Narratives Constitutional Law II. Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005

Transcription

1 Narratives Constitutional Law II Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license. Some Rights Reserved.

2 Table of Contents Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-60258, 31 January 1984] 1 In RE Edillon [AC 1928, 3 August 1978] 1 Board of Directors of Rotary International vs. Rotary Club [481 US 537, 4 May 1987] 3 This collection contains three (3) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007). berneguerrero.wordpress.com

3 454 Occena vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-60258, 31 January 1984] En Banc, Plana (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 took no part Facts: Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be declared as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of 17 May 1982 "from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group, political committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election." On this basis, it is also prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay elections null and void ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of new barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties, political committees, political organizations and other political group." Issue: Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law. Held: The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and important public interests (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835; Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. Examining Section 4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political parties may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their intervention in the election of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of political parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office." Moreover, members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for every 100 registered voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action to promote the election of their candidate. There are reasons for insulating the barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign. The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the Lupon Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local controversies within the barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social structure. 455 In RE Edillon [AC 1928, 3 August 1978] Resolution En Banc, Castro (CJ): 11 concur Facts: Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On 29 November 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution in Administrative Case MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )

4 notice. On 21 January 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP. On 27 January 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on 23 February 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On 2 March 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on 24 March 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on 3 June After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. Issue: Whether Sections 1, 9, 10 of the Rules of Court 139-A, and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws, constitute an invasion of Edillon's constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Held: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. When, therefore, Congress enacted RA 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on 9 January 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through PD 181 dated 4 May 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads that the Supreme Court shall have the power to (5) "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar." Thus, when Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were and are subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )

5 interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. The provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. 456 Board of Directors of Rotary International vs. Rotary Club [481 US 537, 4 May 1987] Powell (J) Facts: Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corporation founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois. It is "an organization of business and professional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world." Individual members belong to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn, each local Rotary Club is a member of International. In August 1982, shortly before the trial in the present case, International comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with a total membership of about 907,750. Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club according to a "classification system." The purpose of this system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a representative of every worthy and recognized business, professional, or institutional activity in the community." Each active member must work in a leadership capacity in his business or profession. The general rule is that "one active member is admitted for each classification, but he, in turn, may propose an additional active member, who must be in the same business or professional classification." Thus, each classification may be represented by two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past service" members may represent the same classifications as active members. There is no limit to the number of clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be admitted to membership. Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new members. International has promulgated Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates for membership will be considered by both a "classifications committee" and a "membership committee." The classifications committee determines whether the candidate's business or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classification. The membership committee evaluates the candidate's "character, business and social standing, and general eligibility." If any member objects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made by the club's board of directors. Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Herbert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary International, testified that the exclusion of women results in an "aspect of fellowship that is enjoyed by the present male membership," and also allows Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social mores. Although women are not admitted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings, give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of Rotary members may form their own associations, and are authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women between 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract, organizations sponsored by Rotary International. In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California, admitted Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to active membership. International notified the Duarte Club that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary constitution. After an internal hearing, International's board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club and terminated its membership in Rotary International. The Duarte Club's appeal to Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )

6 the International Convention was unsuccessful. The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Board's actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The Club sought (1) to enjoin International from enforcing its restrictions against admitting women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of International, (2) a declaration that the board's actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a bench trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized that "some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business advantage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of those expenses by their employers"; but it found that "such business benefits are incidental to the principal purposes of the association to promote fellowship and 'service' activities." The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment for International. The California Court of Appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court denied the Board's petition for review. Issue: Whether the law allowing inclusion of women as members of an association deprive the Rotary Club its right of association. Held: The freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Such relationships may take various forms, including the most intimate. The Court has not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional protection. The intimate relationships to which it has accorded constitutional protection include marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives. Of course, it has not held that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships among family members. It has emphasized that the First Amendment protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." Still, determining the limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter into a particular association unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments." In determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection, the Court considers factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship. The relationship among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection. The size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to more than 900. There is no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary Club. About 10 percent of the membership of a typical club moves away or drops out during a typical year. The clubs therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming" to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge the membership. Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meetings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates and competitors to meetings. The application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with the members' freedom of private association. The Unruh Act does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these activities; nor to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace; nor to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the community. On the other hand, the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." For this reason, "impediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected by the First Amendment." Herein, however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes. Indeed, by opening membership to leading business and professional women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a more representative cross section of community leaders with a Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 )

7 broadened capacity for service. Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. On its face the Unruh Act makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest order." The application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does not violate the right of expressive association afforded by the First Amendment. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )