D.4.2. Systemic report on the value premises and human, ethical consequences of the CFSP/EDSP in the changing environment of border security

Transcription

1 D.4.2. Systemic report on the value premises and human, ethical consequences of the CFSP/EDSP in the changing environment of border security Deliverable submitted June 2010 (M27) in fulfillment of requirements of the FP7 Project, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in Europe (INEX) International Peace PO Box 9229 Grønland T: Research Institute, Oslo NO-0134 Oslo, Norway F:

2 D.4.2. Systematic report on the value premises and human, ethical consequences of the CFSP/ESDP in the changing environment of border security By: Prof. Dr. Eva Gross Institute for European Studies, VUB 2

3 Contents Introduction 4 a. Background 4 b. Report Methodology and Outline 6 1. Value Premises a. Value premises underlying EU foreign policy objectives 7 b. Value premises in CSDP 8 c. CSDP missions in the borderlands 11 d. The bigger picture: CFSP in the borderlands 12 e. Normative dilemmas: stabilization, integration, securitization Values in Practice a. Implementation Experiences 15 i. Have the missions fulfilled their mandate? 16 ii. What were the accountability provisions in the missions? 17 iii. How have European standards been interpreted? 19 iv. What was the nature of civil-military relations? 20 v. What were the effects of intervention on internal reform? 21 vi. Where on the internal-external security continuum are the external CFSP/CSDP interventions located? 21 b. Ethical Consequences i. Values for whom? 21 ii. Stabilization, integration and the role of political conditionality Conclusion Annex a. Table of CSDP missions and operations 24 b. Table of EUSRs in the borderlands, and their mandates 26 c. Program INEX workshop, 11 February 2010 (D.4.3.) References 28 3

4 Introduction Work package 4 of the INEX project focuses on the ethical issues resulting from the link between external and internal security in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and what since the taking effect of the Lisbon Treaty has become the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) formerly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This report analyzes the value premises underlying CFSP/CSDP and their ethical consequences in the implementation of individual CSDP missions and operations but also in the linkages between CSDP and the EU s broader foreign policy goals. The report places a particular focus on the EU s (Eastern) borderlands where questions over the internal-external security continuum and overlapping policies are particularly pertinent. a. Background Following the end of the Cold War, through the creation of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 and later the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999, the EU has increasingly assumed the role as a global actor not just in economics and trade, but also in foreign and security policy. Through the EU ESDP in particular and the launch of some 23 military and civilian operations in the first decade of its existence the EU can look to a growing record as a security provider (see Grevi et al, 2009). This growing record in turn has sparked a conceptual debate over the nature of EU power: the acquisition of military instruments for some signals a move away from the EU s profile as a civilian power and to others completes the EU s profile as a civilian power (see Smith, 2005; Whitman, 1998). Similarly, concepts of the EU as a normative or ethical power remain debated (see Manners, 2002; Aggestam, 2007) as security considerations and the formulation of a security strategy have come to if not dominate then at least take a firm place on the European foreign policy agenda. Beyond questions over the EU s evolving international identity and its normative commitments to values including democracy and the rule of law, the EU s 4

5 increasing activity in the field of security also raises the question over policy implementation - and the extent to which the EU is able to transmit its set of norms through its policy instruments. The changing environment of border security, the increasingly numerous rule of law missions but also the formulation of broad policy frameworks in the neighborhood either the accession perspective for the countries in the Balkans or the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for the EU s Eastern and Southern neighbors raise the questions of whether or not there are ethical consequences in policy implementation that have the potential to compromise norms the EU wishes to uphold. While the EU s guiding foreign policy documents, including its European Security Strategy (ESS), enshrine certain values for EU foreign policy, there is potential for clashing norms and policy areas along three dimensions. First, there is the possibility for overlapping policy priorities within CSDP. Second, there is the possibility for overlapping priorities between CSDP and EU foreign policy more broadly. Third, there is the possibility of the existence of conflicting policy objectives within between EU foreign policy, integration or border security. More specifically, overlapping or competing policy priorities within CSDP, due to the fundamentally intergovernmental nature of the policy, could pit member states against EU structures; or could pit CSDP against other international actors such as NATO or OSCE. In theatres where the EU conducts simultaneous civilian and military operations there could exist conflicts between the two missions with negative consequences for the impact of the EU s effectiveness on the ground. A weak link between Council and Commission competences, policy formulations and implementation could be weak, leading to policy overlap; or the link between CSDP missions and other EU foreign policy instruments could be ill defined, overlap, or be at odds with the broader political objective the EU pursues in a given country or region. Moreover, the border between internal and external security is becoming increasingly blurred not just conceptually but also in the increasingly overlapping security objectives in internal and external security. Counter-terrorism and border security, policy areas located in the third pillar (JLS) increasingly touch on CFSP as a whole and pose new challenges including that of coordination to the EU and its external relations (see Martenczuk and van Thiel, 2008; Guild and Geyer, 2008). Norm clashes, and ethical consequences as a 5

6 result of the EU s foreign and security policy activities, can be expected to particularly affect and therefore also be observable in the European borderlands. This is because the EU pursues differing policy and potentially overlapping objectives in its neighborhood the simultaneous pursuit of security objectives in addition to that of integration in the Balkans and closer political and economic association with selected ENP countries. Specifications in the Lisbon Treaty that either consolidate certain policy areas or that change policy implementation through a more coherent policy structure, can be expected to reinforce or crystallize potential contradictions. b. Report Methodology and Outline Taken together, these developments pose the question of the extent to which these value assumptions in CFSP/CSDP clash or complement each other, and what implications this has for the implementation of EU policies. Over the past decade the EU has amassed a substantial record on the ground through its CSDP missions, its emerging border regime, its policy towards the Balkans and the increasing maturity of the ENP. This report tracks the underlying norms in EU policies, the potential for clashes, and the EU s implementation record as well as the ethical consequences this raises. This report interrogates the value premises underlying EU foreign policy in the changing security environment and assesses the ethical consequences in policy implementation. The report adopts a qualitative methodology in conducting a systematic comparison of value premises in EU foreign policy and its implementation. The analysis relies on conceptual literature, official documents and expert and practitioner input. The report is divided in two parts. The first part analyses the value premises in the EU CFSP/CSDP but also the broader political context in which these policies are placed. It highlights areas of overlap and potential for contradiction in the way the policies are conceptualized, and the potential for conflict in their implementation. The second part of the report analyses the values in practice through the implementation of the EU s individual policies. It assesses to what extent the 6

7 stated and implicit values in the EU s external policies translate into practice and what the human and ethical consequences of these policies are. The report s conclusion summarizes the main findings and offers a number of considerations of how negative consequences of policy implementation can be mitigated. 1. Value premises a. Value premises underlying EU foreign policy objectives The EU has formulated a set of foreign policy objectives that are explicitly grounded in a specific set of values. The identification of concrete foreign policy goals and objectives has been a gradual process. Over time the EU has stated a set of foreign policy objectives first through the creation on CFSP and culminating with the ESS. Specifically, the objectives identified in the 1992 Lisbon European Council include: strengthening democratic principles and institutions and respect for human and minority rights; promoting regional stability and integration; contributing to the settlement of conflicts and international cooperation; strengthening international cooperation in issues of common international interest and promoting good governance (cited in Smith, 2008: 7). Besides addressing security threats, the 2003 ESS moreover identifies as strategic objectives the promotion of security in the EU s neighborhood and the creation of an international order based on effective multilateralism (Council of the European Union, 2003). Through the ESS the EU thus commits itself to the upholding of international law and a rule-based international order. The emphasis on effective multilateralism reinforces the value placed on cooperation and coordination, while the emphasis on human rights highlights the value placed on individual rather than state security. Indeed, the concept of human security formulated in 2004 by the UN Development Program (UNDP) has informed much of the debates surrounding the operational development of ESDP and EU foreign policy more broadly (see Study Group on Europe s Security Capabilities, 2004). The values underlying these policies encompass commitments to the rule of law, democracy, and the promotion and protection of human rights. Importantly, these values in foreign policy mirror those that inform intra-eu cooperation and integration. The ESS draws specifically on the EU s internal development to 7

8 highlight the values guiding EU foreign policy. It speaks of the commitment to deal peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions and states that the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Enlargement, finally, is making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent (Council of the European Union, 2003). More recently, in the wake of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), newly appointed High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that at the heart of everything we do lies a simple truth: to protect our interests and promote our values we must be engaged abroad. No one can hope to be an island of stability and prosperity in a sea of insecurity and injustice (European Parliament, 2010). These values are also key in the EU s dealing with potential future member states and, although less centrally so, its neighbors. With respect to EU enlargement the EU s value premises are enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria, which require that a state has stable institutions able to guarantee democratic governance, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities; and is able to take on the obligations of EU membership. The ENP, on the other hand, is conceptualized as a partnership that promises political, economic, financial and technical cooperation between the EU and individual countries that participate in the ENP as a means to induce political and economic reform. As former Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner put it, the aim of the ENP is to avoid new dividing lines on the continent and deepen relations between the EU and its neighbors. The ENP is not about enlargement but it is about mutual interest in supporting reforms and modernization (cited in Cameron, 2007: 109). The ENP, therefore, assumes common values and interest including democracy, commitment to a market economy and the need to respond to common challenges and trusts in the Europeanization effect when it comes to promoting and fostering these values in other countries (see Emerson et. al., 2005). b. Value premises in CSDP As a policy instrument and as an implementation tool the EU CSDP holds an increasingly important place in the EU s policy toolkit. Presumably, therefore, the 8

9 values underpinning CSDP are the same as those of EU foreign policy stated in the previous section. At first glance, one might even assume that the various military operations and civilian missions are inherently value-neutral but concerned only with providing technical assistance or stabilization. However, there are at least two ways in which CSDP missions endorse specific values: directly, in their aim to establish European standards of policing and the broader rule of law; and, indirectly, by supporting political processes through the launch of military stabilization operations. The development of CSDP over the past ten years belies the initial motivation behind creating the policy in the first place. Rather than merely focusing on European military defense structures that would be able to act independently from NATO, in practice CSDP missions have been overwhelmingly civilian: of the 23 missions launched (and in some cases completed) between 2003 and 2009, 17 missions have been civilian rather than military in nature. The trajectory of deployment and ambitions for these missions has likewise evolved since the policy s creation. Rather than a predominantly regional actor although in the Balkans and sub-saharan Africa the presence of CSDP has been denser than in other parts of the world CSDP has become an increasingly globally used instrument. This mirrors the EU s growing ambitions but has also led to growing limitations both in terms of mission resources as well as in the EU s ability in aligning its political profile with the number and the purpose of missions it has launched. The number of missions also permits a comprehensive analysis of the value assumptions underpinning the EU CSDP. As far as civilian CSDP is concerned, there are a number of value assumptions. They include the pursuit of European standards in policing; the value attached to the rule of law but also the adoption of liberal values underlying Security Sector Reform (SSR) more broadly; and the focus on local ownership of civilian missions goals rather than a top-down approach on the part of the EU towards the country hosting a mission or military operation. 9

10 The concept of SSR has become a key concept for improving post-conflict governance for the EU and embodies a set of values inherently compatible with that underlying EU foreign policy. Not only does it encourage a holistic approach that focuses on integrating defense, policy and judicial reform, it also encompasses a normative commitment to the consolidation of democracy, the promotion of human rights, and accountability and transparency as part of the broader principles of good governance (see Hänggi and Tanner, 2005). Similarly, European standards of policing although in practice these European standards are not transmitted through a unified or aligned system but rather based on 27 member states individual policing practices - do imply a set of values and resulting practices that have at their core the commitment to human rights, democracy, and civilian policing. More broadly, the rule of law has emerged a central policy priority beyond policing the EU is increasingly concerned with justice reform as well, suggesting a comprehensive approach to civilian reconstruction and a commitment to the rule of law that mirrors the values laid out in the ESS. A final way in which civilian CSDP mission can be said to engender a certain set of value assumptions lies in the absence of executive power that is, the authority to intervene forcefully by, for example, making arrests. Instead, civilian CSDP missions privilege local ownership and are focused on mentoring and advising in their broader efforts at institution building. The emphasis on local ownership and institution building in turn constitutes a political test for the EU and states hosting CSDP missions a non-executive mission implies assistance to a sovereign state, whereas an executive mandate suggests a relationship between protector and protectorate. Military CSDP operations, on the other hand, have equally upheld a set of values that of cooperating with or supporting the work of other international actors, most notably the UN but also that of the African Union (AU); and that of contributing to security and humanitarian operations more generally. Geographically, the scope for military operations has been confined to the African continent as well as the Balkans where these operations, apart from contributing to peace and security also created space for the political and civilian engagement of the EU and other actors. 10

11 c. CSDP missions in the borderlands The EU s borderlands the Balkans and the Eastern neighborhood have witnessed a density of CSDP engagement unparalleled in other parts of the world (see Appendix for a list of CSDP missions in the borderlands). This is partly because, as the ESS states, the EU is invested particularly in the security of its immediate neighborhood. It is also because the Balkans hold a specific place in the history of EU foreign policy and the genesis of CSDP in particular. The region has seen the launch of the first ever civilian and military operation, but also the most complex civilian mission to date through EULEX Kosovo. In the Balkans CSDP missions are also inextricably linked to a broader political perspective that of integration; and the focus of EU policy, including CSDP has changed over time from on of stabilization to that of institution building. In the countries of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), on the other hand, where the EU has attempted to positively impact the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus, CSDP missions have been less numerous, and much smaller in size and focused on border management, justice reform and a monitoring mission following the August 2008 war in Georgia. Nevertheless, their focus on border management and justice reform makes these missions of interest in terms of their value assumptions, and their implementation in practice. CSDP missions in the borderlands, in the Balkans in particular, are of analytical interest also because the EU operates simultaneous civilian and military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and because the latest mission, EULEX Kosovo takes place in an ambiguous political context but also departs from civilian CSDP practice to date in that its mandate includes an executive component. Further, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in light of the changing security environment the military operation has not only decreased in size but has also changed its activities from its original focus on deterrence towards increasingly targeting organized crime in its mission activities. Similarly, the civilian police mission EUPM has also increasingly focused on organized crime. The concurrent deployment of two missions one military, one civilian but with a similar focus, suggests first a 11

12 changing security environment in the Balkans where traditionally low-security threats now constitute the main concern for missions. Second, it also suggests a direct link to internal EU security in its more or less explicit concern over and engagement with border security. Finally, the concurrent running of a civilian and a military mission poses questions over value implementation, the degree of overlap or competition that might be observable. This is even more important in light of the broader political framework in which the CFSP missions are placed, and which they are intended to support. d. The bigger picture: CFSP in the borderlands Indeed, the Eastern borderlands of the EU receive significant foreign policy attention on the part of the EU, which is reflected in the application of a broader foreign policy framework and policy instruments located in the EU CFSP. These foreign policy instruments include the post of the EU Special Representative (EUSR), a function that varies according to the country and region deployed in (see Appendix for a complete list of current and former EUSRs). Generally, EU Special Representatives support the work of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They play an important role in the EU's efforts to become a more active, coherent and capable actor on the world stage. They provide the EU with an active political presence in key countries and regions, acting as a voice and face for the EU and its policies. With respect to the EU s Eastern borderlands, currently the EU has appointed an EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Valentin Inzko), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM (Erwan Fouéré), Kosovo (Pieter Feith), Moldova (Kálmán Mizsei), South Caucasus (Peter Semneby) and Georgia (Pierre Morel). These posts also have a direct link to CSDP on the one hand, and the EU s broader political approach on the other. Although not explicitly part of a CSDP mission chain of command, the EUSR nevertheless is to provide local political guidance and advice to the Heads of civilian missions and the Force Commanders of military operations, respectively (see Grevi, 2007). Besides their link to CSDP there are also variations in the post s political ambitions and scope. In FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the role of the EUSR is explicitly geared towards 12

13 facilitation the countries progress towards integration. In Kosovo and Bosnia, on the other hand, two countries with unresolved political issues either in the form of full international recognition in Kosovo or political roadblocks towards constitutional reform that would aid integration in Bosnia; and two countries with substantial international presence besides the EU, the post of EUSR is doublehatted with that of International Civilian Representative (Kosovo) and High Representative (Bosnia), thereby representing not just the EU but also the broader international community. In Moldova and the Caucasus, on the other hand, the post of EUSR has a more explicit reform and conflict prevention mandate: to assist the carrying out of political reforms, conflict prevention and settlement (South Caucasus), conflict settlement and effectiveness of border and customs controls (Moldova), and to represent the EU s position at international talks and facilitate the implementation of the 2008 Moscow/Tiblisi agreement (Georgia). These variations in emphasis for the post of EUSR obviously reflect the EU s foreign policy priorities based on local political, economic and security conditions but also indicate the EU s value premises with respect to either conflict resolution or EU integration. The broader CFSP perspectives that these individual EUSRs support in turn support the Stabilization and Accession Process for the Western Balkans specifically, this means support for regional integration, visa liberalization, the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and state and institution building in Kosovo. As for ENP countries, the broader CFSP perspective includes the Eastern Partnership (EaP), that was launched in 2009 as a forum for strategic partnership agreements with the EU's eastern neighbors: Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Implemented by the European Commission rather than Council in the implementation of individual Action Plans (AP), the EaP nevertheless provides the broader foreign policy framework in which the EUSR but also the CSDP missions operate. The link between CSDP/CFSP and the individual AP, however, tends to be weak as does the political dimension to each AP. Even in the absence of an explicit link, however, the official language used for the APs and the EaP implies a concern with conflict prevention. 13

14 e. Normative dilemmas: stabilization, integration, securitization Beyond potential adverse ethical consequences as a result of policy implementation there are two sets of normative dilemmas apparent in the EU s broader foreign policy goals. First, there is the dilemma between stabilization and integration - specifically in the prioritization of one over the other, given that a linear application of policy tools and norms has not been possible due to the shaping of political conditions on the ground but also in the EU member states where enlargement fatigue has led to less support for taking on additional members. At the time of writing, Bosnia and Kosovo remain unfinished business in the sense of incomplete state-building and political internal deadlock that prevents accession. As a result, stabilization has moved to the forefront of debates, and often clashes with integration. The values of local ownership and soft foreign policy tools of integration are being increasingly questioned in light of protracted political problems rather than transforming or Europeanizing there has been an increasing tendency towards imposing and harder policy tools. With respect to Kosovo in particular current EU policy also raises the question of how the EU will move from establishing protectorates that rely on international authority and intervention towards self-sustaining institutions (see Balfour et. al., 2008). Second, and following from the stabilization-integration dilemma, there is the dilemma of securitizing or at least overly politicizing aspects of EU-Balkan relations that affect candidate countries as well as their citizens. This includes inconsistencies in applying EU standards or granting accession status, which suggested that rather than following impartial standards the process is subject to political conditions. It also includes linking the granting of visa liberalization, which arguably would benefit civil society and help individual citizens relate to and better understand the EU, to conditions including border control and migration management but also to broader political conditions to do with accession (see Balfour, 2008; Knaus and Stiglmayer, 2009). EU policy towards the EaP countries is less affected by these specific dilemmas but not free of them entirely. Less than clashing norms and assumptions that veer between integration 14

15 and securitization, the case is rather that the EU has securitized the official language surrounding the ENP in general by linking it rhetorically to CFSP when, in reality, not all agreements prioritize political conditions. In addition, the ENP and CFSP are decided and implemented separately; and when the EU has launched a limited number of CSDP missions in ENP countries. 2. Values in practice a. Implementation experiences When it comes to values in practice, this report proposes an assessment of implementation experience according to five separate factors: first, whether the CSDP missions have been fulfilling their mandates and the values enshrined in them; second, to what extent there has been accountability in the missions; third, the manner in which individual mandates have been interpreted; fourth, the nature of civil-military relations and any effect on values; fifth, the direct or indirect effects of external intervention through CFSP/CDSDP on internal reform; and sixth, the position of the CFSP/CSDP on the internal-external security continuum. The mission analysis along these five factors in turn facilitates the discussion of ethical consequences in the next section. i. Have the missions fulfilled their mandates? Generally speaking, most analyses of individual CSDP missions conclude that by and large the missions indeed have fulfilled their mandates. As for the military operations, both Concordia in FYROM and Althea in Bosnia successfully contributed to a stable, secure environment in support of the implementation of the Ohrid and Dayton peace agreements, respectively, and to assist local authorities as well as support the EUSR/High Representative for Bosnia. Current consideration of a diminishing in size in the case of Althea also include a possible evolution of the operation towards a non-executive capacity-building and training operation (see Council of the European Union, 2009). As to the civilian missions, conclusions are equally positive if slightly more complicated on account of arguments that mandates have been tailored to fit mission success rather than needs on the ground. 15

16 A brief analysis of two individual missions broadly confirms the fulfillment of individual mandates. In FYROM, EUPOL Proxima as well as the Police Advisory Team EUPAT were charged with monitoring, mentoring and advising on the consolidation of law and order; implementing a comprehensive reform of the Ministry of the Interior; operational transition and creation of a border police; and building confidence between the local police and population. Reforms have been implemented; and trust in the police among the Macedonian population has increased considerably (see Ioannides, 2007). EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, tasked with setting up and advising officials on a customs and border regime, has largely succeeded in its focus on technical aspects to do with border control that is, joint border operations, and the establishment of a customs regime (see Dura, 2009). The case of Bosnia and Georgia, on the other hand, reveals shortcomings due to a mix of planning shortfalls and implementation gaps. In Bosnia, the mission mandate had to be adjusted to adequately reflect operational requirements and abilities. The police mission EUPM was tasked to establish a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service; assist local authority in the fight against organized crime and contribute to an improved functioning of the whole criminal justice system. While EUPM can look to some achievements, the mandate of the mission was adjusted twice in light of perceived shortcomings both in terms of the mission s task list as well as the imprecise mandate (see Merlingen, 2009). EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia, tasked with the development of a reform strategy of the criminal justice sector on the other hand suffered from the formulation of overly ambitious mission objectives for a one-year mission and a belated strategy development that negatively impacted the fulfillment of the mandate (see Kurowska, 2009). ii. What are the accountability provisions in the missions? The question of accountability generally can be tackled from two perspectives: accountability to the sending entity that is, the EU, its member states and the citizenry; to the host government and society. The first concerns mechanisms of mission oversight; the second includes the accountability of mission personnel as well as mission implementation on the ground in general. 16

17 There also is a broader issue of accountability in terms of democratic legitimacy, where it has been argued that national parliaments have little control over decisions taken at the European level, including mission oversight that is entrusted to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Growing decision-making competence at the European level without adequate parliamentary control, coupled with an increasing number of military deployment in a multinational framework has led analysts to warn of a double democratic deficit at the national and the European level (see Wagner, 2006). The fact that national parliaments only vote for missions once they have been decided on the European level (as was the case in FYROM operation Concordia) further weakens democratic accountability mechanisms (see Bono, 2005). The applicability of human rights in military peace operations is a legally complex and controversial issue. The EU s underlying values and principles to human rights require accountability and it has been noted that sending states capacities for disciplinary action and prosecution for personnel may require some enhancement (see Naert, 2007). Indeed, the issue of accountability of personnel is somewhat of a grey zone. Staff seconded from member states (predominantly military but also civilian) is held accountable in the member states. EU personnel, on the other hand, are subject to the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPPC) and the Civilian Operations Commander, who have the authority to sack personnel (Derived from interview with policy expert, May 2010). Human rights accountability mechanisms in the individual missions exist to the extent that human rights advisors are present in some missions, including EUPM. However it tends to be assumed that the general value commitments to human rights in EU policy also extend to EU missions in terms of the missions operational activities. iii. How have European standards been interpreted in mission activities? Given the rather broad wording of mission mandate, there is considerable scope for interpretation on the part of mission staff and leadership when it comes to standards. Here one can observe both a lack of uniformity in practice but also of agreement on what constitute European standards in the first place. Indeed, there 17

18 has been a tendency to invent standards on the part of individual institutional actors (information derived from IES/INEX workshop 11 February 2010). Due to the small size of missions the formulation of standards can reflect the approach of those serving in the mission. And, on-the-spot coordination informs the implementation of mission goals to the extent that whatever it is to be understood by European standards will be decided on the spot (cited in Hobbing, 2008: 249) With respect to the introduction of European standards in policing, for instance, the common general commitment to the upholding of human rights and the rule of law does not translate into uniform implementation in practice. Rather, 27 member states practice 27 policing methods informed by national practice and often, the nationality of the Head of Mission represents an important factor: if the boss is German, the rules are German; if he s Italian, they re Italian (cited in Hobbing, 2008: 249). Granted, the common commitment to the same basic values across the EU means that implementing these values using different national method is unlikely to cause harm to the host country. However, the lack of standards represents a disadvantage for the EU when it comes to communicating EU rules to the member states, other international actors present on the ground, or indeed the governments hosting the missions. Importantly, the EU often operates alongside other international actors, including NATO, the OSCE and the US. This means that beyond the need to harmonize standards within the EU for more coherent implementation practices, there have also been incidences of differences with respect to standards in the broader international community in Kosovo, for instance, differences between the EU and the US over the benefit of their respective legal systems have resulted in Kosovo implementing two incompatible border control systems, one favored by Washington, the other by Brussels (International Crisis Group 2010: 1). This shows that broader political forces act on the EU s and mission personnel s ability to interpret and implement a coherent set of standards. 18

19 iv. What was the nature of civil-military relations, and how has that affected values? The increasing intermeshing of civil-military relations represents a consequence of modern peace operations and reveals a new definition of security. Both military and police forces have become stakeholders in security governance and peace operations. With respect to CFSP/CSDP this is reflected in Bosnia, where EUPM and EUFOR Althea operate concurrently; and in Kosovo where EULEX Kosovo operates alongside NATO s KFOR. Obstacles to civil-military relations have included difficulties in separating functions; variation in civil-military traditions among the participating nation-states but also international organizations; and overlapping mandates. Specifically in Bosnia, separating the functions of the civilian mission and military operation has not been without conflict: EUFOR Althea, although initially tasked with providing a safe and secure environment undertook law enforcement activities in the fight against organized crime. Some of this was done on account of EUPM s weak and non-executive mandate but did affect EUPM s lead role. While the mandate of EUPM was adjusted accordingly and while the EU managed to better delineate mission tasks and hierarchy between missions, the example of Bosnia shows that discrepancies exist even within a single organization. In Kosovo, it has been argued that the variation of civil-military traditions among participating member states has led to value conflicts in implementation. Fundamentally, the practice of KFOR patrolling with Kosovo police forces rather than UNMIK at the time represents a value conflict with respect to norms of delineating police and military functions and to avoid a tendency to rely on the military for policing functions that the EU is committed to uphold (Intervention at IES/INEX workshop, 11 February 2010). With respect to civil-military relations, then, the lack of uniformity in standards when it comes to national but also organizational practice does have negative consequences with respect to values. This also has to do with the delineation of NATO and EULEX tasks, the division of labor between the two missions and their interface with the Kosovo elites but also populations. 19

20 v. What were the direct and indirect effects of external intervention on internal reform? When it comes to the effects of external EU intervention on local reform processes, evidence shows that the EU s record varies among countries and missions settings. It also shows a tendency to emphasize technical aspects of missions rather than broader political reform goals that the EU s interventions seek to foster. This is particularly the case in those countries where missions operate in a highly politicized context such as Kosovo or Georgia. Broadly speaking, political impact goes beyond technical expertise found in individual CSDP missions; and in order for the EU to muster political impact it must align its political instruments and objectives with those of its implementation tools CSDP missions included. The analysis of individual missions and geographic settings reflects this. While it may be too soon to evaluate the effect of EULEX Kosovo on internal reform the mission s operational phase commenced on 9 December 2008, two dilemmas on mission effects have been identified. The first is that of its place in EU foreign policy more broadly. With member states divided on the question of Kosovo s international recognition, the mission s place in the broader political context is questionable. And, the mission s success in tackling the root causes of organized crime and corruption and striking the right balance between the mission s executive functions and that of local ownership at the time of writing remains an open question (see Grevi, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2010). In Georgia, THEMIS did succeed in drafting a justice reform strategy designed to bring Georgia closer to European standards. However, the EU s overall strategy towards the country, including its EU Monitoring Mission as a response to the August 2008 war, remains bedeviled by incoherence and overlap between EU and member states commitments and by the absence of a common strategy vis-à-vis Russia. As a result, the potential of the EU either through CSDP or through the EaP to play a constructive role in conflict prevention is severely limited (Bosse, 2010 forthcoming). Similarly, in EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, the EU has yielded results in terms of technical progress including establishing customs procedures and facilitating the interdiction of large-scale smuggling operations it is 20

21 questionable whether the EU has contributed towards a broader political solution to the Transnistrian conflict. The EU s record in Bosnia is more substantive on account of the timeframe but also the intensity (in terms of financial contributions, mission size but also the number of instruments deployed) of the EU s commitment. This has not, however, necessarily translated into impact in terms of internal reform. Law enforcement in Bosnia continues to face structural problems, and there continues to be political interference in high-level cases. Coupled with shortages in manpower and resources along with a complex and often dead-locked political environment, this has curtailed the influence of externally-assisted reforms despite the fact that EUPM has played an important role in making local police more accountable, professionalizing training, and improving resource management (Merlingen, 2009). vi. Where on the internal-external security continuum are the external CFSP/CSDP interventions located? The missions discussed in this report, due to their emphasis on organized crime and border issues, incorporate elements of internal security either in the EU s concern with the border generally or in the EU s involvement of FRONTEX in the implementation of EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine mission. EUBAM also shows a strong link to the EU s internal security because its launch was helped by the fact that the imminent accession of Romania in 2007 also made it imperative for the EU to ensure that a lawful, orderly and effective control of goods, vehicles and people existed at the common border between two of its new neighbors, Moldova and Ukraine (Dura, 2009: 276) b. Ethical consequences i. Values for whom? Local ownership, accountability, and civil society relations Analyzing the EU s values in practice in the previous section of this report has revealed a number of potential value dilemmas that can have ethical consequences. While not all of the implementation practices create ethical dilemmas, the questions of accountability and the identification but also the targeting of value 21

22 recipients through EU policy implementation have concrete consequences. These consequences include the role of host governments in the design and implementation of reform efforts; the inclusion of civil society in reform efforts; and the question of accountability in conjunction with civil society relations. All three raise the same question in different forms: who are these values for - the EU, or local societies? While it should not automatically assumed that the two are mutually exclusive, CFSP/CSDP implementation records show that EU policies can have (unintended) divisive consequences. The case of Kosovo is illustrative of the consequences of the international community as the predominant actor driving the pace and progress of internal reforms. Granted, governance performance has been found weak in many areas (see European Commission, 2009), and corruption and a weak rule of law interfere with market reforms. Yet, international interference runs the risk of marginalizing the host government (International Crisis Group, 2010). At the same time, the government is a crucial component in sustained implementation efforts but also effective coordination with the international community. Without local ownership understood as political will, capability and leadership in cooperating with the international community CSDP missions but also international reform efforts more broadly run the risk of undermining the goals they are trying to foster through their interventions. The second area where implementation can have ethical consequences is that of the emphasis (or lack thereof) on civilian policing; that is, the inclusion of civil society in mission programming and implementation. Here, it has been argued that the concerns of civil society that is, for the police to take up citizens concerns and to enjoy a level of trust on the part of the local populations - has not sufficiently, or only belatedly been taken into account (see Ioannides, 2007). This is of importance particularly in post-conflict situations or in countries with little or non-existing democratic traditions where the population does not perceive the police as benign social actor. Similarly, concerns over human security that were prominent in debates but also reflected in mission mandates through, for instance, human rights training have now shifted towards an emphasis on capacity building and technical assistance specifically in the fields of border policing and fighting 22

23 organized crime (see Schroeder, 2009). As has been argued in previous sections of this report, the emphasis on technical aspects as a means of sidestepping broader political issues can lead to adverse consequences for the attainment of mission objectives but also broader political goals. In the European borderlands in particular, given the dual objectives of attaining stability and a degree of integration, the question of values for whom and of the nature of accountability are particularly pressing. This is because it raises the broader issue of accountability, civil society relations and opens the EU to charges of neo-colonialism or colonialism by default (see Krastev, 2005) in the way in which it conceptualizes and implements policies towards its neighbors. Such an outcome, of course, is diametrically opposed to the EU s own values as well as its intentions towards its borderlands. Yet, it highlights the need for discussion over accountability of the reformers but also the host government and the need to place discussions over accountability in a political and strategic context rather than view EU activities in merely technical, capacity-building terms. ii. Stabilization, integration and the role of political conditionality A second area where EU interventions can have adverse ethical consequences is in the individual policies diverging and potentially contradictory objectives but also in the lack of consistency in the application of political instruments. Interestingly, ethical considerations (or the lack thereof) can have concrete consequences for policy effectiveness. For instance, observers have noted that when domestic elites in the Balkans perceive the EU s conditionality as driven by self-interest rather than by the spread of norms, compliance the EU s transformative power is weakened which then leads the EU to impose compliance (Noutcheva, 2007). Thus, the EU needs to resolve the dilemma between transforming and imposing change: in Kosovo and Bosnia the EU has a hard presence through the establishment of protectorates, but faces the challenge of devolving its presence towards fostering local ownership and focusing on the accession process. 23

24 3. Conclusion This report has demonstrated that value assumptions underlying the EU s foreign policy but also its crisis management instruments can result in contradictory practices. This is not necessarily because these practices or their underlying value assumptions clash outright but often also because these policies are conceptualized and implemented separately without much considerations over whether or not they result in a comprehensive approach towards a particular country, region or policy problem (see Schroeder, 2007). Current debates over the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, ongoing security challenges emanating from the Balkans but also the broader Eastern borderlands and enlargement fatigue on the part of the EU s member states. In a period where the EU is torn between fear of its neighbors (see Tassinari, 2009) and a continued investment in integration and partly as a result has side-stepped thorny political questions by focusing on technical aspects of state and institution-building many of these tensions have crystallized. 4. Annex a. Table of CSDP Missions in the Western Balkans and Eastern neighborhood (source: Grevi, G., Keohane, D. and Helly, D., 2007) i. MILITARY CSDP OPERATIONS Name Dates Troop Level Budget Contributing states Objectives Legal Basis EUFOR ALTHEA/ BiH ongoing CONCOR- DIA FYROM completed Since EUR 71.1 mio. 350 EUR 6.2 mio. 20 EU member states, Albania, Chile, FYROM, Switzerland and Turkey 13 EU member states and 14 third states To maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH and to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris agreement; to support the international community s High Representative/EU Special Representative for BiH; to assist local authorities. To contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of theaugust 2001 Ohrid Frame work Agreement. Council Joint Action 2004/5 70/CFS P of 12 July 2004 Council Joint Action 2003/9 2/CFSP of 27 January

25 ii. CIVILIAN CSDP MISSIONS Name Dates Missio n Strengt h EUPM Bosnia EULEX Kosovo Since January 2003 Since (2009) 1642 (2009) Budget EUR 12.4 mio. (2009) EUR 265 mio Contributing states 27 EU Member States, Canada, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine 26 EU Member States; Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Croatia, Canada and the US. Objectives To strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organized crime and corruption; to assist and support in the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organized crime and corruption; to assist and promote development of criminal investigative capacities of BiH; to enhance police-prosecution cooperation; to strengthen police-penitentiary system cooperation; to contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability. To support the Kosovo authorities in all areas related to the rule of law. Legal Basis Council Joint Action 2002/2 10/CFS P on 11 March 2002 Council Joint Action 2008/1 24/CFS P of 4 Februar y 2008 EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) Since EUR 24 mio. EU member states; Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan To assist and advise Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and customs officials. Council Joint Action 2005/7 76/CFS P of 7 Novem ber 2005 EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia EU Police Mission (EUPOL) Since EUR 49.6 mio. 24 EU member states EU member states; Norway, Switzerland, Civilian monitoring of conflict parties behavior, including full compliance with the six-point agreement of 12 August Monitoring, mentoring and advising on the consolidation of law and order, including the Council Joint Action 2008/7 36/CFS P of 15 Septem ber 2008 Council Joint Action 25