Africa and the European Union

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2 Africa and the European Union

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4 Africa and the European Union A Strategic Partnership Edited by JACK M ANGALA

5 16 Jack Mangala From Cairo to Lisbon: The Making of the JAES Held in Cairo in 2000, the historic first EU-Africa Summit is credited with initiating a more structured continent-to-continent political dialogue and dynamic that led, seven years later, to the adoption of the JAES and its first Action Plan at the second Summit in Lisbon.1 On the way toward Lisbon, the publication by the EU of its Strategy for Africa in 2005 represented an important contribution to the unfolding debate on the future of EU-Africa relationship. However, African reactions to the EU Strategy for Africa would highlight the political imperative of a common strategy in lieu of the EU s unilateral approach as the best way to respond to a changing regional and international context and tackle the various challenges that had strained the relationship. The Cairo Summit Under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the EU, the Cairo Summit (April 2 3, 2000) brought together, for the first time, Heads of State and Government of African states and the EU to discuss a broad range of issues pertaining to their continent-to-continent relationship and give a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe for the Twenty First Century. 2 Adding a new strategic dimension to the relationship between the two continents was predicated on the recognition that over the centuries, ties have existed between Africa and Europe, which have led to many areas of co-operation, covering political, economic, social, as well as cultural and linguistic domains. These have developed on the basis of shared values of strengthening representative and participatory democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security, political stability and confidence among nations. In the light of the current rapid globalization trend, we are determined to strengthen this co-operation in our mutual interest and make it more beneficial to the two regions. 3 Against the backdrop of this evolving reality and in pursuance of the stated strategic goal of creating an environment and an effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issue, 4 t he Cairo Plan of Action outlined an agenda for political dialogue that touched on a broad range of issues structured around five priority areas: (1) regional integration in Africa; (2) integration of Africa into the world economy (trade, private sector development, investment, development resources, industrial infrastructure, research and technology, debt, cooperation international fora); (3) human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law (including the role of civil society, migration and refugees); (4) peacebuilding, conflict prevention, management and resolution; (5) development issues (sustainable development challenges

6 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 17 and poverty eradication, health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking and culture including the export and removal of African cultural goods). While Cairo s ambitious agenda was translated into an increased convergence of interests in the years following the Summit, its practical implementation however run into difficulties due to differences between EU and African states with regard to the primacy given to the aforementioned priorities. As noted by the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Europeans by and large [were] putting the accent particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more and more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. On the African side, many still consider that some of the issues set out in the Cairo agenda have not been really addressed or at least not had the attention they deserved (e.g. debt issue and the return of African cultural goods, and these are, to some extent, still a source of frustration). 5 In addition to the frustration stemming from the question of prioritization, the implementation of the Cairo Plan of Action was faced with other challenges emanating from a changing context both in Europe and Africa, and which called for innovative approaches that accounted for new developments in particular in the area of regional integration. It suffices to mention, in relation to the EU, the enlargement process in 2004 and 2007 that saw a growth of membership from 15 to 2007; the deepening of the European integration process which led to the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and later the push for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), all of which underlying EU s ambitions for more political influence in world affairs. With regard to Africa, the launching of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the establishment of the AU in 2002 underscored a new phase in regional integration and an increased assertiveness on the part of AU members to formulate pan-african answers and solutions to the challenges facing the continent, and enhance African ownership of the processes stemming from international cooperation. The AU would emerge as a better counterpart to the EU, thus creating an institutional dynamic in favor of new partnership and approaches in Africa-EU relations. However, despite the challenges that hampered the implementation of its Plan of Action, the Cairo Summit represented a foundational step in that it initiated a dynamic of continent-to-continent political dialogue that paved the way for the adoption of the JAES. Moreover, most Cairo acquis (its key thematic areas of partnership and operational principles) still dominate EU-Africa agenda and have been expanded in subsequent policy initiatives and frameworks. The continent-to-continent political dialogue launched in Cairo is often referred to as the Cairo process, one of four processes that encapsulate the various policy frameworks that govern EU-Africa relations. A brief comment on each of these processes and frameworks is necessary, at this juncture, to clearly demarcate the points of departure and junction with the Cairo process, of which the JAES is an emanation.

7 18 Jack Mangala The first framework is the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which defines the various aspects of the relationship between African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) and the European Union including development cooperation, trade, and political dimensions. The CPA was adopted in 2000 as a successor to the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions that had governed EU-ACP relations since the 1960s. All sub-saharan African states (SSA), including in some respects South Africa, are part to the CPA, which remains the main vehicle for aid and trade between the EU and SSA, while incorporating a significant political dialogue dimension to the relationship. An important difference between the CPA and the JAES is that the former is a legally binding conventional framework, while the latter doesn t carry the same legal authority. The second framework was launched under the former Barcelona process, which established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) aimed at defining Europe s relations with countries around the Mediterranean basin, of which Northern African countries are a part. The EMP is now part of a larger policy framework, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) which deals with all Europe s immediate neighbors. The EMP was transformed into the Union for the Mediterranean in Northern African countries and the EU are thus engaged through a set of specific policies pertaining to neighborhood s priorities and concerns, such as immigration and cross-border security issues. The third framework is the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa which was complemented in 2007 by a separate EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership that accounts for the latter s particular economic and political situation in Africa, and in its relation vis-à-vis the former. Like the JAES, the 2007 EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership provides a comprehensive framework that addresses various dimensions of the relationship, while emphasizing political dialogue as a defining feature of the partnership and a key condition for its sustenance. These various processes and frameworks, to say the least, raise issues of consistency and coordination between different policies and actors, a situation which among other factors prompted the EU to formulate its Strategy for Africa in The EU Strategy for Africa and the Way toward Lisbon 2007 In presenting its Strategy for Africa subsequently adopted by the EU Council in December 2005 the European Commission (EC) stressed that for too long the EU s relations with Africa have been too fragmented, both in policy formulation and implementation between the different policies and actions of the EU Member States and the European Commission; between trade cooperation and economic development cooperation; between more traditional socio-economic development efforts and strategic political policies. Neither Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation. The purpose of this Strategy for Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent. 6

8 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 19 The principal objective of the EU Strategy for Africa was to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Africa. 7 Against this backdrop, the formulation of the EU Strategy for Africa was predicated on three central assumptions outlined as follows by the EC: (i) without good governance, rule of law, security and peace, no lasting development progress is possible; (ii) regional integration, trade and interconnectivity are necessary factors to promote economic growth; (iii) if Africa is to achieve the MDGs, more support is needed on issues with a direct impact on living standards, such as health, education and food security. 8 The EU Strategy for Africa was instrumental in two ways. First, as a policy framework and building on the key priorities identified in Cairo it outlined new areas of significant importance such as the fight against terrorism and migration. But, more importantly, the Strategy made key conceptual innovations that would shape the formulation of the JAES. For example, the dual concept of One Africa and One Europe now embedded in the JAES was an important conceptual contribution of the Strategy in that, for the first time, the EU wanted to address Africa as one entity and act toward it in a more unified and effective way by seeking greater coordination, complementarity and coherence than before. 9 Also, in light of the changing context and challenges to EU-Africa relations, the Strategy gave new resonance and urgency to the core principles of equality, partnership, ownership, subsidiarity, and solidarity, all of which would later be amplified in the JAES. Second, as political process, the EU Strategy for Africa confirmed Africa s development as one of EU s top political priorities and reiterated the central tenet of dialogue in EU-Africa relations. 10 Although, under the new Strategy, some progress was made toward mobilizing more support for Africa-led development efforts and ensuring better policy coherence and institutional coordination between various EU actors on the one hand, and EU and African states and institutions on the other hand; the EU Strategy for Africa would be received, from its inception, with skepticism and a great deal of criticism by key African actors. Criticisms centered principally on the fact that the strategy had been developed without sufficient consultations and retained elements of a traditional, unilateral donor-client approach. 11 It was also pointed out that it reflected a too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to creating African ownership. 12 In response to these criticisms, the two sides agreed, during the 5th EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in December 2005 in Bamako, to take their partnership to a new, strategic level and develop a Joint EU-Africa Strategy a partnership with Africa, rather than a strategy for Africa. 13 The EU and Africa expressed the need to make a qualitative change to their relationship by gradually transforming it into a more political, more global and more equal partnership in which African states and organizations would have the primary responsibility for their political future and development. 14 The initial consensus achieved in Bamako reached a critical momentum in early 2007 with the convening of a series of official meetings between representatives of

9 20 Jack Mangala the EC, EU member states, the AUC and African states aimed at developing the JAES. In terms of process, the parties agreed on the need for a large-scale public consultation exercise intended to seek the input of a wide range of noninstitutional actors and stakeholders (members of the civil society, trade unions, entrepreneurs, and simple citizens) in Europe and Africa in the formulation of the Joint Strategy. 15 There were two phases of the public consultation, the first of which resulted in the production of an outline of the joint strategy document, while the second phase led to the final version of the strategy and Action Plan that would be adopted in December 2007 in Lisbon. Although the public consultation process was met with some degree of skepticism by Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) which were concerned about the actual use of their submissions and inputs in drafting of the JAES, it is nonetheless important to note that the public consultation process leading up to the Lisbon Summit and the adoption of the JAES represented the first time in the history of EU-Africa relations that an overarching policy framework had been formulated through an open and public consultation with noninstitutional actors in general and the civil society in particular, thus lending some credit to the notion of peoplecentered partnership, which is supposed to be one of the defining characteristics of the JAES. The Lisbon Summit Since 2000, the road from Cairo had been bumpy and the continent-to-continent political dialogue that Cairo saw to establish came under stress and was faced with a wide range of challenges stemming from a changing regional and international context and shifting priorities and approaches. The fact that it took seven years between the first and the second Africa-EU summit speaks volume of the challenges encountered in carrying forward the Cairo agenda. Seven years after the Cairo Summit, a fundamental shift in EU-Africa relations was needed to give a new impetus to the political dialogue between the two parties. Against this backdrop and beyond the mere adoption of the JAES and its first Action Plan the Lisbon Summit has been a watershed moment in the history of Africa-EU relations, a moment that witnessed the emergence for the first time of a common strategy to address common challenges and seek new opportunities. As stated in the Lisbon Declaration, We have come together in awareness of the lessons and experiences of the past, but also in the certainty that our common future requires an audacious approach, one that allows us to face with confidence the demands of our globalizing world. 16 The dual dynamic of looking both backward by learning from past lessons and experiences and forward by adopting an audacious approach aimed at adapting the relationship to the new world reality was reflected in the Lisbon Summit

10 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 21 and its outcomes. It was eloquently captured as follows by Heads of State and Government who wanted the Summit to be remembered as a moment of recognition of maturity and transformation in our continent to continent dialogue, opening new paths and opportunities for collective action for our common future. 17 Maturity (the capacity to learn from the past especially from past mistakes) and transformation (the political courage to take bold actions to address past shortcomings and chart a different future) were supposed to embody the spirit of Lisbon. The chapters in the second part of this book will assess whether, in concreto, this test has been met. Before that, the remaining sections of this chapter will offer an overview of the JAES and discuss some of its key policy and institutional innovations. The JAES: Overview and Ambitions The JAES and its Action Plans epitomize EU-Africa strategic partnership which is intended, at its core, to bring a measure of coherence to a largely fragmented system of interaction. The strategic partnership is made of five key segments: (1) an overarching policy framework outlined in the JAES; (2) EU and African institutions and actors engaged either formally or informally in the strategy; (3) the structures and events with the thematic partnerships at the forefront aimed at jointly managing this complex relationship; (4) the Action Plan which outlines the parties priorities and operational commitments; and (5) financial resources. The present section will offer an overview of the overarching policy framework that emerges from the JAES vision and principles, objectives and strategies, as well as priorities and partnerships. The next section will focus on the JAES institutional architecture and challenges. Shared Vision and Principles After positing that it is now time for the two neighbors, with their rich and complex history, to forge a new and stronger partnership that builds on their new identities and renewed institutions, capitalizes on the lessons of the past and provides a solid framework for long-term, systematic and well integrated cooperation, 18 t he JAES outlines as follows the shared vision it intends to pursue to take Africa-EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The partnership will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives. This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity. 19

11 22 Jack Mangala This is an ambitious vision that highlights a few core elements: the political dimension of the new partnership; its comprehensive nature; the community of values between Africa and Europe; agreed upon common interests and objectives; and the strategic imperative to further Africa s development. It is worth investigating the stated consensus on values, as well as the common interests and objectives that are supposed to form the bedrock of the JAES. In its opening paragraph, the JAES lists the following as forming the community of values between the EU and Africa: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy. The JAES carries an important value agenda which, beyond the aforementioned values, must be interpreted in light of relevant international agreements and AU/EU constitutive texts. As for common interests, they are not as clearly stated as the common values. They must therefore be inferred from selected priority areas and objectives pursued by the two partners in their political dialogue. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership is to be guided by a number of fundamental as well as operational principles, which further underscore and expand the community of values between Africa and the EU. The former include: unity of Africa, interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and join responsibility, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and instruments. 20 The latter is comprised of: political dialogue, co-management and coresponsibility, burden-sharing and mutual accountability, solidarity and mutual confidence, equality and justice, common and human security, respect for international law and agreements, gender equality and nondiscrimination and longterm approach. 21 Some of these principles for example, long-term approach, mutual confidence and coherence, and effectiveness of existing agreements are new; while others ownership, equality, and partnership have been restated over time through multiple frameworks that govern specific aspects of EU-Africa relations. 22 Objectives and Approaches The JAES identifies four main objectives of the long-term strategic partnership: (i) to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern (peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment); (ii) to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental development in Africa, and to ensure that all MDGs are met in all African countries by the year 2015; (iii) to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative institutions, and the reform of the UN system and other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns; and (iv) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centered partnership. 23 The formulation of these central objectives underscores what has become a tenet of the JAES, which is intended to place the relationship on a more mature and more

12 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 23 equal footing by taking dialogue and cooperation beyond development, beyond Africa, and beyond institutions. 24 This formula, now a commonplace, speaks to three fundamental dynamics that the JAES is supposed to be infuse into the relationship. First, the two sides have expressed the desire, in their political dialogue, to go beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and to embrace a wide range of problems of common concern and interest. Aliis verbis, to go beyond the donor-recipient relationship of the past and reflect a political partnership of equals. 25 Second, the political dialogue is supposed to offer a platform from which to jointly engage the world community. Third, the JAES is supposed to epitomize a people-centered partnership that involves a wide spectrum of noninstitutional and state actors from the civil society, the private sector and academia by going beyond what has been termed the Brussels-Addis Axis. These three tenets represent, at least conceptually, a fundamental shift from traditional Africa-EU relations. To substantially transform the relationship along the lines defined by these tenets and ensure the overall success of the JAES, a new set of approaches that address key political challenges is warranted. It suffices, in that regard, to mention the parties commitments: (a) to move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives; (b) to build on positive experiences and lessons learned from our past; (c) to promote more accurate images of each other; (d) to encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents; (e) to recognize and fully support Africa s efforts and leadership to create conducive conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation of partner-supported development programmes; (f) to work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks; (g) to ensure that bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy; (h) to integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in multilateral context; (i) to encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/diasporas in their countries of residence; (j) to bear in mind that we can only achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders. 26 Beyond specifics, these new approaches are supposed to underscore a broad commitment, on the part of Africa and the EU, to a cultural shift in their relations new ways of relating to and engaging each other and the world. The chapters in the second part of the book will discuss whether this new institutional and political culture has been translated into practice five years after the adoption of the JAES, whose strategic priorities and partnerships outline the most advanced level of interregional relations in world politics. Strategic Priorities and Partnerships The JAES will be implemented through successive short-term Action Plans and enhanced political dialogue at all levels, resulting in concrete and measurable

13 24 Jack Mangala outcomes in all areas of the partnership. 27 This commitment to being a result-oriented partnership stands out as one of the key features of the JAES, which outlines strategic priorities in four main areas: peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional integration; and key development issues. These areas of strategic priority are conceptually presented as inter-related and their implementation calls for the EU and Africa to apply the the principle of policy coherence for development... by identifying and promoting interactions and positive complementarities between sectoral policies and strategies, while ensuring that measures taken in one policy area do not undermine results in other areas. 28 The affirmation of this principle is aimed at addressing one of the major criticisms to EU-Africa relations, which has not always displayed sufficient coherence between various policies. The chapters in the second part of the book will assess whether the parties have followed through this commitment. The first Action Plan ( ) translated the four inter-related priority areas identified by the JAES into eight thematic partnerships along with various priority actions to be undertaken under each partnership. Some thematic questions have been on Africa-EU agenda for quite some time for example, peace and security, governance, economic development, and MDGs; while others for example, science, information society and space, climate change, and the environment represent new areas of emphasis. The third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli (November 29 30, 2010) which was held under the general theme of Investment, economic growth and job creation confirmed those priority actions and slightly reformulated some in light of the implementation progress since the Lisbon Summit. While the Tripoli Summit acknowledged the JAES potential to deliver more and better results, 29 it was also an opportunity for various actors involved in partnership to discuss enduring challenges even growing frustration with the JAES. At this occasion, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa openly expressed his concern that after ten years of this partnership we have very little to show in terms of tangible implementation of the undertaking we made in both Cairo and Lisbon. 30 He went on to caution the Summit against committing to another action plan when earlier commitments have not been implemented. We will return to the implementation debate and assess the merits of President Zuma s claim in the second part of the book. For now, the goal is simply to present an overview of the parties commitments as translated into the thematic partnerships and their priority actions presented in Table 2.1. What Added Value? There seems to be a broad consensus on the fact the JAES added value compared to existing frameworks such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement lies primarily in its ambitious political agenda to substantially transform Africa-EU relations and chart a new path to their continent-to-continent dialogue. Besides, the overarching policy framework discussed above incorporates a number of features and

14 Table 2.1 JAES Thematic Partnerships and Priority Actions Partnerships Priority actions under the first Action Plan ( ) Priority actions under the second Action Plan ( ) Peace and Security Democratic Governance and Human Rights Regional Integration, Trade, and Infrastructure Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security Full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture Predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods Support the African integration agenda Strengthen African capacities in the areas of rules, standards, and quality control Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership Jointly contribute to the global security related governance in Africa, Europe and worldwide, and make the dialogue more effective Address crises and challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and elsewhere and capitalize on commonalities of positions Operationalization of the APSA Predictable funding for peace support operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority Enhance dialogue and cooperation at the global level and in international fora Cooperation in the area of governance initiatives Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation Regional integration Dialogue on the political dimension, policies and experiences on regional integration in Europe and in Africa and on integration in the global economy Trade Customs and trade facilitation Improve the competitiveness and the diversification of African agriculture and industry notably by strengthening African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control Operationalization of Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) Plan of Action in cooperation with UNIDO, RECs and other institutions continued

15 Table 2.1 Continued Partnerships Priority actions under the first Action Plan ( ) Priority actions under the second Action Plan ( ) Millennium Development Goals Energy Ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs Accelerate the achievement of the Food Security Targets of the MDGs Accelerate the achievement of the Health Targets of the MDGs Accelerate the achievement of the Education Targets of the MDGs Implement the Energy Partnership to intensify cooperation on energy security and energy access Raw materials Improve the investment climate Support quality statistics in Africa Infrastructure Support to AFUR and African power pools Support to air sector and satellite navigation Enhancement of maritime administration and safety Transport sector development Establishment of a geo-database Support to improving water governance for trans-boundary water resources in Africa through promoting integrated water resource management Support of PIDA programme Strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors including RECs Improving regional connectivity and basic access to infrastructure services Health Gender Education Agriculture Water and sanitation Disability Energy access Energy security

16 Climate Change and Environment Migration, Mobility, and Employment Science, Information Society and Space Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on Migration and Development Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings Implement and follow up the 2004 Ougadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa Support S&T capacity building in Africa and implement Africa s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action Enhance cooperation on space applications and technology Renewable energy and energy efficiency Institutional capacity building Scaling up investment Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative CLIMDEV and climate information services using earth observation data Strengthening climate adaptation Fight against deforestation Enhancing African negotiators capacity in negotiations including the UN Framework of the Climate Change Convention (UNFCC) and the Kyoto Protocol Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Biodiversity conservation initiatives Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on Migration and Development Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings Implement and follow up the 2004 Ougadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa S&T capacity building for the implementation of Africa s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA) Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa Enhance cooperation on space applications an technology Source : Compiled from Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan and Joint Africa-EU Strategy Action Plan ,

17 28 Jack Mangala innovations that set it apart from other Africa-EU frameworks. Schematically and without any pretense to exhaustivity, these include: The commitment expressed in Lisbon in 2007, and reiterated in Tripoli in 2010, to develop and pursue a joint strategy supposed to exemplify a partnership of equals. The JAES has expanded EU-Africa relations to new areas of cooperation beyond aid and development. The JAES has been complemented with specific Action Plans that underscore its result-oriented approach which seeks to achieve concrete actions and measurable outcomes. The commitment to treating Africa as one which has been translated, among other things, to a central role given the AU and its Commission. The commitment to also look outward by jointly engaging the global community. A complex and inclusive institutional architecture that includes non-state/ institutional actors. JAES Institutional Architecture and Challenges The JAES is to be implemented through an institutional architecture, which allows and promotes intensive exchange and dialogue on all issues of common concern. 31 While recognizing the involvement of a large number of institutional and noninstitutional actors into the partnership, the JAES stresses the central role of the AU and EU as continental organizations in advancing its objectives. Since its inception, the implementation and monitoring of the JAES has been conducted through an elaborated web of actors representing diverse and competing interests and stakes in the process. This web, which has been progressively expanded over the years, is rather difficult to untangle and the scarcity of studies on this new institutional architecture only adds to the difficulty. It is not easy, for the uninitiated, to distinguish between various levels of responsibility assumed by different actors involved in JAES implementation and monitoring process. To guide us through this institutional labyrinth, the present section will heavily draw on the excellent work done by Veronica Tywuschik and Andrew Sherriff, 32 to whom I am particularly thankful for authorizing the use of Figure 2.1 that offers a helpful visualization of the institutional architecture of JAES, especially the coordination and interrelationship between different actors. Following Tywuschik and Sherrif s nomenclature, the remaining of the section will discuss the role and responsibilities, as well as the implementation and monitoring challenges pertaining to five categories of actors: those that are part of Africa-EU inter-institutional structure, European actors, African actors, representative institutions, and civil society organizations. For each category, I will provide an informative overview rather than a detailed account of the activities and issues that have dominated each actor s involvement in the JAES.

18 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 29 AFRICA JOINT STRUCTURES EUROPE AU MS Summits EU MS PARLIAMENTS AND OTHER OFFICIAL BODIES COMMISSIONS GOVERNMENTS AU Delegation to the EU AUC Africa taskforce CIDO PAP + National parliaments RECs AUC Ministerial Troika Senior Officials Meeting College to College meeting AU-EU Taskforce EC Delegations 8 Partnerships: (in Africa) each one has a Joint Expert Group (JEG) AF ITs (African implementation teams) AUC AU MS EU ITs (European implementation teams) EC EU MS EC Gen. Sect. Council Africa Working Group (Council) EU Delegation to the AU Africa intra-service taskforce 8 DG DEV focal points EP EESC ECOSOCC CIVIL SOCIETY CIVIL SOCIETY EU CSO Steering Group Figure 2.1 I n s t it ut ion a l A r c h it e c t u r e of t he J A E S Source : Veronica Tywuschik and Andrew Sherriff, Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, ECDPM Discussion Paper 87 (2009). Courtesy of the European Centre for Development Policy Management. Africa-EU Inter-Institutional Structure To jointly implement the JAES and its Action Plans and facilitate their monitoring, the EU and Africa hold various levels of meetings that involve a host of formal and informal structures which have become part of the JAES institutional landscape. This inter-institutional process is primarily conducted through the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs), the College-to-College meetings (C2C) and the AU-EU Task Force, and various Africa-EU Ministerial Troika and EU-Africa summits.

19 30 Jack Mangala The JEGs represent the most innovative inter-institutional structure tasked with the implementation and monitoring of the JAES. It is worth noting that it took almost a year after the adoption of the JAES to define their role and agree on some basic operating guidelines and procedures. 33 Under the political guidance of the Troika, JEGs are instrumental in advancing the technical dimensions of the JAES. To each thematic partnership is attached a JEG made of various experts that functions as an open-forum where the partnership s priority actions are defined, coordination problems discussed, mobilization of actors and resources pursued, and joint positions sought. Even though the level of engagement, the intensity of the work, and the range of experts involved vary across the various thematic JEGs each of which defines its internal working procedures and composition, as well as the frequency of meetings and their venues it is generally conceded that, within the confines of their limited responsibilities, these informal structures have opened a new space for political dialogue that has brought to the fore important points of convergence and divergence, as well as concerns between Africa and the EU on key issues pertaining to their strategic partnership. 34 One concern expressed by the African side during the early implementation stage of the JAES was that the latter could replace the Cotonou Partnership Agreement s development cooperation framework. Against this backdrop, there was a tendency from the African side to push more aggressively for specific programs, concrete deliverables and new funding mechanisms in the initial meetings of JEGs so as to ensure that the JAES would not turn into a de facto development cooperation scheme. JEG meetings offered an open-opportunity for the EU to respond to this concern and reassure its African partners on the added value of the JAES in terms of political dialogue. Overall, the functioning of JEGs seems to point toward two major problems. The first has to do with their composition which mixes up institutional actors with experts, thus creating a confusion of role... that has reduced both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the JEGs. 35 The second problem underscores a more fundamental issue that amounts to a structural design flaw that comes from a disconnection between the JEGs whose work was supposed to be linked to the political level and streamline with resources and implementation agencies and their actual functioning which seems to exhibit a deviation from the original intent, a situation that Bossuyt and Sherriff explain as follows: In most cases, the JEGs ability to make things happen proved rather weak as a result of limited clarity on: (i) their structural links to the political level; (ii) resources at their disposal, (iii) connection to the implementation (e.g. existing programming cycles), and (iv) membership. In the absence of ongoing political guidance, the Joint Expert Groups are largely left on their own to implement the JAES, with ambiguous mandates and roles, stretching far beyond their remit as an informal technical body of experts. The structural weaknesses of the JEGs have limited participation and engagement in Europe and Africa. There are few incentives for experts to attend JEGs other than a bureaucratic imperative even then it is unclear what kind of continental or regional mandate the participants have. 36 This analysis points toward a major structural problem affecting the JAES key implementation body, and invites further reflections on the necessary adjustments to which the third part of the book will return.

20 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 31 The C2C meeting, which was first held in 2005, provides an avenue for the AU and EU Commissions to strengthen the working relationship between the two executives, and develop the broad Africa-EU political agenda. Since the inception of the JAES, which attributes a central implementation role to the two Commissions, C2C meetings have served as a platform for the exercise of this responsibility through a deepening political engagement involving a wide range of internal structures to the EU Commission with their counterparts in the AU Commission. C2C meetings held since the Lisbon Summit in 2007 seem to indicate that a growing part of their agenda is beeing devoted to the JAES. 37 The political work of the C2C meetings is supported, at a technical level, by the AU-EU Task Force which brings together staff from the AU Commission, EU Commission and European Council Secretariat departments dealing with second pillar matters, which encompass the JAES and its Action Plans. Held every six months and between C2C meetings, AU-EU Task Force meetings play a valuable role in keeping the spotlight and focus on key agenda items in Africa-EU relations, chief among which is increasingly the implementation of the JAES. Given this situation, it has been proposed to have a representation of lead countries in each of the thematic partnerships on the AU-EU Task Force meetings, a change that would certainly contribute to enhance their efficiency through focused upstream preparation and agenda-setting, a clearer identification of priorities, and greater operational continuity. 38 The last Africa-EU inter-institutional level dealing with JAES implementation and monitoring includes two structures, the Africa-EU Ministerial Troikas and the EU-Africa Summits. The latter have been discussed in the preceding section. Only the former will be addressed here. Since the French EU Presidency in September 2008, Africa-EU Ministerial Troikas have played a growing role in monitoring the JAES progress. Meeting twice a year, they have produced progress reports that have highlighted implementation achievements and challenges, as well as different levels of responsibility and actions needed to move the partnership forward. For example, among the challenges identified by the first Ministerial Troika in September 2008 was the involvement of representative institutions in the JAES process. 39 More importantly, it is worth noting that some Troika meetings have been particularly active in expanding the focus of the political dialogue by discussing important world issues such as the global financial downturn, the ICC, and political crises outside of the African theater, thus lending some credence to the idea of the JAES going beyond Africa. 40 Eu rope a n A c tor s Among European actors engaged with the JAES, a special mention must be made of the role played by the EC, the EU Council, EU member states, and the EU delegation to the AU as well as EC delegations in various African countries. In keeping with its executive and implementation responsibilities under EU s treaties, the EC is in charge of facilitating the JAES, whose implementation is, ultimately, a joint EC-EU member-states responsibility. Given the depth and scope of the JAES, several EC Directorates-General are involved with its

21 32 Jack Mangala implementation on the basis of an internal shared responsibility. This situation has prompted the EC to establish new internal coordination mechanisms, which have enriched the vertical approach of coordination that had characterized the pre-jaes era whereby relations between the EC and Africa were dealt with vertically through the DG DEV and DG Trade with a horizontal approach involving an extended number of DGs. The improved internal coordination is assured by the Commission Africa Intra-Service Task Force whose overall goal is to enhance coherence and seek greater synergies within the EC in the implementation of the JAES and its Action Plan by bringing together, for instance, DG DEV, DG RELEX, DG Justice, Freedom and Security, and DG Employment along with EuropeAid Cooperation office (AidCo) and EC delegations in the implementation and monitoring of the Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (PMME). 41 Another internal coordination instrument has been established by the DG DEV with the creation of eight focal points (one for each partnership) tasked with preparing EC inputs into the JAES annual implementation reports. Unlike the EC, which represents the interests of the Union, the Council brings member states perspectives into the functioning of EU institutions. The adoption of the JAES in 2007 has also resulted in new implementation and monitoring responsibility for the Council, which has consequently sought to adjust its working approaches and coordination instruments especially in light of the JAES tenet of treating Africa as one. The Council has thus extended the mandate of the ad hoc cross pillar Working Group for Africa (COAFR) to embrace pan-african issues and attempt to bridge the North-Sub-Saharan Africa policy divide. 42 This new coordination instrument has been added to existing Council working groups and committees, such as the ACP Group and the European Development Fund (EDF) Committee, which also deal with African issues. Despite the pan-african focus provided by COAFR, there are clearly overlap concerns that will have to be worked out as the JAES evolves and the Council s implementation and monitoring instruments mature. JAES institutional architecture provides for one member state to act as the lead country for a specific partnership whose work it facilitates by liaising closely with all stakeholders involved in that partnership. This institutional innovation was intended among other considerations to correct the imbalance that seemed to characterize Africa-EU relations, long-dominated by institutional actors, namely the EU and AU Commissions. It is worth noting two particular features of this institutional arrangement. First, while lead countries are tied to specific partnerships they have chosen to lead; nonlead countries have more flexibility in that regard and can, technically, associate themselves with any partnership in which they have an interest. Second, some partnerships dealing with sensitive questions are led by institutional actors, that is, the EU Council and the Commission. Each partnership has an Implementation Team (EU ITs), an instrument that brings together the EC, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and member states involved in the partnership to discuss its working. The EU ITs have played an important role in framing EU positions on various partnership issues. See Table 2.2 for an overview.

22 Historical Background, Institutional Architecture 33 Table 2.2 EU Lead Countries and Institutions in JAES Partnerships Partnerships Peace and Security Democratic Governance and Human Rights Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure Millennium Development Goals Energy Climate Change and Environment Migration, Mobility and Employment Science, Information Society and Space Lead Countries/Institutions General Secretariat of EU Council Germany EU Commission United Kingdom Austria, Germany France Spain France, Portugal S o u r c e : Compiled by the author from various JAES documents Overall, member states involvement in and contribution to the working of the JAES seems to vary greatly across the board. One determining factor seems to have been the level of familiarity with, as well as historical, cultural, and economic interests in Africa between the old and new member states from central and eastern Europe. Another factor is related to external responsibilities that come with EU presidency. It has been rightly observed that countries have been particularly involved in the JAES in the period leading up to, during, or immediately following their EU presidency. 43 Last but not least, the EU delegation to the AU and EC delegations in African countries have emerged as essential JAES implementation and monitoring instruments whose importance is enhanced by their presence on the ground, and direct access to African partners and stakeholders. The building up of the capabilities of the EU delegation to the AU attests of its growing role and influence in monitoring the JAES. Both the EU delegation to the AU and EC delegations in African countries seem to have provided valuable input into the monitoring process and are playing a growing role in the implementation of the JAES. 44 African Actors On the African side, the general observation that emerges from the institutional implementation of the JAES is that, while the African Union Commission (AUC) has assumed a central role in the process; member states' engagement in the partnership has been quite limited, so has been that of regional economic communities (RECs). The AU Permanent Mission to the EU has also faced some difficulties in asserting itself as a key player in the process. After the adoption of the JAES and its first Action Plan, the 10th AU Summit mandated the AUC to lead its implementation and monitoring. Within the AUC, the Department of Economic Affairs was tasked with coordinating the JAES and developing appropriate instruments and procedures. 45 It must be said that the latter bear some parallelism with those developed by the EU Commission. To each of the eight partnerships has been assigned a lead department or focal point. An inter-departmental