User Guide for the electronic voting system

Transcription

1 User Guide for the electronic voting system The electronic voting system used by the University of Stavanger, is developed by and for the University of Oslo, but is also used by other institutions (e.g. UiT). We have chosen to publish an excerpt of the original manual from UiO. The illustrations below will therefore be slightly different from the screen images at UiS. One of the prerequisites to vote is that you have an IT username at UiS Below is an introduction to how the system works and a step by step guide on how to submit votes in it. Election Portal Login Login page Starting the application you will be transferred to FEIDE login page. FEIDE is a framework for authentication in the higher education sector in Norway, and you must use your regular username and password here. For more information about FEIDE, see On this page you must enter your username and corresponding password for the institution listed under affiliation. Make sure these match. The election application will, if login was successful, receive your national ID and e- mail address from FEIDE. Note: Feide login does not work with NoScript enabled.

2 Finding the right elections Home page. Select valg (election) with the button in the left column. After successful login you will be transferred to the first page of the election application. This is also accessible from the program link at the top of the page. This page is for choosing which election you wish to cast your vote in. The elections are organized into four tables: (1) The elections you have the right to vote in, (2) the elections you do not have the right to vote in, (3) future elections and (4) closed elections. The elections you have the right to vote in come first, and the table shows which census (manntall) you belong to (shown in the right column). To vote, use the button in the left column. You can change your vote until the election closes. You have the opportunity to vote in elections you do not have the right to vote in. The election committee will then look into the matter, and the vote will be approved if a mistake has been made.

3 Preference elections The ranking of candidates can be done in this way. (The order is randomly selected.) Voting in a preferential election is done by ranking candidates from one and up. One need not rank more than one candidate, but you can rank all if you prefer that. Ranking a candidate is done in the box marked "Nr on the row where the candidate is listed. Rank 1 (one) is best, 2 (two) second best, etc. You can only indicate ranking by using natural numbers (integers).

4 Majority elections Majority elections with two candidates. Voting in a majority election is done by casting a vote for as many candidates as you want to, but limited by a given number. The candidates with the most votes win.

5 Control of the ballot before delivery The ballot paper will be presented for inspection. Click "Vote" ( avgi stemme ) to accept. Finally you get an image of your ballot as it appears after possible changes. If you want to cast this vote, click the button "Vote." If you want to change something, click the button "Back" ( tilbake ). When casting a vote a receipt will be sent to your account. This contains information about your vote and when it was cast. If you were to receive such a receipt without having voted, it might indicate that your user account has been compromised. You should then contact the election committee. If you are not in the census (electoral register) - your voting must be explained If you are not listed on the electoral register, you must explain your vote before it is recorded. Write a message about why you think you should be permitted to vote. Your message and your identity (but not the ballot) can be seen by the Electoral Committee who can take your explanation into account before counting the ballots. You must not write how you have voted.

6 Some aspects of the electoral system Casting of votes - voting within and outside the electoral register It is unlikely that an electoral register produced for an election at UiO will match all UiO affiliated individuals ideas of who are entitled to vote in an election. Improved procedures, experience, and cleanup in the source systems will all hopefully help to minimize any discrepancy between a produced electoral register and an ideal one. In a specific case, where the question of the right to vote can be raised, the Election Committee will conduct an assessment and decide the procedure, and not leave it to an electronic ballot application. Therefore, individuals, who are not in the register, will still have an opportunity to vote in an election. This vote (though not its content) will be sent to the Election Committee for evaluation. Other institutions (UiT) publish census lists before the election begins. It is also possible to use the system, namely the list of upcoming elections, to allow users to check whether they are correctly registered. Possibility to vote several times The IT infrastructure does not provide total security at individual level. The problem is that individual users themselves may compromise their account by storing accessible passwords. It cannot be excluded that other causes, e.g. compromise of infrastructure or abuse of rights from the system staff, can cause one or more user accounts to be compromised. If an account has been harmed, it will be the person who has compromised it who will then be able to cast a vote on behalf of that individual. Since there is a possibility that this could happen, the voting system must include mechanisms to deal with this. If an individual denies having cast a vote, it is not certain that this can be refuted. It is a problem that if the vote has been cast it cannot be cancelled afterwards. Consequently, in an electronic voting system there must be rigid security around the control of voter access. Alternatively one can operate with a nonrepudiation policy around voting, or that technically one has to be able to retrieve the vote later in order to cancel it. UiO does not have an IT infrastructure that can ensure adequate control in advance via a web-based system for voting. Therefore, one has opted for a solution in which all eligible voters who cast votes (or if anyone compromises their account and does it on behalf of them, or they claim that) at any time can cast a new vote in the election until the election closes. The old vote will then be canceled. Receipt for cast votes When the election system receives a ballot an ed receipt is sent for a vote that has been cast (not what is voted on) to the person entitled to vote. If you receive such without having voted in that election, you should immediately change your password and then vote again.

7 The link between the identity of the voters and the content of the votes When a vote is cast, two things happen. First, it generates a unique serial number that is stored along with information about who has cast the vote in a database. Secondly, at a completely different location, the content of the vote (what has been voted on) is stored together with the serial number. The latter is encrypted and therefore not readable without a key stored on a separate machine. To be counted the votes will be downloaded into the machine that has the key. But in this process the numbers are changed so it will not be possible to compare serial numbers with the database. The Election Committee can vote for individuals With many voters in an election it is likely that at least one of these, for various reasons, cannot use the electronic voting system. Clearly one cannot exclude them from exercising their right to vote. The Election Committee can therefore hand in votes on behalf of individuals. Such casting of votes will necessarily reveal to the members of the Election Committee who collect the votes how these individuals have voted. When voting on behalf of others takes place, it will be recorded in the election protocol. The security of the election system is not infallible The security of both an electronic and an analog voting system is not absolute. As in the analog election system, there is always a risk that the integrity of the election or the anonymity of those who submit individual votes becomes compromised. It is impossible to create a system where one cannot trust anyone. In analog voting it is primarily the Election Committee and the counting facility that could affect the result. In the electronic system it is the Election Committee and certain system technicians at USIT who fill this role. Elections at UiO do not have the same need for security as parliamentary elections, and USIT would not recommend the system for such elections. Elections at UiO have other problems, such as very low turnout, particularly among students. Consequently, an electronic web-based election system, which may not be suitable for a general election, is found to be acceptable for an election at UiO.