The Measurement of U.S. Influence in Latin America: Hard Power vs. Soft Power Strategies

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1 The Measurement of U.S. Influence in Latin America: Hard Power vs. Soft Power Strategies By: Aquiles Consuegra & Belinda Sardinas Florida International University MA Global Governance Capstone 2015

2 Consuegra & Sardinas 2 The United States is considered by many to be the most powerful country of the modern age. Similar to ancient empires, its power and influence are felt globally. Although the influence of the United States reaches almost every country, the effect of its power and influence has been critically instrumental in its relationship with the Latin American continent. Over the course of several decades, the political maneuvers dictating the future of many Latin American nations were, by design, conceived and executed in the halls of power in Washington. The means by which such plans were put in place varied from direct military intervention to enhanced cooperation of public-private partnerships. The ways in which the U.S. political designs were carried out in Latin America describes the storied relationship between these regions in terms of the of the United States choice of power exerted in the area. All of the measures implemented over time show the evolution in tactical use from hard to soft power. Power, put simply, is the capacity or ability to influence the behavior of others or the course of events to get the outcomes one wants. By using either coercion or attraction, there are several ways to achieve such outcomes. The type of power exerted always depends on the context of the relationship between the influential party and the influenced. That power can be measured and its influence can be estimated when the motivations of influential parties are known (Nye, 2004, p. 2). After the culmination of Cold War, the type of power used in Latin America by the United States shifted from hard power to a type of power that is designed have less injurious effects, but be nevertheless equally effective (Smith, 2012, p. 111). Over the years, the direct implementation of hard power within Latin America had brought detriment to U.S influence within the area. After the Cold War, some of that lost trust was regained as the U.S shifted its dynamics to a softer application of power. However, experience has shown soft power is not in itself, a viable long-term solution. This essay will provide observation and analysis of some of the actions and measures that have led to a considerable decrease and increase of U.S

3 Consuegra & Sardinas 3 influence within the southern continent. The purpose of this analysis is to suggest that a third option exists smart power. By enhancing the blended implementation of hard and soft power, it is in the promise of smart power that the United States can foresee a viable future of sustainable influence within Latin America. Historical Background Hard Power The term hard power refers to a nation s ability to use military strength, economic measures and diplomatic coercion in order to influence other actors behaviors (Nye, 2004). This term relies on the measure of power proposed by the realist school of international relations theory. Within this school of thought, hard power is also linked with the possession of tangible resources, including territory, natural resources and population. Since 1823, the affairs of Latin America have been of paramount importance to the United States. In order to ensure influence, the U.S., has throughout the years, implemented a series of hard political measures (Rubottom, 1966). Beginning with the Monroe Doctrine, President James Monroe made the intentions of the United States explicitly clear in respect to the area by proclaiming that further colonization of the Americas by European powers would not be tolerated. It became a top priority within U.S. domestic policy to deny European access to Latin America. Therefore, with the specific purpose of loose hegemony on the American continent, the United States backed revolutions aimed at driving European dominance from the Americas (Rubottom, 1966). These measures of hard power were not only limited militarily, but also allowed for economic as well as diplomatic conjectures. Accentuated by the end of the Spanish

4 Consuegra & Sardinas 4 American War, military hard power became the preferred course of action for U.S. politics and influence throughout the American continent (Rubottom, 1966). This sort of loose hegemony was maintained through the greater part of the 20 th century until the early 1990 s when all indications pointed to a decreasing U.S. influence in Latin America. The latent decrease of U.S. influence came as the result of the same hard line policies implemented in the distant past- perhaps leading one to beg the question, has United States lost permanence within the Latin American region? The answer could lie in the more recent past; according to Robert Wesson s 1980 s work, U.S. Influence in Latin America, the United States still maintained sustainable influence over Latin America, but such influence was rapidly declining (Wesson, 1982). In his book, Wesson also pointed out several primary reasons regarding the implementation of U.S. hard power that led directly to the diminishing of U.S. influence in Latin America. These included the rampant violation of human rights in Latin America during the 1950 s though the 1980 s. Also, Wesson noted an increased tendency to implement economic sanctions aimed at destroying the economy of pro-socialist governments throughout the region. Additionally, the sale of illicit arms, the open support for military dictatorships and the outright violation of sovereignty also attributed to this phenomenon (Wesson, 1982). Moreover, between the 1970 s and 1980 s, the tone of U.S. foreign policy changed in Washington, by focusing less on Latin America and placing a more acute interest on Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Sloan, 1984). With the culmination of the Second World War, the world had been partitioned and portioned as the U.S and the Soviet Union vied over the hearts and minds of postcolonial nations (Sloan, 1984). The nations of Latin America, being the most susceptible to indiscriminate inequality, became one of the many front lines in this ideological battle (Wesson, 1982).

5 Consuegra & Sardinas 5 Therefore, the implementation of hard power by the U.S. seemed to be the best solution for increase of influence within the region. However, the outcome cultivated negative results during the greater part of the Cold War (Fitch, 193). Nevertheless, in retrospect, the implementation of U.S. hard power demonstrated both positive and negative aspects during and after the end of the Cold War (Fitch, 1993). Throughout the course of the cold war, the United States implemented a series of hard power measures to act as détente against the spread of communism in the region (Wesson, 1982). These practices where not completely restricted to military intervention, but also included economic and diplomatic aspects of hard power (Viotti, 2014). Military Hard Power Soon after the Marxist revolution of 1959, the Cuban leader Fidel Castro became the beacon of anti-u.s. policy in Latin America (Fitch, 1993). As a surrogate of the Soviet Union, Cuba exported its own distorted version of socialist hard power. Such direct challenge to U.S. supremacy in the area provided these nations with an exacerbated sense of ethnonational selfdetermination and the right to challenge the status quo (Martin, 2011). Backed by Soviet money and Cuban military assessment and weapons, the now self-proclaimed Marxist revolutions all over Latin America began to challenge U.S. influence directly. The U.S. response became clear and concise; the pro-democratic governments of Latin America were to be kept in place no matter the cost (Martin, 2011). As a result, the U.S. implemented a more direct approach to hard power in Latin America by providing military assessment, weapons, and sometimes, direct military intervention to those countries posed or on the verge of democratic failure (Lowenthal, 1983).

6 Consuegra & Sardinas 6 Since the end of World War II, the United States has developed extensive programs in order to strengthen its position within Latin America. These programs were directly designed to increase influence through U.S. hard power in Latin America, which consisted of direct military aid, military training programs and arms sales (O'Hanlon, 2009). Covert in nature, most of these programs became conduit to countless human rights violations throughout Latin America. Operation Condor was among the first hard line plans implemented by the United States in order to instate a policy of détente within Latin America nations (Lowenthal, 1983). Beginning in the late 60 s, the operation involved strict agenda of political repression within the countries of the Southern Cone. Supported by the U.S, the military dictatorships of Latin America relentlessly pursued any trace of opposition. In theory, the success of this operation would be promising in fighting communist ideology and dissent, as these were to be quickly thwarted. However, this was not always the case. Paranoia within the ranks of the U.S backed right-wing dictatorships tended to persecute, imprison, torture and execute all types of opposition; pro-u.s. or not (Donnelly, 2013). America had a high level of involvement in training throughout Latin America. It is estimated that between 1960 and 1984, the United States trained around 20,000 Latin American military personnel at the School of the Americas in Panama. As part of the military training programs, the trainees not only learned the latest tactics and equipment, but enhanced forms of interrogation as well. These forms of interrogations consisted of beatings, electrocution, dismemberment and intimidation. These methods became the preferred course of action for the right-wing dictatorships. According to testimonies from the time, nobody was exempt from the brutality (Donnelly, 2013). Suspects were often detained for no particular reason, but suspicion alone. Children were tortured in front of their parents and vice versa, detainees were often

7 Consuegra & Sardinas 7 tortured for hours, even days. In the particular case of Argentina, once the country returned to civilian rule, the government decided to inquire on the status of the disappeared. The Argentine National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) was able to document 8,960 disappearances. Moreover, the commission was able to pinpoint 340 centers of clandestine detention and thus prosecuted 700 military officers. In the end, this hard line approach resulted in the death of thousands of civilians and a huge reduction of U.S influence in the area (Donnelly, 2013). In nominal terms, the military aid destined for Latin American countries increased from $40 million in 1969 to $240 million in 1991 (O'Hanlon, 2009). However, this sum increase failed to display the real purchasing power behind such monies. Only when the amounts were taken into consideration regarding the inflation of monetary value by 1990, did the reduction in aid become clear (Viotti, 2014). America s influence in terms of monies destined to feed the various military complexes of Latin America has also suffered a steady decline since the 1970 s. As a result of the gradual monetary cutback, the military assistance programs (MAP) were reduced from $120 million a year in 1950 to less than $33 million by 1989 (O'Hanlon, 2009). Beginning in the 1990 s, the MAP programs underwent radical transformations. After the reforms of the early 1990 s, the funds destined for MAP programs became extinct, only to be replaced by funds allowing for the purchase of U.S.-manufactured weapons and training (O'Hanlon, 2009). Over the first two years, the funds destined to the new FMF-W programs seemed higher than those allocated to its predecessor. However, the higher funds were neither reflective of the efficiency nor of the allocation of funds in regard to every respective country (Sloan, 1984). Ergo, over 47% of the funds destined for the FMF-W program where allocated within three main Latin American militaries: Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, as part of the anti-drug aid. The other 48% of

8 Consuegra & Sardinas 8 the funds were then allocated to El Salvador and Honduras, leaving less than 5% of the funds to be allocated among the militaries of the remaining 15 countries (Lowenthal, 1983). Probably the most striking feature in the analysis of U.S. military aid to Latin America was that most countries received little to no aid. In between 1981 to 1991, the United States allocated 1.1 billion dollars in military aid to El Salvador alone (Martin 2011). Another $500 million were destined to Honduras, $170 million to Colombia, $90 million to Bolivia and $47 million to Jamaica (Lowenthal, 1983). These five countries comprised 90 % of the aid provided by the U.S. to Latin America during this time period. Conversely, countries like Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Argentina were allocated a combined sum of $14 million over the same time span (Feinberg, Miller, & Trinkunas, n.d.). Weapons sales to foreign military assets increased considerably from an average of $130 million a year in 1969, to $400 million by 1985 (Martin, 2011). These numbers were sustained for much of the 70 s and the 80 s, with a small decline during the Carter administration. The reduction in sales became the result of multiple human rights violations at the hands of Latin American governments throughout the 1970 s, only to be raised again in the 1980 s where it remained until well into the 1990 s (Martin, 2011). After the 1990 s, the sale to foreign military assets declined to $200 million a year as the U.S. set its priorities on the realms of national security and the war on terror (Fitch, 1993). Notwithstanding the irony created by the decrease in aid to Latin America, the influence of the United States in the region was not severely hindered. In fact, weapons sales to foreign military assets within the region increased as grant programs decreased (Fitch, 1993). However, beginning in the 1960 s, the weapons sale monopoly sustained by the United States started to decline as other competitors gained a foothold on the area (Fitch, 1993). For instance, a market

9 Consuegra & Sardinas 9 which, until the 1960 s had been completely dominated by U.S. military hardware suddenly plunged to 36% sales by Consecutively, the average further declined to 21% by 1977 and an all-time low of 7% by 1985 (O'Hanlon, 2009). The decline of US hegemony over the weapons market of Latin America was propagated by two primary reasons. First, as Latin American countries started to lean ever more towards socialism, the Soviet Union began supplying vast amounts of military grade weaponry in order to support the developing Marxists revolutions. Just as in the case of Cuba, once these revolutions became successful, these socialist states turned into proxy markets for Soviet military equipment (O'Hanlon, 2009). Lastly, the vast number of human rights violations taking place throughout Latin America started to affect the international opinion, thus eroding the image of the United States. As previously stated, the ultra-right governments of Latin America whose violations were being attributed were the primary benefactors of U.S. aid recipients as well as foreign sales (Leogrande, 2007). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the foreign military assets program stabilized- but U.S. hard power would never again be prevalent in this aspect (O'Hanlon, 2009). Markets like Europe, Israel and China had begun to emerge, competing vigorously for their share of Latin American weapons market (Fitch, 1993). Despite its covert origins, these operations became crucial in maintaining a positive pro- U.S. influence through coercion and control. These pro-u.s. attitudes in turn served as pivotal points in the fight against threats, which directly posed a challenge to the national security of the United States (Lowenthal, 1983). After 1975, many Americans came to fear that the consistent use of hard power within Latin American politics would create another quagmire similar to Vietnam (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). During the early 1980 s, the Reagan administration started to change the tone in U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America (Martin, 2011). With a

10 Consuegra & Sardinas 10 debilitating Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the ascendency of radical Islam in the Middle East, American hard line influence diminished in Latin America (Martin, 2011). Also, the decades-long history of military support and intervention provided by the United States in Latin America had left the American constituents unhappy (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). Moreover, national security became paramount as new threats of global terrorism and drug trafficking began to endanger U.S. interest (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). Economic Hard Power Two notable examples, the Cuban Embargo and Chile s El Ladrillo, highlight the use of economic hard power, while also ultimately demonstrating its long-term negative effects. The Cuban Embargo was put in place by President John F. Kennedy in 1960 after the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro nationalized all U.S. industry and interest on the island (Sloan, 1984). The Cuban economy fell into disarray, as the embargo prohibited Cuba from engaging in the free trade of its most valuable commodity sugar. The U.S. also implemented restrictions of the importation of all goods, except for those of basic necessity like food and medicine. As part of the embargo, the U.S also shut down all economic ties with the island and pressured other Latin American nations to do the same. The implementation of El Ladrillo, was a successful attempt made by the Nixon administration in order to destabilize the socialist economy of then Chilean president Salvador Allende. As the country s economy fell into disarray, public unrest increased, providing the U.S- backed military junta to take control of the country in 1973 (Centro de studios publicos, ed., 1992). Both of these examples achieved the desired effects at the time, but the repercussions allowed for a greater dissent by the people of the respective nations against U.S. policy. In turn, the emergence of such pronounced hatred towards the U.S. allowed

11 Consuegra & Sardinas 11 for nationalistic and socialist governments to take root in Latin America (Anderson, 1984). Even in the aspect of economics, although they remained loyal to the U.S. for some time, these countries eventually disregarded some aspects of U.S. hard line politics (Viotti, 2014). The economic hard power of the U.S. was once again demonstrated during the 1980 s grain embargo imposed by President Carter upon the Soviet Union. At the time of the embargo, Argentina and Brazil, both fervent supporters of U.S. implementation of hard power, were thwarted by the measures and began to secretly deal with the Soviets in an attempt to increase their agricultural commerce (Viotti, 2014). The Regan administration proved to be even more detrimental to U.S. hard line politics in Latin America. In the first few months of his administration, President Regan was determined to deal with the problem of Latin American revolutions once and for all (Martin, 2011). Tackling the problem at the source meant the abandonment of Latin American pro-u.s. currents in order to concentrate all efforts in Cuba, the prime surrogate of the Soviet Union (Martin, 2011). As the fear for further Soviet expansionism demanded more and more reprimands from the United States. Therefore, both political trends in Latin America, either to the right or to the left, became ever more discontent towards the U.S.; cementing further political distrust and lack of cooperation (Martin, 2011). Diplomatic Hard Power The way in which the U.S. implemented diplomatic hard power within Latin America can be analyzed from a singular point of view: bargaining, which contains a centralized message (Lowenthal, 1983). Given the case, by bargaining with Latin American countries, the United States is able to occupy a more influential posture with the recipient s government and military. Proponents of diplomatic hard power argue the importance of this idea to its adjunction to U.S. policies of the time favoring a posture of détente and democratization (Lowenthal, 1983).

12 Consuegra & Sardinas 12 Programs of direct military assistance provided tangible as well as intangible goods, which could be taken away at any moment if the recipient acted against U.S. interests in the region (Lowenthal, 1983). The bargaining process was designed so that it would be gradual, in order to achieve direct political influence. Therefore, U.S. military assistance programs were compelled to create credible incentive/disincentive measures in order to coerce the target of influence (Fitch, 1993). These programs became essential to the whole process of maintaining U.S. influence in Latin America through a hard power component, as its success became completely dependent on the size of the incentives (Lowenthal, 1983). Directly attributed to the change of alignment regarding U.S.-recipient policies; hence, in accordance with the logic of bargaining, the recipient could be dis-incentivized if it failed to adhere to protocol (Lowenthal, 1983). Equally, the same effect could be attained if the amount of incentives was reduced through no action from the recipient (Fitch, 1993). Thus, one of the primary depreciators of U.S. influence in Latin America has been the gradual reduction of U.S. military hard power over the last two decades (O Hanlon 2009). Nevertheless, the gradual reduction hard power has not been by any means a constant variable, as it tends to oscillate in accordance with U.S. policy obstruction in Latin America (Lowenthal, 1983). Nevertheless, the reduction of U.S. military aid did play a considerable role in the decline of U.S. hard power in the area. Over the years, the discussion about the political significance of U.S. direct military aid to Latin American nations has become recurrent in Washington (O'Hanlon, 2009). Supporters of U.S. military hard power in the area have long argued the importance of these programs in regard to the national security of the United States (Anderson, 1984). The intention of the use of hard power was to raise important points in respect to a direct U.S. military presence in Latin America. First, to prevent and contain any possible serious threats

13 Consuegra & Sardinas 13 to American national security by strengthening support provided by U.S. military aid to Latin America. Second, U.S. military aid in the area was poised to strengthen Latin American militaries professionally. Lastly, the direct influence of U.S. military aid enhanced the overall respect for American values of democracy and human rights within the particular region (Anderson, 1984). Plan Colombia and the Positive Aspect of Hard Power Despite the setbacks suffered by U.S. hard power in Latin America over the years, perhaps no initiative exemplifies its methods better than Plan Colombia (Fitch, 1993). First developed during the administration of Colombian President Andres Pastrana, the plan sought to bring a successful resolution to more than forty years of armed conflict (Fitch, 1993). The plan was also seconded by efforts to eliminate drug trafficking and the promotion of social and economic stability. While the objectives pursued by Colombia differed from those sought by the United States, many of its aspects overlapped, as in the case of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which became the primary source of U.S. funding into Plan Colombia (Veillette, 2005). At first, Plan Colombia was envisioned as an international effort, with several members of the international community as the primary supporters. Until today, the United States is considered by the Colombian government to be the main financial supporter of the plan (Veillette, 2005). Originally, Plan Colombia was designed in order to meet its objectives within a time span of six years. However, in 2005 President Uribe s administration requested that the U.S. Congress provide further support (Veillette, 2005). This extension allowed for the securement of additional funds by the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) division of the Department of Defense (DOD).

14 Consuegra & Sardinas 14 The additional $90 million granted to FMF and DOD assistance, added to the grand total of 4.5 billion dollars, the complete amount of U.S. support in the area to date. The U.S. commitment for the plan originally began in 2000, when Congress passed legislation (P.L ), which provided the amount of 1.3 billion dollars (Veillette, 2005). Initially, the funds were designated primarily for the development assistance of the Colombian security forces and interdiction of drugs emanating from the region. By 2006, U.S. support had extended from development assistance into more delicate operations like the active eradication of coca-poppy plantations, the establishment of social protection, reclamation programs and human rights training (Veillette, 2005). In a 2005 assessment of the key objectives and issues, the U.S. government determined that the purity level of cocaine and heroin still remained constant, despite the systematic eradication of drug cultivations (Veillette, 2005). The revelation however, is not to be considered a defeat of U.S. measures in that region. According to a 2004 testimony before Congress, the former Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) John P. Walters argued that interdiction efforts take some time in order to show proper effect (Veillette, 2005). Also, the ONDCP presented evidence of how drug traffickers had managed to adapt in order to overcome the interdiction efforts, by shifting drug cultivation and production to countries non-aligned with U.S. policies (Sloan, 1984). In regard to purity levels, cocaine and heroin purity has remained almost untouched since the 1980 s. However, as presented by the ONDCP the levels of purity within heroin have been constantly increasing through the decades, reaching its purest levels in 2004 (Veillette, 2005). In contrast to the previous statistics, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) studies on drug consumption reflected an 11% reduction in drug use among young adults (Veillette, 2005). According to the ONDCP it is the interdiction of the final

15 Consuegra & Sardinas 15 product rather than the raw materials that manages to deter drug traffickers from exporting cocaine and heroin to the United States (Fitch, 1993). In support of this argument, in June of 2004, the DEA reported a considerable increase in successful domestic seizures of heroin from 1,152 kilograms in 1999 to 2,351 kilograms by the end of The seizures of cocaine were also considerable, bringing up the number of 106,623 kilograms in 2000 to 115,725 kilograms by the end of 2003 (Veillette, 2005). As successful as the aspect of drug interdiction appeared to be in the U.S., none of the desired results would had been achieved without the full support and cooperation of the Colombian government (Leogrande, 2007). In 2004, the Colombian Ministry of Defense made reports available containing the seizure of more than 148 tons of cocaine. Along with the cocaine seizures, the Colombian military also confiscated 721 kilograms of pure heroin (Veillette, 2005). In its entirety, the confiscations conducted by the Colombian military constituted a 30% increase in cocaine and a 43.9% in heroin, in comparison to the previous year (Veillette, 2005). Moreover, according to the State Department s International Narcotics Strategy Report 2005, the air interdiction program known as Air Bridge Denial (ABD) also reported significant gains during The US-Colombian joint program was responsible for the capture of three smuggling aircrafts in Colombian airspace and eight others throughout Central America. Additionally, the program attributed itself to destruction of another 13 smuggling aircrafts, denying the access of more than 3 metric tons of cocaine to enter the United States (Veillette, 2005). In addition, aerial surveillance allowed for the destruction of several illegal airstrips as well as the seizure of another 5 metric tons of cocaine destined for exportation. Gains by the Colombian government were also made at sea, where another U.S. funded program made considerable advances in the war against drugs (Veillette, 2005). The Special Reconnaissance

16 Consuegra & Sardinas 16 and Assault unit of the Colombian Navy with support from the U.S. accounted for the seizure of more than 12 metric tons of cocaine and 12 kilograms of heroin during Furthermore, during that same year, the elite unit confiscated 17 speedboats, 2 commercial fishing vessels, 34 outboard motor boats and the arrest of 75 smugglers (Veillette, 2005). Progress was also made on the streets, where the Colombian police Anti-Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) accredited itself the seizure of 48 metric tons of cocaine and the destruction of 83 illegal laboratories. Colombian police also confiscated vast amounts of cocaine base, 755,588 gallons of liquid precursors and 1,539 metric tons of solid precursors (Veillette, 2005). Regarding the eradication of fields devoted to the cultivation of cocaine, the United Nations as well as the U.S. State Department reported a significant reduction by 2004, (fig. 1) (Veiliette, 2005, O'Hanlon, 2009). According to the United Nation s Office on Drugs and Crime, by the end of 2003, the cultivation of cocaine within Colombia was reduced to 212,506 acres; a reduction of 47% since the plan began. Also, the cultivation of the opium poppy was reduced from 16,000 acres in 2000 to 10,000 acres by 2004 (Veillette, 2005). Reports submitted by the ONDCP, indicate that during 2004 alone 337,000 acres of cocaine and 27,000 acres of opium poppy were eradicated (O'Hanlon, 2009). In addition, the U.S. Agency for international development has actively sponsored a vast array of programs that encourage farmers to abandon drug crop cultivation, (Fig. 2) (Veiliette, 2005). According to the State Department, 12,845 farmer families benefited from the program assistance in 2004 alone. In retrospect, the direct assistance program has helped a total of 44,015 farmer families in Colombia since the implementation of the program in 2001 (O'Hanlon, 2009). Moreover, under the supervision of the program, 40,791 acres of licit crops have been created in 2004 alone; this added to the grand total of 136,000 acres created since the beginning of the program (Veillette, 2005). Additional

17 Consuegra & Sardinas 17 support was also received by the USAID, which by 2004 had created a total of 874 structures in order to support farm development. Nevertheless, surveys conducted during the same year indicate stability in the production of drugs (Veillette, 2005). This by no means was considered an obstacle, since the surveys demarked it as a result of harvesting of the destroyed crops. In essence, the aerial interdiction phase of Plan Colombia was costing the drug lords more capital in order to make profit out of their losses (Veillette, 2005). Even though the survey indicates that about 282,000 acres of drug crops remained stable during 2004, the production of cocaine fell from 460 metric tons to 430; a reduction of 9%. This reduction was mostly attributed to the drug crop replantation process, which in turn yielded low production of the crops (Veillette, 2005). On the other hand, the survey indicated a 52% decrease on opium poppy cultivation in between the years 2003 and Overall, by 2004 drug cultivation and production in Colombia had been reduced by 7% (Veillette, 2005). Lastly, the promotion of human rights and democracy in Colombia has been a critical component of the plan since the beginning (Leogrande, 2007). Unfortunately, this aspect of Plan Colombia has not been as successful as the other stages. This is mostly due to the armed conflict plaguing the country for over 50 years and the retaliatory circumstances involved within the drug trade. In essence the nature of Colombian society is a violent one. Surrounded by everyday violence and a quite turbulent history, the people of Colombia have integrated violence as part of their daily lives (Leogrande, 2007). Nevertheless, the latter doesn t detract from the people of Colombia to actively seek forms of ending the perpetuation of violence. With the popular disposition in place and the unfaltering disposition of the Colombian government, U.S.- Colombian efforts throughout the course of the plan have managed to deter further violence within the country (Leogrande, 2007).

18 Consuegra & Sardinas 18 The 2004 report on human rights submitted by the U.S. State Department was not very appealing. It stated that some progress had been made regarding violence in Colombia, but there was still a lot of work to be done, (fig. 3) (Veiliette, 2005, O'Hanlon, 2009). That same year, around 3,000 to 4,000 Colombians had fallen victim to armed violence. Also, within the report the capabilities of the Colombian judicial system are heavily criticized as an overburdened, inefficient and subject to intimidation and corruption by terrorist groups (Veillette, 2005). The report also recognizes the role of the security forces in Colombia and acknowledges that such has overstepped the boundaries of its authority. To these accusations, the report also adds the inappropriate cooperation of the security forces with illegal armed groups, including the paramilitaries (Veillette, 2005). Moreover, the assassinations of trade union leaders at the hands of the paramilitaries continued to be a common place in Colombia, but the report indicated that during 2004 the killings of trade union leaders decreased by 25% (Veillette, 2005). The tactical part of Plan Colombia came to a successful conclusion in 2005, as the judicial instruments took back full control of the country. The demobilization efforts of the ACI cost $160 million (Veillette, 2005). Soft Power The concept of soft power has emerged rapidly post September 11 th and has been a guiding factor in U.S. foreign policy and how it achieves national interest. Hard power was the traditional foreign policy tool used to achieve national interest, but it has been proven that there are limits to what it can achieve. The classic form of power typically uses coercion or payments to accomplish a goal, but the nontraditional forms have proved to be successful and avoid such methods. Joseph S. Nye, an American political scientist, first defined the term soft power in 1990 (Nye, 2006). His definition of soft power has evolved over the years, but the most recent

19 Consuegra & Sardinas 19 definition is, the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes (Nye, 2011, p ). Any form of power can be used for good or bad, but soft power is often considered to be the morally superior approach (Nye, 2006). Methods of soft power include unconventional avenues such as, culture, political values, military to military assistance, and public-private partnerships. Relying solely on hard power provides short-term successes on critical challenges. The United States needs to focus on programs that lead to long-term payoffs, not ones that can be accomplished in a few months. Culture Soft power is associated with intangible assets, such as culture, institutions, and personalities (Fattor, 2014, p. 5). Based on Nye s theory, culture is identified as a source of soft power (Nye, 2014). This theory creates a magnet of admiration because values instilled by the media can offer inspiration to individuals who are abroad (Fattor, 2014, p. 5). This leads the consumers to change their political ideals and pressure their governments to emulate the policies associated with the United States. Soft power represents the behavioral way of receiving the desired outcome. Therefore, soft power can be measured by using public opinion polls, such as America s Barometer Survey. The survey measured public perception of the U.S. in Latin America based on 40,000 interviews in over 26 countries (Azpuru & Zechmeister, 2013). This survey indicated that Latin Americans, in general, are more inclined to trust the United States over other non-latin American countries in the region, (fig. 5) (Azpuru & Zechmeister, 2013). Although levels of trust vary, the United States has been shown to have the most favorable public opinion and is considered the most trustworthy when compared to Iran, China, and Russia; countries that all have major influence in the region (Azpuru & Zechmeister, 2013). The goal in soft power is to maintain that positive consensus and level of trust by using tools like the media.

20 Consuegra & Sardinas 20 With the information revolution, the influence of soft power can be recognized to have played a critical role in transmitting the American image around the world. Often called the third industrial revolution, this rapid emergence of technology has increased the processing and transmitting of information exponentially (Nye, 2014). The advances in technology are proving to be a source of power that can be used by the United States. Approximately a third of the world population now uses the Internet and it is projected that 60% of the world will be online by 2020 (Nye, 2014). Latin America has the fastest growing Internet population in the world with over 147 million users (Kohn, 2013). These projections allow soft power to have extremely influential potential in the region. On average, Latin American consumers spend 10 hours a month on the Internet- twice the global average- via their mobile phones (Kohn, 2013). This is attributed to the network connectivity growth in the region. The connection penetration rate in the region is at 112%, which is well over the global rate (GSMA, 2014). The subscriber growth has yet to mature, but its steady increase is displaying positive a forecast for the future, fig. 4. As the technological advances increase, the media is becoming an effective weapon in the balance of power. The media has proven itself to be a central component of power and it has the ability to successfully command and shift world affairs without the conflict of hard power (Fattor, 2014, p. 5). The media not only informs, but it also empowers people and changes their political opinions because it shows a different perspective in a visual manner. In Latin America, a majority of the countries rank well in terms of news media consumption (Maldonado, 2011). The attractiveness of the American culture, liberal values, and foreign policy portrayed by the

21 Consuegra & Sardinas 21 media encourages Latin Americans to pursue such a lifestyle in the hope that they will have the same successes (Fattor, 2014, p. 6). If Latin Americans share a similar worldview and outlook because of the influences from the media, then soft power through culture will be successful. The attraction of American culture helps the United States to achieve foreign policy goals, while winning the hearts and minds of the people. This is one of the factors that maintain strong American influence in the region and that has played a role in the increase of democratic governments in Latin America (Nye, 2004, p. 51). Political Values In part, soft power relies on how governments frame their ideas and mobilize cooperation from other nations without using threats or payments, a method that depends on political will and foreign policy (Nye, 2004, p. 60). Successfully combining words and actions are the framework of achieving soft power relative to political values. In Latin America, the United States has focused primarily on promoting democracy and free trade (Sabatini, 2012). For example, the spread of electoral democracy in Latin America can be attributed to the power and influence the United States has in the region (Smith, 2012, p. 37). As in the case of Colombia, success was largely achieved due to the positive support given by the Colombian government and its constituents. This is, to date, the standard example for a successful operation in Latin America that promotes U.S. influence. Therefore, political will directed towards public opinion must be supported by diplomacy directed towards the leaders (Nye, 2004, p. 105). Over the years, the United States has shifted its foreign policy in Latin America from supporting the democratic process to supporting economics and human rights (Sabatini, 2014). U.S. foreign policy has been the cornerstone for promoting democratic values and institutions

22 Consuegra & Sardinas 22 (Smith, 2012, p. 107). Based on economic relations between the United States and Latin America, political will to trade and do business has been strong in the majority of Latin American countries. In fact, trade is increasing annually and the United States continues to be the leader of exports in Latin America. Throughout history the United States has been Latin America s largest trading partners. Over the last decade, Latin America has purchased 80% more imported goods from the United States than from any other markets (O Neil, 2012). Free trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have strengthened the U.S. Latin American relationship. In 2001, U.S. export trade to Latin America peaked at $800 billion, which is more than three times the region s exchange with China (O Neal, 2012). The United States is also the largest foreign direct investor in the region. Approximately 20% of foreign direct investment in Latin America is a result of U.S. trade and investments (Chafuen, 2014). The United States has remained the largest investor in Latin America throughout the two waves of foreign direct investment in the region (Ocampo & Ros, 2012). Although the United States is facing competition for influence in the region from China and other major players, its shared values, access to the largest economic market, and sources of technology allow it to remain a leader of not only trade and foreign direct investment but of influence (fig. 6) (Global Balance of Power, 2013). The United States has also played an instrumental role in human rights initiatives (HRI), which has gained support and positive influence from several countries. Promoting human rights throughout Latin America has been a priority for the U.S. foreign policy and influence. The U.S. has shown a commitment to protecting fundamental human rights in the region, which has gained support and positive influence from several countries. For example, under the Leahy

23 Consuegra & Sardinas 23 Amendment, the U.S. is required to terminate security assistance to any foreign military that engages in human rights violations (Stavridis, 2010, p. 117). Over 60 HRI events have been held in the United States and abroad involving thousands of global participants (Stavridis, 2010, p. 124). The HRI events allow for high level U.S. and Latin American officials to begin a dialogue and integrate global partnerships. These events have strong potential to erode feelings of mistrust caused by hard power strategies in the past. Human rights initiatives help solidify positive influence and cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America. Military to Military Assistance The Department of Defense (DoD) has also actively participated in soft power strategies. In 2012, DoD participated in over 200 projects in 28 countries and provided $84 million in humanitarian assistance (Meyer & Sullivan, 2012). The U.S. military s soft approach has been useful in stabilizing the region and creating partnerships with foreign militaries, while continuing to meet the needs of U.S. national interest and enhancing public opinion. DoD has engaged in a variety of activities including transporting humanitarian goods, providing disaster relief, responding to emergencies, and working with foreign militaries to counter drugs and terrorism (Meyer & Sullivan, 2012). For example, U.S. Southern Command and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) are working with the Peruvian military in their efforts against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), a communist party (Posture Statement, 2014). The U.S. military also provided support to Brazil during the 2014 World Cup and plans to continue its efforts during the 2016 Olympics. Programs such as these provide a sizeable return on investment and ensure stronger partnerships (Posture Statement, 2014). Military to military cooperation, at the operational and tactical levels, has been vital in promoting sustainability and departing from the hard power mentality that decreased U.S. influence in the region. The strong relationship between U.S. and

24 Consuegra & Sardinas 24 Latin American militaries demonstrates American commitment and support in the region. This support translates to influence because the Latin Americans see the positive outcomes of the relationship. Public-Private Partnerships Another form of soft power is using the resources and expertise of the private sector to achieve national security, diplomatic, and developmental objectives (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 7). The government is often burdened with tight budgets and the delays of bureaucracy. Therefore, using the private sector is an effective way to increase influence in Latin America. The private sector works in conjunction with the several U.S. agencies such as, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department, and the Department of Defense to form public-private partnerships (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 7). The partnering community consists of over 100 representatives and over 70 organizations, including the U.S. government, private businesses, and non-governmental organizations (NGO s). This whole of government approach is one of the most effective sources of soft power because the private sector not only has influence in the region; it also shares a common interest with the U.S. government (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 9). The government and private sector share a mutual benefit in working together because they can exchange information, share expertise, execute projects, and perform operations that could not be possible without their collaboration (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 12). When private companies and NGOs collaborate with the U.S. government, it often fosters good governance, patriotism, and raises public support for American initiatives (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 13). For example, one of the most successful programs is Continuing Promise, which provides

25 Consuegra & Sardinas 25 construction materials, medical training, care, and other donations to Latin America. The mission of the operation is to provide humanitarian assistance and civic support to the region on board the USNS Comfort with the help of U.S. military and civilian personnel. The civilian personnel include members from Operation Smile, Project HOPE, and Rotary International (Stavridis & Farkas, 2012, p. 10). Since 2007, the Continuing Promise mission has made an incredible impact in Latin America by treating thousands of patients and participating in hundreds of construction projects. Programs like this nurture positive U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere and strengthen relationships on the community level. Recommendation Based on the strengths and weaknesses of hard and soft power it recommended that a new application of power be used in the region. It is a mistake to rely on one power over the other. The concepts of hard power versus soft power have been developing over time and have proved there is not a cookie cutter solution to a problem; using both methods in unison is the best solution. Effectively using hard power and soft power to achieve a goal is a multilateral approach called, smart power because relying on only one power will never be sufficient (Nye, 2006). The Merida Initiative is a good example of how the United States has used smart power in Central America. The Merida Initiative was established to reduce drug/ human trafficking as well counter terrorist threats in Mexico (Arteaga, 2009, p. 103). The objective was to have Mexican security forces on a level playing field with the cartels by providing them with the necessary tools. The U.S. government provided Mexican security forces with $1.9 billion for training and military equipment (Priest, 2013). Additional funding was provided to improve the judicial system,

26 Consuegra & Sardinas 26 communication networks, financial intelligence, and repair database interconnectivity (Priest, 2013). The United States also pledged to share information and provide operational support to federal and local law enforcement (Priest, 2013). Similar to Plan Colombia, through the Merida Initiative the United States will continue to work in partnership with the Mexican military. By providing training and assistance, the United States will strengthen Mexico s position as a key strategic partner in the region. The Merida Initiative combined hard and soft power strategies to counter human/ drug trafficking and terrorism, while strengthening the partnership between the Mexico and the United States, therefore, implementing smart power. Nye s clarification with the concept of smart power regarded the misconception that soft power could replace hard power or produce foreign policy (Nye, 2009). The effectiveness and the capabilities of hard and soft power will be reinforced through the use of smart power because the powers are not dependent on each other. Despite the very determined efforts of several administrations, the U.S. military has been far removed from the role they played within Latin America s militaries. Given to the pressures of political isolationism emanating from Washington pre September 11 th, the U.S. has been forced to steadily cut down direct military aid to Latin American militaries (Campbell & O'Hanlon, 2006). These cuts were sustained during the greater part of the decade until 2001, when the September 11 th attacks ignited the rearmament doctrine of Latin American militaries in order to thwart possible terrorist threats. Hence, the future implementation of hard power in the area would emanate from a smart power approach. The foundation of smart power is known as contextual intelligence, another term coined by Nye (Nye, 2009). According to Kahnna, contextual intelligence is the ability to understand the limits of our knowledge and to adapt that knowledge to an environment different from the one in which it was developed (Kahnna, 2014). Achieving contextual intelligence requires analyzing

27 Consuegra & Sardinas 27 the situation outside of the scope of traditional forms of power. For example, winning the hearts and minds will not fix the security concerns in the Northern triangle, but combined efforts using the military will certainly make a difference. Integrated polices, which use the best strategies of each power can then be produced. Contextual intelligence allows policy makers to align tactics with objectives in order to create smart strategies and push the smart power agenda. It is important to note that no power is greater than the other. The two powers should be complementary in order to achieve effective strategies. Programs within U.S. Southern Command, which support smart power initiatives, should receive an increase in funding. These programs will assist in maintaining and improving the influence that the U.S. has in Latin America. By investing in global public goods and providing Latin American governments with resources they could not otherwise attain, the United States is complementing military and economic strategies, therefore, using smart power. Conclusion By combining military and economic resources the United States can exert greater influence in Latin America. It has been determined that using one power over the other will not provide the desired outcome. Though the historical analysis of hard power it is evident that solely relying on this method decreases the U.S. influence in the region. The implementation of soft power has produced positive influence, yet it is not sustainable on its own. In order for foreign policy to be effective and produce the desired outcomes there needs to be a collective effort of confidence in Latin America between the state and its citizens. By using the best practices of hard and soft power, the desired effect of sustainable influence will be achieved through smart power. Therefore, it is recommended that U.S. Southern command use smart

28 Consuegra & Sardinas 28 power strategies to promote, enhance, and maintain influence within Latin America in perpetuity.

29 Consuegra & Sardinas 29 Appendix Fig. 1: Eradication of Drug Crops Fig. 2: Land Under Cocoa & Poppy Cultivation Fig. 3: Measures of Violence

30 Consuegra & Sardinas 30 Fig. 4: Fig. 5:

31 Consuegra & Sardinas 31 Fig. 6: Fig. 7: