Historical-Structural & Cyclical Theories of War. Ch.11. What Causes War? - The International System - notes by Denis Bašić

Transcription

1 Historical-Structural & Cyclical Theories of War Ch.11. What Causes War? - The International System - notes by Denis Bašić

2 Historical-Structural & Cyclical Theories : Background Proponents of the historical-structural theories believe that to understand the current structure of the international system, one needs to know how this system has evolved historically. In many ways the international system of the late 20th century constitutes merely a modification of the structures and processes of the international system that existed, say, in the sixteenth century. Many of the patterns and cyclical processes (including cycles of war) that are present now can be understood by examining their origins and development in previous international systems. Thus, within this scope, we shall examine four theories: Robert Gilpin s Theory of Hegemonic War, George Modelski s Long Cycle Theory, Immanuel Wallerstein s Theory of the Capitalist World System, and Charles Doran s Cycle of Relative Power.

3 Theory of Hegemonic War

4 Theory of Hegemonic War Robert Gilpin s Theory of Hegemonic War, like Organski s Power Transition Theory, is not a general theory of war, but rather a medium range theory that focuses on wars fought between major powers for leadership in international system, therefore, hegemonic wars. Hegemonic wars are direct contests between the dominant power(s) and a rising challenger over the governance and leadership of the international system. (Like the Power Transition Theory or Status Discrepancy) War arises because of an increasing disequilibrium between the political organization of the system, on the one hand, and the actual distribution of power, on the other. As the reigning hegemonic state gradually loses the dominant economic and military position it once held, the distribution of prestige and the distribution of power are no longer in conjunction. This state of affairs is largely due to the law of uneven growth, which virtually assures that the distribution of power in the system will be unstable. Uneven rates in the growth of national power result in a cycle of growth and decline for all states and the rise and fall of hegemonic powers.

5 Theory of Hegemonic War and Neorealism Robert Gilpin s conception of the law of uneven growth is somewhat similar to Lenin s use of the law of uneven development, which he asserted would lead to war between capitalist states. Gilpin, however, is a neorealist; he believes that the clash between major powers is not primarily economic, but is a more fundamental clash of strategic and national interests: it is a power struggle, not an economic struggle! What is important here is the uneven growth of power, not the uneven development of national economies. Gilpin recognizes, however, that this uneven growth of power is created by changes in transportation, communication, industrial technology, population, prices, and the accumulation of capital, in other words by economy, as well as by changes in military technology and strategy.

6 Theory of Hegemonic War and Peace War, of course, has historically been the primary method of resolving the disequilibrium between the structure of the international system and changing distribution of power. Who initiates this war? In Gilpin s theory, the rising challenger is expected to be the most likely culprit, as it attempts to expand its influence to the limits of its new capabilities. Gilpin, however, recognizes the possibility that the hegemon itself may attempt to weaken or destroy the challenger by initiating a preventive war to forestall its loss of position. Neither bipolarity nor multipolarity guarantees peace, according to Gilpin. The most important factor is not the distribution of power, but the dynamics of power relations over time. In both bipolar and multipolar systems, changes in the relative power among the principal actors lead to war and change. Therefore, Unipolar systems (systems of "hegemonic governance") are seen as the most stable, while instability accompanies the decline of the hegemon s military preponderance.

7 Weaknesses of the Theory of Hegemonic War Historical research does not prove Gilpin right. He is not able either to demonstrate that all hegemonic wars have resulted from the type of systemic disequilibrium he discusses, or that all such systemic disequilibria have led to hegemonic wars. Edward Spiezio has examined Gilpin s hypothesis on the case of Britain. As hypothesized, the frequency of international conflict should be inversely related to Britain s relative power during her entire cycle of leadership. However, although wars occurred more frequently during Britain s decline than during her ascendancy, the difference was not overwhelming (54% to 45%). Wars occurred frequently in both phases. Therefore, it could not be concluded, as Gilpin did, either that the Unipolar System is the most stable or that the degree of hegemonic power can be seen as a primary determinant of the occurrence of war. Further weaknesses: Applicable only on the conflicts among superpowers. Overemphasis on politics. (Politics does not seem to be separable from economy.)

8 Long Cycle Theory

9 Long Cycle Theory * According to the Long Cycle Theory, there are three principal structures in the world system: the global political system, the world economy, and the world cultural subsystem. The global political system is not entirely anarchic, but possesses a decentralized polity that lacks an overriding authority. However, according to Modelski, there has always been a world power that dominates the keeping of order in the system through its monopoly of military resources. The rise and fall of these world leaders has been cyclical in nature. Each cycle begins with a global war, which determines how the system is to be constituted and which world power will be able to organize the system. The war leaves military capabilities (particularly seapower) highly concentrated, at least temporarily, in the hands of a single actor. This actor also possesses, again temporarily, the world system s leading economy. Eventually, the power and the political legitimacy of this state decline and it attracts competitors. Order gives way to disorder, concentration of power to deconcentration. Thus, there are four stages of the long cycle: global war, world power, delegitimization, and deconcentration.

10 Dynamics of Changing System Structures : Long Cycles

11 Long Cycle Theory and War & Peace Like the Hegemonic War and Power Transition Theories, the Long Cycle Theory also advocates that concentration of power in the hands of a world leader is associated with systemic stability, though this does not last. The long cycle of world leadership endures approximately one hundred years - three generations. The world power manages the system alone for the initial part of this cycle, but the system does not remain unipolar; as the legitimacy and power of the global leader erode, the system drifts from unipolarity to bipolarity and further to multipolarity, ending in anarchy and chaos. Long cyclists maintain that the cause of wars is to be found primarily in the processes and dynamics of the system, specifically the changing distribution of power that derives from uneven rates of development among members of the international system. Think of this phrase uneven rates of development and check the similarity with the Theory of Hegemonic War.

12 Weaknesses of the Long Cycle Theory Like the Theory of Hegemonic War, the Long Cycle Theory emphasizes the stability of unipolar system, which through historical research has been proven incorrect. (see, for instance, Edward Spiezo s study in the Hegemonic War.) According to Jack Levy, at least three major, long-lasting wars among major powers occurred during the very periods deemed to be most peaceful by the Long Cycle Theory. This fact undermines our confidence in the theory. The long-cycle theory is concerned primarily with global wars - wars that result in the selection of a new world power (or the confirmation of the previous world power). It ignores small scale and local wars.

13 Theory of the Capitalist World System

14 Theory of the Capitalist World System The (capitalist) world-systems perspective is essentially a political economy approach to international relations that focuses on international inequality and dependence. Immanuel Wallerstein, the father of the theory, divides the world systems into two historical types: world empires, in which a single political unit controls the world system s economy (i.e., the Roman Empire), and world economies, which are essentially multicentric, with no single state in control. Wallerstein argues that although limited world empires existed in the past, the modern age (beginning about 1450) has been characterized by the emergence of a European-based capitalist world economy that has gradually become a truly global economy. Although attempts have been made by certain states to construct a world empire, in the modern age none has succeeded.

15 What creates the Capitalist World Economy? Like the realists, Wallerstein emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system. Essentially, the competitive nature of the system prevents monopolization, while the balance of power in the interstate system prevents anyone state from controlling the world economy. Political anarchy leads to a particular form of global economic system - a capitalist world economy with an international division of labor. Check this video on Dependency Theory that explains the basic system of the capitalist world economy.

16 How is the World Economy divided? According to the World-System Theory, the world economy is divided into three segments: the core, the periphery, and the semiperiphery. Core states are the "haves"; they have the most efficient and productive economies and are the most technologically advanced. Production in core states is capital-intensive and uses skilled, high-wage labor. Core states also have the strongest military establishments. Needless to say, they also receive a disproportionate share of the world-economy s rewards. The periphery is made up of economically weak states whose production is primarily in low-wage, labor-intensive goods. Their economies are highly dependent on those of the core state to which they are most closely associated. The semiperiphery constitutes an intermediate category of states, with some production that is similar to that of core areas and some similar to that found in the periphery. Thus, the semiperiphery acts in some respects as an exploiter (of periphery states) and as an exploited area (by the core states).

17 How are the core states further divided? The core itself is divided between hegemonic powers and regular core states. A hegemonic power is a core state that develops a position of dominance throughout the entire world economy. Wallerstein sees this dominance primarily in terms of comparative advantage: the concentration of certain kinds of enterprises (called lead industries) within the core state. The hegemonic state holds a decisive superiority in agriculturalindustrial productivity, in finance and investment, and it dominates world trade, amassing the largest single share of the world market, and therefore the largest economic rewards. As a result, the hegemonic state is able to impose a set of rules on the system.

18 Rise and Fall of a Hegemon World wars result in the crowning of a new hegemonic power; however, the victor s hegemony does not last. According to world-systems theorists, the demise of a hegemonic power has much more to do with economic factors than military ones. Maintaining hegemony is expensive in terms of military and bureaucratic overhead, and tax burdens rise within the hegemon. Uneven capitalist development leads to a change in the distribution of productive capabilities among the core states, and the hegemonic power loses its competitive edge in the production of leading industries; agricultural and industrial production declines. Wages in the hegemonic state tend to rise, reducing competitiveness, and profit rate differentials change, leading to the export of capital from the hegemon. The free market results in the flow of capital and technology to other states; Innovations that have given the hegemonic power a competitive edge can always be copied by others. Hegemonic core states simply can t control this process.

19 The World System Theory and War The World-systems theorists place war in the framework of the development and expansion of the capitalist world economy. At bottom, the capitalist system is a system that has pitted all accumulators of capital against one another. Wallerstein argues that war can be seen as struggles to shape the institutional structures of the capitalist world economy so as to construct the kind of world market whose operation would automatically favour particular economic actors. Christopher Chase-Dunn says, world wars and the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers... can be understood as the violent reorganization of production relations on a world scale, so as to increase the internationalization of capitalist production. World wars are essentially attempts to restructure the interstate political structure to reflect changing economic realities and to convert the politicalmilitary strength of rising challengers into a greater share of the world surplus.

20 How to break the War Cycle? If the cycle of war is inherent in the basic logic of uneven development, exploitation, competition, and conflict found in the capitalist world economy, how is the war cycle to be broken? Presumably, the chances of peace will be enhanced with the dissolution of the present system and its replacement by a socialist world system. In one version (that of Chase-Dunn), a socialist world system would essentially mean that capitalism would be replaced with a collectivist economic rationality, and systemic leadership would be provided by a democratic and federal system of world government. * Notice that the World System theorists do not advocate revolution, but rather evolution, like John Hobson, British liberal economist. Even their idea of the world government might have come from Hobson directly. (See Hobson, Towards International Government, 1914)

21 Kondratieff Waves, aka. Supercycle Both Long Cyclists and World-Systems theorists have incorporated certain economic cycles called Kondratieff waves into their theories of the cycle of world leadership. The Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff claimed in the 1920s to have discovered fifty-year waves (or cycles) in prices, production, and consumption in the economies of the major capitalist nations. He argued that these cycles were indicative of rhythms within the international economic system as a whole. His research also suggested that upswings in economic long waves were related to the occurrence of major war. He tentatively speculated that wars were due to the increased economic struggle for markets and raw materials that accompanied the accelerated pace of economic activity, rising prices, and growth in production that took place in upswing phases. Kondratieff was a Russian, Marxian economist who perished in Stalin s purges in He tried to promote small private, free market enterprises in the Soviet Union. (Does this latter piece of info make you think again about socialism and social market economy?)

22 Weaknesses of theworld System Theory Some critics suggest that Wallerstein tends to neglect the cultural dimension, reducing it to what some call official ideologies of states, which can then easily be revealed as mere agencies of economic interest. (The critics may imply, for instance, that the national role conception might have become a part of the US culture, i.e. collective psyche. The question remains how much culture can be influenced through politics and media.) The World System Theory of War has been criticized for the same or similar alleged omissions for which the Liberal, Leninist, and Marxian Theories have been. For the full list, see chapter 5, seven slides with comments entitled Is there any evidence that the Imperialist/Marxian theory of war is valid?

23 Theory of the Cycle of Relative Power

24 Theory of the Cycle of Relative Power The main proposition of Charles Doran s Theory of the Cycle of Relative Power is that the power capabilities of states, relative to other members of the Great Power central system, follow a cyclical path of growth, maturation, and decline. This cycle is largely due to uneven rates of internal economic development. (think of Lenin s view) Since major powers tend to get involved in large wars, these power dynamics would seem to be helpful in explaining the timing of the larger wars in history, or what Doran calls extensive wars. Relative Power Cycle Theory maintains that the policies and behaviors of states depend largely on their position in the system - in this case on their position in the cycle of relative power. War is most likely to occur as a state reaches four critical points along the cycle. At each of these points an abrupt inversion occurs in the path of relative capabilities. A complete cycle contains two inflection points and two turning points, as indicated in Figure 9.1. (aka 11.1 in the textbook)

25 (For the description see Cashman pp ) Note that the graph is not properly drawn. The top segment of the historical interval at the Low turning point should look much steeper, as it does in the First inflection point and vice versa. The top segment of the historical interval at the Second inflection point should look much less steep, like the one at the Upper turning point. See the other graph.

26 National Behavior National behavior is based in part on the leader s conceptions of the state s role within the system; Furthermore, this national role conception is based primarily on the state s position within the system in terms of its relative power capabilities. A change in relative capabilities will mean a change in roles (from leader to follower, for example). These transitions in role, triggered by passing through the critical points in the power cycle, are difficult for states to make. While the previously mentioned critical points (see the graph) call for major role transformations, their sudden appearance eludes advanced detection; uncertainty is therefore high and national leaders are most vulnerable to overreaction and misperceptions that might lead them to choose war.

27 Power Cycle Theory: The Cause of War (part 1) The key to war causation in power cycle theory is what happens to a state s expectations of future security and role at critical times in its power cycle. Doran argues that governments project their expectations forward in a linear sense from past experience. In most periods of history, structural change continues prior trends and hence is fairly predictable, providing a rather certain political setting for foreign policy and international commerce (2001: 1-2). However, each of four critical points on the cycle (lower turning point, first inflection, zenith, and second inflection) represents a break in the previous trend. Because of its non-linear, relative nature, the occurrence of the critical points is unpredictable; the state s leaders (and the system) are suddenly confronted with their false assumptions about the trend when such critical points are identified. The stark contrast with normal periods of statecraft deepens the sense of uncertainty (think fear). Existing gaps between power and role come to the surface of awareness and demand adjustment.

28 Power Cycle Theory: The Cause of War (part 2) Thus, discordant messages and discontinuity of expectations at critical points, together with a sense of threat and of perceived injustice regarding state demands and/or systemic response, make this interval of history highly unstable and provoke the movement to major war. According to Doran, "Concerns internal to the state ricochet across the system as states seek redress or redefinition of the systemic equilibrium according to their own perceived condition of internal disequilibrium between power and role. (See, Franz Kohout, 2003) In short, war results from changing power relationships among states, lags in adjusting to these changes, differential expectations, and efforts to resist or promote those alterations. The weakness of the theory is that, like the Power Transition Theory, it focuses only on superpowers.