because they cannot count on the protection from a central authority, they have to worry about the capabilities of other states and, therefore, they want to make sure that no other state or grouping of states acquire the power to dominate, conquer, or enslave them. To prevent this from happening states balance against states whose capabilities they perceive as threatening. Hence, balances of power will always be restored if they are, for whatever reason, disrupted. 47 States can balance in two different ways: by mobilizing their own resources (internal balancing) or by ensuring support from other states (external balancing), that is, by allying with one another. 48 The main reason which allows states to expect the support of others, even though all of them operate in a self-help system, is not the commitment entailed by an alliance, but their partners' interest to defend each other against a common adversary. States align with others when they calculate that the protection offered by the other states enhances their own security: "... a decision to defend another state that is under attack may be motivated partly to prevent the attacker from gaining power resources... and partly to keep the victim's resources available to defend oneself..." 49 It is, therefore, the common threat which provides the basic incentive for joining an alliance and for fulfilling one's obligation to defend an ally. Although a formal commitment may enhance mutual confidence, without a common adversary allied states cannot count on each other's support. 50 Hence, "alliances are against, and only derivately for, someone or something." 51 Who threatens whom is determined by the distribution of capabilities, geographic proximity and political conflicts. For structural realists such as Waltz, states decide about their alliance relations chiefly on the basis of relative strength. Weak states are afraid that

12 12 stronger ones might use their superior capability to dominate them, so they try to preserve their security by aligning with other weak states to check the power of stronger ones. When faced with two opposing alliances, states prefer to join the weaker one. 52 Other neorealists, notably Stephen Walt and to a lesser extent Glenn Snyder, analyze how non-structural factors such as threat perception influence alignment patterns. According to them, states prefer to form alliances with distant states, especially when they do not have serious disputes with them. States are less likely to align with neighboring states and those with which they are in conflict; on the contrary, they will tend to balance against those states because they perceive them as threatening. 53 Neorealists, thinking of states as rational actors, assume that states make alliance decisions by comparing the benefits of alignment to its costs, focusing on the effect an alliance has on their security: Security benefits in a mutual defense alliance include chiefly a reduced probability of being attacked (deterrence), greater strength in case of attack (defense) and prevention of the ally's alliance with one's adversary (preclusion). The principal costs are the increased risk of war and reduced freedom of action that are entailed in the commitment to the partner. 54 Thus being allied with another state "generates worries about being dragged into a war over the ally's interests that one does not share." 55 It also constrains a state's independence in formulating its foreign policies and military strategies. The size of these costs and benefits is primarily a function of the distribution of capabilities and the political conflicts between alliance members and their adversary. The net benefit a state gets from an alliance is greatest when it is very weak in comparison to its partners and the adversary, and when all the allies have very hostile relations with the same adversary or the same adversaries. 56 Since the cohesion of an alliance essentially depends on the cost/benefit calculations of its members, it is almost exclusively determined by the factor which crucially affects these calculations: the threat posed by an adversary. The magnitude of the threat is the most important factor for a state calculating the optimal trade-off between the "twin goals of security and independence." 57 The greater the threat, the greater the cohesion of the alliance. 58 For structural realists threats are primarily a function of relative capabilities and,

13 13 therefore, alliances in a multipolar system are less stable than those in a bipolar system: it is less clear who is threatening whom and alliances are less stable because states have more alliance options. 59 Structural realism also argues that the cohesion of an alliance declines when the capabilities of its adversary decline because this shift reduces worries about being dominated by the adversary and increases worries about the enhanced capabilities of one's allies. 60 With different emphasis, other neorealists contend that the cohesion of an alliance depends on its members' threat perceptions which are determined by proximity, the capabilities, and the intentions of other states. Accordingly, irrespective of changes in relative capabilities, the unity of an alliance will decrease if its members feel less threatened by the ambitions of their adversary. 61 Since neorealists attribute only a marginal role to institutions they predict the disintegration of an alliance to begin as soon as the reasons which led to the formation of the alliance no longer operate or when these reasons call for the creation of a new alliance. An alliance will disintegrate if some of its members feel compelled to join a new alliance or if the utility of the existing alliance diminishes to the degree that costs outweigh benefits. Positive incentives to leave an alliance are provided when new threats appear or sudden shifts in the balance of power occur. "[N]ew threats demand new loyalties," 62 that is, they call for the formation of new alliances to balance against them. A dramatic shift in the balance of power will cause states to leave the stronger alliance and join a weaker one. "We do not expect the strong to combine with the strong in order to increase the extent of their power over others, but rather to square off and look for allies who might help them." 63 Neorealists claim that an alliance will start to disintegrate when the threat it was formed to counter diminishes, even when there is no need to join a new alliance. "If two coalitions form and one of them weakens, perhaps because of the political disorder of a member, we expect the other coalition's military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen." 64 The extreme case is the dissolution of a victorious coalition after the defeat of its enemy. 65 Accordings to neorealists a reduction of the threat faced by an alliance leads to its disintegration for two reasons: it affects the trade-off between security and independence and it makes cooperation among allies more difficult. A declining threat diminishes the utility of alliance membership because it reduces the dependence on the protection expected from

14 14 one's partners. Accordingly, a declining threat diminishes also the willingness of members to accept the constraints on their freedom of action which membership entails. States are less inclined to commit themselves to their partners' defense and less prepared to accept their partners' preferences in coordinating foreign policies, military strategies, and force planning. 66 Cooperation among allies becomes more difficult because each of them will start paying more attention to the relative gains entailed. When the common threat recedes, alliance partners will again worry about each other's capabilities and they will be less willing to tolerate shifts in relative capabilities favoring their partners. This means that they will either bargain harder to secure a greater share of the benefits or they will forgo cooperation with their alliance partners. 67 Hence, if a threat posed to an alliance is declining, neorealists expect the alliance to dissolve more quickly the more the alliance affects relative gains considerations of its members and the more it constrains their freedom of action. However, there are two other factors rarely touched upon by neorealists which could also affect the pace of an alliance's disintegration in the face a deminishing threat: the adjustment of defense expenditures, that is, the much debated "peace dividend," and the alignment behavior of third states. Factoring in reductions of defense spending is difficult for neorealists because they lack hypotheses explaining the trade-off between internal and external balancing efforts. Both Waltz and Walt argue that states can balance against threatening capabilities by internal or external balancing. 68 States thus have two options to adapt to a diminishing threat: They can either losen the ties to their alliance partners (what we call "external adaptation"), or they can reduce their defense expenditures ("internal adaptation"). Thus, even though the full implications of these trade-offs are not sufficiently clarified by neorealists, it would still be consistent with the basic assumptions of their theory if an alliance would be able to maintain a relatively high level of cohesion dispite a reduced threat. This may occur if the member states of an alliance cut their defense expenditures so sharply that the weakening of the threat would not substantially reduce their mutual dependence. Still, it follows from neorealist assumptions that in the face of a drastic reduction of the threat, internal adaptation cannot avert but only slow down the disintegration of an alliance because states cherish their autonomy. They will never react only with internal adaptation but always make use of the opportunity to lessen the dependence on

15 15 their allies. Precisely what mix of these two adaptation options a state would favor cannot be predicted by neorealists because it would require an elaborate theory integrating both internal and external state functions. 69 Another factor which could affect the predictions derived from neorealist theory is the alignment of third states. If third states react to the new circumstances by allying with the declining power or alliance, the other coalition's disintegration may be slowed down or halted. If these states ally against the declining power, the opposing coalition should disolve even faster. Here neorealism can offer at least some hints even though these predictions are somewhat ambiguous. According to structural realism, third states are inclined to ally with the declining power in order to prevent its rising opponents from acquiring preponderant power. It is not clear, however, whether these new alignments are necessary, given the disintegration of the stronger alliance. Waltz seems to assume that successful alliances lose their cohesion so rapidly that balancing against them is hardly required. 70 According to Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory, the alignment behavior of third states depends not only on changes in the balance of power but on their overall threat perceptions. Since these perceptions are also influenced by such factors as geographic proximity and threatening intentions, third states may even join the stronger coalition if they are located close to a decaying power perceived to have territorial ambitions or other aggressive intentions. 71 Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Evolution of Alliances NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND ALLIANCES AS A SUBJECT OF STUDY The examination and explanation of the causes and consequences of institutions in international politics is central to neoliberal institutionalism. Military alliances are among the most important institutions shaping international politics, and while research on alliances has traditionally been the domaine of realism and neorealism, neoliberal institutionalists cannot afford to exclude alliances because alliances certainly fit the definition of institutions as "persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations." 72 Indeed, neoliberal institutionalists explicitly state that "alliances are institutions." 73 Inspite of this recognition, however, little empirical research on alliances has been done by neoliberal institutionalists. 74 This is a striking

16 16 shortcoming in the exercise of theory building. Sound theory building requires hard tests to prove the validity of theoretical claims and neoliberal institutionalism has thus far evaded one of the more obvious and crucial tests of the theory. Given neoliberal claims to be superior to neorealism, 75 this is particularly embarassing. Neoliberals realize that they cannot support this claim unless they do substantive scholarly work to overcome these shortcomings. 76 Still, in comparison to hundreds of studies on the traditional topics of neoliberal institutionalism (that is, efforts at institutionalizing "low politics"), little conceptual or empirical research has been published on the relevance of neoliberal theory in explaining the rise and fall of alliances. 77 Given this lack of scholarly attention to alliances, one of the problems we faced was to deduce hypotheses from the core assumptions of neoliberal theory and other relevant theoretical works of neoliberal institutionalists. 78 WHY INSTITUTIONS ARE FOUNDED, WHY THEY PERSIST AND WHY THEY MAY FALL APART Neoliberal institutionalists start with the observation that states have to operate in an increasingly complex world with multiple issues and multiple contacts among societies. In this environment states face ever more limitations to accomplishing essential tasks on their own. Because of the size or nature of many issues, states are often unable to address the underlying causes of these issues without the cooperation of other states. 79 Explaining the formation of international institutions, scholars place different emphasis on different types of institutions and stress different causal variables. Robert Keohane, for example, argues that international regimes are formed because they fulfil particular functions. 80 Others conceive of regimes more broadly and reject an exclusively contractarian perspective. Oran Young argues that "self-generating" or "spontaneous" arrangements qualify as do "imposed" arrangements. 81 Whatever the differences in defining regimes, there is agreement among neoliberals why international institutions are formed. They are formed, first, because they reduce transaction costs in interactions among states and, if institutionalized in a more formal way,

17 17 "provide forums for meetings and secretariats that can act as catalysts for agreement," thereby allowing governments to take advantage of potential economies of scale. In addition, since states interact in a variety of institutional settings and since many of these institutions are interlinked, such "nesting patterns" affect transaction costs by making it easier or more difficult to link particular issues and to arrange side-payments. 82 Uncertainty is another reason why states may want to form or join institutions. Because many situations in international politics are characterized by both conflicts of interests and common interests, neoliberals agree with neorealists that states "have to worry about being deceived and double-crossed." 83 Institutions help to alleviate problems resulting from uncertainty about the intentions of other actors because they help to reduce the range of expected behavior. As a result, governments are in a better position to assess other governments' resources and negotiating positions and to accumulate more accurate knowledge about their future positions, that is, whether and to what extent these other governments can be trusted to keep their commitments. Thus, by reducing asymmetries of information states are in a better position to maximize their long-term gains, thereby offsetting some of the costs they incurred by accepting the constraints associated with membership in an institution. 84 In sum, one of the core argument of neoliberal institutionalists is that "the anticipated effects of the institutions account for the actions of governments that establish them." 85 This is the reason why international institutions are formed. It does not, however, tell us much about the question of how institutions evolve over time or whether and why institutions weaken or dissolve. As its proponents acknowledge, neoliberal institutionalism is not well developed in this regard. 86 In comparison to the multitude of scholarly publications on the origins of international institutions, the number of studies on change in institutions, especially about their weakening and strengthening, is limited. 87 The first challenge, then, is to define institutional strength. We suggest to measure strength by the degree of compliance with institutional principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, particularly when they collide with the pursuit of individual interests of states. 88 From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, an institution may be said to have weakened if member states refuse to comply in any of these four dimensions. For observing that an institution has collapsed, however, it

18 18 is necessary that some of the defining norms and principles (substantive rather than procedural) that characterize the institution weaken or are abandoned. If states merely do not comply with rules and decision-making procedures, an institution may weaken but not collapse. If the underlying principles and norms are no longer followed, however, the basic defining characteristics of the institution are underminded. It is not necessary formally or explicitly to abolish an institution or some of its defining principles and norms for these norms or principles to be weakened or abandoned. As some scholars in the liberal tradition point out, principles and norms need to be reinforced regularly and explicitly to be maintained. Otherwise they will decay and be transformed by changing practices and circumstances. 89 Therefore, the decsisive criterion in determining whether the principles and norms of an institution are maintained is whether all states concerned perceive them to remain effective. What are the factors that determine whether institutions persist, weaken, or strengthen? The most basic neoliberal hypothesis about the endurance of institutions follows logically from the assumption that they are created because states perceive them to be in their interest: "Institutions should persist as long as, but only as long as, their members have incentives to maintain them." 90 This, in turn, is a function of whether the institution is seen to be an effective instrument for the realization of state interests. Institutions may collapse if the calculation of egoistic self-interest leads states to withdraw from the institution. As noted above, there is no fundamental disagreement between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists in this regard. However, neoliberal institutionalists assume that, everything being equal, states have greater incentives to maintain institutions than neorealists would accept. They even maintain that international institutions are "easier to maintain than they are to create" 91 because international institutions are so difficult to construct that, once created, "it may be rational to obey their rules if the alternative is their breakdown, since even an imperfect (institution) may be superior to any politically feasible replacement." 92 Institutions, therefore, tend to be static and resistant to change, often lacking specific rules and procedures that govern change in their substantive provisions. 93 Secondly, neoliberal institutionalists argue that once established, an institution "begins to benefit from the relatively high and symmetrical level of information that it generates, and

19 19 from the ways in which it makes regime-supporting bargains easier to communicate." 94 Institutions, therefore, exhibit "considerable staying power of an inertial nature" and tend to perpetuate themselves. 95 Third, membership in institutions affects the formulation of interests by individual states. 96 Especially in organizations with highly formalized institutionalized structures representatives of different member states interact on a continuous basis. The resulting assessments of the interests of other states will affect the recommendations officials feed into the process of policy formulation by their national government. Therefore, in contrast to issue areas in which states define their interests with little direct contact with other states, these institutionalized structures of communication reduce uncertainty and, by their very existence, alter conceptions of national interests favourable to the perpetuation of the institution. Fourth, governments must fear retaliation if they renege on commitments entered into under the terms of the agreement that led to the creation of an institution. This is especially true when an institution ties states that are highly interdependent across a wide range of issue areas. 97 Because it is unlikely that the interests of all members of an institution in its endurance decline at the same time and with the same intensity, and because governments in most cases interact in different institutional contexts (what Keohane calls "networks of issues" 98 ), governments interested in the persistence of the institution will regard the reneging on commitments on the part of other members as an unfriendly act. Consequently, they will attempt to enforce compliance by trying to change the minds of those considering leaving or by threatening retaliation if they did so. Retaliation may be specific and authorized under the agreed upon terms of the institution or it may be more general and diffuse in the sense that a government would retaliate in other issue areas. Even if a government perceived leaving an institution in its interest, the likelihood that other governments might retaliate may lead that government "to eschew its myopic self-interest." Therefore, "for a government rationally to break the rules of a regime, the net benefits of doing so must outweigh the net costs of the effects on its action on other international regimes." 99

20 20 Fifth, even in the absence of a threat of retaliation, governments may still have incentives to comply with the rules and principles of an institution if they are concerned about precedent or believe that their reputation may suffer if they do not comply. 100 "As long as a continuing series of issues is expected to arise in the future, and as long as actors monitor each other's behavior and discount the value of agreements on the basis of past compliance, having a good reputation is valuable even to the egoist." 101 The desire to maintain good reputations, therefore, might deter governments from leaving institutions. In sum, because international institutions affect the order and intensity of actor preferences as the norms underlying the institution are internalized, 102 institutions develop a self-perpetuating dynamic that helps to sustain the institution even if the causes that led to the creation of the institution no longer apply. Therefore, international institutions "tend to evolve rather than to die." 103 Neoliberals grant that there may be special instances when institutions may collapse. In particular, they point to "fundamental structural changes" in the respective issue area 104 or "dramatic breaks arising from the transformation of existing institutional arrangements" 105 which may cause institutions to weaken or collapse. Yet, as these quotations from neoliberal works show, such statements lack specifity and are impossible to subject to rigorous testing. The lack of testable hypotheses about the decline and collapse of institutions is a major deficiency of neoliberal institutionalism. This is evident with regard to alliances because we know from the historical record that alliances have normally been dissolved once the original threat had faded. What is required is an effort to reexamine the basic concepts underlying neoliberal theory regarding the question whether they are sufficiently differentiated. It can be argued that alliances are institutions with characteristics different from institutions in the area of "low politics." Perceived military threats which for realists and neorealists are the primary causal factor in the formation, persistence, and decline of alliances are powerful but volatile explanatory factors. It is not plausible to argue - as neoliberals implicitly do - that the causes of regime formation, persistence and decline in the field of political economy or environmental protection are functionally equivalent to the causal power of perceived military threats regarding the formation, persistence and decline of alliances. 106

21 21 As some neoliberal institutionalists have pointed out in other contexts, there are differences in institutional characteristics that should to be taken into account. In some of his earliest writings on international regimes Robert Keohane distinguished between "control-oriented regimes" and "insurance regimes." The main characteristic of the former is controlling and regularizing patterns of behavior internally among the members of the regime (GATT, Bretton Woods). An insurance regime, in contrast, seeks to regularize behavior not only among the members of the regime but also, and mainly, between them and outsiders. For an insurance regime to be formed member states would have to conclude that they cannot control their external environment effectively. 107 Introducing this internal-external distinction does not tell us what different causal patterns may be involved in the formation, persistence, and decline of alliances from a neoliberal perspective but it provides a starting point for further research. In doing so, neoliberal institutionalism may benefit from and refine neorealist theory by building on some of the insights in neorealist alliance theory and by applying it more broadly to "low politics" issues. THE FUTURE OF NATO: BREAK-DOWN OR TRANSFORMATION? In the preceding analysis we have developed general neorealist and neoliberal hypotheses about the rise and demise of institutions. We will now apply these hypotheses to the future of NATO. Where do neorealism's and neoliberal institutionalism's predictions concur and where do they differ in a way that enables us to use the future of NATO as a test case to compare the explanatory and predictive power of the two theoretical perspectives? First, we shall turn to neorealism. Why NATO Is Likely to Break up or Gradually Dissolve: Neorealism's Case When making predictions about the future of NATO, neorealists must consider not only the end of the Soviet threat but should also pay attention to the alignment behavior of third states and the reductions of Western defense expenditures because the latter factors could mitigate the impact of the Soviet empire's disintegration. For the foreseeable future, neither of these two variables will strengthen the cohesion of NATO. Barring a dramatic reversal in

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