Socialist Revolution During Brazil s Military. Dictatorship

Transcription

1 Socialist Revolution During Brazil s Military Dictatorship Dominique M. Awis April 3, 2017 Introduction Since the era of the Vargas Administration in the 1950s, Brazil has a rich tradition of collective action performances that include land claiming, peasant leagues, protesting, strikes, and petitions. Brazil s collective action repertoire evolved throughout the military dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s in the form of cosmopolitan performances such as massive demonstrations and guerilla violence. A combination of student movements, middle-class movements, guerilla groups, and urban and rural unions formed the Socialist revolutionary movement. United by the central message of regime change and encouraged by Brazil s political opportunity structure, the Socialist Revolution was a response to the nationwide public opposition against actions by the military regime such as civil rights restrictions and human rights abuses. Because these actions by the military regime affected every individual in the population, it caused a great crisis and movement leaders were able to evoke emotional injustice frames and create solidarity in opposition to the regime. As a result, millions of people shared a common identity of anti-military regime association and the Socialist movement was able to expand its circle of influence. Beginning in the 1980s, an evolved expression of contention was used by the Socialist Revolution movement such that individuals began voting in elections as a performance in opposition to the regime; for example, eighty-nine percent of the population voted in the 1983 election. [2] Protest voting allowed opposition parties such as the Democratic Movement Party and the Worker s Party 1

2 to grow in influence on the national level where the anti-regime movement now had new resources, leadership, and organization to bargain with the state and create national policy change. Eventually, after decades under military rule, Brazil ended its military government and elected socialist leaders in the parliament in 1986 and executive in This report will chart the rise and fall of Brazil s military dictatorship ( ), determine what drove the Socialist Revolution against the military regime, analyze the Socialist Revolution s structure and tactics, and investigate the Socialist Revolution s impact on regime change. The hypothesis of the report is whether or not the independent variable, the Socialist Revolution, had an affect on the dependent variable, the fall of the military dictatorship. 1 Oppressive Military Regime 1.1 Joao Goulart and the Labor Party Joao (Jango) Belchior Marques Goulart was installed as head of the Labor Party in Brazil in He was a fellow gaucho (cowboy) and close friend to the former labor movement s leader and former Brazilian president Getulio Dornelles Vargas. [1] The Labor Party, or PTB, as it was known, was loyal to Vargas Estado Novo, socialist democracy state. [1] The initial goal in the group s formation was to organize a group of working class citizens who would be loyal to Vargas regime. [2] The Labor Party was a working class movement such that the individuals share the common interest of worker s rights and benefits under the exploitative conditions of capitalism. [2] The Labor Party bargained for higher wages and better working conditions for workers. The Labor Party, was a decision-making organization that participated in the policy process and therefore a structural entity. Labor Party mobilized workers, distributed patronage, acted in opposition to its enemies, and rewarded loyalists by creating jobs. [1] Many Labor Party members were known as trabalhistas or Communist union leaders. [2] Unions were very powerful during this period. The Labor Union organized strike movements and work stoppages. [2] Strikes and worker stoppages are forms of bargaining with elites and authority. The strikes and stoppages were often successful. In 1958 there was a recorded 31 strikes. [2] Important agents in the Labor Party of Brazil were union elites, the institutional Ministry of Labor, industrial bourgeoisie inclined towards 2

3 nationalism, and urban union workers. [2] The Labor Party s Goulart became president of Brazil in 1961 after Kubitschek s term despite opposition from the Brazilian military. [3] Goulart installed new reforms in purpose to curb the social pressure of workers and groups such as agrarian reform and urban reform. Agrarian reform was enacted in purpose to settle disputes over land while urban reform allowed tenants to remain in their homes. [2] Additionally, the Goulart Administration focused on more nationalistic framework such that government would take a stronger position in economic matters to curb the social problems caused from economic policies. [2] Goulart increased the minimum wage and salaries of workers. [4] These reforms were supported by the educated middle class of Brazil. [2] During this period, anti-goulart sentiment was growing in the Brazilian military. [2] There was a revolt within the military in 1963 which was a crisis for Goulart s regime. [2] The military was growing in number against Goulart and his reforms; individuals within the military were upset that officer s wages were being lowered while minimum wage was increased under Goulart. [5] Anti- Goulart propaganda was passed through military barracks. [5] The military held certain principles: maintaining social order, respect for hierarchy, and controlling Communism. [2] The military gained values of anti-communism in Brazil s military war colleges, modeled after US war colleges. The military viewed the Goulart Administration as a descent toward Communism [2] and Goulart s presidency only lasted until 1964 [6] when the military overthrew Goulart in purpose to free the country from corruption and Communism and to restore democracy. [2] The US was supportive of the military government and held the view the military government would suppress Brazil s perceived descent into Communism under Goulart. [7] 1.2 Coup The new military government strengthened executive power and limited parliamentary powers. [2] Military officials expelled all members of government that were not military officials; a journalist supportive of the military regime framed the expulsion as decommunization for Communist sympathizers in government. [9] The New York Times observes, the military regime has installed a censorship of the press, made thousands of arrests and dismissed many Deputies without trial. [7] The article negatively framed the Goulart Administration as dangerously bolshevizing the na- 3

4 tion and argued the expulsion of all non-military officials was a preliminary to the restoration of democracy. [7] The new military regime also abolished all political parties except the Military Party and the very unpopular Democratic Movement Party, [2] censored the Media, [11] and arrested suspected Communist groups. [2] One American news reported over 900 armed raids in the state of Guanabara where Communist propaganda was seized and more than 3,000 people were arrested. [8] Students were targeted and universities were raided. [2] Many union league leaders were jailed; any leftists were singled out for military persecution. [2] The military introduced invasive security reforms like National Information Bureau or SNI to collect and analyze data pertaining to national security, counterintelligence, and information on matters of internal subversion. [2] This reform gave the military regime the authority to engage in violent torture procedures on civilians. The military regime acquired the reputation for being cruel and brutal. [2] The military was quick to enact policy to counter the socialist measures of the Goulart Administration and the Labor Party. By this period in Brazil, many already held socialist political views and were loyal to Goulart s state and therefore opposed the military regime. The military regime used authority tools to control public behavior such as censoring media, restricting individual rights, and arresting thousands of individuals. This caused outrage in Brazil mobilization against the regime increased. 2 Emergence of an Opposition Movement 2.1 Origin Theory Movements like the Socialist Revolution are a type of contentious collective action made when a network of individuals gather for a common purpose with common interests (common goal) and organize and mobilize to challenge opponents, elites, and authority. Movements are an example of a collective action because behavior outcomes are given in measurements of holistic behavior. Movements are unlike interest groups in that they lack the funding and organization that interest groups have. Mobilization often comes at a costly risk; because these agents lack resources, movements often involve violence or deprivation as a means of communication to the state authori- 4

5 ties. Protesting and demonstrations are viewed in Brazil as offensive actions that demonstrates one group s interests in social change. [13] According to Freeman s (1999) theory of the origins of social movements, there must be four propositions met for popular grievances to form a social movement. The first is there must be preexisting communications networks or infrastructure with the base of the movement. [13] Within the Socialist Revolution, the networks of people are student organizations, urban and rural unions, allied guerilla groups, and the leftist Media association. Many students, representatives of and middle class people took part in the Socialist revolutionary movement. [2] There was an increase in the participation of doctors, lawyers, senior civil servants, merchants, and business people. [12] Many members of the church openly challenged the military government in protests. [2] The second proposition is not only the network needs to be able to communicate, but it has to be a place where ideas are exchanged, where people will be receptive of a new message that will cause mobilization. [13] In this case, networks were brought together in universities where ideas are shared, churches where people come together and organize, businesses are where people work and unionize. These close network places would allow people to be exposed to new messaging and share information. Proposition three is that there must be shared grievances of the network. [13] Citizens did not approve of the military regime s overreaching executive powers and felt their civil liberties threatened with the new regime s actions. Anti-regime messaging was taking place all over Brazil with networks of people outraged at the new regime s restrictive and often cruel practices. The agents involved with the movement all shared an anti-regime association. The fourth proposition is crisis would cause a network of grieving people to mobilize into action in the form of protest or demonstrations. [13] The crisis need not be that large one, but any event that would call on others to organize into action. In 1968 following a crisis of the death of a student at the hands of the military police, there were massive demonstrations in Brazil; the massive demonstrations were massive protests and the beginnings of contentious collective action against the new Brazilian government. [2] The student s death was a catalyst for summoning waves of mobilization as death symbolism evokes the deepest emotions within individual. 5

6 3 Structural Agents 3.1 Marxism and the Youth Brazil had a relatively young population; over half of the population was under 20 during this period. [2] Marxism was a guiding philosophy for many of Brazil s youth. Marxism provided a way for youth to understand their social reality and as a guide to mobilized action against their grievances. [14] Marxism holds people will engage in collective action if their social class is in contrast with the authority; in Brazil s military regime, students were targeted and this could have bound them under one social class against the authoritarian regime. The youth held very Marxist attitudes about the world around them. The youth believed that man was under an exploitative social order that favors some classes over others. The attitude of the youth was that man needed mobilization to liberate man from all chains that socially enslave him, allowing him to fulfill his potentialities; and one the other hand an optimistic attitude concerning the capacity of human communities for self-determination. [14] The Marxist youth used various cultural symbols to mobilize other youth, build networks, and sustaining their movements. One example, the revolt, is a Marxist framework such that through revolting individuals can create political change, and thus the youth believed through protest and revolt, changes could be made. Mobilization was a form of political bargaining and a way for the youth to express their grievances to the government. Marxist philosophy and its relation to Communism further exacerbated the government s antagonistic behavior towards the youth, and many youth turned to extremism in an effort to revolt against the perceived atrocities of the new military government. 3.2 Workers United Both rural and urban social movements continued during the military dictatorship giving rise to a massive labor movement. Urban and rural workers have a long-standing repertoire of contention such that strikes were a part of rural and urban history in Brazil since the Vargas and Goulart eras. Union leaders sought to organize the rural and urban classes under the banner of workers rights. The workers sought better working conditions and better salaries. In rural areas, movements could 6

7 be divided into three groups: 1) religious and social needs, 2) religions and social justice, and 3) social justice. [2] Many individuals falling under the religious and social need and religious and social justice needs took up arms against the state and formed militia groups in land claims. The third group, those seeking only social justice, participated in strikes to increase salaries and seek better working conditions. The increase of urbanization lead to a growing urban labor movement. Cities caused people to migrate and hundreds of workers were exposed to harsh working and living conditions. [2] During this period, urban mobilization proved to be unsuccessful because industry was a small part of Brazil s economy and workers did not have enough bargaining power. [2] While the labor movements were comprised of the networking and shared grievances steps of successful movements, and the worker s mobilized, there was a lack of leadership. The movements were isolated in certain areas of Brazil so no unifying message was made to the state. The government also had control over the movements such that state security was not threatened by them. The labor movement needed leadership and the power to bargain with the state to be more effective. 3.3 Guerilla Violence There were violence and clashes with police as the mobilization against the government increased. [2] This further increased the grievances and inspired the networks to keep pursuing the demonstrations. The waves of mobilizations brought much violence from Marxists. Many armed guerilla (rebel) groups were forming; many of the armed guerilla groups were former military. [2] These guerilla groups were radicalized against the government and chose armed resistance that would partake in violence against the military government in purpose to overthrow the military government. There may be many reasons for why the rebels took up arms but violence is a form of political bargaining and these former military operatives were accustomed to using such tactics. Many guerilla groups committed violence towards the government in the form of kidnapping, robbery, murder, arson, and hijacking. [15] Robbery was a newer form of contentious action not seen in earlier periods of social unrest in Brazils history. Guerilla groups, unlike institutions, lack the financial capital to bargain with the state through formal channels and therefore often robbed 7

8 banks to in pursuit of capital to fund their goals. Robberies were very violent forms of collective action; many police officials and guerilla rebels were killed during these events. Many guerilla groups also participated in kidnappings as a form of contentious political action. Kidnapping is a very violent form of contentious political action and the death of individuals was often an end result. The guerilla groups exposed their enemy s (the military government) weakness (political leaders) and sought to take advantage of the military government s vulnerability by kidnapping and threat of murder. Four Days in September In one famous event, the Revolutionary Movement 8th October, a guerilla group made up of former Brazilian Communist Party members kidnapped the American Ambassador, Charles Burke Elbrick in 1969 in Rio de Janeiro. The group is known for its Marxist- Leninist ideology. These communist revolutionaries sought to bargain the life of the Ambassador with the lives of fifteen political prisoners that were imprisoned by the military regime. The group gave the government an ultimatum that if the prisoners were released, the guerilla rebels would release the Ambassador as well. The group had two choices if there demands of the military regime were not met. They could have chosen to release the Ambassador or choose to kill him. In this notorious example, the guerilla rebels might have killed the Ambassador had the military regime not agreed to the guerilla rebels terms. The Ambassador and the fifteen political prisoners were eventually released after four days of negotiations. The US pressured the Brazilian government to accede to demands of the kidnappers and pressured the Brazilian local law enforcement for greater protections for its staff. [16] The guerilla rebels were arrested and tortured by the military regime, but later released when another rebel group kidnapped the German Ambassador and a similiar agreement was reached. The guerilla rebels were exiled from Brazil after release from military captivity. The bargaining proved to be successful. The guerilla group, united with arms under the grievance against the authoritative government, successfully bargained with the government and exchanged the Ambassador for the prisoners. Agents may have an effect in challenging authority despite the size of the agent. Smaller actors have proven to have an effect on the actions of opponents, elites, and authority. This is true for the guerilla rebels as between 1979 and 1980, 129 political prisoners were released in return for kidnapped ambassadors. [16] 8

9 Figure 1: Film: Four Days in September (1997). The guerilla wave that occurred during the 1970s proved to be successful, not in the organizations initial goals of political revolution, but successful in bargaining power and influence to get individuals released from captivity. The guerilla wave was not sustainable as many of those in guerilla group were arrested, killed, or exiled. The guerilla groups could not sustain robbing banks for income resources. The limited power of the guerilla revolutionary group proved to be short lived and unsuccessful at its initial aims however it the agents managed to affect the decisions of the military regime. 4 Sustainability The Socialist Movement was structured such that the movement maintained its support over decades. This is likely because Brazil had an opportunity structure that supported the Socialist Revolution such as high performance participation with little to no threat of retaliation; authorities and elites often had little power to stop the performances. Mobilization was so high such that millions of people participated in some type of non-violent performance. The movement was able to maintain its support through the use of effective messaging. Evoking emotion, symbolism, and identity construction, the movement gained solidarity and extended its circle of contention by implementing compelling meaning through the use of frames. Churches, workers, students, and the middle-class were emotionally affected by the injustice frame and this tactic proved successful in widening the movement s circle of contention. 9

10 Figure 2: Massive Demonstrations, Brazil Figure 3: Protests, Brazil To maintain political power, The Socialist Revolution has a long list of performances in its repertoire of contention. Land claims, peasant leagues, strikes, protests, and petitions began in the 1960s and were conventionalized forms of collective action. Given Goulart s history of enacting land and labor reform under pressure caused by collective action, these performances proved to be successful tools with which to bargain to the state and enact policy changes. During the 1970s, the Socialist Revolution s repertoire of contention later evolved to more cosmopolitan forms of political contention such as guerilla violence and massive demonstrations which were observed in other Latin American states during this period. By the 1980s, the protest vote performance emerged and was practiced and encouraged by the Worker s Party in Brazil [2]. 10

11 5 The End of the Regime 5.1 The Rise of Opposition Parties After popular pressure on the government, the military regime allowed the elections of new political parties in 1979 after abolishing all but two in The once unpopular Democratic Movement Party was increasing in popularity with rural and urban union members, the Catholic Church, and the professional middle-class. [2] In 1983, the Socialist Revolution partnered with a new socialist opposition Party, the Worker s Party [2]. This gave the Socialist Revolution leadership needed to bargain with the state and the Democratic Party the numbers to win elections. The Worker s Party was unique in the fact that it was a social movement party. [17] The party absorbed the Socialist movement and used the momentum of the movement to propel the party into the national electoral arena. The Worker Party s platform aimed to secure the rights of individuals and socially transform Brazil into a socialist state restoring policies of the Goulart Administration and going further towards progressivism. The Democratic Movement Party had a similar socialist platform as the Worker s Party and were allied with the Worker s Party. Like Goulart s Labor Party, Worker s Party and Democratic Movement Party and had socialist policy platforms, encouraged collective action, and sought power by the form of elections. These parties used social networks already established by the Socialist Revolution to set proper conditions for massive collective action to be directed toward electing opposition leaders. The Worker s Party especially was able to make meaning and implement frames of injustice to increase the utilization of the protest vote. [17] 5.2 Elections Table 1: Brazil Parliamentary Elections as Percentages Year Military Democratic Movement Worker s Party

12 Figure 4: A Model of the Relationship between election Outcome and Voter Decision Making After over a decade of collective action, the Socialist revolutionary movement was finally experiencing drastic policy change. In 1984 a nation-wide campaign (diretas ja ) was led to reintroduce direct election for the president and other officials, and national support for the opposition parties heightened. In 1985 the military installed a civilian president, Jose Sarney... and planned to hold legitamate presidential elections in [20] This was a major victory for the Socialist revolution movement. In 1986, Parliamentary elections were held in Brazil were held mainly with three major opposing parties, the Military Party (National Renewel Alliance), the Democratic Movement Party, and the Worker s Party. Table 1 shows the fall of Military Party support and the rise of Democratic Movement Party and Worker s Party support. The data was provided by Wikipedia (2017). The Democratic Movement Party received the most support at 47.8 percent of the vote while the Military Party only earned 8 percent of support, an 82 percent decrease in support. This was a surprising political victory for the Socialist Movement; from , the Military Party received a majority win in every parliamentary election. Because the Worker s Party s main performance was the protest vote, the party was able to channel the Socialist Revolution social movement into political power. The Worker s Party s protest vote proved to be effective; its electoral percentage had increased by 97 percent. The protest vote 12

13 rationally is a low-cost behavior that comes with a potentially high reward and no threat of retaliation. Voting is a civil right and not a disruptive behavior; the performance also does not take as much time or resources such as land claims, peasant leagues, protests, strikes, petitions, guerilla violence, or massive demonstrations and therefore became a highly successful performance tool for the revolution. Voting became an act of nonviolent contention involving nearly all members of the population; voting is less costly and a more affective alternative to obstructionist public demonstrations. One can approach the election process as a relationship in which the aggregate choice for leader and parliament (voter decision) is the independent variable and the fall of the military dictatorship is the dependent variable. A model for this relationship may be found in Figure 4. Because the aggregate voter decision was for the Democratic Movement Party, the result of the election lead to the fall of the regime. Military leaders were ousted and socialist opposition parties assumed power. Through publically held elections, Brazil had transformed itself from an authoritarian regime (far right on the ideological continuum) to a socialist democratic regime (far left on the ideological continuum). Conclusion Given the fall of the military dictatorship was the direct result of a process, it is safe to assume partial causality such that the military dictatorship fell because the result of the pressures caused by the Socialist Revolution. Further, one can conclude that the creation of socialist democracy (thus ending an authoritarian military dictatorship) was caused directly by election results therefore this report is assuming causality among these variable to a high confidence. This is an interesting relationship, but what factors drove individuals to turn out in massive turnouts and therefore turn the election on the side of socialist democracy opposed to authoritarianism? The answer may lie in collective behavior such that structural factors caused an aggregate individual outcome to vote for the Democratic Movement Party for parliament in 1986 and Fernando Collor de Mello for executive in One may safely generalize that the great wave of social movements lead by students, workers, middle-class, Church, media, guerilla groups began as a response to the brutal and suppressive military regime, widened its circle of contention through 13

14 messaging and performances, and eventually became institutionalized through the use of protest voting. The protest vote performance was experimental initially, but after several years of use and effectiveness, the performance became a conventional form of collective action. The protest vote was added to the Socialist Revolution s repertoire of contention and it proved to be very effective against the military regime. To explain its success, the protest vote was far cheaper than strikes and took far less time than peasant leagues, protesting, massive demonstrations, or petitioning as well as was non-violent unlike land claims or guerilla activity. Voting is a civil right and unlike other performances in the repertoire is not an obstructionist behavior that would result the military regime s retaliative authority tools. The process of democratization in Brazil was a slow one however effective. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil was having greater turnout in its federal and local elections resulting in an aggregate democratic behavior and socialist policies on the national level. With time, the Socialist Revolution lead the public to turn more and more out to vote and show support of the greater movement at large while working towards institutionally affecting policy. The success of the Marxist Revolution movement is largely based on organization and structure. The movement s central message was an alternative governmental representation and the many diverse groups that opposed the regime shared this goal. Through effective collective action performances such as the protest vote, groups were able to combine their association for change and evolve to become an overwhelming political force. Bibliography [1] R. M. Levine, Father of The Poor, Cambridge University Press, [2] B. Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, Cambridge University Press, [3] T. E. of Encyclopdia Britannica, Joao goulart, com/biography/joao- Goulart, [Online; accessed 20-January-2016] (2008). [4] H. of Everything, Government joao goulart, historiadetudo.com/governo-joaogoulart, [Online; accessed 21-January-2016] (2015). [5] T. E. Skidmore, The politics of military rule in Brazil, , Oxford University Press., 14

15 1990. [6] BBC, Brazilian ex-president joao goulart not poisoned, bbc.com/news/worldlatin-america , [Online; accessed 21- January-2016] (2014). [7] N. Y. Times, Brazil s new regime, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, [Online; accessed 20-January-2016] (1964). [8] E. C. Burks, Arrests in brazil placed at 7,000, ProQuest Historical News- papers: The New York Times, [Online; accessed 20-January-2016] (1964). [9] E. C. Burks, Anti-red law asked by military in brazil, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, [Online; accessed 20-January-2016] (1964). [10] N. Ribke, Telenovela writers under the military regime in brazil: Beyond the cooption and resistance dichotomy, in: Media, Culture, and Society, Vol. 33(5), 1970, pp [11] T. E. Skidmore, Failure in brazil: From popular front to armed revolt, in: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 5,3, 1970, p [12] J. Freeman, On the origins of social movements., in: Waves of protest: Social movements since the sixties, 1999, Vol. 101, 7. [13] C. Furtado, Brazil: What kind of revolution?, in: Foreign A airs, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1963, pp [14] J. Means, Latin american report: Political kidnappings and terrorism, in: The North American Review, Vol. 255, No. 4, 1970, pp [15] J. C. Barker, The protection of diplomatic personnel, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., [16] M. E. Keck, The workers party and democratization in brazil., in: Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 73(2), 1993, pp [17] Green, James. We cannot remain silent: opposition to the Brazilian military dictatorship in the United States. Duke University Press, [18] Leacock, Ruth. Requiem for revolution: the United States and Brazil, Kent State University Press, [19] Breneman, Tracy Ann. Brazil s Authoritarian Experience: ; A study of conflict. Conflict Research Consortium. Working paper,