Governance and Corruption: Evidence and Implications

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1 Governance and Corruption: Evidence and Implications Francesca Recanatini and Daniel Kaufmann Meeting with future Russian Leaders, The World Bank, October 25 th, 2002

2 Governance and Poverty Nexus Lower Investment and Growth Unsound economic/institutional policies due to vested interests Distorted allocation of public expenditures/investments Low human capital accumulation Elite corporate interests capture laws and distort policymaking Absence of rule of law and property rights Governance obstacles to private sector development Lack of Health and Education Low human capital accumulation Lower quality of education and health care Cont

3 Governance and Poverty, cont. Poor have Smaller share in Growth State capture by elite of government policies and resource allocation Regressiveness of bribery tax on small firms and the poor Regressiveness in public expenditures and investments Unequal income distribution Impaired Access to Public Services Bribery imposes regressive tax and impairs access and quality of basic services for health, education, and justice Political capture by elites of access to particular services

4 Emerging Findings and Debate Issues Beyond Anti-corruption Campaigns : Towards Good & Clean Government (good governance) Broader framework of analysis and strategic formulation Costs and Determinants of poor 'governance' internationally Specific governance challenges in Transition Economies? The Power of Empirics-Information: Diagnostics in country What kind of Capacity Building priorities? The role of Civil Society, Parliaments and Social Contract? Subnational/Municipal Level reforms Role and Responsibility of the Corporate Sector and FDI Role of the International Donor Community

5 ????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????? -??????????:???????????????????????????????????? (?????????????????????????)????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????:???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? --??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

6 Governance: A working definition Governance is the process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised: (1) S -- the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) E -- the capacity of gov t to manage resources and provide services efficiently, and to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations; and, (3) R -- the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them

7 Operationalizing Governance: Unbundling its Definition into Components that can be measured, analyzed, and worked on Each of the 3 main components of Governance Definition is unbundled into 2 subcomponents: Voice and External Accountability Political Stability and lack of Violence&Terror Quality Regulatory Framework Government Effectiveness Control of Corruption Rule of Law We measure these six governance components

8 Broadening our Perspective: Assessing Governance Control of Corruption (or Graft) Rule of Law Lack of Regulatory Burden Government Effectiveness Voice and Accountability Political Stability and lack of Violence

9 ?????????????????????????:???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????:?????????????????????,????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????

10 Good Quality of Rule of Law by Region Poor OECD East Asia MENA South Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa Former Soviet Union

11 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

12 Traffic Light Map: Rule of Law, 2000/01 Source for data: ; Map downloaded from : Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse; Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90%

13 Control of Corruption: one Aggregate Indicator (selected countries from 155 worldwide, for illustration, based on 1998 research data*) Good 2 Corruption Control 1 Corruption Level Margin of Error POOR Tajikistan Iraq Myanmar Sudan Ukraine Indonesia Syria Pakistan Mexico Philippines Thailand Korea, South Botswana Costa Rica Hungary Belgium Chile Australia Singapore New Zealand Source: Governance Matters, 1999, PRWP 2196 by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido. Denmark GOOD

14 Traffic Light World Map Control of Corruption 2000/01 Source for data: ; Map downloaded from : Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse; Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90% ; Dark Green above 90%

15 Legal "Misgovernance" in Transition: Share of firms report Corrupt Legal System 100 % Estonia Hungary Russia Slovenia Ukraine Proportion of all firms (%) Frequently Mostly Always

16 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????,???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? %?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

17 CORRUPTION DETERS FOREIGN INVESTORS: Probability of Investment Loss due to Corruption (within 5 years) TURKMENISTAN 95 COLOMBIA 79 GEORGIA 71 PAKISTAN 68 UKRAINE 62 RUSSIA 58 BULGARIA 44 ROMANIA MEXICO POLAND 29 ESTONIA 24 GREECE 15 COSTA RICA ITALY *Source: S&P/DRI 1998 SINGAPORE 6 UNITED STATES 5 0% 10% 20 % 30% 40% 50 % 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

18 ????????????????????????????????????????:??????????????????????????????????????????????? (???????? 5??? ) T??????????? 95???????? 79?????? 71???????? 68??????? 62?????? 58???????? 44?????????????? 39 41?????? 29??????? 24?????? 15??????????????? *????????: S&P/DRI 1998???????? 6??? 5 0% 10% 20 % 30% 40% 50 % 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

19 Impact of good government on investment and growth % Investment share in GDP Income per capita Growth Rate 20% 2% 1.5% 1% 15% 0.5% 0% -0.5% -1.0% 10% High Medium Low -1.5% High Medium Low Government Quality

20 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 20%????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2% 1.5% 1% 15% 0.5% 0% 10%???????????????????? -0.5% -1.0% -1.5%??????????????????????????????????????

21 The Dividend of Good Governance Infant Mortality and Corruption 12,000 10,000 Per Capita Income and Regulatory Burden 60 8, , , , Weak Average Good Weak Average Good x Development Dividend Control of Corruption x Development Dividend Regulatory Burden 100 Literacy and Rule of Law Per Capita Income and Voice and Accountability x Development Dividend Weak Average Good Rule of Law x Development Dividend Weak Average Strong Voice and Accountability Note: The bars depict the simple correlation between good governance and development outcomes. The line depicts the predicted value when taking into account the causality effects ( Development Dividend ) from improved governance to better development outcomes. For data and methodological details visit

22 ?????????????????????????? Infant Mortality and Corruption 12,000 10,000 Per Capita Income and Regulatory Burden 60 8, , , , Weak Average Good Weak Average Good x Development Dividend Control of Corruption x Development Dividend Regulatory Burden 100 Literacy and Rule of Law Per Capita Income and Voice and Accountability x Development Dividend Weak Average Good Rule of Law x Development Dividend Weak Average Strong Voice and Accountability Note: The bars depict the simple correlation between good governance and development outcomes. The line depicts the predicted value when taking into account the causality effects ( Development Dividend ) from improved governance to better development outcomes. For data and methodological details visit

23 High Corruption & Bureaucratic Discretion Low -0.5 Low Medium High Bureaucratic Discretion

24 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 2???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????

25 Corruption penalizes especially lower income users (% of income paid in bribes, as reported by all users that requested public services) Low income Medium income High income 2 0 Ecuador Peru Honduras

26 The role of governance assessments Will and Political Leadership for Institutional Reforms On governance Strategy and Action Plan Governance assessment: - Identification of severe obstacles - Vulnerability of each institution - Identification of priorities Empirical Tools and Data Capacity building and coalition building

27 Salient Features of New Governance Diagnostic Tools Multi-pronged surveys of: households, firms and public officials [ triangulation ] Experiencial questions (vs. opinions /generic) Specially designed and tested closed questions Conceptual framework: Incentive Structure behind Governance; focus on development Rigorous technical requirements in implementation Local Institution Implements, with WB Collaboration Recognizing Multidimensionality of Governance Focus on Service Delivery: Input for Action and Change

28 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????:??????? (????????????????),???????????????? [??????????? ]??????,???????????????????????? (?????????????? )?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (??-??? )????????????????????:??????????????????????????????????????????????????;???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????:????????????????????????????????

29 Key dimensions to analyze Extent of mis-governance Type of mis-governance Quality of services Link with service provision Link with institutional determinants

30 Corruption can manifest itself in many different forms A. Bribes to facilitate transactions and administrative processes. B. Bribes to public officials to influence the legislative process, judicial and regulatory decisions (Capture of the State) C. Bribes to win public contracts D. Leak/losses in budget and mis-allocation of funds and resources E. Purchase of public administration positions and nepotism

31 Enterprises are Prepared to be Taxed for Better Government: Share of Firms that would pay additional taxes to eliminate corruption, crime and excessive regulations 70 Proportion of firms Prepared to Pay Taxes to Alleviate: Corruption 0 Czech Republic Estonia Kazakhstan Russia Ukraine Crime Regulations

32 ??????????????????????????????,???????????????????????????????????????????????????:????????,????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, 70????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????: 0????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

33 % bribe 'cut' by Firms with FDI for public procurement contracts (avg., mid-99; beeps prelim) UK 5.9% Country of origin of investment USA France Other Germany Turkey FDI firms 1.5% 5.7% 5.6% 5.0% 4.5% 4.7% Domestic firms 4.8% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% Percentage of contract value

34 %?????????????????????????????,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (?????.,???????? 1999?.;?????????.)????????. 5.9%??? 5.7%??????-????????????????????????????????????????????? 1.5% 5.6% 5.0% 4.5%???????? 4.7%??????????????? 4.8% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%???????????????????????????

35 Smaller Firms Are Hit Harder by Corruption in Russia and in Transition Economies Bribes to secure public procurement bids (% of contract value) % of contract value % Small Medium Large Small Medium Large

36 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (%????????????????????) %???????????????????? % ??????????????????????????????????????

37 State Capture as particular manifestation of grand corruption and misgovernance Defining State Capture: Influential firms that shape the formation of rules of the game (laws, regulations and policies of the state) to their advantage -- through illicit, non-transparent private payments to officials/politicians Includes the following measurable manifestations: purchase of legislative votes purchase of executive decrees purchase of major court decisions illicit political party financing Illicit influence on Central Bank policies/regulations

38 Extent of State Capture in Transition Parliamentary legislation (% of firms) Presidential decrees (% of firms) Central Bank (%of firms) Criminal Courts (% of firms) Capture Classification Party finance Capture index Country (% of firms) (% of firms) Albania Low Armenia Low Azerbaijan High Belarus Low Bulgaria High Croatia High Czech Rep Low Estonia Low Georgia High Hungary Low Kazakhstan Low Kyrgyzstan High Latvia High Lithuania Low Moldova High Poland Low Romania High Russia High Slovakia High Slovenia Low Ukraine High Uzbekistan Low Overall

39 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Parliamentary legislation (% of firms) Presidential decrees (% of firms) Central Bank (%of firms) Criminal Courts (% of firms) Capture Classification Party finance Capture index Country (% of firms) (% of firms) Albania Low Armenia Low Azerbaijan High Belarus Low Bulgaria High Croatia High Czech Rep Low Estonia Low Georgia High Hungary Low Kazakhstan Low Kyrgyzstan High Latvia High Lithuania Low Moldova High Poland Low Romania High Russia High Slovakia High Slovenia Low Ukraine High Uzbekistan Low Overall

40 Differences in Transition Countries on the Extent of State Capture %of all Firms report negative impact of grand corruption 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 Hungary Estonia Russia Azerbaijan Adverse Impact of Purchases of: Parliamentary legislation Decrees Central Bank Influence

41 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? %of all Firms report negative impact of grand corruption 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0 Hungary Estonia Russia Azerbaijan Adverse Impact of Purchases of: Parliamentary legislation Decrees Central Bank Influence

42 Enormous Socio-Economic Costs of State Capture by Oligarchs and Vested Elite Interests: Business sector grows much slower, lacks investments and insecure property rights Average rate of growth '97-' High capture Countries Low capture countries Sales Investment

43 ?????????????????-?????????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????:????????????????????????????????????????,???????????????????????????????????????????????? Average rate of growth '97-' High capture Countries Low capture countries Sales Investment

44 % of All Firms % The result: weak property rights Firms reporting insecure property and contract rights Est Uzb Pol Sln Azer Hun Cro Slk Geo Bul Arm Rom Bel Cze Kaz Lit Kyr Rus Ukr Mol

45 %????????????????? % ?????????:??????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????????????????????????????? Est Uzb Pol Sln Azer Hun Cro Slk Geo Bul Arm Rom Bel Cze Kaz Lit Kyr Rus Ukr Mol

46 State Capture exists where partial Civil Liberties and slow Economic Reforms Extent of State Capture 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% High Civil Liberties Partial Civil Liberties Economic Reforms Low Ec. Reform Partial Econ. Reform High Economic Reform Degree of Civil Liberties in Transition Economies

47 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Extent of State Capture 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% High Civil Liberties Partial Civil Liberties Economic Reforms Low Ec. Reform Partial Econ. Reform High Economic Reform Degree of Civil Liberties in Transition Economies

48 High Civil Liberties Help Control Corruption (Worldwide Evidence, 150 countries) Corruption Low Not Free Partly Free Free Civil Liberties

49 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

50 Control of Corruption and Freedom of the Press Control of Graft [kkz] High Low FIN CAN CHE DNK NLDSWENZL SGP CYP ISL GBR DEU AUS LUXNOR IRL AUT HKG USA ISR FRA ESP PRT CHL SVN FJI GRC ITA MYS JPN KWT HUN! BWA EST OMN QAT TWN TTO MLT CRI BHS NAM URY POL CZE CUB ZAF MUS LSO MAR JOR ARE BRN BRA KOR SLE TUN CIV SWZGMB SVK GUY CHN BHR BIH EGY GNB LKA SUR LTU MNG JAM TGO GHA BGD PER MEX PHL MWI INDSEN THA VNMTUR ARG LVA HRV ETHMDA ZWESLV BFA COL LBN BOL PRK HTI MOZ ROM BLR KEN COG BGR UGAMKD MDG PAN SAU TCD ZMB RUS MLI DZA IDNAGO ARM GEO IRN KAZ GIN KGZGTM PAK ECU DOM BEN NGA LBY SYR VEN YEM NIC ALB AZE CMR GAB HND PNG MMR SOM SDN UZB LBR PRY TZA UKR YUG IRG TJK TKM ZAR NER r =.68 r = Low Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) High

51 ???????????????????????????????????? Control of Graft [kkz] High Low FIN CAN CHE DNK NLDSWENZL SGP CYP ISL GBR DEU AUS LUXNOR IRL AUT HKG USA ISR FRA ESP PRT CHL SVN FJI GRC ITA MYS JPN KWT HUN! BWA EST OMN QAT TWN TTO MLT CRI BHS NAM URY POL CZE CUB ZAF MUS LSO MAR JOR ARE BRN BRA KOR SLE TUN CIV SWZGMB SVK GUY CHN BHR BIH EGY GNB LKA SUR LTU MNG JAM TGO GHA BGD PER MEX PHL MWI INDSEN THA VNMTUR ARG LVA HRV ETHMDA ZWESLV BFA COL LBN BOL PRK HTI MOZ ROM BLR KEN COG BGR UGAMKD MDG PAN SAU TCD ZMB RUS MLI DZA IDNAGO ARM GEO IRN KAZ GIN KGZGTM PAK ECU DOM BEN NGA LBY SYR VEN YEM NIC ALB AZE CMR GAB HND PNG MMR SOM SDN UZB LBR PRY TZA UKR YUG IRG TJK TKM ZAR NER r =.68 r = Low Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) High

52 What to Do About Corruption: Responses from Officials In 62 Countries Percentage of respondents assigning high rating 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% Anticorruption watchdog institutions Privatization Democracy and civil Liberties Reform tax regime Budget transparency Deregulate economy Implement penalties for corruption Example set by leadership

53 ????????????????????:??????????????????????????????? 62?????????????????????,??????????????????????? 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

54 Emerging Operational Strategies Albania Judicial reform Tax and customs Standards for health care University entrants Monitoring by NGOs Georgia Regulatory reform Tax and customs Public procurement Fiscal management Replacing Judges Monitoring by NGOs

55 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

56 10 Overall Corruption Over Time (Selected Countries; ICRG index, rescaled 0-10) High corruption 8 El Salvador Indonesia Russia 6 Indonesia Low corruption Russia Poland Finland El Salvador Poland Finland

57 10????????????????????????????? (???????????????;?????? ICRG,??????? 0-10)??????????????????????? 8???????????????????????? 6????????? 4 2??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? Poland?????????

58 The Underground Economy in Transition % Unofficial GDP/total GDP 50% Ukraine 40% Russia 30% 20% Poland 10% Source: Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997

59 ????????????????????????????????? %?????????? GDP/???????? 50%??????? 40%?????? 30% 20%?????? 10% Source: Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997

60 Strategy for Good Government and Anticorruption Checks and Balances: Checks and Balances: Independent and effective judiciary Decentralization with accountability Accountability of Political Leadership: Disclosure of parliamentary votes Transparency in party financing Asset Declaration, Conflict of Interest Rules Civil Society Oversight: Freedom of information Public hearings of draft laws Monitoring by media/ngo s Good and Clean Government Competition & Entry : Competitive restructuring of monopolies Regulatory simplification Public Administration and Public Finance: Meritocratic civil service Transparent, monetized, adequate remuneration Accountability in expenditures (Treasury, Audit, Procurement)

61 ????????????????? «????????»???????????????????????????????????????????????? :??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????: «??????????????»???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? :?????????????????????????????????????:??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? :???????????????????????????????,????????????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (????????????????????,?????,

62 Misgovernance and Corruption is Enormously Costly for Growth, Poverty Alleviation, Investment and PSD For a Good Government & Anti-Corruption (GGAC) Strategy: TIP Synthesis -- Integrating 4 Process Components International Experience: GGAC = TK + IP + LE + CA i) TK: Transparent Information & Knowledge -- rigorous diagnostic, empirical analysis and monitoring; w/ IT ii) IP: Incentives for Prevention -- meritocracy within institutions, transparency/disclosure; civil service reforms, external accountability; enforcement iii) LE: Leadership: example from the top iv) CA: Collective Action -- participatory and consensusbuilding approach, with all key groups in society, inside and outside government (including private sector)

63 National Governance: Challenges in Integrating Anti- Corruption Into a Strategy of Institutional Change A simple Formula synthesizing Governance/Anticorruption: IG and AC = KI + LE + CA Improving Governance and Anti-Corruption = = Knowledge/Info.Data Leadership (incl. Political) Collective Action (change)

64 ?????????????????????????:????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????,??????????????????????????????????????????????????: IG & AC = KI + LE + CA?????????????????????? (IG)?????????????????? (AC) =??????/?????????? KI +...+????????? (???.????????????) LE ???????????????????? (????????) CA

65 Data for Analysis and informing Policy Advise, not for Precise Rankings The data contained in this presentation originates from various enterprise surveys (as well as outside expert rating agencies) and are subject to a margin of error. The purpose is therefore not to present precise comparative rankings across countries, but instead to illustrate characteristics of governmental and corporate performance in order to assist in drawing implications for action. No ranking of countries is intended in presenting results from these external sources by either the presenter of this work, the World Bank or its Board of Directors.

66 Data for Analysis and informing Policy Advise, not for Precise Rankings??????????.??????,????????????????????????????????,???????????????????????????????????????,????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.????????????????????????,???????????????????????????????????????????????????,?????????,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.?????????????,??????????????????????????????????????,?????????????????????????,?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.

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