GLOBALIZATION AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN ASIAN COUNTRIES

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1 Abstract The globalization of corruption has given rise to the concern in many coun - tries on how to combat corruption and many international conferences on this topic. However, in spite of the sharing of best practices in fighting corruption at these conferences, there is still a great deal of divergence in combating corrup - tion in Asian countries because of the different contextual constraints and the effectiveness of their governments anti-corruption strategies. This article describes and evaluates the three pat - terns of corruption control in six Asian countries and concludes that the third pattern of anti-corruption laws with an independent anti-corruption agency adopted by Singapo re and Hong Kong is the most effective. GLOBALIZATION AND CORRUPTION CONTROL IN ASIAN COUNTRIES The case for divergence Jon S. T. Quah Key words Corruption, anti-corruption measures, Mongolia, India, Philippines, China, Singapo re, Hong Kong Jon S. T. Quah Professor of Political Science National University of Singapore AS1, 4th Level, 11 Arts Link Singapore, polqst@nus.edu.sg Vol. 4 Issue Public Management Review ISSN print/issn online 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: /

2 454 Public Management Review INTRODUCTION In 1968, Gunnar Myrdal (1968: 938 9) referred to the taboo on research on corruption in South Asia as a major factor inhibiting such research. However, this taboo no longer exists as a great deal of research has been done on corruption in Asian countries in recent years. Indeed, in contrast to the dearth of such research in the 1970s, research on Asian corruption has mushroomed into a growth industry in the 1990s. 1 With the end of the Cold War, the number of news stories on corruption in the Economist, the Financial Times and the New York Times quadrupled between 1984 and 1995 (Leiken : 58). This global corruption epidemic or corruption eruption can be attributed to the emergence of civil societies and the disclosure of corruption in many countries, and the trend towards democracy and markets, which has paradoxically increased both the opportunities for graft and the likelihood of exposure (Leiken : 58). Corruption is not an easy concept to de ne as there are many alternative de nitions, depending on the emphasis. Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1989: 8 11) has identi ed three types of de nition of corruption namely, public of ce-centred de nitions, market-centred de nitions and public interest-centred de nitions. For this article, the United Nations Development Programme s (UNDP) public of cecentred de nition of corruption will be used. Thus, corruption refers to the misuse of public power, of ce or authority for private bene t through bribery, extortion, in uence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement (UNDP 1999: 7). It is a serious problem in many Asian countries according to the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) conducted by the Berlin-based Transparency International (TI) in recent years. Table 1 shows the ranking of twelve Asian countries on the 2000 CPI. From Table 1, Singapore is perceived to be the least corrupt Asian country, while Indonesia is considered to be the most corrupt country in Asia. This article contends that the globalization of corruption has given rise to an overriding concern with how to combat corruption in many countries. Many international conferences and workshops have been held in recent years on the causes, consequences and control of corruption in various countries. At such meetings, there is a conscious attempt to identify and share the best practices in combating corruption among the participants. However, in spite of such sharing of best practices in ghting corruption, there is still a great deal of divergence in combating corruption in Asian countries because of the different contextual constraints and the effectiveness of their governments anti-corruption strategies. This article describes and evaluates the three patterns of corruption control in six Asian countries: Pattern 1 (Mongolia); Pattern 2 (India, the Philippines, China); and Pattern 3 (Singapore and Hong Kong). It concludes that Pattern 3 is the most effective in ghting corruption, followed by Pattern 2 and Pattern 1.

3 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 455 Table 1: Ranking of twelve Asian countries on Transpa rency International s 2000 Corruption Perception Index Country Ranking (from least to most corrupt) Singapore 6 Hong Kong 15 Japan 23 Taiwan 28 Malaysia 36 South Korea 48 Thailand 60 China 63 India 69 The Philippines 69 Vietnam 76 Indonesia 85 Source: THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORRUPTION Globalization is the buzzword of the moment.... Corruption is the specter at this feast; it is the by-product of Globalization, and perhaps its ful llment too. (Pryce-Jones 1997: 22) In his analysis of the implications of globalization for public administration, Ali Farazmand concludes that globalization pushes for increased privatization, which promotes greater opportunities for corruption. Corruption has turned societal resources into illegal, immoral, and unproductive activities. It also challenges the very foundations of societal health and destroys citizens trust in leadership and system legitimacy (1999: 518). Accordingly, he has urged public administrators in all countries to act ethically and morally and they must expose and ght corruption at any level and at any time (1999: 519). During , corruption was transformed from a predominantly national or regional preoccupation to an issue of global revolutionary force. Indeed, corruption has emerged in the 1990s as a truly global political issue eliciting a global political response (Glynn et al. 1997: 7). Consequently, many international organizations like the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, the World Economic Forum, Interpol, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, the International Institute for Administrative Sciences and the Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management have organized conferences, symposia and workshops on various aspects of corruption.

4 456 Public Management Review The globalization of electronic communications increases the opportunities for corruption as it makes it easier to transfer money across borders and to launder funds of dubious origin. On the other hand, it has also resulted in enhancing the opportunities for exposing and controlling corruption through unrestrained media as the risks for government of cials... of seeing their names blackened by corruption charges on a global scale are higher than ever (Glynn et al. 1997: 14 15). The global anti-corruption agenda accelerated in the 1990s with the advent of the corruption eruption. In 1993, a group of former World Bank executives formed a non-governmental organization known as Transparency International (TI) to curb corruption by mobilising a global coalition to promote and strengthen international and national integrity systems (Transparency International 1997: 7). By the end of 1998, TI had forty-three national chapters (Transparency International 1999b: 16 19). The November 1994 United Nations Conference on cross-border and organized crime resulted in 138 countries signing the Naples Declaration to promote domestic action and international co-operation to ght organized crime. In March 1995, the World Economic Forum urged governments and business executives to co-operate to combat corruption (Glynn et al. 1997: 16 17). In 1998, the OECD Convention against the Bribery of Foreign Public Of cials came into force and made the bribing of foreign public of cials to win or retain business a criminal offence. Two programmes organized by the UNDP that focus on ghting corruption in Asian countries deserve mention here. First, the Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT) aims to build and strengthen capacities to improve accountability and transparency in the nancial, political and administrative spheres, thereby creating an enabling environment for good governance. For example, PACT organized a workshop on Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Economies in Paris in October In September 1998, PACT provided technical assistance to prevent and control corruption in Mongolia through the drafting of a national anti-corruption plan. Second, the UNDP Regional Of ce in Islamabad, Pakistan, produced a learning module on corruption issues for UNDP staff and its national counterparts in Asian countries. This module has two aims: to promote good governance by including anticorruption strategies in UNDP supported programmes; and train staff to prepare and monitor culturally appropriate projects that help prevent corruption. Apart from making the users aware of corruption and its adverse effects on governance, the module is also designed to make them familiar with examples of best practices and successful lessons learned elsewhere (UNDP 1999: 30 5). In this connection, Denis Osborne has argued that seminars on preventing fraud and corruption are arranged and funded as part of the increasing and diverse world-wide efforts to ght corruption (1998: 163). Finally, the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank has organized National Integrity Workshops (NIWs) in fteen countries. The purpose of a NIW is to enable the major stakeholders in a country to discuss the causes of inef ciency and

5 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 457 corruption and to formulate alternative solutions. Petter Langseth describes the activities involved in a NIW: Opening with presentations of survey data, as well as, diagnostic papers written by representatives of various stakeholder groups, the workshop then addresses international experiences and best practices in controlling corruption. Breaking-out into small discussion groups by sector or pillar, the participants then devise action plans. These plans for the various stakeholder groups judiciary, media, legislature, etc. are then integrated into a uni ed National Action Plan. (Langseth 1998: 8 9) In short, the globalization of corruption has given rise to the emergence of many international organizations concerned with curbing corruption. The UNDP, OECD, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and others have organized international and regional conferences to enable the participants from various countries to share and learn the best practices in ghting corruption round the world. For example, the ADB and OECD organized an international conference on Combating Corruption in Asian and Paci c Economies in Manila, the Philippines, from 29 September to 1 October PATTERNS OF CORRUPTION CONTROL IN ASIAN COUNTRIES What are the reasons for the different levels of corruption in Asian countries? To answer this question, we must critically evaluate the three patterns of corruption control in Asian countries to assess their effectiveness. Pattern 1: Anti-corruption laws with no independent agency (Mongolia) The rst pattern of corruption control is adopted in Mongolia, which has the Law on Anti-Corruption (LAC), which was enacted in April 1946, and three provisions restricting bribery in the Criminal Code. However, there is no independent anticorruption agency (ACA) as the task of controlling corruption in Mongolia is shared between the police, the General Prosecutor s Of ce and the courts. 2 The LAC requires all Mongolian public of cials to declare their incomes and assets and those of their families within a month of assuming their positions, and thereafter to submit their annual declarations during the rst two weeks of February of each year. Failure to submit such declarations will result in nes of between 5,000 and 25,000 togrogs (US$5.90 to US$29.40) for the errant of cials. The penalty for of cials who do not monitor the declarations is a ne of between 20,000 to 30,000 togrogs (US$23.50 to US$35.30). Those of cials who do not declare gifts or foreign bank accounts are required to pay higher nes of between 30,000 to 40,000 togrogs (US$35.30 to US$47.05). Finally, corrupt of cials will be discharged or displaced according to the procedure provided in the law.

6 458 Public Management Review The Criminal Code of Mongolia has three articles dealing with bribery. Article 195 states that of cials found guilty of receiving bribes can be suspended from their positions or imprisoned for six years. Article 196 punishes bribe-givers with imprisonment of up to four years or performing public works for 18 months. The penalty for recalcitrant bribe-givers is a jail sentence of between three to ten years. Similarly, Article 197 imposes the same penalty of imprisonment of up to four years or performing 18 months of public works for those found guilty of mediating in bribetaking and giving. The LAC is ineffective as no public of cial in Mongolia has been convicted of corruption even though it is four years old. It has two weaknesses. First, the responsibility for implementing the LAC has not been assigned to a speci c agency as Article 5 has indicated that all state organizations are required to perform four common duties to prevent corruption. The experiences of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong con rm the effectiveness of employing an independent agency in implementing respectively the anti-corruption legislation in both city-states (Quah 1995). The second weakness of the LAC is that the penalties imposed on of cials for failure to submit or monitor their annual income and assets declarations are ineffective deterrents as the nes range between 5,000 togrogs (US$5.90) to 40,000 togrogs (US$47.05) and there is no imprisonment. As there is no ACA in Mongolia, corruption offences are handled by the Criminal Police Department (CPD), which investigates these cases and refers them to the Investigation Department (ID). The CPD and ID investigate complaints of corruption against public of cials and if there is evidence to substantiate these complaints, the cases will be handed over to the General Prosecutor s Of ce (GPO). From the GPO, the cases are processed by the aimag courts, the Capital City Court and the Supreme Court. This procedure for dealing with corruption offences is ineffective as it provides opportunities for corruption among the of cials involved as they can interpret the law differently. For example, a bribery case by the police can be viewed as a smuggling offence by the GPO, and as illegal crossing of borders by the courts. As judicial salaries are low and one out of three judges does not have an apartment (McPhail 1995: 45), the courts are perceived by the public to be corrupt as individuals can pay the poorly paid judges to make decisions in their favour. Pattern 2: Anti-corruption laws with many agencies (India, the Philippines, China) India In India, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the state anticorruption bureaux and the state vigilance commissions. The CBI was created in April

7 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries to investigate cases of bribery and corruption but it could only do so in a state with the consent of the Government. This became a problem after the decline of the Congress Party as some state governments withdrew the consent given by their predecessors whenever they felt that an investigation taken up by the CBI was politically embarrassing or uncomfortable for them (Narasimhan 1997: 255 6). The CVC was established in February 1964 to perform four functions. First, the CVC investigates any transaction in which a civil servant is alleged to act for an improper purpose. Second, the CVC examines complaints against civil servants for using their powers for improper or corrupt purposes. Third, the CVC requests reports from ministries, departments and public enterprises to enable it to check and supervise their vigilance and anti-corruption work. Fourth, the CVC requests the CBI to investigate a case, or to entrust the complaint, information or case for inquiry to the CBI or the ministry, department or public enterprise concerned (Narasimhan 1997: 264 5). In his book, The Pathology of Corruption, S. S. Gill (1998: 237) wrote: Looking to the number of agencies created to tackle corruption, it would appear that the government was in dead earnest to eradicate this malady. However, he lamented that this elaborate and multi-layered apparatus to control administrative corruption has hardly made a dent on the situation. The CBI has been perceived by the public to be a pliable tool of the ruling party, and its investigations tend to become cover-up operations for the misdeeds of the ministers. Its ineffectiveness is further re ected in its low conviction rate as only 300 of the 1,349 cases (22.2 per cent) in 1972 and 164 of the 1,231 cases (13.3 per cent) in 1992 resulted in conviction. Gill has also accused the CBI of going only after the small fry as only one gazetted of cer was dismissed in 1972 and two of cers in The CBI s record in investigating the various mega scams has been dismal as there has been no conviction (1998: 238). Hence, it is not surprising that India is considered to be the second most corrupt country in Asia after Indonesia in the 2000 annual survey conducted by the Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) (Richardson 2000: 16). The Philippines The Philippines is the Asian country with the most number of anti-corruption measures as it has relied on seven laws and thirteen anti-graft agencies since its ght against corruption began in the 1950s. The rst anti-corruption law was the Forfeiture Law of 1955, which authorized the state to forfeit in its favor any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public of cer or employer. However, this law was ineffective as there were no convictions even after four years of its passage. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or the Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, which was passed in April 1960, identi ed eleven types of corrupt acts among public of cials and required them to le every two years a detailed and sworn statement of their assets and liabilities. The third anti-corruption law, RA No. 6028, which provided for the

8 460 Public Management Review creation of the Of ce of the Citizens Counsellor, was passed in August 1969, but was not implemented. The remaining four laws were the Presidential Decrees (PD) issued by President Marcos after the establishment of martial law in September PD No. 6 identi ed twenty-nine administrative offences and empowered heads of departments to dismiss guilty of cials immediately. This resulted in the sacking of nearly 8,000 public of cials. In November 1972, PD No. 46 prevented public of cials from receiving and private individuals from giving gifts on any occasion, including Christmas. Finally, PD No. 677 and PD No. 749 are amendments to RA No. 3019, requiring all government employees to submit statements of their assets and liabilities every year, instead of every other year; and providing immunity from prosecution for those willing to testify against public of cials or citizens accused of corruption (Al ler 1979: 326 7). The number of anti-corruption agencies in the Philippines can be attributed to the frequent changes in political leadership as such agencies were either created or abolished by the President. During May 1950 and January 1966, ve anti-corruption agencies were formed and dissolved as there were ve changes in political leadership during that period. President Marcos created another ve anti-corruption agencies during his two decades in power because the rst three agencies were ineffective and lasted between eight months and two years (Quah 1982: 168 9). In July 1979, Marcos formed the Sandiganbayan (Special Anti-Graft Court) and the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) by issuing PD No and PD No respectively. After assuming of ce in February 1986, President Corazon Aquino formed the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos family and their cronies. Unfortunately, Aquino s anticorruption stance was viewed with cynicism by the public as two of her cabinet members and her relatives (referred to derisively as rela-thieves ) were accused of corruption. The PCGG was also a target for charges of corruption, favouritism and incompetence, and by June 1988, ve of its agents faced graft charges and thirteen more were under investigation. In May 1987, Aquino established the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) to respond to increasing public criticism. However, the PCPEA was ineffective as it lacked staff and funds. In short, Aquino s honesty has not been matched by the political will to punish the corrupt (Timberman 1991: 233 5). The Tanodbayan or Of ce of the Ombudsman was reborn in 1988 during Aquino s term of of ce. However, it was inef cient as it took a long time to process the complaints received. Consequently, it had accumulated a huge backlog of 14,652 cases, or 65 per cent of its total workload by December The Sandiganbayan had a higher pro le than the Tanodbayan but the former was less ef cient as it completed only 13 per cent of its total caseload in 1996 (Balgos 1998: 247 8, 250 1). President Ramos appointed Eufemio Domingo to head the Presidential Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) in 1994, two years after assuming of ce. In June 1997, the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Co-ordinating Council (IACC) was formed to

9 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 461 control graft in government through the sharing of information and resources among the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission, the National Bureau of Investigation and the PCAGC. The Philippines joint sixty-ninth ranking with India among the ninety countries covered in TI s 2000 CPI is a re ection of the ineffectiveness of the PCAGC, IACC, Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to minimize corruption. The major reason for the failure of these agencies was provided by Domingo, the head of the PCAGC, who concluded in 1997 that the system is not working. We are not making it work because: We have all the laws, rules and regulations and especially institutions not only to curb, but to eliminate, corruption. The problem is that these laws, rules and regulations are not being faithfully implemented.... I am afraid that many people are accepting {corruption} as another part of our way of life. Big-time grafters are lionised in society. They are invited to all sorts of social events, elected and re-elected to government of ces. It is considered an honor in fact a social distinction to have them as guests in family and community affairs. (Balgos 1998: 267 8) China After overthrowing the corrupt Kuomintang government in October 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was concerned about curbing corruption in the People s Republic of China (PRC). Accordingly, the Act of the PRC for the Punishment of Corruption, which de ned corruption and its punishment, was adopted in As corruption has become endemic in China during the post-1978 reform period, Deng Xiaoping s regime relied on the Criminal Law of 1979 as the major legal measure in ghting corruption. This law was amended in 1982 to impose stiffer punishment for corruption. It was further amended in 1997 to include a chapter on corruption, which speci ed the penalty for corruption depending on the amount involved. For example, a person found guilty of corruption involving more than 100,000 yuan or US$12,000, will be punished by ten years imprisonment or the death penalty (Chan 1999: 300 1). Unlike India and the Philippines, China has a communist political system. Accordingly, the anti-corruption agencies are organized along three sectors. For the judicial sector, the Supreme People s Procuratorate (SPP) was re-established in 1978 to combat corruption. The SPP formed the Procuratorial Division of Graft and Bribery in 1989 after the Tiananmen anti-corruption and democracy movement (Chan 1999: 301). Below the SPP, the Bureau for Embezzlement and Bribery of the People s Procuratorate is responsible for handling and preventing cases of embezzlement and bribery. Given China s large territory, it is not surprising that there are 3,563 agencies for embezzlement and bribery (Luo et al. n.d.: 3). For the administrative sector, the Ministry of Supervision (MOS) was re-established in December 1986 in part to curb corruption and maladministration within the civil service. For the CCP, the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee (CDIC) was

10 462 Public Management Review formed in 1978 to check corruption among its members (Chan 1999: 301). Even though the MOS had received more than 700,000 reports in 1993, both the CDIC and MOS failed to reduce corruption because the authorities appear[ ed] to lack the political will to handle corruption cases among more senior party members (Burns 1994: 57 8). Until recently, few senior party of cials have been convicted of corruption because they can short-circuit corruption investigations by appealing to their protectors in the party hierarchy (Root 1996: 752). In 1994, Li Yiaoshi, former Vice-Minister of the State Science and Technology Commission, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment for corruption (Burns 1994: 58). In July 1998, the former Beijing party chief, Chen Xitong, was the highest ranking party member to be jailed for corruption, when he was sentenced to sixteen years (instead of the death penalty) for corruption of 555,000 yuan and dereliction of duty (Straits Times 1998: 14). Recently, Premier Zhu Rongji has waged a crusade against corrupt of cials (Leggett 1999: 1). On 5 March 2000, he informed party delegates at the National People s Congress that: All major cases, no matter which department or who is involved, must be thoroughly investigated, and corrupt of cials must be brought to justice (Straits Times 2000a: 23). To reinforce Zhu s message, Hu Changqing, deputy governor of Jiangxi province, was the highest ranking public of cial to be executed three days later on 8 March for corruption involving 5.44 million yuan between May 1995 and August 1999 (Straits Times 2000b: 30). Similarly, Li Chenglong, deputy mayor of Guigang city, was executed on 23 April 2000 for taking US$478,500 worth of bribes (Straits Times 2000c: 2). Pattern 3: Anti-corruption laws with an independent agency (Singapore, Hong Kong) The third and most effective pattern of ghting corruption is the combination of comprehensive anti-corruption laws which are impartially implemented by an independent anti-corruption agency. Singapore and Hong Kong employ this effective combination to curb corruption and it is not surprising that they are both perceived to be the least corrupt countries in Asia. Singapore The rst anti-corruption law was introduced in Singapore when the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) was enacted in December The POCO was implemented by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) within the police force. The ACB failed to curb corruption for two reasons: it was poorly staffed and had limited resources; and it could not deal impartially with police corruption. The last straw was the discovery by the British

11 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 463 colonial government that the police were involved in the theft of S$400,000 of opium in October The opium hijacking case demonstrated the ACB s ineffectiveness in ghting corruption and made the British authorities realize the importance of establishing an independent anti-corruption agency that was separate from the police. Consequently, the ACB was dissolved and replaced by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 (Quah 1995: 393 4). When the People s Action Party (PAP) government assumed of ce in June 1959, corruption was a way of life in Singapore and perceived by many to be a low-risk, high-reward activity. To minimize corruption and change the public perception of corruption to a high-risk, low-reward activity, the PAP leaders initiated a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in 1960 by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and strengthening the CPIB. As Singapore s gross national product per capita in 1960 was S$1,330 (US$443), the PAP government could not afford to raise the salaries of civil servants. Accordingly, it was left with the alternative of strengthening the existing anti-corruption laws to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to increase the penalty for corrupt behaviour. The POCA of 1960 removed the POCO s weaknesses, enhanced the penalty for corruption to ve years imprisonment and/or a ne of S$10,000 3 and gave the CPIB more powers to perform its duties. The CPIB is the anti-corruption agency responsible for enforcing the POCA s provisions. It has grown by nine times from eight of cers in 1960 to its current establishment of seventy-one of cers, comprising forty-nine investigators and twentytwo clerical and support staff. The CPIB performs three functions. First, it receives and investigates complaints on corruption in the public and private sectors. Second, the CPIB investigates malpractice and misconduct by public of cials. The third function of the CPIB is to examine the practices and procedures in the public service to minimize opportunities for corrupt practices (CPIB 1990: 2). Unlike Hong Kong s ICAC, which has 1,400 of cers, the CPIB can perform its duties without a large staff as its location within the Prime Minister s Of ce and its legal powers enable it to obtain the required co-operation from both public and private organizations. Hong Kong In Hong Kong, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) was introduced in 1948 and was implemented by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), which was formed in the same year as a special unit within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF) to handle the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases (Kuan 1981: 24). The ACB was separated from the CID in 1952, but it kept its title and remained within the RHKPF (Lethbridge 1985: 87). In 1968, the ACB reviewed the POCO and recommended a scrutiny of the anti-corruption laws of Singapore and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). A study team visited the two countries during 1968 to examine how their anti-corruption laws worked in practice. The study team was impressed with the independence of the anti-corruption agencies in these

12 464 Public Management Review countries and attributed Singapore s success in minimizing corruption to the CPIB s independence from the police (Wong 1981: 47). The knowledge gained from the study tour contributed to the enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) on 15 May The introduction of the POBO in May 1971 led to the upgrading of the ACB into an Anti-Corruption Of ce (ACO). The escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent P. F. Godber, on 8 June 1973 to England angered the public and undermined the ACO s credibility. Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr, Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, indicated that the arguments for keeping the ACO within the RHKPF were largely organizational and the arguments for removing it were largely political and psychological. The Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, accepted Sir Alastair s advice of considering public opinion and decided to form a new anti-corruption agency that was independent of the RHKPF (Quah 1995: 402). The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was created on 15 February 1974 with the enactment of the ICAC Ordinance and was entrusted with two tasks: to root out corruption and to restore public con dence in the Government (Wong 1981: 45). The ICAC is independent in terms of structure, personnel, nance and power. Before the handover of Hong Kong to China in July 1997, the ICAC was directly responsible to the Governor, and its Commissioner reported directly to the former and had easy access to him. After July 1997, the ICAC reports directly to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and is directly responsible to him. EFFECTIVENESS OF PATTERNS OF CORRUPTION CONTROL Which of the three patterns of corruption control is the most effective and why? To answer these questions, it is necessary to explain why the third pattern is more effective than the rst two patterns. The experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate the critical importance of political will in curbing corruption. If political will refers to the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level, Sahr J. Kpundeh (1998: 92) contends that it is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective programmes as without it, governments statements to reform civil service, strengthen transparency and accountability and reinvent the relationship between government and private industry remain mere rhetoric. The political leadership in a country must be sincerely committed to the eradication of corruption by demonstrating exemplary conduct and adopting a modest life-style themselves. Those found guilty of corruption must be punished, regardless of their position or status in society. Political will is absent when the big sh (rich and famous) are protected from prosecution for corruption, and only the small sh

13 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 465 (ordinary people) are caught. Under such circumstances, the anti-corruption strategy lacks credibility and is doomed to failure. Political will is the most important prerequisite as a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy will fail if it is not supported by the political leadership in a country. For example, even though the Philippines has the most anti-corruption laws and agencies in Asia, it has been ineffective in curbing corruption because of the absence of political will among the political leaders. When Corazon Aquino replaced Marcos as president in February 1986, there was high expectation that the end of the culture of graft and corruption was near (Varela 1995: 174). Unfortunately, Aquino s honesty has not been matched by the political will to punish the corrupt (quoted in Timberman 1991: 235). Second, Pattern 3 is more effective because the anti-corruption agency is a specialized agency concerned solely with minimizing corruption. The agency s speci c focus on combating corruption is an advantage as it is not distracted by other priorities. Thus the CPIB in Singapore and the ICAC in Hong Kong focus their energies and resources on curbing corruption unlike India s CBI, which is concerned also with tackling terrorism and organized crime in addition to corruption. Finally, the commitment of the political leaders in ghting corruption ensures the allocation of adequate personnel and resources to the anti-corruption effort, and the impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the anti-corruption agency. Thus, Pattern 3 is the most effective in combating corruption because of the presence of political will, which ensures the implementation of the anti-corruption laws by an independent agency. Patterns 2 and 1 are ineffective in curbing corruption because of the absence of political will. For both India and the Philippines, which have adopted Pattern 2, there is a plethora of agencies and laws to combat corruption. However, the political leaders in these two countries lacked the political will to implement these measures effectively. Pattern 1 is the most ineffective as both political will and an independent anti-corruption agency are absent. ACCOUNTING FOR DIVERGENCE IN CORRUPTION CONTROL If the third pattern of ghting corruption is the most effective, why has it not been adopted in more Asian countries than Singapore and Hong Kong? Furthermore, the experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption have been publicized widely as best practices at various international conferences. For example, the experiences of both city-states in curbing corruption were discussed at the Uganda International Conference on Good Governance in Africa: Empowering Civil Society in the Fight against Corruption in Kampala from 21 5 April If the success of Singapore and Hong Kong in ghting corruption has been widely publicized, why have their experiences not been replicated elsewhere in Asia? Even though Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in minimizing corruption, their method of corruption control is not widely practised in other Asian countries for two

14 466 Public Management Review Table 2: Policy contexts of six Asian countries Country Land area (sq km) Population GDP per capita (US$) Political system Singapore ,163,500 32,810 Democracy Hong Kong 1,075 6,500,000 25,200 SAR, China Mongolia 1,565,000 2,000, Democracy The Philippines 300,000 71,400,000 1,200 Democracy China 9,560,900 1,244,200, Communist India 3,287, ,200, Democracy Source: Andrews (1999: 56 7, 66 7, 76 7, 119, and 168 9). reasons. The rst reason is that the policy contexts of both city-states are unique and different from those of Mongolia, India, the Philippines, China and other Asian countries. Table 2 provides details of the major differences in policy context between Singapore and Hong Kong and the other four countries discussed above. The rst contextual difference is that, unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, the other four countries are much larger. China is the largest Asian country, followed by India (third), Mongolia (sixth) and the Philippines (seventeenth) (Andrews 1999: 14). Second, in terms of population, China and India have the two largest populations in the world with 1,244.2 million and million respectively. Similarly, the population of the Philippines (71.4 million) exceeds the population of Hong Kong (6.5 million) and Singapore (3.4 million). In contrast, Mongolia has the smallest population with 2 million persons. Third, the variations in Gross Domestic Product per capita are wide, with Singapore and Hong Kong occupying the second (US$32,810) and third (US$25,200) positions at one extreme, and the Philippines (US$1,200), China (US$860), Mongolia (US$390) and India (US$370) at the other extreme (Andrews 1999: 14, 19). The nal difference in policy context is the nature of the political system. On the one hand, China has a communist political system and Hong Kong became part of the Special Administrative Region in July The other four countries are democratic systems with signi cant variations. India is the world s largest democracy with the lowest standard of living among the six countries. Singapore is a parliamentary democracy with a one party dominant system. The Philippines reverted to democracy in February 1986, after Corazon Aquino used people power to replace Ferdinand Marcos, who had imposed martial law from 1971 until his downfall. Mongolia was a communist country from 1921 to 1991, when the Soviet advisers left. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and cessation of Soviet technical assistance, Mongolia was compelled to transform its centrally planned economy into a market economy. In my analysis of whether Singapore s model of development (SMD) is transferable to other developing countries, I argued that the answer to the question whether SMD

15 Quah: Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries 467 is transferable to other target countries is no in view of the differences between Singapore and these countries. Furthermore, it is dif cult to transplant SMD to other countries because of the great costs involved (Quah 1998: 120 1). In the same vein, it can be argued that Singapore s and Hong Kong s experiences in combating corruption has not been replicated to a great extent in other Asian countries because of the differences in policy context and the dif culties involved in minimizing corruption. 5 In my comparative analysis of the anti-corruption strategies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, I contended that: The effectiveness of anti-corruption measures depends on two factors: (1) the adequacy of the measures themselves in terms of the comprehensiveness of their scope and powers; and (2) the level of commitment of the political leadership to the goal of eradicating bureaucratic corruption in the country concerned. In other words, for anti-corruption measures to be effective they must not only be properly designed (to attack the causes of corruption in the society), but must also be sponsored and upheld sincerely by the political leaders. The most elaborate and well designed anti-corruption measures will be useless if they are not enforced by the political leadership. (Quah 1982: 175) Why have China, India, the Philippines and Mongolia not adopted the effective third pattern of ghting corruption? In other words, why are these four countries ineffective in curbing corruption? The most important reason for these countries poor performance in combating corruption is the lack of political will. In China s case, the CCP has hindered anti-corruption efforts through the protection of its corrupt members. In recent months, Premier Zhu Rongji has been concerned about curbing corruption, but it remains to be seen whether his anti-corruption stance can overcome the CCP s reluctance to punish senior party of cials for corruption. India s anti-corruption strategy is hopeless because its political leaders are not committed to ghting corruption, and its anti-corruption measures are inadequate as the CBI and CVC do not have the powers and resources required to combat corruption effectively. The Philippines has the most anti-corruption measures in Asia, but its political leaders have not been committed in ghting corruption. Of the four countries, Mongolia is the most likely to adopt the third pattern of ghting corruption as it had requested technical assistance from the UNDP to formulate a national anti-corruption plan, which will include the creation of an independent anti-corruption agency, the improvement of the existing anti-corruption laws and the involvement of the entire society in the anti-corruption struggle. 6 Needless to say, whether this plan will be implemented depends on the commitment of the Mongolian political leaders and people to ght corruption as well as the willingness of international agencies to continue funding the anti-corruption effort. In sum, while corruption has become a global problem in recent years, only three Asian countries Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia have succeeded in minimizing it. However, in spite of the widespread publicity of these countries best practices, their pattern of curbing corruption has not been replicated elsewhere in Asia because

16 468 Public Management Review of the differences in policy context and the lack of political will in ghting corruption in these countries. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This article is a revised version of a keynote paper prepared for presentation at the Fourth International Research Symposium on Public Management at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, April I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for his constructive comments and suggestions, which I have taken into account in revising this article. NOTES 1 For examples of such research, see Lo (1993), Gong (1994), Kim (1994), Pasuk and Sungsidh (1996), Quah (1995, 1999a, 1999b), Hwang (1996), Pavarala (1996), Guhan and Paul (1997), Kwong (1997), Coronel (1998), Gill (1998), Ho lena (1998), Kingsbury (1998), Mitra (1998), Chua (1999), Colmey and Liebold (1999), Robertson-Snape (1999), Vittal and Mahalingam (2000). 2 This analysis of Mongolia s pattern of ghting corruption is based on Quah (1999c). 3 The ne was increased tenfold to S$100,000 in See de Speville (1996) and Tan (1996). 5 Malaysia is the only Asian country that has followed Singapore s and Hong Kong s example in ghting corruption as it created the Anti-Corruption Agency to implement the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1961 (see Marican 1979). However, Malaysia was ranked joint thirty-second rank with Costa Rica in TI s 1999 CPI. Malaysia s lower ranking indicates that the ACA is less effective than the CPIB and ICAC. Apart from the growing problem of money politics, the ACA has been criticized for not investigating corruption cases involving big sh impartially as the recent corruption trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim appears to be politically motivated as other big sh have not been similarly targeted. 6 I served as the lead consultant for the UNDP mission to Ulaanbataar from September to November 1998 to formulate the National Anti-Corruption Plan for Mongolia. REFERENCES Al ler, M. C. P. (1986) The Process of Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Emerging Patterns in L. V. Carino (ed.) Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: Causes, Consequences and Control. Quezon City: JMC Press. Andrews, J. (1999) Pocket Asia, 5th edn, London: The Economist Newspaper. Balgos, C. C. A. (1998) Ombudsman in S. S. Coronel (ed.) Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines. Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Burns, J. P. (1964) Civil Service Reform in China. Asian Journal of Political Science, 2:2 pp Chan, K. M. (1999) Corruption in China: A Principal-Agent Perspective in H. K. Wong and H. S. Chan (eds) Handbook of Public Administration in the Asia-Paci c Basin. New York: Marcel Dekker Inc. Chua, Y. T. (1999) Robbed: An Investigation of Corruption in Philippine Education, Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.

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