A System Dynamics model of the FM 3-24 COIN Manual. CAPT Brett Pierson Warfighting Analysis Division J8/WAD

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1 A System Dynamics model of the FM 3-24 COIN Manual CAPT Brett Pierson Warfighting Analysis Division J8/WAD 1

2 Assess the Full Range of Military Operations Warfighting analysis assess proficiency Multiple scenarios Wide range of variables within scenarios Alternative CONOPs Alternative campaign objectives Force equivalencies/force substitution Multiple analytical models Other force structure requirements assess sufficiency Day to day demands: Forward basing, forward presence, lesser contingencies, homeland defense, theater security cooperation Peak demand of overlapping warfights Sustained surge demand of post-hostilities operations Force equivalencies/force substitution Analysis of Irregular Warfare challenges 2

3 Analysis Framework Tools Workgroups Mission Analysis Data Models Scenarios Metrics Wargaming Interagency partners Senior Leader reviews Peer reviews Partner nations Methodologies Intellectual approach Rationale Physical assumptions Philosophical assumptions Tank guidance SPG tasks Study Objective Senior Leader insights 3

4 Comparison of Traditional and Non-Traditional Analysis Conventional Campaigns JICM, ITEM, Thunder, Structurally complex, limited geographic focus, kinetic domain, means are predominately Military Victory clearly defined, quickly understood, well-established Focused on Phase III Operations, approved MSFDs (MCOs) Physics based, authoritative sources identified, JMEM (historical, published, formatted) DoD centric, generally accepted; historic, repeatable validation Physical warfight outcomes, measurable and explainable Characteristics Metrics Scenarios Data Models Results Non-Traditional Campaigns System Dynamics, Agent- Based Models, Wargames,. Interactively complex; global focus; human, social, cognitive domain, means integrate all elements of National Power (DIME) Many on-going efforts to define Victory (JCS J5, SOCOM J3/J5) More than Phase III Operations, draft vignettes, wargames for event list Perishable, culturally relevant, soft aspects, questionable reliability, no- JMEM equivalent Expertise outside DoD; exploring non- DoD models; still in research mode; structural validation, useful/credible Identify High Leverage areas and trends; insights on capabilities backed-out and often not DoD 4 4

5 Analysis in Irregular Warfare Triangulation Search in the Physical World Uncertainty Space in the Analytic World Sensor 1 Sensor 2 SME and Theory Experts Historic Analogy Sensor 3 Analytic Models and Wargames Uncertain distance with known error Uncertain error with known distance Efforts to refine the solution risk missing a fleeting opportunity to attack 5

6 Why System Dynamics Modeling? Characteristics of systems problems include: Dynamic changes over time and inherent system delays Tendency to overshoot and crash or oscillate Frequent over-reactions that drive exponential growth in costs Multiple players, diverse interests Interdependencies across borders and across disciplines Proposed solutions that appear simple and are usually wrong Very difficult to communicate! System Dynamics Modeling can add value in several areas. It provides a platform for Effectively framing issues and problems. Representing the essence of the interdependencies that underlie system performance; minimize policy resistance Reliably inferring the dynamics associated with a set of initiatives Communicating creating a single sheet of music to play Excerpts from An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & ithink Workshop 6

7 System Dynamics Disclaimer Various software and consultants being used within DOD STELLA / ithink modeling software VENSIM modeling software PA Consulting / Boeing / VMASC / MIT consultants using a mix of commercial and proprietary software to develop SD solutions Excerpts from An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & ithink Workshop 7

8 System Dynamics Software STELLA / ithink isee systems Barry Richmond Language of stocks and flows, graphics user interface Innovator in application to social systems STELLA in the classroom to study Hamlet in High School 8

Building a Simple STELLA Model Savings account Stock savings Flows in deposits and interest Flows out withdrawals Simulation what is the effect of various interest rates?

9 Building a Simple STELLA Model Savings account Stock savings Flows in deposits and interest Flows out withdrawals Simulation what is the effect of various interest rates? How about deposits and withdrawals? Where is my leverage? Most of the things that concern people are entities that accumulate or dissipate over time and we are concerned with trends. Unlike the simple example above, most don t have a closed-form solution 9

Using a STELLA-Based Presentation Begin with a cause and effect relationship diagram Expand into a model structure that captures all elements and assigns

10 Using a STELLA-Based Presentation Begin with a cause and effect relationship diagram Expand into a model structure that captures all elements and assigns assumptions about relationships Troubleshoot model structure and validate against some sort of truth data historical data, research, or in this case doctrinal theory 10

11 Potential Fractiousness of Society Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams

12 An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development. A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Coalition Funding Investment Potential Fractiousness of Society Development Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government

13 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.

14 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters. Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support

15 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Coalition An appropriate Satisfaction force with mix, and correct operational Funding tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very significant impacts on Expectations The restoration for of essential services. The populace s perception of security. Investment The Government s and COIN forces credibility in Potential Fractiousness their communications efforts with the populace. of Society Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Total Force Coalition Force Force

16 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures Total Force Coalition Force Force

17 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24 Total Force Coalition Force Force

18 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Basic Information Ops Loop Total Force Coalition Force Force

19 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Total Force Coalition Force Force

20 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Total Force Coalition Force Force

21 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Insurgent to Force Ratio Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Coalition Force External Material Support Available Workforce Force HN Intelligence

22 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Insurgent to Force Ratio Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Coalition Force External Material Support Available Workforce Force HN Intelligence

23 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Insurgent to Force Ratio Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Coalition Force External Material Support Available Workforce Force HN Intelligence

24 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Insurgent to Force Ratio Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Comprehensive Information Loop Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Total Force Coalition Force External Material Support Available Workforce Force HN Intelligence

25 Developing and Restoring Essential Breakdown of Essential Psychological Operations Effectiveness Satisfaction with Expectations for Potential Fractiousness of Society Coalition Funding Investment Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force Appropriate Strategic Emphasis Perceived Security Insurgent Acts of Violence Available Workforce External Material Support HN Intelligence Insurgent to Force Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24 Total Force Coalition Force Force

26 The STELLA Model - Interfaces 26 26

27 The STELLA Model - Structure Population Development Security 27 27

28 The STELLA Model Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government 28 28

29 Using the Model in Analysis COA Option Adjust Mix of Effort and use of Force to focus totally on security Technology-driven and reactive cost imposing strategy Ignores FM 3-24 recommended effort on non-security LLOs 1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral 1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral 1: 2: 3: 100 1: 2: 3: 100 1: 2: 3: : 2: 3: : 2: 3: Page Months 2:35 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007 Untitled 1: 2: 3: Page Months 4:31 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007 Untitled Appropriate mix of effort set to a balanced focus on all Logical Lines of Operation All effort focused on Perceived Security and, others zero Waiting to start on the Non-Security LLOs until Security is established is an inherently flawed and self defeating strategy. The LLOs are too interdependent. 29

30 Optimizing a Solution 1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral 1: 2: 3: 100 1: 2: 3: : 2: 3: Page Months 7:49 AM Tue, Oct 30, 2007 Untitled One of the most Results important with balanced lessons in mix Afghanistan of effort on LLOs and in combined Iraq is that military success is not sufficient. with slight Our reduction efforts in must External also Material address Support economic anddevelopment, institution building, slight the reduction rule of in law, Potential promoting Fractiousness internal of reconciliation, Society good or at least decent governance, public services, training and equipping indigenous security forces, effective, strategic communications, and more. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 29 January

31 Coalition Input Optimized 3-24 case Manning and Funding held sufficient through the entire period A sustainable peace we remain involved and remain invested as intervener 31

32 Coalition Input Kilcullen case Manning and Funding get ramped down as capacity increases A durable peace one left to thrive as a better version of itself with less cost to us 32

33 Coalition Input Ramped up effort case Manning and Funding get ramped up as needed to face crises No peace mired in strife at the same cost to us as Kilcullen case over the period 33

34 Coalition Input the long slow grind Eventually the corner is turned assuming no return to major hostilities Requires persistent sufficient investment many times longer despite greater losses 34

(Perceived Security)..four IED attacks (Insurgent Acts of Violence) he will renew the contracts ( Development) is distrustful of the government (Psychological Operations Effectiveness).

35 Is It Working?..in this agrarian area where date palms outnumber buildings (Knowledge and Understanding of Social Structure) concerned citizens are being paid ( Development) () They are making their community safe (Perceived Security)..four IED attacks (Insurgent Acts of Violence) he will renew the contracts ( Development) is distrustful of the government (Psychological Operations Effectiveness)...they will become members of the Iraq security Forces. ( Security Force Development) install security among all tribes, not just Sunni (Potential Fractiousness)..it is a security program, not an attempt to create armed militias (Perceived Security) counter false perceptions (Psychological Operations Effectiveness) the money they receive ( Development) political infighting () Christian Science Monitor October 2 nd 2007: Violence dropped dramatically Credit for success is given to efforts that directly map to FM

36 Contextual Mapping Perceived Security Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx Overall Status Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+,-./ $ '&"$. 01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5 Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx!&$07 0", 819$.-./$. '3"5 :"&( 600$ Overall Status 4$5. Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend ;# =$µ$&3./$. /$5 2""0 ;#7 %$&'" </-." '&$( 83' )*+,-./ $ '&"$.!"##$ 01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5 $& & $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5 6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530 Desired Outcome ;#7 3: xxx.xxxx!&$07!#1" 0", 819$.-./$. '3"5 :"&( 600$./$.? 231'/. Overall 4&3µ µ( Status 8$7 4$5. Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend ;# =$µ$&3./$. /$5 2""0 ;#7 %$&'" </-." '&$( 83' )*+,-./ $ '&"$.!"##$ Security $&3107 Forces 01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5 43& $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5 6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530 Desired Outcome ;#7 3: xxx.xxxx!&$07!#1" 0", 819$.-./$. '3"5 :"&( 600$./$.? 231'/. Overall 4&3µ µ( Status 8$7 4$5. Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend ;# =$µ$&3./$. /$5 2""0 ;#7 %$&'" </-." '&$( 83' )*+,-./ $ '&"$.!"##$ Development 01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5 $& & $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5 6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530 Desired Outcome 3: ;#7 xxx.xxxx!&$07!#1" 0", 819$.-./$. '3"5 Overall :"&( Status 600$./$.? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7 4$5. Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend ;# =$µ$&3./$. /$5 2""0 ;#7 %$&'" </-." '&$( 83' )*+,-./ $ '&"$.!"##$ 01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5 $& & $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5 6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530 ;#7!&$07!#1" 0", 819$.-./$. '3"5 :"&( 600$./$.? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7 4$5. ;#7 </-." 83' ;#7!#1" ;# =$µ$&3./$. /$5 2""0 $& & $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5 6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530./$.? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7 Contextual Mapping helps metrics point towards the appropriate LLOs What can you say about these except I hope they start getting greener To be useful, metrics need a contextual mapping, which infers a framework 36

Campaign Design TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 Commander s Appreciation and Campaign Design Commander s Appreciation Need to develop a shared understanding of complex operational problems Structured

37 Campaign Design TRADOC Pamphlet Commander s Appreciation and Campaign Design Commander s Appreciation Need to develop a shared understanding of complex operational problems Structured problem framing (and re-framing!) Problem structure well structured (structurally complex, linear): professionals agree on how to proceed apply the Science of War ill-structured (interactively complex, nonlinear): professionals disagree on how to solve this problem apply the Art of War Topic of Army Stand-To e-newsletter, 1 Feb 2008 To access TRADOC Pamphlet go to: 37

A System Dynamics View of Campaign Design Gap in "State of Affairs" between what is and what ought to be Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design Campaign plans at each level should nest in the

authoritatively prescribed in doctrine Complex Operational Problem (unstructured problem) Resolving the natural tension between the formulation of strategy and the planning for its implementation

of courage, powers of intellect, and strength of will) doctrine, training, and leader development Simultaneously building and understanding of the problem through the creation of a conceptual

38 A System Dynamics View of Campaign Design Gap in "State of Affairs" between what is and what ought to be Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design Campaign plans at each level should nest in the same way that tactical orders do linear phenomena that can be controlled professional soldiers can agree Concern to lessen or a Military Action to achieve an end state professional consensus and authoritatively prescribed in doctrine Complex Operational Problem (unstructured problem) Resolving the natural tension between the formulation of strategy and the planning for its implementation Commander's Appreciation Problem framing and its military use during a campaign Operational Problem (well or medium structured) Science of War Art of War Intuition and Genius (harmonious combination of courage, powers of intellect, and strength of will) doctrine, training, and leader development Simultaneously building and understanding of the problem through the creation of a conceptual solution or design Reframing as understanding expands Understanding is not a matter of capturing reality sufficiently correctly, [it is a matter of] constructing an interpretation that is sufficiently useful in dealing with reality Link near-term actions to the strategic aim of the campaign Operational Art An iterative process that integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war Analysis of the Mission (breaking it down into specified, implied, and essential tasks) Detailed series of executable missions that directly affect allies, adversaries, and the environment easy to control through technical reduction and a systematic method-based solution Mutually respectful competition of opposing ideas (candid and free) Agreement on a Shared Starting Hypothesis Giving a Complex Problem enough structure so that further planning can lead to useful action Detailed plan for action (blueprint) Action(s) to be Taken Operational Design 2) Arranges operations is space and time and identifies capabilities and resources Operational Engineering 1) Seeks to explain the qualitative relationships embedded within complex problems

A Framework for Success Three Completely Different entities The DoD; The USIP; and

Africa Safe and Secure Environment Rule of Law Stable Democracy Sustainable Economy

Development Development Since these disparate groups can agree on the problem

39 A Framework for Success Three Completely Different entities The DoD; The USIP; and Dr. Paul Collier, an Oxford Economist with a lifetime of working aid issues in Africa Safe and Secure Environment Rule of Law Stable Democracy Sustainable Economy Social Well Being Security Laws and Charters Trade Aid Security Security Force Development Development Since these disparate groups can agree on the problem statement and solution path, how are we in the USG working together to operationalize the answer? 39

40 The STELLA Model Demo/Questions Success will be less a matter of imposing one s will and more a function of Success shaping will behavior less of a matter friends, of adversaries, imposing one s and will most and importantly, more a function the of shaping people in behavior between. of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people Secretary in between. of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007 You don't kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength insurgency. Gen. David Petraeus, 14 September 2008 Support for Insurgency Neutral Populace Support for HN Government 40 40

Analysis of the Draft Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2017

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