Can policy programs influence policy change? The Case of Swiss Climate Policy. Paper prepared for the 2012 IPSA World Congress, Madrid, July

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1 Can policy programs influence policy change? The Case of Swiss Climate Policy Fritz Sager, Marietta Bürki, and Jennifer Luginbühl Paper prepared for the 2012 IPSA World Congress, Madrid, July Contact: Prof. Dr. Fritz Sager Center of Competence for Public Management at the University of Bern Schanzeneckstrasse 1 P.O. Box 8573 CH-3001 Bern Switzerland phone fax fritz.sager@kpm.unibe.ch Abstract While there is vast array of research on the question of how policy programs are influenced by the policies they are meant to implement, the inverse question - do policy programs influence policy decisions? - has not yet been the subject of any significant amount of research. We will approach this question first theoretically by identifying different aspects of policy change, such as problem definition, agenda setting, goal and instrument definition and resource allocation. We will go on to discuss several different ways in which a policy programme may influence policy change: by negative and positive learning, by coalition building and by policy community building. Secondly, we will empirically test our assumptions in two case studies from Swiss Climate Policy. Specifically, we will analyse the ways in which the Swiss energy programme "EnergieSchweiz", which was in place from 2000 to 2010, influenced two specific regulatory decisions: (a) the Cantons coordinated model regulations for new buildings; and (b) the implementation of the Swiss Federal CO 2 Act. We found that, while the policy programme was not critical for these decisions, it nevertheless played a role as an agenda setter, as an initiator of learning processes as well as through its policy community. 1 Introduction While there is a vast array of research on the question of how policy programs are influenced by the policies they are meant to implement, the inverse question - do policy programs influ- 1

2 ence policy decisions? - has not yet been the subject of any significant research. A classic definition of policy programs is provided by Pressman and Wildavsky (1974:xiv-xv), who distinguish programme from policy as follows: Let us agree to talk about policy as a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences. (...) A programme consists of governmental action initiated in order to secure objectives whose attainment is problematical. A programme exists when the initial conditions the if stage of the policy hypothesis have been met. The word programme signifies the conversion of a hypothesis into governmental action. (...) Considered as a whole, a programme can be conceived of as a system in which each element is dependent on the other. Hall (1993:278) sees policy change as the deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. While policy change thus involves modification of the policy hypothesis, including problem perception and the value-based choice of solutions, the programme is located at a subordinate level in that it regards the decision to become operative in a coherent manner. In this paper, we empirically investigate our overall research question by way of two case studies from Swiss Climate Policy. Specifically, we will analyse the ways in which the Swiss energy programme "EnergieSchweiz", which was in place from 2000 to 2010, influenced two regulatory decisions: (a) the Cantons coordinated regulation of standards for new buildings; and (b) the implementation of the Federal CO 2 Act. The regulatory landscape of EnergieSchweiz changed dramatically during the course of the programme. In the course of the 2000s, various new acts and requirements were implemented in the field of energy and climate policy 1, such as, for instance, a CO 2 tax on fossil fuels, cost-effective feed-in tariffs for renewable energies or the model regulations of the Cantons in the energy sector. Since EnergieSchweiz clearly was conceived as part of the overall strategy of Swiss climate and energy policy, the programme and its measures must be seen in the context of the general political situation and the interplay between the two examined. The central issue here is the extent to which the EnergieSchweiz programme influenced political decision-making processes. This question will be investigated by means of two case studies, which can be used to demonstrate, by means of example, how the EnergieSchweiz programme was able to exert influ- 1 Climate policy has become an important issue in energy policy discussions over the last few years as a result of the international debate on climate change and the corresponding goal of reducing CO 2 emissions, particularly since the current level of CO 2 emissions in Switzerland is attributable largely to the burning of fossil fuels (Wasserfallen 2007: 15). Thus, energy policy is always also climate policy (Geden und Fischer 2008: 10). This is why, in addition to the energy policy regulations, the most important climate policy regulations will also be included in the following discussion. 2

3 ence. 2 Based on an analysis of the regulatory context of EnergieSchweiz, two cases were selected for investigation: (a) the tightening-up of the Model Cantonal Building Regulations in the Energy Sector (Mustervorschriften der Kantone im Energiebereich, referred to hereinafter as MuKEn ) in 2008 and (b) the implementation of the CO 2 Act. Following on from this, two specific research questions can be derived for the analysis: To what extent did EnergieSchweiz contribute to the tightening-up of model regulations in the Cantons in the energy sector? To what extent did EnergieSchweiz influence the implementation of the CO 2 Act with the introduction of the CO 2 tax on heating fuels? Section 2 contains a brief description of the cases selected for the case studies. In the third section, the model of effectiveness on which the analysis is based is presented and the postulated links explained. Information regarding the specific empirical approach can be found in Section 4. The results of the qualitative evaluation are presented individually for each case study in Section 5. Finally, the last section refers the findings back to the research questions and discusses similarities and differences between the two case studies. 2 Description of the cases to be investigated A clear policy change 3 can be observed both in case A the tightening of the MuKEn 2008 and in case B the implementation of the CO 2 Act. To be able to understand and explain policy change, the dimensions of policy that are altered must first be identified. According to Capano and Howlett (2009: 4-5), policy change can be expressed through the following six aspects of a policy: in the definition and Agenda Setting 4 of the societal issue, in the objectives, in the choice of policy instruments, in the mode of political decision-making, in the distribution of resources and power and in the institutions involved in the political process. The two selected cases will be outlined below in terms of the policy change that occurred. 2 The results will refer to the two specific cases and can be generalised to a limited extent only. However, the selection of two cases allows us to compare the results and to arrive at conclusions which are more far-reaching. 3 Policies are subject to ongoing change. The very general definition of policy change is that an existing component of a policy or field of policy has changed (Capano und Howlett 2009: 3). 4 Agenda Setting means that a societal problem attracts the attention of the political players and is brought to the political agenda (Jann und Wegrich 2003: 83). 3

4 2.1 Case Study A cantonal regulations in the buildings sector Pursuant to Article 89 para. 4 of the Federal Constitution, the Cantons are responsible for energy law measures in the buildings sector. In order to guarantee the comprehensive harmonisation of energy law rules and regulations, these are jointly drafted and agreed by the Cantons. As long ago as 1992, the Cantons agreed in the course of the Conference of Cantonal Energy Directors (Konferenz Kantonaler Energiedirektoren, referred to hereinafter as EnDK ) on a Model Regulation in the buildings sector. This was replaced in 2000 by the Model Cantonal Regulations in the Energy Sector (Mustervorschriften der Kantone im Energiebereich, MuKEn 2000). The MuKEn 2000 were subsequently replaced in 2008 with the MuKEn These respective model regulations are transposed into cantonal energy law. The objective here is to achieve far-reaching harmonisation that takes account of cantonal peculiarities (EnDK 2008: 11,13). With the introduction of the MuKEn 2008, the model regulations were tightened considerably within a very short period of time. While the objectives of the policy the harmonisation of the cantonal legislation on the reduction of energy consumption (SFOE 2007b: 4) were not fundamentally altered, the instruments as a whole, i.e. the model regulations in their entirety, were made considerably more stringent. Although policy change here appears at first glance to be part of an ongoing development process within the model regulations, on closer inspection, a fairly abrupt change is evident. The policy change from MuKEn 2000 to MuKEn 2008 took place comparably quickly. The revision of the EnDK was decided, drafted and passed within a year. The implementation - that is, the transposition into provisions of cantonal legislation - was also considerably faster than in the case of the MuKEn Furthermore, the material changes in the MuKEn were significant, since they decided on a reduction of previous energy consumption of buildings by almost 50%. In the following, we will use the various dimensions according to Capano and Howlett (2009: 4-5), to show the extent to which the policy change is evident in the MuKEn The abovementioned material change in the MuKEn can be seen not only as a tightening of the instrument, but also as a change in objectives. The model regulations pursue two main objectives: firstly, to reduce the energy consumption of buildings, and, secondly, to harmonise the building regulations in this sector. While in the first version of the model regulations, the focus was still on the goal of harmonisation, in the MuKEn 2008 more importance was attributed to the objective of decreasing energy consumption (EnDK 2008: 13). The total revision 4

5 of the MuKEn, which had been tabled for 2010, was brought forward by two years due to the need for action in energy and climate policy (EnDK 2008: 11). While both objectives were retained over the years, a shift in the definition of the problem and the main objective can nevertheless be observed, moving away from a focus on a high degree of harmonisation to emphasising the target of a reduction in energy consumption. In addition, the objectives have become increasingly more ambitious. While the model regulation provided for a maximum heat requirement of 12 litres of fossil fuel equivalent per square metre for new-builds, in MuKEn 2000 this was reduced to 9 litres and in 2008 just 4.8 litres. This intensification of efforts can, to a certain degree, also indicate a change in the problem definition: by setting more ambitious goals, the problem of energy consumption is afforded more importance and relevance. The method of decision-making as well as the institutional structure and the distribution of power and resources appear to have remained the same. The MuKEn 2008, like the MuKEn 2000, were passed by the Cantons in the course of the EnDK and integrated into the cantonal energy legislation. 2.2 Case Study B implementation of the CO 2 Act The CO 2 Act, which entered into force in 2000, relied primarily upon voluntary measures to achieve the objective of a reduction in CO 2 emissions by 2010, with the implementing programme of EnergieSchweiz playing a central role (Ingold 2007: 53). 5 In the event of the failure to achieve the target CO 2 emission reduction with these voluntary measures, the Act provided for the subsidiary introduction of a CO 2 -incentive tax on heating fuel or motor fuel. When it became clear that Switzerland would not be able to meet its energy and climate policy targets, at the beginning of the 2000s work began in the Federal Department of the Environment, Energy and Communications (Eidgenössisches Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation, UVEK), under the helm of the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and in close collaboration with the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE), to develop a CO 2 tax. During the same period, the Swiss Fossil Fuels Association (Schweizerische Erdölvereinigung) put forward the idea of climate cents on motor fuel, to prevent a CO 2 tax. As a result of the political majorities in place, the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) decided in 2005 in favour of the implementation of the CO 2 Act by means of a compromise solution 5 The CO 2 Act is considered to be the key element of Swiss climate policy and serves the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, signed in The target of the CO 2 Act is a ten percent reduction in emissions compared to the level in 1990 by The relevant figures for the achievement of this target are the average values for the years 2008 to

6 consisting of a CO 2 tax on heating fuels and the Climate Cent 6 on motor fuel. The tax on fossil fuels suggested by the Federal Council had to be approved by the Federal Assembly. The CO 2 tax on fossil fuels was the subject of much controversy during the parliamentary discussions. Finally, in March 2007, the two executive bodies again in the course of a compromise and contrary to the suggestion of the Federal Council decided on a gradual introduction of the CO 2 tax on fossil fuels. 7 Through the promulgation of the CO 2 tax on fossil fuels, a clear change in the selection of policy instruments took place. Instead of the previous, primarily voluntary measures, the CO 2 tax on heating fuels marked the introduction of a more stringent regulatory instrument. The objectives of the policy remained the same, but the instruments used to implement these goals were altered to take account of prior experience. The change in the CO 2 legislation was also illustrated by a change in the distribution of resources and power in the course of the 2000s. According to Ingold (2010: 57), until into the year 2000 there was an equal balance of power between economic representatives and right-wing parties, who supported voluntary measures on the one hand, and the environmental associations and left-wing parties on the other, which preferred stronger regulatory measures in the form of a CO 2 tax on fossil fuels. According to Ingold and Varone (2012) the political brokers between these two groups including the SFOE gained considerable influence and power in the course of the 2000s. In the other dimensions, the change in the context of the implementation of the CO 2 Act is not apparent, or only to a small degree. The conception of the problem in the relevant policy field, for instance, does not appear to have changed significantly. While the IPCC-reports, for example, have made the urgency of the issue of CO 2 emissions clearer, the definition of the problem has not changed to a significant degree. The definition of objectives as stipulated by the CO 2 Act and the Kyoto obligations has also remained the same. The method of political decision-making has not shown any marked change either. Decisions continue to be taken in the course of the established decision-making bodies (Swiss Federal Assembly and Parliament). The last dimension identified by Capano and Howlett (2009: 5) is the institutional arrangement within or outside a policy field. In the course of the 2000s, no significant change in national or international institutional arrangements could be observed. 6 The Climate Cent was introduced by means of an agreement with the newly-established Climate Cent Foundation as from October 1, 2005 and is between 1.3 and 1.9 cents per litre of fuel. 7 The Swiss Federal Assembly had provided for a CO2 tax on fuel of CHF 35 per tonne of CO 2. The Parliament meanwhile passed a tax of CHF 12 per tonne of CO 2, which was doubled in 2009 and 2010 when the CO 2- reduction targets were not met. 6

7 3 Analytical Model As for the question of how policy change can be explained, a review of the literature shows that reference can be made to various factors to explain policy change, but there is no ex- clo 1975; Sabatier 1993; Hall haustive list or priority of explanatory factors. The main focus in the present study is on the player-related theoretical approach, i.e. the explanatory approach of Policy Learning (Cf. He- 1993), coalition theory (Cf. Sabatier 1993) and the explanatory approach of Policy Communities (Cf. Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 2003; Kingdon 1995) supplemented with considerations relating to path-dependency (Cf. Pierson 2000) and the effect of external events (Cf. Sabatier 1993). It became apparent in the course of the literature analysis that many explanatory factors reinstruments, for ex- late to specific aspects of the policy change, such as a change in policy ample. In this context it makes sense to select and discuss the explanatory factors with referposed in this ence to those aspects of policy that change. Due to the specific question paper - to what extent did EnergieSchweiz influence political decision-making processes - in the following, explanatory factors relating to the two case studies will be used to demonstrate the role played by EnergieSchweiz. Figure 1: Analytical Model (Diagram created by the authors) 7

8 The overview in Figure 1 above shows on the upper level of the diagram on the one hand potential explanatory factors for policy change and on the other hand the dimensions through which such policy change can manifest itself. Both are then applied to the case studies at the lower level. This allows causal links to be made between EnergieSchweiz and the corresponding explanatory factors for policy change and the dimensions in which the policy changed. These causal links will be explained in more detail below. 3.1 EnergieSchweiz as a Policy Community Pursuant to Varone et al. (2007: 10), Policy Communities 8 can have a considerable influence on the definition of a problem. The EnergieSchweiz programme can be understood as a Policy Community. EnergieSchweiz describes itself as a network and knowledge centre in the energy sector (SFOE 2009a: 3) and maintains links with many public and private players. EnergieSchweiz is active in a technical policy area, has privileged access to expert knowledge and works in close cooperation with state players. The programme would like to be seen as a do-er and a driving force (SFOE 2007c). These factors appear to be even more prominent in the buildings sector: The topic of energy efficiency in construction is a highly technical field that demands a great deal of specialised knowledge. The pool of players involved in the MuKEn 2008 is very limited and restricted in particular to the EnDK or EnFK 9 and close partners. The players often work together, such as, for instance, in the course of the Public Bodies and Buildings section of EnergieSchweiz and in connection with the MINERGIE Label 10. The fact that in the MuKEn 2008 an instrument that is very similar to the MINERGIE standard has asserted itself would also support the proposition that EnDK and EnergieSchweiz have similar values. EnergieSchweiz had only just emerged from its predecessor programme Energie 2000 when the MuKEn 2000 were being drawn up and had far less scope for influence and much less experience than it did eight years later. It is plausible that with the stronger influence exerted by EnergieSchweiz, the problem definition developed more towards a focus on energy efficiency, a core issue for EnergieSchweiz. This is likely also to have altered the definition of tar- 8 The present study uses a definition following Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 251): Policy Communities are networks of experts with a small number of well-connected members with common/shared values. 9 In contrast to the EnDK, the Conference of Cantonal Energy Agencies (Konferenz der kantonalen Energiefachstellen, EnFK) deals primarily with specialised technical issues. The MuKEn 2008 were developed in the course of a working group of EnFK and passed by the EnDK. 10 MINERGIE is a quality designation for sustainable construction. The label is organized as an association and is jointly funded by the Confederation, the Cantons and the economic sector (MINERGIE 2011). 8

9 gets of the MuKEn 2008 away from purely harmonising construction regulations towards a decrease in the energy consumption of buildings. For this reason, the following will examine whether EnergieSchweiz as a Policy Community brought about a change in the definition of the problem and targets, thereby influencing the MuKEn Lessons learned from MINERGIE In 1992 the EnDK drew up the first model regulation, with further rules added in 2000 and The Cantons did not stray from this path (the use of model regulations, which are subsequently transposed into cantonal energy legislation), but made adjustments to the contents in 2008 in particular there was a clear tightening of the existing model regulations. Many of the provisions in the voluntary supplementary modules of the MuKEn 2000 are already included in the basic provisions of the 2008 version, which is to be implemented by all Cantons. Path dependency is a possible explanatory factor for this stability in relation to the MuKEn, but the change can also be explained as a form of intensification of the previous path. The path-dependency can be strengthened by high fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effects and expectations (Pierson 2000: ). In the case of the cantonal measures in the buildings sector, learning effects in particular are apparent: in 2005 the EnDK defined its energy policy strategy for the second half of the EnergieSchweiz programme and provided therein for a revision of the MuKEn. An important requirement was that a value corresponding to that for MINERGIE -buildings was to apply to new-builds and the reconstruction of existing buildings (EnDK 2008: 11). The MINERGIE standard is promoted both by EnergieSchweiz and the Cantons (SFOE 2007a: 5) and is represented as a partner of EnergieSchweiz in the section Public Bodies and Buildings. The MuKEn 2008 explicitly point out that experience with the label MINERGIE showed that it is possible to construct more efficient buildings with lower additional costs and greater comfort (EnDK 2008: 13). The MuKEn 2000 were still based on the prior generally accepted rules of construction and were then adjusted in 2008 to reflect the MINERGIE -Standard (EnDK 2008: 13). This makes clear that, in the development of the MuKEn 2008, through Learning, direct reference was made to the experiences of MINERGIE. The present study intends to establish whether EnergieSchweiz had a decisive influence on the harmonisation of the MuKEn 2008 with the MINERGIE - Standard through its positive experiences with MINERGIE. 9

10 3.3 The SFOE as a Policy Broker Pursuant to coalition theory, Ingold (2007) allocated the various players in Swiss energy and climate policy to two coalitions: while the pro-ecology-coalition demanded a CO 2 tax on fossil fuels, the economic representatives demanded a complete waiver of a CO 2 tax (Ingold 2007: ). In the course of the 2000s, pursuant to the study by Ingold and Varone (2012) in addition to these two coalitions the Policy Brokers, the intermediaries between the coalitions, are also seen as important. They have gained considerable influence, which they did not yet have at the end of the 1990s at the time of the study by Kriesi and Jegen (2000; 2001). The SFOE in particular played an active broker role according to Ingold and Varone (2012) and was considered very important for explaining the change in the CO 2 legislation and the creation of the compromise solution consisting of the CO 2 tax on fossil fuels and the Climate Cent on motor fuel. Ingold and Varone (2012) do not allocate EnergieSchweiz to any coalition because, as a political programme, it is difficult to integrate into a network of players. Accordingly, this study also dispenses with allocating EnergieSchweiz to either of the two coalitions. However, since the SFOE is responsible for running EnergieSchweiz and the programme represents an important area of the SFOE, the question that arises is whether EnergieSchweiz might not have indirectly had an effect via the SFOE and thereby contributed to the creation of the compromise in the CO 2 -legislation. 3.4 Lessons learned from the voluntary measures Upon its introduction in 2000, the CO 2 Act continued and further anchored what had already been established through the Energie 2000 programme: voluntary measures in the form of partnerships between industry and commerce on the one hand, and the administration on the other (Ingold 2007: 50). The introduction of the CO 2 tax 11 on fuels in 2008 represented a break with this tradition since for the first time patently a more binding instrument than the voluntary measures that had dominated to date was introduced. A change in policy instru- 11 The CO 2- tax is categorised by Wasserfallen (2007: 22) as an economic incentive instrument. By making fossil fuels more expensive, those causing the emissions private sector and private individuals are to be moved to consume less fossil fuel. Whether this does indeed happen depends mainly on the level of charge. In contrast to the CO 2 tax, the steering effect or incentive of the Climate Cent is considerably less pronounced because the charge is only 1.5 cents per litre of motor fuel. Although the Climate Cent de facto represents a charge for the consumers, it is not seen as a regulatory instrument, since it was introduced as a voluntary economic measure without any legal basis. 10

11 ments is often explained in the literature with the theory of Policy Learning (Cf. Bennett and Howlett 1992; Howlett and Ramesh 1993). The voluntary measures and agreements in the course of EnergieSchweiz can be categorised as voluntary or information-based measures of policy instruments. Thus, it can also be assumed that EnergieSchweiz also provided experience and information regarding this type of policy instruments. Accordingly, it will be examined whether EnergieSchweiz, through the experiences gained with the programme - which was that voluntary measures do not sufficiently contribute to the attainment of energy and climate policy goals - influenced the selection of the more binding instrument of the CO 2 tax by means of Policy Learning. In addition to learning from the experiences with EnergieSchweiz, there could also have been Policy Learning from international experience. The international influence on Swiss energy and climate policy is based on existing CO 2 taxes in other countries and on global developments. In this context, the Kyoto-Protocol and the IPCC reports are most relevant. Thus, the question that arises is whether and to what extent the political decision-makers in Switzerland were influenced by the experiences of other countries with a CO 2 tax, by scientific findings contained in the IPCC-reports or by other international experience. 4 Empirical Approach The study is based on a comparative case study design using two case studies. Due to the limited number of cases and the detailed research interest, a qualitative research technique was selected. The data was collected by the authors by means of semi-structured interviews with experts and supplemented in certain points with a document analysis of verbatim reports from the National Council and the Council of States. The data collected was evaluated using the qualitative contents analysis according to Mayring (2008). A hypotheses-led system of categorisation was selected for the evaluation. From the analytical model, two working hypotheses were derived for Case Study A and three for Case Study B. For each hypothesis the relevant aspects and steps necessary to test the hypothesis were identified. The interview questions for the semi-structured interviews with experts are divided according to these two interim steps. The system of categories for the qualitative contents analysis was created on the basis of this preliminary work. The interview questions can in each case be allocated to one or several sub-categories, meaning that the 11

12 responses can also be categorised accordingly. An overview of the empirical approach, including the system of categories is contained in Appendix I. The interview partners were also selected on the basis of the hypotheses. The original list of interview partners was modified slightly in the course of the research project due to the lack of time available to the persons asked and the findings obtained from the first interviews. The definitive list of interviewees is included in Appendix II. The interviewees were questioned on the hypotheses relating to both case studies, to only one of the case studies or certain aspects of individual hypotheses depending on which organization they belonged to and their level of expert knowledge. Thus, for each expert interview an individual guideline was compiled from the general catalogue of questions. The selection of documents included in the analysis was also made more precise as the study progressed and was necessarily restricted due to lack of access to certain documents. Lastly, in Case Study B, the verbatim reports from the National Council and the Council of States concerning the debates on the implementation of the CO 2 Act were also included Results In the following, the results of the qualitative evaluation will be discussed first for Case Study A on the cantonal measures in the buildings sector and subsequently for Case Study B on the implementation of the CO 2 Act Results of Case Study A With the following explanations regarding Case Study A, the question posed earlier, namely the extent to which EnergieSchweiz contributed to the tightening of the MuKEn, can be answered. Furthermore, two other questions can also be resolved: firstly, why the revision was brought forward by two years and, secondly, why the MuKEn threshold is roughly the same as the MINERGIE -Standard. EnergieSchweiz was able to exert influence in three main ways. The first and most important was through Agenda Setting. Through political pressure and in the context of the buildings programme through pressure regarding the contents, the programme directors of Energi- 12 An overview of all verbatim reports on this issue can be accessed at Curia Vista, the database of parliamentary proceedings (Curia Vista: issue ). 13 In this presentation of the research findings, the results will be displayed in summarised form and we will dispense with referencing the working hypotheses. Detailed explanations of the analysis of the working hypotheses can be found in Bürki und Luginbühl (2011). 12

13 eschweiz was able to force the EnDK to bring the revision forward. Coupled with the altered political circumstances in 2006 and , this is what is responsible for the change in the perception of the problem. On the one hand, this changed from a focus on the need for harmonisation to a focus on tackling the lack of energy efficiency in buildings; on the other hand, the players became aware that the problem was imminent and had to be tackled immediately. In this context, the activities of EnergieSchweiz were able to help raise awareness both in the Cantons and among the population as a whole. A further factor for the bringing forward of the revision of the MuKEn could be - irrespective of EnergieSchweiz pressure for centralisation exerted by the Federal authorities in respect of the Cantons. That is to say, there was ongoing pressure from the central state to become involved should the Cantons prove to be unable to organise and harmonise. As a second type of means of influence, some experts from EnergieSchweiz were able to work directly in the relevant EnFK-working groups that were responsible for the drafting of MuKEn However, this influence was not perceived as direct by the cantonal representatives questioned and was more in the background. Lastly, EnergieSchweiz to a limited degree was probably also able to influence the MuKEn 2008 via its partner MINERGIE. The influence of MINERGIE on the MuKEn 2008 was great, but occurred almost exclusively directly through the Cantons. According to the unanimous opinion of various experts, the MuKEn threshold value was directly adjusted to reflect the MINERGIE standard. The reason given for this decision was the positive experience made with the label. The close links between MINERGIE and the Cantons also contributed to this, making it even simpler to follow the MINERGIE standard. It should be noted that the influence of EnergieSchweiz was not exerted as assumed via the Policy Community. Indeed, the existence of such Policy Community could not be confirmed. While the use of expert knowledge of EnergieSchweiz was an influencing factor, reference was made not to network experts, but to employees of EnergieSchweiz working within the administration. Direct influence through members of the network in this case MINERGIE was also of limited benefit for EnergieSchweiz. 14 In Spring of 2007 there were various climate policy events that led to an increased awareness of the subject. These included the Von Wattenwil discussions in the Federal Assembly and the special meeting of the Federal Council, the implementation of the CO2-Act, the amendment of the Mineral Oil Tax Law, the publication of the fourth IPCC-report and the launch of two climate policy popular initiatives. These events are described in more detail in the context analysis contained in Module 1. 13

14 The main reason why EnergieSchweiz did not have a greater influence on MuKEn 2008 is that EnergieSchweiz is located at the higher-ranking federal level and is thus seen by the Cantons as a federal programme, and first and foremost a SFOE programme. The Cantons are keen to retain their autonomy in the buildings sector, which falls within their sphere of competence; the central state is not to become involved here. Accordingly, the Cantons did not seek out any cooperation with EnergieSchweiz. 5.2 Results of Case Study B The research question for Case Study B is as follows: to what extent did EnergieSchweiz have an influence on the implementation of the CO 2 Act with the introductionn of the CO 2 tax on heating fuels? As shown in the diagram in Figure 2, the results of Case Study B can be divided into two levels in order to answer this question. A distinction can be made between, on the one hand, the level of influence between the impact channel, that is, the method of exerting influence and, on the other the effect as to the contents. On the other hand, at the level of the players a distinction must be made as to whether EnergieSchweiz exerted influence within the administration itself in the UVEK during the drafting of the implementation of the CO 2 Act, or in the parliamentary debates on the CO 2 tax on fossil fuels. The impact channel differs depending on the player. In the case of internal administrative influence, what we are dealing with is customary cooperation within the administration. In parliament, in contrast, Energi- The effect of eschweiz was able through its network to exert influence in a targeted manner. EnergieSchweiz in terms of the contents on both levels of players is attributable to the fact that EnergieSchweiz provided the necessary findings for a learning process. Figure 2: Results for Case Study B (Diagram created by the authors) The first impact channel shows that the high level of integration into the SFOE enabled Ener- gieschweiz unlike other implementing programmes to directly influence legislation 14

15 through the professional cooperation within the UVEK during the drafting of model regulations. Cooperation in the UVEK takes place officially, at the level of official bodies, as well as unofficially between individual departments or persons. The internal influence within the UVEK is ensured in particular by the programme director, who simultaneously holds the post of vice-director of the SFOE. This allows EnergieSchweiz, despite the fact that it does not itself represent an official body, to contribute via the customary channels within the UVEK. However, the close links between EnergieSchweiz and the SFOE make it difficult to decide whether internal information or proposed solutions stem from EnergieSchweiz or the SFOE. In the specific case of the compromise CO 2 tax on heating fuel and the Climate Cent on motor fuel, the data analysis suggests the conclusion that the outcomes from EnergieSchweiz at that time flowed into the Federal Council s message through the SFOE. In the case of the Climate Cent, some influence of EnergieSchweiz on the SFOE in certain points was found, since EnergieSchweiz immediately took up the newly-launched idea of a climate cent and subsequently succeeded in convincing the SFOE of its merits. The second impact channel relates to the influence of EnergieSchweiz on the parliamentary debates on the CO 2 tax on heating fuels. In general, EnergieSchweiz s interests can be represented in parliament via three routes: firstly through those MPs who are members of the programme s strategy group; secondly, through the programme directors, if they are on the committees; and thirdly through individual MPs who are members of executive bodies of the partners of EnergieSchweiz. 15 Through its broad network, EnergieSchweiz also has the option of representing its interests in parliament through individual players. Furthermore, the Energy Agency of the Economy 16 (Energie-Agentur der Wirtschaft, EnAW) is also an important partner agency of EnergieSchweiz that plays a key role, since it is through the EnAW that a large portion of the economy was incorporated into the network. Since these economic representatives supported the CO 2 tax on fuels in order, later, to be exempted therefrom it was possible to also convince conservative MPs of the merits of the CO 2 tax. The research in the context of Case Study B showed that EnergieSchweiz s influence in terms of the content on the implementation of the CO 2 Act took place both within the Federal Department of the Environment, Energy and Communications and in parliament by means of 15 For example, Member of the Council of States Bieri is President of the Swiss Association for Heat Pump Promotion; National Council Member Simoneschi-Cortesi is President of Eco-Drive, Member of the Council of States Lombardi is President of InfraWatt and National Council Member Nordmann is President of Swissolar. 16 When EnergieSchweiz began, an agreement was concluded with the EnAW within the framework of which many target agreements with sectors and companies were subsequently concluded. 15

16 negative Policy Learning. This means that the experiences with EnergieSchweiz confirm the assumption that voluntary measures do not contribute enough to the attainment of the CO 2 - reduction targets. In terms of a learning process, a new policy instrument was introduced, because experience with the previous instrument had showed that it did not sufficiently implement the objectives specified in the policy. The findings from the programme EnergieSchweiz were necessary in order to obtain a majority for the CO 2 tax on fuel on the political level in parliament, as well as in the Swiss Federal Assembly as a whole. Since the argument that they wanted first to try using voluntary measures was no longer justified, it was possible to prevent any further delay to the introduction of the CO 2 tax. In addition to the lessons learned from the experiences with EnergieSchweiz, there could also have been Policy Learning based on international experience. The data analysis made clear that while the decision makers in the administration and parliament were aware of international experiences, these findings did not directly result in support for the CO 2 tax on fuels. National experiences with the inadequate effects of the voluntary measures in the course of the EnergieSchweiz programme were significantly more influential. 6 Conclusions The following explanations will, on the one hand, address the questions and on the other hand draw comparisons between the two case studies, in order to highlight similarities and identify differences. The discussion relates to the three subjects of Agenda Setting, Policy Learning and the Role of the Network of EnergieSchweiz. Firstly, the question of the extent to which the EnergieSchweiz programme had an effect on political decision-making processes will be answered. Following the examination of the two case studies it can be concluded that EnergieSchweiz was indeed able to influence both the MuKEn 2008 and the implementation of the CO 2 Act. In Case Study A on the MuKEn 2008, three types of influence can be found: firstly, the programme directors of EnergieSchweiz were able to alter the perception of the problem by means of Agenda Setting, thereby hastening the revision of the MuKEn. Secondly, experts from EnergieSchweiz were directly involved in the drafting of the MuKEn 2008 through their participation in an EnFK-working group. Thirdly, EnergieSchweiz was to a limited degree able to influence the standard in the MuKEn 2008 through its partner MINERGIE. Various methods of exerting influence were also observed in Case Study B, the implementation of the CO 2 Act. A distinction can be drawn 16

17 between two impact channels: EnergieSchweiz was able to influence the SFOE internally, while on the other hand using the network to directly represent its interests in parliament. Furthermore, in Case Study B, an effect on the contents can be observed, which is attributable in both impact channels to a learning process on the part of the players, which was initiated by EnergieSchweiz. In the comparison of the two case studies, firstly the role of the highly developed skills network of EnergieSchweiz will be discussed. It was not possible to confirm that the network of EnergieSchweiz constitutes a Policy Community. It is too large and too heterogeneous in terms of its values. In particular, the Cantons, while officially part of the network, in actuality hardly use the network and do not wish to be perceived to be part thereof. The network played a more important role in Case Study B than in Case Study A. Here, it was possible to exert influence in parliament via the network. Specifically, EnergieSchweiz first and foremost used contacts with its partner agency EnAW and with MPs who were members of the strategy group of EnergieSchweiz or on the management of partner programs. Exerting influence via the network was not successful at the cantonal level. The Cantons, on the one hand, barely used the EnergieSchweiz network and, on the other hand, were reluctant to allow the federal level to gain too much influence. For this reason, it appears to be a prerequisite for successful influence via a network that the network partners are basically prepared to cooperate. In both of our cases, the cooperation appears to be easier if the partners are at the same player level and do not view one another as competitors. It may possibly also be necessary for the partners to have the same interests. For EnergieSchweiz the network is very important, but does not always work as desired. Thus, the importance of the network should not be overestimated, since it does not constitute EnergieSchweiz s sole impact channel. Agenda Setting appears to have played a role in both case studies, with EnergieSchweiz able to exert influence both within the administration and also on external players. In Case Study A, Agenda Setting was the most important method of exerting influence. By exercising political pressure and pressure as to the contents, the programme directors were able to alter the circumstances in the Cantons so that they decided to bring forward the revision of the MuKEn. Since the Agenda Setting takes place in an area outside the SFOE and thus outside the real core organisation of EnergieSchweiz, we refer here to external Agenda Setting. In Case Study B, EnergieSchweiz was more involved in determining the issues internally in that it was able, for example, to convince the programme directors of SFOE to support the Climate 17

18 Cent. It is interesting that in both cases Agenda Setting took place not as initially assumed via the EnergieSchweiz network. In Case Study B, it was a purely internal administrative process, while in Case Study A various methods of Agenda Setting were utilised. For instance, EnergieSchweiz acted as part of the federal policy, which in particular during 2006 and 2007 responded to climate policy events (inter alia the publication of the fourth IPCC-report) with initiatives. Furthermore, the programme directors put pressure on the Cantons, especially through the buildings programme, so that the latter would bring forward the revision of the MuKEn. Lastly, EnergieSchweiz also informed the population at large through its information and communication strategy and in this way contributed to raising awareness of the issue of energy efficiency, which, in turn, indirectly affected the Cantons. The last discussion point we will turn to is Policy Learning, which also played an important role in both case studies. However, the learning in Case Study A did not occur directly through EnergieSchweiz. On the contrary: the Cantons referred directly to experience gained with MINERGIE. In Case Study B, EnergieSchweiz was able to trigger a learning effect at the content level among decision-makers in administration and parliament and in so doing had a significant influence on the introduction of the CO 2 tax on heating fuels. EnergieSchweiz was thus able to make an important contribution to this policy change in policy instruments used in Swiss energy and climate policy, since the new instrument is based largely on the experiences gained through EnergieSchweiz. However, learning plays a role only if there are no strongly organised counter-interests that compromise the learning effect. The transport lobby, for instance, successfully prevented a tax on motor fuel. This type of lobby could not be seen either in the heating fuel or in the buildings sector. The findings from the two case studies can, to a limited degree, also be applied to other energy and climate policy decisions. The impact channels observed in Case Study B in particular are also relevant to other issues. EnergieSchweiz is able to exert influence internally through cooperation during the preparation of issues in a large number of fields and is standard procedure in the administration. It is also conceivable that pressure could be exerted on parliamentarians through the network in other issues. Thus, the impact channels exist, but EnergieSchweiz s concrete influence on the contents depends on the specific issue concerned. In summary, the study shows that EnergieSchweiz was able to exert influence primarily through Agenda Setting, the initiation of learning processes for decision-makers and through its network. The demonstrated effect of EnergieSchweiz was greater in the case study on the 18

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