The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)

Transcription

1 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) Project Deliverable No. D 10 of the Project Institutional Interaction How to Prevent Conflicts and Enhance Synergies Between International and European Environmental Institutions December 2001 John Lanchbery In collaboration with: Fridtjof Nansen Institute Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development Institute for European Environmental Policy London Supported by the European Community under the Specific Research and Technological Development Programme Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (Contract no. EVK2-CT ) Ecologic, Institute for International and Eureopean Environmental Policy Pfalzburger Straße 43-44, Berlin, Tel.: (030) ; oberthuer@ecologic.de

2 Introduction CITES seeks to protect wild species by regulating trade in them, and products made from them. Its aim is actually to conserve endangered species but it does so by limiting trade. In other words, it uses a proxy to achieve its objective. It implicitly recognises the fact that it is often hard for an international regime to effectively prescribe what its parties should do at home whereas it is often far easier to regulate an international activity, in this case trade. The idea of limiting international trade in endangered species is not a new one. It dates back to the first decade of the twentieth century when there was a call for a treaty limiting trade in the exotic bird feathers then used in ladies hats. Later, the 1933 London Convention on the preservation of fauna and flora in Africa included provisions for restricting trade and also introduced the concept of having easily changeable annexes or appendices listing species. Many later regional fauna and flora treaties followed the example of the London Convention, paving the way for the global CITES agreement which limits trade in species listed in three appendices. Substantive political moves for a global agreement on trade in endangered species began in the 1950s, together with other wildlife agreements, notably the Ramsar Convention on wetlands. In 1963 the Governing Council of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) called for an international convention on regulating the export, transit and import of rare or threatened fauna and flora species or their skins or trophies. Subsequent progress on negotiating a treaty was, however, slow until the 1972 Stockholm Conference re-emphasised the need for such an agreement. By March 1973 CITES had been negotiated and signed by its first twenty one parties. In essence, the mode of operation of CITES is simple. Its main features are three appendices that are reviewed, and can be changed, at its conferences of contracting parties (COPs). The first appendix lists species in which trade is banned in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The regime also lays down detailed rules governing the import and export of species or products made from them. CITES requires its parties to establish national Management Authorities (MAs) and Scientific Authorities (SAs). The former are responsible for supervising domestic enforcement by, for example, providing customs officials with lists of species and means of identifying them. 1 Some operational features of the treaty have evolved considerably over time. It has, for example, set up a Standing Committee (SC) to oversee the operation of the agreement between conferences of parties. It has also developed a compliance and enforcement mechanism: the SC can, and does, recommend the cessation of all wildlife trade with recalcitrant states. 2 In 1992 it banned such trade with both Italy and Thailand until they came into compliance. When considering horizontal institutional interactions with CITES, it is important to realise that there are at least three major factors which tend to drive the regime to act synergistically with others. The first major factor is that CITES is one of many wildlife conservation treaties that have similar or overlapping aims. These include global treaties such as the Convention on Migratory Species (CMS, Bonn), the Ramsar Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and a host of regional 1 CITES routinely provides the MAs with information to help them in their task. The quality of both types of body varies considerably from country to country and CITES runs training schemes to try to improve the effectiveness of the bodies. 2 Throughout this paper the term wildlife is used in the sense that includes both wild fauna and wild flora.

3 Institutional Interaction: CITES 2 agreements. Because they have similar aims, the wildlife agreements almost invariably interact synergistically to strengthen each other. 3 This synergy tends to be reinforced by the fact that they typically use different means to achieve their ends: CITES restricts wildlife trade, Ramsar conserves wetlands that are used by birds, and so on. Rather than compete, the regimes therefore usually complement each other, with one regime requesting another to support it in attaining a particular goal, as in the first case in this study where Vicuña Convention asked CITES for help by limiting trade in vicuña products. Secondly, in order to be effective, CITES must act in concert with a range of institutions with goals that do not concern the environment, notably the World Customs Organisation (WCO), the International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO, known as Interpol), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Failure to work with any one of these institutions would obviously hinder the operation of CITES whose restrictions on trade are enforced by the customs and police services Worldwide. CITES therefore has memoranda of understanding with the WCO and ICPO-Interpol. The CITES Secretariat sits on the WTO s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), on Interpol s Wildlife Crime Working Group and has a joint Working Group with the WCO, which ICPO-Interpol secretariat staff attend. The third factor influencing the operation of wildlife treaties, including CITES, is the IUCN (now known as the World Conservation Union but preserving its old initials) and a few other key NGOs, notably WWF and associated organisations such as the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) and TRAFFIC 4,5 These play a vital part in the operation of CITES. Indeed, the IUCN, WCMC and TRAFFIC are formally recognised as the technical partners in CITES. They provide much of the information about science and about infractions that the regime needs in order to operate effectively. For example, the IUCN s Red Lists of endangered species tend to drive CITES listings in its appendices and misbehaviour by parties is often reported by TRAFFIC via the Secretariat s List of Alleged Infractions. 6 In recent years CITES has deliberately attempted to interact even more synergistically with other institutions, especially since adopting a Decision (10.110) at its tenth COP in 1997 to the effect that continued cooperation between CITES and the CBD shall be fostered and this should be extended to other relevant conventions. Since then, the CITES Secretariat has intensified its formal and informal links not only with other biodiversity-related agreements but also with the other institutions with which it routinely needs to work, including the WCO, the WTO and ICPO-Interpol. The Standing Committee recently published a document entitled Synergy between biodiversity-related conventions and relations with other organisations (CITES Document SC.42.17, 1999) which is impressive in the number and scope of the interactions that it describes. 3 Members of the Secretariats of wildlife agreements regularly attend others meetings. For example, CITES staff attend meetings of the IWC, CDB, and Bonn Conventions, and vice versa. 4 Both the WCMC and TRAFFIC were originally set up by WWF but are now independent of it. 5 Other organisations, such as UNEP, also play important roles but that of the IUCN is particularly longstanding, powerful and hence important. 6 The IUCN is an unusual body in that its membership includes governments, government agencies and environmental groups. As a consequence of including governments it is a powerful organisation and, partly as a consequence of including many environmental groups, often surprisingly radical. It played a central role in both the instigation and negotiation of the major, global wildlife treaties.

4 Institutional Interaction: CITES 3 Finally, it should be noted that vertical interactions with the EU are not always synergistic. This is partly because the EU is not a party to CITES although its member states are, individually. Nevertheless, the two institutions do interact. There is a Council Regulation concerning CITES (338/97), an accompanying Commission Regulation and an EU Committee, comprised of member states, on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora focussing on CITES. Table 1. Outline of interactions with CITES covered here and some of their main characteristics Institution Issue Main Cause Source/ Initial effect Nature of Response Adequacy of (field/interacti target influence response on) Vicuña treaty Trade in Membership Vicuña Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally ok. (environmen- vicuña prod- /CITES Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional Little more that tal/horizontal) ucts tional. coordination could be done. Whaling, Trade in Means Whaling/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally ok. ICRW (envi- whale prod- (linked to CITES Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional Little more that ronmental/ ucts membership) tional. coordination could be done. horizontal) CMS (envi- Trade in Means CMS/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally ok. ronmen- houbara (linked to CITES Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional Little more that tal/horizontal) bustard membership) tional. coordination could be done. products CBD (envi- Synergy Means CITES/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally ronmen- CBD Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional significant but room tal/horizontal) tional. coordination for improvement. WTO (non- Synergy/ Means CITES/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally environmen- potential WTO Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional significant. Probably tal/horizontal) conflict Outcome? tional. coordination adequate. WCO (non- Synergy Means and CITES/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally environmen- objectives WCO Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional significant and tal/horizontal) Outcome? tional. coordination probably adequate. ICPO (non- Synergy Means and CITES/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally environmen- objectives ICPO Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional significant. More tal/horizontal) Outcome? tional. coordination action planned. EU (vertical) Poor imple- CITES/ Synergy Dependent on Collective decision-mak- Institutionally mentation EU Output consent. Inten- ing/inter-institutional significant and Outcome? tional. coordination adequate.

5 Institutional Interaction: CITES 4 1. Horizontal Interactions 1.1. Convention for the conservation of the vicuña: trade in vicuña wool cloth (This is one of several, linked and similar cases) The issue: Both the CITES and the vicuña treaty are nature conservation agreements but CITES aims to protect all endangered species whereas the latter specifically targets the vicuña. As part of its efforts to conserve the vicuña (a llama-like creature with soft, commercially valuable fleece), the Convenio para la Conservación y Manejo de la Vicuña (CCMV) tries to restrict trade in the products of the creature, primarily wool and cloth woven from the wool. Vicuña products are listed by CITES and so the remits of the two institutions overlap in this area. The basis for the interaction (there have been several similar ones) is that the CCMV can, at best, only control exports of vicuña products and encourage domestic conservation, but its membership is limited and quite poor. (Its membership is restricted to range states of the vicuña: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru). It has a hard time controlling exports over long borders with limited customs resources. The customers for vicuña products are, on the other hand, comparatively wealthy (mainly European and North American) and are almost all members of CITES. They are in a far better position to restrict imports than the CCMV members are to control exports. The two regimes thus act in concert to try to conserve the vicuña. Causes and policy fields: Both insistitutions are environmental, specifically conserning nature conservation. In this case, and in previous cases, the source institution was the CCMV and the target was CITES. The functional responsibilities of the two regimes overlap. One is, in effect, a subset of the other, in that the purpose of the vicuña regime is to conserve the endangered vicuña and CITES aims to conserve all endangered species, including the vicuña which is listed in both Appendix I and Appendix II of CITES. A difference in membership was the main cause of the interaction. Membership of CITES is more or less global whereas that of the CCMV is restricted to those countries in which the vicuña lives (socalled range states because they are within the creature s natural range). However, the main threat to the vicuña is over-exploitation due to demand for its valuable wool or skin in highly developed countries. A main means of restricting over-exploitation is thus to restrict imports of vicuña into developed countries but the limited membership of the CCMV prevents it from taking such action. It therefore asks CITES both to list the vicuña and vicuña products in its Appendices and periodically calls for enhanced enforcement in various ways, such as calling upon CITES members not to recognise wool not marked with CCMV stamps of approval. There are significant differences between the detailed objectives, means, and institutional features of the two institutions but these are not the main cause of the interaction. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (CITES) responded by passing a COP Resolution obliging CITES parties to take action, see policy responses section, below. Whether this output resulted in a definite outcome is hard to establish because to determine this would involve establishing whether national Management Authorities (MAs are esta b- lished under CITES) actually restricted imports of vicuña products, and whether they did so systematically and deliberately. MA performance, which is anyway linked to domestic customs and police per-

6 Institutional Interaction: CITES 5 formance, is patchy and not generally linked to particular products, but to national circumstances. Vicuña numbers have not crashed, but whether this is due to the operation on CITES, or even the CCMV, or whether it would have happened anyway is very hard to determine. Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence: The nature of the influence is synergistic with CITES acting in support of a regime with similar goals. There are several discreet cases of the vicuna convention asking for support on particular issues, firstly, in getting the vicuña listed in the CITES Appendices and subsequently asking CITES parties to take specific actions regarding the import of wool or cloth. 7 Most recently, in April 2000, the secretariat of the vicuña treaty asked CITES to, amongst other things, authorise the import of vicuña cloth only if it bore a distinctive logo. The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses: CITES has apparently always responded positively to requests from the vicuña convention. In the most recent case, mentioned above, the COP passed a Resolution which recommends that the CITES Management Authorities (which each Party is obliged to establish domestically) only to import cloth bearing the correct logo. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: The fact that the Convention for the Vicuña has felt the need to repeatedly ask CITES to ask its members to take similar actions implies that practical success has been limited. On the other hand, the South American regime presumably considers that it worth working with CITES, otherwise it would not continue to do so. The response was thus not completely adequate in terms of effectiveness but probably the most that the target regime (CITES) could realistically do. It was thus an institutionally adequate response and probably could not be improved upon by the institution,. Other remarks: At least three interactions have occured on wool and cloth: in 1992, 1997 and There are probably more. All involved the vicuña convention approaching CITES Sources: CITES and CCMV official documentation. 8 7 For example, CITES Resolutions 8.11 on stocks of wool and cloth of vicuna and 11.6 on trade in vicuna cloth 8 Much of the background information on wildlife agreements is from "Long term trends in systems for implementation review in international agreements on flora and fauna" John Lanchbery in Chapter 2 of The implementation and effectiveness of international environmental commitments: theory and practice, eds. D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala and E. B. Skolnikoff, pp 57-88, MIT Press/IIASA, And from documents cited in this text.

7 Institutional Interaction: CITES International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW): trade in cetacean specimens and products (Linked to several similar cases) The issue: In its modern form, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) seeks to protect whales, although it does allow some whaling for scientific purposes and by indigenous peoples. CITES also aims to protect some species of cetaceans by limiting trade in them. (Cetaceans are listed in CITES Appendices.) There is thus common ground between the two agreements in terms of their aims. In the particular case highlighted here, in 2000, CITES basically responded to a request from the ICRW to support it in protecting any stocks and species of whales protected from commercial whaling by the ICRW. The basis for the interaction is that the bulk of the membership of the ICRW wish to stop all whaling. (This has not always been the case, and was not what the treaty was originally established for but it has metamorphosed, in line with the wishes of most of its members, from a resource management agreement into an environmental agreement, with some members still dissenting.) The ICRW does not, however, limit trade and preventing trade in whale products is one way of restricting the killing of whales. The ICRW has thus repeatedly (since 1979) aksed CITES to restrict trade in whale products. Causes and policy fields: Both insisututions are environmental and concern nature conservation (or rather that is how most of the ICRW members think of the regimes nowadays.) The source institution was the ICRW and the target was CITES.The cause is basically the ICRW s wish to stop all commercial whaling by stamping out any international trade in whale meat. The main cause of the interaction was a difference in means, coupled with membership. CITES enables restrictions on trade which the ICRW does not (being mainly concerned with restricting the taking of whales). Moreover, CITES has a far larger membership and so any action taken by CITES has a far larger effect. Although there are differences in the objectives and insititutional features of the two regimes they are not the main cause of the interaction. However, it is interesting that the objective of the ICRW has changed over time, driven by the wishes of many of its membership (expanded by membership of nonwhaling nations) and facilitated by the institutional structure of the agreement which enables change to be effected quite simply (by changing its Schedule). When established, as the last in a series of whaling agreements, the ICRW was concerned with managing whale stocks in order to allow more whaling. It was not, in the modern sense, an environmental regime and would not have interacted with CITES in this way, even had CITES then existed. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (CITES) responded by passing a COP Resolution recommending CITES parties to take action, see policy responses section, below. Whether this output resulted in a definite outcome is hard to establish. There are several reasons for this difficulty. Only a limited number of whales are now taken, mainly for scientific purposes and by relatively few countries, such as Japan and Norway, where domestic consumption of whale meat is high. Exports and thus bound to be quite low, especially when coupled with the fact that most people in most other developed countries would not wish to, knowingly, eat whale meat. (Whale meat used to be used in pet food but again, this has generally declined due to consumer, pet-owner, pressure.) Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence: The ICRW specifically requested, and received, action from CITES.

8 Institutional Interaction: CITES 7 The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses: CITES responded to the ICRW request at COP 11 in April 2000 by passing a Resolution (11.4) recommending, amongst other things, that: i. CITES parties that do not adhere to the ICRW should do so; ii. iii. iv. CITES parties agree not to issue any permits for primarilly comercial purposes for any specimens of species or stocks protected from commercial whaling by the ICRW; the CITES Secretariat should prepare a lists of the above species and stocks; all countries cooperate to prevent illegal (under the ICRW) trade in whale meat and report to the CITES Secretariat about any illegal trade and directs the Secretariat to share any information with the ICRW. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: At the institutional level this was certainly a succcessful response. The practical success, in provoking domestic action, is not clear. There is, realistically, little more that the institution could do. Other remarks: Similar requests from the ICRW in the past occured in 1979 (CITES Resolutions 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9), in 1981 (Resolution 3.13) and in 1994 (Resolution 9.12). Sources:.CITES and ICRW official records.

9 Institutional Interaction: CITES Convention on Migratory Species (CMS): the houbara bustard The issue: The houbara bustard is a rare and endangered species of bird, particularly in Arabia but also in North Africa. The species is endangered because of uncontrolled hunting, and there is international trade in the species, although it is included in Appendix I of CITES. Its endangered status was highlighted at the World Conservation Congress (run by the IUCN, amongst others) at its first session in 1996 (Recommendations 1.27 and 1.28). Its poor conservation status was then raised, by Saudi Arabia, at the fifth COP of the CMS in 1997 (Recommendation 5.4). As the Asia representative on the Standing Committee of the CMS, Saudi Arabia helped develop an agreement on the bustard under the CMS 9. The basis for the interaction (there have been several similar ones) is basically a common concern to protect rare species, via traeties with common aims. As mentioned in the Introduction, the wildlife treaties work closely together, with the IUCN and often UNEP. This bond is particularly strong in the case of CITES and the CMS: the secretariats of both are provided by UNEP, and both UNEP and the IUCN coordinate multi-treaty responses to particular problems. The houbara bustard is on the IUCN Red Lists and all releveant treaties are thus targeted by the IUCN and UNEP, via both secretariats and parties. Causes and policy fields: Both regimes are environmental and concerned with nature conservation. The source institution was the CMS and the target was CITES. CITES is solely concerned with restricting trade whereas the CMS is main aimed at direct on the ground nature conservation. (the CMS is a complex, unusual regime, see other remarks below.) The cause was basically the CMS and the IUCN and individual parties calling for assistance on a matter of common concern. The main cause of the interaction was a difference in means, coupled with membership. The CMS cannot restrict trade and hence cannot try cut off demand for animal products and thereby prevent over-exploitation caused by the sale of the products to other countries. Also, the membership of CI- TES is far larger than that of the CMS, whose membership includes neither most American states (including the USA and Brazil) nor countries such as Russia and China. Working via CITES i thus a way of effectively extending the membership on particulat issues. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (CITES) responded by passing a COP Resolution requesting CITES parties to take action, see policy responses section, below. Whether this output resulted in a definite outcome is almost impossible to establish. This bustard is a very rare bird and establishing, let alone attributing, changes in the numbers of the species is hard. Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : Specific requests for action from the other regimes and common parties. The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. 9 One of the main functions of the CMS is to develop subagreements on specific species. There are agreements on African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds, small cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas, European bats, and the Great Bustard and six other species or sets of species.

10 Institutional Interaction: CITES 9 The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses: CITES responded to the requests by passing Resolution at the 10th Conference of its Parties which i. urges parties that are range states for the houbara bustard to prohibit hunting, trapping and egg collecting in the species breeding and nesting areas; ii. iii. calls upon range states 10 to review the draft CMS agreement from Saudi Arabia, and return comments to the Saudis; encourages further research in range states. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: Unclear. The regime interaction certainly occured but the CMS agreement on the houbara bustrad has yet to appear. On the other hand, the CMS lists many species that would benefit from either formal agreements or memoranda of understanding and it may take many years for them all to come to fruition. At the institutional level this was certainly a succcessful response. There is, realistically, little more that the institution could do. Other remarks: The Convention on Migratory Species is, as its name suggests, designed to protect migratory species. It has two appendices with quite different purposes. The first list species that countries in the natural range of the species are obliged to protect. The second list species which the Parties to the CMS that are range states are obliged to draw up separate sub-agreements to protect. There are now eight agreements covering a range of species but it is a complex and long-winded process to get them under way, if only because they need separate ratification. The current trend is thus to aim for memoranda of understanding instead, which at least do not need separate ratification. An agreement on the houbara bustard is still being discussed in the CMS. Sources: CMS, CITES and IUCN official documents. 10 A range state in the context of the CMS is a country that is included in the natural range of a particular species.

11 Institutional Interaction: CITES Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): attempts at synergy (several linked cases) The issue: Most multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) were concluded to address specific problems on an ad hoc basis and were not specifically designed to be synergistic, even where the issue areas they cover overlap considerably. This is certainly the case for CITES that very specifically targets international trade in endangered species. The CBD is more concerned with providing a framework for domestic action, such as drawing up national strategies for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. However, by the time that the CBD entered into force, nearly 20 years after CITES, the need for co-ordination between related regimes was better recognised and the CBD is specifically obliged (under its Article 24.4) to co-ordinate with related instruments. The basis for the interaction (there have been several similar ones) is, ultimately article 5 of the CBD which specifically requires parties to cooperate with other relevant regimes. When the treaty was drafted, there were already many nature conservation regimes in force and the parties were keen to avoid duplication of effort. At least partly to facilitate cooperation, the treaty stipulated that UNEP was to provide the secretariat. Both CITES and the CBD are thus part of the coordinating mafia, the nexus of which are the IUCN and UNEP, as in the case of CMS/CITES interactions. Causes and policy fields: Both regimes are environmental and concerned with nature conservation. The source institution was the CITES and the target was the CBD. Interestingly, although the CBD specifically encourages co-ordination, CITES was the first to publicly recognised the need for cooperation with the CBD shortly after the latter entered into force (29 december 1993) and action on this front was mentioned in the Secretariat s Strategic Plan (Doc. 9.17) at the ninth Conference of Parties in This interaction was driven by an obvious need for synergy and co-operation, mainly due to a difference in the means available to the two institutions. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (the CBD) responded by passing a COP Resolution asking CBD parties to take action, see policy responses section, below. Whether this output resulted in a definite outcome is hard to establish, in large part because it is almost impossible to distinguish between which actions by parties would have happened anyway, as a result of demand (by them) within the IUCN/UNEP system. At the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : Specific requests for synergy from both regimes. The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses: The CBD responded to the CITES 1994 Strategic Plan with its own COP Decision III/21 (Relationship of the Convention with the Commission on Sustainable Development and biodiversity-related conventions, other international agreements, institutions and processes of relevance) endorsing a Memorandum of Understanding between the two secretariats. The need for synergy was re-emphasised by CITES in the context of of a review of the effectiveness of the Convention at COP 10 (Decision ) and in a COP 10 Resolution (10.4) specifically on cooperation and synergy with the Convention on Biological Diversity. Resolution 10.4 specifically

12 Institutional Interaction: CITES 11 i. asks the CITES and CBD secretariats to coordinate their programme activities via UNEP coordination meetings; ii. iii. iv. suggests that parties make their own efforts to encourage synergy; asks parties to look for ways of obtaining funding through the GEF that would be relevant to the aims of both Conventions; recommends that the CITES Secretariat seek ways in which CITES can act as a partner in implementing CBD provisions; v. asks the next CBD COP to further consider ways of enhancing synergy between the two agrements with a view to considering them at the next CITES COP. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: Unclear. A significant institutional response certainly occured and the COPs are talking to each other. Indeed, there is considrerable discussion of global goverance in the UNEP governing Council (see CITES Standing Committee, June 2001 meeting, SC45.Doc. 6). There is room for further improvement, as suggested in the CITES Resolution 10.4 itself., for example, as in CITES implementing CBD provisions. Other remarks: Sources: CITES and CBD official documentation.

13 Institutional Interaction: CITES World Trade Organisation (WTO): attempts at cooperation (several linked cases) The issue: As the WTO aims to govern World trade and CITES aims to restrict certain aspects of it, there is clearly scope for considerable disagreement between the two regimes. The basis for the interaction was the growing debate during the 1990s about possible conflicts between Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and non-environmental agreements, especially the GATT and later the WTO. (The debate began in earnest with the 1991 decision by the GATT in the so-called Tuna-Dolphin case that efforts by the USA to protect resources (in this case dolphins) were inconsistent with the rules for international trade, see Feber et al.) In fact, there would appear to have been little or no direct conflict between the GATT/WTO and CITES, perhaps because the remit of CITES is very clear and its membership is large, encompassing most of the WTO members and all of the most powerful nations favouring free trade. These nations would thus have to contradict themselves in order to create a significant clash between CITES and the WTO. Nevertheless, becasue of the fears of a clash, the two institutions made concrete moves to formalise coordination, rather than just assume that it would happen anyway. Causes and policy fields : CITES is an environmental regime, concerned with nature conservation, and the WTO is concerned with trade liberalisation as an end in itself. The source institution was CI- TES and the target was the WTO. Active work on closer cooperation began following the development of CITES Secretariat s Strategic Plan (Doc. 9.17) at the ninth Conference of Parties in 1994 whose theme was cooperation with other agreements. In 1997 the CITES Secretariat became observers to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) and both Secretariats closely follow developments in the other s regime. The interaction was driven mainly by the difference in the objectives of the two institutions, which clearly could lead to disruptive interactions without quite close co-operation and coordination. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (WTO) responded directly in several ways, see policy responses section, below. There was an outcome but this was slightly atypical in the context of this project, in that the desired outcome was greater synergy between the institutions which was achievable largely at the international institutional level. At the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : Specific requests for synergy from both regimes. The source institutation has little power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. Whilst CITES could, in theory, influence the WTO by restricting trade, in practice, it only restricts trade within a well-defined (by international agreement) remit that the WTO accepts. Anyway, as mentioned before, the memberships of CITES and the WTO overlap consideerably and it is most unlikely, in practice, that the membership of CITES would contradict itself. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses: A host of small but significant meetings between the two regimes have occurred in recent years. For example: i. In June 1999, UNEP (which provides the CITES Secretariat) organised a meeting between the WTO Secretariat and MEAs, including CITES. In the same month there was a meeting with the CTE at which the CITES Secretariat agreed on a regular exchange of views with the CTE.

14 Institutional Interaction: CITES 13 It was agreed that CITES will coordinate with other UNEP administered conventions on international trade. ii. iii. In September 2000, the WTO Secretariat prepared, with the MEA Secretariats, a long list of trade measures persuant to selected MEAs (WT/CTE/W/160) for WTP delegates. In October 2000, CITES presented a paper to the WTO CTE on the relationship between the two bodies, elaborating on the June1999 exchange and laying out some proposals on how to promote synergy (WT/CTE/W/165). The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: Unclear. An institutional response has certainly occured and there has been no direct conflict between them. However, it is doubtful whether recent liaison between the regimes actually prevented conflict. Other remarks: Sources: CITES and WTO official documentation. Note that all outstanding CITES Decisions are now listed in one document from COP 11. The Strategic Plan mentioned above is now incorporated in Annex I of the COP 11 document.

15 Institutional Interaction: CITES World Customs Organisation (WCO): moves to greater synergy (linked cases) The issue: CITES relies upon the WCO for much of its practical enforcement and the two regimes thus have to work very closely together. It is customs officers who, with police officers, intercept shipments that are illegal under CITES. The basis for the interaction is long-standing, dating back to when CITEs first came into force. CITES is specifically designed to interact closely with national customs authorities. Parties are obliged to establish Management Authorities to issue CITES-related export permits and supervise CITES-related imports. To enable common import and export formats and proceedures, it was thus inevitable that CITES and the WCO work togther, and they did. Nevertheless, with the debate about possible conflicts between MEAs and non-environmental agreements during the 1990s (mentioned previously in the WTO case) an event more positive effort was made to avoid possible conflicts. Causes and policy fields : CITES is an environmental regime, concerned with nature conservation, and the WCO is concerned with the effective operation of customs organistations. The source institution was the CITES and the target was the WCO. As in the case of other agreements, more active work on closer cooperation began following the development of CITES Secretariat s Strategic Plan (Doc. 9.17) at the ninth Conference of Parties in In July 1996, the Secretariats of the World Customs Organization and CITES signed a updated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This lays down a legal framework for international cooperation between the two organizations, providing for controlled information exchange, development of synergy between Customs and CITES Management Authorities at national level, and providing awareness measures and training for the relevant services. The interaction was driven by a difference in both means and objectives: means in the sense that the WCO has the means available (which CITES lacks) to it to facilitate CITES; objectives in the sense that they are so different between the two regimes that a speciific effort at interaction is required. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (WCO) responded in a variety of ways, see policy responses section, below. As in the case of the WTO, there was also an outcome, in the sense that part of the desired outcome was to be attained at the international institutional level and this was achieved. The extent to which there was an outcome on the ground in individual states is harder to assess, for the reasons outlined above. Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : Specific requests for synergy from both regimes. The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses:amongst other things, joint actions by CITES and the WCO include: i. A joint WCO/CITES Working Group attended by staff from the Secretariats. ii. The Secretariats facilitate the exchange of information through the WCO s Central Information System (CIS) and its programme for the regionalization of intelligence. In 1997, the WCO and the CITES Secretariat set up a joint database on CITES-related offences.

16 Institutional Interaction: CITES 15 iii. As an example of publicising information about each others activity, the WCO website home page is, for example, dominated by CITES information, with a brochure on CITES and customs and a children s page about conservation of the North American Black Bear. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: There was a strong institutional response and there would appear to be little more that the regimes need to do institutionally. Other remarks: Sources: CITES and WCO official documentation.

17 Institutional Interaction: CITES International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO/Interpol): moves to greater synergy (linked cases) The issue: As in the case of the WCO, CITES relies upon Interpol for much of its practical enforcement and the two regimes thus have to work very closely together. The basis for the interaction was the need for better enforcement of CITES. Whilst national customs and police services and basically those responsible for implementing CITES, the need for multilateral cooperation and information exchnge between domestic domestic services is clearly essential for success in trying to prevent international trade. As in the case of the WTO and WCO, formal cooperation intensified in the 1990s with increased debate about potential conflicts between environmental and non-environmental regimes. Causes and policy fields : : CITES is an environmental regime, concerned with nature conservation, and the ICPO is concerned with the effective operation of police organistations, especially their international coordination. The source institution was the CITES and the target was the ICPO. As in the case of other agreements, more active work on closer cooperation began following the development of CITES Secretariat s Strategic Plan (Doc. 9.17) at the ninth Conference of Parties in In October 1998, a Memorandum of Understanding between the CITES Secretariat and the ICPO came into force. The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen co-operation aimed at combating the international trade in endangered through an increased exchange of information, reciprocal representation at meetings and the production of joint documents and publications. (ICPO/Interpol also concluded a similar agreement with the WCO in 1998.) CITES is an environmental regime, Interpol is not. As in the case of the interactions with the WCO, the interaction was driven mainly by different but complementary means and objectives: means in the sense that the ICPO has the means available (which CITES lacks) to it to facilitate CITES; objectives in the sense that they are so different between the two regimes that a speciific effort at interaction is required. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (ICPO) responded by taking a number of initiatives, see policy responses section, below. As in the case of the WTO, there was also an outcome, in the sense that part of the desired outcome was to be attained at the international institutional level and this was achieved. The extent to which there was an outcome on the ground in individual states is harder to assess, for the reasons outlined above. Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : Specific requests for synergy from both regimes. The source institutation has no power to unilaterally influence the target, other than via overlapping membership. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target. Policy responses:amongst other things, joint actions by CITES and ICPO Interpol include: i. A joint ICPO-Interpol/CITES Wildlife Crime Working Group attended by Secretariats and linking to the CITES/WCO Working Group; ii. joint efforts (with WCO as well) on training;

18 Institutional Interaction: CITES 17 iii. informal agrement to work more cooperatively on enforcement, with WCO as well. CITES is to draw up proposals for this. The response involved both collective decision-making and inter-institutional co-ordination. Success or failure/adequacy of response: Interaction between the institutions appears good and plans are in hand to make them better. Other remarks: Sources: CITES and ICPO-Interpol official documentation.

19 Institutional Interaction: CITES Vertical Interactions 2.1 European Union: changes to EU Regulations (several linked cases) The issue: The basis for the interaction is that the EU is not a party to CITES, although all but one (Ireland) of its individual members are. This matter has long rankled with other parties. They feared that in a situation where trade boundaries within the EU were lowered and yet legal obligations to enforce CITES domestically were up to individual members states, CITES enforcement within the EU would be undermined and essentially dictated by the state with the most lax import and export controls. To help engage the EU (then the EEC) CITES COP 4 (Gaborone, Botswana, 1983) amended Article XXI of the Convention to allow regional economic organisations to become parties. Shortly before COP 4, the EU had, in fact, developed a Regulation (EEC No 3626/82) for implementing CITES within the EU and which came into force in However, by COP 6 (Ottowa, 1987) the other parties to CITES were still concerned. In a COP Resolution (Conf. 6.5) they expressed several concerns, notably about increased lowering of EU border controls and the fact that the new community legislation (3626/82) was a voluntary, rather than a binding, to CITES commitments. CITES therefore asked the EEC to urgently establish full means of Community supervision of its legislation by means of an adequately staffed Community inspectorate, and monitor the movement of CITES specimens within and between Member States in accordance with the mechanisms foreseen in EEC Council Regulation 3626/82 and by use of existing forms available under Community legislation. Causes and policy fields : Matters came to a head in 1992 by which time it was clear that not only was the EEC planning to essentially abolish internal border controls in 1993 but that some member states still had inadequate CITES-related domestic legislation whilst, at the same time, EEC legislation was non-binding. This matter was highlighted by the fact that Italy, in particular, had a very poor record of implementing CITES and in 1992 the Standing Committee called upon the CITES parties to ban all wildlife trade with Italy until it implemented the treaty properly. The main causes of the interaction were a combination of membership and objectives. Membership in the sense that not all EU members are members of CITES and neither, therefore, is the EU. (CITES is basically trying to enforce its domestic implementation in a state that is not a member.) Objectives in the sense that whilst the EU has environmental objectives, it was not these that provoked the interaction. It was a desire to lower, or eliminate, trade barriers within the Union. Initial effect: The source regime influenced the output of the target regime, in that the latter (the EU) responded by passing new regulations, see policy responses section, below. Whether this output resulted in a significant, definite outcome is harder to establish. Certainly at the output level, the initial interaction was synergistic. Nature of influence : The source institutation has, in theory, power to unilaterally influence the target, because all but one of the EU member states are parties to CITES, even though the EU is not. The influence was intentional in the case of both the source and the target.

20 Institutional Interaction: CITES 19 Specifically, the nature of the influence was as follows. CITES COP 8, in Kyoto in 1992, passed a Resolution (Conf. 8.2, Implementation of the Convention in the European Economic Community) berating the EU on a number of points. It is a very clear resoltion and is thus reproduced, in part, below: TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that in the EEC terminated controls between member countries and that consequently any specimen that enters one of the countries of the Community is allowed free circulation within the Community; CONSIDERING that the EEC is one of the most important regions with respect to trade in CI- TES species and that a weak implementation of the Convention opens this important market to the trade in CITES specimens of illegal origin; CONSIDERING the efforts made by some exporting countries in their fight against illegal trade, in spite of difficult economic circumstances; RECOGNIZING that some EEC countries do not have adequate national legislation to ensure the correct implementation of the Convention, particularly with regard to the requirements of Article VIII; CONSIDERING that some EEC countries issue re-export certificates without taking the necessary measures to ascertain the validity of the documents issued by the countries of origin, and that the potential re-exports may legalize goods of illegal or igin; CONSIDERING that this situation is serious both in general terms and in particular in the cases of live animals and of reptile skins and parts thereof; TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that one European country is a member of the EEC but not of CI- TES; THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION URGES: a) the EEC Member States that are Parties to the Convention to complete the development of appropriate legislation and to increase substantially the allotment of resources required to ensure the enforcement of the Convention, and to provide to the international community the necessary assurance regarding compliance with the agreements in force; and b) the EEC Member State not party to CITES to ratify the Convention as soon as possible; and RECOMMENDS that Parties that have not yet done so accept the Gaborone amendment. Policy responses: The EU s eventual response was new Council and Commission Regulations to replace EEC No 3626/82: Council Regulation (EC) No. 338/97 and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 939/37, which came into effect on 1 June The new Regulations enforce CITES as well as providing additional measures for the conservation of species in trade. Although the EU documentation does not mention the CITES Resolutions regarding the EU, it does say that the new Council Regulation was needed to: adequately reflect the current structure of trade and cope with the abolition of internal border controls which resulted from the Single Market. The abolition of internal borders has made necessary the adoption of stricter trade control measures at the Community's external borders. 11 Note that CITES revises texts retrospectively and that this date was added after the COP>