Our entire system of cooperation and connections depended on trust. (Joseph Bonanno, American Mafia Boss) 2

Transcription

1 Organized Crime and Trust On the conceptualization and empirical relevance of trust in the context of criminal networks Klaus von Lampe and Per Ole Johansen 1 "How will my partner react if the police arrest him and start asking questions? If he has never been prosecuted, I have no way of knowing. That s the basic question: is my partner to be trusted or not?" (Kjell, veteran Norwegian alcohol smuggler) Our entire system of cooperation and connections depended on trust. (Joseph Bonanno, American Mafia Boss) 2 They were so honorable that no one in the Mafia ever trusted anyone else. (Meyer Lansky, American underworld figure) 3 I just big-headedly assumed that anyone who knew me liked me and wouldn t do such a thing. I was too nice to be grassed. (Howard Mr. Nice Marks, Welsh dope trafficker) 4 In the organized crime literature it has become a truism to say that what holds organized criminals together are bonds of trust. There are, in essence, two perspectives from which the issue of trust and organized crime is addressed. On one hand, there is the question of how to account for the fact that criminals cooperate in the first place. After all, there are particular risks involved in co-offending. Many of the institutional safeguards designed to compensate for the consequences of deceit and betrayal, such as the courts and insurance, are unavailable for illegal actors, and in light of the threat of law enforcement intervention and criminal sanctions, the consequences of disloyal behavior are likely to be 1 Respectively, Researcher, OC Research Project, Chair of Criminology, Free University Berlin, Germany; Professor, Department of Criminology, University of Oslo, Norway. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for interesting remarks and suggestions. 2 Bonanno (1983: 155). 3 Quoted in Lacey (1991: 75). 4 Marks (1998: 144). 1

2 much more severe than those to be expected in the legal sphere of society (McCarthy et al. 1998; Reuter 1983). Trust, it is said, reduces the uncertainty regarding the behavior of potential accomplices to a tolerable level and thereby stimulates the willingness to co-offend (Weerman 2003; Zaitch 2002). On the other hand, there is the desire to explain the perceived tendency of organized crime to be embedded in webs of kinship and ethnic ties. It is the requirement for trust, it is argued, which gives members of close knit communities a competitive advantage in the crime business (Paoli 2002). 5 While these notions have some merit to them, they cannot be taken at face value. The conventional wisdom regarding the relation between trust and organized crime lacks a comprehensive theoretical and empirical underpinning. Conceptually, often enough the term trust is being used in such a vague sense that it does not amount to much more than an empty phrase. Moreover, empirically, the notion of trust has been challenged by arguing that organized crime is better characterized by a lack of trust (van Duyne et al. 2001: 99, 127), as people who tend towards criminality are unlikely, in the words of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990: 213), to be reliable, trustworthy, or cooperative. Even life in the Sicilian Mafia, as Diego Gambetta (1996: 152) has stressed, is fraught with uncertainty, distrust, suspicion, paranoid anxiety and misunderstanding. Before this background, considerable efforts have to be made to come to a better understanding of the importance of trust in the context of organized crime. What future research and theory construction will have to produce is threefold: 1. a clear conceptualization of what trust is and does for organized criminals; 2. a clear understanding of how trust emerges among criminals and how it contributes to the emergence and continued existence of patterns of criminal cooperation, and 3. valid and reliable data on the concrete presence of trust as a binding force in criminal relations. The modest purpose of this essay is to make a few cautious steps in the direction of a better understanding by attempting to clarify and specify the concept of trust and by pointing out some anecdotal evidence from our empirical research which sheds a little light on the actual relevance of trust. 6 5 It should be noted that another important perspective on trust and organized crime is not discussed in this paper, the emergence of criminal groups as private protection agencies in low-trust societies (see Gambetta 1988a; 1996; Varese 2001). 6 The present discussion is a further elaboration of the points made in two previous papers by the authors (see Johansen & von Lampe 2002; von Lampe & Johansen 2004). 2

3 We begin with a brief outline of potentially trust relevant constellations in the two illegal markets that form the objects of study of our ongoing research of criminal relations, the illegal alcohol market in Norway (Johansen 1994; 1998; 2003) and the cigarette black market in Germany (von Lampe 2002; 2003). The identification of these constellations is not the result of a systematic analysis of the importance of trust as our research has not been designed for this purpose. Instead, we use these data merely to avoid a purely theoretical discussion. We attempt to specify and clarify the concept of trust, drawing on a review of the pertinent academic literature, with a view to two questions, one relating to the functional role of trust, the other relating to its empirical manifestations. In so doing, our ambition is not to make a significant contribution to the theory of trust but to introduce a more refined understanding of the concept of trust to the study of organized crime. The main emphasis of our conceptual analysis is to identify empirical referents, the consideration of which may prove fruitful in the analysis of organized crime phenomena in the future. In essence, we propose a fourfold typology of different bases of trust along a micro-macro dimension. With this differentiation, we hope, it will be possible to depart from the undifferentiated use of the term characterizing the organized crime literature to date, and to discuss in a more concise and systematic matter the adequateness and meaningfulness of the concept of trust in this specific context. Following the conceptual discussion we turn to the question of the actual relevance of trust in various settings, using anecdotal evidence from our research on the alcohol and cigarette black markets in Norway and Germany, respectively. Given the lack of systematic research, we are not in a position to arrive at any empirically based conclusions. Instead we try to underscore the need for future systematic research in this area. What our data tentatively suggest, however, is, first of all, that just as in social life in general - there are different types of trust in the context of organized crime and that trust might have a broader base than conventional wisdom implies. Secondly, the violation of trust is not uncommon, but, contrary to stereotypical imagery, where it occurs it does not necessarily entail violent responses. Finally, it appears that criminal relations can exist without a basis of trust and even in the presence of outright mistrust. The outcome of our discussion, therefore, is twofold. We identify a number of empirical referents of the concept of trust which in the past have not received the necessary attention in the analysis of criminal structures, and at the same time we challenge the conventional notion that trust has universal explanatory power with regard to the emergence and continued existence of patterns of criminal cooperation. 3

4 The Basic Structures of the Alcohol and Cigarette Black Markets In our research on the illegal alcohol market in Norway and the illegal cigarette market in Germany, we have come across myriad criminal networks that cover more or less the entire spectrum from criminal relations embedded in strong social ties to ad-hoc contacts established across ethnic and cultural boundaries. These findings have given us the impetus for a closer examination of the significance of trust for the emergence and continued existence of criminal relations. Our data are primarily derived from interviews conducted with market participants, law enforcement officials and other informants in the case of Norway (Johansen 1994; 1998; 2003) and from law enforcement records in the case of Germany (von Lampe 2002; 2003). The study of the illegal liquor market in Norway is an ongoing research project which extends over several years and includes interviews with some 400 smugglers, dealers and customers of bootleg liquor, police and customs officers, and the analyses of some 250 case files covering the time period from 1978 until the late 1990s. The data on the illegal cigarette market in Germany have been obtained in the course of a more recently initiated research project from the analysis of some 50 case files covering the time period 1990 until 1997 and interviews conducted with about 20 customs and police officials and informants. The black market for alcohol in Norway and the black market for cigarettes in Germany fall in the overall category of illegal markets. An illegal market is a place within which there is an exchange of goods and services, the production, selling and/or consumption of which are forbidden or strictly regulated by law (Arlacchi 1998). The alcohol and cigarette black markets are similar in that they deal with commodities that are essentially legal but are subject to high taxation. What makes the sale of alcohol and cigarettes illegal is the circumvention of excise and customs duties. Both markets can be divided into roughly three levels, procurement, whole sale, and retail. On the top level, the procurement level, alcohol and cigarettes, respectively, are obtained for black market distribution from low-tax or no-tax sources. These sources include legal manufacturers that sell their products for export and thus with no taxes added to the sales prices, or outlets in relatively low-tax countries such as, for example, Poland. In addition, some of the goods illegally distributed are also illegally manufactured domestically. This is primarily true for Norway with its long tradition of moonshining, but the discovery of 4

5 an illegal production site for counterfeit cigarettes in Germany in the year suggests, that this might be a more widespread phenomenon. On the whole sale level, bulk loads are stored, divided up and distributed in more manageable consignments to retail dealers. On the retail level, finally, the commodities are passed on to consumers. Retail distribution may take on clandestine forms, very similar to the distribution of, say, stolen goods or drugs, it may take place in the form of under-the-counter sales in otherwise legal outlet stores, as is the case, for example, in some countryside grocery stores that sell bootleg liquor in Norway, or retailing may take place in the open, as is the case in some places in Eastern Germany, where mostly Vietnamese asylum seekers sell contraband cigarettes as street vendors. On each of these levels, within particular illegal enterprises, and between different levels of the market pyramid, actors cooperate on a more or less continuous basis and with more or less success, and in every instance the question arises: Is trust the binding force that brings and holds these actors together? And if so, on what basis does one criminal actor place trust in another? In a one sided way, the same questions may arise in the relations that illegal entrepreneurs typically establish with legitimate businesses, for example legal manufactures, hauling companies and warehouses. To the extent illegal entrepreneurs have to consider the possibility that the true nature of their dealings becomes known to their legitimate business partners, trust becomes an issue. An example taken from the study of the German cigarette black market (von Lampe 2003) may illustrate this point. In the second half of 1994, German customs uncovered a scheme to supply the black market in Germany with a container load of 11.5 million cigarettes manufactured in the United Kingdom and officially destined for export to Russia. The British manufacturer sold the consignment of untaxed cigarettes to a trading company residing in Hamburg, Germany, which in turn had closed a deal with a firm in Kaliningrad, Russia, and had received the negotiated price, US$ 174,800, in cash from a Lithuanian acting on behalf of the Kaliningrad firm. The Hamburg trading company requested the cigarettes to be delivered to a bonded warehouse in Portugal where they were picked up by a Polish truck driver in the service of a Dutch haulage company. This haulage company had been hired by a company based in Riga, Latvia, with orders to bring the cigarettes to Kaliningrad via the 7 See press-release Zollfahndungsamt Essen, 22 July

6 German-Polish border, but on condition that the driver awaits further instruction once he has reached the Berlin area. Berlin is not only near the German-Polish border but also has the largest regional market for the retail-sale of contraband cigarettes in Germany. At the same time as arrangements were made through legal business channels a group of three Poles living in the town of Braunschweig, Germany, began to look for a potential buyer for the 11.5 million cigarettes, presumably serving as independent sales agents for the persons behind the firms in Kaliningrad and Riga. In the course of their efforts, one of the Braunschweig group managed to establish a contact to a Pole who had obtained German citizenship and lived in Berlin. This naturalized German had spent time in prison for involvement in trafficking in stolen motor vehicles where he had befriended a Vietnamese convicted of trafficking in contraband cigarettes. The Vietnamese showed interest in purchasing the container of cigarettes, but only because he had previously agreed to work as a confidential informant for the German customs service. Overall, the link to this alleged Vietnamese buyer was established through a chain of three men with Polish background, a man living in the Western-Polish city of Szeczin, whom one of the Braunschweig group had only recently met, another unidentified Pole with unknown place of residence, and the naturalized German living in Berlin. The sales agents from Braunschweig enter into negotiations with the Vietnamese and agree to sell the 11.5 million cigarettes for a price of 713,000 DM (355,000 ). As the truck with its container load of untaxed cigarettes approaches Berlin the driver receives a message from the dispatcher of his employer, the Dutch hauling company, telling him that upon request of the client the cigarettes are not to be brought to Kaliningrad, but to a highway service area outside Berlin. There he is met by the Pole from Szeczin who had been instrumental in linking supplier and buyer and eventually got involved in the deal himself. He has brought a friend with him who later claims he has been ignorant of the wider implications but quickly agrees to help unload the contraband cigarettes after the truck is redirected to a warehouse. The reception of the truck and the unloading is monitored by a member of the Braunschweig group who remains in the background and only gives directions via cell phone. In the meantime the two other sales agents from Braunschweig and the Vietnamese buyer are in Berlin to negotiate the final details of the transaction. In previous meetings the suppliers had pressed the Vietnamese to accept an arrangement by which the risk of the cigarettes being seized by authorities would be split even between the two parties. This was firmly rejected by the Vietnamese so that finally both sides came to agree that the full risk of 6

7 loss is carried by the Braunschweig group until the cigarettes are unloaded. In exchange the Vietnamese promised to find an appropriate warehouse for quick unloading. The unloading takes place after the Vietnamese is shown the container and after the sales agents are assured that he actually has the money. The Vietnamese is taken to the service area where the truck driver awaits further instructions. The Vietnamese is told that the cigarettes are inside the container, but no verification of this claim is presented. After returning to Berlin the Vietnamese, in turn, shows one of the sales agents a suitcase filled with cash in the safe room of a hotel. Shortly after the unloading begins, all participantsexcept the confidential informant and one sales agent who has remained unidentified-are arrested by customs service agents. This example comprises various sets of relations each of which is connected with certain risks for those involved. The three sales agents from Braunschweig, for instance, collaborated on a team basis to sell the container load of contraband cigarettes, and seized documents hint at the possibility that they had been involved in similar schemes before. Each member of the group, thus, was in a position to provide detailed incriminating information on the respective other two that could result in fairly high prison terms. Moreover, there is, at least theoretically, a potential for conflict over how to divide profits. Any agreement arrived at beforehand could not have been enforced in a court of law so that each participant not only faced the risk of being given up to authorities by his accomplices but also that his efforts would go unrewarded. Similarly, the man from Szeczin who helped in completing the deal with the Vietnamese buyer and assisted, along with his friend, in unloading the truck, posed a potential threat to the sales agents, especially in light of the fact that the contact between the two groups had only recently been established. Any concerns that might have existed on the part of the sales agents turned out to be justified because it seems that after their arrest the two men from Szeczin willingly supplied all the information they had. Reversely, the two ran the risk of coming home empty handed because they-as appears to be common practice in the market-received no advance payment but instead had to rely completely on the promise that they would receive a financial reward after the successful completion of their tasks. The same applies to the naturalized German who established the contact between the suppliers and the alleged Vietnamese buyer, believing that the latter was his friend and that he would give him a hefty reward. Instead, he ended up with a prison sentence and the feeling that his friendship was betrayed. 7

8 The relation between the Braunschweig group on the supply side and the alleged Vietnamese buyer is replete with vulnerabilities. For example, until the unloading begins, there is no proof that cigarettes are indeed inside the container or, more specifically, inside the boxes that are being unloaded. In this respect, no confirmation is offered to the alleged buyer, just as the suppliers cannot be certain at the time the unloading begins that the cash one of them had been shown in the hotel safe room actually amounted to the agreed sum. The unloading signal is even given despite a refusal of the alleged buyer to show the cash to another member of the Braunschweig group. Finally, the involvement of legal businesses in the scheme, including the cigarette manufacturer, the Hamburg trading company and the Dutch haulage contractor, carried with it specific risks for the main organizers of the scheme, if these firms were not a party to the conspiracy altogether. For example, the enormous detour the cigarettes took via Portugal on their declared trip from Great Britain to Russia only made sense because the cigarettes were never meant to leave the European Union. Instead, as evidenced by a similar case, it was intended to use forged customs stamps to fake proper export from the EU with the justified expectation that the Portuguese customs service would be unfamiliar with the stamps used at the German-Polish border and therefore unable to identify the forgery. There is reason to believe that the organizers of the scheme, those unidentified individuals behind the firms in Kaliningrad and Riga, were aware of the possibility that the legal businesses and authorities they dealt with would grow suspicious. In theory, this could at least have lead to the shipment, which had been paid for in cash already, being seized. Still, the organizers went ahead, perhaps trusting that these companies and agencies either would take no action at all or at least in a way that would not jeopardize their criminal venture. In fact, none of the legitimate actors who had knowledge of the suspicious shipment reported to the customs service; and the Portuguese customs officers were alerted to the foul play only after their German colleagues had picked up the trail through their own investigations. So, in the end, it appears safe to say that the criminal actors involved in the scheme acted in the face of possible betrayal and exposure, and one is inclined to conclude that they did so because of a sense of trust regarding their witting and unwitting accomplices. This conclusion, however, is fairly meaningless and in the last instance purely speculative as long as the concept of trust remains vague and no clear understanding exists on what to look for empirically to ascertain the presence of trust. 8

9 Conceptualizations of Trust In order to assess the importance of trust in this and other cases, it is necessary to specify and clarify the concept of trust both on a theoretical level and with regard to its empirical referents. The issue of trust has received considerable attention in the social sciences over the past 10 to 15 years (see e.g. Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 1988b; Laucken 2001; Misztal 1996; Seligman 1997; Weber & Carter 2003). Still, trust continues to be a very imprecise and confusing notion (Misztal 1996: 9). Quite similar to the concept of organized crime, the use of the term trust, as Seligman (1997: 7) has observed, tends to be loose and imprecise. According to one widely shared view, trust has to do with how people cope with risk and uncertainty. One person trusts another person where effective means to control the other s behavior are unavailable and where the other s behavior is potentially harmful in a broad sense of the word, and still the trusting person is confident that no harm will be done. Trust is seen as an essential component of social life. Without trust, Niklas Luhmann argues, only very simple forms of human cooperation which can be transacted on the spot are possible, and even individual action is much too sensitive to disruption to be capable of being planned, without trust, beyond the immediately assured moment. Trust is indispensable in order to increase a social system s potential beyond these elementary forms (Luhmann 1979: 88). The overall vagueness and the diversity of trust conceptions make it difficult to introduce the concept of trust to the study of organized crime. There is not one approach that would appear to be more suitable than others for the analysis of criminal relations. Likewise, it would seem to be of little value to reduce the discourse on trust to a common denominator, as such a broad concept would not constitute a true departure from the status quo. Instead of trying to introduce a concise and coherent concept it may be more fruitful to differentiate dimensions along which conceptualizations of trust vary, and to use these dimensions as a frame of reference. There are two dimensions in particular that are at the center of the academic discussion on trust and seem to be heuristically valuable. One dimension refers to the level of rationality or irrationality in the decision of a trusting person to trust. The other dimension, ranging from micro to macro level, refers to the social context in which trust emerges. 9

10 The Rationality-Irrationality Dimension In the spectrum from rationality to irrationality, trust takes up a space somewhere between purely rational calculation of probabilities and irrational blind faith. Towards one end of the spectrum we find proponents of rational-choice theory like James S. Coleman, who assumes that a rational actor will place trust (...) if the ratio of the chance of gain to the chance of loss is greater than the ratio of the amount of the potential loss to the amount of the potential gain (Coleman 1990: 99). Outside the rational-choice paradigm there seems to be broad agreement that trust by definition involves some element of arationality or irrationality because the notion of trust, it is argued, can only have meaning in situations of uncertainty in which the trusting person has incomplete knowledge of the probabilities of the trusted person s behavior. Trust, then, is not exclusively based on the weighing of probabilities, but also on such factors as emotions, sentiments and culturally induced values (Dunn 1988; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 1988b; Misztal 1996; Simmel 1992[1908]). As Anthony Giddens (1990: 33) has put it: All trust is in a certain sense blind trust! The Micro-Macro Dimension The second major dimension in the conceptualization of trust, which may be termed the micro-macro dimension, pertains to diverging views on the allocation of trust in society. It ranges from trust in persons to trust in abstract systems (Misztal 1996: 72; Seligman 1997: 18). Some, namely proponents of rational-choice theory, discuss trust primarily in the context of face-to-face relations between a trustor and a trustee (see Coleman 1990). Others focus on what has been termed abstract or institutional trust. In these cases, trust is placed in the functioning of macro-level institutions (Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979; 1988). Individuals are only recognized as agents who perform certain institutionally prescribed roles (Seligman 1997: 19). In between these two extremes, there are intermediate levels of observation with different forms of socially induced trust, for example trust that relies on generalizations about certain categories of people. Depending on whether or not trustor and trustee belong to the same social group, this kind of trust can be rooted either in stereotypes or in a sense of shared habits, norms and values. In the latter case, this can be simply a matter of inferring from generalizations to the likely behavior of a particular individual (the same would be true for 10

11 trust based on stereotypes), but it has also been argued that belonging to the same social group can create moral obligations to place trust in others (Fukuyama 1995). Trust, then, is a moral commandment to treat people as if they were trustworthy (Uslaner 2002: 3). A Working Definition Trust The most appropriate starting point for discussing trust in the context of organized crime, we would like to suggest, is a network approach. This means that in our discussion, we view trust first of all as a property of dyadic relations that form the basic elements of criminal networks. Criminal networks can be defined as sets of actors that are connected by ties which in some way or other support the commission of illegal acts (von Lampe 2001). Understood in this way, criminal networks constitute the least common denominator of organized crime (McIllwain 1999: 304) and should therefore be taken as the key empirical referent of the concept of organized crime (Coles 2001; Hobbs & Dunnighan 1998; Ianni 1975; Johansen 1996; von Lampe 2001; Morselli 2001). The dyadic relations we are concerned about involve a trusting person P, the trustor, and a trusted other person O, the trustee. For reasons of simplicity, we specifically focus on the perspective of the trusting person while leaving aside the question of how the trusted person perceives, interprets and copes with the situation. Within this narrow framework, we can tentatively define trust as the expectation of P, under conditions of uncertainty, that (1) O will not harm P, even though (2) O could harm P (see also Dunn 1988: 74; Gambetta 1988b: 219). This expectation, we assume, can be based on a variety of more or less reliable perceptions, assumptions and attitudes that pertain to the trusted person and to the social environment in which trustor and trustee interact. The quintessential situation in which trust is an issue in the context of organized crime is that of a collaborative criminal venture involving P and O as co-offenders. By saying that P trusts O in a cooperative criminal venture we are implying that P expects that! O will not violate the specific terms stipulated in the particular explicit and implicit agreements regarding the venture, that! O will not violate general expectations of considerate behavior, and that 11

12 ! O will protect the secrecy of the venture (with regard to law enforcement, as well as to competing and predatory criminals). But co-offending is not the only constellation where the notion of trust may come into play. From an analytical perspective there is a broad spectrum of situations that have to be taken into account, including more passive relations, even to the extent that criminal actor P deals with O as a mere bystander. Here the trust P places in O relates to the expectation that! O will not interfere with P s actions, and that! O will not alert others (e.g. the police) to P s actions. Between the two poles of cooperative relations on the one end of the spectrum, and passive relations on the other, there are several intermediate levels of interaction imaginable between trustor and trustee, for example, that relating to communication relations through which criminally relevant information is passed on between P and O. A Typology of Trust in Criminal Relations The first step in the analysis of a given criminal relation would be to examine whether or not trust plays a role at all. The potential alternatives to trust are a relation characterized by either a lack of trust or by mistrust. Lack of trust, in our understanding, refers to a situation in which P perceives that O could harm P, but P has no basis on which to determine whether or not O will harm P. In contrast, mistrust would exist when P perceives O to be capable and willing to harm P. Provided there is trust involved in the relation between P and O, the crucial question is: on what grounds does P expect O to act in an agreeable way? We think that this question is heuristically tremendously valuable as it opens up the view to a complex of personal, relational and contextual factors that potentially contribute to the emergence and continued existence of criminal relations. To systematize the analysis, we propose a typology modeled on the basic dimensions identified above characterizing the sociological debate on trust. Our typology distinguishes 12

13 different bases of trust along a micro-macro dimension, and within each category we consider variations in the rationality of the decision to trust. Individualized Trust The first category in our typology involves individualized trust. The expectation of agreeable behavior relates specifically to the trustee as an individual. The basis for individualized trust can be quite diverse. It may lie in previous observations of the trustee s behavior, characteristics and dispositions, and the more or less rational assumption that the trustee will act accordingly in the future (Misztal 1996: 76); it may lie in equally rational expectations of how the trustee reacts to sanctions (Coleman 1990: 115); or the motivation to trust a particular individual can be irrational in that it is the result of affections the trustor feels for the trustee (Gambetta 1988b: 232; Huemer 1998: 121; Misztal 1996: 21). Criminally exploitable individualized trust can be expected to emerge, for example, from continuous interaction in delinquent peer groups or in prison settings, out of which affectionate bonds and a sense of predictability may develop (see e.g. Ianni 1975). Another aspect that needs to be taken into account is that trust, especially individualized trust, may be mediated. In this case no direct bond of trust exists between P and O. Instead, P and O are each connected to an intermediary who may take on the role of advisor, guarantor, or entrepreneur (Coleman 1990: 180). In the advisory role, the third person passes a judgment about O on which P relies. As guarantor, the third person will compensate P for losses incurred as a result of O s disloyalty. In the entrepreneurial function, the intermediary induces the trust of several trustors and combines these resources, ordinarily placing them in the hands of one or more other actors who are expected to realize gains for the trustors. In the latter two cases, the trustor places trust in the intermediary s performance capability and integrity (Coleman 1990: 180-2). Trust Based on Reputation The second category pertains to trust based on reputation. Here the trustor relies on publicly formed and held opinion about the trustee (Dasgupta 1988: 54). This type of trust 13

14 hinges on the flow of information. With regard to criminal relations, information may be dispersed in a context associated with illegality, for example the underworld grapevine system first described by Frederic Thrasher (1963[1927]: 285), but one can also think of criminally relevant reputation being created by the media, possibly in concert with law enforcement agencies. It has been argued, for example, again drawing on the historical case of Prohibition-era Chicago, that Al Capone owed much of his (undeserved) reputation of being an all powerful underworld leader to the media (Bergreen 1994: 211). In terms of content, various personal characteristics can be expected to form the reference point for a criminally relevant reputation, including reliability in keeping dates and deadlines, providing support, and maintaining self-control under stress. From the point of view of rationality vs. irrationality, relying on reputation can of course be rather thoughtless and careless, depending on how sustained and how well tested the reputation is. On the other hand, reputation can be a valuable asset and from the trustor s perspective it may be quite rational to assume that the trustee will not want to put his or her reputation in jeopardy through disloyal behavior (Misztal 1996: 121, 126). Trust Based on Generalizations The third category, trust based on generalizations, comprises constellations in which trust is linked to social groups rather than to a particular individual. The trustor places trust in the trustee based on the presumption that the trustee conforms to some more general norms or patterns of behavior. Under conditions of illegality, such generalizations could be attached, for example, to members of a delinquent subculture or of a mafia-like fraternal association based on the assumption that they adhere to certain codes of conduct such as mutual support and non-cooperation with law enforcement. Placing trust in another member of a deviant community can be quite rational, especially in the case of fraternal associations. Members of fraternal associations such as the Cosa Nostra can be expected to adhere to a set of mutually understood rules of conduct which in turn are ensured by selective recruitment combined with a period of testing and schooling, rigid enforcement of discipline, male bonding rituals, and secrecy (Haller 1992: 3-4; Jacobs 1994: 102). Secrecy, as Georg Simmel (1992[1908]: 448) has stressed, can have a binding force in and by itself by blocking members from outside interference. 14

15 Some of these factors can apparently also bind members of a deviant subculture. Yet they will probably do so to a lesser degree. By definition, members of a deviant subculture share a set of norms and values and are likely to harbor feelings of solidarity in view of a hostile outside world. This has been noted, for example, in the case of the Western European drug cultures of the 1960s and 1970s (Ruggiero & South 1995: 134). Another classic example is found in the community of professional thieves described by Edwin Sutherland (1937: 202-6). Trusting another member of a deviant subculture, then, can be seen as a rational decision. On the other hand, placing trust out of a subculturally induced moral obligation to trust could be rather irrational. The same would probably be true for relations between an outsider as the trustor who relies on more or less stereotypical expectations relating to an insider as the trustee. On a more mundane level, but perhaps with the most rational justification to it, a trust producing sense of predictability may arise in routine situations that are governed by habit rather than by conscious deliberation (Garfinkel 1963). What Harold Garfinkel has emphasized about the relevance of unspoken rules in daily life could also be valid for everyday interactions under conditions of illegality, for example routine transactions of illegal goods. Abstract Trust The fourth category refers to trust that is placed in abstract systems that set and maintain certain basic conditions, for example the government, the monetary system or the medical system in society at large (see Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979; 1988). While these institutions have no direct counterpart in the illegal spheres of society, it appears to be overly strict to say that, due to the lack of a public power, there is no systemic trust and therefore that under conditions of illegality trust necessarily has only a personal basis (Paoli 2002: 84). There are documented cases where criminal groups have exercised territorial control in the form that they imposed and enforced certain rules of conduct for criminals who operated in a given area (Abadinsky 1981; Gambetta 1996). It can be assumed that such a quasigovernmental framework shapes and influences behavior and thus contributes to a sense of predictability and the emergence of trust. 15

16 It should be noted that the four categories individualized trust, trust based on reputation, trust based on generalizations, and abstract trust - are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it can be expected that a given trust relation rests on different bases of trust (Misztal 1996: 21). Conversely one can think of social settings within which various trust building factors take effect. Before the background of our own empirical research into the bootleg liquor market in Norway and the illegal cigarette market in Germany we want to briefly discuss four social settings with regard to their presumable trust building potential: family, local community, ethnic community and business. Then we will look at some empirical constellations we have discovered that cannot be readily explained by conventional conceptions of trust. Trust Producing Social Settings Family According to a widely held notion, criminal relations in general and within illegal enterprises in particular tend to be embedded in kinship ties. This view is supported by general assumptions about the link between family and trust. Anthony Giddens (1990: 101), for example, suggests that kinspeople can usually be relied upon to meet a range of obligations more or less regardless of whether they feel personally sympathetic towards specific individuals involved. Trust in family members, it is argued, rests on familiarity and conformity, i.e. on individualized trust growing out of continuous interaction, and on generalized trust based on a sense of similarity and shared norms and values (Misztal 1996: 39, 157, 171). However, the link between kinship ties and criminal relations via family based trust may not be as easily established as is commonly assumed. There is, first of all, the aspect of inner family conflicts. The assumption of family based trust hinges on a somewhat romantic notion of family harmony that does not necessarily live up to reality. In fact, some family based illegal enterprises may be more the product of considerations of conflict avoidance than an outgrowth of trust relations. As Pino Arlacchi in his analysis of Southern Italian Mafia groups has observed, often relations between families of brothers are marked less by cooperation and solidarity than by disagreement and impulses towards mutual conflict. One 16

17 strategy for dealing with the constant threat of disintegration is, according to Arlacchi, the institution of forms of outright family communism, based on common ownership and control by the members of the cosca s innermost nucleus of a good part of the group s possessions and economic activities (Arlacchi 1986: 135-6). The other issue that needs to be addressed here both theoretically and empirically is the question of borrowed loyalty : Under what circumstances do long-term relations with no illegal connotation, as is the case with familial ties, can become a basis of trust for criminal cooperation? In fact, our findings do not indicate a dominant role of kinship structures in the black markets we study. Among alcohol smugglers in Norway, the most common pattern of cooperation where kinship ties are apparent at all are father-and-son teams, sometimes structured on equal terms. And in some instances, smugglers have been found to receive moral and logistical support from their wives and families. One Norwegian bootlegger recollected in an interview: My wife and I, we have always been together. I go nowhere or do nothing without her. We did our first deals in the 50s went to the loan shark with our wedding rings to raise money for our first investment in cigarettes and booze... But my son, by the way, is a doctor. In the cigarette black market in Germany, likewise, cooperation between husbands and wives appears to be the most common type of family based criminal relations. Local Community Similar to families, local communities may produce trust through familiarity and conformity (Giddens 1990: 101; Luhmann 1988: 94). In fact, in the case of the illegal alcohol market, close-knit, local communities in rural Norway appear to be a more significant trust factor than the immediate family. In these communities, local self-rule and solidarity have a long tradition and hostility towards central government dates back to the times ( ) of Danish and Swedish domination (Fuglum 1978; Furre 1992). 8 The strong social fabric connects a broad range of activities, from politics to sports, and widespread moonshining is part of it, so that disloyal behavior would be directed not only against a business partner but against the entire community. Under such conditions, we hypothesize, family ties, to the 8 For a brief overview of Norway s political and social history, see also Libæk and Stenersen (1999). 17

18 extent they are criminally relevant at all, provide no added value in trust relations and are therefore no prominent feature of cooperative structures. Ethnic Community Perhaps more than family and local community, the role of ethnicity as a basis of trust has been stressed in the organized crime literature. The link between ethnicity and trust is fairly easy to establish where close-knit ethnic communities exist, because here the same notion of trust created by familiarity and conformity would seem to apply (Misztal 1996). Moreover, ethnic communities will tend to be characterized by a stronger sense of we and they. This means that placing trust and cooperating within an ethnic community is not only a reflection of greater cohesion in response to outside pressure. It may also be a reflection of reservations and suspicions maintained by members of ethnic communities that work against communication and cooperation across ethnic boundaries. Members of ethnic communities may willfully withdraw from the larger society out of concerns that outsiders do not share their values and will therefore not treat them fairly (Uslaner & Conley 2003: 333). At the same time, this means that too much reliance on ethnic ties (or kinship or community ties, for that matter) can become a liability because it limits opportunities for cooperation (Pearson & Hobbs 2001: 28). Where intra-ethnic relations are not embedded in close-knit communities, the trust building role of ethnicity is less clear. What would have to be assumed is that a sense of similarity is generally present in the interaction between people of the same ethnic background, and that their behavior will therefore be predicted with greater confidence (see Hardin quoted in Misztal 1996: 134). With regard to the role of ethnicity as a trust producing factor under conditions of illegality, it needs to be stressed, first of all, that in many instances where bonds of trust are attributed to ethnic cohesion, the actual foundation may lie in social relations like kinship, friendship or community ties (Ianni 1975: 282; Kleemans & van de Bunt 1999: 25; Potter 1994: 121). However, ethnicity cannot be completely ruled out as a trust variable, considering that the marginalization of ethnic minority groups may eliminate moral precepts while at the same time creating internal solidarity. These factors may be reinforced by social norms of 18

19 keeping matters secret from outsiders and by a high cultural value placed on loyalty (Bovenkerk 1998: 121-2). As such, a criminal actor may come to trust another simply on the grounds that they share the same ethnic background. In our research we have found a significant difference in the importance of ethnicity between the bootleg liquor market in Norway and the cigarette black market in Germany. Whereas in Norway, members of ethnic minorities play only a marginal role at best, in the cigarette black market in Germany certain market levels are clearly dominated by particular ethnic groups. The procurement and whole sale levels tend to be occupied by Polish smugglers and dealers whereas the street sale of contraband cigarettes in East Germany, as mentioned, has for several years been almost exclusively in the hands of Vietnamese. An illustrative example of the relevance of ethnicity is provided by the relation of Vietnamese dealers to other members of the Vietnamese community. As a legacy of East German politics, the Vietnamese community had been concentrated in large housing projects isolated from the German population. Within these dormitories, whole sale and retail dealers could openly store, transport and sell untaxed cigarettes without fear of being reported to authorities by their fellow countrymen. While in the instance of a particular apartment, the other occupants might have been loyal based on family and friendship ties, a general sense of solidarity seems to have prevailed among all Vietnamese living in these dormitories. No cooperation was sought with the German authorities despite the inconveniences connected with the frequent searches of the premises conducted by police and customs service. Evidence could also be collected on how networks of Poles living in Poland and in Germany have been used to disperse information related to the smuggling and distribution of contraband cigarettes (von Lampe 2003: 58). Here, some of the factors that characterize the relations between ethnic minority community and host society may also characterize the asymmetric relations between Poland as a country of transition and Germany as an advanced capitalist country. This notion is supported by findings about cigarette smuggling ventures undertaken from Poland to Germany that have apparently been discussed and planned in Poland without concern for secrecy even among casual acquaintances. The most striking aspect about the dominating role of certain ethnic groups in the cigarette black market, however, is not that they foster or at least facilitate criminal relations, 19

20 but that there is an apparent ease with which ethnic cleavages are being bridged by criminal actors. Two constellations are noteworthy in this regard: the relation between Polish suppliers and Vietnamese dealers and between Vietnamese street vendors and German customers. From the available evidence it seems that Polish cigarette smugglers have initially taken the risk of directly approaching potential Vietnamese customers without prior introduction by a third party or any other preceding connection. In the early 1990s, Polish suppliers typically established these contacts by more or less randomly soliciting customers in front of housing projects occupied by Vietnamese. Apparently, both sides were similarly confident that members of the respective other ethnic group would be trustworthy. In a legal business context, relations across ethnic and language barriers are generally believed to be difficult to establish and maintain (Neubauer 1997). There is great potential for gross misunderstanding where members of different cultures are oriented towards radically different sets of background assumptions and beliefs systems, but are unaware of these differences (Good 1988: 45-6). Interestingly, however, quite the opposite may be true in the case of illegal business since the respective other s status as a foreigner minimizes the possibility of his or her cooperating with the authorities. A sense of being in the same boat and forming an unspoken alliance against the German authorities could also be a factor. Thus, the original relation between Polish suppliers and Vietnamese dealers may provide an example of trust based on ethnic stereotypes. In the relation between (East) German customers and Vietnamese street vendors the same mechanism may be in place. It seems plausible to assume that there is a general belief that these Vietnamese vendors can be trusted, because they are unlikely to be covert customs officers, given the marginalized status of the Vietnamese community in East Germany (von Lampe 2002). Moreover, the social and economic problems in the post-communist transition process could have contributed to a sense of solidarity between East Germans and the Vietnamese living in East Germany. Yet another trust building factor may be at work in the relation between German customers and Vietnamese vendors that should be mentioned in a comprehensive analysis, the routinization of the street sale of contraband cigarettes. These exchanges are publicly repeated in the same fashion over and over again so that a given customer will most likely not anticipate any deviation from this norm when he or she decides to approach a vendor. In the end one can hypothesize that the cultural and ethnic cleavages that separate German 20