Africa Regional Summary

Transcription

1 Africa Regional Summary November 2014

2 Executive Summary Political upheaval in Burkina Faso coupled with multiple days of violent protests throughout the country resulted in the resignation of President Compaore on October 31, with military heads contesting the position of interim head of state. Although opposition leaders have welcomed the move and called for calm, volatility is likely to remain high. In Ivory Coast, the fracturing within the main opposition FPI continues to manifest as reports indicate that currently incarcerated former President Gbagbo aims to contest in intraparty elections. Political mistrust and tensions between Somali President Mohamud and Prime Minister Ahmed have reached new heights in Mogadishu after the Prime Minister attempted a government reshuffle of the cabinet without consulting with the President. In Uganda, President Museveni s tight grip of power has become increasingly evident following the sacking of Prime Minister Mbabazi. In Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta s increasing domestic popularity was demonstrated as tens of thousands of supporters welcomed him upon his return from trial hearings at the International Criminal Court (ICC). HIGH RISK Meanwhile, Ebola continues to spread throughout West Africa, posing a serious social, political and economic threat to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, where a vast majority of the cases have been recorded. Additionally, a first case of Ebola has been recorded in Mali, while Nigeria and Senegal have officially been declared Ebola free. Cameroon persistently faces dual security threats emanating from Boko Haram militants in the Extreme North Region as well as the violent spillover of the CAR conflict in the east. The Nigerian government announced a looming ceasefire deal and that it was in direct negotiations with the Islamist sect in Chad, although violence continues to be recorded in the northeastern regions. The CAR has witnessed a notable increase in violence in the 2 capital P a gof e Bangui, while a new pro-peace faction has emerged following a split from the ex- Seleka movement. Moreover, there has been an upsurge in militant activity in the eastern DRC, leaving dozens dead following numerous attacks, while Mali continues to witness growing insecurity as attacks targeting UN forces in the north persist. In Niger, three simultaneous militant attacks highlight the ongoing threat of militancy in the Sahel region, as France increases its military presence in Niger and the Sahel as a whole. 2Page Burundi has witnessed an upsurge in criminality in central towns, leading to demonstrations denouncing alleged government ineptitude in dealing with the growing problem. South Africa continues to record an alarming level of violent crimes, as police struggle to combat increased murder and armed robbery cases. Finally, Zambian President Michael Sata died in a hospital in London following a time of illness, necessitating the holding of national elections in the country within 90 days.

3 The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name. EXTREME RISK Africa Ebola Virus Outbreak... 4 CAR... 5 Somalia... 6 South Sudan... 7 HIGH RISK Burkina Faso... 8 DRC... 9 Mali Nigeria Sudan MEDIUM RISK Angola Burundi Cameroon Ethiopia Ivory Coast Kenya Liberia Mozambique Niger South Africa Uganda LOW RISK Ghana Sierra Leone Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Notable Dates for November Page

4 EXTREME RISK Africa Ebola Virus Outbreak According to the World Health Organization (WHO) report issued on October 29, there are currently a total of 13,676 suspected and confirmed cases of Ebola in West Africa, with 2,966 suspected cases recorded over the past 21 days, and approximately 4,900 confirmed deaths in total. This includes 1,391 confirmed cases in Guinea, 2,515 cases in Liberia, 20 cases in Nigeria, 3,700 cases in Sierra Leone and one case in Senegal. Those operating or residing in Africa, particularly in DRC, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone, are strongly advised to practice heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the Ebola outbreak. Cautious optimism as international community continues to expand measures to combat virus in West Africa, while Nigeria and Senegal succeed in containing epidemic On October 17 and 19 respectively, Senegal and Nigeria declared that their outbreaks of Ebola had successfully been contained. Meanwhile, Mali became the sixth West African nation to be effected by Ebola when their first confirmed case died on October 24. The West African nations of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia continue to be susceptible to widespread outbreaks, including within their capitals. All districts in Sierra Leone and Liberia have now affected by Ebola. In Guinea, no new districts reported fresh Ebola case within the past week, potentially signaling increased containment of the virus. The weekly increase in cases appears to have decreased in Liberia, however, its numbers remained subject to underreporting of cases and missing data. However, WHO officials still believe that the caseload in Liberia may even be decreasing by as much as 25% on a weekly basis. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has recorded a weekly rise in the number of cases for the sixth consecutive week within its western rural region as well as has seen additional areas emerging as potential concerns. October 30 marked the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response s (UNMEER) 30th day since implementation, as foreign forces have increased their presence throughout West Africa. For instance, the UK announced plans on October 8 to send 750 troops to Sierra Leone to aid in establishing treatment centers. The US also deployed an additional 100 troops to Liberia bringing the total number of American troops in West Africa in an effort to combat Ebola to 565, according to the US officials. Some residents and health workers have taken to rioting and striking in order to express their frustrations regarding the perceived inefficiency of their respective governments, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Bans on public celebrations as well as the implementation of lockdowns, specifically in Sierra Leone, remain potential tools in the prevention of the further spread of Ebola within severely affected nations. Mauritania s decision to close its border with Mali on October 26, reopened on October 30, highlights the continued likelihood of nations to take protective measures in order to protect themselves from outbreaks in neighboring countries as well. 4Page

5 EXTREME RISK CAR Violence re-erupts in Bangui as the anti-balaka call for government to resign. In attempt to calm the country, President Samba-Panza announces key political developments. New pro-peace party emerges out of ex-seleka, underscoring ongoing internal divides. We continue to advice against all travel to CAR, including Bangui, at this time given extreme security risks and volatility. If travel is unavoidable, it is advised to remain within the confines of the Bangui M Poko International Airport compound. Confrontations resume in Bangui, elsewhere after anti-balaka gives deadline for president to resign, as President Samba-Panza announces measures to calm violence in Bangui On October 6, the anti-balaka gave President Catherine Samba-Panza 48 hours to resign over accusations of violations of the Brazzaville agreements, an alleged embezzlement of 10 million USD given as aid to the country by Angola, and the possible arrival of Chadian troops to protect the president. Protests on October 8 devolved into unrest and clashes between the anti-balaka and the ex-seleka militias, as well as between the militias and international forces took place over the following 10 days, leaving more than 23 people dead in Bangui, including one UN peacekeeper. Additionally, clashes elsewhere in the country, especially near the ex-seleka stronghold of Bambari, killed at least 30 people. Attempting to calm the violence in Bangui, President Samba-Panza held a week of consultations with CAR's "main actors". On October 22, she announced, among other actions, that the country would skip the second phase of the Brazzaville ceasefire agreements, and that the third phase, a grand forum for the reconciliation and reconstruction of the CAR, will start to be organized by the end of October. Overall, we assess that these measures were aimed at impressing a sense of efficient governance and progress towards reconciliation that would increase her internal support and reduce calls for her resignation. Nonetheless, we assess the militias are unlikely to be satisfied by these measures, and as such they do not guarantee stability in the short term. Altogether, these events underscore the highly volatile security situation in the country, which is likely to persist over the coming months, as well as growing questioning of government s legitimacy. Ex-Seleka form new pro-peace political-military movement, splitting the militia A faction of the ex-seleka, led by former generals and spokespersons, decided to form a new political-military movement in Bambari on October 25-26, named the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC). The movement is allegedly in favor of an immediate end of hostilities in the country, based on the Brazzaville agreements, as well as being opposed to a partition of the CAR. This marks the group s first major split, and as such it is likely to weaken the power of the separatist faction. A large allegiance shift from the ex-seleka to the propeace UPC would thus be a positive step towards the return of stability in the CAR. 5Page

6 EXTREME RISK Notable Dates Al-Shabaab s main stronghold of Barawe captured by AMISOM forces on October 5, although fighting between militants, government troops persists in other regions. Somalia Political tensions resurface, as longstanding dispute between President and Prime Minister reaches new heights. We continue to advice against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions, which is for essential purposes only, due to the volatile security situation in the country. Fighting between al-shabaab, government forces persists; Barawe stronghold recaptured During the month of October, hostilities between the Islamist militant group, al-shabaab, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) forces have persisted, with offensives carried out by the two warring sides. AMSIOM has recorded notable victories, with a significant development on October 6, taking control over the group s last prominent stronghold in Somalia in the city of Barawe, while killing 60 and 80 militants in southern Somalia on October 11 and October 23 respectively. Meanwhile, the Islamist insurgent group has continued to launch attacks throughout central and southern Somalia, as well as in Mogadishu, highlighting their sustained operational capabilities despite the increasingly successful counterinsurgency Operation Indian Ocean. In another development, the Somali Federal Government is reportedly planning to begin efforts to produce oil within the next six years, underscoring the government s recent achievements in combating al-shabaab militancy. Moreover, such infrastructural projects and potential oil exploration sites will likely serve as attractive targets for insurgents. Altogether, we assess that the militant group is likely to continue with its retaliatory efforts and guerilla style tactics over the coming weeks, as AMISOM and SNA forces continue to successfully dislodge the insurgents from former militant strongholds throughout the country. Political tensions resurface, as longstanding dispute between President, PM climaxes Following Prime Minister (PM) Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed s cabinet reshuffle on October 25, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud released a statement deeming the new appointments null and void, as the PM did not consult the presidency about the issue. The rift between the two leaders is reportedly ongoing for several months, with the dispute allegedly reaching a climax after Abdullahi Mohamed Ali, the former chief of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and a close friend of the President, was dismissed from his position. In light of the longstanding discord between the two Somali leaders, we assess that the already strained relations between the President and the PM are likely to aggravate, consequently raising political tensions in the country. Furthermore, such political tensions between the two country leaders may increasingly grow in the lead up to the presidential elections in Page

7 EXTREME RISK South Sudan Notable developments recorded in peace negotiations between rival factions over recent weeks, albeit the viability of the implementation of agreed upon points and their contribution to long-term stability remain questionable. Deeply rooted mistrust among warring factions, coupled with the nearing end of the rainy season, likely to signal increased frequency of localized clashes. It is advised to restrict travel to Juba at this time given persistent insecurity in outlying areas due to residual volatility from the ongoing internal conflict. Positive developments in peace negations Recent weeks have witnessed various rounds of talks and meetings between political representatives of the government forces, Sudan People s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and rebel fighters of the SPLM/A - In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO). President Salva Kiir has reportedly agreed to the adoption of a federal system of governance and to Riek Machar s ability to be nominated as Prime Minister. Meanwhile, concessions made on the part of the SPLM-IO appear to be few. While these concessions point to some developments in the reaching of a peace agreement, the previous failure of warring leaders to cooperate, highlighted by Kiir s removal of Machar from the Vice Presidency in 2013 and the continued ceasefire violations, suggest that a proposed governmental structure incorporating both figures would likely remain highly volatile. Further, deep-running mistrust between both parties remains a key obstacle in securing a peace agreement, highlighted by both sides' continuous stockpiling of arms. The recent re-assertion of military capabilities by both sides also underscores the continued skepticism among regional actors and the international community over the ability of any likely agreement to be fully supported by military leaders on the ground. Given that a conclusive solution has yet to materialize, we assess that the formation of a proposed transitional government is likely to be continually stalled. Continued fighting in Upper Nile and Unity States Fighting has tended to be concentrated in oil-rich states, namely Upper Nile and Unity States, which act as strategic locales in continued attempts to gain territory and so strengthen positions in talks. Recent clashes between SPLM and rebel forces on October 27 in Bentiu, capital of Unity State, further highlight the persistent unstable security situation in the country's northern region despite alleged progress in peace negations. Unrest in these states may increase in frequency and severity over the coming weeks given the impending conclusion of the rainy season, which previously inhibited belligerent groups from continuing the conflict unabated. Should there be a return to fighting on a more wide scale level, which remains unlikely at this time, recent achievements in the reaching of a longterm peace agreement remain likely to collapse along with terms stated under the May ceasefire agreement. 7Page

8 HIGH RISK Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore resigned on October 31 following protests over a proposed constitutional revision that would have enabled him to seek an additional term during the 2015 presidential poll. General Honore Traore assumed control of the executive, however the leadership status of the country remains unclear and the potential for unrest remains elevated. Those operating or residing in Burkina Faso are advised to minimize movement at this point in time and stay in secured location with sufficient water and food supply, particularly in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, due to the potential for further unrest. Moreover, ensure that contingency evacuation plans are updated. Blaise Compaore resigns following wave of protests; Chief of Staff assumes control On October 31, President Blaise Compaore announced his resignation after 27 years in office and called for elections to be organized within 90 days. The stepping-down occurred after several days of mass protest throughout Burkina Faso which were triggered by an October 21 government decision to submit a bill to the National Assembly that would initiate a revision of the constitution. This would enable Compaore to seek an additional presidential term. As a result, General Honore Traore, the Chief of Staff of the Burkinabe military assumed control of the executive while the deputy commander of Presidential Security, Lieutenant-Colonel Zida, declared that the Burkinabe constitution had been suspended and a transitional government body established. Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports indicate that former President Compaore has left Burkina Faso and is currently in Ghana. Also, the military has reportedly enforced a nationwide curfew from 19:00 to 06:00 (local time) and ordered the closing of all air and land crossings while Ouagadougou has continued to witness sustained protests and incidents of looting. There have been reports of divides within the military and a power struggle between General Traore and Lieutenant- Colonel Zida as well as indications of a marginalization of the political opposition by military figures. Reports of divisions within the military and the alleged marginalization of opposition leaders further diminish the prospects of a rapid clarification of the political situation. As long as the political situation and leadership status of the country are not clarified, we assess that that protests will likely continue to be organized. Moreover, should widespread looting continue, a possible decision by the military to forcefully engage perpetrators would exacerbate tensions and increase the potential of clashes with security forces. That said, the opposition s calls for calm and welcoming of Compaore s resignation could partially mitigate the intensity of the recent political violence witnessed in Burkina Faso. Altogether, we assess that the situation in Burkina Faso is likely to remain extremely tense, with a heightened potential for unrest throughout the country. 8Page

9 HIGH RISK DRC President Joseph Kabila reshuffles structure of military ahead of 2016 elections; rising instability perpetuated by rebels likely to underscore attempts at bolstering power. Resurgence of rebel group activity in eastern DRC over recent weeks underscores persistent insecurity in outlying areas. Business essential travel can continue to Kinshasa at this time, while adhering to necessary security precautions. We advise against nonessential travel to outlying rural areas given rampant criminal and militant risks. It is advised to practice heightened health precautions due to the Ebola outbreak. Restructuring likely aimed at extending presidential power over armed forces prior to elections DRC President Joseph Kabila's reshuffling of the military leadership structure, including the creation of three "National Defense Zones," is likely aimed at consolidating and bolstering support ahead of the 2016 elections. Those rebel or minority leaders not given positions of power in this restructuring may begin to exacerbate already present ethnic tensions within the country. The continued presence of local militias and the resurgence of rebel group activity particularly in the eastern regions will likely continue to perpetuate instability. This in turn will challenge the effectiveness of Kabila's influence and support garnered around the country in the run up to the elections. Persistent presence of local militias, resurgence of rebel groups in eastern regions There has been a marked increase in militant activity in the eastern Kivu regions, particularly within the northern part of North Kivu, as well as in the Katanga Province. Violence this past month, in the province of North Kivu alone, has allegedly claimed the lives of at least 80 people and forced hundreds of displaced residents to flee north. In response to this and other attacks throughout the eastern provinces, there has been an increasing presence of foreign forces on the ground, including joint commands between the Congolese military (FARDC) and UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). Residents have begun to address their frustration with the perceived inefficiencies of these security forces amid the continued attacks through various protest tactics. In the past, these counterinsurgency efforts have focused on combating an isolated militant group, which allowed other factions to reorganize while evading pressure. We assess that it is likely the upcoming decisive joint FARDC-UN military action will again prove the need for a more all-encompassing strategy, one aimed at the eradication of the multiple armed groups present who together pose a comprehensive threat throughout the eastern DRC rather than isolated challenges. 9Page

10 HIGH RISK Mali Suspected militant attacks targeting UN forces in the north persisted, French forces slated to reinforce international troops, highlights continued volatile security situation. Negotiations between armed rebel groups, Bamako government postponed to end of November, as preliminary agreement reportedly being examined by parties. Travel to Bamako may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy. Persistent militant attacks in northern regions The uptick in militant attacks noted since August has persisted, with over 20 soldiers having been killed since its start. Meanwhile, French forces continued to carry out arrests, detaining three militants suspected of having carried out the October 7 rocket attack on the base of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Moreover, these developments come as French forces are slated to bolster their presence in northern Mali, as a means to assist the UN force that has been experiencing operational and logistical shortcomings. The increased presence of French troops is likely to result in additional military operations in the region, while potentially deterring militant attacks. That said, French troops are deployed throughout the Sahel and are unlikely to be capable of bolstering the understaffed MINUSMA troops on a continuous basis. Thus we assess that militant attacks are likely to continue in northern Mali, as the deployed force remains limited in its ability to mitigate the threat. Ongoing negotiations between Bamako government, rebel groups The negotiations which were slated to take place in October, were postponed until the end of November. According to the Algerian Foreign Minister, the decision was taken in order to give the parties the time to consult their officials and bases in Mali in regards to what unconfirmed reports have called a draft preliminary peace agreement. Meanwhile, clashes between Tuareg and Arab rebel groups in northern Mali have resurged, indicating growing opposition to the main Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Thus, although a draft preliminary peace agreement is reportedly being examined by the parties, we assess that the negotiations are likely to continue to be stalled, as internal divisions within the rebel groups persist. Moreover, we assess that the negotiating Tuareg and Arab groups do not represent all of the interested parties in northern Mali, and thus some opposition to a negotiated peace agreement is likely to remain, making any peace deal difficult to implement over the entire northern. 01Page

11 HIGH RISK Nigeria Government negotiates with Boko Haram, announces premature ceasefire, as numerous suspected militant attacks recorded in northeast regions. Insecurity persists in Niger Delta waterways due to piracy and criminal activity. Elevated political tensions ahead of 2015 elections, accompanied by localized violence. Travel to Lagos and Abuja may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance for militancy and crime and following general security protocols. Chad mediates Government, Boko Haram negotiations; insecurity is likely to persist Multiple accounts by key actors indicate that negotiations are currently underway between the Nigerian government and Boko Haram. We assess these accounts credible as both sides can expect to reap short-term benefits from negotiating; the Islamist sect entered the talks following a negative momentum and several high profile defeats, whereas the government is keen to present gains ahead of the nearing elections. Nevertheless, mounting evidence signals that the October 17 declaration of a ceasefire by Nigerian officials was premature, as multiple clashes and abductions transpired in the country s northeast following the announcement, most recently in Mubi, Mafa, Damboa and Abadam. We assess that persisting violence is indicative of the prevailing lawlessness in the region enabling criminal activity, the confused Nigerian military command hierarchy, and a probable fragmentation of Boko Haram, factors that will continue to undermine security in the region. Bayelsa bandits clash with JTF, Navy forces, abduct passengers, oil workers Criminal activity has persisted in the Niger Delta region, especially in Bayelsa State, with notable attack took place in the Nembe-Santa Barbara waterways on October 24, in which gunmen killed three police officers and abducted six civilians in two attacks on oil industry shipments, and in the Ogbia-Brass waterways in which four people were abducted on October 11. The lucrative oil industry in the Niger Delta pose a strong incentive for criminal activity, while the large number of small waterways provides an opportunity in the form of easy access and escape routes to the open sea. Given this and inclination of militants to clash with the Nigerian military Joint Task Force (JTF) and Navy forces, we assess that the threat of piracy is likely to persist in the area. APC intensify mobilization as localized political violence continues Political tensions in the country persisted during October, with the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC) staging a mass rally in Port Harcourt as well as an extraordinary national convention in Abuja. President Goodluck Jonathan officially singled his intention to seek a second term by collecting the People's Democratic Party (PDP) nomination forms. Elevated tensions were accompanied by politically motivated violence, including armed attacks in Edo, Bayelsa and Lagos States. We assess that similar incidents will persist in the months leading up to the elections, while also being propelled by state and municipal issues. 00Page

12 HIGH RISK Sudan President Omar al-bashir chosen as both leader and presidential candidate of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) for April 2015 general elections, as persistent crackdown on opposition camp casts doubts over legitimacy of upcoming polls. We advise against all travel outside of Khartoum given ongoing insurgencies, high levels of criminality and persistent inter-communal clashes in southern regions. President Bashir to run as ruling party candidate in April 2015 polls, clampdown on opposition likely to continue On October 21, President al-bashir was chosen as the ruling party's candidate in presidential elections scheduled for April 2015, after being selected from amongst five possibilities put forward by the NCP Leadership Council on October 20. The longstanding conflict with the south until its secession in 2011, coupled with the prevailing military hostilities with rebel factions based in the outlying regions have significantly impacted Sudan s political landscape. In this context, Bashir has capitalized on the country s continuous cycle of instability and political transformations, which have resulted in the absence of democratically held elections. The upcoming 2015 general elections will be the second multiparty elections held since the 1989 military coup. Additionally, the persistent crackdown on the country s opposition witnessed over the past months has cast doubt over Bashir s commitment to improve political freedoms as well as the legitimacy of the 2015 elections. Furthermore, several opposition parties, such as the Popular Congress Party (PCP), have announced their intention to withdraw from the electoral process given that the current state of public repression and lack of public freedom continues to hamper any form of political process. Altogether, the government s continuous socio-political clampdown coupled with Bashir s recent election as the party s presidential candidate may result in an internal divide and weakening of the national dialogue process. Lastly, we assess that opposition parties may capitalize on Bashir s perceived desire to maintain the political status quo by portraying Bashir s re-election as illegitimate in order to garner increased support from current opposition camps as elections draw nearer. 02Page

13 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Angola Government s efforts at increasing regional influence underlined by expanding financial interests and geostrategic alliances, highlights aspirations of becoming powerhouse on the continent. Travel to Luanda can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions. President Dos Santos' aspiration of Angola becoming regional powerhouse, highlighted by growing efforts to engage politically and economically with international community Since the end of the civil war in 2002, President Eduardo dos Santos promotion of postwar peace and stability is being reflected in the large investment devoted to the security apparatus, which has enabled the country to engage and expand its strategic, multilateral partnerships globally. According to reports, the government's steadfast determination to maintain the political status quo and become a key regional actor has transformed Angola into the largest military spender in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, we assess that dos Santo's spending spree in the military is indicative of government's rising aspiration in undertaking a superpower role in regional security. Moreover, on October 16, Angola was elected to serve on the UN Security Council. Such development underscores the government's successful achievement at positioning itself at the center of the peacekeeping and interventionist discussion in the African continent. Furthermore, dos Santos interest in maintaining political and social stability under an effective government has been essential in attracting international investors in an environment conducive to economic growth. By serving at the UN Security Council and becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Luanda has showcased its desires to become a leading interlocutor in a wide array of security and economic-related bodies, and thus facilitating its engagement with the international community in an effort to be viewed as one of the most influential countries in the southern region. 03Page

14 MEDIUM RISK Burundi Upsurge in violence recorded in central Burundian towns since August, coupled with increased localized discontent given poor government response. Heightened political tensions ahead of 2015 elections; President keen to amend constitution to extend his presidency while crackdown on opposition camp persists. Travel to Bujumbura can continue while adhering to increased security protocols regarding criminality, while avoiding nonessential travel to outlying areas. Rise of criminal violence, likely to increase dissatisfaction with government The uptick in crime since August was allegedly fueled by non-local groups in four central Burundian towns; namely Rusaka, Mwaro, Mugongo-Mango and Mukike, located between 20 km and 40 km east of the capital Bujumbura. The alleged lack of response by security forces despite the rise of violent incidents has reportedly prompted local residents and youth to engage in protests and vigilante activity. Meanwhile, it is suggested that an armed splinter faction of the Hutu opposition National Forces of Liberation (FNL) attacked Burundian soldiers on October 6 in the town of Gihanga, located 20 km north of Bujumbura. While FNL rebels claim to have killed six Burundian soldiers, the army denies these claims arguing instead that one rebel was killed. Although it remains possible that the violence is politically or ethically motivated, it would seem that the uptick in violence in central Burundi is likely criminal in nature. Meanwhile, given the declining trend of militant attacks throughout the previous year, we assess that a return to significant militancy remains unlikely. Even so, should incidents of violence be repeatedly perpetrated by foreign groups and contribute to general insecurity in outlying regions, this may increase the potential for further protests by local residents, especially given perceived inefficient response by security forces. Growing political tensions ahead of 2015 elections Allegations against President Nkurunziza issued on October 18 over his potential involvement in a suspected corruption case is likely to fuel further dissatisfaction against the incumbent government. This comes amid heightened tensions given alleged constitutional changes allowing President Nkurunziza to run for a third term in the 2015 elections. That said, widespread unrest is unlikely given that government response has tended to forcefully crackdown on anti-government rallies. This is highlighted by the government s approach towards suppressing dissidence, as evident of the October 12 arrest of opposition Front for Democracy s leader, Leonce Ngendakumana. These political maneuvers will likely increase the climate of political mistrust, particularly since the constitution ensures the balance between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. In the event of a significant government-sponsored crackdown on opposition activities, mainstream dissident supporters may be enticed to join more radical splinter factions, which would increase the potential for localized militant attacks in the country. 04Page

15 MEDIUM RISK Cameroon Boko Haram release 27 hostages, yet clashes persist in Extreme North Region. Violent spillover from CAR to east Cameroon; attacks are likely to continue as FPDC rebels seek release of captured leader. Travel to Douala and Yaounde may continue, while it is advised to refrain from all nonessential travel to outlying areas, particularly the Extreme North and the eastern border regions, due to volatile security conditions. Boko Haram release hostages, as clashes continue On October 10, the Islamist militant sect released 27 hostages, including 10 Chinese nationals and the wife of the Vice Prime Minster of Cameroon. The hostages were reportedly kidnapped in May and July in the Extreme North Region. The exact details of the release have not been made clear by Cameroonian authorities, in particular whether the release was part of a negotiated deal of the Islamist sect. In an interview, the Chadian Foreign Minister allotted the release as the first stage of an encompassing ceasefire deal with Boko Haram. At the time of writing, however, such a deal has yet to materialize on the ground. Following the release, military forces reportedly clashed with militants in multiple incidents, including near the towns of Amchide, Kolofata and Fotokol, all located in the Extreme North Region in close proximity to the Nigerian border, and are adjacent to Nigerian communities reportedly under Boko Haram control. Cameroonian sources claim to have repelled insurgent raids and inflicting large casualties on the militants. Nevertheless, the persisting reoccurrence of these incidents lead us to assess that Boko Haram continues to maintain an operational presence in the Extreme North Region, likely to manifest in additional clashes in the coming weeks and months. Growing insecurity in CAR border regions Insecurity persisted in the east of the country, near the border with the Central African Republic (CAR), as rebels continued to launch cross border attacks. Most notably, on October 5 Cameroonian Rapid Intervention Brigades repelled an attack by anti-balaka rebels, arresting 40. On October 12, a Polish missionary priest was kidnapped in the town of Baboua in the CAR, in close proximity to the Cameroonian border, by members of the rebel group Central African People s Democratic Front (FPDC). Furthermore, unconfirmed reports indicate that suspected FPDC rebels kidnapped nine people in the Cameroonian town Garoua-Boulai, across the border from Baboua, in several incidents on October Altogether, these incidents demonstrate an ongoing spillover of violence from the CAR into Cameroon, and we assess that attacks are likely to persist given the deteriorating security situation in CAR. Furthermore, the FPDC demands the release of their leader, Abdoulaye Miskine, captured in As long as Cameroon maintains its refusal to release Miskine, we asses that rebel attacks are likely to continue in the vicinity of Garoua-Boulai. 05Page

16 MEDIUM RISK Ethiopia Western embassies warn of persistent militant threat in Addis Ababa, as government continues to charge dissidents and militancy suspects under anti-terrorism law. American missionaries attacked near Moga, north of Addis Ababa; underscores threat of insecurity to Westerners in outlying regions Travel to Addis Ababa may continue while adhering to general security protocols with regards to risk of civil unrest and the underlying threat of militant attacks. Threat of militancy, government s utilization of controversial legislation On October 15, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa issued a warning regarding an imminent threat of an attack in Addis Ababa's Bole area by al-shabaab. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had also warned its citizens of the potential attack by al- Shabaab, adding further credibility to the threat. Given that the threat of a militancy in Ethiopia remains credible, we assess that security forces are likely to intensify their operations, particularly throughout Addis Ababa over the coming weeks and months. Meanwhile, over recent months, Ethiopia's government has been criticized by human right groups for its alleged crackdowns on dissident activity, with over 119 suspects reportedly charged under the country s controversial anti-terrorism law. The Addis Ababa government claims that the legalization is aimed at protecting Ethiopia from militancy and harmful dissident activity. Given the high number of arrests, coupled with mounting allegations of human rights violations, we assess that the government is likely increasing its usage of the law as a means to crackdown on dissident activity and silence regime critical journalists in the country. In this context, we assess that the Western embassies security warning are likely to further facilitate the government's actions against dissident activity, enabling them to act under the legal guise of the bill, as the threat of militancy remains at a high level. American missionaries attacked north of Addis Ababa, highlights threats to insecurity to Westerners in outlying regions On October 6, an American couple performing missionary work had been wounded after having been shot while they were traveling to build a house in Moga, 90 km north of Addis Ababa. No reports have been released as to who the attackers were and what the motive of the attack was. The director for the couple's missionary organization claimed the attack was a "random act of violence." Westerners and foreigners are often perceived as lucrative targets by criminals and rebel militants. Therefore, despite the proclamation made by the missionary organization for which the couple was working, we assess that it is likely that the two may have been specifically targeted as Westerners. The incident underscores the threat of insecurity and violence in outlying and rural regions of Ethiopia. 06Page

17 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Ivory Coast Internal fractioning within the main opposition FPI reaches climax as reports indicate former President Laurent Gbagbo slated to run in party elections against current leader, N Guessan. Travel to Abidjan may continue at this time while maintaining heightened vigilance for crime and social unrest. FPI internal divisions Although Gbagbo has yet to officially announce his candidacy for the leadership of the Popular Ivorian Front (FPI), his son announced that this would take place in the coming days. A new leader is slated to be elected during the party s congress in December, with current leader, Affi N Guessan having already announced that he would contest. N Guessan remains a divisive personality in the FPI, having attempted to adopt a more conciliatory and moderate approach to the ongoing tensions with President Alassane Ouattara s government. This approach led him to agree to the party s participation in the electoral commission, which was later struck down in an internal vote by the more old guard Gbagbo loyalists. Even though internal tensions were later mitigated during a conciliatory meeting, the differences in approaches have remained salient as evidenced by Gbagbo s announcement. We assess that Gbagbo s candidacy cement the internal divisions within the FPI, which will render it difficult for N Guessan to secure an outright victory. As such, we assess that although reports indicated that the FPI was unlikely to split into two different entities at this time, it remains possible that such deepening internal fracturing will result in a fragmentation of two groups. That said, we assess that given that FPI s party congress is slated to convene in two months from now, it is still possible that an internal negotiated solution will be reached so as to avoid dividing the party, and its support base. Altogether, these developments underscore the continued internal divisions within the FPI, which will continue to hamper the opposition s ability to be successful in the 2015 elections and effectively challenge President Ouattara s government. 07Page

18 MEDIUM RISK Kenya Threat of al-shabaab militancy on Kenyan soil grows as Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) reaps success against group in Somalia, security forces intercepts vehicle containing heavy explosives at northeast border point while arresting militants in Nairobi. President Kenyatta s rising popularity showcased after being welcomed by tens of thousands upon returning to Kenya from International Criminal Court (ICC) trial status conference. Travel to Nairobi and essential travel to Mombasa can continue at this time while adhering to stringent security protocols regarding high levels of crime and militancy. Growing threat of retaliatory al-shabaab attacks Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) under the African Union command (AMISOM) killed at least 60 al-shabaab militants on October 10 as well as more than 80 insurgents on October 23 during separate offensives against militant bases in the Bula Gadud and Jamame areas of Somalia s Jubaland. Moreover, five al-shabaab suspects were killed along the Kenya- Ethiopian border by KDF troops on October 19 as they attempted to infiltrate Kenya with heavy explosives and six suicide vests. In the beginning of October, two suspected militants were apprehended in Nairobi as they were allegedly planning to retrieve weapons to conduct a large scale attack against a mall along Ngong Road in the capital. As the KDF continues to record successes in ousting al-shabaab from its former strongholds in Somalia, the Islamist militants have elevated their attempts to execute retaliatory attacks on Kenyan soil, as highlighted by the recent incidents. The developments further underline the persistent threat of both low-level as well as sophisticated and well-planned militant attacks in Nairobi and other major urban centers. Nonetheless, recent arrests of militant suspects by Kenyan security forces underscore the increased usage of intelligence gathering and covert operations against militant cells. That said, given the large Somali population in Kenya among which militants can avoid detection, local sympathizing groups like al-hijra, and al-shabaab s long term presence in Kenya, the militant threat will likely remain high in coming weeks. President Kenyatta s rising domestic popularity Kenyatta s decision to personally attend the status conference of his case at the ICC reportedly propelled his popularity among Kenyans, as a subsequent study showed that he now enjoys 71% approval rating, the highest thus far in his presidency. Following the ICC hearing, the president was welcomed by a large scale procession in Nairobi, attracting tens of thousands, demonstrating his growing popularity. Amid persistent weaknesses in the ICC case, the trial has little chance of materializing into a ruling against Kenyatta. Moreover, the decreased frequency of militant incidents in Kenya over recent months as well as the main opposition coalition, CORD s, struggling camping to launch a referendum on constitutional changes have further served to increase support of Kenyatta. 08Page

19 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Liberia Rising dissatisfaction with government over measures taken to combat Ebola likely to continue to increase political tension. Those operating or residing in Liberia are strongly advised to practice heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the confirmation of Ebola cases. Governmental actions aimed at gaining additional powers amidst Ebola crisis, intensify discontent among population According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) most recent report, as of October 24, there have been 4,665 Ebola cases and 2,705 deaths recorded within Liberia. Nations around the world have continued to send military forces and other aid in an effort to assist in the fight against Ebola. Locals, however, have continued to experience disruptions to their daily life through indefinite school closures and quarantines leading some to express their feelings of frustration and helplessness through strikes. The president s actions have come under particular scrutiny as they are perceived to be in the interest of those in power to retain authority instead of the prevention and protection of residents from the further spread of Ebola. This was best demonstrated when President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf requested to receive greater executive powers, by widening the 'state of emergency' in place since August, however, this was denied by the government. Additionally, she has been harshly criticized for unnecessary attempts at restricting guaranteed basic rights. Her move to indefinitely suspend the nationwide Senate polls was rejected with both the House and Senate insisting that the elections be held by December 20. Meanwhile, the Liberian media has publicly accused the government of restricting and limiting Ebola coverage, seeing the focus as wrongly placed on censoring free press instead of fighting the epidemic. As the deadline for elections approaches, it is likely that the government will again attempt to postpone them due to continued health and security risks associated with Ebola. These continued efforts to enhance presidential influence will likely compound the present underlying mistrust directed at the government. Finally, should heavy restrictions persist, localized instances of unrest within the population may transpire in the coming weeks. 09Page

20 MEDIUM RISK Mozambique Ruling party Frelimo declare winner of general elections, as opposition Renamo reiterates its refusal to accept results; disarmament and reintegration of Renamo forces yet to commence. Travel to Mozambique may continue while adhering to stringent security protocols, and refraining from nonessential travel to Sofala Province. Ruling Frelimo party wins election, as Filipo Nyusi elected as President Mozambique s general elections transpired relatively peacefully on October 15 with small-scale instances of unrest reported in the city of Beira and Nampula. According to the official results released by National Elections Commission (CNE) on October 30, Nyusi attained 57% of the votes, while opposition Renamo s Afonso Dhlakama gained 36.6% and Daviz Simango of the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM) obtained nearly 7 %. Furthermore, election campaigning has been marked by instances of politically motivated violence, with clashes taking place between supporters of competing parties and occasional instances of attacks by security forces on opposition demonstrators, both before and immediately after the elections. Additionally, numerous accusations were made throughout the country accusing the ruling party of fraudulent activity and electoral irregularities. Furthermore, Dhlakama claimed on October 18 that given an alleged lack of credibility in election results, these would have to be negotiated, while further assuring that Mozambique would not return to a state of war. However, despite localized instances of irregularities and fraudulent allegations, the electoral process was broadly approved by international observers. In this context, we assess that Dhlakama s calls for negotiations are likely an attempt to gain additional influence in the political arena despite losing the elections. On October 29, the Military Observation Team on the Cessation of Hostilities (EMOCHM) began supervising the disarmament process of the main opposition party Renamo s armed wing. However, Renamo s chief negotiator stated on October 27 that the party needs to have an approved reintegration model for it forces before it submits a report on its fighters. In light of this we assess that little progress will be achieved until both parties establish a framework for integration of Renamo forces in the country s security apparatus. Lastly, such an agreement might be delayed as Renamo seeks to contest the electoral results, while capitalizing on its recent post-electoral political gains to achieve further administrative concessions as well as larger economic involvement. 21Page

21 MEDIUM RISK Niger French forces intercept Islamist convoy in Niger, as Paris is set to increase French military presence in the country. On October 30, simultaneous militant attacks were recorded in the Tillaberi region, close to the Malian border region of Gao, killing seven Nigerien security forces. Travel to Niamey may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to general security protocols. French forces intercept Jihadist convoys in Niger, as Paris will increase military presence French forces seized in the overnight hours of October 9-10 a suspected al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) convoy carrying large amounts of weapons, while killing several militants and arresting a number of others. The seizure was part of the larger French regional counter-militancy Operation Barkhane and was carried out in coordination with Nigerien authorities. Meanwhile, defense sources in France have reportedly announced that the country will establish a temporary advanced base in Madama, near Niger's border with Libya, in order to rule in on the human, drugs, and arms trafficking routes linking the latter country to northern Mali. The base will be manned by approximately 50 French soldiers, with support from Operation Barkhane aerial and infantry forces based in Ndjamena, Chad. The seizing of the convoy underscores the continued militant activity in the Sahel region, which has been greatly fueled by the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and the country's ensuing instability, resulting in widespread weapons proliferation that significantly strengthened regional militant groups. The new advanced French base, which will be based more than 100 km closer to the border with Libya than the northernmost Nigerien base, will significantly reduce the radius of search for any future interception mission, thus likely making such efforts more efficient. Nonetheless, we assess that smugglers and militant groups are likely to eventually adapt to the increased vigilance by French forces, thus continuing to take advantage of the region's porous borders. Militant attacks kill seven security officers Simultaneous militant attacks occurred on October 30 in the Tillaberi region, located near the Malian border region of Gao, killing seven members of Niger s security forces. Although no group has yet claimed responsibility for the assaults, we assess that the attacks were likely carried out by members of Islamist militant groups active in northern Mali, including AQIM and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). The motives behind the attacks are likely rooted in the increasing role of Niger in the ongoing regional counterinsurgency operations, as well as their continued support of French troops and participation in the international UN peacekeeping force in Mali. Altogether, the recent developments underline the persistent threat of attacks against government related targets, by militants who use the region s porous borders to launch cross border attacks into Niger. 20Page

22 MEDIUM RISK South Africa Recently released crime statistics demonstrate that violent crime continues to grow, as highlighted by increasing incidents of mall robberies as well as high profile murders. A prolonged strike at the national post office has witnessed incidents of violence, and caused disruptions to businesses reliant on mail services. Competition between rival taxi operators has led to violence and police confiscation of at least 71 taxis in the Gauteng Province. Travel to Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town can continue as normal while adhering to heightened vigilance against possible criminality. Statistics reveal increase in violent crime throughout country During the year measured September 2013-September 2014, there was a spike in armed assaults and robberies at malls throughout the country, including a marked increase in such incidents in Cape Town throughout October. We assess that the rise in armed robberies may be a result of the increase in stock of goods at these locations ahead of the Christmas period. Additionally, there was a high profile shooting of a former Member of Parliament in an attempted robbery, as well as the killing of the national soccer captain in an apparent failed robbery. We assess that due to the historical and socio-economic issues throughout South African society, as well as institutional shortcomings of security forces, violent crime is likely to continue to plague South Africa in the coming years. Violence during prolonged post office strike Casual workers at the national post office have held an ongoing strike for over 11 weeks, during which post offices have been vandalized and razed. Around 6,000 workers are taking part in the labor action that has effectively shut down the postal service, severely affecting those reliant on postal services. The violence that has been witnessed during this strike underscores the persistent threat of unrest that accompanies strikes and protests in South Africa. We further assess that the strike action is likely to continue in the coming days and weeks as there remains a vast difference between the demands of those striking and the offers made by the post office. Rival taxi operators embroiled in violent conflict over access to routes Taxi operators in the Gauteng Province have been involved in a violent conflict which has led to shootouts on main roads as well as a police intervention where at least 71 vehicles were confiscated. A meeting held between taxi operators and senior taxi officials in Eersterus, located roughly 12 km northeast of the Pretoria Central Business District (CBD), devolved into clashes on October 22 with at least two people being injured and reports indicating that firearms were discharged. In light of this violence, as well as the apparent failure to resolve the longstanding dispute, we assess that further violence is likely between rival taxi operators in the coming weeks and months. 22Page

23 Former Prime Minister (PM) Amama Mbabazi takes leave of absence as secretary general of ruling party following allegations of presidential ambitions; highlights President Yoweri Museveni tight grip on power. The government confirmed the first death from Marburg virus in Kampala on October 5, although the Health Ministry declared on October 27 that the spread of the virus had successfully been contained. MEDIUM RISK Uganda Travel to Kampala may continue while adhering to general security protocols with regards to criminal threats, ethnic violence and the persistent risk of militant attacks. Rift between former PM Mbabazi, President Museveni widens The recently sacked PM Mbabazi decided to take a leave of absence from his duties as secretary general for the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) from October 20 until December 31. The incident follows closed meetings of the NRM s Central Executive Committee (CEC), which recommended that Mbabazi take a leave of absence. The developments are significant since Mbabazi s recent sacking as PM was over his alleged covert mobilization to run for president in the 2016 elections, and was perceived as a viable threat to President Museveni. Although it remains unclear whether Mbabazi would attempt to challenge Museveni from within the NRM party structures or as an independent candidate, we assess that his ambitions for the country s top political office remain intact. Altogether, we assess that the incident underlines Museveni entrenched and tight grip on power within the NRM and within the nation s political arena as a whole. Moreover, as Mbabazi will likely continue to be perceived as a threat to Museveni, a government crackdown against his supporters remains likely over the coming weeks and months. Marburg virus successfully contained On October 5, the government confirmed that a health worker passed away from the Marburg virus on September 28 in Kampala. The ministry s statement added that 80 people, who were thought to have been contact with the deceased since September, have reportedly been put under quarantine in Kasese district in Western Uganda, the index case s burial place. The Health Ministry declared on October 27 that the virus had successfully been contained. The Marburg virus is highly contagious and lethal, and is caused by a virus from the same family of the Ebola hemorrhagic fever, and in the past, Uganda has experienced outbreaks of Marburg virus in 2007 and 2012, resulting in 10 deaths in total. Although the government were able to successfully contain the outbreak of Marburg virus, future spreads of the virus remains possible. 23Page

24 LOW RISK Ghana Intermittent power outages and deteriorating economic conditions, including rising cost of living and widespread unemployment, carry the potential to spark an uptick in antigovernment protests due to growing discontent with President Mahama s administration. Travel to Accra may continue at this time while avoiding nonessential travel to outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions. Infrastructural deficiencies, economic grievances increase likelihood of protests Despite incumbent President Mahama's campaign promises of improving the economy and quality of life in Ghana, the country continues to suffer from endemic infrastructural deficiencies, which in turn hinder development. Sustained periods of load shedding started on September 16 and are slated to continue until October 31, underlining the persistent nature of electricity outages in the country, which are partially related to delays in supply from Nigeria. These ongoing outages likely discourage further foreign investment interest due to the ensuing interruptions to business continuity. The civil society group, Concerned Ghanaians for Responsible Governance (CGRG), planned a protest in Accra on September 22 to draw attention to economic stagnation in the country. While Mahama has implemented measures to encourage economic growth, these initiatives will take time to come to fruition, and their probability of success decreases due to infrastructural insufficiencies as well as heavy dependency on foreign aid. Therefore, in light of a persistent campaign by anti-government elements to blame the administration for the nation s continued economic hardship and rising inflation, we assess that there is an increased likelihood of further protests over the coming months. 24Page

25 LOW RISK Sierra Leone Two Ebola deaths confirmed in Koinadgu, marked the last Ebola-free area in the country to succumb to the outbreak. Furthermore, protests by residents against government s handling of the Ebola epidemic have resulted in clashes with security forces in Freetown. Travel to Freetown may continue at this time, while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity, and practicing heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the Ebola epidemic. Residents continue to protest against government s handling of Ebola, cases in Koinadugu mark last virus-free district On October 14, a protest by residents of the Aberdeen Neighborhood in Freetown was forcibly dispersed by security forces firing tear gas and live ammunition from light weapons. The residents protested a delay in the evacuation of the body an Ebola victim, who was reportedly left lying in the street for two days. On October 15, two cases of the Ebola virus were confirmed in the northern district of Koinadugu. The findings marked the last Ebola-free area to be affected by the disease. On October 9, Britain sent a military contingent consisting of 750 troops, three helicopters, and a medical ship to lend assistance in the containment and treatment of the Ebola outbreak. The developments in October demonstrate Sierra Leone's persistent struggle and limited results in containing the Ebola outbreak. Moreover, the World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed that Sierra Leone has recorded a weekly rise in the number of cases for the sixth consecutive week within its western rural region as well as has seen additional areas emerging as potential concerns. At least 3,700 people have died from Ebole in Sierra Leone thus far. The deployment of the British military contingent further underscores the nation s insufficient infrastructure to combat the epidemic. Consequently, we assess there to be an increased potential for further unrest emanating from residents who are frustrated with the government's perceived poor handling of the disease. Given the potential for unrest amongst residents, we assess there is an increased potential for the government to implement another nationwide lockdown, similar to the one witnessed in September, in an attempt to halt the continued spread of the virus. 25Page

26 LOW RISK Tanzania Opposition continues attempts to mobilize ahead of the 2015 general elections. Alleged suspected planner of several militant attacks fatally shot by police. International donors suspend aid following claims of government corruption. Travel to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar may continue at this time while adhering to general security protocols given the potential for militancy and criminal activity. Opposition continues attempt to mobilize ahead of 2015 general elections On October 26, the Coalition for the People's Constitution (UKAWA) held a rally at Dar es Salaam s Jangwani grounds, concluding with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating that a single opposition candidate will run for the presidential post in the General Election slated to be held in The rally took place amidst elevated political tensions in Tanzania over recent weeks between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the dissident camp over the draft constitution and follows several detentions of opposition members and supporters. As elections are upcoming in 2015, we assess that UKAWA s attempts of gaining political support are likely to result in further demonstrations, which have the potential to lead to additional incidents of unrest given the government s inclination to use harsh measures to restrict any dissident activity. Alleged suspected planner of several militant attacks fatally shot by police on October 19 According to police officials, a man suspected of planning a series of attacks in Arusha and Zanzibar since 2012 was fatally shot by security forces on October 19. As no group has claimed responsibility for the bombings throughout mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar in recent years, the attacks have been mostly attributed to the local militant Islamist movement, Uamsho, as well as to members and sympathizers of the Somali-based insurgent group, al-shabaab. While it remains unclear whether the police s claim that the suspect was complicit in the Arusha and Zanzibar bombings are viable, the incident highlights the Tanzanian authorities intensified actions against the alleged growing militant activity in the country. That said, we assess that the threat of militancy remains credible due to increasing reports of active and sleeper cells of al-shabaab sympathizing militants in the country. International donors suspend aid following government corruption claims Reports from October indicate that international donors have suspended nearly 500 million USD worth of budget support to Tanzania after claims that senior government officials have embezzled aid funds intended for the improvement of electrical supply throughout the country. Donors have stated that they will not resume their installments of budget support until further information regarding the suspected case has been released. Tanzania relies heavily on foreign donors support, and its suspension could therefore negatively impact the ruling party s credibility while increasing the support base of opposition party Chadema, which runs a campaign centered on an anti-corruption platform. 26Page

27 LOW RISK Zambia Notable Dates President Michael Sata died in London on October 28, Guy Scott elected interim president, elections to be held within 90 days; political tensions likely to increase over election of successor UNZA students protest on campus in Lusaka following comments made by Minister of Sports and Youth; additional protests likely Travel to Lusaka can continue, while practicing heightened vigilance against possible unrest and violent protests. President Michael Sata dies in London on October 28; political tensions likely to increase over election of successor The Zambian government has announced that President Michael Sata died in a London hospital during the night hours of October 28, where he had been receiving medical treatment for the past week for an undisclosed illness. Reports confirm that the cabinet elected Vice-President Guy Scott as the interim president. New national elections are slated to take place within 90 days as per the country's constitution. The death of the president is likely to elevate political tensions in the country, both among rival factions within the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) and from opposition parties. We assess that the opposition camp is likely to capitalize on the death of President Sata so as to gain momentum and pressure to bring about political change to the country. With this in mind, opposition-led protests may transpire in the coming days and weeks in Lusaka. Should protest actions materialize, we assess that localized unrest remains plausible given that the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) directs the actions of the police and thus is prone to use heavy-handed measures against dissident activity. UNZA students protest on campus in Lusaka following comments made by Minister of Sports and Youth; additional protests likely Police were called in to quell violent protests by students of the University of Zambia (UNZA) along the Great East Road in Lusaka in the night of October 14. The students were angered by comments made by Minister of Sports and Youth, Chishimba Kambwili. Security forces were also mobilized at the State House, however protests remained within the vicinity of the UNZA campus on the Great East Road. Protest actions by students from UNZA have persisted for several years and have often devolved into violence thus we assess that further protest by students is likely to occur. 27Page

28 LOW RISK Zimbabwe A prolonged protest transpired at Harare s Africa Unity Square; underscores increasing dissatisfaction regarding poor economic outlook. Doctors at public medical facilities engage in nationwide strike action, provision of medical care affected. Travel to Harare and Bulawayo can continue while adhering to basic security precautions against common criminality. Anti-government protests in Harare The prolonged protest, held for four consecutive days on October 20-24, was led by a known journalist and editor, Itai Dzamara, who is demanding fresh elections due to the reported declining state of the economy and country as a whole. The protests were dispersed by riot police with reports indicating that organizers and prominent participants have since been detained and beaten by security forces. In a further incident, a journalist was arrested for taking picture of homes that were recently burnt down, allegedly by security forces. We assess that additional protests remain likely in the coming days given that President Mugabe is unlikely to adhere to the demands of the demonstrators. The harsh crackdown on these protesters by the security forces is demonstrative of the government s inclination to crack down upon dissidents. We assess that further anti-government protests of this nature are likely over the coming months, while the potential for a recurring crackdown by security forces remains plausible to counter such demonstrations. Doctors at public medical facilities embark on nationwide strike action Medical doctors in Zimbabwe launched an open-ended nationwide strike on October 27, after the government failed to address their October 7 demands for better pay and improved working conditions. Given that the health care system in the country is already strained and underdeveloped, we assess that that the reported strike by is likely to inhibit the provision of medical care nationwide. We further assess that the doctors are unlikely to have all their demands met in full as the country is in financial hardships and remains under a regime of international sanctions. That said, we assess that the strike action is unlikely to persist for an extended period of time due to the critical and sensitive nature of a labor action within the health industry, which is likely to prompt a negotiated agreement. 28Page