POLICY AND REGULATORY OPTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: WHY USA AND EU HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND HOW WTO NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE INVOLVED?

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "POLICY AND REGULATORY OPTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: WHY USA AND EU HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND HOW WTO NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE INVOLVED?"

Transcription

1 6 th International ICABR Conference Ravello, Italy, July 11-14, 2002 Agricultural Biotechnologies: New Avenues for Production, Consumption and Technology Transfer POLICY AND REGULATORY OPTIONS ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: WHY USA AND EU HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND HOW WTO NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE INVOLVED? Roberto Esposti Dipartimento di Economia Università di Ancona Alessandro Sorrentino# Dipartimento per lo Studio delle Società Mediterranee - Università di Bari J.E.L. Classification: Q16, Q17, F13 Keywords: Genetically Modified Organisms, World Trade Organisation, Convention on Bio-diversity # This paper is part of the INEA Research Project: "Governing the Agricultural Biotech Revolution: Policies and Institutions". The authors are listed alphabetically and the authorship is equally attributed. ABSTRACT This paper deals with the trade implications of the different policy and regulatory options currently adopted for managing the main issues raised by the recent large diffusion of the Genetically Modified (GM) crops. Though many different national regulatory approaches can be observed worldwide, USA and EU are the most relevant and cited cases of alternative (strongly permissive vs. strongly preventive) regulatory frameworks in the case of GM-crops. The institutional and normative background underlying these two alternative solutions is shortly dealt with in the paper. Particular attention is paid to different attitudes toward risk assessment in USA and EU society and political system, and to the different acknowledgment of consumers concerns and right to be informed. According to this aspect, the paper then focuses on the WTO negotiations and the conflicts emerged in this context with respect to the GMO trade. The analysis is based on the recent theoretical contributions by Bagwell and Staiger (1999; 2001a; 2001b) on the WTO agreements as Pareto enhancing devices. The paper analyses under which conditions this approach to the WTO negotiations can maintain its requisites in the case

2 of GMO trade. In other words, in which conditions both negotiators (EU and USA) can find a satisfactory (Pareto enhancing) agreement for trading GM products. 1. Introduction Thirty years ago, Vernon Ruttan (1971) identified in the lagging-behind institutional innovation the main reason of the recurrent mistrust of the public opinion in the most radical scientific advancements. In other words, as long as some potential effects of an invention/innovation raise relevant ethical, environmental or health concerns in the public opinion, the main issue is not to hamper or slowdown the progress of the experimental sciences but rather to boost as rapid evolution and upgrading of the political and social sciences. Ruttan made clear the strategic role of social sciences in providing adequate instruments able to regulate and manage novel issues and concerns occurred because of scientific and technological progress. He particularly referred to the environmental impact of chemical and mechanical innovations in agriculture, but his argumentation remains generally valid also in the current debate on the "safety" of the agro-biotechnological innovations. It is therefore a main task for the political and social scientists to identify and settle those regulatory frameworks dealing with the production, diffusion and commercialisation of the Genetically Modified Organisms or Materials (GMO and GMM) in such a way to guarantee the public opinion about all the possible food, environmental, social and ethical concerns it legitimately raises. However, no policy addressed to deal with agricultural biotechnology innovations can be wholly effective and successful if designed and managed at the level of the individual country. The economic forces and interests involved in the diffusion of the GM-crops span their action on a larger spatial dimension than policies do. In this sense, the "civil society" expresses a real concern about the increasing gap between the rapid globalisation of the markets and the slow globalisation of the rights (Rodotà, 2001). Thus, governing the agricultural biotech innovations eventually means finding a way to harmonise of rules and principles on a global scale. In such a perspective, it becomes a major task for the social scientists to come up with appropriate institutional innovations speeding up this process of harmonisation, by starting with a careful analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of the existing multilateral negotiations and agreements. Handling all possible issues of "safety" and "goodness" (Buckingham and Phillips, 2001) concerned with the diffusion of the GM-crops usually involves two different levels of regulation: granting intellectual property rights and access to market. The former deals with what kind of exclusivity has to be granted to the "GMvariety creator" and, on the other side, what kind of privilege has still to be acknowledged to the farmers as well as to further potential breeders. The latter concerns with the required procedures and steps for admitting these crops in the environment and their output in the market. In both cases the fundamental legal issue is whether GM and conventional crops have to acknowledged as like crops and, therefore, whether to adopt different regulations or not. In this respect, it must be acknowledged that USA and EU has taken divergent directions. In the USA, on the one hand, the GM-crops are considered specific and different in terms of intellectual property rights since a patent right can be granted to them but not to the conventional crops. On the other hand, the introduction of the GM-crops in the environment and the market approval is based on the principle of "substantial equivalence" and, therefore, it follows the same steps of the conventional crops. In the EU, the approach is opposite. Even after the Directive 44/1998, patents can not be granted to GM-crops. They are protected with the same plant breeders rights acknowledged to the conventional crops, essentially giving higher priority to "farmers and conventional breeders privilege" rather than to the innovators intellectual property rights. On the contrary, EU market approval for the GM-crops, following a strict interpretation of the "precautionary principle", requires different and more complex procedures than the conventional ones. The recent EU Directive 18/2001 imposes

3 mandatory labelling and traceability for the GM food and GM-derivatives and for any GMM to be introduced in the environment. The main possible explanations of this opposite attitude by USA and EU are widely analysed in the recent literature on the topic (Ford Runge et al. 2001). A key role is played by the two underlying principles adopted: the "substantial equivalence" and the "precutionary principle". In the former, the basic idea is that without a clear scientific evidence there is no reason to treat the GM-crops differently. It follows a "science-based" approach where any consistent concern about human health and environmental impact has to be supported by rigorous and widely accepted analytical procedures. In the latter, the basic idea is that, until a clear and unquestioned evidence on the safety of these crops is lacking, and since the connected risks are potentially very high and irreversible, it is legitimate to discriminate GMO and GMM and treat them with particular and specific caution. In short, the major difference between the two approaches is that, in the first case, a strong scientific evidence is needed to discriminate the GM products, whereas in the second case a strong scientific evidence is needed to not discriminate them. The above mentioned principles eventually lead to largely different regulations and, consequently, also to potentially strong trade controversies between these two partners. This conflict between principles can in turn be traced back to the complex system of relations between the policy maker, the scientific community and the society/public opinion, named by OECD (2000) as the "Agricultural Knowledge System (AKS)". Different balances within this system can eventually explain different attitudes. In the EU, the recent negative episodes that hit the European food sector (the BSE, dioxin contamination in the poultry meat, etc.) has induced in the public opinion a substantial mistrust in the institutions devoted to control and grant market approval to new products, as well as in the agricultural research system that should provide the needed scientific evidence on the possible risks. This mistrust can explain the increasing demand by the public opinion of a strong political control over the issues concerning the food and environmental safety, leaving only a marginal space and autonomy to the scientific community and the scientific evidence on the final decisions. In the USA case, equilibrium in the AKS acknowledges much more relevance and autonomy to the scientific community. This expresses the trust the civil society put in the political and scientific institutions and in their capacity to interact to find the appropriate decisions also with respect to the legitimate consumer concerns. It is essentially the difference in the trust in the appointed institutions by the public opinion that eventually determines the different weight assigned to the political control and to the scientific evidence in the AKS. 2. GMO regulations as global common: a case of policy harmonisation Introducing GMO and GMM in the environment and in the market can cause both pecuniary and nonpecuniary effects largely beyond the national borders. Not only the innovative activity produces the usual spatial spillovers (Alston, Norton and Pardey 1995; Huffman and Just 1999); it also implies relevant pecuniary externalities by affecting the terms-of-trade as will be explained in details below. Moreover, most of the concerns raised about the diffusion of the GM-crops mainly the conservation of the biodiversity and its collective property, the risk of environmental contamination, the protection of the consumers right to information tend themselves to become relevant world-wide, regardless the localisation of the biotech "pipeline" and the national regulations. This also implies that the effectiveness of measures adopted at the national level can be, in fact, largely affected by possible alternative choices made by other countries, also when these are not relevant trade partners (nonpecuniary externalities). If negative externalities of the diffusion of the GM-crops really occur, and they spread their effect over the national borders, all the actions and measures aimed to limit or "optimise" these external effects could be interpreted as a non-local (eventually global) common good. But in such a case the economic jurisdiction of the political action is broader than the administrative jurisdiction and measures carried out at a level of government "too local" would provide a sub-optimal (in a Pareto terms) amount of the above mentioned common good

4 (Olson 1969; 1986). Governing the agricultural biotech innovations should be therefore regarded as providing an international public good and, consequently, its provision should be on charge of international institutions and rules. Beyond the legitimate national/particular interests, finding appropriate international agreements in terms of GM-crops diffusion aims then to improve the economic efficiency in the provision of the public and private goods involved. The need of an international regulation of the biotech revolution in agriculture remains valid also if there were no clear scientific evidence of the relevance of the mentioned negative externalities. Even if not fully supported by the scientific evidence, the negative attitude of the public opinion towards the agricultural GM-crops in many countries (especially in the EU) represents by itself a strong enough objective constraint to a free and unbounded international diffusion. According to this, the real aim of the public international regulation would be to create a set of warranties and to recreate an atmosphere of trust with respect to the results and the institutions of the scientific community. A system of internationally shared rules in the use of the GM-crops has to be viewed as common good also in the case the negative attitude of part of the public opinion would not be scientifically supported, but would be only generated by a subjective perception of the problem. Whenever this subjective feeling is widely shared, it is still a major impediment to an appropriate and beneficial development of this agricultural technology. Currently, there are several international negotiations and institutions where the harmonisation of the different national regulations about the GM-crops diffusion and trade can be dealt with. In principle, any of these has its own specific competence and satisfies a different claim to international regulation. Nevertheless, the complex nature and the interdependence of the issues induced by the biotech revolution in agriculture could make the agreements achieved in these specific and partial contexts somehow not homogenous and, above all, reciprocally inconsistent. Before dealing in details with the possible consistent solution within the WTO agreements, it is now useful to recall shortly which are the international institutions and multilateral agreements that are mostly capable to promote negotiations, and to settle disputes, about the GMO and GMM international trade. Table 1 synthesises the main characters of these international agreements and institutions. The SPS (Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary), the TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) and the TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Properties) agreements have been negotiated in the GATT/WTO context without any specific reference to the GMO case. However, they can be still invoked whenever the national unilateral standards and regulations conflict with the agreed multilateral free access to markets. On the contrary, the Convention on BioDiversity (CBD) and, above all, the BioSafety Protocol (PBS) directly deal with issues raised by the introduction of the GM-crops in the environment and by the protection of the intellectual property rights on the living materials, especially with respect to the possible risks for the biodiversity. In terms of scientific support to the international negotiations mentioned above, an important role must also be acknowledged to those international institutions whose aim is to define largely accepted international scientific and technical standards about food-safety, human health and plant protection and safety (Buckingham and Phillips 2001; Josling 2001). This is the case of the Codex Alimentarius (CA) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). The present paper mainly focuses on free trade of GM-crops, that is on those multilateral agreements concerning the regulations of market access for these specific products. The issues regarding the protection of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), though particularly relevant, are not currently as crucial as the market access. When a multilateral agreement on this latter issue will be found, it will also be more clear how large and stable the GM-crops market will be, thus redefining the relevance of the IPR issues themselves. Currently, the multilateral agreements in force admitting specific negotiations on GMOs trade are provided by WTO, and particularly by SPS and TBT agreements. Actually, PBS also defines strict rules for transboundary movements of living GMOs, but it is not yet in force because only 13 countries ratified the protocol instead of 50 as necessary to make it effective.

5 3. The rationale behind the WTO agreements and the GMO controversy As stressed in the previous section, the substantial differences in approaching the GMO regulation in USE and EU eventually generate a trade dispute. This is a clear and essential point of the problem: though the regulations on GMO can be not expressly trade measures, major differences in regulation finally produce different conditions of access to the international markets. Inevitably, therefore, the GMO controversy between USA and EU is essentially a trade dispute; thus it may naturally be negotiated in those main international institutions aiming to settle those international trade disputes to eventually increase the overall market access. Pragmatically, not only involving the GATT/WTO is inevitable, but it might also be the most sensible way to tackle the GMO dispute, since some relevant agreements already exist (TRIPS, SPS, TBT, etc.) to allow starting the negotiation on already accepted and established framework and device. In principle, however, though we may accept that the issues regarding GM-crops in the international context ends up to be essentially trade disputes, we can seriously question whether the GATT/WTO existing agreements, as well as the WTO as institution, are the appropriate context in which the dispute can be rationally settled. In general and abstract terms, the starting point is to understand which is the rationale behind the WTO agreements, that is why their principles and rules are multilaterally accepted as efficient devices. Once this first point is established, the problem becomes to understand if this rationale holds also in the case of the GM-crops dispute. This section will deal in sequence with these two issues The Bagwell-Staiger approach Recent contributions by Bagwell and Staiger (1999; 2001a; 2001b) have substantially improved the representation and comprehension of the rationale underlying the WTO agreements. In particular, Bagwell and Staiger (2001b) summarises their approach to WTO agreements by admitting negotiations on both tariffs and national standards and regulations. By working with a two-countries two-commodities perfectly competitive general equilibrium trade model, they demonstrate how any country finds efficient to define its own terms-oftrade with a bilateral agreement rather than relying on unilateral tariffs. Essentially, the trade agreements allow a cooperative equilibrium of terms-of-trade which is always preferable for both countries to possible noncooperative equilibria. This first result of the Bagwell-Staiger approach strongly supports the rationale behind the WTO negotiations on multilateral tariffs reduction. However, this approach is founded on two basic assumptions. Firstly, they assume that in this game model, any country pay-off is defined by some measure of the country welfare. In other words, the assumption is that any country bases its own trade policy on no other political motivation than to increase internal welfare. Secondly, the model assumes that the national welfare is only affected by its respective terms-of-trade. In other words, interaction among countries occurs only through the international market and no other nonpecuniary externality is admitted, so that counties have no other reason to worry about others behaviour than the effects on the own terms-of-trade. On this base, the Bagwell-Staiger (2001b) model states that bilateral (multilateral) negotiations define respective import demand and export supply curves that allows the highest possible market access to all countries thus allowing the best (in welfare terms) terms-of-trade. In this sense, the WTO agreements are Pareto enhancing devices and their role is then to remove the inefficiency, so that member governments can enjoy greater welfare (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). Accordingly, the bilateral (multilateral) trade agreements reduces the effects of negative externalities of unilateral tariffs by defining a sort of optimal rights on that common good represented by free market access.

6 This approach apparently contrasts with the largely common opinion that GATT-WTO agreements are driven by a single mission, to serve the interests of exporters, rather than by the desire of governments to reap the economic efficiency gains of free trade for the whole national community, and in particular for consumers. Though Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) acknowledge that the consumer gain coming from freer trade may not be the liberalising force that is harnessed by the GATT-WTO, within their model, and in particular under the assumption of prefect competition, the final outcome of the negotiations is still to maximise market access rights and, at the end, to maximise the consumers gain. However, what may really undermine the above-depicted approach, is admitting that the consumer s utility, and consequently the national welfare, is not only depending on prices and on the terms-of-trade. In particular, environmental, labour and health standards can affect the consumer welfare as well. In this case, we may doubt that the WTO s effort for securing market access for exporters is really enough to make the multilateral agreements act as Pareto enhancing devices. In fact, focusing only on terms-of-trade could eventually lead each government to resist raising the labour and environmental standards it applies to national producers and/or consumers ("regulatory chill") and perhaps even to lower these standards ("race to the bottom") - that it would otherwise impose on the base of its own internal optimal policy mix (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001a). In this case, the free trade may not rest on the efficiency frontier for any country. However, according to Bagwell and Staiger (2001a; 2001b) this objection does not affect the main characters of the WTO agreements as Pareto enhancing device. In their view, the central purpose of the WTO rules is to create a "negotiating forum" where member governments can voluntary exchange market access commitments. Maintaining the assumption of no nonpecuniary externalities, the multilateral agreements can still allow the maximisation of the national welfare also under these non-trade concerns. In other words, the Bagwell and Staiger perspective identifies how supporters of sound trade policy and supporters of sound labour and environmental standards can in a broad range of circumstances both benefit from a well-functioning WTO. The key point of their argumentation is that WTO allows the definition of efficient levels of market access in any case. How this market access level is defined is another sort of problem. In particular, the same optimal level of market access can be granted by the negotiating countries with different mixes of trade policies (tariffs) and domestic standards/regulations. Any negotiating country can define its own optimal mix while granting the optimal multilateral market access level. On the contrary, market access negotiations that target tariffs alone cannot achieve efficient policy outcomes, since these negotiations deflect the unilateral incentive to restrict market access as consequence of domestic policies such as labour and environmental standards. Exclusive negotiations on tariffs would therefore introduce an incentive to distort one s domestic standards to reclaim unilaterally a portion of the market access that the negotiated tariff reduction has granted. This incentive ("regulatory chill", "race to the bottom") underlying the WTO negotiation on tariffs would introduce inefficiencies into domestic standards choices. However, this inefficiency is not necessarily implied by the WTO negotiations. As mentioned, the WTO principles and rules, actually much more than the WTO practice, allow for the combination of any mix of tariffs reduction and domestic standards. In principle, governments may first use tariff negotiations to achieve the efficient levels of market access; then, with the prospect of so called "nonviolation complaints" (admitted in GATT Article XXIII) securing market access at the negotiated level, they can unilaterally set the mix of tariffs and domestic standards that secure the agreed market access to other negotiators. According to this argumentation, WTO rules maintain the capacity to act as efficiency enhancing device, also when any government wishes to fix internal standards according to its internal optimal mix. In this perspective, entering the standards/regulations debate does neither destroy the rationale underlying the WTO nor it requires any change in the WTO rules and principles. Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) admit that this efficient outcome relies more on the WTO principles and rules rather than WTO practice. Therefore, what would be really needed

7 is to bring the practice closer to the above-mentioned principles Problems with GM-crops This interpretation of the rationale driving the WTO negotiations could apparently be extended also the abovementioned GMO trade controversy between USA and UE. After all, as suggested by Anderson and Nielsen (2001), this controversy essentially depends on the following "clash of rights": the right of the EU to set its own standards and regulation for GM-crops trade according to the specific alleged preferences of the European consumers; the market access right of the USA products in the EU markets. Following the Bagwell and Staiger analysis, this clash of rights should not exclude the chance of a "free trade" agreement for GM-crops in the WTO context. On the contrary, the WTO would just represent the appropriate device since, as described, it can efficiently manage this kind of "clash of rights". Eventually, the problem in the Bagwell-Staiger perspective would be to increase the use of tariffs-standards compensation in the WTO negotiation practice. However, applying this kind of analysis to the GMO controversy reveals some more issues that make it much more intricate when considered in the WTO perspective. In particular, there are three more key-issues to be considered. Firstly, as suggested by Sheldon (2002), the current EU regulation is based on the assumption that the GM and the conventional crops are different products. Since they are not like goods, the Bagwell-Staiger approach in terms of rebalancing more restrictive internal standards with higher tariffs does not work as such, since this balance should maintain the market access, and therefore the terms-of-trade, for the same product invariant. By skipping the substantial equivalence, this rebalancing is, at least in the strict sense, not affordable. A second related issue is that the EU regulations on GM-crops can not be regarded as an internal technical standard. It applies not only to EU products but also to the border, therefore to imported products. Consequently, this regulation do not reduce the EU terms-of-trade. From the USA perspective, it rather reduces imported products competition thus negatively affecting the USA terms-of-trade. At the end, it acts like a protectionist measure that can not be re-balanced along the line depicted by Bagwell and Staiger. As a matter of fact, in principle, the WTO should not concern itself with the process of GMO-GMM regulation in the EU. This becomes a WTO issue, whenever specific aspects of GMO regulation are trade distorting, not because the EU "standards" disadvantage the internal production but because they force the imported products to increase their production costs. By imposing mandatory labelling on GMO products (Directive 18/2001), the EU implicitly increases the production costs of both GM and GM-free USA crops; the former as labelling costs, the latter as identity preservation costs (Laplan and Moschini, 2001). Since the EU production of GM-crops is substantially zero, this regulation eventually affects the USA production costs while not affecting very much the EU ones. In other words, this is not case where domestic standards are prevented by the risk of a reduction in its own terms-of-trade ("race to the bottom"). It is rather a case in which domestic-border standards imposes a reduction in the terms-of-trade of the imported products, thus eventually generating a "race to the top" process of regulation. The third issue concerning the GMO trade controversy with respect to the Bagwell-Staiger approach is related to the exclusion of nonpecuniary externalities from their analysis. As mentioned, this assumption restricts the international effects of domestic policies only to the terms-of-trade. According to Bagwell and Staiger (2001b), domestic labour and environmental standards could also raise a set of humanitarian/global commons (international nonpecuniary externality) issues that are not fundamentally market access issue. Since the WTO is only designed to efficiently address market access issues, possible global commons concerns should be more properly handled by other international institutions. In the case of GM-crops, however, this assumption can be critical. In particular, if we admit the EU regulation aims to increase the internal consumers welfare by allowing them to express their preferences for GM-free products, we should also consider that this preference might be linked to global commons. If the consumer prefers the GM-free products because they think these do not harm the "global" environment (for instance biodiversity), their welfare is also affected by the USA internal

8 regulation since it affects the "global" environment as well. Therefore, nonpecuniary externalities can not be ruled from the analysis whenever they can affect the optimal internal combination of tariffs and standards/regulations. In this case, indirectly, they also have a trade effect and eventually affect the capacity of the WTO rules to achieve both optimal market access levels and optimal internal policy mix between tariffs and regulation. In the next section we will try to show under which further conditions the Bagwell and Staiger analysis maintains its conclusions about WTO also in the case of the GMO trade controversy Extension of the approach: possible solutions The basic intuition of the approach depicted in section 3.1 is that the WTO negotiations remain efficient also when domestic regulations are introduced, since they still allow appropriate combination of regulations and tariffs reduction that maintains the same level of market access. We now try to show how this efficient mix of policies can be afforded in the case of EU regulation on GMO trade thus considering GM and GM-free crops as different products, applying the regulation to all (domestic and imported) products and assuming that these regulations are costly. Then we will also consider what happens when we admit nonpecuniary externalities of domestic regulations. Let start from the Bagwell and Stiger (2001a) general representation of the government objectives and consider a bilateral trade agreement. As mentioned, the assumption is that both negotiating governments aim to maximise their internal welfare. This welfare depends on three key-variables: the level of internal prices (P), the terms-of-trade (T) and the level of internal standards (S). To make this point clear, let consider as an example an agricultural commodity like maize and USA and EU as the two negotiating countries. The respective welfare can be depicted as follows: USA internal welfare: W USA [S USA ; P USA (τ USA,T USA ); T USA (τ USA, τ EU )] EU internal welfare: W EU [S EU ; P EU (τ EU,T USA ); T EU (τ USA, τ EU )] where T EU = 1/T USA. It is also generally assumed that: W/ S>0, W/ P<0, W/ T>0. Considering USA as net exporter of maize and EU as net importer, the USA terms-of-trade in the case of maize is given by the ratio between the maize world price and the world price of one normal good USA import from EU that we will assume constant over the analysis. Therefore, changes in the terms-of-trade only occur if the maize world prices change. If this increases, the terms-of-trade T for USA will increase, while the terms-of-trade 1/T for EU will decrease. Both country will increase their welfare if the respective terms-of-trade increase. Moreover, the assumption is that the internal standard S is established to increase the welfare and also that the national welfare is inversely linked to maize internal price P. This internal price, in turn, depends on the terms-of-trade, that is on the maize world price, and on import-tariff τ. According to this simple representation, the internal policy is given by the mix of S and τ that apparently do not affect the welfare of the foreign country. However, the linkage between the internal price and the world price, therefore the terms-of-trade, transmits indirectly, i.e. through the world market, this internal mix to the foreign country eventually affecting its welfare. In this kind of analysis, the only external effects of internal policy mix are changes in the world prices (at this stage, again, nonpecuniary externalities are not admitted). Efficient negotiated agreements are therefore combinations of the internal instruments (S and τ ) that make internal welfare increase for both USA and UE. In traditional tariffs-reduction agreements, the idea is quite straightforward (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). Both USA and EU can reduce their import-tariffs on the respective import goods, thus reducing the world and internal prices for both but leaving unchanged the terms-of-trade

9 (Case 1 in table 2); thus the welfare increases for both. This is also why the final gain of this kind of agreements should be an increased consumers surplus, though their preferences are not directly involved in the negotiations. In this representation, it is also straightforward to understand the implication of increasing the internal standards according to Bagwell and Staiger (2001a; 2001b) (Case 2 in table 2). Any country aims to increase the internal standard S since this improves the national welfare by increasing, for instance, the consumer food safety, the environmental safety, etc.. However, an increase in internal standards of the importing country implies, implicitly or explicitly, an increase of the internal production costs, thus increasing the competitiveness, i.e. the market access, of the imported maize. This, in turn, leads to a supply reduction in the world market and, therefore, an increase in the world price. These effects on the world market imply a lower terms-of-trade for the importing country, thus a welfare reduction. The risk is that, eventually, dw/ds<0, i.e. an overall reduction in importing country welfare, since the decrease of the terms-of-trade overcompensates the positive welfare effects of standards. This is basically what is meant by "regulatory chill": any country is prevented from defining the proper internal standards by the consequent reduction in its own terms-of-trade. However, this reduction in terms-of-trade due to higher internal standards can be rebalanced by an appropriate increase in import-tariff τ. For any country importing maize, increasing the import-tariff determines a better terms-of-trade, due to the consequent reduction of the maize world price. It follows that there can be a set of different combinations of S EU and τ EU providing the same maize world price, therefore leaving the terms-of-trade unchanged. This is the basic idea of introducing the standards in the WTO negotiations: any country can unilaterally define its optimal combination of standards and import-tariffs provided that the terms-of-trade are not affected. Under this condition, the other negotiating country will accept the unilateral on standards and import-tariffs since they will leave unchanged the agreed market access levels. Does this kind of analysis apply to the EU recent regulation (Directive 18/2001) on GM-crops trade (Case 3 in table 2)? This regulation imposes mandatory labelling and traceability of GMM for both internal and imported products and refers to those commodities that can be traded both in conventional (GM-free) and GM form, as in the case of maize. As mentioned in the previous section, two main issues arise in interpreting this case as a traditional unilateral internal standard. First, this regulation implies market discrimination of the GM-free and GM maize. They become two distinct products within the EU while, if the regulation is not adopted world-wide, there will be still only one maize world price, therefore only one term-of-trade. Second, this regulation also applies to imported products and, consequently, its costs have also to be beard by the foreign maize. It must be emphasised that the current EU regulation implies higher production costs ( C) for both GM product (labelling costs) and GM-free product (identity preservation costs) (Lapan and Moschini, 2001). Whatever is the initial mix of the two different types of maize, this regulation will increase the internal price for both. Since it applies also to imported maize, this regulation eventually acts as a further import-tariff on both products. This clearly indicates that the EU regulation on GM-crops does not increase the competitiveness of the imported product, does not increase the market access rights for USA products. Consequently, no compensation with import-tariff increase does actually make sense, the standard itself behaving as a tariff increase. Since the EU regulation aims to segregate the GM and GM-free maize, the consequent internal welfare gain exists only if the EU consumers strictly prefer the GM-free product. Since the unit production costs of the GMfree maize as well as the consumers willingness to pay are greater, the GM-free maize price (P FREE ) will be greater than the GM maize price (P GM ). Therefore to make the regulation welfare-increasing in the EU it must be (P FREE > P GM ). However, this welfare gain from the market segregation, as well as the maize price increase due to the segregation costs ( C), is not transmitted in the world market, where the two products are not discriminated. The maize world market price, and therefore the USA terms-of-trade, will be only affected by the "increase in tariff" effect of the EU regulation. Therefore, the world price and the terms-of-trade will decrease with a consequent reduction in the USA welfare.

10 The main implication of this analysis, is that EU regulation on GM maize is not a measure that have to be compensated by an import-tariff increase that leaves the terms-of-trade unchanged. On the contrary, to maintain the same terms-of-trade, the EU have to compensate its regulation with a large enough reduction in maize import-tariff. Only in this case, the USA will accept the unilateral EU regulation together with a bilateral agreement on tariffs in the WTO negotiations. How should this compensatory tariff reduction be accomplished and how strong should it be? In principle, tariff reduction could regard either GM and GM-free maize since in both cases the consequence for the USA would be an increase in its terms-of-trade. However, as it is typically proposed (Sheldon, 2002), the tariff reduction should be applied to the GM-free products. As mentioned, the basic assumption of this analysis is that the European consumer strictly prefers the GM-free product and this make the segregation a welfare-increasing policy. In this case, by reducing the import-tariff on GM-free product would reduce the ratio P FREE /P GM therefore causing a further positive welfare effect in the EU. In any case, there are two important conditions for this compensation to work. Firstly, there must be an initial import-tariff on the commodity in question and this tariff should be large enough to make its reduction significant. Secondly, this tariff reduction should be strong enough to restore the initial terms-of-trade for the USA; that is, the tariff reduction has to increase the import demand, thus reducing the residual world market supply and, in turn, increasing the world price of maize. This effect on the world market has to be strong enough to restore the initial world price for the undifferentiated maize. This compensatory tariff reduction should re-balance the "increase in tariff" effect induced by the mandatory labelling-identity preservation costs, therefore has to be proportioned on ( C). In short, the EU should compensate the higher production costs imposed on the USA maize by increasing the market access to the EU markets. If the tariff reduction is applied to GM-free maize, it means that the EU regulation should be compensated by an increase of the USA share in the EU maize market. In fact, the internal price increase, caused by the segregation costs, is expected to reduce the whole EU internal demand of maize. If the USA share in the EU market were maintained at the initial level, it would imply a lower demand of imported maize, thus still inducing an excess supply in the residual world market compared to the preregulation period. Therefore, if the compensatory tariff reduction has to fully "drain" this excess supply, it also must increase the market share of the imported (USA) product (figure 1). As mentioned, the increase in this share should be proportional to the ( C) implied by the regulation. In fact, even if we assume that this additional costs do not affect at all the internal USA market price but only refers to the exported product, it still needed to increase the access of the USA maize into the EU market to maintain the initial USA terms-of-trade. It also follows, however, that to make this compensatory tariff reduction acceptable for the USA, the EU selfsufficiency rate for the GM-free maize has to be is large enough to allow a large enough compensatory "transfer" of the market share to the USA. Under the above conditions, also summarised in table 2, it would be possible within the WTO principles and rules and following the Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) analysis, to find Pareto enhancing agreements between EU and USA, saving at the same time the right of unilateral internal regulation (thus avoiding "regulatory chill") and the right of exporting countries to freely trade GM-crops. It must be emphasised at this stage that this possible negotiable arrangement essentially depend on the EU consumer preferences, in particular on her/his concerns about the GM-crops. The extent of her/his preference for the GM-free product also affects the extent of the EU welfare gain from the segregation, therefore defines to what extent associated costs ( C) are acceptable. On the one hand, these costs make the maize price (of both kinds) increase in the EU, thus reducing the welfare gain (since welfare function depends on the internal price). On the other hand, it also affects the required level of the compensatory tariff reduction. Consequently, although the WTO agreements apparently do not directly admit consumer concerns, the extent the EU consumer prefers the GM-free crops indirectly but largely affects the eventual WTO solution of the controversy. There is also a further point to be considered about the EU consumer concerns and it refers to the third issue

11 raised by the GM-crop trade and already mentioned in section 3.2. It might be the case that the EU consumer preference does not refer only to the internal regulation. She/he prefers the GM-free products not only for her/his own food safety or local environmental concerns, but also for the global environmental concerns raised by the GM-crops (for instance reduction of the biodiversity worldwide). Under this hypothesis, which is not far from reality in the EU case, and following the usual notation, the EU welfare should be depicted as W EU [S USA ; S EU ; P EU (τ EU,T USA ); T(τ EU, τ USA )]. In particular, if the consumer expresses global concerns, global standards (or global regulation), rather than the local ones, are relevant for her/his welfare. In short, it would be W/ S EU 0 and W 2 / S EU S USA >>0. This is the case of those nonpecuniary externalities ruled out by Bagwell and Staiger (2001a) as not-market issues. However, under this hypothesis, "regulatory chill" could arise not with direct reference to market access issues, but as a consequence of the cross-countries effect of different regulatory frameworks. In particular, the optimal mix of regulation and tariffs for the EU can not pursued if there is not an analogous regulation in the other countries (global regulation). In this case (case 4 in table 2), the WTO should not only promote multilateral market access rights and allow unilateral standards but also promote multilateral regulations. The issue becomes whether or not the WTO principles and rules can make the EU regulation for GM-crops be applied also in USA, again by introducing some compensatory arrangement to make the agreement Pareto enhancing. Extending the EU regulation scheme, would essentially mean imposing the associated costs ( C) also to the USA internal production. In this case, the USA welfare is negatively affected by the increase of the internal prices and this welfare reduction, for normal goods, would never be fully compensated by the expected increase in the terms-of-trade (if the regulation were applied globally, the maize world price would in fact increase). It follows, that the only condition to make this global extension of the regulation affordable (and Pareto enhancing) is that the GM-free maize has to be globally strictly-preferred, that is by both USA and EU consumers. This holds particularly if this preference largely depends on the consumers global concerns both in EU and USA, so that the regulation can produce relevant positive nonpecuniary externalities from both side. 4. Conclusions The analysis proposed in this paper aims to show that, under some specific conditions, the WTO can represent an appropriate institutional context for negotiating the GMO regulations along with international trade liberalisation. This negotiation should conciliate two opposite attitudes, here represented respectively by USA and EU: a strongly promoting approach towards development and diffusion of GM-crops; a strongly preventive regulation discriminating the GM from the traditional crops (Paarlberg, 2000). The basic idea is to extend the Bagwell and Staiger (1999; 2001a; 2001b) analysis to the case of GMO trade. In principle a Pareto enhancing multilateral agreement can be found by allowing both GMOs free trade and unilateral domestic regulations (for instance, the mandatory labelling in the EU), whose effects on the terms-of-trade (the "trade effects") are compensated by appropriate import-tariffs reduction on the GM-free analogous. Such a solution, although consistent with the WTO principles and rules, can face some difficulties in the real WTO practice; therefore, it remains open the issue about how actually to implement this kind of compensation. As widely acknowledged, within the WTO, the SPS and the TBT agreements are two institutional contexts where a multilateral arrangement about GMO trade can be found. In the interpretation of Heumueller e Josling (2001), the SPS agreement should be concerned with trade restrictive measures whose only objective is to protect the health and sanitary conditions of consumers, plants and animals. On the contrary, the TBT agreement would better fit domestic regulations aimed to multiple objectives, as well as specifically concerned with environmental safety and protection, consumers right to free choice or other possible ethical-religious

12 issues. Again, in such agreements, there is not a full correspondence between the principles, that could admit a positive solution of the GMO controversy, and the actual practice for implementation and enforcement. The principles recalled in both agreements clearly refer to the risk of "regulatory chill" or "race to the bottom", that is the negotiating country drops the introduction of stricter internal standards since they would indirectly worsen the national terms-of-trade and, at the end, competitiveness. According to this concern, the mentioned WTO agreements, in principle, would have to work as a "negotiating forum" where to trade, on a multilateral base, market access rights as well as unilateral domestic regulation. In any case, in principle, though the consumers do not enter directly the WTO negotiations, their welfare would be positively affected by the agreements, both through lower prices and through more adequate domestic standards. In practice, however, within the SPS and TBT agreements, negotiation and implementation are carried out following a different and more realistic rule. The main driving concern is actually to avoid the use of internal regulations as "hidden" forms of protectionism. So that, rather than being "negotiating forums", such agreements become essentially "codes of fair behaviour" accepted by any country in selecting admitted unilateral standards and regulation. According to this restrictive view, the attention on unilateral regulations is mainly on their overall legitimacy and consistency, rather than considering them as possible measures to be negotiated and traded off against equivalent tariffs. Besides the discrepancy between the principles and the practice within the WTO agreements, there are also real differences between the SPS and TBT when referred to the case of the GMO trade and regulation. If the nonpecuniary externalities are excluded, the most common reason for an internal regulation discriminating the GM and GM-free products is the alleged uncertainty about possible sanitary effects, still widely unknown and, therefore, not demonstrable. In principle, these concerns could be admitted within the SPS agreement, according to the general idea of balancing EU mandatory labelling with reduction of tariffs on GM free product. However, this idea could conflict with the practice of evaluating measures within the SPS agreement as a "code of fair behaviour". In particular, in such agreement the approach to any internal regulation is strictly science based and does not admit any uncertainty in the scientific evidence about the risk; so it leaves very limited room for a negotiated solution outside this strict approach. This interpretation of the admissible SPS measures makes very difficult to negotiate any separate measures on the GM-free and GM products. In fact, on the one hand this would mean to drop the substantial equivalence principle, which is strongly based on a science and analytical procedures. On the other hand, it would imply accepting and institutionalising in such a context the precautionary principle; by definition, this means excluding the science based arguments as the only ones to drive SPS measures admissibility, while claiming space for a wider political evaluation. Under this perspective and according to the actual practice, the TBT agreement seems to provide more space for negotiating solution on the GMO trade controversy. Unlike the SPS measures, unilateral regulations under the TBT agreement can be supported by different kind of motivations and they have not to be fully justified only on a strictly scientific ground. According to the objectives of domestic regulations, the "domain" of this agreement is in practice much broader and, following some interpretations, the criteria for evaluating and eventually admitting the proposed unilateral measures should be definitively more flexible (Heumueller and Josling 2001). What is particularly important is that, in a borderline case, a national regulation, having for example only strong ethical-religious or socio-political justifications, could be accepted as a legitimate TBT measure even if not supported by any scientific evidence. GM food and crops could pertain to similar cases; though concerns about the food-safety can not be easily supported by the scientific evidence, a negotiating country can still propose a precautionary measure for regulating the GMO trade (mandatory labelling, for instance) to increase the social acceptance of such innovations. Social acceptance that could be affected also by some non-tradable global commons concerns (such as biodiversity, cultural and gastronomic heritance, etc.). The institutional original characters of the TBT agreement, as well as the actual practice of its application, makes it much closer to that idea of "negotiating forum" rather than the SPS agreement. Thus, it could represent

TRADE, LABELING, TRACEABILITY AND ISSUES IN BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT

TRADE, LABELING, TRACEABILITY AND ISSUES IN BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT TRADE, LABELING, TRACEABILITY AND ISSUES IN BIOSAFETY MANAGEMENT - THE SRI LANKAN PERSPECTIVE - Mrs. Gothami Indikadahena Deputy Director of Commerce Department of Commerce 07.04.2004 Management of Bio-Safety

More information

Introduction to World Trade Organization. Risk Analysis Training

Introduction to World Trade Organization. Risk Analysis Training Introduction to World Trade Organization Risk Analysis Training Purpose/Focus Introduce WTO History and Mandate Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement Role of Risk Analysis Standard Setting Bodies Technical

More information

Biotechnology, Food, and Agriculture Disputes or Food Safety and International Trade

Biotechnology, Food, and Agriculture Disputes or Food Safety and International Trade Canada-United States Law Journal Volume 26 Issue Article 41 January 2000 Biotechnology, Food, and Agriculture Disputes or Food Safety and International Trade Serge Frechette Follow this and additional

More information

14.54 International Trade Lecture 22: Trade Policy (III)

14.54 International Trade Lecture 22: Trade Policy (III) 14.54 International Trade Lecture 22: Trade Policy (III) 14.54 Week 14 Fall 2016 14.54 (Week 14) Trade Policy (III) Fall 2016 1 / 23 Today s Plan 1 2 3 Trade Policy as a Second Best Instrument Strategic

More information

Mohammad Ghodsi: Summary of Ph.D. Dissertation Trade Policy, Trade Conflicts, Determinants, and Consequences of Protectionism

Mohammad Ghodsi: Summary of Ph.D. Dissertation Trade Policy, Trade Conflicts, Determinants, and Consequences of Protectionism Mohammad Ghodsi: Summary of Ph.D. Dissertation Trade Policy, Trade Conflicts, Determinants, and Consequences of Protectionism Issues related to trade policy, its determinants and consequences have been

More information

HANDLING, TRANSPORT, PACKAGING AND IDENTIFICATION OF LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS

HANDLING, TRANSPORT, PACKAGING AND IDENTIFICATION OF LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS CBD Distr. GENERAL UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/7/8 11 August 2014 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY SERVING AS THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL

More information

Markus Böckenförde, Grüne Gentechnik und Welthandel Summary Chapter I:

Markus Böckenförde, Grüne Gentechnik und Welthandel Summary Chapter I: Summary Chapter I: 1. Presently, end consumers of commercially sold GMOs do not have any specific advantage from modern biotechnology. Whether and how much farmers benefit economically from planting is

More information

Introduction to the WTO Non-tariff Measures and the SPS & TBT Agreements

Introduction to the WTO Non-tariff Measures and the SPS & TBT Agreements Introduction to the WTO Non-tariff Measures and the SPS & TBT Agreements Gretchen H. Stanton Agriculture and Commodities Division World Trade Organization Introduction to the WTO 1. General Introduction

More information

Discussion Following the Remarks of Ms. Coffield and Mr. Frechette

Discussion Following the Remarks of Ms. Coffield and Mr. Frechette Canada-United States Law Journal Volume 26 Issue Article 42 January 2000 Discussion Following the Remarks of Ms. Coffield and Mr. Frechette Discussion Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj

More information

The Precautionary Principle, Trade and the WTO

The Precautionary Principle, Trade and the WTO The Precautionary Principle, Trade and the WTO A Discussion Paper for the European Commission Consultation on Trade and Sustainable Development November 7th 2000 Peter Hardstaff, Trade Policy Officer,

More information

Table ronde / Roundtable. Jeudi le 11 mai 2006 Thursday May 11, h

Table ronde / Roundtable. Jeudi le 11 mai 2006 Thursday May 11, h Program and Overview Table ronde / Roundtable organized by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Anne Petitpierre, Professors at the Faculty of Law Jeudi le 11 mai 2006 Thursday May 11, 2006 14.00-17.30 h

More information

Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex VIII to the SADC Protocol on Trade

Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex VIII to the SADC Protocol on Trade Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex VIII to the SADC Protocol on Trade Approved by the SADC Committee of Ministers of Trade on 17 July, 2014, Gaborone, Botswana Page 1 of 18 ANNEX VIII CONCERNING SANITARY

More information

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM TRAINFORTRADE 2000 TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM Module 2 2 Table of Contents PREFACE...3 I. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE WTO...4 A. BACKGROUND...4 B. THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE

More information

Chapter 27 The WTO Agreements: An Introduction to the Obligations and Opportunities for Biosafety

Chapter 27 The WTO Agreements: An Introduction to the Obligations and Opportunities for Biosafety Chapter 27 The WTO Agreements: An Introduction to the Obligations and Opportunities for Biosafety CHEE YOKE LING AND LIM LI CHING THIRD WORLD NETWORK The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is an extremely

More information

10 common misunderstandings about the WTO

10 common misunderstandings about the WTO 10 common misunderstandings about the WTO The debate will probably never end. People have different views of the pros and cons of the WTO s multilateral trading system. Indeed, one of the most important

More information

The Development of FTA Rules of Origin Functions

The Development of FTA Rules of Origin Functions The Development of FTA Rules of Origin Functions Xinxuan Cheng School of Management, Hebei University Baoding 071002, Hebei, China E-mail: cheng_xinxuan@126.com Abstract The rules of origin derived from

More information

Journal of International Law and Trade Policy

Journal of International Law and Trade Policy Volume 17 Number 2 2016/pp.137-172 www.usask.ca/esteyjournal The Estey Journal of International Law and Trade Policy Consistency of Assessment of Socio-Economic Considerations under the Cartagena Protocol

More information

Trade and Public Policies: NTMs in the WTO

Trade and Public Policies: NTMs in the WTO Trade and Public Policies: NTMs in the WTO Xinyi Li Trade Policies Review Division, WTO Secretariat 12 th ARTNeT Capacity Building Workshop December 2016 1 Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed in

More information

The Biosafety Protocol: An Analysis

The Biosafety Protocol: An Analysis The Biosafety Protocol: An Analysis 20 th March 2000 Peter Hardstaff Trade Policy Officer RSPB The Lodge Sandy Bedfordshire SG19 2DL UK Tel: 01767 680551 E-mail: pete.hardstaff@rspb.org.uk The author would

More information

The World Trade Organization. Alireza Naghavi

The World Trade Organization. Alireza Naghavi The World Trade Organization Alireza Naghavi The WTO 1948: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1995: the World Trade Organization narrow group of specialists; staff: 530 people leading symbol

More information

Report of the International Conference on Addressing Barriers to Rice Seeds Trade between India and Bangladesh

Report of the International Conference on Addressing Barriers to Rice Seeds Trade between India and Bangladesh Report of the International Conference on Addressing Barriers to Rice Seeds Trade between India and Bangladesh 1. Introduction (RISTE Project) 22 nd December 2013, BRAC Centre Inn, Dhaka, Bangladesh CUTS

More information

EU-MERCOSUR CHAPTER. Article 1. Objectives and Scope

EU-MERCOSUR CHAPTER. Article 1. Objectives and Scope EU-MERCOSUR CHAPTER TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Article 1 Objectives and Scope 1. The objective of this Chapter is to enhance the integration of sustainable development in the Parties' trade and

More information

The GMO Panel: Applications of WTO Law to Trade in Agricultural Biotech Products

The GMO Panel: Applications of WTO Law to Trade in Agricultural Biotech Products European Integration Vol. 31, No. 3, 409 429, May 2009 ARTICLE The GMO Panel: Applications of WTO Law to Trade in Agricultural Biotech Products GILBERT R. WINHAM Department of Political Science and Faculty

More information

Article 14. Bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements

Article 14. Bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements Article 14. Bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements 1. Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements regarding intentional transboundary

More information

Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex to the SADC Protocol on Trade:

Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex to the SADC Protocol on Trade: Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Annex to the SADC Protocol on Trade: Approved by the SADC Committee of Ministers of Trade on 12 July 2008, Lusaka, Zambia Page 1 of 19 ANNEX VIII CONCERNING SANITARY AND

More information

The Republic of Turkey (hereinafter referred to as "Turkey") and the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter referred to as "Estonia");

The Republic of Turkey (hereinafter referred to as Turkey) and the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter referred to as Estonia); FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND ESTONIA PREAMBLE The Republic of Turkey (hereinafter referred to as "Turkey") and the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter referred to as "Estonia"); Recalling their

More information

Whose Rules Rule? Development and the Global Governance of Biotechnology

Whose Rules Rule? Development and the Global Governance of Biotechnology IDS Bulletin 35.1 Globalisation and Poverty Whose Rules Rule? Development and the Global Governance of Biotechnology Peter Newell and Ruth Mackenzie* 1 Introduction Few case studies highlight as clearly

More information

T H E B I O S A F E T Y P R O T O C O L. Philippe Cullet

T H E B I O S A F E T Y P R O T O C O L. Philippe Cullet T H E B I O S A F E T Y P R O T O C O L Philippe Cullet 1 T H E B I O S A F E T Y P R O T O C O L Philippe Cullet The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena

More information

International Regulation of Trade in the Products of Biotechnology. Executive Summary

International Regulation of Trade in the Products of Biotechnology. Executive Summary International Regulation of Trade in the Products of Biotechnology Executive Summary Grant E. Isaac Associate, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade Associate Professor of Biotechnology

More information

Introduction to WTO and the SPS Agreement. Anneke Hamilton Agriculture and Commodities Division 12 September 2013 SADC Workshop, South Africa

Introduction to WTO and the SPS Agreement. Anneke Hamilton Agriculture and Commodities Division 12 September 2013 SADC Workshop, South Africa Introduction to WTO and the SPS Agreement Anneke Hamilton Agriculture and Commodities Division 12 September 2013 SADC Workshop, South Africa Outline Introduction to WTO Use of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs)

More information

Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System An Overview and Synopsis. Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden

Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System An Overview and Synopsis. Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System An Overview and Synopsis Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden Tim Josling (josling@stanford.edu) is Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute

More information

International Political Economy: Politics and the Design of Commercial Agreements

International Political Economy: Politics and the Design of Commercial Agreements International Political Economy: Politics and the Design of Commercial Agreements Robert Gulotty Department of Political Science University of Chicago PKU-UChicago Summer Institute 2014 Outline of Talk

More information

World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division. The Value of Domestic Subsidy Rules in Trade Agreements

World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division. The Value of Domestic Subsidy Rules in Trade Agreements Staff Working Paper ERSD-2009-12 November 25, 2009 World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division The Value of Domestic Subsidy Rules in Trade Agreements Michael Ruta: Daniel Brou:

More information

WTO Plus Commitments in RTAs. Presented By: Shailja Singh Assistant Professor Centre for WTO Studies New Delhi

WTO Plus Commitments in RTAs. Presented By: Shailja Singh Assistant Professor Centre for WTO Studies New Delhi WTO Plus Commitments in RTAs Presented By: Shailja Singh Assistant Professor Centre for WTO Studies New Delhi Some Basic Facts WTO is a significant achievement in Multilateralism Regional Trade Agreements

More information

EC-BIOTECH: Table of Contents

EC-BIOTECH: Table of Contents EC-BIOTECH: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE PANEL S INTERIM REPORT 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary... 3 I. Introduction... 5 II. Transparency and Public Participation... 7 A. Transparency... 7 B. Public

More information

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 10 common misunderstandings about the WTO Is it a dictatorial tool of the rich and powerful? Does it destroy jobs? Does it ignore the concerns of health, the environment and development?

More information

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web

CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RS20139 Updated April 2, 2002 China and the World Trade Organization Summary Wayne M. Morrison Specialist in International Trade and Finance

More information

The International Regulation of Modern Biotechnology

The International Regulation of Modern Biotechnology The International Regulation of Modern Biotechnology Ruth Mackenzie* Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development I. INTRODUCTION Products derived from modern biotechnology are subject

More information

29 May 2017 Without prejudice CHAPTER [XX] TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. Article X.1. Objectives and Scope

29 May 2017 Without prejudice CHAPTER [XX] TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. Article X.1. Objectives and Scope 29 May 2017 Without prejudice This document is the European Union's (EU) proposal for a legal text on trade and sustainable development in the EU-Indonesia FTA. It has been tabled for discussion with Indonesia.

More information

The Parties to this Protocol, Being Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, hereinafter referred to as the Convention,

The Parties to this Protocol, Being Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, hereinafter referred to as the Convention, Preamble 131. The preamble of an international agreement sets out the context in which the agreement was negotiated and concluded. Under general rules of treaty interpretation the preamble is not considered

More information

Canada European Union Trade Negotiations 7. Technical Barriers to Trade and Regulatory Cooperation

Canada European Union Trade Negotiations 7. Technical Barriers to Trade and Regulatory Cooperation Canada European Union Trade Negotiations 7. Technical Barriers to Trade and Regulatory Cooperation Publication No. 2010-58-E 3 October 2010 Alexandre Gauthier and Michael Holden International Affairs,

More information

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD. Kyle Bagwell Robert W. Staiger

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD. Kyle Bagwell Robert W. Staiger NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD Kyle Bagwell Robert W. Staiger Working Paper 10249 http://www.nber.org/papers/w10249 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050

More information

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT An Agenda for Developing Countries

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT An Agenda for Developing Countries TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT An Agenda for Developing Countries Some trade and environment linkages work out in the same way for developing countries as for developed countries. However, most of the positive

More information

Commission position paper on the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Negotiations of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and China 1. INTRODUCTION This paper provides the Commission

More information

EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement EU TEXTUAL PROPOSAL. Chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement EU TEXTUAL PROPOSAL. Chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures This document contains an EU proposal for a legal text on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in the Trade Part of a possible modernised EU-Mexico Association Agreement. It has been tabled for discussion

More information

The US-China Business Council (USCBC)

The US-China Business Council (USCBC) COUNCIL Statement of Priorities in the US-China Commercial Relationship The US-China Business Council (USCBC) supports a strong, mutually beneficial commercial relationship between the United States and

More information

Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise March 5, 2009

Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise March 5, 2009 Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise March 5, 2009 CHAPTER ONE OVERVIEW OF ACTIVITIES At their 17 th October 2008 Summit, EU and Canadian Leaders agreed to work together to "define the scope

More information

The Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova

The Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova Moldova State University Faculty of Law Chisinau, 12 th February 2015 The Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova Environmental Cooperation Gianfranco Tamburelli Association Agreements with Georgia,

More information

Summary UNICE: POST-CANCUN TRADE AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY. 5 December 2003

Summary UNICE: POST-CANCUN TRADE AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY. 5 December 2003 POSITION PAPER POSITION PAPER 5 December 2003 UNICE: POST-CANCUN TRADE AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY Summary 1. UNICE s overall trade and investment objective is to foster European business competitiveness in

More information

We the Stakeholders: The Power of Representation beyond Borders? Clara Brandi

We the Stakeholders: The Power of Representation beyond Borders? Clara Brandi REVIEW Clara Brandi We the Stakeholders: The Power of Representation beyond Borders? Terry Macdonald, Global Stakeholder Democracy. Power and Representation Beyond Liberal States, Oxford, Oxford University

More information

EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area

EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Area Reading guide The European Union (EU) and Georgia are about to forge a closer political and economic relationship by signing an Association Agreement (AA). This includes the goal of creating a Deep and

More information

International Business 7e

International Business 7e International Business 7e by Charles W.L. Hill (adapted for LIUC09 by R.Helg) McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 6 The Political Economy of

More information

The Precautionary Principle in EU Policies

The Precautionary Principle in EU Policies The Precautionary Principle in EU Policies An Overview of Recent Developments Mattia Pellegrini, DG SANCO 02 Strategy and Analysis The story of the Tour Madou LSC asks the Commission to abide by the principle

More information

TTIP, AGRIFOOD TRADE AND REGULATORY COHERENCE

TTIP, AGRIFOOD TRADE AND REGULATORY COHERENCE 1 TTIP, AGRIFOOD TRADE AND REGULATORY COHERENCE Alan Matthews alan.matthews@tcd.ie Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Presentation to GMCC-15, 7 th International Conference on Coexistence between Genetically

More information

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THE URUGUAY ROUND

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THE URUGUAY ROUND MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THE URUGUAY ROUND RESTRICTED MTN.GNG/12 15 August 1988 Special Distribution \ Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT) GROUP OF NEGOTIATIONS ON GOODS Eleventh meeting: 25 and

More information

,QIRUPDWLRQQRWHWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ IURP&RPPLVVLRQHUV/DP\DQG)LVFKOHU

,QIRUPDWLRQQRWHWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ IURP&RPPLVVLRQHUV/DP\DQG)LVFKOHU ,QIRUPDWLRQQRWHWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ IURP&RPPLVVLRQHUV/DP\DQG)LVFKOHU 6XEMHFW WK :720LQLVWHULDO&RQIHUHQFH1RYHPEHU'RKD4DWDU± $VVHVVPHQWRIUHVXOWVIRUWKH(8 6XPPDU\ On 14 November 2001 the 142 members of the WTO

More information

248 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources

248 Power and the Global Governance of Plant Genetic Resources Conclusions From the general, to the particular, and back again. This thesis has provided broad archaeologies and genealogies of discourse which are relevant to the global governance of plant genetic resources.

More information

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EUROPEAN COMMISSION Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM(2017) 492 final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE

More information

Answer THREE questions. Each question carries EQUAL weight.

Answer THREE questions. Each question carries EQUAL weight. UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA School of Economics Main Series UG Examination 2017-18 EUROPEAN ECONOMY ECO-5006B Time allowed: 2 hours Answer THREE questions. Each question carries EQUAL weight. Notes are not

More information

PRIVATE STANDARDS AND THE WTO COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES

PRIVATE STANDARDS AND THE WTO COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES PRIVATE STANDARDS AND THE WTO COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES Christiane Wolff Counsellor, World Trade Organization 1 Original: English Summary: Private standards have been under discussion

More information

Scientific Principle under the SPS Agreement

Scientific Principle under the SPS Agreement 2010 International Conference on E-business, Management and Economics IPEDR vol.3 (2011) (2011) IACSIT Press, Hong Kong Scientific Principle under the SPS Agreement Eun Sup Lee Department of International

More information

Proposition 37 is an initiative petition

Proposition 37 is an initiative petition V. 16 no. 1 Sep/Oct 2012 California s Proposition 37 and the WTO Agreements Drew L. Kershen Proposition 37 raises significant and difficult issues as to whether it complies with World Trade Organization

More information

For a Strong and Modern World Trading System

For a Strong and Modern World Trading System POSITION PAPER - SUMMARY For a Strong and Modern World Trading System May 2016 Create new market access worldwide, stop protectionism Subsequent to the December 2015 WTO Ministerial Conference in Nairobi,

More information

EU Mercosur negotiations. Chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Draft consolidated text ARTICLE 1 OBJECTIVES

EU Mercosur negotiations. Chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Draft consolidated text ARTICLE 1 OBJECTIVES This document contains the consolidated text resulting from the 28 th round of negotiations (3-7 July 2017) on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in the Trade Part of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement.

More information

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALBANIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALBANIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALBANIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AGREEMENT ON FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ALBANIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF MACEDONIA PREAMBLE Desirous to develop

More information

Overview of recent trends in patent regimes in United States, Japan and Europe

Overview of recent trends in patent regimes in United States, Japan and Europe Overview of recent trends in patent regimes in United States, Japan and Europe Catalina Martinez Dominique Guellec OECD IPR, Innovation and Economic Performance 28 August 23 1 Growing number of patents

More information

LIST OF KEY MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS IN MEXICO UNDER THE MARKET ACCESS STRATEGY 22 September 2016 MAAC/

LIST OF KEY MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS IN MEXICO UNDER THE MARKET ACCESS STRATEGY 22 September 2016 MAAC/ Barrier LIST OF KEY MARKET ACCESS BARRIERS IN MEXICO UNDER THE MARKET ACCESS STRATEGY 22 September 2016 MAAC/2016-037 Description Protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights The huge market

More information

The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade and Environment Debate Francesco Sindico

The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade and Environment Debate Francesco Sindico The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade and Environment Debate Francesco Sindico NOTA DI LAVORO 11.2005 JANUARY 2005 NRM Natural Resources Management Francesco Sindico, Departamento

More information

ITUC 1 Contribution to the pre-conference negotiating text for the UNCTAD XII Conference in Accra, April

ITUC 1 Contribution to the pre-conference negotiating text for the UNCTAD XII Conference in Accra, April ITUC 1 Contribution to the pre-conference negotiating text for the UNCTAD XII Conference in Accra, 20-25 April 2008 2 Introduction: Trade, Employment and Inequality 1. The ITUC welcomes this opportunity

More information

EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS EFFICIENCY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE : A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS TAI-YEONG CHUNG * The widespread shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence in the twentieth century has spurred scholars

More information

TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Disclaimer: In view of the Commission's transparency policy, the Commission is publishing the texts of the Trade Part of the Agreement following the agreement in principle announced on 21 April 2018. The

More information

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP PREAMBLE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR AN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP PREAMBLE Disclaimer: The negotiations between the EU and Japan on the Economic Partnership Agreement (the EPA) have been finalised. In view of the Commission's transparency policy, we are hereby publishing the

More information

Making the WTO More Supportive of Development. How to help developing countries integrate into the global trading system.

Making the WTO More Supportive of Development. How to help developing countries integrate into the global trading system. Car trailer-trucks in Brazil Making the WTO More Supportive of Development Bernard Hoekman How to help developing countries integrate into the global trading system IN WORLD trade negotiations there is

More information

Pavlos D. Pezaros Director for Agricultural Policy & Documentation Ministry of Rural Development & Food (GR)

Pavlos D. Pezaros Director for Agricultural Policy & Documentation Ministry of Rural Development & Food (GR) Pavlos D. Pezaros Director for Agricultural Policy & Documentation Ministry of Rural Development & Food (GR) Liberalisation and the Future of Agricultural Policies The Greek View 1 Paris, 07 October 2004

More information

CHAPTER 5 SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES. Article 1: Definitions

CHAPTER 5 SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES. Article 1: Definitions CHAPTER 5 SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 1. For the purposes of this Chapter: Article 1: Definitions Competent Authority means those authorities within each Party recognised by the national government

More information

Multilateral Environmental Agreements versus World Trade Organization System: A Comprehensive Study

Multilateral Environmental Agreements versus World Trade Organization System: A Comprehensive Study American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 1 (3): 219-224, 2009 ISSN 1945-5488 2009 Science Publications Multilateral Environmental Agreements versus World Trade Organization System: A Comprehensive

More information

WTO and the Environment: Case Studies in WTO Law. Dr. Christina Voigt University of Oslo, Department of Public and International Law

WTO and the Environment: Case Studies in WTO Law. Dr. Christina Voigt University of Oslo, Department of Public and International Law WTO and the Environment: Case Studies in WTO Law Dr. Christina Voigt University of Oslo, Department of Public and International Law 1. Overview: 1. Trade and Environment: the Debate 2. The Multilateral

More information

Chapter 9: Fundamentals of International Political Economy

Chapter 9: Fundamentals of International Political Economy Chapter 9: Fundamentals of International Political Economy MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. International political economy can be defined as a. the international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund

More information

Review of the Operation of the SPS Agreement DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

Review of the Operation of the SPS Agreement DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION Review of the Operation of the SPS Agreement Gretchen Stanton Paper prepared for: The World Bank s Integrated Program Of Research And Capacity Building To Enhance Participation Of Developing Countries

More information

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION & ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION & ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 186 OCTOBER 2002 THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION & ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS STEPHEN WOOLCOCK CEPS Working

More information

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO ON AMENDMENTS TO THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

More information

Joint Working Party on Agriculture and Trade

Joint Working Party on Agriculture and Trade Unclassified Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 13-Feb-2013 English - Or. English TRADE AND AGRICULTURE DIRECTORATE Unclassified

More information

National regulatory autonomy and market access

National regulatory autonomy and market access Has the WTO gone too far? National regulatory autonomy and market access Steve Woolcock London School of Economics The issues The next WTO Ministerial meeting is Qatar towards the end of this year will

More information

3 July 2003 EU TRADE POLICY ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE A NEW PUSH FOR THE REMOVAL OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE GLOBALLY.

3 July 2003 EU TRADE POLICY ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE A NEW PUSH FOR THE REMOVAL OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE GLOBALLY. 3 July 2003 EU TRADE POLICY ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE A NEW PUSH FOR THE REMOVAL OF TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE GLOBALLY Executive Summary TBTs are a concern to industry worldwide. While many other

More information

UNICE COMMENTS ON NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE

UNICE COMMENTS ON NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 2 July 2003 UNICE COMMENTS ON NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE: TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE In its position of 25 October 2003 on non-agricultural market access negotiations 1, UNICE insisted that equal importance

More information

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of Romania (hereinafter "the Parties"),

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of Romania (hereinafter the Parties), PREAMBLE The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of Romania (hereinafter "the Parties"), Reaffirming their firm commitment to the principles of a market economy, which constitutes the

More information

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA PREAMBULE THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA AND ROMANIA (hereinafter called the Parties ), REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles of market

More information

The following text reproduces the Agreement1 between the Republic of Turkey and the Slovak Republic.

The following text reproduces the Agreement1 between the Republic of Turkey and the Slovak Republic. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WT/REG68/1 24 March 1999 (99-1190) Committee on Regional Trade Agreements Original: English FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY The following

More information

Should Trade Agreements Include Environmental Policy?

Should Trade Agreements Include Environmental Policy? 84 Symposium: International Trade and the Environment Should Trade Agreements Include Environmental Policy? Introduction Josh Ederington Back in 1992, Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec led a research project

More information

INTERNATIONAL TRADE. (prepared for the Social Science Encyclopedia, Third Edition, edited by A. Kuper and J. Kuper)

INTERNATIONAL TRADE. (prepared for the Social Science Encyclopedia, Third Edition, edited by A. Kuper and J. Kuper) INTERNATIONAL TRADE (prepared for the Social Science Encyclopedia, Third Edition, edited by A. Kuper and J. Kuper) J. Peter Neary University College Dublin 25 September 2003 Address for correspondence:

More information

INTERNATIONAL TRADING RULES & THE POPS CONVENTION

INTERNATIONAL TRADING RULES & THE POPS CONVENTION INTERNATIONAL TRADING RULES & THE POPS CONVENTION November 1999 Claudia Saladin & Brennan Van Dyke, Center for International Environmental Law I. Introduction In June 1998, over 90 governments met in Montreal

More information

CUTS-CITEE Research Profile

CUTS-CITEE Research Profile Research Profile April 2005 Established in 1983, Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS) is a non-governmental research and advocacy organisation with its headquarters in Jaipur, India. Since 1991, CUTS

More information

MONEY AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD

MONEY AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD MONEY AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD Popescu Alexandra-Codruta West University of Timisoara, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Eftimie Murgu Str, No 7, 320088 Resita, alexandra.popescu@feaa.uvt.ro,

More information

Lecture 9a: Trade Agreements. Thibault FALLY C181 International Trade Spring 2018

Lecture 9a: Trade Agreements. Thibault FALLY C181 International Trade Spring 2018 Lecture 9a: Trade Agreements Thibault FALLY C181 International Trade Spring 2018 Introduction International agreements: 1) Trade agreements WTO Regional trade agreements 2) Agreements on labor issues 3)

More information

Distr. RESTRICTED. TD/B/COM.1/CRP.4 26 February 2007 ENGLISH ONLY WTO PANEL REPORT ON THE "EC BIOTECH" CASE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Distr. RESTRICTED. TD/B/COM.1/CRP.4 26 February 2007 ENGLISH ONLY WTO PANEL REPORT ON THE EC BIOTECH CASE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT Distr. RESTRICTED TD/B/COM.1/CRP.4 26 February 2007 ENGLISH ONLY TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD Commission on Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities Eleventh session Geneva, 19 23 March 2007 Item 6

More information

WTO LAW IN THE LIGHT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

WTO LAW IN THE LIGHT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WTO LAW IN THE LIGHT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION Overview of the WTO s mandate and institutional structure History of the Trade and Environment debate The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment The Doha

More information

WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX SPS Agreement Article 5 (Jurisprudence)

WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX SPS Agreement Article 5 (Jurisprudence) 1 ARTICLE 5... 5 1.1 Text of Article 5... 5 1.2 General... 6 1.2.1 Standard of review... 6 1.2.2 Risk assessment versus risk management... 8 1.3 Article 5.1... 9 1.3.1 General... 9 1.3.2 "based on" an

More information

Presented at the Closing Plenary Session on 11 September 2006

Presented at the Closing Plenary Session on 11 September 2006 AEBF10 CHAIRMAN S STATEMENT 11 September 2006 The 10 th Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF10), Helsinki Chairman s Statement Presented at the Closing Plenary Session on 11 September 2006 The 10 th Asia-Europe

More information

9 January 2017 Without prejudice CHAPTER [XX] SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES. Article X.1. Objectives

9 January 2017 Without prejudice CHAPTER [XX] SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES. Article X.1. Objectives 9 January 2017 Without prejudice This document is the European Union's (EU) proposal for a legal text on sanitary and phytosanitary measures in the EU-Philippines FTA. It has been tabled for discussion

More information

Essays on Incentives and Regulation

Essays on Incentives and Regulation Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli Facoltà di Economia Dottorato in Diritto ed Economia - XXII Ciclo Essays on Incentives and Regulation Extended abstract Tutor: Candidato:

More information