EXPLAINING EU AND RUSSIA SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY. A STRATEGIC CULTURE APPROACH.

Transcription

1 EXPLAINING EU AND RUSSIA SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY. A STRATEGIC CULTURE APPROACH. Author: Kitija Grave, T221 Supervisor: Per Jansson Master Thesis in International and European Relations 2014

2 ABSTRACT This thesis will apply strategic culture concept to EU Russia relations, as an attempt to expand on the usual explanations of state behaviour provided by realism and liberalism. It explores different strategic cultures possessed by the EU and Russia, by looking at the differences in their strategies which are based on a specific culture, values and beliefs about the international security environment. These differences then are applied to the Ukraine crisis, to see how opposite the approaches and actions carried out by these two actors are. This demonstrates that strategic culture is a useful approach to look beyond the importance of military power and when properly analysed, makes a good contributions to explain strategic behaviour in EU Russia relations. 2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A CONCEPT IN ANALYSING FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY STRATEGIES Defining strategic culture Development of the strategic culture Concept of strategic culture Constructivism and Identity Connection between strategic culture and security strategies Framework for strategic culture analysis THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY IN STRATEGIC CULTURE CONCEPT Developing the Common Security and Defence Policy and European Security Strategy European security from a strategic culture perspective Historical aspect and identity Level of ambition in international security policy Scope of action for the executive decision making Foreign policy orientation Willingness to use military force Critique on the EU strategic culture Summary STRATGIC CULTURE IN RUSSIA Analysis of Russian strategic culture History and identity Level of ambition in international security policy Scope of action for the executive decision making Foreign Policy Orientation Willingness to use military force Critique on Russian security strategy Summary A COMPARATIVE FOCUS ON EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS Development of EU and Russian security relations after the Cold War Aspects of strategic culture in the EU-Russia relations

4 CONCLUSIONS BIBILOGRAPHY APPENDIX

5 INTRODUCTION Security has always been one of the most important aspects that states have to deal with. Indeed, one of the main functions of the state has always been to protect its citizens. Traditionally this was done by increasing the states military power, threatening any enemies, and using the military means available if the state felt it was in danger. Over time, the international security environment has evolved into a more complex system, where just a military arsenal is not appropriate to face the threats and challenges brought by globalisation. Therefore the changing nature of threats has required actors to rethink their traditional strategies and seek new ways how to tackle these challenges. This has led to new, different strategies for actors, which very often are not compatible, creating tensions in international relations. International relations theories such as realism and liberalism are often used to analyse and describe the behaviour of actors in the field of security. However, this changing international security system can be analysed by more than these theoretical perspectives by looking at elements that are usually left out of these classic theories. One of the most important areas of international security to emerge in the 21 st century has been between the EU and Russia. The classic approaches mentioned above are struggling to explain the security relationship between these two entities as the EU in particular is a non-traditional power in the security sense. The fact that 28 states can present a common foreign and security model that can challenge the single state model of Russia is a new phenomenon in the international arena and requires an approach beyond the usual camps of realism and liberalism to explain. To do this culture will emerge to be a priority theme beyond the usual measures of soldiers, guns and economic might. This will be the focus of this thesis as the concept of strategic culture will be explored through the security relationship of the EU and Russia. Background or why culture matters? With new threats to security and global stability emerging, behaviour of international actors has changed. They are looking for new ways to ensure security and avoid threats by improving foreign policy, security strategies and means to cope with the new threats. Very often what is seen as appropriate action for one actor is totally inappropriate for others. For example, a state such as North Korea that possesses and produces nuclear weapons for its security whilst not agreeing to the Treaty of the 5

6 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be seen as a threat by those who have agreed on non-proliferation. Or a separatist movement in a state, trying to secede might be seen as a threat by the state it is trying to secede from, whereas others may see it as a legitimate case of self-determination. Therefore the developments of incompatible views are one of the main sources for tensions between actors. For a long time, realist and liberalist schools dominated international relations theory as these approaches have been seen as the best ways to explain developments on the international stage. Realists assume that a state is a rational actor, not keen on cooperation, and power and military might are the keys to understanding how the world operates. Liberalists on the other hand, see actors as able to cooperate to achieve lasting peace, while stressing the importance of international law, organisation and human rights. However, these classic models cannot explain the differences in foreign and security policies of international actors, or willingness to intervene or use force, even though they have capabilities that are equal to each other, and who are constantly facing the same international pressures. Other approaches are needed to explain these differences in behaviour. As will be presented in this thesis these differences can be explained by looking at aspects such as the culture, history and past experiences of these actors. Strategic culture is an approach that has emerged to examine these aspects and understand how they play a key part in the decision making of actors. Therefore it allows us to look at international relations form a different perspective. Strategic culture focuses on how national preferences and attitudes can be explained by looking at different cultural sources (see chapter 1), the domestic and international factors that shape states foreign and security policy and the beliefs of policy makers towards the use of military force. Strategic culture also supports the view that throughout history attitudes towards the ways of solving conflicts have differed, ranging from glorifying military interventions and the power of coercion, to belief that force should only be used as a last resort after all other means have proven to be ineffective. The concept of strategic culture explains the role of cultural, ideational and normative influences can have on the motivations of states and their leaders, 1 and that these 1 Bezen Balamir Coskun, Does Strategic Culture matter? Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security in Perceptions, Summer-Autumn 2007, Centre for Strategic Research, (Acessed ) 6

7 actors are strongly influenced by past experiences. The power of these elements culture, norms, beliefs and fears should not be underestimated as they have played an important role in making history and influencing identities of actors before. By looking at these aspects from the perspective of security, strategic culture also focuses on dynamics of the foreign policy spectrum of different actors as it can be used to explain why and actor switched from a strict pacifist culture towards more interventionist and aggressive one 2. Aims and research questions This thesis will examine the EU-Russian security relationship through a strategic culture approach. By doing so it aims to highlight the role that culture, which includes history, values and identity, plays in defining the security between these two actors. Such a focus will aim to demonstrate that traditional measures of security such as military capability are not the only aspects to consider and that it is the cultural legacy and identity that leads to the key decision making and security behaviour of states. Main research questions: How has strategic culture evolved and what role does it play in foreign policy and security strategy making? How can the EU strategic culture be identified and how has it developed? How is Russian strategic culture different from the strategic culture of the EU? Can strategic culture explain the conduct of EU and Russian relations regarding the crisis in Ukraine? Methods This thesis will be based on the qualitative research design. Qualitative research analysis is the most appropriate when answering questions how instead of how many and is the approach that is used most often by social sciences researchers. It seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and the individuals 2 Wilhelm Mirow, Strategic Culture Matters, (Trsnsaction Publishers, 2009), 9. 7

8 who inhabit these settings 3. Carrying out this type of research requires a specific data collection, which can be based on observations and behaviours of actors involved. It also is usually used to explain different phenomena and describe and explain a relationship either between individuals, groups or other types of subjects. This is appropriate to the concept strategic culture, as at its core is connected to the state behaviour, strategies carried out and decisions made by leaders, which are founded on different concepts, values and beliefs. Qualitative approach is more open to interpretations of the meaning of the data and the end result is more descriptive. Whereas quantitative approach focuses on using large amounts of data, qualitative approach takes more time in analysis, and data cannot be simply analysed by a computer program. Qualitative approach is also preferred when it comes to dealing with real time issues applying it to the real world, looking at events and behaviours that are occurring. This thesis, which is concerned to the present situation of EU-Russia relations, will use this relationship as an example of the use of strategic culture. EU-Russia relations will be used as a case study. Case study is one of the preferred methods when analysing society, culture and organisations. A case study is a phenomenon, or an event, chosen, conceptualised and analysed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events 4. According to researchers in international relations case studies have made a central contribution to the understanding of international security 5. Case studies are useful as they show specific social and political processes and give an insight to a particular problem because a case study is not limited on to what is its unit of analysis can involve several actors (units) of different nature. So by taking a state, international organisations or individuals using a case study can help to explain political developments and events and their causes and character. The use of an interpretative case study is a good way to develop and evaluate theories. In these the theoretical framework is used to provide an explanation of particular cases 6. This thesis is looking at EU-Russian relations from a case centred study view a theory (in this case the strategic culture concept) is 3 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for Social Sciences, 7th ed., (Pearson Education, 2009), 8. 4 Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating, Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences. A Pluralist Perspective, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), Ibid Ibid

9 used to understand a specific case, as the purpose is not to develop theories but to use and evaluate an existing theory. The data for analysis will be acquired mainly by looking into official documents and discourses. The EU and Russia has different foreign and security policy strategies and visions, so it is important to gather data from official primary sources from both sides. Official documents can be used to gather data about strategic culture, as documents such as foreign policy concepts or military doctrines are the main guidelines for state decision making and behaviour. Scope and limitations There are certain limitations to this research. This thesis examines how strategic culture explains EU-Russian relations, but does not explain in detail the decision making within the EU. The main limitation regarding the EU s strategic culture is the fact that the EU consists of 28 memberstates. Of which, each have their own cultures and values and decision making processes and coming to an agreement very often is complicated and takes a lot of time. However, this thesis is written assuming the decisions are made and memberstates have agreed on an issue, as during times of crisis the EU should speak with one voice and express a strong, united opinion. The second limitation concerns the example of Ukraine in the case study. As the conflict in Ukraine is ongoing, this thesis will focus on the events and actions that have already been made until the mid-may Data will be mainly gathered from the media and reports on the development of the situation in Ukraine from both sides the EU and Russia to get a full insight. However, with such an ongoing crisis it must be acknowledged that data my be unreliable and the truths of one week can become the fallacies of the next. Overview of the thesis In the first chapter I will look at the concept and theory of strategic culture how it was developed, what are the possible definitions of it are, and what it consists of. I will also look at how constructivism is connected to strategic culture, and what the overall role of strategic culture is in strategy making and development. The second chapter will focus on the strategic culture of the EU. Based on an analytical framework (see chapter 1) I will analyse aspects of the EU foreign and security policy 9

10 making strategy, and critique about the level of strategic culture in the EU. In the third chapter I will analyse Russian strategic culture following the same analytical framework as in chapter 2, showing the differences of these actors. The final chapter is devoted to the overall EU-Russia relations aspect, by giving a brief insight in history of the relations from 1990s to the present day, and the case of Ukraine, where the EU and Russian interests have clashed. 10

11 1. STRATEGIC CULTURE AS A CONCEPT IN ANALYSING FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY STRATEGIES For years, international relations were dominated by the assumptions of the major political theories like realism and liberalism. Realism was the obvious choice of many scholars in addressing issues connected with state security and defence after the Second World War. States were seen as rational actors, who are pre-occupied with physical safety, deterrence and military abilities were one of the most important indicators of state s power and role in international affairs, as well as the ability to protect its borders. However, today it is about finding the best ways how to deal with new challenges the globalised world has brought before us and how the actors deal with it, where in most of the cases, realist ideas cannot explain strategic behaviour of actors whether it is a state or other type institution. In this chapter I will explain how the concept of strategic culture is different from other theories, how it is defined and how relevant it is to security, defence and strategy. 1.1 Defining strategic culture The term strategic culture does not have one solid definition and up until today, scholars are still trying to find the best way how to explain this concept. Rather it is seen as a convergence of ideas from three different generations. Nevertheless, this concept has evolved through time and serves as a promising approach to gain a better understanding of strategic behaviour of actors and offers more nuanced picture than does solely realist approach 7. If at first strategic culture was concentrated on more narrow area of the Soviet Union and American nuclear strategies, then today it has come a long way and can be used in a much wider sense Development of the strategic culture Strategic culture was developed to understand other aspects of strategic behaviour of actors, different from that of the realism perspective. Strategic culture reaches further than principles and core assumptions of realism. Firstly, it is the concept of groupcentrism - human beings cannot survive as individuals, but can be protected as a part of a larger group, which at the same time requires their loyalty in exchange for security from external enemies 8. Secondly power is an obligatory requirement for 7 Norbert Eitelhuber, The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and what it Implies for the West in Connections. The Quarterly Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, (Winter 2009), 4. 8 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy, in Lobell Steven E. et al.(ed.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 14 11

12 these groups to secure their goals, which can vary from simple self-preservation to world domination. However, there are several directions in realism, and for example neoclassical realism identifies states as the most important actors in international politics, and that fear plays a crucial role in group formation. It also states that leaders define the national interests and conduct foreign policy based upon their assessment of relative power and other states intentions 9. One of the most popular realism scholars, E.H. Carr argues that values are derived from power and ethics from politics and that harmony of interests is nothing other than the result of a specific configuration of power 10. Strategic culture differs from realism, as it takes in consideration other factors that influence decision making and strategies pursued by states, organisations and their leaders, as we will see further in this chapter. We can divide between three generations of strategic culture. However, only the third generation is seen as more or less complete, taking the best of its predecessors and adding new ideas. First notion of strategic culture appeared in 1977 by Jack Snyder, in his report on Soviet and American nuclear strategies The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. In the introduction of his paper he states that neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconceptionfree game theorists and that as a result of different doctrines with different organisational, historical and political contexts, both actors have asked different questions about the use of nuclear weapons and thus have developed different answers 11. Snyder stresses the importance of socialisation, through which a set of beliefs, attitudes and behaviours are formed. In general, for the first generation scholars which emerged around early 1980s, strategic culture was more of a tool that helped to explain national behaviours and how forms of language, religion, beliefs and values shaped national character in the Second World War. First generation was more interested in what role strategic cultures played in how states formed their security policies. Even though, there was a lack of agreement on one definition, Snyder defined strategic culture as the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic 9 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, Introduction: Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy, in Lobell Steven E. et al.(ed.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge University Press, 2009), E.H. Carr cited in Stefano Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold, (Routledge, 1998), Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, (RAND Cooperation, 1977), v. 12

13 community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy 12. To indicate the differences, he argues that Soviet strategy has been influenced by unique factors from Soviet historical experience different from that of the USA. Although he argues that strategic cultures may change over the time as the conditions change, he also stresses the importance of continuity meaning individuals are socialised into a mode of strategic discourse and acquire a fund of strategic concepts that evolve over time 13. First generation scholars argued that strategic culture did not determine actors behaviour, but rather produced tendencies. So for the first generation, strategic culture was mainly about nuclear strategies which set the rules for the Cold War. This is one of the reasons why the first generation was criticised no solid definition, seen as too wide with too many variables which explained behaviour. According to Jack Snyder, strategic cultures are product of each state s unique, historical experience which is reaffirmed and sustained as new generations of policy makers are socialised into a particular way of thinking 14. Although the second generation, started in mid-1980s, intended to fill the gaps in definition that first generation failed to explain, it still was seen as incomplete. This generation focused on the differences between a security community s officially declared policy and the real aims and motives of the respective policy elite 15. This division led to doubts, if strategic culture is worth studying at all and that strategic culture was not expected to have an effect on strategic behaviour at all. However, similarly to the first generation, scholars agreed that strategic culture was a product of historical experiences. However, scholars do not spend much attention on the second generation while discussing strategic cultures nowadays, so they use the third generation ideas to explain the strategic cultures nowadays. The present idea and the most complete concept of strategic culture up to this date emerged in 1990s with the third generation scholars. First this generation tries to find answers that previous two generations could not do. Also, situation has changed with 12 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, (RAND Cooperation, 1977), Ibid Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), Biehl Heiko, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, (Potsdam: Springer VS, 2013),

14 the end of the Cold War. It included more theorising about identity formation and norms that were shaped by history, tradition and of course culture. Culture was then seen as a variable that could affect state behaviour. If anything, third generation came the closest to identify strategic culture, taking culture as a core element and defining it (see chapter 1.1.2). Cultural forms were seen as means and according to Alastair Johnston, some scholars use military culture, some political military culture, and other use organisational culture, but they all take realist edifice as target, and focus on cases where structural-materialistic notions of interest cannot explain a particular strategic choice 16. As opposed to the first generation, that strategic culture has just a mere influence on the behaviour, and second generation were effect of strategic culture is not that important, scholars like Johnston looked at strategic culture as a variable that actually could determine specific actor behaviour. In addition, third generation argued that the sources of cultural values are, however, less deeply rooted in history, and more clearly the product of recent practice and experience 17. Third generation brought strategic culture as a concept which had an impact on the actors strategy and defence policies. There are also debates whether or not there is a fourth generation of strategic culture, however, for this thesis, I will look at strategic culture based on the ideas of the third generation, as it is the most complete Concept of strategic culture Because of three different generations, the idea and a definition of the strategic culture concept has been inconsistent. Each generation was trying to improve the concept, which was changing over time, however, the core beliefs are the same actor s beliefs and assumptions are what frame particular actor s choices in security and defence. For example, for Kerry Longhurst, strategic culture consists of three components: underlying foundational elements, observable regulatory practices, and the security policy standpoints that govern the translation of the core elements into practice and that if all there elements exist and function properly, it means that strategic culture in a continuous state of self-evaluation 18. Another opinion is that strategic culture is a good additional supplement to realist approach, instead of stating it as a counter-theory, stating that strategic culture consists of repetitive patterns of 16 Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, in International Secuirty, Vol. 19, No.4, (Spring, 1995), Ibid, Longhurst cited in Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, (Routledge, 2006),

15 action, country s degree of restraint [or] precipitateness in times of crisis, its level of tolerance for ambiguity and its attitude towards arms limitations regimes 19 and that in case when strategic choice is not properly explained by realism, it may bring drawbacks and incomplete assumptions. So this shows, that there are numerous interpretations of strategic culture which have developed over time, how the core elements and ideas have changed, adjusting it to the situation and how different the viewpoints are. So when combining ideas from all three generations, the possible definition of strategic culture could be: strategic culture is a number of shared beliefs, norms and ideas within a given society that generate specific expectations about the respective community s preferences and actions in security and defence policy 20. However, to understand this definition more clearly we must look at what strategic culture consists of and how it can be used to explain behaviours. What should be taken in consideration is that strategic culture still remains a concept which may mean different things to different people. Culture It is important to talk about culture and understand it, to get most out of strategic culture. Seeing strategies and security policies through the lens of culture and identity is a fairly new trend. However, culture is seen as the main element of strategic culture and it is useful to look what strategic culture is, how it is defined, and what is its role in international relations. Today, contrary to realism, culture is seen to have an important impact on strategic outcomes and events that unfold. Culture is seen as a variable that can influence behaviour, however, it is still secondary to international systemic pressures. Culture can also be used as a theoretical model than can explain strategic behaviour from a different point of view than that of neorealism or neoliberalism. Decision making in a state usually is left to the decision makers, and accordingly, human conduct can be understood only by becoming immersed within a culture 21. However, the human behaviour is rarely random or spontaneous, which makes us believe that the behaviour is influenced by norms, rules and structures. 19 Rajesh Basur cited in Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, (Routledge, 2006), Biehl Heiko, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic Cultures in Europe. Secuirty and Defence Policies Across the Continent, (Springer VS, 2013), Ed. John Baylis, Colin S Gray et al., Strategy in Contemporary World, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2007),

16 Culture is a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes to life 22. Culture can affect behaviour in a way that people share values and world views, and if they have this shared culture based on beliefs and values, they are more likely to cooperate. Culture also consists of shared assumptions which in turn create an order for a relationship of individuals or groups in social, organisational or political environment. Although there can be multiple cultures within a society (state or community), usually there is a dominant culture whose holders are interested in preserving the status quo 23. Culture is important when it comes to understanding strategies, because it directs attention to the customs, beliefs and behaviours that persist, and therefore are relatively deep, rather and ephemeral and shallow 24. That is to say, that looking into the role of culture in international relations, it gives deeper meaning and helps to see aspects of strategies that traditional and classical theories have failed to do. There are also two culture standards which are used to analyse how actors see and relate to one another cognitive (which consists of norms and values) and evaluative (consists of rules and models). However, culture is created from different sources. According to strategic culture scholar Colin S. Gray, there are three orders of culture and strategy roots, forms and manifestations. As first order subjects to pursuit of the cultural perspective on strategy have to geography and history 25, because what people believe to be true about geography and history, can shape their behaviour and matter when it comes to decision making. These aspects also matter when it comes for a group/community/state to choose and adopt their cultures even though they have no restrictions and they are, the political and strategic situation outside the borders will have an impact when it comes to a practical implementation of the existing culture. Countries make their own history and interpret their own historical experience, but this making and interpreting is effected in the dynamic context of interaction in cooperation and conflict with other countries and their cultures Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, in International Secuirty, Vol. 19, No.4, (Spring, 1995), Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, in International Secuirty, Vol. 19, No.4, (Spring, 1995), Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, (Oxford University Press, 2013), Ibid Ibid

17 Historical experience, political structure and behaviour History and experience play an important part in not only culture, but also in identity making and in birth and development of states. With the help of historical experiences we can look at the world order. States can be classified as weak or strong, from democracies to failed states and other aspects, which is essential when looking at the behaviour of one state or another. This leads to the idea, that depending on their historical experiences, their culture will be shaped, and when states encounter different problems, the ways how they choose to deal with them can be different from state to state. This also means that aspects like threat framing (or threat perception) will be different, and the same goes for who and what they see as an immediate threat. Differences in culture can be seen depending on the development of a state more developed states have more consistent culture than the ones who are in progress. Looking at any kind of actor (a state or a defence organisation) participating in international affairs, political structure matters. In this case, some states, have adopted modern liberal Western democracy style of government, while other have chosen a different path, very often the opposite to liberal democracies. It is because of different cultures (which includes values, religion, ethnic situation etc.), because some states find it impossible to adapt to the patterns of Western democracies as a result of these different cultures, past practices, values and freedoms. Some states might just be developing, which means they have a long way to become a democracy. Another important aspect in strategic culture is behaviour. Different states have different strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state and are influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of state and elite. According to Johnston, strategic culture could be also defined as an ideational milieu which limits behavioural choices 27. Overall strategic culture deals with explaining these different behaviours from a new point of view, trying to fill the gaps (or complementing as some scholars say) that realist and rationalist theories have left out. It is seen as essential today globalised world brings new changes every day, challenging states, and shaping their behaviour, as there are more than just materialistic or military dimensions to strategic behaviour. 27 Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, in International Secuirty, Vol. 19, No.4, (Spring, 1995), 34 17

18 Even though strategic culture appears to be a constant phenomenon, that does not mean that strategic culture is static. It gives a room for a change. Strategic culture and its bonds of an actor, however, may change. Circumstances vary from actor to actor. There is more than one possible reason for a strategic culture to change, like external shock or when primary tenets of strategic thought come into direct conflict with one another 28. For example, genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in 1990s, triggered a change of strategic culture in European countries, like Germany, making it reconsider its strategic objectives. On the other hand there are states and organisations which prefer non-military actions when it comes to dealing with a strategic culture dilemma they might get a challenge for democracy which would call for it to use military force after all. Different types of strategic dilemmas, domestic and external situations can trigger actors positions and pressure them to change their strategies Constructivism and Identity Constructivism is very often linked to the idea of strategic culture. Core ideas are very similar so it is useful to look at the identity making in strategic culture form the view point of constructivism, which also, similar to strategic culture, are opposing realist arguments about self-interested states and military capabilities are the main variable in international relations. Constructivist approaches to security seek to understand the way ideas and norms affect international security and combined with national interests or military competition 29. It also stresses the importance of international norms controlling international politics. Constructivism and strategic culture got more involved with the third generation of strategic culture in 1990s, when constructivism renewed the interest in developing strategic culture even further. To this day, constructivism similarly to strategic culture is seen as one of the newest, but very dynamic theories of international relations. The difference however, is that whereas strategic culture focuses on more than variable, constructivism devotes a special attention to identity building, resulting from history, organisational processes, history, tradition and 28 Ed. John Baylis, Colin S Gray et al., Strategy in Contemporary World, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007), Anthony Burke, Security in An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd.ed., (Cambridge University Press, 2012),

19 culture. According to Alexander Wendt, constructivism sees state identities and interests socially constructed by knowledgeable practice. Constructivism is seen as an opposite to rationalism, challenging its assumptions, particularly the notion of an unchanging reality of international politics 30. The world is seen as constructed and not given, meaning, that states may be self-interested rational actors, but their definition of interests change, their identities may change over time, international norms that change, may influence practices of states and also the social identity of the sovereign states. Wendt argues that the way international politics is conducted is made not given, because identities and interests are constructed and supported by intersubjective practice 31. Opposite to rationalists who assume that actors are atomistic egoists, constructivists assume that actors are deeply social their identities are constituted by the institutionalized norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act 32. Institutional norms thus set a condition to what actors consider necessary and possible in practical and ethical terms, although the other hand, institutional norms may put constraints on actions of the actor. Whilst rationalists see interests of the actors as determined, constructivists treat interests as a consequence of identity acquisition, which is learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment. In addition, where rationalists view society as a strategic realm a place where actors rationally pursue their interests, constructivists see society as constitutive realm, which makes actors who they are. Wendt divides identities in two groups social and cooperate, with the former referring to status, role or personality that international society ascribes to the state. The latter refers to the internal human, material, ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is 33. This is a part of so called third-image perspective, which mostly focuses on the interaction between unitary actors meaning how they see each other and how states relate to one another in the external international sphere. 30 Maja Zefhuss, Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Alexander Wendt cited in Maja Zefhuss, Constructivism in International Relations. The Politics of Reality, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Christian Reus-Smit, Constructivism in Theories of International Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Ibid

20 In connection to strategic culture, constructivism stresses the importance of shared ideas, beliefs and values, stating that they have structural characteristics and that exert a powerful influence on social and political actions 34. Non-material structures are important, as only through structure of shared knowledge, material resources acquire any meaning. It is non-material structures that condition identities of the actors Wendt believes that identities inform interests, and interests in turn form actions of the actors involved, because understanding how actors develop their interests and how it affects following actions, can help explain a wide range of international political phenomena, including the behaviour. In addition, constructivism explains interest formation with focus on the social identities of individuals and states. Identities are the basis of interests, and constructivists in general does not oppose to the realist idea that actors may be selfinterested, but argue that this tells us nothing unless we understand how actors define themselves 35 and what influence does the identity has on its interests. According to constructivist view of point, identity is important also because many things are based on how and actor thinks of itself. In some instances, identity change can produce global governance 36, because successful international organisations rest on shared principles and norms that states have taken in account in shaping their identities. However, it must be noted, that constructivism does not predict events or in opposite to strategic culture offer a definite advice on how a state should act in the international arena 37. So taking in consideration sources and aspects from strategic culture and adding constructivist assumptions about the actor behaviour and interests on the international stage can provide with a useful framework of analysis. Therefore constructivism is key to strategic culture as it is at the foundations of how identity is formed and what direction and aims actors use that identity to achieve. In the case of Russia this will be show to be a strong, proud and historically motivated identity opposed to the EU s identity constructed to avoid such traits which can so easily lead to conflict. 34 Christian Reus-Smit, Constructivism in Theories of International Relations, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Ibid Patric Thaddeus Jackson and Joshua S.Jones, Constructivism in An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd.ed., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), Ibid

21 1.2 Connection between strategic culture and security strategies Today the term security has multiple definitions, forms and meanings. One definition by Ian Bellamy states that security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with relatively high expectations that defeat will be not a consequence of any war that should occur 38 or national security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad 39 by Giacomo Luciani. Security has always been on the daily agenda for states, organisations, unions and of course society. Security contains four basic elements: physical safety, autonomy, development and rule, and it are up to leaders how they deal if these elements are being threatened. Some actors may go considerable lengths in preserving security, including military means if necessary. On the other hand, most of the actors prefer non-military solutions when it comes to eliminating possible threats. These means how an actor deals with security threats most of the part are described in different security strategies or doctrines, which serve as guidelines for policy making which in turn generate strategic culture. However security strategies are as different as the actors involved, so it is useful to look at how strategic culture has shaped these perceptions about threats and has it been influenced by security strategies. If looking at strategy making, the basic assumptions about strategies (national strategies) is that they are structured in similar ways. At first it sets out states understanding of specific security and threat environment, then with an outline of specific policies in different fields, comments on relationships with other major players and outline specific missions of armed forces 40. The difference is that traditionally security strategies have been state centred and from the realist perspective it was about military conditions that were necessary for the state to survive. Per M. Norheim Martinsen also argues that typically a strategy paper offers and interpretation of how the status quo has emerged and the role that the state or organisation has played in getting there 41, However, with a new actor emerging and the Cold War ending, the basic idea about strategy changed, meaning, strategies 38 Ian Bellamy, Towards a Theory of International Relations in Political Studies (29/1, 1981), Giacomo Luciani, The Economic Content of Security in Journal of Public Policy Vol. 8, No.2, (1989), Ursula C. Schroeder, Upside down secuirty strategy development in the European Union in European Homeland Secuirty. A European Strategy in Making?, Ed. Christian Kaunert, Sarah Leonard and Patryk Pawlak, (Routledge, 2012), Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013),

22 started to include objectives that where out of the military sphere. Military means are now among many other means how to achieve goals, as the main threats have changed from purely military to non-military, like environment, migration or energy concerns which can raise serious issues if not tackled right and with the most suitable means. What is the role of the strategic culture when it comes to the security strategies and planning? Strategic culture namely provide decision makers with uniquely ordered set of strategic choices from which we can derive predictions about behaviour, that can be observed in strategic cultural objects, and whose transmissions across the time can be traced 42. Strategic culture can be also used to explain what constraints strategic actors from making certain type of decisions. According to Norheim Martinsen, the essence of strategy ultimately comes to down to the extent to which any instruments of power military or non-military further are perceived political end. Military power is not strategic per se. It is the linking of military power to political purpose that is strategic 43. Meaning, that it is about how the military power can be linked to political purposes and so the EUs soft power politics does not mean that it is less strategic than some other actors, because a strategy is about ends and means and how are they linked. 1.3 Framework for strategic culture analysis All the aspects mentioned above combine to create strategic culture. However, there are aspects of policies and security strategies that need to be analysed in order to see and explain strategic culture of different actors. For looking at the EU and Russian strategic cultures, I will use the framework, proposed by Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas in their book Strategic cultures in Europe; Security and defence policies across the continent (2013). They have created an analytical framework that they have used to determine the scope of strategic culture in the EU memberstates. In this framework, they have identified four issue areas that reflect essential facets of national security and defence policies, and which in turn reflect the strategic culture of a particular nation state. Even though this framework was created for strategic cultures of separate states, I chose this framework to analyse the EU and 42 Alastair Iain Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, in International Secuirty, Vol. 19, No.4, (Spring, 1995), Ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the EU s Common Secuirty and Defence Policy. Theory in Action, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2012),

23 Russia, because on the international stage the EU is functioning as a one actor, and thus has its documents common to all 28 memberstates, and for Russia, because it is one of the largest states in the world with a very specific policy making strategy, which requires a deeper explanation. In addition to the four areas, I will add my own area, focusing on history and identity, which are essential when discussing strategic culture of two radically different actors. These issue areas are: 1) Role of history and identity. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, historical experiences and identity forming play an important role in how these four other areas have been shaped. I will make slight adjustments to this framework, by adding aspect of history and identity, as the role of history should be considered alongside with the role of current situation in the international affairs, because history directly enters into the creating of national interests, influencing how political elites define the situation their state faces. In turn, national identities and national interests are therefore historically contingent, as human agents continuously produce and modify them through public debate over legitimacy 44. History can explain how national identities are created and how those shape interests of the actor. History participates in creating national interests as well as influencing how political elites define the situation their state faces, and national identities and national interests are therefore historically contingent, as human agents continuously produce and modify them through public debate 45 and history has a clear impact on the points of analysis mentioned above, as the present situation is a result of choices made earlier and very often based on historical events. 2) Level of ambition in international security policy. This means the continuum between a passive indifference and active international leadership and how has the actor defined its formal level of ambition 46. It includes questions such as: what are the country s (actor in the case of the EU) main objectives in the security realm, how do security and defence policy documents define the role the country seeks to play do 44 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity and Security Interests, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), Ibid Ed. Heiko Beihl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic culture in Europe. Secuirty and Defence Policies across Europe, (Springer, 2013),

24 policy elites or policy documents claim a particular responsibility for international order, stability and peace. Also, it asks if the actor shows a tendency, discourse or practice, to promote proactive intervention as a suitable response to security challenges and if so, how many troops has the actor deployed on crisis management operations and what arguments are used to support this kind of action. What is important is also to look at if the actor has key documents or elite discourses that show preferred channels to implement this level of ambition. 3) Scope of action for the executive in decision-making. This refers to where the actor positions itself between low level and high level of executive flexibility, meaning who are the key players in security and defence policy, what are the decision making processes for deployments and what are the legal instruments that regulate these deployments. What is the role of the parliament, does it possess some instruments of control 47. It is also possible talk about whether or not there are other players involved in the decision making that are beyond official executive and legislative branches, including interest groups. 4) Foreign policy orientation. For separate states, the analysis concentrate on where the states sees its positioning between a European and Transatlantic focus as their preferred forum of security and defence cooperation. To analyse this area, the questions concentrate on whether security and defence documents define a preferred arena for cooperation, how are the roles of these arenas defined 48, and do these documents or elite discourses describe specific objectives for the future development or the EU and/or NATO 49. Also important is if the state defines important bilateral relationships in the security and defence policy arena. 5) Willingness to use military force. This area defines whether the state is reluctant or on the opposite unconstrained acceptance to use military force as an instrument of security policy. This includes questions regarding how is the role of the armed forces as an instrument of foreign, security and defence policy, defined in comparison to 47 Ed. Heiko Beihl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic culture in Europe. Secuirty and Defence Policies across Europe, (Springer, 2013), According to Heiko Beihl et al., for the European states it the definition of the role of the EU and NATO, whereas for the EU it would mainly be UN and NATO (see the next chapter). 49 Ed. Heiko Beihl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic culture in Europe. Secuirty and Defence Policies across Europe, (Springer, 2013),

25 other instruments such as diplomacy, development cooperation, trade etc. 50. How are the forces deployed if there are any national caveats when deploying within an international operation, and what kind of tasks do the deployed forces usually fulfil and how are the missions framed, for example, with reference to humanitarian needs, international stability or even specific national interests and the most important in the EU context, do the security and defence documents specify a broad preference for non-military instruments, or whether the military is defined as an instrument of last resort Ed. Heiko Beihl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, Strategic culture in Europe. Secuirty and Defence Policies across Europe, (Springer, 2013), Ibid

26 2. THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY IN STRATEGIC CULTURE CONCEPT As we saw in chapter 1, strategic culture can be also applied to other actors than just states. Even though the framework explained in the first chapter mainly focuses on separate EU states, strategic culture can be applied to different processes of the EU security policy making. Even though first half of the 1990s was characterised by a studious advance of military security, even as a topic in the EU context, the EU was clearly moving forwards more focusing on soft end crisis management tasks. In this chapter, I will firstly look at how the ESS and Common Security and Defence Policy have developed over time. I will continue with analysing EU strategic culture according to the framework seen in the previous chapter. I will finish this chapter, by providing with critique, which indicates how there is a much room for the EU strategic culture to develop. 2.1 Developing the Common Security and Defence Policy and European Security Strategy Even though the security policies of the EU could be found on the soft end of the power spectrum, that does not mean that the EU is less strategic than others like the US or Russia, who are perceived as more hard power/militaristic strategic actors. The means and the ends matter as long as there is strategic culture involved on which the actor can rely to further the ends it has pinned down. And when we talk about strategic culture in the EU, it mostly refers to the EU s comprehensive foreign policy strategy which is explained in the European Security Strategy (ESS), covering all dimensions of external actions from aid to trade to diplomacy and if necessary military 52. Officially the ESS is a comprehensive document which analyses and defines the EU s security environment, identifying key security challenges and subsequent political implications for the EU. However, the beginning of the EU as a clearly strategic actor could be traced back to St Malo declaration in December 1998, which was the first step towards creating Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (formerly known as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)) and it is the most important tool European security strategy aspect. The EU was in need for European states to modernize 52 Ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the EU s Common Secuirty and Defence Policy. Theory in Action, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2012), 65 26

27 military and to be able to act like one player on the international stage. CSDP is the actual institution and framework where the action happens within the EU security and defence field. According to Martensen, it is a clear example of how culture binds rationality 53. It was the beginning of stressing the importance of traditional tools of power, like diplomacy and non-military intervention. During the Cold War, EU interest in having a unified security and defence policy and possibly a military doctrine, was subordinated to NATO. It was clear that after the collapse of Soviet Union, the EU was in a need of having an autonomous capacity to take decisions and when NATO is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises 54. What the EU needed now, was to reduce dependence on the USA, by acquiring and improving capabilities in different fields, starting from logistics to computers and surveillance. However, CSDP was a part of Common Foreign and Security Policy, which main goals after the Amsterdam treaty in 1999 were safeguarding EU common values, interests, independence, and integrity in conformity with the UN charter, strengthening security, preserving peace and strengthening international security, to promote international cooperation, and of course developing and consolidating democracy and rule of law, especially for human rights and fundamental freedoms 55. In addition, for the EU it meant to define main principles and guidelines for conducting foreign and security policy, which included deciding on common strategies and common positions, which would show how integrated and unified the EU actually is. However, even with having these guidelines, there was a need for a more coherent and more defined foreign policy and security guidelines, to underline the one face of the EU. However, established with the Nice treaty in 2001, the main aim of the CSDP was the first structure that enabled the EU to launch crisis management operations and pursue foreign policy objectives Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Lars Wedin, The EU as a military strategic actor, The European Union and Strategy, Ed. Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Hellenberg, (Routledge, 2008), Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine. A Reference Handbook, (Library of Congress-in-Publication Data, 2009), Frédéric Mérand, European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State, (Oxford University Press, 2008),

28 What followed was the ESS in 2003 (adopted by the European Council on 12 th and 13 th of December), which was supposed to enhance the limited military capabilities of the EU and prove that the EU is a global actor, than can participate in the world politics and have a say in international affairs. It envisaged main threats (see chapter 2.2.1) to prove that there is a coherent EU military doctrine that would allow the EU function outside framework of NATO. Originally it was named A Secure Europe in a Better World, which briefly analysed and defined the EU s security strategy, identifying threats and offering possible solutions. However, in 2007, the French president at the time Nicolas Sarkozy, called for a major revision of this strategy, as France was in charge of the Council presidency in the second half of Unfortunately, at the end, there was not a new, bolder and improved strategy created what was created after many seminars, meetings and debates, was an improved version of the 2003 security strategy called Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy 57. It was justified by saying that it does not replace the ESS, but is intended to supplement it. This has led to the EU (even when it went under the name of European Economic Community) to be seen as purely civilian actor. Even after the Maastricht treaty and creating CSFP which was intended to create a greater European integration, many scholars focused their efforts on trying to explain how these developments did not detract from Europe s status as civilian as normative power 58. So at the same time, strategic scholars did not take CSDP and CFSP seriously, because very often strategy itself was understood in military way on how to achieve goals. Some scholars even saw EU as too insignificant in the field of strategy and security, as not capable of using full potential of the means available. However, military strategies and tools are not the only ones available to strategic actors, and EU is much more than just a military actor, which means that it can be analysed from more than one perspective. Therefore, by applying strategic culture elements, we can better understand the potential for civilian power. 57 Per M. Norheim Martinsen, EU Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End, in Peter Shmidt and Benjamin Zayla (Eds.), European Security Policy and Strategic culture, (Routledge, 2013), Ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the EU s Common Secuirty and Defence Policy. Theory in Action, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2012),

29 2.2 European security from a strategic culture perspective According to the framework in chapter 1, the further analysis will focus on five areas to show the EU strategic culture, utilising official documents, such as the ESS 2003 A Secure Europe in a Better World and the 2008 enforcement of the ESS. However, to provide with deeper insight and background, other official and non-official sources such as headline goals and others will also be used Historical aspect and identity The EU is now more than 60 years old. During this time it has changed not only its name, but also its purpose, and of course identity. Born during the time of the Cold War, it was all about economic benefits and cooperation, with a hope of restoring Europe and preventing possible arising of further conflicts. But over time, it has developed into a great power, with an important role to play on the international stage. These years have given the time for the EU identity to emerge and history to be made. The history of the EU must be viewed in the context of Europe as such. After experiencing two devastating world wars, there was a clear need for a guarantee that nothing like that would ever happen again on the territory of Europe or anywhere else in the world. At its core, the EU is a project of Kantian peace an attempt to create a peaceful union of European states that been at war with each other 59. It was seen as important to have a common market, common rules and shared framework of human rights to achieve this peace. The idea was, that the different levels of the EU national and supranational could co-exist, supplementing each other in hopes of achieving deeper integration. It also was based on common culture, including political culture, values and love for democracy and social justice. However, there are 28 different nations, memberstates with different identities and democracies. People are still arguing whether their identity is national or European. Whether, for example, people in France feel French or European. Nations in the EU were created upon deep legacies of history and culture, a sense of common rights and 59 David Held and Kyle Mcnally, Europe, the EU and European Identity, Open Democracy, , (Accessed ). 29

30 duties and a shared recognition of overlapping fates 60. At the beginnings of this organisation, when the interdependence among memberstates was grown people started identifying themselves European because of the common values. However, the economic crisis in 2008 led to the EU downfall and so the questions about a common European identity were raised. A common identity can only be built based on common ideas and shared values, however, after the enlargements, the EU had memberstates which were different, experienced financial issues, and felt far from the EU. Crisis raised tensions between the old and new memberstates, and growing feeling of nationalism in the memberstates. Already from its beginnings the EU was intended to sustain a long lasting peace. This indicates that the means and policies carried out where peaceful, involving economy and diplomacy. At its core we can see that non-military means and goals are the priorities of the EU. Therefore this historical legacy can be seen throughout policies of the EU and is integral to the creation of a common strategic culture across the EU Level of ambition in international security policy When analysing strategic culture, it is important to look at how the actor sees itself. Since the creation of the EU when it was established under a name of the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris, 1951), the ambitions of the EU have changed considerably. The EU we know today has come a long way from a 6 member economic community, to a 28 member state union with its own supranational institutions, laws and of course diplomatic power. Ever since officially being named the European Union, one of the main goals of the EU, has been to become a global actor on the international scene. This aspiration was similar to the one of the USA, and was firstly indicated in the ESS, where European Union is inevitably a global player and European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and affective actor. Europe should be ready to share the responsibility for global security in building a better world 61. In addition, the implementation of the ESS 2008 adds to this role with comparing the EU to an anchor of stability and that the ESS has set out a vision of how the EU would be a 60 David Held and Kyle Mcnally, Europe, the EU and European Identity, Open Democracy, , (Accessed ) 61 ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, (2003), 1. 30

31 force for a fairer, safer and more united world 62. This 2008 improvement also stresses the progress that has been made since the ESS was adopted and that over the previous five years, the influence of the EU has grown and developed. When it comes to the level of ambition, it is worth looking at the actor s threat perception and challenges that are drawn as the most important. Originally, in 2003 the ESS indicated such challenges as energy dependence, competition for natural resources (especially water), poverty and AIDS, and key threats terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime 63. However, five years later, other challenges, mostly brought by globalisation, were added. These included global warming, environmental degradation, as well as cyber security and notable climate change. It also stresses the importance of energy security, stating that by 2030 up to 75% of the EU s gas and oil will have to imported, and it will be from a limited number of countries, which make up the list of threats. The diverse nature of threats clearly shows how strategic culture is needed to provide a framework for the EU that is capable of dealing with all the threats. Therefore the ESS also indicates on what role the EU has already played on the international stage. This involves how active the EU has been in tackling key threats, how the capacity to address threats has evolved and how Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes 64. It is clear that the EU is active through multinational frameworks, which include wide range of instruments, and its preferred channels to implement its level of ambition are based on soft end and military instruments are to be used only as a last resort, preferring civilian missions and economic means over military ones, but still positioning itself as a global player. Therefore while sticking to its fundamental values and pursuing this calm policy, the EU still manages to be an important part in conflict resolution. 62 Report on implementation of the European Security Strategy Providing security in a changing world, ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World, (2003), Ibid

32 2.2.3 Scope of action for the executive decision making Security culture can be observed also by looking at the decision making structures of the EU. Although the EU has been critiqued about its inability to take coordinated decisions, the common values that everyone signs up for when they join the EU allows strategic culture to explain the legitimacy of the once voice that EU speaks with about international security. It is important to translate common security interests into political decisions, and EU involves multiple actors at different levels within and beyond the Union. Key players in security and defence policy in the EU are firstly states, followed by different institutions created to ensure functioning of such large organisation. As CSDP is seen as the main ground for carrying out military and civilian missions and operations of the EU, the decision making is complicated with many actors and parties involved. However, the main decision maker in this area is the European Council. It is worth mentioning, that with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the influence of the European Council has increased in addition with creating new posts for the president and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which are now taken by Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton. If a crisis happens, the common EU values and beliefs create a common strategic culture which then determines whether or not the EU should get involved, and what is going to be the response. The EU must make decisions on whether or not to get involved, how to deal with it, and what means should be used. Decision making process is fairly complicated, which involves several key players. However, the first are the memberstates, who, in case of crisis, collectively determine that the EU action is appropriate and when the Political and Security Committee (PSC) reaches a consensus on this issue, a dedicated mission planning process starts 65. First step is drawing up of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC). Similarly to the ESS, this document is supposed to describe the EU s political interests, describe the conflict and proposes the aims and objectives that the CSDP engagement would pursue, thus the CMC is what links these purposes to tools that are available to act and respond to crisis situation. This step is usually agreed on by PSC as well as it is formally adopted 65 Ed. Jochen Rehrl and Hans-Bernard Weisserth, Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, 2nd ed., (Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2012),

33 by the Council, endowing it with the highest level of political approval 66. After this, follows the consideration of all strategic options available and the Council decision to act. This includes PSC asking for different Military Strategic Options (MSO), Police Strategic Options (PSO) or other Civilian Strategic Options (CSO) 67 if needed, to be elaborated by the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. When PSC agrees on the right option, the Council can take a decision to act, and a Council decision is drawn. This is the legal act of which the Council formally establishes the operation, appoints Head of Mission and Operation Commander(s) and decided on the financial agreements for distributing the costs resulting from the engagement 68. After this follows the elaboration of the detailed planning documents or Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN), with the main goal to outline how the commanders see the operation fulfilling the objectives, as well as giving guidelines on the use of force. This includes list of all the resources needed to conduct the operation. And again, both CONOPS and OPLAN need to be approved by the Council. However, it should be noted, that these are just guidelines to facilitate a decision making cycle that will be influenced by the crisis environment which in most cases is chaotic. In addition to these guidelines, different steps may be taken, or documents created and approved if it is seen as necessary. Drafts may have different contents and one draft can have different versions. But not only the Council and PSC have a say in decision making. Other committees and working groups may be asked to participate and may offer an input, like European Union Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) or Political Military Group (PMG) as most important ones. What is worth to mention is the flexibility of the procedure Member States at all times retain political control and exercise oversight over all CSDP action 69. The role of the PSC is mainly providing strategic directions to all missions and operations, and so it is done through various documents, resources and the decision to launch, prolong or end the CSDP engagement and it is the party to whom the chain of 66 Ed. Jochen Rehrl and Hans-Bernard Weisserth, Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, 2nd ed., (Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2012), Ibid Ibid Ibid

34 command reports to. So in this way, Member States are provided with up to date information on the situation and its developments. Therefore they key reason why such a diverse group of states with seemingly incompatible interests at times can make a collective decision is due to strategic culture. This is due to the common values that bind the memberstates together Foreign policy orientation There is no doubt that it is easier to see the foreign policy orientation of separate countries, and when compared, how more complicated it is for the EU. However, one thing is clear the USA has played an important role in the development of the EU security policy making, together with NATO, ensuring a shared history has been constructed. In the ESS it is stated that the United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO 70. In 2003, a paper titled European defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations was issued. It stresses the importance of the EU and NATO cooperation, and explains how the collective capability of the EU can be strengthened, including the ability to plan and run certain operations, and describes how consideration of the options involved would take place between EU Partners and Allies 71. This paper also indicates that NATO is a main forum for discussion and the natural choice for operations, where European and American allies are involved. We can see that not only has a shared history being developed but shared values have been established ensuring a highly compatible strategic culture to emerge that makes the USA a natural partner for the EU to align itself with. A good example of this, where common values has led to joint action was during the conflict in the Balkans. This led to the ESS to state that through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict 72. The cooperation with the USA is accented when speaking about tackling possible threats. It mentions attacks on terrorist financing 70 ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations, (2003), 1, NATO%20Consultation,%20Planning%20and%20Operations.pdf (Accessed ) 72 ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), 8. 34

35 along with the mutual legal assistance with the USA. The ESS refers to the transatlantic relationship and NATO is an important expression of this relationship 73. This relationship is very important, because it enables a framework for a better cooperation organising crisis management, reflecting a common goals and determination to deal with challenges Willingness to use military force Although the EU felt comfortable aligning itself with NATO, due to the dna of the EU is to avoid conflict, it is uncomfortable to be so involved with American and NATO framework, which is too aggressive. Despite the common values and culture, there was a need for a stronger EU force that can operate independently from the NATO. The idea about the EU s military capabilities was raised already in the late 1990s, when EU leaders in a Cologne European Council (June 1999) agreed that the union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO 74. The following European Council in Helsinki (December 1999), set out Helsinki headline goal, setting particular targets concerning Member States, such as they to develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of full range of Petersberg tasks set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam 75 and that these forces should be military, self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements 76. However, by 2003, it was clear, that this goal was encountering numerous challenges and shortfalls such as deployment time and high risk of carrying out these operations, allowing future modifications in headline goals. The new Headline Goal ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), Presidency Report on Strenghtening of the common European policy on security and defence. Cologne European Council, Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions, , %20Annex%20III%20of%20the%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf (Accessed ) 75 Helsinki Headline Goal, 1999, (Accessed ) 76 Helsinki Headline Goal, 1999, (Accessed ). 35

36 (approved in May 2004), states that by 2010, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive actions applying full coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 77, meaning that the main areas where Member States should put the effort are deployability and sustainability, as the Union need forces which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, which would help to increase responsiveness of these multinational forces. As a result, in 2007, as a part of the EU military rapid response concept, EU Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, rapidly deployable force package, capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations 78. Because of the pacifist nature of the EU, ESS offers just a few points on the actual use of the EU military force, compared to the comments, on how far into the military realm the EU has moved. However when the EU uses military force or other instruments in pursuit of some notion of collective European security interests, it does so de facto within some kind of context or (a) strategic culture (s) 79. On the first page of the ESS, it says: European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions 80, which shows very well the main lines of the European strategic culture, which is not based on military power or intervention. Rather it is based on common culture, history and values developed in post war Western Europe. It follows the assumption, that none of the threats today are purely military, so they cannot be dealt with by purely military means. Tackling problems and challenges, the EU intends to use a mixture of instruments. According to Norheim, the only place where the military intervention and use of force is explicitly mentioned is in connection with the failed states. It states that military instruments may be needed to restore the order, which means that the EU will restrict military means to the post conflict phase and then only in concern with other 77 Headline Goal 2010, (2004), 1 (Accessed ) 78 EU Battlegroups, Common Security and Defence Policy. European Union External Action, (Accessed ). 79 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), 1. 36

37 reconstruction tools 81. This also helps to understand one of the questions in this area - how is the role or the armed forces, as an instrument of foreign, security and defence policy, defined in comparison to other instruments such as diplomacy, development, cooperation and trade. EU is concentrating more on preventive engagement, instead of pre-emptive approach which is used by the USA. In the ESS, this idea of the preventive engagement is used to legitimise military force of the EU if that is necessary, and makes it feel more like a part of a European strategic culture. When dealing with proliferation, the ESS states that it can be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled 82. However, using this mixture of tools, the EU has successfully completed 15 missions and operations military and civilian in different parts of the world (see image 1). In addition, the EU at the moment is participating in 16 ongoing missions and operations, which are also military, for example EULEX in Kosovo, and civilian like EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see image 2). It is clear that diplomatic means are given preference in the EU policy making over military means. This can be explained with the fact, that according to Joseph Nye, the EU finds itself on the soft side of it. EU is more civilian strategic actor. Nye also mentions, that the difference between the soft and hard power is that the use of force and payment and agenda setting based on them can be classified as hard power, whereas agenda setting that is regarded legitimate by the target, positive attraction and persuasion are the parts of the spectrum of behaviours of soft power 83. As seen earlier, the EU s actions are mostly based on soft power by using diplomacy, trade aid and enlargement to further European interests abroad. It does so, because when the EU moves into military aspects of security strategy in turn does conflict with the image of the EU as well as with its values, ideas and norms that the EU is based on. 2.3 Critique on the EU strategic culture Although we can see that the EU possesses a certain strategic culture, it has its flaws, indicating that at time it can be insufficient and ineffective. Some scholars argue that 81 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), ESS: A Secure Europe in a Better World (2003), Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, (Public Affairs, 2009),

38 Europe lacks both capabilities and will to create and follow a specific strategic culture. Criticism is mostly dedicated to the ESS as a weak and too broad strategy and the fact that the EU is not a single state but a Union. However, this chapter is not about stating all the drawbacks of the EU security policy it is about looking at this critique as a room for improvement. By looking at this critique, we can see how much the EU strategic culture still needs to develop, and what are the main pitfalls, that prevent the EU from having an even stronger strategic culture. Definition of goals and aims Some people argue that the goals set in the ESS are too wide, that the 2008 revision of the 2003 strategy actually did not bring any new improvements. It was more on how to do things than about what to do 84. Although the ESS defined new goals and threats, at some points it may seem that the EU just does what it has been doing even before the ESS was created, but this time it is official. Although the EU lacks this military dimension of the strategic culture, the civilian and non-military dimension goals in the ESS are more clearly defined. It could be argued, that it is not enough, because the best way should include both goals military as well as non-military. The absence of the military references on one part could be associated with the fact, that there is a lack of agreement between the member states in this particular issue. In addition, the EU moving into military aspects of security strategy in turn does conflict with the image of the EU as well as with its values, ideas and norms that the EU is based on. Even the origins of the EU while being just a trade cooperation, was based on dealing peacefully with any conflicts or arguments that could arise, by not using military force, but a full spectrum of other instruments. The problem could be because of the different natures of the memberstates that make up the EU, because memberstates have very diverse security traditions, so in turn, strategy making is different and threat framing is different. There are clear differences among memberstates in training experience and traditions, language, culture, available equipment is different and of course history 84 Ed. Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, Explaining the EU s Common Secuirty and Defence Policy. Theory in Action, (Palgrave Macmillan. 2012),

39 Decision making This goes together with the critique that at times the EU is incapable of taking decisions fast and cooperatively. However, already with 28 memberstates, decision making in almost every area concerning the Union is complicated and sometimes even impossible as the memberstates have different backgrounds, experiences and interests in the EU. This in turn leads to an inefficient decision making, which is seen very clearly when the EU must deal with a crisis situation like Iraq or Georgia. Before the war in Iraq, the EU did not have united and clear policy documents, where strategic objectives for security and foreign policy would be stated. During the decision making, the EU experienced clear division among member states in supporting the USA government split between the old memberstates, and disagreements between these states and potential candidate states. This inability of then 15 members of the Union resulted in the EU issuing some 19 declarations, decisions and joint actions within the CSFP framework in reference to Iraq question 85 which ceased from the EU daily agenda from early Decision making was even more complicated when the EU faced Georgian war in Different historical experiences with Russia led to arguments within the Union once again, mostly with the new memberstates who had been a part of the Soviet Union. This inability take decisions could be explained with the fact that, even though by joining the EU the governments of the memberstates have signed an agreement, individual memberstates remain inclined to protect its relative autonomy and only allows for a piecemeal strengthening of joint capacity enhancing institutions 86. In addition, in the centre of the European security, states remain primary actors and when it comes to the decision-making and delivering security this action is challenged by multiple public and private actors. It involves the growing numbers of aid workers, judges, police officers, customs officers and private contractors in post conflict reconstructions, and also in various aspects of war fighting. This means that the more actors involved in national and European level have sought to accommodate various 85 Asle Toje, America, the EU and Strategic Culture. Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), Kjell Engelbrekt, The making of a security and defence strategy, in The European Union and Strategy, Ed. Kjell Engelbrekt and Jan Hellenberg, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008),

40 processes of fragmentation in the monitoring, delivering and coordination of its security policy 87. The EU, the USA and NATO Another critique that the EU has received is that the strategic culture is influenced by the USA since the end of the Cold War. The USA has been the main ally to the EU and most of the EU memberstates are members of the NATO as well, which makes the connection with the USA obvious. But to what extent does the USA affect the strategic culture of the EU? Some scholars argue that as long as there is NATO, the EU will not be able to carry out military operations fully on its own. Experts even go so far as indicating that the ESS has been influenced by the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA. Norheim Martensen argues that typically a strategy paper offers and interpretation of how the status quo has emerged and the role that the state or organisation has played in getting there 88. For example, for the USA and NSS the point of departure is the Cold War, whereas the EU does not have anything like that mentioned in the ESS. Adrian Hyde Price argues that exactly this unprecedented effect of the experience of the war has traditionally had on national strategic cultures is exactly why such a common European strategic culture is unlikely to emerge 89. However, the main critique is that even though the EU is trying to achieve military power and larger independence from NATO and the USA, it is a long way to have a solid EU military doctrine like the traditional nation states have and that it could be carried out in a short term while at the same time not challenging the dominance of NATO. This makes the EU not as capable as the USA in efficiency of conducting large joint military operations at a fast pace Summary We can see that the EU has a specific strategic culture. Although it is still in development, it gives good guidelines to assess the EU foreign and security policies. The EU has an official document the ESS which mainly confirms the preference 87 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Ibid Hyde-Price cited in Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, The European Union and Military Force. Governance and Strategy, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine. A Reference Handbook, (Library of Congress-in-Publication Data, 2009),

41 for soft power strategy tools, instead of military. Even though the EU does not have a solid military doctrine, it still has established strategy and procedures for international crisis management and solutions. However, when it comes to carrying out these strategies and actions, the EU would still prefer using economic and political sanctions, diplomacy everything apart from more aggressive tools like coercion or armed attacks, as an actor favouring a preventive engagement in crisis solution. Despite the lack of military aspects in the EU foreign and security policy, which would suggest that the EU could not have a functioning security policy, the strategic culture demonstrates how the EU can still carry out successful missions in Europe and outside its borders. Only when diplomatic means have not worked, the EU uses its military capabilities. Majority of the time, however, the EU has been capable of solving crisis by using its preferred domain of soft power. The EU strategic culture shows that even nowadays, it is still based on the core values that were established in 1950s. Striving for peaceful conflict resolution has been the centre of the EU policy. However, without doubt there is still a room for some improvement, as the strategic culture of the EU is a rather new concept, still in development. The EU is trying to find a way how to be more independent from NATO and rely less on the help from the USA. However, the EU is closely linked with NATO so until the EU can carry out military missions by itself, there will be presence of NATO in the EU s strategic culture. 41

42 3. STRATGIC CULTURE IN RUSSIA 3.1 Analysis of Russian strategic culture Before looking at what role strategic culture plays in EU Russia relations, it is important to look at Russian strategic culture as such, which without any doubt is different from that of the EU. Similarly to the European documents on European security strategy, official documents issued by the Russian government will be used, such as Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (concept), which states different directions of Russian foreign and security policy and is approved by President Putin on February 12, 2013 and military doctrine (2010). The structure for analysis is the same as in chapter 2.1 with five areas of analysis History and identity In order to understand the foundations of Russia s strategic culture, its historical legacy must be explored. Russia s identity in the international politics is seen with great awareness - it has been hard for Western policy makers to understand if Russia will be a friend or foe. However, it is no surprise that Russia always have influence in the global security environment. To find out what is Russia and what does Russia do, scholars need to focus on questions of what Russia was and did in the past 91. For Russia, question of national interests is closely linked with the formation of its identity. This identity is bound to history and identification is itself shaped by the events in the past. In present day Russia, different periods have played an important role tsarist Russia, Soviet Union and post-soviet Russia. However, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Russia was seen as an aggressive actor, which kept strengthening its influence over most of the Eastern Europe with means of coercion, trying to achieve an alliance, which would leave and impact on the West. Leader of the Soviet Union at the time, Joseph Stalin regarded the Western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile. Its history is rooted in powerful heads of state, which have been forcing its country to achieve even higher military might, which in turn would serve as a guarantee for the external security. Dictatorship was seen as essential, without which they did not know how to rule and in the name 91 Anne L. Clunan. The Social Construction of Russia s Resurgence, Asprirations, Identity, and Security Interests, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 2. 42

43 of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value when it came to methods and tactics for boosting this power 92. Henry Kissinger indicates that Soviet empire failed in part because of its own history had tempted in inexorably toward overextension 93, as the Soviet state was born against all odds, and still managed to survive different rulers this state has experienced over time. Today we can see similar patterns a strong ruler (President) who is in charge in most aspects of foreign policy making. However, the biggest issue was the thinking of Soviet leaders, more precisely their way of sense of how much is too much. Their sense of proportion was way off, not seeing that the Soviet Union s ability to endure this expansion, consolidate military and economic gains was too weak. Arsenal of nuclear weapons was not enough to sustain the Soviet state its imperialistic ambitions were too much. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was experiencing struggles economic and social stagnation, some degree of isolation and disintegration. Russia was experiencing crisis it never had. It has lost its military power status, and the only way how to regain it was by strengthening economic position, by using first of all the natural resources Russia possesses. It was trying to borrow ideas from Western democracies and the idea about free market, however at the same time, Russian leaders realised that there are internal and external factors that limit Russian foreign policy choices and were most of the time to agree to compromise. However, the situation changed when Putin started his second term in the office in 2004, thereby changing Russian foreign policy. It moved towards pursuing its interests in a more assertive manner, with special attention towards post-soviet states, most which were now enjoying benefits of being members of the EU and NATO. This more aggressive policy started with raising energy prices, which supported Russian economy as planned. And up to the present day, these historical experiences are shaping the decision making in Russia Level of ambition in international security policy The history of being a great power, is fundamental to the strategic culture of Russia. Similarly to the ESS, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, stresses the importance of the changing environment and new trends in global 92 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon and Schuster, 1994), Ibid

44 development require new approaches to key aspects of the rapidly changing situation in the world and a new vision of priorities in Russia s foreign policy, taking in account Russia s increased responsibility for setting the international agenda and shaping the system of international relations 94. This feeling of responsibility comes from the fact that Russia today can be seen as a great power according to these three factors: it has nuclear and conventional weapons, it is important to the world economy, as it possesses important natural resources which lets it influence relations with the Europe, and also that it has the indispensability it is geographically located that it is an important part most of the time in solving critical world conflicts 95. In addition, Russia sees that the ability of the West to dominate world economy and politics continue to diminish and the power and development potential is now more dispersed and is shifting to the east 96. This maintenance of great power status is mainly achieved through cooperation and influence on the former Soviet states and allies of Russia in different parts of the world. This direction and need to be close and have a close cooperation, comes from the memories about the amount of influence Russia had over these states more than 20 years ago, giving it an equal power to intimidate the USA, therefore demonstrating, the main pillar of Russian strategic culture. Seeing how important the new threats and global challenges are, Russia also is focusing on using political and diplomatic, as well as economic, financial tools supplemented by military options available, showing a willingness to change in a softer direction. One of the main goals set for this is to strengthen international security, which means reducing of arms, supporting processes which aim at establishing zones of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and strengthening nuclear safety. It will also work in the context of efforts to strengthen regional stability in Europe, ensuring the conventional arms control regime in Europe into line with the current reality and intends to participate in international peacemaking activities under the UN auspices and within the framework of collaboration with regional and international organisations 97. This concept gives no doubt for what Russia is aiming for in international affairs - to ensure it is seen, heard 94 Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013, Chapter 1, art Ermarth, cited in. Norbert Eitelhuber, The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West in Connections.The Quarterly Journal, Vol.9, No. 1, (Winter 2009), Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013, Chapter 2, art Ibid. Chapter 3, art. 32d and 32k. 44

45 and taken into consideration during decision making and perceived as an equal player by other great powers Scope of action for the executive decision making Russian foreign policy decision making is as complicated as that of the EU large bureaucracy, enormous role of the President and of course the influence of the general elite in the country is the main key to decision making in Russian foreign policy. As seen in previous parts, a strong head of state has had an influence on Russian decision making at all times. For present day Russia, the importance of the President is mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept, in article 95: The President of the Russian Federation in accordance with his constitutional powers directs the foreign policy of the country and as a Head of State represents the Russian Federation in international relations. The role of the President is stressed as well in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, where [..] (President) shall be the head of the state and he shall take measures to protect sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, and ensure concerted functioning and interaction of all bodies of state power 98. The President is also in charge of defining the basic domestic and foreign policy guidelines of the state in accordance with Russian Constitution and federal laws. He also has the rights to supervise the conduction of the foreign policy, conduct negotiation and sign instruments of ratification. In general, president has most of the executive power in the state, and it can be observed over the past years Putin seems to be behind every move that is made by Russia, but again having a strong and decisive leader has been the case of Russia for centuries which defines the present day strategic culture and having Putin run the state for the third term now is an example of how the past influences present. Article 96 of the Foreign policy concept states that Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation also provide legislative frameworks for the country s foreign policy and fulfilment of its international obligations and the Government of the Russian Federation carries measures to implement the country s foreign policy 99. This shows how much of the main power is in the hands of the elite, and the enormous bureaucracy of Russia. However, this type of executive decision making 98 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Section 1, Chapter 4, art Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013, Chapter 5, art. 96 and

46 has attracted critique about its legitimacy decisions are often made behind closed doors, fast and are influenced by other actors like oil and gas companies for example. Therefore this indicates the decision making culture in Russia, which consists of autocratic mechanisms Foreign Policy Orientation There are differences in the foreign policy orientations between the EU and Russia. For Russia, cooperation with the UN is important, which is seen in article 29: The United Nations should remain the centre for regulation of international relations and coordination in world politics in the 21 st century, as it has proven to have no alternative and also possesses unique legitimacy 100. This means that Russia sees it important for other actors involved in world politics to follow the provisions and principles of the UN. The UN is also very important for Russia, as it is the one organisation, where Russia can have an influential say as Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UN SC). This shows that Russia wants to have an acknowledged voice in international relations, as it did during the Soviet times. It has veto rights, and it has not been afraid to use them, especially when it faces opposition from the USA and other permanent members, for example, together with China, Russia vetoed UN SC bid for sanctions to Syrian regime several times 101. Also throughout the concept, references to the UN are seen quite often, and articles about cooperation with and within the UN come before mentioning relations with the EU. The recent history of Russia in informing its security culture is demonstrated by looking at the influence it exerts over its former territories and satellite states. As the Baltic States and Poland joined the EU and NATO, Russian influence on these actors was declining, it has moved towards closer cooperation with other post-soviet states. Russia s other priorities include Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with whom it is important to develop bilateral and multilateral cooperation, further strengthening CIS as a basis for enhancing regional interaction among its participants who not only share common historical background but also have great capacity for integration in various spheres and contributing to development of 100 Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Chapter 3, art Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N as Russia and China Veto another Resolution on Syria Sanctions, in The New York Times, , (Accessed ). 46

47 interaction among CIS Member States 102. It is also worth mentioning that article 51 calls for assistance in formation of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia as modern states, strengthening of their international positions and their social and economic recovery as one of the Russia s priorities. However, the following article 52, it says that Russia is interested in normalisation of relations with Georgia in the areas in which the Georgian side shows its willingness, while taking into account the existing political environment in Transcaucasia. Russian foreign policy concept has a special part dedicated to the relations with the EU demonstrating the primacy of the UN over the EU. Article 56 shows that in its relations with the European Union, the main task for Russia as an integral and inseparable part of European civilization is to promote creating a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific, followed by the article 57, stating that Russia is interested in enhancing cooperation with the European Union as its principal trade and economic counterpart and important foreign policy partner, looks forward strengthening mutual interaction, emphasizes the importance of establishment of four common spaces in the areas of economy; freedom, security and justice; external security, and scientific research and education, including cultural aspects 103. This underlines the wish to continue dialogue and improve cooperation not just in military and political sphere but also in other areas. Having similar ideas and carrying them out in different areas would improve the overall level of cooperation. To stress the importance of this cooperation, during his term as the president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev proposed an idea about a new pan-european security treaty which would create a common and undivided space of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic region. As a result of not having the desired influence in security decision making on the European continent, Russia proposed this treaty, which when viewed from strategic culture perspective shows the wish to affect affairs in Europe. At the moment, however, it is in a form of draft. This possible treaty also ensures that one party will not do anything that would affect security of any to her parties of the treaty, sort of giving guarantees, and it goes as far as it even establishes possible mechanisms for settling disputes or differences that might arise between parties, 102 Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013, Chapter 4, art. 42 and Ibid. Chapter 4, art. 56 and

48 including, consultation, conferences, and extraordinary conferences used in cases of an armed attacks to one of the parties involved. Even though, the draft of this treaty was created by Russia, and sent to different Euro-Atlantic organisations such as the EU, NATO, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), CIS and others, it came with an option for other parties to make proposals on the subject matter. The main driving force for Russia for this idea, was the situation where Russia was tired of not having a meaningful say in European decision making, as for an example with NATO Russia does not have any veto rights regarding decisions made by NATO. However, there has not been a real enthusiasm from the EU about this treaty, as it has been dismissed as too bureaucratic and just as a reiteration of previous documents Willingness to use military force When it comes to the use of military force, we can see the main difference from the EU. Russian foreign and security policy strategy finds itself on the hard power spectrum, which means that military options are not seen as a last resort and may be used if the decision makers see it necessary, despite the fact that Russian strategic culture has developed from being just a military culture. Strategic culture in Russia has developed towards political and foreign policies, which in turn strongly influences economic culture. In the foreign policy concept, chapter 3 article 39n, it is stated that Russia views as one of its objectives working to establish Russia s positive image [..], improving the application of soft power and identifying the best forms of activities in this area that would take into account both international experience and national peculiarities and build on mechanisms of interaction with civil society and experts 105. However looking at recent events in Ukraine, Georgia or even Chechnya, we can see that soft power is definitely not one of the first tools preferred by Russia to solve problems. Analysing Russia and the military, we must look at The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which was approved by president Medvedev in 2010, where the main official views on armed defence and protection of Russia can be found. Doctrine has framed military dangers and military threats to Russia, for example weakened world development, unsolved regional conflicts and that the existing international 104 Andrew Monaghan, The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity in Russia and Eurasia, (Chatham House, April 2013), Concept of the Russian Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013, Chapter 3, art. 39n. 48

49 security system, does not ensure equal security for all states. This doctrine ensures that armed forces are ready all the time, to deter and prevent military and other types of conflict. Even though in other documents Russia stresses the importance of nonmilitary means, throughout this doctrine we can see indications on how the armed forces and other troops must be ready for combat utilisation at any moment. The use of force has been institutionalised as a response for Russia forming a significant part of its strategic culture identity. The following example demonstrates this. When it comes to the struggle against international terrorism, doctrine indicates that the Russian Federation considers it legitimate to utilize the Armed Forces and other troops in order to repulse aggression against it and (or) its allies and the Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and in an event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons 106. This doctrine does not leave military instruments as the last resort. Several articles in the doctrine return to the readiness of military forces, which supplements the idea of Russia as a hard power player and that military means are dominating over the soft power tools like diplomacy, even though in rhetoric Russia convinces about the need to pay more attention to non-military aspects of security. 3.2 Critique on Russian security strategy Rhetoric, reality and securitisation Russia s security and foreign strategy has been criticised a lot. One of the main critiques has referred to Russia s willingness to use hard power. Even though over the past years, official Russian documents have stressed the transition process from hard to soft power. Security documents call for more soft power use, reality shows that Russia does not have a balance or so called smart power between soft and hard power. In 2013, Putin urged Russian diplomats abroad for a need to apply soft power more extensively. However, Joseph Nye thinks that the leader has not really grasped 106 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2010, Chapter 3, art. 20 and

50 how to achieve these goals One of these soft power tools is the strengthening of Russian language in the state and abroad. But even with the soft power tools they use, it is not enough. According to some Russian scholars, Russia is essentially a hard power, because it believes in a much more dangerous world and because it has little soft power that is, social, cultural and economic attractiveness 108. There is also a clear difference between the discourses of Russian leaders, official documents and the actions carried out. In words, Russia follows international laws, stresses the importance of the UN and following treaties that have been signed international and bilateral. When it comes to the actions it is a different story - Russia is seen guilty in intimidating its neighbours, carrying out military manoeuvres near its borders close to the other states. However, there have always been justified arguments why it has been done, and that Russia has the rights to what it thinks it is necessary on its territory. This focusing on the military development can be also observed by looking at the military reform, which has been carried out since The developments in the military sphere indicate a change in Russian thinking about threat perception security environment as such 109, not forgetting the importance of military threats. It is intended to move Russia away from Soviet time military machinery and poorly equipped troops and to acquire a modern and strong military force. This emphasis on improving military quality in the state indicates on Russian securitization meaning that an issue in the state is presented as an existential threat, that requires emergency measures and justifying actions outside the norms bounds of political procedure 110. According to Barry Buzan, there are several sectors which can be securitized military, political, economic, societal and environmental, and some scholars argue, that Russia has been putting a security label on most of these areas. This causes other actors to see Russia first as an aggressive actor. This suggests that a 107 Joseph S. Nye, What China and Russia Don t Get About Soft Power, Foreign Policy, , er (Accessed ). 108 Sergey Karaganov cited in Joseph S. Nye, What China and Russia Don t Get About Soft Power, Foreign Policy, , er 109 Andrei Makarychev and Alexander Sergunin, Rusian military reform: institutional, political and security implications in Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 24, Nr. 4, (2013), Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Lynne Riener Publishers Inc., 1998),

51 root cause of tensions between Russia and other actors are due to differences in strategic culture, rather than historical Cold War differences. Using natural resources as a security leverage One of these areas that are seen as securitised, where Russia has been critiqued, is the use of natural resources as a strategic instrument in its relations with Europe. Russia has been using unilateral economic sanctions in the form of gas pricing and gas disruptions against many NATO member states 111 and these manipulations are allowing Russia to pursue its foreign and security policy. Since the gas and oil industry have developed in Russia, it has used it as a weapon in several situations as a mean of coercion against the EU and NATO members. By doing this, Russia can influence the decision making in the states which are the most dependent on Russian gas, for example Baltic states. Using this leverage, Russia is trying to achieve not just geopolitical gains, but also political stability on its territories and around. However, some experts have argued that this mainly serves as a political weapon to keep control at least at some level, over the post-soviet states. Even Putin himself has indicated that this energy policy is a very effective tool that can be used by Russia, to regain its strength 112. This energy identity indicates that Russia can afford being aggressive in its strategic culture, and not be too worried that repercussions will harm its core export. 3.3 Summary As far as history goes, it has always been ruled by leaders with great ambitions trying to achieve status of Russia as a great power. Historical events have played an important role in shaping Russian identity which cannot be explained through realist perspective, which in turn influences decisions made now. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia had lost its previous glory and power, and as we can observe nowadays, its ambitions have returned alongside with aggressive policy making. For Russia to really succeed in developing credible soft power, the main thing to do will be to match discourses to real actions in its policy. It will also need to look at its own policies and aims more self-critically, and use the full potential of its civil society, as 111 Alexander Ghaleb, Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power, (Strategic Studies Institute, October, 2011),v. 112 Ibid

52 according to Nye, government is not the main instrument of soft power soft power springs from the individuals, the private sector and society. 52

53 4. A COMPARATIVE FOCUS ON EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS The EU and Russian relations are more than complicated - two different actors, with two different strategic cultures, yet dependent on each other economically. The EU is Russia s main trading partner, and the EU is dependent on Russian energy supplies. There is cooperation between the two actors in different fields; however the cooperation in the security field is far from smooth, especially when it comes to conflicts where the EU and Russian security interests clash. Since the EU adopted the ESS, there have been conflicts where both actors have been involved and most of the time on opposite sides. So in this chapter I will look at strategic culture in Russia and what are the main perspectives of it. Relations between the EU and Russia have never been particularly calm or harmonious. Indeed, in recent years, tensions between the two actors have grown to an extent where the EU is imposing sanctions on Russia as a result of it breaking international law several times. The EU and Russian history, identity, strategies, preferred policies and threat framing is different, so when it comes to dealing with each other vis-à-vis, interests clash and new tensions arise. In this chapter I will try to explain EU-Russian relations based on the different strategic cultures as discussed in chapters 2 and 3. First I will briefly look at the main points in the relationship since the end of the Cold War, second at the differences and similarities based on strategic culture, and finally I will apply these differences to look at the situation in Ukraine. 4.1 Development of EU and Russian security relations after the Cold War During the final years of the Soviet Union, encouraged by leader at time Mikhail Gorbachev, the concept of new thinking emerged. This meant Russia moving closer to a Western style of policy involving opening up to the world, arms reduction, withdrawal from Afghanistan, retreat from satellite states, affirming democratic principles and respecting human rights 113. The EU used to play an important role in Russia s development, especially in 1990s when Moscow was very keen on incorporating European standards. During the immediate post-soviet years Russia was ready to restore its great power status within the international society, develop the domestic situation, improving living conditions for its people and restoring (or rethinking) its identity. This was intended as a first step towards moving away from 113 Thomas Gomart, Europe in Russian Foreign Policy: Important but No Longer Pivotal, in Russie.Nei.Visions Nr. 50, IFRI (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales), 7. 53

54 being a military superpower towards more balanced power with normalised institutions inside the state and in relations with other actors. Up to today, the main document on which EU-Russian relations have been based is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (signed 1994, entering force 1997). The main aims for this agreement were to ensure there is a space and a framework for a dialogue, to support the efforts of Eastern states in strengthening democracy on their territories and assisting in developing their economies 114. It also was intended to aid the strengthening of trade relations between the EU and Russia. However, in general, Russia s foreign policy orientation in early 1990s could be characterised as a pragmatic affair, with the main objectives to avoid isolation, establish trade and economic relations and to create a stable energy demand 115. Since 1999 establishing closer ties with the EU was on the daily agenda for Russia, proposing different forms of pan-european cooperation and agreements. However, there was a slight hesitation from the side of the EU to reciprocate. For example the 1999 Common Strategy on Russia did not function as intended, as the EU could not speak with one voice to Russia. With the coming of future EU enlargement, achieving the one voice goal was becoming more and more difficult in the sphere of EU- Russia relations. This was compounded by the fact that the 2004 accession would mean that Russia s former territories were to join the EU. The 2004 enlargement brought new challenges for the EU and Russian relations. Newly independent post-soviet states were striving towards the EU membership, which would out the EU and NATO right at the doorstep of Russia. The question about the enlargement has always been a sensitive matter, especially to Russia. Former leaders of the country claimed that the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO would violate a solemn pledge made by the governments of West Germany and the United States in 1990 not to bring any former Communist states into the alliance 116, during the talks about unification of Germany and it staying in the alliance. However, no official documents were signed or released, so when it came to 114 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Europa.eu, European Union Website, pe_and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm (Accessed ). 115 Tom Casier, The European Union and Russia: Partners by Default? in The European Neighborhood: Challanges and Opportunities, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), Mark Kramer, The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia in The Washington Quarterly, Vol.32, Nr. 2, 2009,

55 the actual enlargement process, no one had the right to object and officials from the Washington insisted that no such promises were made and the option of including new countries in NATO was not foreclosed. This added to a further mistrust in EU- Russia relations as it felt a double betrayal. Not only were its former territories joining the EU, they were also joining NATO, therefore turning from ally to enemy. Today relations between the EU and Russia are characterised by their highly institutionalised nature. For example every year there are two summit meetings, meetings at ministerial level, and meetings within the EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council 117. In spite of these regular meetings, the EU critique about situation in Russia concerning democracy and human rights has been expressed only officially - no real pressuring was taken until the current crisis in Ukraine, which sparked disagreements between the EU and Russia. What is important to recognise is that Russia prefers having bilateral relations with separate countries, instead of those with the EU as a whole entity. As most of the EU countries have close trade ties with Russia and dependence on Russian energy, there is little wonder why Russia would prefer dealing with each memberstate separately. States like Germany today are seen as one of the most important strategic partners for Russia, and so is France. Many Russian businesses are deeply connected with some memberstates like Cyprus, which has an enormous Russian business community and investments are flowing both ways. Today the progress in this relationship has mainly been achieved in trade and economic sector, whereas political, security and diplomatic relations are far from being close and perfect. 4.2 Aspects of strategic culture in the EU-Russia relations The EU and Russian cooperation in the field of security has been rather small even though the EU has been trying to have a constructive dialogue with Russia since This is mainly due to the different characteristics of these two actors. As seen in the previous chapters, the EU and Russia have different characteristics of strategic culture, based on culture, history and identity which have been shaping their relationship for some time now. 117 Tom Casier, The European Union and Rusisa: Partners by Default? In The European Union Neighborhood. Chalnlanges and Opportunities, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013),

56 In the field of security, threat perception must be analysed how the actors frame threats. Russian perception of threats is different from that of the EU. During the early 2000s, the Russian idea of threat framing came from a traditional perspective through the prism of geopolitics and increasing power struggle among actors. It was driven by the desire to be a great power, to be seen as an equal by its closest neighbour the EU and have an equal say in security making on the European continent. In a 2003 speech, Putin indicated how necessary it is to preserve the existing borders of Europe by maintaining Russia as a strong power 118. Although, this way of threat perception shifted towards more global definition of threats, which is similar to the threats mentioned in the ESS, by looking at the latest events with Russia involved in Ukraine, we can see that it is still pursuing this previous kind of idea about threats. This more aggressive threat framing clashes with the EU soft edge of threat framing, shaping the EU security agenda within a broader societal perspective 119. The EU concentrates more on democracy, human rights, liberal values and absence of threats in the first place. For the EU threat framing is connected with preventive engagements, meaning actions before the events develop and get out of hand. This would mean using diplomacy, conducting civilian missions (or military if needed), before countries fail or an enormous conflict arises. This does not mean in any way that the EU has not framed threats as military in nature, it just indicates the preferred direction of security making is an avoidance of military means. Therefore strategic culture shows us that two powers have fundamentally different frameworks for identifying threats due to their differing values which results in polar opposite world views. Different threat framing requires different measures to be taken. Even though the core threat framing today is similar for both actors, it is the use of force and rationales behind it that makes the difference. When it comes to the means preferred, the Union s policy of preventive engagement using non-military means is in contrast to Russia s readiness to use extraordinary, military means in order to deal with 118 Vlaimir Putin, Russian President Vladimir Putin s State of the Nation Address to the Federal Assembly, , (Accessed ). 119 Charlotte Wagnsson, The Alien and The Traditional. The EU Facing a Transforming Russia, in Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson (Ed.), Changing Transatlantic Security Relations. Do the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic Triangle?, (Routledge, 2006),

57 challenges 120. Over the years, since the end of the Cold War, focus for both players has changed in terms of means used to deal with threats. Soft security still remains the main focus for the EU, but in recent years, the EU has taken different steps to ensure a harder edge to its security making. With the ratification of the Lisbon treaty (2009) which intended to improve the CFSP and CSDP, the EU is making sure it is seen as more than just a civilian actor, incapable of carrying out missions involving military means. Russia, who is left with a militarised Cold War legacy, is trying to go down the reverse path from hard to soft security aspects. Russia has changed a lot, putting a greater emphasis on non-military means such as diplomacy and economy. During the first years of his presidency (from 2001), Putin s Russia was concentrating more on high politics, the matters that are essential to the state survival. Part of this emphasis was the rational that Russia wanted to maintain its image of a great power in order to oppose de facto US hegemony 121. Therefore it was a logical step to focus more on military aspects as means for reaching its goals and maintaining the influence. An example of differences in preferred means in the security sphere between the EU and Russia can be observed in the response to the second war in Chechnya. In response to the crisis the EU called for Russia to restrain troops and instead try to solve the issue through talks and less aggressive means. In response Russia found the EU actions and approaches as too intrusive. Russia has indicated several times that it does not want the EU to intervene in its domestic issues, whilst the EU is pursuing policy directed towards Russia accepting European standards on such issues like democracy and human rights. The EU does not view borders of the Union to be fixed, as demonstrating by its continually expanding nature. On the other hand, Russia has a very clear perspective as what is Russian sphere of influence, and what is not. Also the international role they assign to each other is important. For Russia, the place and importance Europe holds in Russian foreign policy have changed and not in the favour of Europe. In Russia s view, Europe is no longer the only important player in the international arena. The global influence is slowly shifting towards the Asia-Pacific region, 120 Charlotte Wagnsson, The Alien and The Traditional. The EU Facing a Transforming Russia, in Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson (Ed.), Changing Transatlantic Security Relations. Do the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic Triangle?, (Routledge, 2006), Ibid

58 diminishing the role of the Europe and the EU in foreign policy. However, the dilemma that Russia is facing is how to position itself in relation to Europe in creating its global identity 122, as creating a global identity has been a goal for Russia for many years now, and so it has been for the EU. For the EU on the other hand, Russia still plays an important role in cooperation and maintaining good international climate in Europe. Recent events in Ukraine have forced both sides to review these roles assigned to each other. When the EU sees Russia, it does not see it as a military threat. Before the Ukraine crisis, the EU was not worried about the military aggression that could come from Russia, but rather about organised crime, money laundering and the trafficking of drugs, people and weapons 123. Similar to the Russian change of view towards the EU, the EU has changed its opinions about Russia over the past years with Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, and on its own territory (Chechnya), the EU now sees Russia as more aggressive actor that is following its legacies from history. Although both sides are part of Europe, there are substantial cultural differences between Russia and the EU memberstates. Different identities are one of the first points to look at when analysing the EU and Russian relations. EU is a rather new organisation, compared to the age of Russia, and so are the identities different. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was trying to create a new identity that would be accepted as normal and understood by the West. However, due to the lack of attention and involvement from the EU towards Russia, and discovery that it can sustain its power by using the natural resources found on its territory, Russian identity has developed in the opposite direction from the EU identity. Today Russia is a traditional, sovereign state that has experienced rise and downfall several times. Although officially Russia positions itself as a democratic country, based on similar values to the EU, reality is different and claims of democracy are not taken seriously by the West. It must be remembered that after the collapse of Soviet Union, Russia saw the Europe as a model for further development. 122 Thomas Gomart, Europe in Russian Foreign Policy: Important but No Longer Pivotal, in Russie.Nei.Visions Nr. 50, IFRI (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales), Katinka Barysch, EU Russia Relations. The EU Perspective in Debra Johnson and Paul Robinson (Ed.) Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations, (Routledge, 2005),

59 The EU is a unique creation, not a state and not built on sovereignty. It is built on democratic and liberal values, stressing the importance of human rights and freedoms. In the core of the EU lies these fundamental values, on which the EU was built in the first place to unite European nations, achieve integration and possibly avoid another world wide conflict. 4.3 UKRAINE AS AN EXAMPLE The current situation in Ukraine is a good example the above differences. Traditionally relations between actors would be seen through a military or economic perspective. For realists it would be a power struggle among these actors, use of military instruments and possible economic benefits. Firstly looking at Ukraine, we can see that economically Russia does not benefit from Ukraine, because it is rather economically unstable and recently it has been experiencing economic crisis. Secondly, grabbing Crimea because of military reasons would not benefit Russia at all, as there were already Russian military bases in Crimea. Therefore, the criteria of strategic culture are needed to understand the behaviour of the EU and Russia. First of all Ukraine highlights the fact that there are two different security goals for Russia and the EU. Through the Association agreement, the EU wants to bring Ukraine into its orbit. On the other hand, Russia is determined to keep its present level of influence over Ukraine by offering a 15 billion dollar loan and an option of closer integration in the planned Eurasian Union 124 along with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Identity and culture has played a crucial role in Ukrainian crisis. Ukraine is thrown between the West-East split, the former preferring closer relations with the EU and the latter preferring maintaining closer ties with Russia. Crimea plays an important part in Russian memories, it has a large Russian speaking population, still sentimental about old Soviet times, and it is also a home to Russian military bases. Crimea still looms large in Russia s national imagination 125. For Russia, Crimea still feels like a part of it, with a large Russian speaking population. Strategic culture emphasizes how important identity and culture is to explaining decision making processes. The romantic desire to reunite Crimea with Russia cannot be underestimated in the 124 Allan Yuhas, Ukraine crisis: an essential guide to everything that s happened so far, The Guardian, , (Accessed ). 125 Ibid. 59

60 Russian decision making process to annex the peninsula. Ukraine used to be a Soviet state, and together with Belarus used to be the closest states to Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putin s main course of action towards these states can be called economic imperialism, i.e. an attempt to increase Ukrainian dependency on Russian energy deliveries 126 which was successful. The soft power core of the EU s identity has ensured that the measures taken against Russia have never met the military level. Instead of pursuing a smart power policy (a mix of soft and hard power tools), the EU stays loyal to its soft power essence and sticks to imposing sanctions approach. There have been several stages of sanctions. First two were only dedicated to ban Russian elite and people who are close to Putin (inner circle of Putin) from coming to Europe by refusing visas. If at first sanctions were imposed on some of Russian elite, then further sanctions apply to state officials, close to Putin. The Council of the European Union decision Nr. 2014/265/CFSP of 12 May 2014, lists these names that have been added to the list of undesirable persons banned from travelling to the EU. The list also included some pro-russian separatist leaders in Eastern Ukraine. Sanctions may vary from weak restricting Russian vodka, caviar and fur exports to the EU, to medium restrictions to Russian investments in the EU energy sector, banning coal exports from Russia and also stopping any cooperation activities. The strong sanctions would restrict the EU from investing in Russian economy, and a full ban of Russian gas and oil imports to Europe 127. This EU approach is seen as too mild by the international society, not strong enough to seriously face Russia and its actions in Ukraine. The EU anti-russian sanctions are seen as less far-reaching than sanctions imposed by the USA for example. Whilst the EU was still debating about who should be banned from traveling to the EU, or whose assets will be frozen, the USA had already acted. By observing EU actions in Ukraine, we can see that because of the EU values have such a strong emphasis on non-military action, it explain the EU stance towards Russia. 126 Bertil Nygren, Putin s Policy Toward Ukraine and Belarus in Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson (Ed.), Changing Transatlantic Security Relations. Do the US, the EU and Russia Form a New Strategic Triangle?, (Routledge, 2006), ES ir trīs sankciju varianti, ja Krievija izjauks vēlēšanas Ukrainā (The EU has three options of possible sanctions for Russia in case Russia tries to sabotage Ukrainian presidential elections), TVNET news site, , es_ir_tris_sankciju_varianti_ja_krievija_izjauks_velesanas_ukraina (Accessed ) 60

61 On the other side there is Russia which sees the present Ukrainian situation as a threat to its interests and rather than responding in a manner similar to the EU, it chose to use force immediately as a response, seizing Crimea and destabilising Eastern Ukraine. Despite the fact that Russia insists on following the international laws and supporting peaceful conflict resolutions, its reaction to the protests in Kiev did not come as a surprise to anyone. What followed was a staged referendum in Crimea for joining Russia as an Autonomous Republic of Crimea If initiating referendum was still a peaceful solution, then sending troops over the border to an independent country violating its sovereignty and integrity clearly shows Russia s aggressive strategy towards achieving its goals. One of the reasons why Russia has not taken the EU sanctions seriously is the fact that the EU is no longer seen as a pivotal partner. As a result of growing mutual mistrust between the EU and Russia over time and the existence of different political views, Russia feels that it can find a way how to survive without the EU. It also realises, that two actors are too interdependent on each other, which has lead most of the EU and Russian discussion to be about energy questions. Recently Russia signed a 30 year gas deal with China for 400 billion dollars 128, for Gazprom (the largest gas company in Russia) to deliver gas to China. This indicates the growing shift from the focus on the relations with the EU, towards Asia. This way, Russia who has made the EU dependent on Russian energy, and Moscow is not afraid to use its privileged energy ties with Berlin, Paris and Rome 129 as it has been considering other partners. Therefore we can see that the core of the crisis, the driving forces guiding the EU and Russia s actions are not from the rational sphere of realist power play or economics. It is the emotional cultural and historical variables that are causing action to be taken that would not necessarily be done if the situation was handled in a rational way. This means that the Geneva agreement, which calls for the refraining of violence or 128 Alec Luhn, Russia signs 30 year deal worth $400bn to deliver gas to China, The Guardian, , (Accessed ). 129 K.Smith cited in Thomas Gomart, Europe in Russian Foreign Policy: Important but No Longer Pivotal, in Russie.Nei.Visions Nr. 50, IFRI (Institut Francais des Relations Internationales),

62 provocative actions, 130 is unlikely to be successful as they are rooted in the traditional world of power politics. 130 Geneva Statement on Ukraine, European External Action Service, , (Accessed ). 62

63 CONCLUSIONS Over the past year, attention in international relations has been directed towards EU- Russia relations, especially in the context of Ukraine crisis. In this thesis I have argued that relations between these two actors are one of the most important aspects in international security environment. Despite being neighbours, partners and having close ties in different areas of cooperation, relations are currently tense, requiring an analysis from a different point of view, that can look beyond the power, military and arms. Traditional assumptions about security should be questioned, because of the changing nature of international environment. As a possible option, I have offered to use strategic culture as an approach in explaining this relationship between the EU and Russia, taking in consideration such aspects as culture, history and identity in account, which are often overlooked by traditional approaches. The main idea of strategic culture is to understand certain strategic behaviours and decision making of actors, based not on military arsenal, but on past experiences, values and beliefs. These aspects have an impact on ways, how an actor frames threats, what means it prefers to use (military or non-military) to deal with these threats, how it positions itself among other actors and how it sees and pursues its foreign and security policy. Throughout this thesis, strategic culture approach has allowed us to look at how different the EU and Russia are in greater depth than traditional measures of power allow. The EU as such is a rather new actor in the international arena, based on liberal values, human rights and freedoms and supporting democracy as the best government model, whereas present day Russia is rooted in the inheritance of the Soviet Union, emphasizing realism and geopolitics by pursuing a foreign policy that of a superpower, preferring bilateral relations with other actors and influencing territories around it. Even though both of the actors see themselves as European because of the different values and historical experiences, the definition of what it means to be European is open for interpretation. Therefore, both actors have incompatible views on liberal and democratic values, differences in opinions about how the civil society should be with freedoms and rights in the EU, and limited scope of freedoms in Russia. As a result of this, it is to be expected that their respective strategic cultures are radically different at their core. This can only lead to tensions. These 63

64 disagreements on basic values shape the relationship and provide a source of discontent for further cooperation in security field and very often we see the EU accusing Russia of violating the international law, and Russia answering that it is none of the EU s business on what is happening inside its territories. In addition to analysing relations between actors from a realist perspective, by applying strategic culture approach, we can understand better why the EU and Russia are taking the chosen paths towards Ukraine. Crisis in Ukraine clearly shows the differences when it comes to the preferred means of actions. The EU is being faithful to its long term soft policy, threatening Russia with further economic sanctions, not just to Russian elite individuals, but also to companies and banks, achieving Russian isolation and forcing Putin to quit his ambitions in Ukraine. Russia on the other hand, driven by a historical sentiment and willingness to protect its Russian speaking population outside its borders does not seem to be taking the EU seriously. It keeps on violating Geneva agreement on most of the points, and despite the actions from the West, it still has not backed away from Ukrainian borders, is supporting separatist movements in the East of Ukraine and considering the region of Crimea its own. This refusal to change its position shows how the EU s strategic culture is deeply rooted in its values and where the realist school of thought would have suggested sabre rattling, the EU is content to continue with the sanctions path. At the moment, the overall state of relations is far from perfect. There is hostility between the EU and Russia, which has a potential of a long term conflict. It is not just security that is affected, it is also the economic and social areas of this relationship that are slowly being destroyed. Development of the events in Ukraine, will offer more aspects of EU-Russia relations to be considered, as all actors involved have ambitions, plans, and no one is ready to back away. Some scholars agree these continuous disagreements and differences may lead to another Cold War, which is why it is even more important to understand, how culture, history and identity have shaped the present situation today and maybe to find a solution to prevent it from happening. Although strategic culture as an approach has emerged not too long ago and most of the time is not the first one to be chosen, it gives us a good perspective on explaining specific behaviour of the EU and Russia. Taking these two actors as an example has 64

65 helped to determine and confirm most of the elements of strategic culture described in this thesis, when taking this idea as a theoretical approach. With the help of strategic culture we can look at their preferences and actions that are based on the past experiences or goals, such as, willingness to achieve lasting peace or expansion by force boosting its power. We can also look at what impact have previous leaders of a state left, which is quite clear in the case of Russia most of the Russian leaders in the past have been driven by the urge to expand Russian territory, and ensure its greatness on the international stage. To sum up, in international relations, the main contribution of strategic culture is to bring culture back in the international discussions about international security and support the idea that there are different rationales, not just military thinking, behind the use of force as a result of these diverse cultures. However, in this thesis, the contribution of strategic culture is more or less limited, as the realism still is dominating the international security environment. Society in general still measures power of an actor in military terms, not giving enough focus to values, such as culture. Therefore perhaps it is useful not to separate strategic culture from the classical theories, but use it alongside them, to gain greater insight into EU Russian relations. Nonetheless, strategic culture can add texture to the assumptions about security, explaining aspects of behaviour that are underrated by realism. 65

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72 APPENDIX Image 1: Completed missions and operations of the EU Source: European External Actions Service, February

73 Image 2: Ongoing missions and operations of the EU Source: European External Action Service, February