OUTGOING . Reference: S/AC.40/2016/NOTE.11

Transcription

1 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES OUTGOING DATE: 22 January 2016 Reference: S/AC.40/2016/NOTE.11 TO: FROM: The Representative Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism Kiho Cha Committee Secretary For Action For Information SUBJECT: Outcome document on open meeting with Research Network partners (NOTE.11) Secretariat Contact: Kiho Cha, (212) , Phillip Schell, (212) , Fax: Hannah Jung, (212) , SC Subsidiary Organs Branch General Telephone Number: (212)

2 SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) CONCERNING COUNTER-TERRORISM S/AC.40/2016/NOTE January 2016 Note by the Chair The Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism presents his compliments to the members of the Committee and has the honour to transmit, for their information, an outcome document on the open meeting of the Committee held on 24 November 2015 with Research Network partners on Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

3 Open meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network on Foreign Terrorist Fighters 24 November 2015 I. Introduction 1. Security Council resolution 2129 (2013) directs the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to identify emerging issues, trends and developments relating to Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014) and to advise the Counter-Terrorism Committee on practical ways for Member States to implement those resolutions. 2. Paragraph 19 of resolution 2129 (2013) invites CTED to support the Committee s efforts to promote the implementation of the resolutions by enhancing its partnerships with civil society, academia, and other entities in conducting research and information-gathering and in identifying good practices. In accordance with resolution 2129 (2013), the Committee, assisted by CTED, launched a Global Counter-Terrorism Research Network in February On 24 November 2015, the Committee, assisted by CTED, held an open meeting for the wider United Nations membership to analyse and discuss emerging terrorism issues and trends, particularly those pertaining to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). 4. The goal of the open meeting was to enable the Committee, CTED and Network partners to analyse and discuss related emerging issues, trends and developments and to build on research gaps with a view to identifying priority areas of work with respect to the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014). II. Summary of discussions 1 A. ISIL FTFs 5. ISIL s core recruitment strategy appears to be based upon the principles set forth in its publication The Management of Chaos-Savagery and its 2015 editorial for Dabiq (an online ISIL publication): seeking confrontation, diversifying the nature of attacks, attacking soft targets, targeting the young, and using social media to attract sympathizers. ISIL s core strategy for attracting supporters and opponents is thus known, and should be taken into account in the design of counter-terrorism strategies. 6. Even though social media are an important radicalization tool, research shows that three in every four FTFs to Al-Qaida and ISIL join through friends and that around one in five join with family. In some countries (e.g., France), nearly one in four are converts to Islam. Around 80 per cent have no formal religious education or training, but are born again into radical Islam in late adolescence or early adulthood. Most are young people at a transitional stage in their lives (immigrants, students, individuals between jobs, marginalized individuals who have not yet committed to a long-term relationship, individuals who have left 1 For a full version of the discussions, see UN web link: ) 1

4 their homes and are seeking ways to find purpose and significance). However, many ISIL volunteers are far from marginal in their societies. 7. ISIL s so-called caliphate is highly attractive to such individuals. It provides a purpose and a chance to liberate oneself from a world that offers merely a specious freedom of false and meaningless choices. 8. ISIL uses social media platforms, as well as peer-to-peer and gaming platforms. It uses sophisticated marketing technology to sift through hundreds of millions of social media messages in search of a few thousand users who are likely to support its cause. (Many of the conversations are encrypted to avoid detection by law enforcement. ISIL even offers an online encryption help desk ). 9. Counter narrative strategies developed by think tanks and used by Governments may be largely ineffective. ISIL may spend hundreds of hours enlisting individuals and their friends; empathizing instead of lecturing; and turning personal frustrations and grievances into moral outrage. 10. ISIL s target are well known. In social media, the messenger matters. Government voices lack authenticity and agility. Their policies and practices make them suspect. Fortunately, there is no shortage of credible actors, whether at the community level or from popular culture, who are ready to engage globally with potential recruits. Those voices include athletes, musicians, graffiti artists, hip hop activists, actors, comedians, imams, business icons and others. But systematic study is needed to determine which narratives work, for whom, and in what context. B. Key gaps in understanding ISIL s operations, and ways to address them 11. For those who voluntarily join from abroad, ISIL is seen as a joyful movement bonded in blood. This joy is evident among those (mainly young) people who volunteer to risk their lives in ISIL s cause. It comes from joining with comrades in a glorious cause, anger, and the gratification of revenge. 12. As suggested by the work of researchers (interviews; experimental studies with youth in Paris, London, and Barcelona, and with captured ISIL fighters in Iraq and Jabhat an-nusra fighters from Syria): simply to dismiss ISIL as nihilistic is to avoid the imperative to comprehend and address the attraction of its mission to change and save the world. There is no evidence for (and massive evidence against) the role of brainwashing. Brainwashing is invoked by those who wish to remain ignorant of the sincere motives of those who join such radical movements or who wish to deny that apparently normal members of society may seek out such movements of their own volition. (Parents surprised that their children have joined such movements are those most ready to invoke brainwashing ). 13. Extreme forms of mass bloodshed are generally considered to be either pathological or evil expressions of human nature gone awry or the unintended consequences of righteous intention. However, across most of human history and within most human cultures, committing acts of violence against other groups is considered to be a matter of moral virtue. For, without a claim to virtue, it is difficult to justify the killing of large numbers of innocent people. (Brutal terror also serves to sway enemies and those who are undecided.) 2

5 14. Because many potential FTFs play a marginal role in their host countries, Governments and NGOs believe that offering material advantages, such as jobs or education, may suffice to counter the lure of the caliphate. However, if such individuals are prepared to sacrifice their lives, it is unlikely that offers of material advantage will stop them. Such incentives may provide viable alternative life pathways at initial stages of radicalization, but fully radicalized individuals who are fused with a certain group and its values are not particularly susceptible to material incentives or disincentives (punishments, sanctions), which often backfire by increasing support for violence. 15. There is a clash of traditional cultures, not a clash of civilizations. The popular notion of the clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is misleading, even if it is an idea purposely promoted both by Al-Qaida and ISIL and by many who oppose them. Violent extremism represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures, but their collapse. It is perpetrated by young people who have become detached from millennial traditions and desperately seek a social identity that gives personal significance and glory. This is the dark side of globalization. Individuals radicalize in an effort to find a solid identity in a world that no longer makes sense to them. Vertical lines of communication between the generations are replaced by horizontal peer-to-peer attachments that can cut across the globe. In the absence of concerted intellectual effort, awareness-raining, and individual attention, little progress will be made against ISIL and similar groups, and force of arms (with all its unforeseen and unintended consequences, agony and suffering) may well be the only alternative. Even if ISIL is eventually defeated, its message may still appeal to future generations unless Governments, businesses, information and entertainment media, faith-based groups, and civic organizations work with others to actively engage and mobilize youth, earnestly consider their perceived grievances, listen and learn from their aspirations and dreams, and provide concrete pathways rather than mere promises for the realization of their hopes and a chance to achieve a better world. 16. Grassroots approaches are not alone sufficient. Local initiatives may deter individuals from committing political or religious violence, but will not challenge the broad attraction of ISIL for young people. There is a need to establish a platform from where lessons learned from local successes can be shared with Governments and ideas allowed to bubble up from youth to those in Government who can help refine and realize them. No such platform yet exists. The United Nations should (and is possibly the only globe-spanning organization that could) provide such a platform. C. Rehabilitation and reintegration 17. The specific challenges posed by returning FTFs transcend rule-of-law and CVE approaches. Because of difficulties in securing prosecutions for offences committed overseas, Governments are increasingly exploring rehabilitation and reintegration options. Where there are gaps in evidence presented in the prosecution of returning FTFs, there is a danger that States may seek to fill those gaps and apply criminal-justice methods that are neither transparent nor human-rights compliant. Part of the ongoing mission of CVE practitioners and policymakers is to persuade States that CVE approaches (the non-coercive alternative to traditional counter-terrorism methods) are not just a soft option. Rather, they are necessary in addressing the causes of violent extremism. This is a security imperative, not a soft option. Non-human-rights compliant counter-terrorism approaches are ultimately counter-productive because they engender sentiments of mistrust among certain communities and thus help 3

6 violent extremist group to build support. Given the range of individuals attracted to ISIL, there is no cookie-cutter approach that can be devised for an effective counter-radicalization programme. However, certain general principles may be taken into consideration. Taken together, these factors suggest the following: 18. The need for counter-radicalization programmes to focus particularly on addressing the sense of civic disengagement expressed by such individuals. (Could more effective civic engagement help redirect isolated youths hunger for community and purpose? How can this be achieved?) 19. The need for an enhanced emphasis on civil society and programmes, which should aim to include young men and women who feel alienated, purposeless, and hopeless. (It may be more effective to prioritize psychological and emotional support over tutorials in religious doctrine?) Previous counter-radicalization programmes have relied heavily on religious figures to help redirect such individuals, but the future challenge may be to broaden their sense of belonging to the wider culture. 20. The need for future counter-radicalization efforts to limit the use of law enforcement. (Overuse of law enforcement may deter individuals from being genuinely open to programmes aimed at diverting individuals away from violent activities.) 21. The need for counter-radicalization programmes to recognize the interpersonal factor in recruitment, even where social media plays a big role. (Families and communities can help prevent radicalization, provided the help offered is open and supportive rather than being chastising in tone and perceived as a form of reverse-brainwashing.) 22. The need for counter-radicalization efforts to take into account the need to develop societies that are inclusive, welcoming and nourishing, and in which at-rick individuals can find a place and an identity. Without this, CVE programmes may fail. 23. The need to expand national CVE activities to remote areas. (Most such activities are confined to capitals, rather than remote areas where radicalization may be more acute.) 24. The need to categorize returning FTFs (who may be disillusioned and disaffected or may be sufficiently radicalized to pose an immediate further threat). (Before one can deal with the individual, one must understand him, assess the risk that he poses, and develop a tailor-made response.) D. The importance of research 25. It is important to avoid politically driven assumptions. It is also important not to downplay the role of ideology or even humanitarianism when dealing with the terrorist threat. (FTFs are neither psychopaths nor individuals with particular criminal tendencies.) It is important to avoid politicizing the debate. Effective research can redress the potentially negative effect of politically driven assumptions. 26. It is necessary to identify the reasons for FTF disengagement (specifically, why individuals become disillusioned and disaffected) in order to design effective prevention, disruption, disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies. 4

7 27. It is essential to understand the specifics of the narratives of recruiters, the underlying grievances and motivations for joining a violent organization, specific recruitment methods, the attraction of terrorist organisations, and other factors that influence recruitment dynamics in a specific environment. 28. It is important to research the effectiveness of more informal approaches that are either community or family based (and thus less expensive). Since large numbers of fighters are travelling from the Middle East and North Africa, there is a need to identify State and community-level responses that are aligned to a realistic assumption of available resources. 29. It is important to understand the messages contained in ISIL s The Management of Chaos-Savagery in order to develop counteractions. 30. It is necessary to research and test messages of hope for those who are disillusioned and disaffected (those seeking meaning, glory, esteem, adventure, respect, remembrance, camaraderie, justice, rebellion, self-sacrifice and structure) and to build an independent network of credible global voices, local content creators, bloggers, etc., who understand the generational, cultural, theological and geographical nuances of their communities. 31. It is important to build a network of social media early responders to monitor, disrupt and block the distribution of ISIL content. (Need to identify which methods have worked in the past.) 32. It is important for Governments to fund and support these efforts. Societies require commitment and leadership from citizens and from the private sector. People all around the world wish to help. Research on how to crowdsource funding and volunteers could help in this regard. 33. It is necessary to involve the media in defining responsible restraint. Media exposure not only amplifies the perception of danger but, in generating fear, makes the threat even greater. Because the role of contemporary media is to entertain, rather than inform, it is easy for ISIL to exploit the media to its own advantage. Research could help indicate when and where restraint is most effective, least limiting of free expression, and most informative. 34. It is important to identify and understand wedge issues between host populations and ISIL and between diaspora populations in Europe and elsewhere (who do not directly support ISIL or violence, but through which ISIL volunteers may move freely because the surrounding populations themselves (especially immigrant populations) do not trust Government actions to be just, fair or reasonable). However, not all such issues can be used as levers to pry these populations away from ISIL and its volunteer networks. Social network analysis can be used to separate direct from indirect support networks, and questionnaires may be employed to elicit and prioritize the issues to be used. 35. It is important to study ways to discredit the ISIL leadership (e.g., by uncovering their hidden personal wealth, immoral behaviour, or murders of internal rivals). 36. It is critical to monitor and measure impact, test the results, and share conclusions (including on initiatives that are less successful, regardless of their origin or sponsor). 5

8 37. It is important for research institutions to gain access to Government information sources, field sites, prisons, facilities, court records, etc., under appropriate arrangements, in order to strengthen their output. 6