"The American Occupation of Japan" Jeremi Suri E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison TRANSCRIPT

Transcription

1 "The American Occupation of Japan" Jeremi Suri E. Gordon Fox Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison TRANSCRIPT Jeremi Suri: All right. Today, we're going to discuss the American occupation of Japan. And I want to begin with this photo --certainly one of the most famous immediate post-war photographs. That's Emperor Hirohito, OK. This is a photograph taken during the American occupation of Japan, which is the subject of our discussion, the subject of our lecture today. We'll come back to this, but notice two things, among many, in this photograph. Notice how much, not just taller and larger MacArthur is, notice how much more informal MacArthur is relative to Hirohito in this photograph. There is nothing in this photograph that is there by accident, right? This is the informal American who is towering over the formal, somewhat obedient Japanese emperor. That is clearly the image MacArthur wanted. It is, I would argue, the image one gets from this photograph. Notice a second thing about it. Notice that MacArthur is not in civilian attire; he's in Army fatigues, right? And notice that the emperor is not in traditional Japanese attire; he's in formal business attire. That's also important, also very important. This is a collaboration between the American military and the Japanese civilian leadership. Very important. That's the other point that's getting across here. Notice Hirohito is not in a military uniform. Notice MacArthur is. OK? Very important point in this photograph. On the 14th of August, 1945, this man, Emperor Hirohito announced, for the first time, on Japanese radio--it was the first time most Japanese citizens had heard his voice, the first time he spoke on radio. We're accustomed to Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats and the stories about those. The Emperor, for the first time, addressed the Japanese people by radio on the 14th of August, 1945, announcing that the nation would surrender to the United States. The emperor, who himself had been a strong proponent of the war but would not admit to it, claimed that he was now going to provide the Japanese people with the relief that they needed, that he would remain the father of the Japanese people, he would remain their godly figure at home, but that now, due to superior American force, the Japanese would have to bow out of the war that they themselves had initiated. Though again, he did not put it, obviously, in those terms. The Japanese surrender announced by Hirohito on the 14th of August was a moment, as you all know, of great elation and relief for American citizens. After four long years of war, following almost a decade of depression, American citizens finally felt that they had worked themselves out of difficult economic, political, and military times. 1

2 They felt they had more great challenges before them, but, for the first time in at least five years, they were not at war, nor suffering from the immediate presence of a war on their shores. The American people felt vindicated, vindicated in the response to the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. This was also a moment of great relief and a moment of anguish for Japanese citizens. For Japanese citizens, the terrible ordeal of war was over. As much as Americans felt the sacrifice, felt the pinch, felt the difficulty of war during World War II, the Japanese felt things, especially in the latter years, much, much worse. For the Japanese civilian population, they had lived through years of privation, years of meager rations, years of death and destruction to their own homes. If you lived in Tokyo, the likelihood was that your home no longer existed. If you lived in any major urban area, the likelihood was that your home no longer existed. There was hardly a family in Japan that was not touched by multiple deaths in war. Americans were touched by the war, but the American casualty rate is far, far lower than anything the Japanese suffered. There was not a family in Japan that did not lose multiple relatives. For the Japanese, this was a moment of humility, a moment of, to some extent, humiliation, but also a moment of great relief. The crucial point for us to remember is that, as much as Japanese resented the loss of the war--and many of them did--this man was still a hero to them. They did not blame him for the war, for the most part. Nonetheless, the Japanese knew they had lost the war. There was no one, or virtually no one, in Japan who argued that Japan had not lost, had not lost badly. There was no one arguing that Japan had been stabbed in the back, OK? This is a crucial difference from World War I. At the end of World War II, the Japanese know, accept, recognize that they have lost the war. And that is the basis for the American occupation. This is not a contested occupation. It's contested over what the occupation should be, but no one contests the fact that the Japanese have lost the war. What is unprecedented in this moment is not the loss of war by a country, but the degree to which Japan is now subject to the occupation by a foreign society. Unlike many of its neighbors in Asia, unlike many of its counterparts in other parts of the world, Japan had never before been occupied. This is the first time that a major foreign power occupied virtually all of Japan, dictating the development of political and social life in Japan. Now, for the United States, this was also an unprecedented moment, because while the United States had acquired a limited number of colonies and certainly taken on a more interventionist, international role during the early part of the 20th century, the United States had never occupied a society, occupied a country of the size, industrial capability, and of the power of Japan. What I would argue is that the United States--in occupying the Philippines, in occupying Cuba, in occupying Haiti, in occupying the Dominican Republic--was occupying small 2

3 societies, societies that were difficult enough to occupy, but societies that did not have the reservoirs of strength, power, national unity, and traditions of independence that Japan had. The Japanese population in 1940 totaled 73 million people. That was slightly lower by the end of the war, obviously, but the United States was now in control of a very large population. And Japan was one of the largest and most sophisticated industrial countries in the world, all under American occupation. The key point for today's lecture, the key point of departure, the key thesis I want everyone to keep in mind is that, starting in 1945, when the United States finds itself, after the Japanese surrender, in control of the Japanese islands, that neither the United States government nor the Japanese government that's in place has any plans for the occupation, that in fact the plans for occupation that exist are abstract and general, and that they do not in fact govern day to day affairs. The story of the American occupation of Japan is a story of adaptation. It's a story of negotiation. This is a negotiation--unequal negotiation, but negotiation nonetheless. It's a story of uncertainty. The plans Americans had did not provide guidance in any detail to the actual occupation. The story of the occupation is a story of constant interaction, constant embracing and distancing between different groups, between in particular the American occupation authorities and the Japanese government, as well as the American people and the Japanese people in the Japanese islands. And I'll argue today that the accomplishments of the American occupation, as well as its shortcomings, were accomplishments and shortcomings of, basically, on a daily basis, figuring out how to deal with a common set of problems. Daily adaptation, daily negotiation, daily resolve to uncertainty, was the basis for the American occupation. And, I will argue, the American occupation achieved remarkable things, but also had gaping shortcomings. And the accomplishments and shortcomings are understandable, not because of some grand plan, but because of the daily development of political activities on the Japanese islands during this period. In particular today--and I want everyone to think a lot about this--i will argue that the course of Japanese, Asian, and American history is reset at this moment, in directions in which no one could have predicted nor anyone would have assumed at the time. And the transformation that occurs is due to the interaction between these two men and many of the other people working with them, behind them, and against them at this time. We'll talk in today's lecture about the achievements of the American occupation; and they were great, I would argue. We'll talk about the shortcomings; and they were gaping. And then we'll talk about the legacies, the ways in which this really is a moment in which we can argue that the international system is transformed but transformed in ways that no 3

4 one single entity was in control of at that time. PART I: ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OK? So let's begin with the achievements of the American occupation. The United States in taking control of Japan, takes control of a society that was, in fact, the most militaristic society - in terms of the degree of its military development, in terms of its history of aggression and in terms of its ideology of dominance over its neighbors within Asia at the time. The United States takes control of a society that has no real history of democracy. This is not to criticize Japanese history, it has a history of many other forms of government, but not anything like what we would call democracy today. And it's a society that, over the last 20 years at least, has been engaged in constant rivalry and in the last 10 years - even the five years preceding the war - major conflict with the United States. So, this is the United States taking control of a society that one would not expect to move in the directions towards which Japanese society in fact moves - as we all know - after I will argue that the central achievement of the American occupation is not to implant democracy or implant demilitarization, but to find a way on a daily basis - working with the Japanese, who do most of the work - to create unprecedented transformations in Japanese society. Once again, the United States does not come in with a template and oppose this on Japan, but the Japanese did not do it themselves either. And I would argue to you it would not have happened in Japanese society without the American presence. More complicated, I would argue, it would not have happened in Japanese society without the presence of Douglas MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur is especially after the Korean War - and we'll spend a lot of time talking about his role in the Korean War - recognized as, in fact, one of the greatest threats to civilian leadership within American society in the second half of the 20th century. This is a man who explicitly disobeyed the President's orders during the Korean War. A man who thought of himself as a general, being above the President in In 1945 he thought of himself in similar terms, he thought of himself as the new emperor of Japan in many ways. But, for all of MacArthur's anti-democratic behavior - and we'll talk about it in the Japanese context - he also, at the same time, had a firm belief in American democratic principles. This was a man who took his West Point education very, very seriously. He was one of the most distinguished graduates at West Point and any of you who know about the educational system at West Point know that it stresses among other things, a serious reading of American foundational documents and a serious belief in American foundational principles. Whether applied accurately or not. 4

5 This was a man who believed that Japan, under his occupation, should learn in his words, "To embrace the enlightened ideals of American governance." Now, this is not to say that he was responsible entirely or even largely for this, but it is to say that MacArthur never doubted his own righteousness and never doubted the possible applicability of these ideals to a society that had had no experience with them before. Other leaders, other intellectuals would have questioned this decision, but MacArthur himself never questioned it. Whether he was right or wrong is debatable, but it no doubt had a significant influence upon Japanese society. TRANSFORMATION IN JAPANESE MILITARISM. Let's begin by talking about the transformation in Japanese militarism. MacArthur comes into a society where the man he's standing next to here was not only a religious figure head, but also seen as an embodiment of the Japanese military and spiritual, spiritual purpose in the world. He was a man who had, though he later denied it, been a strong advocate of militarization and had defined the Japanese mission in the world - a Godly mission, he saw it - as dominance over Asia. Japan had rightful claims, he argued, to control over Asia and to do it through military means. The story of the Japanese and their actions in China and Korea makes this quite clear. There was no army more brutal than the Japanese in those two contexts. There might have been others that equaled them, but it's hard to find one that was more brutal. In Nanking, for example, the Japanese army in , as you all know, was responsible for countless rapes of local civilians. Rapes that were not only committed by local soldiers, rapes that were ordered by the top leadership. In order to take control of the society. In order to implant Japanese dominance over the society. In order to ethnically cleanse the society. They didn't use that term, but that's what the Japanese were arguing for. In Korea, the Japanese pursued a similar set of policies. Anyone who questions the degree of animosity still felt between Chinese and Japanese or between Koreans and Japanese, go to this moment. Go to World War II, that's your explanation in many respects. The Japanese had clearly then, a deep history of militarization and brutal military behavior. They were not the only ones, but they were certainly responsible for a lot of it. MacArthur comes in and one of the first things he does is put together a group of Japanese civilians, as well as American civilians, who will rewrite the Japanese constitution, explicitly aimed at taking the power out of the hands of the militarists in Japan. The Japanese constitution of 1947 is a remarkable document. It is a document signed by the Emperor. It is a document in which the Emperor remains a figurehead of Japan, but it is a document that explicitly prohibits the use of the Japanese military in war. 5

6 The Japanese constitution of 1947 explicitly prohibits the Japanese from having a traditional military. It explicitly prohibits Japan from pursuing any militaristic course towards its neighbors. And, in fact, that provision in the Japanese constitution lives on to this day. It is now a contested issue and the Japanese might, in fact, take it out of their constitution. But it is there, put in large part because of the pressure from MacArthur. MacArthur argues, and the Japanese accept in many respects, the sense that the future of Japanese peace and development requires a turn away from militarization and most significantly, he argues based upon the American experience. (Now think about this, this is military man making an argument that a society should not have a military.) He argues that the strength of the American system, in his eyes, has been that the military does not call the shots. And that the constitution in Japan must be set up to prevent the military from calling the shots. This is an American general telling the Japanese not to let generals make decisions. It's an extraordinary moment, an extraordinary moment. Yes, MacArthur is not practicing what he preaches, but yes MacArthur is also having an enormous effect upon the reorganization of Japanese society. Now, the Japanese deserve most of the credit. Japanese leaders embraced this point. Japanese civilian leaders, including Hirohito embrace this part of the constitution. In fact they turn it to a virtue. In remaking their society, they seek to remake the image of Japan now as a peace loving society, a society that will contribute to the positive development of its neighbors, rather than conflict with its neighbors. This is a way of recreating the Japanese place in the world, and it is embraced by the Japanese leadership. The Japanese also find a way to work with MacArthur around some of the problems that this provision creates. The Japanese create a self-defense force. They're not allowed to have a military force for use in traditional warfare, but they are allowed a self-defense force. A basic force to defend their borders against Korean and other incursions today, North Korean incursions, for example. This self-defense force, as most of you know I would guess, is now the basis for the existing Japanese military. The self-defense, while it is not a traditional military, is in most terms one of the largest militaries in the world. So the Japanese do develop a military of their own, but they develop it under the auspices that make it illegitimate for its use outside of Japanese self-defense. It's only recently the Japanese have even sent ships as aid mechanisms, such as military support mechanisms outside of Japanese waters. And the self-defense force is clearly not to be used for aggression against other societies. The Japanese redefine, under MacArthur's influence and under their own determination to change the place of their society in the world. They redefine their foreign policy from one of militarism to one of international aide and peaceful cooperation.this is something embraced by the Japanese because of their clear recognition that they lost the war; clear recognition that the prior approach to military activities was counter productive and embraced because of the influence of MacArthur 6

7 and others. The Japanese Constitution of 1947 is one of the most successful documents ever written to transform a society-and it is largely written by an American General working with local civilians. POLICIAL DEMOCRACY The Japanese Constitution does something else even more significant than the demilitarization of Japanese society it democratizes or contributes to the democratization of Japan. Japan before the end of World War II had no -- as I said before -- no real history of political democracy in the sense in which we talk about it. Japan had a long history of various kinds of government with various virtues of their own. So, this is not a criticism; but it is to say as a political democracy as we recognize it today did not exist in Japan before The United States works with local Japanese -- many of whom had been arguing for democratic reform going as far back as the '20s -- the United States works with many of those groups to transform Japanese society and to in fact create; political, social and cultural structures in Japan that are far more democratic. And this is not something that is planned in any significant way. MacArthur comes with a sense in which he wishes to democratize Japanese society, but how MacArthur's going to do this he doesn't know until he gets there. This is determined and debated and discussed and formulated; on a daily basis. JAPANESE PARLIAMENT (The Diet) One of the first things that's done in 1946 is that a Japanese Parliament; a true parliament with true parliamentary legislative powers is created -- the Japanese Diet. There had already been numerous Japanese Parliaments but this Diet is created and it's created as an amalgam of American and Japanese ideas towards political democracy. The Diet has representative leadership, people elected from different parts of the country and the Diet has a role in approving legislation. That sounds very American; representative democracy. What's Japanese about the Diet is that the Diet is organized along corporate lines. Which is to say; that the parties are not designed to be competitive with one another but to be cooperative with one another. The Diet is designed to embrace communal structures rather than an individualistic approach to democratic governance, as is assumed in the United States. That is to say that the Diet representatives are not elected simply to represent -- not thought of simply as representing individual constituencies -- they are seen as representing different parts of an organic Japanese community. The ways in which representation is discussed in Japan is reformulated to both mix American and Japanese sensibilities. That's part of it but there is much more to it than that. Who is represented in Japan is a crucial transformation that involves again 7

8 cooperation and negotiation between American and Japanese authorities. One of the most vocal and active groups in Japan after World War II are women. Women are arguing for political voice that they did not have before. There are numerous educated women in Japan who had been, in some ways, forced to keep their mouths shut; but who had been against the war for quite some time and had been arguing, at least informally, for political representation. There is a long story of shall we say feminist activism in the political realm within Japan dating back to the late 19th century. And in fact Japan had a very active and impressive group of women political activists. They had not been able to break through the structures of Japanese leadership until the end of World War II. MacArthur is no feminist. Please don't get me as saying that is all. He is not, not in any sense. But MacArthur in arriving in Japan recognizes very quickly or at least his advisors recognize the power of this body. This female political grouping which represents a large proportion of the political population within Japan is active is embracing reform and believes that the future of Japan is a future of democratic and peaceful change. MacArthur responding to this -- responding to the pressure of women within Japan, will move quickly to force -- and this is a case where he uses force, to force the Japanese leadership (Hirohito) to give women the right to vote. In giving women political rights in Japan the political landscape has changed as it had not been before. For the first time the Japanese leadership must appeal to issues that it did not appeal to before. The image of the militaristic; self sacrificing Japanese male is now challenged by a feminization of Japanese politics that now involves an attention to family, an attention to internal development. An attention that we would call quality of life features. One could argue that the development of a Japanese welfare state to replace the Japanese militarist state is a function of women in Japan asserting their role in politics. This makes a huge difference. And in fact there are a number of women who play an active role working with MacArthur and actually formulating provisions for legal protection to women. All of this; the broadening of political representation, the inclusion of women as not before, and the creation of real representative bodies in Japan, but representative bodies that are connected with local traditions; not just imposed by the United States, creates what one historian calls a culture of democracy in Japan that did not exist before. Historian John Dower argues that a culture of democracy is actually the most significant transformation in Japan. He argues that what you see from the period of the American occupation is Japanese citizens filling a stake of their own in democratic change. For various reasons; often for anti-american as well as pro-american reasons, Japanese groupings Japanese citizens will embrace the idea of democracy, will embrace control 8

9 over their government, will embrace a new approach to political order; because they now see a stake in it for themselves. The Japanese now develop a more informal structure of social interaction. Worker organizations are now included in political representation-though limited in their actual dominance over political representation. Moral rigidity breaks-down in a way it hadn't before. Japanese citizens are allowed more personal freedoms, embrace more personal freedoms. Education is reformed; both to American and Japanese influence. Within Japan now education becomes something less controlled by the military, less controlled by assertions of Japanese national superiority and more committed to cosmopolitan interaction with foreign societies. The Japanese begin to learn English for example as they had not before. And most significantly, at least some historians argue, Japanese citizens are now given a stake in the economy as they have not before. Under American leadership with push, control and influence from the Japanese the United States reforms the structure of land ownership in Japan. Land ownership; this is in the words of some historians, the end of the futile history of Japan and the beginning of a more capitalist history. What does that mean? It means that most land and most major economic power in Japan had been held by people like Hirohito until the end of World War II. Aristocrats; dominate inherited elites controlled the wealth as well as the politics of Japan. After World War II; United States working with local groups reapportions - not necessarily the control over the economy but the control over daily economic resources. Land is redistributed to smaller farmers in Japan. Smaller groupings are given access to economic control, ownership of society; ownership of companies; ownership of the means of production within society. There is a democratization of the Japanese economy as well as a democratization of Japanese politics. All of this occurs under MacArthur's' leadership. None of it occurs exclusively because of MacArthur, but all of it is influenced-- one way or another, by interactions between MacArthur, Hirohito, and other Japanese. 3) JAPANESE BECOME ALLY OF USA Third major transformation-- Third major achievement; Japanese go from being what we may call a bloody enemy of the United States to being a firm ally. It is extraordinary in fact that the United States has dropped two atomic bombs on Japan that very soon there after these two societies can become, what I would argue, are the most significant partners in the future development of Asia. It's an extraordinary moment. It is something that MacArthur believed was necessary for America's position in the world, and it's something that Hirohito believed was necessary for Japan to work its way out from the humiliation of surrender. 9

10 Hirohito makes an extraordinary decision, right? He is responsible, as I've argued, for many of the atrocities in World War II, so I don't want to exonerate him from that. But he makes a strategic and important decision, that Japan must embrace its enemies, that Japan must now find in the United States--the country it was just at war with--must define its future and partnership with the United States. This, taking you back to World War I, is exactly the kind of decision that the losers of World War I did not make, right? The Germans, in fact, made the opposite decision after World War I. The Chinese made the opposite decision after World War I. The losers of World War I continued to fight against their enemies. The losers of World War II--we'll see this in Germany as well--embraced their former enemies. And that made all the difference, all the difference in the world. And the Japanese leadership and the Japanese citizens, the Japanese militarists--for all the horrible things they did in World War II--deserve credit for that insight: that they could not continue to fight but had to now embrace those who had defeated them. HOW DID THE OCCUPATION WORK? How did this work? Well, it worked, in the beginning, by the United States playing a role and actually putting itself on Japanese territory. What do I mean by that? The United States established a permanent military presence in Japan, a presence that was designed to protect Japan and protect American interests. MacArthur did what any strategic thinker does; he said the firmest way to put together a partnership is to establish joint military interests. And Okinawa is the best example of this. Notice on this map how far Okinawa is from the main islands of Japan. Okinawa, which had only a few centuries before become part of Japan, is now made the center for all American military activities in north Asia, OK? And to this day, Okinawa remains a major part of American military strategy in Asia. This is another one of those crucial strategic areas. It's not contested anymore, but it's a crucial area, in Mahanian terms, for the projection of American power, by sea, and especially by air. After World War II, the United States establishes four major bases at Okinawa. And as far as I know, they are all still in use. There are two that are major air bases, to this day, on the island of Okinawa. These are air bases that are crucial when we talk about the Korean War next week. They are bases that were used as late as the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Desert Storm I, and were probably used more recently, as the latest date I have is from But they were still in use as late as These bases are designed to be permanent American leases. And there are now some Japanese who, for various reasons, are arguing for the United States to be forced out of these bases. That's a longstanding debate. But nonetheless, these bases are created at the end of World War II as longstanding American leases, explicitly created so that the United States can project power in Asia and protect Japan. The bases are designed to be mutually beneficial, and they are seen that way by many within the Japanese leadership. 10

11 Hirohito will in 1948 and 1949, will argue against the Japanese developing their own air force, because he will want to rely upon what he sees as the more effective and less costly, to him, American air force. He will rely upon American strength to protect the development of Japan. Hirohito's argument is that, by the United States having these firm air bases in Okinawa, the United States can protect Japan and allow Japan to focus on its internal development. OK? So the American bases are for Japan's self-protection, and of course, they are for the projection of American power. They become the basis for American containment within Asia. This is a partnership formed along military lines, even though the Japanese are not to be a militaristic society. That's very important to keep in mind. The Japanese also benefit directly from American Cold War policy in Asia. It is the spending that the United States puts into its military activities in Asia that is the initial fuel of the Japanese economy. It's a point many people forget. Let me stress that again. The Japanese economic boom that we're all familiar with--it might've come to an end a few years ago. But the growth of Japan as a major economic power--really, the second largest economy, to this day, in the world--is fueled, financed, initially by the American military. American military spending -- particularly during the Korean War, 1950 to provides a boom for the Japanese economy. It is a spending the United States employed, or uses, to buy Japanese products, the spending to put American soldiers in place, the spending to put American soldiers in place, the spending to create Japanese capabilities to contribute to warfare. The United States rebuilds the Japanese economy so the Japanese can not only prosper and become a stable society but also contribute to American defensive activities in Asia. That is fueled by the American military. That is something these two men know. They didn't plan it out, but they see it happening, and they both therefore see benefits, through partnership, in the Cold War. It's a political-economic argument, as well as a military argument. JAPANESE LEADERSHIP EMBRACES THE AMERICAN POSITION OF ANTI-COMMUNISM IN THE COLD WAR. And finally, both men, and many of their followers, many Japanese citizens, share a deep anti-communism. The Japanese society had a large communist party, dating back to the early 20th century, and the communist party resurfaces after World War II as a major political force. The Japanese leadership, under Hirohito, is deathly scared of the communist party, not solely because of possible Soviet influence, but because the communist party is opposed to the maintenance of the emperor, right? It's hard to imagine that you could have had a communist party in Japan with Hirohito staying in power, right? So many Japanese who continued to define their existence through the emperor, and the emperor himself, believed that the communists must be put 11

12 down in Japan. Therefore, the Japanese leadership embraces the American position of anti-communism in the Cold War. And of course, the United States has established an anti-communist position because of its fears of Soviet expansion. So there is collaboration between these two men, along the lines of anti-communism, as well as military and economic development. All told, by 1951, when Japan is formally granted independence under a peace treaty signed with the United States, within six years, Japan goes from being the most militaristic society in Asia to the least militaristic--at least in terms of traditional definitions--goes from being undemocratic to being one of the democratic societies in Asia, and goes from being an enemy of the United States to its closest ally. That is an incredible transformation, and that is something to which these two men, and the Japanese people, showing an extraordinary fortitude after years of war, deserve credit for. PROBLEMS AND SHORTCOMINGS But there were, of course, shortcomings. There were, of course, problems. There were, of course, difficulties and things that were intentionally overlooked or neglected out of ignorance at the time. And I want to spend a little time on those, because this is not a totally rosy picture; this is a mixed picture. And each of the achievements had its shortcomings. Democracy, as embraced by the Japanese, as instituted by the Japanese and American leadership, was not consistent. This was democracy from above. This was democracy with particular aims. This was democracy with prejudice. "When is democracy not with prejudice?" one must ask. The Supreme Commander, MacArthur, was the key influence, in terms of actual legislation about democracy, and the emperor. These were not democratic figures. The Japanese party that's created to oversee, in the Diet, the development of Japanese democratic institutions is the so-called Liberal Democratic Party that ruled Japan until a few years ago. The Liberal Democratic Party becomes the dominant party. This is not a multi-party system. This is not a system with various points of political view given air. This is a system that is embracing more people, allowing more people to participate, but not allowing more political ideologies to flow across society. And it is a democracy, for all the dispersion of resources among different groups, it still remains dominated by a small group of elites. It still does to this day, in fact. Japanese political and economic development is dominated by the zaibatsu. The zaibatsu are the traditional economic conglomerates. The groupings of, in American terms, corporatist elites -- elites in business, labor, and government that have dominated the Japanese economy. They continued to dominate the political structure of Japan after World War II for one simple reason, they're the ones working with MacArthur. They're 12

13 the ones collaborating with them. They're the ones who work with the emperor. So these elites, the ones who made war in a new democratic structure, remain the most powerful elements within Japan. They continue to dominate the economy. Mitsubishi, everyone's heard of Mitsubishi, right? Mitsubishi is one of the zaibatsu. They made the Japanese aircraft that were used, some of them to bomb Pearl Harbor. They, then, will work with the United States to make automobiles after World War II. They remain in power. The reverse course of 1948 makes this, in fact, legislatively the case, because the reverse course of 1948 in particular is called the reverse course because MacArthur determines with the Japanese leadership, in 1948, that it would be too damaging to investigate collaboration with militarists among the political elites. The reverse course is a reverse away from prosecution of military criminals toward embracing them for political stability, anti-communism, and economic development in Asia. It's a reversal of an inclination to prosecute war criminals. It's now a determination to integrate them. That's the reverse course of And it gives the zaibatsu a lease on life. They continue to dominate Japanese society. They dominate it because they work with MacArthur. And MacArthur is doing this by embracing and encouraging free expression, but also censoring people who say things he doesn't like. OK? There has never been, before 1945, a time when the Japanese had a freer press than the years after World War II. And there was never a time when they had more censorship at the same time. Those were not mutually exclusive positions. There was a flowering of Japanese opinion, but there were also clear boundaries set up. You could not, by law, criticize the American Occupation during the occupation. And MacArthur closed newspapers, censored movies, and censored individuals for criticizing the American Occupation when they did so. He allowed and encouraged more free expression, but he also set key markers on it, censoring elements of it. He also accepted the Japanese determination not to talk about their own horrors in World War II. He embraced Japanese educational reformers who argued that the future of Japan was to emphasize partnership with the United States, not the atrocities committed in China or Korea. And to this day, as most of you know I think, the Japanese still refuse in their textbooks, still refuse in general public discussion, to discuss many of the horrors from World War II that they themselves committed. Very different story from Germany. There's an established, long tradition of analyzing the Holocaust in Germany. There is no real tradition in Japanese schools of studying what the Japanese did in China and Korea. In part, MacArthur is responsible for that, because MacArthur believes that too much focus upon that, too much focus upon that will undermine future partnership between Japan and its neighbors. So he contributes to a silencing of opinions about the victimization of Japanese neighbors, as well as the victimization by the United States as well. 13

14 JAPANESE TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION MacArthur's activities with building an alliance with Japan also contribute to Japanese tensions with the Soviet Union. The alliance eliminates many of the tensions between the United States and Japan and in that sense creates a more peaceful order in Asia, but it creates new tensions, new disorder in relations with the Soviet Union. As Japan becomes part of an anti-communist American alliance, as it becomes part of Kennan's Containment, and Kennan goes over to Japan in 1948 to encourage that, as that happens tensions with the Soviet Union rise. It's an inverse relationship between the, ooh I'm getting mathematical here, inverse relationship between the transformation and the relationship to the United States and the relationship to the Soviet Union. And the key area where that occurs is the Kurile Islands. Just north of Japan right? And south of the Soviet Union, OK, the Kamchatka Peninsula up there is part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union seizes these islands, these small islands, at the end of World War II. After the second American atomic bombing, the Soviet Union enters the war on August 10th, 1945, and seizes those islands. Stalin, that's what Stalin does at the end of the war. The United States and Japan contest the Soviet seizure of these islands. By the way, these islands had been seized by Japan from Russia in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War. Everyone remembers that, right? What happens though is that as part of an American alliance, these islands become a source of continued conflict with the Soviet Union. The United States, working with Japan, does not seek negotiation over these islands with the Soviet Union, nor do the Soviets. But these islands remain an area of contestation throughout the Cold War. And time and again, Japanese and Soviet fisherman, Japanese and Soviet ships will come into conflict with one another over these islands. Japan finds itself, over these islands, over Korea in a few years, over China in general, and over Vietnam, on the side of the United States fighting against the Soviet Union. And it finds itself with rising tensions toward the Soviet Union and rising fears of Soviet aggression towards Japan. The chances of any peaceful relationship between Japan and Russia are diminished by the better relations between Japan and the United States within a Cold War context. Japan is forced to take a side in the Cold War, and that is a cost of the American Occupation in Japan. It might have been inevitable, but certainly alternatives are closed off because of the American Occupation. LEGACIES OF THE OCCUPATION So what do we make, in the last minute, of the legacies of the occupation? What came out of this moment? Well first of all, and I think there are three legacies. First of all we need to think about the ways in which Japanese society was transformed by this crucial moment of change. Occupations matter. Societies can be changed. It doesn't occur because an outside society decides to change a society. It occurs because an outside power working with elements of a local society decide to change things. It is not because the United States had a grand plan, but because the United States under General Douglas MacArthur had certain firm ideas, and it found a way to negotiate and 14

15 accommodate local interests in the pursuit of those ideas. And in doing this, Japan was democratized, demilitarized, and made a strong American ally, as no one would have expected in And it happened remarkably quickly. That is the miracle, I would argue the post-war order, and that more than anything else deserves praise and credit, I would argue, after the fact. But this was done at grave cost -- costs that would continue to be paid, along with the dividends that were gained, throughout the Cold War. Japan will become a Cold War flash point. It will become a source, not only of tension in the Cold War, it would become a reason for the United States to remain overly involved in Asia, or so I will argue. The United States had to play a more militaristic role itself as Japan was less militaristic in defending American interest in Japan as a consequence of the occupation. This was true in the Korean War, and boy was it true in the Vietnam War. One could argue that both the wars in Korea and Vietnam are fought, at least in part, to protect Japan, protect Japan's markets, protect Japan's interests, protect America's position as an economic partner of Japan. This is William Appleman Williams' argument and Williams has a point. Most significantly of all, the American Occupation of Japan created Japanese-American friendship and an interpersonal level that we now all assume, but this friendship has remained unequal. This friendship has remained tense. The Japanese continue to feel like they're being treated as unequal partners, and the United States continues to feel that the Japanese are ungrateful toward us. That is both a positive and a negative legacy of the occupation. We have become friends with our enemies, but we are not friends without tension as a consequence of the ways in which occupation played out. We will examine these same issues in the case of Germany after World War II on Monday. 15