Dr. T.X. Hammes on U.S.-China Relations

Transcription

1 Dr. T.X. Hammes on U.S.-China Relations Interviewed by Rick Berger Dr. T.X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research at National Defense University s Institute for National Strategic Studies, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Hammes specializes in future strategic concepts, irregular warfare, and humanitarian aid/disaster relief. Hammes served in the United States Marine Corps for 30 years, retiring as a colonel. He is widely published, having written over 120 articles and the curriculum staple The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century. Dr. Hammes is also an active and leading participant in the ongoing debate over U.S. strategy in the Western Pacific. Rick Berger currently works on the defense budget as a Research Assistant at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He holds a master s degree in security policy studies from the George Washington University s Elliott School of International Affairs. He is the outgoing managing editor of IAR s online publication. RB: Many of our authors have differing views on whether the U.S. military has so far done a good job of committing to military-to-military exchanges with the People s Liberation Army. How do you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. military in this area? TXH: The U.S. military and, in particular, its officers have bent over backwards to support military-to-military exchanges. This is evident in the Navy s inviting China to join in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2014, but the effort has spanned all sorts of arrangements. For instance, the Navy has allowed PLA Navy personnel to board U.S. aircraft carriers and in doing so probably improved both their understanding of how the U.S. military fights and its own capabilities. The U.S. military has pursued this relationship to the extent that American hawks have clamored about the 76 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

2 RICK BERGER military being overly trustful of the PLA, but the effort has been largely successful. RB: Recently, U.S. Pacific Fleet s former chief intelligence officer, Navy Captain James Fanell, set off a media firestorm by publicly assessing that the Chinese military is preparing for a short, sharp war, alluding specifically to an amphibious assault of Taiwan. Fanell s comments drew quick attention from interested parties and were later seemingly walked back by other U.S. officials and officers. Were Fanell s comments really that significant? TXH: Remember, Fanell s latest comments in February 2015 were made at his retirement ceremony. If we start policing what officers say at their retirement ceremonies, I think we re getting into an area in which we have some bigger problems in terms of freedom of speech. Fanell s original commentary that made waves came at the 2014 West Conference in San THE UPROAR OVER THE CHINESE LAND RECLAMATION PROJECT IS UNWARRANTED. Diego, but he didn t say anything there that he hadn t said before or released in unclassified intelligence assessments. Further, Captain Fanell didn t say anything that PLA officials haven t said themselves about what the Chinese military is doing in terms of training and preparation. People in both the United States and China are somehow getting upset about a guy making comments that were essentially a direct summary of what Chinese officials had already said. I don t think there s a story here. RB: In early March 2015, incoming Pacific Command chief Admiral Harry Harris delivered possibly the strongest statement yet by any U.S. official on Chinese actions in the South China Sea, in particular its land reclamation project on islands in the area. How do you assess the islandbuilding project? TXH: The uproar over the Chinese land reclamation project is unwarranted. We need to understand why the Chinese are engaging in this project, how they justify it, and what new capabilities this project provides VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 SUMMER

3 INTERVIEW WITH T.X. HAMMES them. To start, China has essentially said that they re building up islands in the same way that other nations have, and they re not entirely wrong. This isn t new behavior. Several South China Sea claimants have already engaged in island-building, to differing degrees. Second, the land reclamation project is more political than military. It anchors China s more problematic claims about the extent of the nine-dash line by improving their ability to exert de facto control of the area, but doesn t at all affect the competing claims under the UN Convention on the Law of Sea. Militarily, these new islands don t give the Chinese military much more to work with. They may be able to launch a few more patrols and do some IT DOESN T HELP THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS STILL HASN T RATIFIED UNCLOS, EITHER. work on studying the littorals to improve their anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the South China Sea, but the islands aren t particularly significant in a military sense. In the Offshore Control strategy, which denies China access to the first island chain through reciprocal antiaccess/area-denial, these islands would be well within the denied zone. In a shooting war, any useful military infrastructure would be hit immediately by the United States. The real thing to worry about in the South China Sea is the extent of the nine-dash line claim and the fact that Manila s legal protest doesn t legally bind Beijing to argue its claims in court. It doesn t help that the U.S. Congress still hasn t ratified UNCLOS, either. RB: Over the past year, we ve seen several deals between a diverse set of countries to include the United States, Australia, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Do you view these deals as stabilizing, in that they prevent U.S. partners and allies from acting unilaterally, or destabilizing, in that they stoke Chinese fears of encirclement and containment? TXH: No, I don t view these partnerships and deals as destabilizing. To the extent that these things are occurring, it s a direct result of Beijing s 78 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

4 RICK BERGER behavior, so they have no one to blame but themselves. There are a lot of reasons for the continued success of Abe and the conservatives in Japan, but a serious contributing factor is Beijing itself. We also have to remember that cooperation between East and South Asian countries in some areas may not translate to other areas. Many of these countries, even some that have signed deals in the past two years, have very significant disagreements that aren t likely to get solved anytime soon. RB: A number of our authors recommend further soft initiatives, such as cultural & student exchanges, to build trust and foster Sino-American relationships. Do you see these sorts of programs as having potential, or are they simply lowrisk, little-gain initiatives? THERE ARE A LOT OF REASONS FOR THE CONTINUED SUCCESS OF ABE AND THE CONSERVATIVES IN JAPAN, BUT A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS BEIJING ITSELF. TXH: I think these programs are of immense value and should be pursued with vigor. For starters, we re talking about two very different cultures, and to the extent that exchanges can be pursued to improve cultural understanding, we should invest in them. Particularly for the hundreds of thousands of Chinese students who study and live in America, these programs are useful in that they tend to ruin mischaracterizations of America offered by Party propagandists. A Chinese student comes here believing because she s been told this that the United States is planning a replay of the Chinese century of humiliation. She quickly finds out that Americans aren t particularly interested in foreign affairs; they re watching The Biggest Loser or checking on Paris Hilton; there is no concerted anti-china feeling or effort by Americans to undermine China. Second, these programs create relationships, especially business relationships, which will be critical down the line. RB: In January, DOD shuttered the AirSea Battle Office and reassigned it to the Joint Staff under the name of Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, a written articulation of which should VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 SUMMER

5 INTERVIEW WITH T.X. HAMMES arrive by end Do you view this as merely an expression of interservice politics or a vindication of your repeated warnings about the provocative nature of the ASB operational concept? TXH: AirSea Battle has been misunderstood from the beginning. My work in criticizing AirSea Battle wasn t necessarily criticizing the operational concept itself. The AirSea Battle Office and those in the joint staff working on the new Joint Concept are definitely doing fine work in terms of improving interservice cooperation. The main target of my criticism was the idea that AirSea Battle itself was a strategy or the idea that it was the correct response to an unavoidable problem. By identifying one aspect of the strategic landscape and attacking that problem, the idea of AirSea Battle as an entire strategy was indeed very escalatory. First impressions matter, and I don t know how long the tension-inducing AirSea Battle characterization will live on in the debates that Chinese and other regional strategists are having. RB: Given the method of victory in your Offshore Control strategy, do you think that current U.S. policy in the Western Pacific focuses too heavily on China to the exclusion of allies and, in particular partners? TXH: No, the United States is constantly looking for partnerships, whether bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral. Especially on the military side, DOD is always inviting new participants to an expanded list of exercises and training programs. For instance, the naval-based Malabar Exercise was a formerly a U.S.-India bilateral exercise; in 2014, the Japanese joined for the first time since 2009 and Singapore and Australia often show up. RB: Several of our authors have discussed how domestic politics in both the United States and China render execution of a long-term foreign policy strategy difficult. To what extent is the current political landscape in the United States limiting the country s foreign policy? What practical recommendations do you have to minimize the mixed messages coming from Washington? What are the major domestic challenges for political leaders in Beijing? 80 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

6 RICK BERGER TXH: Our own political and economic troubles are our biggest strategic weakness. Whatever strategy we pursue vis-à-vis China, our adversaries, allies, and partners no longer treat our word as ironclad. The political problems in this polarized Congress are of particular concern; they impede our ability to follow through on what we say we will or will not do. This hurts us both domestically, in passing laws and budgets, and abroad, in signing treaties and speaking with one American diplomatic voice. The state of Congress makes worse our military procurement problems, which are already bad. Many of these problems don t currently have long-term fixes applied to them. To fully OUR OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TROUBLES ARE OUR BIGGEST STRATEGIC WEAKNESS. WHATEVER STRATEGY WE PURSUE VIS-À-VIS CHINA, OUR ADVERSARIES, ALLIES, AND PARTNERS NO LONGER TREAT OUR WORD AS IRONCLAD. restore this area of former American strength a bipartisan governing structure you probably have to fix the way we do primaries. The current structure forces candidates to run well to the left or to the right to get past the primary. You probably have to address the absurd amount of money in politics right now, too. On the other side, the Chinese have two problems that are somewhat intertwined. The largest problem that the political leadership in Beijing must address is the widespread corruption interwoven in every inch of the Chinese economy. That has to be first. The corruption seriously impedes China s ability to respond to its economic problems, which are growing. It will soon face the same problem as the United States and Europe, but on a much larger scale: a shrinking workforce supporting a growing number of older citizens. Economic growth is already slowing down in China, and the effects of these major structural problems aren t even being felt yet. For that reason, I think those who believe in the inevitability of a power transition or conflict between the United States and China are unlikely to be proven right. VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 3 SUMMER