BA-PROJEKT SOMMER 2015

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1 OBLIGATORISK FORSIDE Prescribed front page BA-PROJEKT SOMMER 2015 INSTITUT FOR ERHVERVSKOMMUNIKATION Department of Business Communication STUDIENUMMER NAVN Ida Bruun Davidsen STUDIUM: (Engelsk, Tysk, Fransk, Spansk eller Europæiske studier) Engelsk og Europæiske studier VEJLEDER: Rasmus Brun Pedersen ANTAL TYPEENHEDER I DIN BESVARELSE (ekskl. blanktegn): 54,517

2 The EU's Economic Partnership Agreement with the Caribbean region: the intersection between development and trade Aarhus University, Business and Social Sciences Bachelor thesis Student: Ida Bruun Davidsen Student number: Name of supervisor: Rasmus Brun Pedersen Date of submission: Characters excl. blanks: 54,517

3 Abstract This thesis examines how trade and development objectives are balanced in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and the Caribbean region. More specifically, the purpose is to measure whether development objectives are the primary shaping force behind the agreement. The research questions, thus, is; is the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region primarily shaped by development objectives? This, is answered by applying the Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory. The assumption is that the EU wants to be a normative power and, consequently, wants to incorporate development objectives. The independent variable, development objectives, are, thus, examined through NPE theory. Theoretically, emphasis is on the accounts of Ian Manners, Arne Niemann, and Tessa de Wekker. Manners is used to extract the core arguments of the NPE theory, where especially the EU's norm of social solidarity is described. The social solidarity norm includes aspects as reducing and eradicating poverty and is emphasized as the norm the EU wants to project to the Caribbean region. In addition, Niemann and de Wekker's approach to NPE is described. Here, focus is on their three normative dimensions; normative intent, process, and impact. In this thesis, these dimensions function as framework for the analysis. In extension, the Caribbean region is chosen as case study, instead of one of the other ACP regions, due to the thesis' case design. The case design is most likely, which means that the NPE theory is to be tested under the best possible settings. This, enables a single case study with large abilities to generalize, since if the NPE theory does not hold under the best, or most likely, circumstances the theory is severely weakened. If the Caribbean region and the EU both emphasize the norm of social solidarity, as the most important norm in the EPA, development objectives are the primary shaping force and the NPE theory is successfully applied. To arrive at a conclusion on this, the NPE framework is used in the analysis. Therefore, the dimension normative intent investigates the main NPE features; legitimacy and coherence, normative process investigates the main features; inclusiveness and reflexivity, while normative impact investigates the main features; credibility and local ownership. The analysis shows that in the normative intent dimension the EU's intentions are perceived as legitimate and coherent. However, in the other two dimensions the EU struggles with producing normative results. In normative process, the two main features show that the EU is not perceived as inclusive nor reflexive. In fact, the Caribbean region does not understand the EU's actions, as giving the negotiating mandate to DG trade and, thus, making the EPA a trade agreement. As a result, the Caribbean region ends up feeling bullied by the EU. This normative process, or lack thereof, effects the normative impact where the result is

4 that the EU actually ends up promoting a different norm than the intended social solidarity norm. The EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region, therefore, has the normative intent but lack normative process and impact. Consequently, the EU does not act as a normative power. The implication of the analysis is that the NPE theory is weakened. Adding to that, the analysis shows that normative process is closely linked to the extent which the impact is normative. To enable the NPE theory to be reinforced a modification to the theory is suggested. Here, it is suggested that the EU's normative basis should be extended. The EU uses its normative basis, as the social solidarity norm, as a reason to act the way it does. However, this produces a self-perceived superior EU, which should be removed before the EU can become a normative power, at least within this analyzed area. The final conclusion is that the NPE theory is not applicable and, as a result, the EPA is not primarily shaped by development objectives. Characters excl. blanks: 3,358

5 Table of content Abstract Introduction and research question Theory The EU's norms, principles, and values Normative intent, process, and power Operationalization Dimension 1: Normative intent Dimension 2: Normative process Dimension 3: Normative impact Methods Structure of the paper Case selection and research design Delimitations Analysis Brief historical review of the EPAs Dimension 1: intent Legitimacy Coherence Partial conclusion Dimension 2: process Inclusiveness Reflectivity Partial conclusion Dimension 3: impact Credibility Local ownership Partial conclusion Concluding remarks Reflections... 22

6 6. Conclusion Reference list List of abbreviations... 31

7 1. Introduction and research question In the EU, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are formally considered trade concerns and are handled by Directorate General (DG) Trade (Elgström 2011: 131). Moreover, trade policy is negotiated through the European Commission (EC) who has almost exclusive competences (Hill and Smith 2011: 277). Thus, it can be expected that the EU acts coherently and "speak with a single voice". (Elgström 2011: 131). Yet, EPA negotiations are not normal trade agreements because of the EPA's focus on development objectives such as reducing and eventual eradicating poverty. Therefore, trade and development objectives both exist in the EPA (Elgström 2011: 131). EPA's are, as just mentioned, formally considered a trade concern and the EC has the advantage of being responsible for the negotiations. However, some member states question the EC's view that free trade is the best way to reach the development objectives, and whether development policy objectives should be incorporated (Elgström 2011: 131). Consequently, the EU has to decide whether incorporate development objectives or not. This, leads to the research question: Is the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region primarily shaped by development objectives? To answer the research question, the paper examines how much the independent variable, development objectives, effects the dependent variable, EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region. The paper, consequently, locates a theory which can explain why the EU wants to consider development objectives in its' policy making. For this paper, the reasons for incorporating development objectives are analyzed by applying Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory. Here, a core assumption is that the EU wants be a normative power and, therefore, wants to include development objectives. This, is analyzed by conducting qualitative single case study where the NPE theory works as explanatory tool. Moreover, the case design is most likely, which means that the NPE theory is critically tested under the best possible settings where its explanatory power is expected to be large. The empirical strategy is to use the NPE framework to analyze the content and outcome of the EPA and to which extent development objectives have been included. Therefore, the core arguments in NPE theory are derived. Hence, three normative dimensions, intent, process, and impact, are chosen as determinants of whether development objectives are successfully included. Each of these normative dimensions, derived from NPE theory, are analyzed separately to the case of EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean. NPE, therefore, function as framework for the analysis. The analyzed content and parts of the EPA are chosen due to this framework and the selection Page 1 of 31

8 is, thus, theoretically based. At the end of the paper, the research question is answered and the applicability of the NPE theory is evaluated. 2. Theory This section presents an explanation and description of the NPE theory, which is used to answer the research question. The NPE theory is chosen because it has a high explanatory power for the development area in the EU, and the development area is linked with the norm of social solidarity that the EU wishes to project (Birchfield 2011: 149). The section is based on the accounts of Ian Manners, Arne Niemann, and Tessa de Wekker. It focuses on NPE in relation to the EU and begins with a general explanation of the main features. Originally, the NPE theory is developed by Ian Manners (Whitman 2011: 1). The NPE theory focuses on aspects of the EU that previous international relations theories have not focused on. According to Manners, scholars who try to conceptualize the EU focus too much on military and civilian power and, thus, place too much emphasis on the EU as a state like actor (Manners 2002: 239). Therefore, Manners wants to remove focus from military and civilian power and in order to do so, he introduces the normative power concept (Manners 2002: 238). Here, normative power is understood as the "[...] ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations" (Manners 2002: 239). Therefore, the NPE theory looks at how the EU affects other actors ideas and not whether these actors are affected by military or civilian means. Consequently, the theory examines what the EU is instead of only what it does. Therefore, normative power is a question of how much the EU's norms have spread to others. As a result, the NPE theory focuses on how the EU creates what is normal and, consequently, the perception of what is right. Due to this focus on perception, the NPE theory places norms and values at the center and, therefore, those aspects become point of departure for the NPE theory. Furthermore, norms and values are perceived as the factors which shape the EU and are identified and explained in the following section (Manners 2006: 32) 2.1 The EU's norms, principles, and values. According to Manners, the EU as a normative power has promoted several normative principles, or norms, which are approved by the United Nations (UN) (Manners 2008a: 46). Furthermore, it means the norms are universally applicable (Manners 2008a: 46). Therefore, the EU is a "force for good" (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 4). Manners states that the EU has developed its' normative basis through initiatives such as treaties and policies (Manners 2002: 242). Moreover, he suggests Page 2 of 31

9 that this development has led to the creation of five core norms in the EU; peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights (Manners 2002: 242). These norms are the EU's basic norms and are all stated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) article 6 (European Parliament n.d.). As a result, these are norms that all the EU's member states agree on. In addition, Manners identifies four minor norms. These minor norms are more debatable then the five core norms, but are still viewed as a large part of the EU's normative basis (Manners 2002: 242). These four minor norms are social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance (Manners 2002: 242). This paper mainly focuses on the social solidarity norm. Here, social solidarity is understood as "[...] the promotion of the social economy, the social partnership, and social justice within the EU, and in relations with the developing world." (Manners 2006: 36). This, means that the EU needs to take the different member states and the developing world into account when initiating or implementing new policies or actions. This norm is the main focus in this paper because social solidarity implies more than relations within the EU (Manners 2006: 36). Moreover, the social solidarity norm is stated as an objective in the EU's Constitutional Treaty article I-3 and is, thus, mentioned as something that the EU should strive to achieve (Europa n.d.). Here, the understanding of social solidarity includes aspects such as social solidarity between the different member states and the developing world, and eradication of poverty (Manners 2006: 36). As a result, this norm touches upon several perspectives that this paper examines. Since the NPE theory does not focus on empirical evidence but on normative processes it can be hard to measure normative power, and detect how it is exercised. Therefore, the following contains a way to empirical test and use the NPE theory and is based on the empirical study of EU's relation with Moldova made by Niemann and de Wekker. 2.2 Normative intent, process, and impact. Niemann and de Wekker sets out to operationalize NPE on an empirical basis (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 7). They do so by examining three normative dimensions; normative intent, process, and impact (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 7). Consequently, they analyze if the EU's intentions are normative (intent), if the way the EU acts is normative (process), and if the end result is normative (impact) (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 10). Normative intent is the first dimension. Here, the extent which the EU's engagement is brought on by genuine intentions is analyzed (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 7). If the EU wants to be a normative force for good it should base its' actions on its norms, and not on its' own interests (Niemann Page 3 of 31

10 and de Wekker 2010: 7). According to Niemann and de Wekker, this is analyzed by looking at factors as coherence and legitimacy (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 8). An important element of these factors is if the EU's norm is based on an universal norm, such as an UN approved norm (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 7). The second dimension is normative process. Niemann and de Wekker state that the EU is a force for good and, consequently, needs to take external actors view into account as well as being responsible for the consequences that its' actions might infer on these actors (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 9). This is done by including external actors in the negotiations and change or adjust policies according to their view (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 9). Consequently, this dimension focuses especially on two factors; inclusiveness and reflexivity (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 9). When these two factors are included the EU can more easily promote its norm (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 9). The last dimension is normative impact. In this dimension focus changes from analyzing factors within the EU, to factors outside the EU (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 10). According to Niemann and de Wekker, this dimension is the core of Manners argument where NPE is "[..] 'the ability to define what passes as "normal" in world politics'." (Manners 2002 cited in Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 10). To examine this, the norm the EU has the intention of promoting is analyzed to see if the external actor has taken it in (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 11). Niemann and de Wekker determines this by looking at the external actor and evaluating if it emphasizes the same norm, in the same way, as the EU does (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 11). Furthermore, they suggest to look at whether changes in the external actors legislation has happened and if the external actors follow this legislation (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 11). When the three dimensions are analyzed it is possible to assess whether the EU is a normative power on a specific empirical area Operationalization This section outlines the way NPE's theoretical concepts are measured in the analysis which is necessary due to the intangibility of the concepts. Following Niemann and de Wekker, the analysis is structured around the three normative dimension; normative intent, normative process, and normative impact. Here, a hypothesis is made for each normative dimension. These hypothesis are based on expectations derived from the NPE theory and are the foundation for evaluating the explanatory power of the NPE theory to the case study. Moreover, the analysis builds on the assumption; the normative dimensions are grounded on the norm of social solidarity. Consequently, the analysis Page 4 of 31

11 aims at measuring whether the EU succeeds in projecting this norm and, thus, in including development objectives Dimension 1: intent Concerning the first dimension, normative intent, the EU's intentions are examined. According to Niemann and de Wekker, the EU is a force for good and its actions are based on its norms. In this case, the EU is in a superior position compared to the Caribbean region. In order to protect the vulnerable states in the Caribbean region, development considerations should be included in the EPA, especially if the EU wants to be a force for good. Consequently, the first hypothesis is: H1: It is expected that the EU, as a normative force for good, wants to incorporate development objectives. According to Niemann and de Wekker, two main features are necessary for the EU to be a normative force of good; legitimacy and coherence. Consequently, legitimacy and coherence are the key explanatory factors. However, these two concepts are broad and it is necessary to define the way to empirically measure them. Here, legitimacy is understood as acting in accordance with established rules and objectives. Moreover, focus is on international legitimacy, which is the EU's legitimacy in relation to its international policies and, as a result, it is focused on the external actor, the Caribbean regions, perception of the EU (Hill and Smith 2011: 132). To test for legitimacy two indicators are used; the norm is based on international norms and the intended norm(s) is visible. For the EU's negotiations in the EPA to seem legitimate it, according to the NPE theory, need to be based on guidelines and norms made by other international actors, as for example the UN. Likewise, the EU has to make the norm visible to be viewed as legitimate by the external actor. Otherwise, projecting this norm is impossible. Therefore, the second indicator, the intended norm is visible, is used by looking at the EU's official statements. Furthermore, coherence is made testable. The EU member states have to agree on incorporating the norm if it is to be effectively promoted. In this paper, vertical coherence is examined, which refers to coherence between member states in regards to consensus on EU level (Hill and Smith 2011: 107). To enable the EU member states to agree, their decisions need to be based on reaching the common good. Therefore, the last indicator, not merely serving self-interest, is tested for Dimension 2: process. The second dimension is normative process. According to NPE the EU's position, as a force for good, means that it has to take responsibility of the consequences it infers on external actors. As a Page 5 of 31

12 result, the EU has to include these actors in the policy making process. It is, thus, hypothesized that the EU does this in the negotiations with the Caribbean region: H2: in the EU's pursuit of reaching a signed agreement, the Caribbean region feels included and heard. In order to examine normative process, Niemann and de Wekker state that the main features are inclusiveness and reflexivity. To test these explanatory factors, measurable indicators are necessary. Firstly, inclusiveness is made measurable. According to NPE theory, a normative framework exists if the EU projected norm is internationally institutionalized (Tocci 2008: 8). For a normative framework to be effective it needs to include both actors. The EU's institutional setting within the EC has to enable this. Therefore, the indicator for inclusiveness is that the EPA binds all actors. Secondly, reflexivity is made measurable. Niemann and de Wekker say that the concept refers to adjusting policies and actions relative to the external part, the Caribbean region. To measure this, there is a need to examine whether the EU uses positive sanctions or engagement and non-coercive means. These two factors are, thus, the indicators for reflexivity which is analyzed by looking at the EPA and how it is made. Yet, due to the scope of this paper the entire EPA cannot be examined and focus is on a specific part of the agreement, trade of services, where the Caribbean region has a comparative advantage. In addition, it is important to note that economic sanctions can seem as coercive as military ones, especially for developing countries (Tocci 2008: 9). Here, means based on engagement are most normative (Tocci 2008: 10) Dimension 3: impact. The last dimension is normative impact. Focus is on the impact that the EU's norm has on the Caribbean region. In line with Niemann and de Wekker's argumentation, the aim is to examine if the Caribbean region has taken the EU projected norm in, and if this has created any change in the Caribbean region. This leads to the last hypothesis: H3: Improvements on development objectives, and consequently normative power, are identified. According to hypothesis 1, it is expected that the EU emphasizes development objectives, and acts as a normative power. Therefore, the last two key explanatory factors are analyzed which can identify if improvements have happened and if normative power is identified. Niemann and de Wekker suggest to look at the external actor and examine how, or if, the action is implemented. One key explanatory factor is credibility. Credibility is made measurable by looking at the expectations that Page 6 of 31

13 the Caribbean region has to the EPA and, consequently, the EU. Furthermore, these expectations are affected by the political dialogue between the Caribbean trade officials and the region. The indicators are; enhances stable political dialogue and whether expectations correspond to outcome. If the EU is not perceived as credible the Caribbean region is not likely to implement the agreement. Furthermore, the analysis looks at whether the EU and the Caribbean region promote and emphasize the same norm. In this paper, it is termed local ownership and is the second explanatory factor. Local ownership is measured by seeing if the norm is embedded in both actors. It is necessary to see if the norm the EU projects corresponds to the Caribbean region's norm. Correspondence means that the EU has acted as a normative power. The above operationalization is graphically shown in figure 1 below. The hypothesis' are not included in the figure to make it easier to comprehend. Normative intent Normative process Normative impact Main features Legitimacy Inclusiveness Credibility Coherence Reflexivity Local ownership Indicators The norm is based on international norms Positive sanctions or engagement The norm is embedded in both actors Not merely serving selfinterest Non-coercive means Expectations correspond to outcome The intended norm(s) is visible Bind all actors Enhances stable political alliances Empirical testing The EU's official discourse The EU's institutional setting regarding the EPA The Caribbean regions expectations to the agreement Documentation from other actors (UN, WTO and member states) Analyzing a part of the EPA (Trade in services) Evaluating if trade in services has affected the Caribbean region as expected Figure 1. Operationalization of the NPE theory (self-generated) Page 7 of 31

14 3. Methods The following section, firstly, states the structure of the paper and afterwards explains why and how the case and research design are chosen. Secondly, it accounts for the delimitations. 3.1 Structure of the paper The previous chapter 1 gives an introduction to the paper and states the research question. Chapter 2 follows with the theory and operationalization while this chapter 3 outlines the methodological considerations. Afterwards, chapter 4 contains the analysis of the EUs policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region based on a NPE framework. Chapter 5 reflects on the findings in the analysis and chapter 6 contains the conclusion. 3.2 Case selection and research design The research design and case selection are based on the research question; is the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region primarily shaped by development objectives? They are, thus, chosen on the basis of how advantageous they are towards answering the research question. In this paper, the case is a single case qualitative study since the paper examines an unit on a certain time, and that one case only (Andersen et al. 2012: 86). A single case is chosen in order to gain in depth knowledge about underlying motives and structures. In this paper, the case is the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region. Furthermore, the aim is to determine the applicability of the NPE theory to this case. Therefore, it is a theory testing single case study (Beach 2012: 220). This means, that the paper focuses on the causal relationship between the dependent variable, the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean (y) and independent variable, development objectives (x). Here, the NPE theory works as an explanatory tool, which means that the theory is used to explain the relationship between x and y (Beach 2012: 220). However, the case is also chosen as a most likely case, which means that the theory is tested under the best possible settings (Andersen et al. 2012: 90). Therefore, the NPE theory is chosen due to its' large explanatory power for the development area in the EU where Manners suggests that the EU's Consensus on Development, which commits the EU to eradicate poverty, shows that the EU is a normative power (Manners 2008b: 23). Moreover, the Caribbean region is chosen, within the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) group, because it is the only group to have completed the negotiations of the EPA. As a result, it is the region which is most likely to have adopted the EU's projected norm, social solidarity, Page 8 of 31

15 in this area. The NPE theory is, thus, set up to be examined under the most likely settings. Here, the NPE theory is studied critically and the aim is to show that the NPE theory is not as applicable as previously assumed. Therefore, if the theory does no work in this case it will most likely not work in similar cases either (Andersen et. al. 2012: 90). Consequently, if the analysis shows that the EPA negotiations are not shaped by development objectives, it is likely that the study can say something general about the applicability of NPE theory (Andersen et al. 93). 3.3 Delimitations Due to the scope of the paper, there are some delimitations. Firstly, only some parts of the NPE theory are derived and focused on in this paper, mostly the social solidarity norm and normative intent, process, and impact. Besides, some of the sources in the thesis are material from the Caribbean region and the EU's institutions. Therefore, the applied material is credible but possible biased towards either the Caribbean region or the EU. Secondly, it is necessary to look at how much the single case study can generalize. Since the NPE theory is used as analytical tool, the case study can assess whether there are large factors in the case that the NPE theory can account for or not. However, it should be noted that a qualitative single case study cannot claim too much. It can generalize to a certain extent, but several factors will vary from case to case. Yet, the case is chosen as a most likely case and if the NPE theory does not work under these most advantageous circumstances it will struggle under other similar circumstances (Levy 2008: 12). The paper thus has potential in regards to saying something about the applicability of the NPE theory. 4. Analysis This chapter contains the analysis of the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region where the NPE theory functions as explanatory tool. Here, the case design is most likely and the aim is to critically evaluate the NPE theory's applicability to the case study. The chapter starts with a brief history of the creation of the EPAs. Then the analysis of the agreement follows which is structured around the three normative dimensions; intent, process, and power. The analysis will take its stance in the three hypothesis, which are stated under operationalization, and use the main features and indicators that the theory section described as point of departure. The structure of this empirical case study is, thus, made on the basis of a self generated theoretical framework. Page 9 of 31

16 4.1 Brief historical review of the EPAs The analysis starts with a brief explanation of why the Cotonou agreement and the EPAs were made with the ACP countries. This is necessary in order to understand the EPA negotiations. The EU and the ACP countries have had a special connection since the European Economic Community's (EEC) Treaty of Rome (Barbarinde and Faber 2005: 3). An ex-colonial tie exists between the ACP countries and some European countries and a preferential treatment was established, through a trade agreement, to ensure that the special connection continued to exist (Barbarinde and Faber 2005: 3). These preferential trade agreements eventually led to the Lomé Convention in 1975 where the preferential treatment was institutionalized (Barbarinde and Faber 2005: 4). The Lomé Convention should ensure economic and social development of the ACP countries and, thus, introduces non-reciprocal trade preferences which allows the ACP countries to export most of their products duty free to the EU (Baribarinde and Faber 2005: 4). This agreement is the most preferential trade agreement with the EU which exists (Barbarinde and Faber 2005: 8). Yet, this nonreciprocal nature is not in accordance with the World Trade Organizations (WTOs) rules since it is discriminating towards other poor countries (Hill and Smith 2011: 329). Therefore, the Cotonou agreement and the EPAs are introduced and replace the Lomé Convention. Furthermore, the Cotonou Agreements most important objective is "[...] reduction and eventual eradication of poverty" (Barbarinde and Faber 2005: 7). Today, the ACP countries comprises of 79 countries and is the largest trade partnership between the EU and developing countries (European Commission 2013a: 1). Consequently, the ACP countries are divided into seven regional negotiating groupings; Caribbean region (CARIFORUM), West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community EPA group, and the Pacific region. 4.2 Dimension 1: intent The first dimension is normative intent where the hypothesis is: it is expected that the EU, as a normative force for good, wants to incorporate development objectives. This, is examined through the main features legitimacy and coherence. Page 10 of 31

17 Legitimacy Firstly, it is analyzed whether the EU has legitimacy when negotiating the EPA with the Caribbean region. For the EU's EPA negotiations to seem legitimate, the NPE theory states that the EU needs to be in line with the guidelines, and norms, made by other universally recognized actors. By comparing the EU's objectives with universally recognized norms and objectives, this section can examine for the indicators; based on international norms and intended norm is visible. Firstly, the UN's guidelines are defined and afterwards it is examined if the EU follows these guidelines. Today, development objectives are an important component of the EU's foreign policies (Hill and Smith 2011: 325). A large contributor to this, was the UN's Millennium Declaration which was signed in 2000 (Hill and Smith 2011: 331). This Millennium Declaration, consist of eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and bind the UN member states to development objectives (Holland 2008: 344). These MDGs have a large complementarity to the EU's development objectives and specially its' policy coherence for development (PCD). Moreover, this PCD is based on the Lisbon Treaty's article 208 "The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries" (Lisbon Treaty n.d.). This, means that the PCD is made to take the negative spillover effects that the EU's policies have on other areas and actors into account, especially in regards to the effect the policies have on developing countries. In relation to the EU's policy making in the EPA with the Caribbean region the aim is for the EU to incorporate this PCD and, thus, link trade policy to development objectives. As a result, this paper examines what the EU itself suggests as the primary reason behind the EPA and if development objectives are sought. If the EU has development objectives as basis for the agreement, the agreement is based on internationally recognized norms due to the UN's MDGs, which emphasizes the importance of development considerations. The norm, which is present, is the social solidarity norm. Here, social solidarity is understood as explained in the theory section of this paper. To analyze whether the EU follows the UN's MDGs, statements from the EC and afterwards the actual EPA document are analyzed. Firstly, The EC states that the EPAs with the ACP countries are made to promote trade and free access between the Caribbean markets and the European markets, and to ensure sustainable development. The EPAs are, thus, referred to as trade and development agreements (European Commission 2013b: 3). Besides, when assessing the EC's webpage regarding the EPAs specially the development aspect is emphasized (European Commission 2013c). Moreover, statements from Peter Mandelson, the external trade Commissioner when the agreement was Page 11 of 31

18 drafted in 2007, show that the EU sees the agreement as an exceptional opportunity for the ACP countries (Kirby 2007). Secondly, in the actual EPA with the Caribbean region it is stated in article 3 that the objective of sustainable development is to be implemented at every level of the agreement, especially in relation to the objective of reducing poverty (European Community and Council 2008/805). The EPA is, thus, presented by the EU as a way to liberalise trade but mostly as an agreement that includes development objectives. According to the EU, the way to reach development objectives are, consequently, to promote the social solidarity norm of reducing poverty. Therefore, the norm is present in the negotiations and is based on an internationally recognized norm, the UN's MDGs. Consequently, the EU has international legitimacy since its' actions are based on established rules and objectives. Moreover, because the norm is clearly emphasized by the EU, as the main driver of the EPA negotiations, the norm is visible which is the second indicator for normative intent. However, for the norm to be based on development objectives, and an international norm, not only the EU has to have the intentions of incorporating these objectives in the EPA. The EU member states have to agree on this too. The following section, examines this by looking at coherence between the EU's member states' view on the EPA with the Caribbean region Coherence Coherence enables the EU to speak with one voice and to achieve it the EU cannot merely follow self interests. In the EU, competences on trade and development policies are shared between the EC and the EU's member states (Makhan 2009: 110). Regarding trade negotiations, which the EPA is characterized as, the EC has most competences. Yet, development objectives are sought in the EPA and in development policies member states still share competences with the EC. Consequently, a coherent EU requires member states to agree on the development objectives. The EPA negotiations were initiated as a consequence of primarily external factors. Externally, the WTO pressures the EU to change its' trade agreements with the ACP countries (Makhan 2009: 49). Therefore, the WTO's rules mean that the EU is, legally, forced to make new trade arrangements with the ACP countries. Moreover, it is often claimed that the preferential treatment exists because some EU member states have colonial ties with the ACP countries. Adding to this, the EU has changed in scope and size. The enlargement rounds have resulted in a more diverse EU where not all member states share the colonial past and, as a result, are less concerned with preferential treatment of the ACP countries (Arts 2004: 103). This, creates a division between the old member states, who share colonial ties with the ACP countries, and the newer member states. The old member states, especially France Page 12 of 31

19 and Britain, have defended the preferential treatment of the ACP (Dickson 2004: 51). Oppositely, the newer member states would rather have preferential treatment of the eastern European countries, who due to this enlargement of the EU, are the EU's neighbor countries (Hewitt and Whiteman 2004: 145). However, in the Maastricht treaty the obligation for member states to coordinate their development policies and positions is stated (Holland 2002: 171). Therefore, the EU increasingly needs to explain its' preferential treatment of the ACP countries to the new member states (Holland 2002: 170). Moreover, Holland (2002: 171) suggests that this treaty obligation only can modify differing opinions on development issues and not completely change them. Yet, following the WTO's demand for a new agreement, which is less preferential for the ACP countries, the preferential treatment is already modified. In addition, due to the WTO's demands, the countries who support preferential treatment would rather defend domestic interests than keep these preferences (Dickson 2004: 52). This implies, that the EPA, as a trade agreement which seeks to reach development objectives, is a way to keep preferential treatment for the ACP countries while making the agreement less preferential than before. Therefore, it satisfies the interest of both the old and new member states. The EPA, consequently, does not merely serve self interest since a compromise is made Partial conclusion Normative intent tests the first hypothesis: it is expected that the EU, as a normative force for good, wants to incorporate development objectives. The main features are legitimacy and coherence where the analysis shows that in the EPA the EU is balancing between following the international applicable norm of social solidarity and the EU member states differing interests towards the ACP countries. When balancing, legitimacy is obtained by the EU through official statements from EU officials and incorporating the development objectives in the concrete EPA document. Moreover, the intentions behind the EPA are in line with the UN's MDGs. Therefore, the EU projected norm is both based on an international norm and clearly visible. Moreover, coherence between the different member states is obtained. Here, the EPA, as a trade and development agreement, accommodates both the new member states interest, less preferential treatment, and the old ones, preferential treatment. Since the EPA is not reflecting the wishes of specific member states the EPA is not merely reflecting self interests. It can, therefore, be concluded that the EUs intentions towards incorporating development objectives are genuine and the hypothesis is affirmed. Normative intent is, thus. identified. Page 13 of 31

20 4.3 Dimension 2: process The second dimension is normative process where the main features are inclusiveness and reflexivity. The main features examine the hypothesis: in the EU's pursuit of reaching a signed agreement, the Caribbean region feels included and heard Inclusiveness An indicator for inclusiveness is that it binds all actors. For the EPA to bind both the EU and the Caribbean it has to be perceived as inclusive. Otherwise, neither the EU nor the Caribbean region will adhere to it. There are two dimensions, an internal and an external. Internally, to enable inclusiveness the EU's institutional design has to be established accordingly. To arrive at a conclusion on EU's inclusiveness, the EU's institutional design are taken into account. Here, the internal division of competences between the EC's DGs is an important factor. As previously mentioned, the EC has almost exclusive competences when negotiating trade agreements. The EC is organized into DGs according to area of expertise (Wallace et al. 2010: 71). These DGs are headed by a Commissioner. Generally, each member state nominates a candidate for Commissioner while consulting the Commission President, who then appoints the Commissioner a DG (Nugent 2010: 112). Once elected, the Commissioner is suppose to represent the European interest. The relevant DGs for the EPA negotiation with the Caribbean is DG trade and DG development and Cooperation (DEVOC). The EPA is termed a trade for aid partnership where a trade agreement is made to promote development objectives (Mohammed 2013: 160). The terminology gives the EC the ability to place the EPA as a DG trade or DG DEVOC responsibility. The responsibility is given to DG trade instead of DG DEVOC, who had conducted the previous ACP negotiations. This means that the negotiations of EPA are considered trade negotiations, which means it has a high level of coherence (Elgström 2011: 138). This, coherence exists because the EC has almost exclusive competences on trade which the member states widely agree with. However, it can infer consequences for the inclusiveness. As previously mentioned, Britain and France have supported preferential treatment of the ACP countries. This is interesting due to DG trade being almost exclusively led French and British Commissioners from when the EPA negotiations began (European Commission n.d., 2010). In several studies, it is claimed that the Commissioners preferences are influenced by their nationalities and that Commissioners, thus, function as national agents (Hartlapp et al. 2014: 46). Following these studies, having almost exclusively French or British commissioners are affecting the negotiation of trade policies. Another study says that convergences between French and Eu- Page 14 of 31

21 ropean policies and their view on development have been documented (Hewitt and Whiteman 2004: 128), which makes a French Commissioner handling the negotiation of EPA desirable for the EU. Thereby, development objectives are more easily incorporated in the EPA. Consequently, giving DG trade the responsibility for the EPA while having French or British commissioners at the lead should make it easier to agree on including the development considerations. However, this institutional arrangement does not function as expected, mostly because it sidelines the DG DEVOC. Had the EPA instead been under DG DEVOC the agreement would most likely differ. As a result, the agreement being placed under DG trade and not DG DEVOC affects the Caribbean region and their perception of the agreement. Therefore, the external dimension of inclusiveness is affected. Previously, the Caribbean region collaborated with DG DEVOC and not DG trade (Makhan 2009: 125). Therefore, some ACP officials fail to understand the way the EC is handling the negotiations (Makhan 2009: 125). According to their view, the trade officials deploy "[...] a narrower definition of development, based mainly on trade-related gains." (Bilal 2005 cited in Makhan 2009: 125). This view shows that the intentions the British and French trade Commissioners have, who are concerned with incorporating development objectives, are often not materialized at the technical level (Alavi et al. 2007: 79). Moreover, for the DG trade officials the agreement is viewed as an usual trade agreement (Elgström 2011: 140). Therefore, DG trade is perceived by the ACP as a tough negotiator who does not care about development objectives and only focuses on liberalizing trade (Elgström 2011: 140). The ACP states thus feel pressured and less included than expected if the EU is a normative actor and cannot be expected to feel bounded by the agreement. The strategic choice of placing the responsibility with DG trade gives the EU more coherence, since trade is an area where the EC has almost exclusive competences and the trade Commissioners widely agree on including development objectives. However, the Caribbean region views this institutional arrangement as a way to put trade considerations over development objectives. Moreover, development objectives are not materialized at the technical level, due to the trade officials handling the EPA. The agreement which seems coherent from a trade perspective is not including when deploying a development perspective Reflexivity The reflexivity dimension, analyzes how much the EU consciously examines the expected consequences that the EPA will have on the Caribbean region. The indicators are that there are positive sanctions or engagement and the means are non-coercive. To start with, it should be noted that the Page 15 of 31

22 division of the ACP into six trade blocs enables differentiation and that the EU allows for variations in the agreements with these blocs. Oppositely, the division in trade blocs can be viewed as a way to weaken the Caribbean's negotiating power (Mohammed 2013: 160). When dividing the ACP countries in six blocs it is clear that an asymmetrical relationship between the EU and the Caribbean region exists. The ACP primarily comprises of poor countries while the EU of much richer countries, which makes it clear that the EU has more power in the negotiation than the six ACP groupings (Oxfam 2006: 2). Due to this imbalance, the EU has to be careful with the strategies it uses when negotiating the EPA with the Caribbean. Whether the EUs strategies comprise of positive sanctions or engagement and non-coercive means are analyzed by looking at a specific part of the agreement and the consequences it has for the Caribbean region. The EPA is a different way of reaching development objectives than the previous agreement with the ACP countries (Makhan 2009: 38). The EPA consists of a liberalization of goods, services and investment. This paper focuses on title two in part two of the EPA; Investment, Services, and E- commerce (Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 2009: 6). In this regard, trade in services is the main focus. This focus is chosen since the Caribbean region is the only ACP region which is a net supplier on services and thus has a comparative advantage on a number of areas covered by the EPA (Cambell et al. 2010: 6). Moreover, export of services is the fastest growing kind of trade and an area where the EU is trying to establish its leadership (Mohammed 2013: 166). It is therefore advantageous for both the EU and the Caribbean region to facilitate successful trade of services. The EU has under the EPA committed itself to opening approximately 90 per cent of its service sector and the more developed countries in the Caribbean to 75 per cent while the lesser developed countries to 65 per cent (Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 2009: 6; Nurse et al. 2008: 65). The definition of service trade that the EPA deploys is based on the WTO. Here, what the WTO refers to as mode 4, presence of natural persons, is especially important to the Caribbean region since it is the area with greatest potential for the Caribbean region (Nurse et al. 2008: 68). Mode 4, according to the World Trade Organization (2015) "[...] covers services supplied [...] by a service supplier of one Member, through the presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member.". The mode, therefore, covers for example business people who are temporarily in another country to supply a service. It is advantageous for the Caribbean due to its available human resources (Nurse et al ). Its' advantage lies especially in giving cultural service providers, such as artists, a chance for market access in the EU and, thus, a chance to export expertise to the EU, which is a new form of trade for the Caribbean region (Nurse et al. 2008: 67). How- Page 16 of 31

23 ever, the EU chooses to liberalize mainly under Mode 1, cross border trade, which is a mode that the Caribbean cannot benefit from to the same extent (Mohammed 2013: 169). Cross border trade refers to selling or buying services where the seller is in one country and the buyer in another, as an EU member state selling to a Caribbean country. Furthermore, this mode provides opportunity for the EU to expand its E-commerce services, such as internet services firms (Mohammed 2013: 169). Therefore, the Caribbean region experiences supply side constrains since it cannot exploit its comparative advantage due to e.g. lack of information on the E-commerce area. Trade in services, therefore, shows that the EU is not using positive engagement. Had the EU increasingly incorporated trade under mode 4, thereby including the wishes of the Caribbean region, the Caribbean region would have been positively engaged because they were being heard. Instead the EU chooses to incorporate trade under mode 1 and, thus, impedes the Caribbean market. Therefore, the agreement is not adjusted to the Caribbean region's situation nor is it reflexive enough regarding the consequences that it infers on the Caribbean region. Moreover, the use of primarily mode 1 in trade of services without properly accommodating the Caribbean region's wishes supports the claim that the EU is using bullying tactics in the EPA to some extent (Hill and Smith 2011: 341). When using tactics to obtain signature the EU uses its superior position and the EPA is not merely reached by noncoercive means Partial conclusion Normative process examines the hypothesis; in the EU's pursuit of reaching a signed agreement, the Caribbean region feels included and heard. This is measured by the features inclusiveness and reflexivity. The section concludes that the EU's negotiations in the EPA with Caribbean region are characterized by a lack of both inclusiveness and reflexivity. Inclusiveness shows that in an attempt to incorporate the intended development objectives the responsibility for the negotiation is placed with DG trade. The EC enjoys the benefits of having most competences while the trade Commissioners have been in favor of preferential treatment. Yet, DG trade is managed by trade officials who do not materialize the development objectives in the EPA. As a result, the strategic considerations made by the EC result in unexpected troubles with projecting the social solidarity norm. The indicator that the norm is embedded in both actors is, consequently, not fulfilled. Moreover, due to the institutional setting reflexivity is likewise compromised. Consequently, when analyzing a part of the EPA, where the Caribbean region has comparative advantage, it is shown that the Caribbean region experiences supply side constraints. These constraints are caused by the mode which the Page 17 of 31