Australia and regional order in the South Pacific and beyond

Transcription

1 Australia and regional order in the South Pacific and beyond Derek McDougall Mailing address: School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Vic. 3010, Australia. A paper prepared for the Panel on Regional Powers and Order within Regional Systems, Whatever Happened to North-South?, IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference hosted by the Brazilian Political Science Association (Associação Brasileira de Ciência Politíca) at the University of São Paulo (Universidade de São Paulo), February Draft only. Please do not cite without permission.

2 The focus of this paper is the role played by Australia in the international politics of the South Pacific region. It aims to clarify the aims and motivation for Australian involvement, the strategies pursued and the impact that Australia has had. Australia in this context refers to the Australian state acting through the Australian government, and with particular reference to the post-cold War era. It is hoped that the discussion will help to illuminate some of the general issues that have arisen in recent discussions of the role of regional powers, 1 but the paper can also be read simply as a review of key aspects of Australian involvement in the South Pacific. The paper argues that Australia has indeed seen itself as playing a leading role in the South Pacific. Concerns about Australian security broadly defined have been a major motivation for Australian policy in this region, coupled with a perception that Australia has an international responsibility to ensure stability. Australia has used various political means to further its objectives, making particular use of economic resources. Australian strategies have both bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Limitations on Australian influence arise not just because of the role played by Pacific island states, but also because Australia shares the stage with other powers such as New Zealand (at the regional level) and extra-regional powers (for example, France, the United States, Japan, the European Union, China and Taiwan) and international political organizations extending beyond the region (most notably the United Nations and the Commonwealth). Nevertheless among both regional and extra-regional states and organizations involved in the South Pacific Australia has more influence than any other single actor. In assessing Australia s role in the South Pacific it is important as well to point out that Australia also sees itself as having a regional role in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific more broadly: Australia might be the single most important power in the South Pacific but having an influence in the broader region is a far greater priority among Australia s international goals. Australia s regional goals in turn relate to the global goals it believes to be important. In developing this argument the paper will firstly review some salient points from the discussion of the role of regional powers more generally. Then we will give attention to the factors affecting Australia s approach to its role as a regional power in the South Pacific. Next we will give attention to the strategies pursued by Australia in relation to three key aspects of regional involvement: bilateral relations, multilateralism and the role of other powers and global organizations. This in turn provides a basis for assessing Australia s regional impact. There is also some attention given to Australia s broader regional involvement (East Asia and the Asia- Pacific) and its global role as a way of putting the South Pacific dimension into context. 1 For example, Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010); Regional powers in a changing global order, special section in Review of International Studies, vol. 36 no. 4 (October 2010), pp ; Miriam Prys, Hegemony, Domination, Detachment: Differences in Regional Powerhood, International Studies Review, vol. 12 no. 4 (December 2010), pp

3 Background: The role of regional powers Preliminary points that have arisen in the discussion of the role of regional powers and that are helpful for the purposes of this paper include such matters as the way in which regional powers are defined and the strategies they pursue. While much of the recent discussion focuses on emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa in their regional context, Australia has received some mention but not a lot of analysis. 2 As far as the matter of definition is concerned, Detlef Nolte highlights three points seen as essential for a state to have status of regional power : a self conception that emphasises the role of regional leader; the material and ideological resources for regional power projection; and great influence in regional affairs. 3 Australia certainly meets the first two criteria in relation to its involvement in the South Pacific, and could be judged to have significant influence in the region. Miriam Prys goes further in her discussion by suggesting three types of regional powers: regional detached powers, regional hegemons and regional dominators. 4 Key points in defining each type include self perception, regional perceptions (acceptance or not), the way in which power is exercised, and the kinds of goods (public or private) provided or not provided to the region. Australia in relation to the South Pacific would conform most closely to the regional hegemon type, although some qualification would be desirable as the subsequent discussion will indicate. In terms of definition it is important to keep in mind that regions are not natural but are political constructs. Regions achieve some substance by being accepted and used within presumed regions. In the South Pacific context the establishment of the South Pacific Commission in 1947 and then the South Pacific Forum in 1971 were significant developments in strengthening the dominant regional construct. A term such as Pacific islands region is broader than South Pacific and underpins the renaming of the South Pacific Forum as the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000 (thus recognizing the extension of the Forum into the Central Pacific). The Central Pacific is roughly coterminous with Micronesia; the South Pacific can be subdivided into Polynesia and Melanesia (roughly coterminous with the Southwest Pacific). The term power also merits some comment. At a broader international level a distinction is sometimes drawn between great or major powers, middle powers and small powers. A power could have one status at a global level but another status at a regional level (and also the same status in both contexts as another possibility). The different levels refer primarily to the ability and willingness of a state to use its various power resources to project and achieve influence. In the global and Asia- 2 For example, Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte refer to a differentiation between traditional middle powers for example Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries which, to some extent, are losing influence, and new emerging regional powers or emerging middle powers for example, South Africa, India and Brazil (Daniel Flemes and Detlef Nolte, Introduction, in Flemes, Regional Leadership in the Global System, p. 5. Emphasis added.). Miriam Prys refers to Australia being called to its responsibilities for bringing order and stability to some of the failed states of the South Pacific (Prys, Differences in Regional Powerhood, p. 480). 3 Detlef Nolte, How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics, Review of International Studies,vol. 36 no. 4 (October 2010), p Summarized in Table 2, Prys, Differences in Regional Powerhood, p

4 Pacific context Australia is often referred to as a middle power; 5 however in the South Pacific Australia, as we will see, can claim to be and is widely recognized as a major power and perhaps as the major power. On the matter of strategies, Sandra Destradi s discussion is helpful for understanding Australia s role in the South Pacific. 6 Destradi postulates three ideal types of empire, hegemony and leadership, with hegemony divided into hard, intermediate and soft versions, and leadership being either leader-initiated or follower-initiated. 7 Australian strategy in the South Pacific combines elements of leader-initiated leadership, and intermediate and soft versions of hegemony. Leader-initiated leadership involves the (p)ursuit of common goals through a socialisation process initiated by the leader. Soft hegemony emphasises the realisation of the hegemon s goals through normative persuasion and socialisation ; intermediate hegemony involves the realisation of the hegemon s goals through the provision of material benefits. These points can be elaborated in the subsequent discussion of Australia s strategies in the South Pacific, but first we will give some attention to the factors affecting Australia s approach in the region. Factors affecting Australia s approach in the South Pacific Australian involvement in the South Pacific has been motivated primarily by an assumption that this region is important for Australian security broadly defined. While in the past there was a perception at times that the South Pacific could provide bases for powers that might be hostile to Australia, in more recent times the concern has been that political instability will result in situations that could be detrimental to Australian interests. This could involve the emergence of governments with close relations to states ideologically and politically hostile to Australia, or Australia might be called upon to respond to situations involving economic collapse, humanitarian emergencies or breakdowns in law and order (including the possibility of organized crime gaining a foothold). The perceptions that are central to the Australian approach are mainly important at the elite level but would have broad popular support. Australia s material interests in the South Pacific are limited, but this is not to deny that there are some important Australian companies operating in the region. Papua New Guinea is Australia s most significant trading partner among the Pacific island countries, accounting for 1.0 per cent of Australia s exports and 1.4 per cent of imports in (16 th ranking in both instances). 8 Australian companies have long 5 See, for example, Carl Ungerer, The Middle Power Concept in Australian Foreign Policy, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 53 no. 4 (2007), pp ; John Ravenhill, Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraints and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 52 no. 3 (1998), pp ; Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press; Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1993). 6 Sandra Destradi, Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership, Review of International Studies, vol. 36 no. 4 (October 2010), pp Summarized in a table, ibid., pp Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Papua New Guinea Fact Sheet, (accessed, 17 January 2011). It should be noted that Australia was the principal export destination and principal source of imports for Papua New Guinea according to 2008 figures (28.0 per cent of exports; 43.1 per cent of imports, 2008). For Fiji, Australia was the second most important export destination (15.9 per cent of exports) and second most important source of imports (22.1 per cent of imports) in 2009, Singapore being first in both instances (Australia, 4

5 been active in exploiting mineral resources in Papua New Guinea, with notable companies in the past being Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia (CRA, now part of the consolidated Rio Tinto Group) and Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP, now BHP Billiton), with copper mining at Bougainville and Ok Tedi respectively; more recently Australian companies such as Santos (oil and gas), Oil Search Limited and Highlands Pacific (gold, copper, nickel, cobalt) have been involved in the resources sector. 9 In the case of Fiji Australia is the major source of foreign investment. Historically Burns Philp was a prominent trading company in Fiji and other parts of the Pacific; CSR Limited (originally the Colonial Sugar Refining Company) dominated sugar milling in Fiji before People-to-people involvement can have some bearing on Australian policy in the region, the links Australian churches have with various regional churches being a good example; however, in general, this involvement is not a major factor affecting Australian policy. Historically the Australian colonies placed pressure on the British government to play a more active role in the South Pacific. A good example was the pressure exerted by Queensland in for Britain to acquire Papua (southeastern New Guinea) as a means of forestalling German designs. Apart from Germany there were also concerns about the involvement of France in the region (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, New Hebrides). The same approach continued after the federation of the self-governing British colonies as the Commonwealth of Australia in In 1914 Australia took action to occupy German New Guinea on behalf of the British Empire. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference Prime Minister Billy Hughes resisted any Japanese expansion south of the Equator and ensured that Australia took control of German New Guinea (albeit as a League of Nations mandate). Concerns about Japan continued during the interwar period and of course came to a head in the Pacific war, with Japanese forces occupying large parts of New Guinea and adjoining territories such as Solomon Islands. During the Cold War there was some focus on limiting the involvement of Communist powers, most notably the Soviet Union and China, in this region; Libya was also a concern at one stage in the mid-1980s in relation to its links in Vanuatu and New Caledonia. 10 However there was a shift in Australian perceptions with decolonization, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s, and the emergence of independent Pacific island states. This shift was accentuated during the post-cold War era. The main external power of concern from about the 1970s was France, not so much as a threat to Australia itself but because the policies it pursued in its territories (particularly New Caledonia) were seen as destabilizing for the region; there was also region-wide opposition to French nuclear testing at Mururoa atoll in French Polynesia. In focusing on the issues facing the independent island states Australia s concern was that these issues be managed successfully so that Australia s own integrity would be protected and the island states would not become a major burden. Department of Foreign Affairs, Fiji Fact Sheet, (accessed, 17 January 2011)). 9 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Papua New Guinea country brief, (accessed, 17 January 2011). 10 See Greg Fry, Australia and the South Pacific, in P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel (eds), Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs, (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp

6 Focusing on the post-cold War era Australian governments have been concerned to ensure that the independent Pacific island states have viable economies and can manage the state-society tensions that exist throughout the region. Most Pacific island countries are dependent on high levels of foreign aid; this dependence has been accentuated by the fact that the number of public employees is high relative to the size of the populations. From the early 1990s Australian policy has promoted economic rationalist methods to encourage island countries to live more within their own means (or at least to reduce the extent of their dependence on aid). 11 Australia has been actively involved in situations where internal conflicts affect the stability of island states. Major concerns in this respect have been the Bougainville secessionist conflict in Papua New Guinea (most intense between 1989 and 1997), the tensions between Malaitans and Guadalcanalese on the island of Guadalcanal in Solomon Islands culminating in the attempted coup of 2000 and the subsequent undermining of law and order, and the various coups in Fiji relating to tensions between Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians (and within this group also) (two coups in 1987, attempted coup in 2000, coup in 2006). Relations with other significant powers, regional and extra-regional, have affected Australian perceptions of the role Australia should play in the South Pacific. The most significant regional power in this respect is New Zealand. Australia and New Zealand have generally cooperated in relation to their policies in this region, with Australia generally taking the lead in Melanesia (Southwest Pacific) and New Zealand likewise in Polynesia (Southeast Pacific); however this division of responsibilities does not exclude either power from the other s sphere. It should be noted that New Zealand is more exclusively focused on the South Pacific than is the case with Australia. In relation to the major English-speaking powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, Australia and New Zealand together have essentially assumed the former British role, and are also expected by the US to play the leading role in this region. 12 The US is more active in relation to the Central Pacific (Micronesia) but also controls American Samoa; the US state of Hawaii is part of Polynesia. Australian relations with France, as previously mentioned, have been difficult in the past. France remains active in the region but mainly in relation to New Caledonia and French Polynesia; Australia respects the French role in those territories while also being alert to any signs of instability. 11 See Greg Fry, Australia and the South Pacific: The Rationalist Ascendancy, in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), Seeking Asian Engagement: Australia in World Affairs, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1997), chapter In relation to Papua New Guinea, a 1991 Australian parliamentary report observes that in the final analysis the United States sees Papua New Guinea as Australia s responsibility. The report cites evidence by Professor Ross Garnaut of the Australian National University that The US State Department sees this as our part of the world; if there is a mess in Papua New Guinea, Australia is not pulling its weight (Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia s Relations with Papua New Guinea, December 1991, p. 223). Although not strictly speaking in the South Pacific a similar point was made in relation to the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in September 1999 when then prime minister John Howard supposedly referred to Australia as deputy sheriff in relation to the US; Howard had accepted the term deputy in the course of an interview but did not subsequently reject the deputy sheriff term (Fred Brenchley, The Howard Defence Doctrine, Bulletin (Sydney), 28 September 1999, pp US Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly said in 2002 that he saw Australia as a sheriff in its own right rather than simply as a deputy sheriff (cited in Roy Eccleston, It s time for steel, not retreat, The Australian, 21 October 2002). 6

7 While Australia sees itself as the leading regional power in the South Pacific, this role is only part of Australia s regional context. Australian governments have assumed this role on the basis of the perceptions that have been indicated, while also being well aware that the South Pacific is of minor significance in international politics more broadly and indeed for Australian policy. Relatively speaking Australia puts far more emphasis on the role it plays in relation to East Asia and the wider Asia- Pacific. However in this broader context Australia is nevertheless of far less significance than it is in the South Pacific. Australian leaders sometimes portray the South Pacific as a burdensome responsibility that they discharge but would prefer not to have. Although this did not necessarily represent then prime minister Paul Keating s attitude, prominent conservative columnist Greg Sheridan once wrote that Australian prime ministers should not waste their time sitting in long houses on tiny Pacific atolls talking about tuna fish [thus] elevating a tenth order issue to the first order. 13 Further discussion about the significance of the South Pacific in relation to Australia s wider regional and global role will be presented subsequently. Australian strategies in the South Pacific If Australia s role in the South Pacific has been influenced primarily by the perceptions prevailing within Australian governments, what strategies or means have been used to further Australian objectives in the region? Here we will focus on the various bilateral and multilateral strategies that have been pursued, while also giving attention to the relevance of Australian relations with other powers involved in the region as a factor affecting Australian policy. These three dimensions have complemented each other in enabling Australia to play the role of the region s leading power and possibly regional hegemon. Australian governments have used primarily political-diplomatic means in pursuing their regional objectives, with the provision of development assistance and other forms of financial aid being important tools for strengthening Australian policy. Given the emphasis in Australian policy on maintaining security broadly defined it is also relevant that in some circumstances Australia has been prepared to deploy military and police resources to deal with crises. Since the culmination of decolonization in the South Pacific in the 1970s Australia has maintained diplomatic missions in virtually all the independent island states. 14 These missions have been important in enabling Australia to exert diplomatic influence in relation to the island states, as well as in the administration of Australian development assistance. Of course these missions have varied in scope and size. Australia s single most important relationship is with Papua New Guinea, an Australian territory before it became independent in Papua New Guinea is the single most important recipient of Australian foreign aid, accounting for A$415m. in 13 Quoted, Rowan Callick, Australia s Noisome Neighbours: Never Pacific, Never Paradise, Never Ours, The Sydney Papers, Spring 2000, p Australia has diplomatic missions in all of the independent South Pacific island states except Tuvalu, viz. Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu. Since all of these states are Commonwealth members the missions are known as high commissions. On the origins of Australia s expanded diplomatic network in the South Pacific, see R.A. Herr, Australia and the South- West Pacific, in P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel (eds), Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp

8 country program aid or A$457.2 m. in all forms of aid in the Australian budget (11.5 per cent and 12.6 per cent respectively of all Australian aid); in terms of country program aid Papua New Guinea took 15.6 per cent of the total in , and 45.9 per cent of the aid allocated to the Pacific island countries. 15 After independence a significant proportion of Papua New Guinea s budget came from Australia, although there has been a shift towards project aid in recent years. Concerns about Papua New Guinea s stability manifested themselves in the support given to Papua New Guinea during the Bougainville crisis from 1989 to 1997, and then the subsequent involvement in peace monitoring in Bougainville until More recently there have been attempts to strengthen Papua New Guinea through additional assistance in relation to policing and financial administration (known as the Enhanced Cooperation Program (from 2003), and then as the Strongim Gavman Program from 2008). 16 Apart from Papua New Guinea, Australia s main specific concerns have been Solomon Islands and Fiji. Concerns about instability in Solomon Islands after the attempted coup there in 2000, culminated in the Australian-led intervention known as RAMSI (Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands) in mid While initially the force involved (over 2000 personnel, mostly from Australia) had a large military component, RAMSI was essentially a policing operation designed to restore law and order and tackle issues of corruption and mal-administration. In the case of Fiji s various coups Australian pressure to restore democracy has come through political-diplomatic means, together with the imposition of selective economic sanctions. This pressure has generally been of limited effectiveness in getting Fiji to change direction. 17 Australia s major area of concern in the region has been the Melanesian states of the Southwest Pacific (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, with Fiji furthest east on the edge of Polynesia). Nevertheless Australia has maintained a diplomatic and aid presence throughout the entire region, extending also to the Micronesian states of the Central Pacific (Nauru being a particular concern as a former Australian-administered territory). The Melanesian states are the most populous in the region as well as being closest to Australia. With development assistance being an important tool in the pursuit of Australian objectives it is of interest to note the most recent figures on Australian aid to the region. 15 See Budget International Development Assistance A Good International Citizen, Statement by the Honourable Stephen Smith MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Honourable Bob McMullan MP, Parliamentary Secretary for International Development Assistance, 11 May 2010, Table 3 (p. 35), Table 15 (p. 66), Table 16 (p. 67) (accessed 18 January 2011). 16 For a critique of the Enhanced Cooperation Program, see Allan Patience, The ECP and Australia s Middle Power Ambitions, Discussion Paper 2004/5, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, (accessed 18 January 2011). 17 See Richard Herr, Time for a fresh approach: Australia and Fiji relations post-abrogation, Special Report, Issue 27, January 2010, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra. 8

9 Australian Budget estimates for AusAID country programs, Papua New Guinea and Pacific, (A$m.) 18 Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Vanuatu 49.3 Fiji 18.0 Tonga 17.0 Samoa 26.4 Kiribati 16.9 Tuvalu 6.1 Nauru 17.4 Micronesia 4.2 Cook Islands 2.2 Niue and Tokelau 2.2 Pacific Regional Total Papua New Guinea and Pacific AusAID Country Programs 2,654.9 AusAID Global Programs Under the post-2007 Labor government in Australia there has been some emphasis on concluding Pacific partnership agreements as the basis for allocating Australian aid. The general intention is to set objectives in relation to aid and to provide a means for monitoring progress towards those objectives. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals provide a framework within which more specific goals and means can be formulated. 19 While Australia works closely on a bilateral basis with the various states of the region, it also places some emphasis on the multilateral dimension as a means of advancing its objectives. Australia was a foundation member of the South Pacific Commission in 1947, originally consisting of the various colonial powers of the region. 20 At a political level the major focus since 1971 has been the South Pacific Forum (Pacific Islands Forum since 2000). Among regional organizations in the Third World the Forum was unusual in having two developed countries as members (Australia and New Zealand), and indeed founding members. This arrangement has put Australia and New Zealand in a strong position to exert influence at a regional level. Australia s leading role is generally accepted by regional countries but not necessarily as a matter of course. The influence of the two Antipodean powers is of course enhanced by the fact that they provide most of the finance needed for the Forum. 18 Budget International Development Assistance, Table 15 (p. 66), Table 16 (p. 67). 19 AusAID s assessment of progress towards these goals makes pessimistic reading. See AusAID, Tracking development and governance in the Pacific, August 2009, (accessed 18 January 2011). 20 Apart from Australia, the founding members of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) were France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The SPC is now known as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and involves some 22 island states and territories as well as the founding members (apart from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom); its focus is nonpolitical and technical. 9

10 Through the Forum Australia (and New Zealand) were able to take the lead in the campaign against French nuclear testing from the 1970s to the 1990s. At the same time Australia was able to influence the island states to pursue their objectives in more moderate ways than might have been the case if they were left to their own devices. The establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone under the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985 was done in such a way as to minimize any problems for the US. 21 Australia has deflected criticism within the Forum from states such as Vanuatu of Indonesian policy in West Papua. More broadly Australia has tried to use the Forum to win support for its preferred norms in relation to development assistance (the formulation of the Pacific Plan through the Forum being a good example). Australia took the lead in winning support for the Biketawa Declaration at the Forum meeting in This declaration gave the Forum a role in dealing with situations of political instability that might have region-wide implications. From an Australian perspective this shift in the role of the Forum was useful in legitimizing the goals and means favoured by Australia in relation to such situations as the Solomon Islands in 2003 (through RAMSI) and Fiji after the coup in While the focus at a regional level in dealing with these situations has been the Forum, Australia (and New Zealand) have attempted also to make use of the Commonwealth as a means of dealing with some of these situations. All of the independent states in the South Pacific are members of the Commonwealth, although this is not the case with the former US territories in the Central Pacific. Apart from development assistance the island countries have become more closely linked with Australia (and New Zealand) through major economic agreements. Under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) of 1980 most Forum members obtained duty free access to the markets of the two Antipodean countries for most of their products. With both Australia and New Zealand following neoliberal economic policies and reducing tariffs, the value of SPARTECA to the island countries became less over time. In 2001 the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), involving Australia, New Zealand and the island countries, provided for closer integration in relation to a range of economic activities. The PACER Plus negotiations, launched in 2009, are likely to lead to even further economic integration. Another aspect of the regional situation that is relevant to Australian strategies is the relationship Australia has with other powers involved in the region. Australia, as indicated previously, generally works on a cooperative basis with New Zealand. Australia normally takes the lead in relation to Melanesia, and New Zealand in relation to Polynesia. However New Zealand was able to take a more active peacemaking role with the Bougainville conflict because the relevant Bougainvilleans saw New Zealand as more disinterested as between Papua New Guinea and Bougainville than was the case with Australia (seen as having supported the Papua New Guinea government). In relation to the Tongan riots of 2006 both Antipodean powers provided limited military and police support but New Zealand played the senior role. With the Solomons issue Australia has taken the lead but New Zealand has been very supportive. The two countries have worked together in relation to Fiji. 21 See Michael Hamel-Green, The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone: A Critical Assessment (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1990). 10

11 This includes exerting diplomatic pressure on Fiji, as well as coordinating their approach in the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth. New Zealand would no doubt baulk at Australia being described as a regional hegemon. Cooperative hegemony would perhaps be a better term, but both Antipodean countries would regard their regional involvement as being based on a broader cooperative regionalism. New Zealand s stronger self-identification as a South Pacific country (about 20 per cent Polynesian overall, with about 15 per cent being Maori) can be an asset for both Antipodean countries in advancing their joint and largely overlapping regional objectives. Among the external powers cooperation and support in relation to both Britain and the US can be important in advancing Australian objectives. As previously mentioned the United Kingdom has had a relatively minor role in the region in recent years; however its diplomatic support, including within the Commonwealth, can be helpful. The US has specific concerns in relation to American Samoa and the Central Pacific, but has a diplomatic presence in some South Pacific countries (Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Samoa (ambassador resident in New Zealand)). It generally cooperates and defers to Australia on South Pacific matters while also focusing on issues in the region that might have some global relevance (for example involvement in the region of possible rivals such as China). Among the Western powers in the region France would be least sympathetic to any Australian pretensions to play the role of regional hegemon. France is mainly concerned with its own territories in the region (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna), as well as with Vanuatu (the former British-French condominium of New Hebrides). However France also sees itself as having a broader strategic role in the Pacific, contributing in turn to France s perception of its world role. Cooperation with Australia would be on the basis of perceived mutual interests, rather than deferring to Australia as a regional leader. Australia in turn is concerned that France not limit Australia s own role and the functioning of the Forum. Australia was not keen on suggestions that France become involved in the Solomons intervention in France and Britain together would be the European powers that have the greatest interest in the involvement of the European Union in this region, mainly through development assistance but extending to broader economic partnerships with island countries through the Cotonou agreement of This involvement could be seen as enhancing Australia s development objectives in the region, but of course having multiple donors also means a reduction in the influence of any one donor. The same point applies in relation to the involvement of various Asian powers such as Japan, China and Taiwan. Japan provides development assistance and has a low diplomatic profile in the region; there is generally a cooperative relationship with Australia in relation to regional matters. The involvement of China and Taiwan has been part of their ongoing conflict. In pursuing issues of diplomatic recognition China and Taiwan bring additional aid (and sometimes corruption) to the region; their involvement is a complicating factor for Australia s role rather than being a major obstacle. China s positive diplomacy towards the post-2006 military regime in Fiji has weakened Australia s efforts to achieve a democratic solution in that country. 22 See Stabilising the Solomon Islands, Strategic Comments, vol. 9, issue 5 (2003). 11

12 In relation to international organizations the Commonwealth sometimes has a diplomatic and political role in the South Pacific, and also plays a small aid role; its activities generally complement those of Australia and can enhance Australian objectives (the Commonwealth s Fiji diplomacy is a good example). The political involvement of the United Nations is minimal (it did play a small role in relation to the implementation of the Bougainville peace agreement, and the UN Secretary- General offered support to RAMSI in 2003). The UN is probably more significant as a vehicle for development assistance through bodies such as the UN Development Programme and the World Bank. 23 As with the Commonwealth, UN involvement essentially complements Australia s role rather than undermining it. Australia s impact in the South Pacific Australia has been relatively successful in achieving its major objective of maintaining security broadly defined in the South Pacific. However there are clearly many situations that pose a continuing challenge to that objective. Australia s material resources in conjunction with the policies that have been followed have put it in a strong position to achieve the status of regional leader. Its position in this respect has been facilitated by the way in which the island states have accepted, although not uncritically, Australian leadership. Australia s leading role has also been reinforced by its cooperative relationship with New Zealand and the relationships it has had with most of the external powers and international organizations involved in the region. Australia s material resources clearly give it a strong base to exert an influence in the adjoining region. The following table provides a comparison between Australia and the independent island states of the South Pacific. The independent South Pacific island states have an overall population of just over eight million. Papua New Guinea is the most populous (with about three quarters of the total), followed by Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Samoa, Tonga and Kiribati; Tuvalu and Nauru are both microstates. Population (July 2010 estimate) Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(purchasing power parity, 2010 estimate), US$ Per capita GDP (purchasing power parity, 2010 estimate), US$ Military spending as percentage of GDP (2009 estimate) Australia 21,515, bn 41,300 3 New Zealand 4,252, bn 28,000 1 (2005 estimate) Fiji 875, bn 4, Kiribati 99, m. 6,200 - Nauru 9, m. (2005 $5000 ( estimate) estimate) Papua New Guinea 6,064, bn 2, (2005 estimate) Samoa 192, bn 5, See the sections on the South Pacific in Roderic Alley, The United Nations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1998). 12

13 Solomon 559, bn 2,800 - Islands Tonga 122, m. 6, (2006 estimate) Tuvalu 10, m. (2002 1,600 ( estimate) estimate) Vanuatu 221, bn 5,500 - Source: United States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, (accessed 19 January 2011). Among the independent South Pacific island states only Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga have regular military forces. In projecting itself in the South Pacific, Australia s material resources are insufficient in themselves. There also has to be motivation and political will. It has been demonstrated that Australia does have important objectives in the region and Australian governments have had sufficient will to pursue those objectives as a high priority. Nevertheless the degree of motivation can vary depending on the government. It should also be noted that while objectives relating to the South Pacific are important, they are not the highest priority among Australia s international objectives; this point will be developed in the next section. Australia s impact in the South Pacific is also facilitated by the willingness of the island states to accept Australian leadership. This does not mean that island governments accept Australian policies uncritically. Island governments need to be persuaded. However the financial and political resources that Australia can provide frequently give its government very strong bargaining power. Nevertheless Pacific island countries can be selective in terms of what they are prepared to implement in practice. Sometimes there can be tensions between Australia and particular Pacific island governments, as with the Sogavare government in Solomon Islands between May 2006 and December 2007 (critical of RAMSI), and also in relation to the post military regime in Fiji. While Australia pursues its objectives through bilateral means, its domination of the multilateral context in the South Pacific gives it another tool to assist in persuading Pacific island countries that might otherwise be reluctant. One regional grouping that does not include Australia is the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). 24 This grouping perhaps reflects most truly a Melanesian perspective but lacking resources and subject to political division, it is relatively weak; on occasions it might be an impediment to Australian objectives, but not in a major way. If other major actors opposed Australian involvement in the South Pacific in any significant way, then this would have a negative impact on Australia s leadership role. However, as we have seen, Australia does not face major obstacles in this respect; for the most part the role of other actors supports and complements the role played by Australia. Australia has a cooperative relationship with New Zealand in relation to the South Pacific, as with many other matters. The US and Britain defer to and expect Australia to play the leading role in the region. The activities of the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the European Union complement Australian involvement. There are no major tensions with Japan in relation to the South Pacific. 24 The members are Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, as well as the FLNKS, the main Melanesian party in New Caledonia. 13

14 France is a possible constraint on the Australian role but, with the end of the nuclear testing issue, its involvement is very much focused on its own territories. Similarly China and Taiwan have sought to expand their influence in the region in ways that sometimes limit Australia s role (China s recent involvement with Fiji being a case in point); however it would be difficult to characterize this situation as imposing major constraints on Australia. Overall then Australia is in a strong position in relation to the South Pacific. Australia can certainly be characterized as the regional leader. Given the large element of cooperation underpinning the Australian role, the use of the term regional hegemon might be too strong. Hegemon implies a degree of domination that might be misleading in this situation. Australia plays the leading role and is in a position to persuade other actors to follow its preferred policies; however its approach is noncoercive. Comparison of Australia s South Pacific role with Australia s wider regional and global roles Having discussed the major features of Australia s role as the regional leader in the South Pacific, it is important to point out that this is only one of the regional roles (and not necessarily the most important of such roles) to which Australia aspires. Irrespective of Australia s status as the regional leader in the South Pacific, Australia s position in relation to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific more broadly is of far greater importance. In this context Australia obviously cannot aspire to be the leading regional power, let alone the regional hegemon. However Australia can and does see itself as capable of exerting a significant influence within the region, and thus aspires to be a significant Asia-Pacific regional power. Australia in this context could be seen as acting as a middle power. The wider regional role in turn complements the global role that Australia aspires to: pursuing important security and economic objectives both as an Asia-Pacific power and as a significant liberal democracy on the world stage. From both perspectives the security and broader political relationship with the US is important, but Australia also acts independently. Taking all these dimensions into account Australia s South Pacific role is an important feature of Australia s international involvement, but is by no means the highest priority. East Asia (defined here to encompass both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia) is important to Australia for both economic and security reasons. The Asia-Pacific definition of the region is generally preferred by Australia (and the US) because it legitimizes Australian and US involvement in East Asian affairs; increasingly the Asia-Pacific definition has been extended eastwards to include India, another country of increasing significance to Australia. As far as East Asia more narrowly defined is concerned, normally some 40 percent of Australian exports go to Northeast Asia and about 15 per cent to Southeast Asia. From the late 1960s Japan replaced the United Kingdom as the most important single recipient of Australian exports, but more recently China has assumed first place; South Korea is also important. Coal and iron ore dominate Australian exports to Northeast Asia; these exports have become a mainstay of the Australian economy and helped limit the impact of the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis on Australia. From a security perspective Australia has been concerned to ensure that rivalries among the major powers in the region do not have a destabilizing impact, that hot spots such as Korea and Taiwan are successfully 14

15 managed, and that the various state-society tensions in Southeast Asia do not lead to major conflict. Instability in relation to any of these matters would have an adverse political impact on Australia, while also jeopardizing its economic links with the region. In pursuit of its objectives in the region Australia has maintained an active diplomatic role in relation to the various major powers (China, Japan, India, US), as well as South Korea in Northeast Asia, and the most significant states in Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia). It has worked closely with the US as an allied power, while not necessarily following the US on every issue (for example, the caution expressed by Australia in relation to the China-Taiwan issue, and the less critical stance in relation to human rights concerns in Indonesia and Burma). Apart from its active bilateral diplomacy in the region, Australia has been involved in various multilateral contexts. It is a dialogue partner in relation to ASEAN, as well as a founding member of both APEC (1989) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (1994). More recently it joined the East Asia Summit (from its founding in 2005) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (2010). Apart from this Asia-Pacific regional role Australia also sees itself acting on the global level, essentially as a middle power. The Asia-Pacific orientation and the South Pacific regional role are part of what Australia brings to the global stage, but Australia also sees itself as pursuing important economic and security objectives that are primarily global in nature. Given the interdependent nature of the global economy the protection and development of the Australian economy are dependent on a whole web of relationships occurring at the global level. Australia s identification with the liberal democracies of the world is also very important. 25 Most recently Australia has been active in pursuing global economic objectives through the Group of 20, Australian membership of which is symptomatic of the state s global status. On security issues Australian involvement at the global level has been primarily through the US alliance, with Australia contributing most recently to the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan (with the former occasioning some domestic controversy, but less so until recently in the latter case). The United Nations has also been important in pursuit of Australia s security objectives, with regional concerns (such as East Timor) to the fore but not exclusively so. In relation to the South Pacific the point of this overview of Australia s wider regional and global roles is that Australia has more important international priorities than the South Pacific. Nevertheless Australia sees itself as having significant 25 A 2001 survey of over 800 policy officers in Australia s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade where respondents were given the options of strongly agree, agree, disagree or don t know indicated strongest support at the level of agree (about 75 per cent) for the assessment of Australia as a member of community of developed liberal democracies. Next in order at the agree level were good international citizen, manager of South Pacific stability, middle power, supporter of trade and investment regimes and important in East Asian region (the last two were approximately equal at just under 50 per cent). At the level of strongly agree the highest level of support was for the assessment of Australia as a supporter of trade and investment regimes followed by middle power. The highest support for the disagree option was in relation to the statement that Australia was a marginal player to main games of global politics. Suggesting that there was scepticism with some respondents, the second highest support for disagree was in relation to the statement that Australia was important in East Asian region. See Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy (2 nd ed.) (Port Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p