THE PARDEE PERIODICAL JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS FALL 2017 VOLUME II, ISSUE 2

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1 THE PARDEE PERIODICAL JOURNAL OF GLOBAL AFFAIRS FALL 2017 VOLUME II, ISSUE 2 Editor-in-Chief Stephanie Gagnon Print Managing Editor Katherine Spiekermann Production Editor Christopher Duffy Online Managing Editor Jacob Howe Web Managing Editor Philip J. Horowitz Editors Florian David Bodamer Hannah Cooperrider Bradley Douglas Kieron Farrelly Sarah Ritterspach Samantha Robertson Dina Wyler Faculty Advisory Board Kevin Gallagher, PhD Vesko Garčević, Amb William Grimes, PhD MA International Relations & Environmental Policy MA International Affairs MA Global Policy MA International Affairs MA International Relations & Environmental Policy MA International Affairs MA International Relations & Religion MA International Affairs MA International Affairs MA Global Policy MA Global Development Policy MA International Relations & Religion Adela Pineda, PhD Kaja Schilde, PhD Henrik Selin, PhD ISSN:

2 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs 121 Bay State Road Boston, MA pardeeperiodical.com Copyright 2017 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs All Rights Reserved ISSN: Published by the Pardee Graduate Council 121 Bay State Road Boston, MA Cover design by Lejla I. Brackovic Cover by Elizabeth Martin Cover Photo by Jess Kraft / Shutterstock.com Printed by Kendall Press 1 Main Street, Suite 105 Cambridge, MA With contributions from: The Institute for the Study of Muslim Societies and Civilizations at Boston University The Boston University Department of Earth and Environment The Institute for Economic Development at Boston University The African Studies Center at Boston University The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University This publication is a product of students at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. The opinions expressed in the articles herein are those of the individual contributors and do not reflect the views of the Editorial Board of the Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs, The Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, or Boston University. ii

3 Editor s Note My promotion to the position of Editor-in-Chief was a kind of grand experiment, a determinant of whether the Pardee Periodical had progressed sufficiently that it would survive the transition to a board made up of entirely non-founding members. It is therefore my privilege and great honor to present to you the Fall 2017 issue of the Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs as a testament to the great foundation laid by the previous Editorial Boards, and to the hard work and strong vision held by this issue s Editorial Board. The papers contained in this issue include a broad snapshot of past, current, and future global issues, ranging from the long-lasting effects of childhood exposure to violence in conflict, to the complexities of global climate change negotiations, to North Korea s nuclear deterrence strategy. Throughout the papers, the authors present a deep level of analysis of both existing literature and their own observations, continuing a conversation begun by prior researchers and opening new opportunities for other students across the disciplines to join in the dialogue. They engage directly and poignantly with relevant issues, but never sacrifice nuance for timeliness. Across all papers, you will find a perspective unique to a generation coming of age in a time of unprecedented technological advancement that both enables positive societal advancement and propagates existential threats. In an age fueled socially by the expansion of globalization and politically by the rising tide of populism, it is as important as ever to provide a platform for graduate students to contribute to the modern discourse on global affairs and to propose positive solutions to global problems. I am extremely grateful to the Fall 2017 Editorial Board for their flexibility in difficult situations, their creative problem solving, and for their hard work throughout the process of selecting, editing, and producing this issue. I am especially grateful to Florian David Bodamer and Samantha Robertson for their vision and dedication to the mission of the Pardee Periodical over the past three semesters; they will be graduating in January and their presence on the Board will be sorely missed. On behalf of the Editorial Board, I would also like to extend our sincerest gratitude to our authors for their hard work, the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies for its support, and to our incredible Faculty Advisory Board for their guidance, as well as to our generous donors whose financial contributions made this issue possible. We are ever grateful for all of your support, and could not continue our work as a graduate student publication without you. We would also like to thank Michael Williams for his support throughout the past two years, and his commitment to ensuring the continued success of the Pardee Periodical. We wish him all the best in his future endeavors. And now, without further ado, the Editorial Board is proud to present the Fall 2017 issue of the Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs. Stephanie Gagnon Editor-in-Chief iii

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5 1 Effects of Childhood Exposure to Conflict on Attitudes Toward Democracy, Trust in State Institutions, and Political Participation in Colombia Christoph Sponsel 23 Little Victories Against Capitalism: The ALBA Bloc s Participation in Climate Negotiations Veronica Lopez Gamboa v

6 37 To Be or Not to Be: The Ongoing Question of Missile Defense Jarek Buss 53 Enhancement of Marine Sinks in International Climate Policy Chelsey Bryson 67 DPRK Nuclear Strategy: The Objectives and Limits of Risk Manipulation Jordan Routt and James Keagle vi

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9 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Toward Democracy, Trust in State Institutions, and Political Participation in Colombia Christoph Sponsel Christoph Sponsel graduated from Yale University with a Master s Degree in International and Development Economics. Prior to Yale, he studied Economics at Cambridge (UK) and at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. His research interests cover Latin American development and politics. He has interned at the United Nations in Bogotá, the German embassy in Quito, and various NGOs across Latin America. Originally from Germany, Christoph has lived most of his life abroad and is fluent in four languages. He is an avid skier, saxophone player, and hopes to eventually open up his own ice cream shop in Colombia. Abstract This study utilizes differing levels of conflict intensity across Colombia in order to identify the effects of childhood exposure to violence. It analyzes how such exposure to violence influences an individual s opinions toward democracy, their level of trust in state institutions, and their level of political participation. Results indicate that exposure to conflict during childhood reduces an individual s appreciation of democracy and state institutions while its effects on their level of political participation are ambiguous. These results, though small in magnitude, are robust throughout a wide range of different regression specifications. This analysis is based on datasets from Colombia s statistical agency (DANE) and the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC), and controls for municipality, cohort, survey wave, and department-fixed effects to exclude potential sources of endogeneity. The results hold under different indicators of conflict intensity. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 1

10 Christoph Sponsel 1 Introduction 1.1 Research Question War and civil conflict, prevalent in many developing and middle income countries, often have wide implications for economic and social development. This paper aims to analyze the effects that exposure to conflict during different stages of life has on citizens political beliefs and participation. Exposure to conflict may affect political attitudes in various, and sometimes polar, ways. On one hand, it may reduce trust in the functional abilities of the state and its representatives. On the other, exposure to violence could sensitize citizens to the importance of a well-functioning state, yielding increased trust and support for democracy and state institutions. How such exposure to conflict affects the individual might also depend on the age at which this exposure occurred. An adolescent experiencing conflict might develop very different attitudes toward government and institutions than a newborn child growing up surrounded by violence. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for these effects using the case of Colombia s civil war and seeks to identify whether childhood conflict exposure at different ages has had an impact on various indicators of opinion toward democracy, trust in state institutions, and political participation. 1.2 Outline This paper adheres to the following structure: Section two outlines the motivations behind this analysis. Section three describes the empirical strategy used to isolate the effects of conflict exposure on political attitudes and describes the data and the robustness checks used. Results are presented in section four. Section five concludes with the possible underlying driving mechanisms, the limitations of this analysis, and the potential for further inquiry. 2 Motivation, Existing Literature, and Political Context 2.1 Motivation A vast array of literature in economics and political science demonstrates how an institution s form and quality can affect economic growth, inequality, political stability, and other welfare indicators. 1 Institutions such as the structure of political representation, the ways in which elections are held, and the rules governing the policy process have a strong influence on various policy decisions. 2 An institution s form and quality are not only formed by history, but are shaped by the active views of its citizenry. Citizens may affect the institutional framework such as the electoral system, the extent of power separation, and the overall role and strength of the state in society. 3 Aghion et al. argue that institutional rules can be driven by citizens demands, and that institutions are endogenous since they are partly chosen by members of the polity. 4 Political preferences and trust in institutions thus influence the role of government, the institutional setting, and even specific policies. Multiple factors influence citizens political beliefs, their political participation, and their level of trust in state institutions. One such factor might be a citizen s exposure to conflict during 1 See for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution, Besley and Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices, Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

11 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure certain periods of life, since such experiences have the potential to substantially impact living circumstances and subsequently the formation of personal values and opinions. If conflict and violence can affect political beliefs, this in turn implies that they may influence the quality and form of institutions, and ultimately socio-economic welfare. Thus the potential causality between childhood conflict exposure and political beliefs is highly relevant, and provides the motivation for this paper. The data at hand displays a wide divergence across the 33 Colombian departments for violence levels, as well as attitudes toward democracy and political participation. 5 Figure 1 below reveals that the number of clashes in the Colombian conflict varied between 0 and 1,864 across departments during the time period from 1988 until 2005 with an average of 527 clashes per department. Likewise, casualties ranged from 0 to 8,634 per department during the same time range with an average value of 1,594 per department. 6 Figure 1: Variation across Colombia s departments As shown in Figure 1, the average rating of how democratic each department considers Colombia to be on a scale from zero to ten also reveals great heterogeneity, with some considering Colombia to be very democratic and others considering Colombia to be fairly undemocratic. The same holds for the distribution of voting turnout across departments. Since Colombia is ethnically and culturally a relatively homogeneous country, these vast differences are puzzling. This paper aims to identify whether the diverse extent to which Colombian departments were affected by civil conflict could be a partial explanation. 5 Colombia is divided into 32 departments and one capital district. 6 Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC), Colombia Civil War Dataset. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 3

12 Christoph Sponsel 2.2 Literature Review The existing literature provides ambiguous insights into the relationship between exposure to conflict and political beliefs. Adhvaryu and Fenske have analyzed post-1945 data on conflicts and political attitudes in 17 sub-saharan African countries. Their results, based on individuals who experienced conflict exposure between the ages of one and fourteen, suggest that exposure to conflict does not alter political beliefs. Only cases of extreme exposure led to large, lasting effects. 7 On the other hand, Grosjean uses data from 35 mainly European countries to show the negative and enduring legacy of war-related violence on political trust and perceived effectiveness of national institutions. Her results show heterogeneous effects across different types and outcomes of conflict. 8 In terms of political participation, Bellows and Miguel demonstrate that individuals in Sierra Leone whose households directly experienced intense war violence are more likely to engage in different forms of political participation (such as joining local political groups or voting) than those who did not. They use a cross-sectional data set based on household surveys. However, due to the lack of a nation-wide counterfactual, their results remain limited to certain regions of Sierra Leone. 9 Similarly, Blattman s use of quasi-experimental variation in rebel recruitment in Northern Uganda provides evidence for a link between past violence and increased political engagement among ex-combatants. Interestingly, the results do not hold for non-political civic engagement. 10 Jaeger et al. examine how violence during the Second Intifada influenced Palestinian public opinion. They find that exposure to violence led Palestinians to develop more radical attitudes toward the conflict with Israel and temporarily support more radical factions. However, in the long run the same exposure led to increased disaffection and a lack of support for any faction. Further, they found that geographically proximate fatalities have a larger effect than those that are distant. 11 Blattman and Miguel summarize the existing research on civil conflict and argue that beyond the trends revealed by cross-country evidence, there is little consensus on causes, conduct, and consequences of civil conflict. Consequently, they argue that there is a need for case studies and micro-level analysis to take into account the heterogeneity of effects. 12 The aim of this paper is to follow and expand on this argument. Since there appears to be no study as of yet on the Colombian conflict experience and its effect on political opinions, trust, and participation, this paper seeks to address that gap in the literature. 2.3 Country Specific Context - The Colombian Civil War The launch of a communist insurgency in the 1960s marked the beginning of Colombian civil conflict. 13 This insurgency was motivated by extreme inequality, rural poverty, and the example set by the Cuban revolution. The primary actors on the insurgency side consisted of left-wing guerrillas, mainly the Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC) and the 7 Adhvaryu and Fenske, Political Beliefs in Africa, 1. 8 Grosjean, Conflict and Social and Political Preferences, Bellows and Miguel, War and local collective action in Sierra Leone, Blattman, From Violence to Voting, Jaeger et al., Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada, Blattman and Miguel, Civil War, Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

13 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure National Liberation Army (ELN). Both factions were aiming to overthrow the country s political and economic system. 14 Until the 1990s, the conflict effectively served as a low-intensity Cold War proxy. 15 Violence levels increased sharply with the emergence of paramilitary groups in the late 1980s. These groups were organized by rural landowners and drug barons in response to growing guerrilla extortions. In 1997, various paramilitary factions collectively formed the United Self- Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) which concentrated their forces and increased their military strength. 16 Paramilitary groups often targeted civilians perceived to be allied with guerrillas, which often led to severe human rights violations. 17 Both paramilitaries and guerrillas financed their activities through narco-trafficking, kidnappings, extortions, theft of natural resources, and predation of public funds. 18 While officially all three groups guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the Colombian army were fighting each other during the 1990s, there is extensive evidence of cooperation between paramilitary groups and the Colombian government forces in countering guerrilla factions. 19 Politicians involvement with paramilitary groups was exposed through several scandals revealing how paramilitary groups had supported certain politicians through voter coercion and forcible elimination of opponents. 20 One could argue that the occurrence of such scandals had the potential to persistently erode citizens trust toward their government and institutions. In 2003, parts of the AUC demobilized, leading to a gradual decrease in violence. 21 Nevertheless, the human rights situation was and is, especially in rural Colombia, still tenuous with frequent attacks on social activists such as trade unionists or community organizers. The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC followed a four year negotiation process and initial rejection by referendum, but was subsequently modified and ratified by Congress. In the agreement, various proposals for a post-conflict Colombia have been detailed, such as demobilization plans, a transitional justice system, a substitution program for illicit crops, and an extensive plan for rural infrastructural and economic development. Alongside the implementation of these proposals, peace talks between the Colombian government and the ELN are currently expected to result in a similar peace agreement. Given decades of extreme levels of violence and human rights violations, it is likely that these activities have had psychological effects on large parts of the Colombian population. This paper may provide valuable insights into how war has affected Colombians political opinions, a factor that has contemporary relevance as the success of the peace deal s implementation depends heavily on Colombian citizens attitudes. 14 Richani, The Political Economy of Violence, Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, Ibid. 17 Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas, The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict, Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, Ibid., Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos, The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia, Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 5

14 Christoph Sponsel 3 Analysis Approach 3.1 Empirical Strategy The identification strategy uses geographical and temporal variation in incidences of the Colombian conflict, as well as the exogenous difference in people s year of birth. Moreover, municipality and time-fixed effects are used as well as department-specific time trends. The main specification is:, Y "#$% = α + β * *-. Exposure *# + γx " + δ # + ρ $ + Θ % + π = (t) + ε "#$% Y imct is a measure of political opinion, trust, or participation for an individual, i, living in municipality, m, member of the cohort, c, born in the same year, and surveyed in survey wave, T. The coefficient of interest is β s, which measures the average effect of exposure to conflict for an individual, i, during life stage, s, on the respective outcome variable. The treatment variable, Exposure, measures the intensity of fighting in individual, i's, municipality during life stage, s. The considered life stages are early childhood (zero until two years old), preschool (three to five years old), primary school age (six to eight years old), and early secondary school age (nine to eleven years old). These ranges are broad in order to work with potential errors in reported age. The coefficient of the treatment variable shows how, on average, political beliefs and participation change for a person who experienced violence during a given life stage compared to a person who did not have exposure to violence during that same life stage. The survey respondents without exposure to violence at the same age (within the same and in other municipalities) thus form the control group. X i is a vector of multiple individual specific characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, literacy, level of education, employment status, marital status, and income. δ m covers municipality fixed effects to control for any specific characteristics of all respondents in the same municipality which are time-invariant. ρ c, the cohort fixed effect, captures any common shock that affects all respondents of the same cohort in a similar manner. Θ % is a control for common shocks for respondents in the same survey wave. π d(t) is a department trend controlling for departmentspecific divergences over time, such as varying economic development. ε imct is a random error term. Since the used outcome variables are nominal with few possible survey answers, the answer possibilities are ranked, and results are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Ordered Logit regressions (or a normal Logit regression in the case of binary outcome variables). Using the Breusch-Pagan test, 22 heteroscedasticity was detected in some of the OLS specifications. Therefore, robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are used in order to account for the likely case that violence exposure, at any given year, varies at the 22 Test which indicates whether the regression errors variances are dependent on the values of the explanatory variables which would yield heteroscedasticity such that estimators would no longer have the lowest variance possible. 6 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

15 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure municipality level. 23 Moreover, the Ramsey Reset test 24 was undertaken for the OLS specifications to test for potential model mis-specifications such as omitted variables. The model thus addresses concerns of endogeneity in various ways. Through the use of municipality fixed effects, the analysis controls for time-invariant municipality characteristics that may be correlated with conflict occurrence and the outcome variables. The same holds for the cohort fixed effects. There is, however, a small potential for reverse causality, given the possibility that certain municipalities experienced more violence than others due to their residents already being more anti-democratic, less trustful toward state institutions, and less politically active. This is unlikely, however, since the people affecting the violence would be from the survey respondents parents generation, and not the respondents generation themselves. Since the violence measured and the public opinion measured occurred at different moments in time, the risk for reverse causality is reduced significantly, especially since violence measured occurred only at life stages during which a respondent could not have realistically influenced violence levels. Thus, the effects of violence experienced during childhood are unlikely to be contaminated by reverse causality. Finally, a person s year of birth is likely to be exogenous to all relevant factors. After singling out department- and year-specific variations, it is thus assumed that the level of violence is not correlated with any determinant of opinions toward democracy, trust in state institutions, or political participation. These assumptions are tested in the results section of the paper. 25 The coefficients of exposure during different life stages are also compared to see if the different β s in adjacent age ranges are significantly different from one another. This will provide insights into which life stage is most influential in determining an individual s political opinions and participation. 3.2 Robustness Checks Various robustness checks are performed to ensure that the results are not affected by misspecification, endogeneity, or measurement error. To avoid mistakes in the data on conflict, additional specifications are run in which one measure of conflict is instrumented with another (Number of Casualties with Number of Clashes or vice versa) in order to account for potential bias as well as attenuation. 26 Since the data shows that many conflict clashes occurred without casualties and since data for both variables is cross-checked against various different data sources, it is unlikely that a potential measurement error is correlated with the endogenous and instrumental variables (IV). 27 Hence, both variables provide valid instruments for each other. Robust standard errors are used for these IV specifications to account for heteroscedasticity (tested using the Breusch-Pagan test). 28 After testing the IV regressions for potential underidentification, no evidence is found of it occurring in the respective specifications. Similar to Adhvaryu and Fenske, the data set only indicates an individual s current municipality, rather than the municipality of birth. Selective migration out of conflict zones by 23 This would lead to errors independent across municipalities but correlated within municipalities and over time, resulting in inefficient estimates. 24 Test which indicates whether the assumed linear regression equation correctly matches the data at hand or whether additional, non-linear combinations of variables are needed to explain the outcome variable. 25 It is further assumed that the attitudes measured in wave T are independent of the attitudes measured in previous waves, which is in line with approaches undertaken in the related literature. 26 For instance, mistakes in the data collection process (measurement error) could cause the estimators to not display the true magnitude and direction of effects. 27 In such a scenario, the estimated effect would still be biased. 28 With heteroscedasticity, the variance of the regression error term is not constant across observations, which would cause the estimators to be inefficient, meaning that we do not have the estimator with the lowest possible variance. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 7

16 Christoph Sponsel the most strongly affected individuals would potentially alter the results. To avoid this, alternative regressions are run without municipalities that are likely destinations for migrants (typically major urban centers) Data for Opinion toward Democracy, Trust in Institutions, and Political Participation Data for the outcome variables is taken from the 2011, 2013, and 2015 waves of the Encuesta de Cultura Política, a nationally representative household and individual survey by Colombia s National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). 30 The survey asks respondents questions regarding political preferences and participation. Various specifications of the model are tested using different indicators of opinion on democracy, trust in Colombia s institutions, and political participation as outcome variables. The survey also captures information on various socio-economic indicators such as income, employment status, and educational attainment. Unfortunately, DANE, for reasons of privacy, does not publish the survey respondents municipalities nor departments of residence. Therefore, the analysis could only be undertaken at DANE s research lab in Bogotá and only regression results, not the original data set, can be published. Since it is not possible to compute childhood conflict exposure for individuals born prior to the beginning of the available conflict data, the analysis can be undertaken based on approximately 15,000 survey respondents out of the approximately 90,000 respondents in all three waves. Older cohorts cannot be considered, since it would not be clear as to which childhood years of violence exposure the results in the outcome variable could be attributed to. For older cohorts, reverse causality would be an issue since participants in the Colombian civil war, due to forced recruitment by paramilitaries and guerrillas, were often as young as twelve years old. 31 As with any survey data, there may be errors in the reported age due to missing information of the month of birth or incorrect survey answers. This could lead to an erroneous assignment of violence exposure. To alleviate this potential problem, violence exposure is analyzed during relevant age ranges instead of specific years. 3.4 Data for Conflict Exposure The spatial data on the Colombian conflict is taken from the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) s Database of the Armed Conflict in Colombia. 32 CERAC is a private and independent research center, specializing in the study of armed violence, conflict analysis, and resultant social and economic impacts. The database includes more than 21,000 war-related events in over 950 Colombian municipalities from 1988 to The conflict events are specified with their municipal location, date, and number of casualties. 33 The conflict data is merged with the survey data, which identifies the number of conflict events (denoted as clashes) or casualties that took place in an individual s municipality during any year. Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas provide a detailed description of the database and the data collection process. 34 The data set is based on media reports in 25 major newspapers and is 29 Adhvaryu and Fenske, Political Beliefs in Africa, DANE, Encuesta de Cultura Política 2011, 2013 y Child Combatants in Colombia, CERAC, Colombia Civil War Dataset. 33 Classified as either guerrilla attacks, paramilitary attacks, military attacks, or violent encounters between two parties. 34 Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas, The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

17 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure supplemented by reports from a network of Catholic priests, a group considered to be neutral toward all parties, thus reducing concerns of misreporting. The priests described incidents of political violence in nearly every municipality in the country. The events are also cross-checked against several other official sources. 35 Two alternative measures of conflict exposure are used: the number of casualties and the number of conflict events occurring in a survey respondent s municipality in each age grouping. In alternative specifications, the exposure variables will be normalized by population size (using data from DANE s population census in 2005). 36 Similar to Dube and Vargas, this study takes into account that 7.8 percent of Colombian municipalities in 1988 were later divided into multiple municipalities by adapting all variables to the 978 municipalities and corresponding departments of the 1988 boundaries. 37 Descriptive statistics of the data will be provided in the following section. 4 Results 4.1 General Comments on the Results This section presents the results of the most relevant outcome variable for each of the three outcome categories: opinion toward democracy, trust in institutions, and political participation. For opinion toward democracy, the analyzed variable is a respondent s satisfaction with democracy while for trust in institutions, the variable is a respondent s stated belief on whether the vote counting process in Colombia is biased or not. For political participation, the variable is a respondent s stated likelihood to vote in elections. These outcome variables were selected since they are the most representative indicators available for their respective categories. Results of additional outcome variables in each category are presented in the appendix. 38 Even though the three outcome categories are fairly diverse, the results show a common pattern of how exposure to violence at an early age affects a survey respondent s political attitude: On average, an increased exposure to violence has a negative impact on a respondent s opinion toward democracy, reduces their trust in state institutions, and reduces their likelihood to actively participate in politics across most analyzed age bands. These general takeaways hold for those variables presented in the main part of this paper and for those for which the regression results are presented in the appendix. However, for all analyzed regressions, it is important to note that the magnitude of estimated effects should be interpreted carefully. While the results do provide a sense of the effects directions, the coefficients absolute numerical values do not provide much insight given inaccuracies resulting from survey respondents varying interpretations of the different answer possibilities. For example, different respondents who are both similarly satisfied with democracy might have nevertheless responded with different answers due to varying interpretations of whether their opinion should be considered very satisfied or only satisfied. The magnitude of coefficients for violence exposure measured by casualties in a municipality are for all analyzed outcome variables smaller than when exposure is measured by the number of clashes within a municipality. The reason is that the clashes considered in the CERAC database involved on average multiple casualties, so the impact of one marginal clash 35 Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, DANE, Censo General Dube and Vargas, Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict, Categories include: whether respondents associate democracy with something good or bad for opinion toward democracy, whether respondents consider that Colombian congress represents different political tendencies for trust in institutions, and membership in political parties for political participation. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 9

18 Christoph Sponsel weighs stronger than the impact of one marginal casualty. This difference in magnitude of effects holds across all realized regressions and thus provides validity for the empirical strategy. For some of the analyzed outcome variables, significant coefficients for the same violence exposure variable vary across the OLS, IV, and Ordered Logit specifications. 39 Most coefficients, if significant, are similar between the OLS and the IV specifications in terms of sign and magnitude. In the cases that these coefficients differ, there is likely a measurement error in the data. Under such circumstances, IV specifications provide a better estimate of the effect than OLS. Also under such circumstances, endogeneity due to measurement error impacts the Ordered Logit algorithm, thus making IV the specification that provides the highest degree of accuracy. When significant coefficients are very similar across OLS and IV specifications, there is likely no endogeneity due to measurement error. In such cases, the Ordered Logit coefficients are different from those of OLS/IV due to the Ordered Logit s ranking and assumption of discreteness. Overall, it is assumed that the significant coefficients are unbiased, since the empirical strategy used eliminates other potential sources of endogeneity. 4.2 Opinion toward democracy The first analyzed outcome variable is respondents answers concerning their general degree of satisfaction with democracy. Possible answer choices included being very unsatisfied, unsatisfied, neither satisfied nor unsatisfied, satisfied or very satisfied with democracy in Colombia. 40 The mean of all answers recorded was 2.68 on a scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied), indicating that on average survey respondents are slightly more unsatisfied than satisfied with democracy in Colombia. Results of answers to the survey question, Do you associate the term democracy with something good or bad? are presented in the appendix. As would be expected, results indicate that childhood exposure impacts respondents association with the term democracy similarly to the effects on their general degree of satisfaction with democracy. The various significant coefficients with a negative sign indicate that exposure to violence reduces respondents satisfaction with democracy across all analyzed age ranges. However, the magnitude of these effects seems to be small, as could be expected due to the existing literature. For instance, based on the IV specification, an increase of 100 casualties during the age range of three to five years old would lead to a decrease in points on the satisfaction scale when compared to the mean outcome. The significant coefficients signs are negative regardless of whether we measure exposure to violence through casualties or clashes. As outlined above, the coefficients for the violence exposure variables measured by clashes are larger than for those measured by casualties due to the larger volume of casualties which occurred. All of the significant coefficients are significant at the one or five percent level. 39 Logit in the case of binary outcome variables. 40 DANE, Encuesta de Cultura Política 2011, 2013 y The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

19 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure VARIABLES Satisfaction with Democracy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Ordinal Ordinal OLS Logit IV OLS Logit IV Casualties Years *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Constant 2.682*** 2.674*** 2.677*** 2.676*** ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 14,578 14,578 14,578 14,578 14,578 14,578 R-squared Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The results show that the magnitudes of the significant coefficients are in a broadly similar range for all analyzed age bands. However, the difference in significant coefficients of violence exposure must be tested. As it turns out, the coefficients are significantly different from each other at the five percent level. This result indicates that age difference seems to matter, even if the difference in magnitudes is not large. 4.3 Trust in institutions In the second category of outcome variables, the effect which exposure to violence has had on people s trust in state institutions is analyzed. Results are presented and analyzed from the answers to the survey question, Do you consider the vote counting process in Colombia to be unbiased? 41 Results of answers to the survey question, Do you think the Colombian congress represents different political tendencies? are presented in the appendix and display effects with the same direction as those for trust in the vote counting process. 41 Ibid. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 11

20 Christoph Sponsel Trust in Vote Counting Process (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES OLS Logit IV OLS Logit IV Casualties Years ** * ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ** ** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ** *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years * *** ** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Constant 1.677*** 1.671*** 1.669*** 1.670*** ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 13,075 13,075 13,075 13,075 13,075 13,075 R-squared Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors in parentheses * p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 While the vote counting indicator may not display general trust in all of the different government institutions, it nevertheless reveals how much people trust the state to execute a core democratic process, and thus how neutral they consider the election process to be. The question is binary and answers are ranked such that considering the process as unbiased is indicated by the numerical value one, while considering the process as biased is indicated by the numerical value two. The coefficient of the constant variable of shows that on average survey respondents consider the vote counting process in Colombia to be rather biased. The various significant coefficients with a positive sign indicate that exposure to violence at most analyzed age ranges further increases respondents likelihood to consider the vote counting process as biased. 42 The magnitude of all significant coefficients is relatively small, as could be expected based on the existing literature. For instance, based on the OLS specification, an increase of exposure by 100 casualties during the age range of six to eight years old would lead to an increase 42 Due to the numeric ranking of possible answers, a positive coefficient actually implies a reduction in trust. This differs from the variable on satisfaction with democracy, where a positive coefficient implies an increase in satisfaction. 12 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

21 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure in points on the likelihood to vote scale compared to the base outcome. The coefficients of exposure to clashes are, throughout, larger than coefficients of exposure to casualties, which confirms our expectations as previously outlined. The signs of significant coefficients of both measured types of violence exposure are consistent, which is in line with expectations and further indicates that the specifications identify the actual effect. Also, for trust in the vote counting process, the different significant coefficients of conflict exposure (at different age ranges) are significantly different from each other at the five percent level. Thus, this finding confirms that conflict exposure affects trust in institutions differently depending on the age at which the exposure occurred, even if the difference in magnitudes is not large. 4.4 Political Participation Survey respondents propensity to vote in elections is the main outcome variable indicating political participation. In the appendix, results concerning survey respondents likelihood to be a member of a political party are presented, displaying effects with the same direction as those identified for propensity to vote. Regarding survey respondents behavior in Colombian elections, possible answers were to always vote, sometimes vote, or never vote. 43 Given that the possible answers were ranked such that never voting has the highest numerical value, three, and always voting the lowest, one, the constant variable, 1.814, shows that on average, survey respondents vote slightly less often than sometimes. The various significant coefficients with a positive sign indicate that exposure to violence reduces a respondent s likelihood to vote across most analyzed age ranges. Nevertheless, this effect is not consistent for all age ranges. For violence exposure during ages three to five, a positive effect on voting turnout can be observed when measuring violence by casualties per municipality as well as by number of clashes per municipality. The magnitude of all significant coefficients is relatively small. For instance, based on the IV specification, an increase of exposure by 100 casualties during the age range of zero to two years old would lead to an increase of points on the likelihood to vote scale compared to the base outcome. The magnitude of the coefficients measuring violence exposure by clashes is, throughout, larger than the coefficients measuring exposure by casualties, which is in line with our expectations as previously outlined. 43 DANE, Encuesta de Cultura Política 2011, 2013, y Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 13

22 Christoph Sponsel VARIABLES Voting in Elections (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Ordinal Ordinal OLS Logit IV OLS Logit IV Casualties Years *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years * *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Casualties Years ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years ** *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years *** *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Clashes Years *** *** ( ) ( ) ( ) Constant 1.814*** 1.818*** 1.801*** 1.804*** ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Observations 15,019 15,019 15,019 15,019 15,019 15,019 R-squared Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Also for political participation, the significant coefficients of exposure at different age ranges are significantly different from each other at the five percent level. This confirms that exposure to violence affects opinions about democracy differently, depending on the age when the exposure occurred. 4.5 Validation of Results via Robustness Checks Further alternative regressions have been run to verify the robustness and validity of the above described results. The empirical strategy used for the robustness checks, based on OLS, IV, and Ordered Logit regressions, is identical to the empirical strategy applied in the main regressions. Moreover, all specifications include exactly the same control variables. When analyzing the robustness checks output, the focus has been on whether significant coefficients confirm or contradict the direction of the effects identified in the main regressions. The first robustness check targets potential bias of the results due to selective migration out of conflict zones by the most strongly affected individuals. The Colombian civil conflict left more than seven million people displaced, the majority of whom had to leave their rural origins 14 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

23 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure to start a new life in Colombian cities. 44 Since the data set only indicates a survey respondent s municipality of residence but not the municipality of birth, individuals who live in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants have been excluded. Such urban centers were the most likely destinations for conflict refugees and are therefore, possibly, no longer a valid comparison group (due to the municipality consisting of people of different violence exposures at an early age). For the modified data set, the same regressions have been run as those used for the main results. While the magnitude of the coefficients differs from those of the main regressions across most specifications, the signs and significance of the coefficients are mostly in line. Since the robustness check results are free of potential selective migration bias, these findings validate the results. The second robustness check accounts for the varying population size of Colombian municipalities. The same number of casualties or clashes would represent a different violence level if they occurred in a municipality with a very large or a very small population size. Therefore, the violence exposure variables have been normalized by dividing the number of casualties and clashes by the population size of each municipality. These amended variables have been used in the otherwise unchanged regressions. Results show effects as having the same direction as those identified by the main regressions. Since the robustness check results are free of potential biases resulting from differing municipality population sizes, this validates the main regression results. 5 Conclusion This study examines the impact of childhood exposure to the Colombian civil conflict on citizens opinions toward democracy, trust in state institutions, and political participation. The results indicate that on average, survey respondents exposed to conflict during childhood have slightly more negative opinions toward democracy, a slightly reduced trust in state institutions, and are slightly less likely to participate actively in politics. That the results show long-lasting effects, despite the fact that surveys were conducted years (or, for some respondents, decades) after conflict exposure is remarkable. These results are evident for conflict exposure across most analyzed age ranges and across violence exposure measured by casualties and by clashes per municipality. Testing whether the relevant significant coefficients are statistically different from each other reveals that the effects differ according to the individual s age at the time of conflict exposure under all specifications. However, these differences appear to be small, which is indicated by the significant coefficients limited range of magnitude. The coefficients are a good indicator for the effects directions, but should be considered in relative terms since survey respondents may have interpreted scaled answers differently. 45 The conducted robustness checks concerning potential biases due to migration or due to errors in the conflict data confirm the validity of these results. However, the results are not completely unambiguous. While exposure to violence generally reduces the likelihood of people to participate in elections, the effect appears to be reversed for survey respondents whose conflict exposure occurred between the ages of three and five. Nevertheless, for all other analyzed age ranges and for all analyzed outcome variables, the impact of exposure to violence on opinions toward democracy, trust in institutions, and political participation is clearly negative. 44 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, Global Report on Internal Displacement, For example, different respondents who are both similarly satisfied with democracy might have nevertheless responded with different answers due to varying interpretations of whether their opinions should be considered very satisfied or only satisfied. Hence, the coefficients absolute numerical value do not provide much insight. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 15

24 Christoph Sponsel Why conflict exposure at an early age has a negative impact on opinions toward democracy, trust in state institutions, and political participation requires further analysis. Several logical explanations are possible for this negative impact. Firstly, violence is likely to traumatize individuals leading them to have little trust in the state s ability to protect them. Since Colombia was a democracy during the civil conflict, these individuals could conclude from their personal experiences that democracy is a flawed system unable to prevent conflict or provide safety and is thus not the best system of societal organization. Such reasoning could explain why such individuals find lesser value in democracy, have less trust in state institutions, and participate less in elections. Especially in the case of Colombia, this explanation likely holds true as the state was the perpetrator of many human rights violations, for which, only in rare exceptions, has it been held accountable. 46 An additional possible explanation for the negative effect on trust in state institutions and on political participation could be the fear of further violence fortified by previous conflict exposure. Development in post-conflict Colombia illustrates this explanation. Social and political activists are frequently the target of assassinations and violent threats by successors of paramilitary groups. Moreover, such violent groups are particularly active in those Colombian municipalities where the conflict was most prevalent and where state institutions have little strength. Therefore, citizens who have had conflict exposure at an early age might have an increased fear that political activism or trust and reliance on state institutions could place them again in the focus of violence. This could provide a serious risk for the implementation of the Colombian peace process, which relies on citizens active support. There are also multiple possible reasons why violence exposure at certain age ranges increases the likelihood of citizens political participation. For instance, individuals affected by violence at later stages of childhood might be more able to cope with violent events and interpret these experiences as motivation to participate in elections. Such individuals might think that violence can be more effectively prevented if citizens use their political influence to shape society in a way that strengthens non-violent solutions to political and social disputes. However, in order to validate the above-mentioned hypotheses, further investigations would be required to analyze what drives the reversal of effects at certain age ranges. The results are mostly consistent with those in the existing literature. Other studies such as those by Grosjean, Adhvaryu and Fenske, and Jaeger et al. also find that conflict exposure during childhood has a negative effect on trust in political institutions, political beliefs, and perceived effectiveness of state institutions. 47 However, across all studies, the magnitude of detected effects is small when viewing the effect in relation to the amount of violence which has been measured. The ambiguity of effects (conflict exposure reduces opinions toward democracy and erodes trust in state institutions, but increases political participation if exposure occurred at certain age ranges) is also shown by the existing literature. For instance, Bellows and Miguel find that having been exposed to war in Sierra Leone increased the likelihood of a household s political engagement. 48 Nevertheless, it is important to note that all of these studies cover very different cases and differ in their empirical strategy thus they are only comparable to a limited degree. The fact that this study s results direction of effect is consistent with other studies is therefore merely an indicator of the validity of these results and should not be interpreted as concrete evidence. 46 Richani, The Political Economy of Violence, Grosjean, Conflict and Social and Political Preferences, ; Adhvaryu and Fenske, Political Beliefs in Africa, 11-18; Jaeger et al., Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada, Bellows and Miguel, War and local collective action in Sierra Leone, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

25 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure As is the case with any analysis based on survey responses, a potential limitation of the analysis results from misreporting of survey answers. This is especially true for surveys used in this study, since these surveys cover political questions which can be potentially sensitive in Colombia. In a country rife with violence stemming from political cleavages that affect the people s willingness to publicly announce their political beliefs, the idea of peace is still a fragile condition. The resulting consequence is a potential statistical imprecision since survey responses might not accurately reflect actual political beliefs. Therefore, the magnitude of the detected effects must be considered with caution. Since DANE s Encuesta de Cultura Política survey is published in intervals of two years, the study at hand can naturally be extended in the future with an increased sample size to further increase the statistical precision of results. An additional limitation of the analysis is that the identification strategy used does not allow for examining possible heterogeneous effects. For certain individuals, particularly those exposed to extreme violence, the detected effects could be much larger due to more severe traumatization. However, such effects are not identifiable in the given data at hand. Concerning the external validity of the results, it is likely that the uniqueness of the Colombian civil conflict, with its close interlinkage to the American War on Drugs, is based on such specific circumstances that the inference of these results toward other scenarios would not be advisable. This is in line with Blattman and Miguel, who argue that civil conflict analyses should be undertaken on an individual conflict basis on account of the high amount of unique factors at play. 49 Further studies could investigate the mechanisms through which exposure to violence might alter people s political beliefs and participation. For instance, drawing more heavily on psychological and medical research or on surveys collecting interviewees reasoning for their answers concerning questions on political beliefs and participation could provide valuable insights. Such knowledge would provide useful guidelines for policies on how to limit the negative effects of violence exposure on political opinions, trust in state institutions, political participation, and the related risks for societal stability and development. 49 Blattman and Miguel, Civil War, Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 17

26 Christoph Sponsel 6 Appendix 18 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

27 Effects of Childhood Conflict Exposure Bibliography Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos. The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. 1 (2013): Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4 (2002): Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 9, no. 5 (2001): Adhvaryu, Achyuta and James Fenske. Conflict and the Formation of Political Beliefs in Africa. HiCN Working Paper 164 (2014). Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi. Endogenous Political Institutions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 2 (2004): Alesina, Alberto, Ricardo Hausmann, Rudolf Hommes, and Ernesto Stein. Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America. Journal of Development Economics 59, no. 2 (1999): Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 19

28 Christoph Sponsel Barro, Robert. The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice 14, no. 1 (1973): Bellows, John and Edward Miguel. War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics 93, no (2009): Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States. Journal of Economic Literature 41, no. 1 (2003): Blattman, Christopher. From Violence to Voting: War and political participation in Uganda. American Political Science Review 103, no. 2 (2009): Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel. Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 1 (2010): Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC). Colombia Civil War Dataset. Accessed in conflict database.htm. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). Encuesta de Cultura Politica 2011, 2013 y Anonymized microdata and code book available from 4 1/index.php/home. Individual data accessed in Bogotá in 2016 and 2017 at DANE s Sala de Procesamiento Especializado. Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). Censo General Accessed in Dube, Oeindrila and Juan F. Vargas. Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia. The Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 4 (2013): Glennerster, Rachel, Edward Miguel, and Alexander D. Rothenberg. Collective Action in Diverse Sierra Leone Communities. The Economic Journal 123, no. 568 (2013): Grosjean, Pauline. Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries. Comparative Economic Studies 56, no. 3 (2014): Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council. Global Report on Internal Displacement Report (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 2017). Jaeger, David A., Esteban F. Klor, Sami H. Miaari, and M. Daniele Paserman. The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada. Journal of Public Economics 96, no. 3-4 (2012): Restrepo, Jorge, Michael Spagat, and Juan F. Vargas. The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set. Homo Oeconomicus 21, no. 2 (2004): Richani, Nazih. The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39, no. 2 (1997): You ll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia. Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2003) The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

29 Little Victories Against Capitalism: The ALBA Bloc s Participation in Climate Negotiations Veronica Lopez Gamboa Veronica Lopez Gamboa is a second-year M.A. candidate in International Relations and Environmental Policy at Boston University s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. Her focus is on environmental conservation and sustainable development in Latin America, with a special interest in indigenous people s issues and natural resource management. Originally from Cochabamba, Bolivia, she received her B.A. in International Relations from Roger Williams University. Abstract In recent years, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) has gained strength as a united body that champions a common ideology of social equality and Living Well. Within the arena of global climate negotiations, ALBA negotiates as a bloc, providing a unified front and giving a stronger voice to its member states. This paper explores how ALBA has impacted the global climate change governance structure, and what its future holds. While ALBA countries are diverse in their political, economic, and cultural contexts, they are united by a similar set of political goals specifically aimed at anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist governance and have been using climate negotiations to promote their political positions. An analysis of ALBA s participation and impact on the different United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change conferences from Cancún to Paris, together with an analysis of its members nationally determined contributions, show how ALBA has been advancing their ideological goals through climate negotiations. While ALBA has not been successful in achieving all of its objectives, its participation in climate negotiations has shaped the discourse by advocating for wider participation and stricter regulations within the global climate regime. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 21

30 Veronica Lopez Gamboa Introduction On December 12, 2015, the world celebrated the adoption of the Paris Agreement. This document, which had been preceded by several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations, was hailed as an historic and ambitious treaty that would bring about a new era in environmental governance. 1 While the bottom-up approach of the treaty is more participatory and cognizant of national sovereignty issues than its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, many critics still believe that it does not do enough to battle climate change. In the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) emerged as a united front for several developing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to make their voices heard. Together, these countries expressed their discontent with the existing efforts to combat climate change and have continuously called upon the global community to take stronger action against it. ALBA s particular anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology and unwavering position regarding the environment makes it an interesting case study. This paper aims to explore how ALBA has impacted the global climate change governance structure and what its future holds. To do so, the first section of the paper will give a brief overview of the group and discuss the commonalities that unite the ALBA members in climate change negotiations. The second section will take a look at the involvement of ALBA in the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement and the individual commitments that the ALBA states have made under the Agreement. The final section will look at the future of ALBA and analyze whether or not it will be successful in achieving its goals. Overview of ALBA What is ALBA? Understanding the origins of ALBA and the commonalities that unite its members is integral to analyzing the group s involvement in international climate negotiations. In Latin America, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a period of neoliberal reforms and military dictatorships that were backed by the United States and Northern financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2 Attempting to increase American involvement in Latin American politics and economies, the United States first proposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas in Many people were disappointed with the lack of benefits from the economic development policies and regional trade initiatives that had been imposed on their countries, leading to strong opposition to foreign intervention in Latin America. 4 Hugo Chávez, former President of Venezuela, was one of these people. In 2001, he created the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas and the Caribbean, a trade initiative to serve as a counterpoint to the free trade area proposed by the United States. 5 By 2005, Fidel Castro s Cuban government had declared its support for the initiative, which the Declaration of Havana renamed as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, more commonly known as ALBA. 6 The formal creation of 1 Deluca, Frank, and Portalewska, Annexed: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Climate Change Conference Goodchild, What is the ALBA? 3 Linares, The ALBA Alliance, Ibid. 5 Ibid., Ibid., The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

31 Little Victories Against Capitalism ALBA coincided with a pink tide 7 of leftist governments in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, all of which opposed the American free trade option. 8 This leftist trend gave Chávez and Castro s trade alternative the strength it needed to expand throughout Latin America. Since 2005, ALBA s original members have been joined by Bolivia, Dominica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Grenada, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. 9 In addition, Suriname is awaiting full membership, and Haiti, Iran, and Syria are observer states linked to the organization by their anti-imperialistic ideology. 10 ALBA also has the support of many social movements and social programs in Latin America, Africa, and the United States. 11 To accommodate them, ALBA has created a Council of Social Movements, which has the same authority as the Council of Ministers, a group of foreign affairs ministers that advises ALBA s Presidential Council. 12 While ALBA members only represent a small percentage of the region s economy, population, and territory, the wide support base from social movements and civil society helps give the alliance its legitimacy. In the years since its creation, ALBA has evolved from a regional trade alternative into a political, economic, and social alliance in defense of independence, self-determination, and the identity of peoples comprising it. 13 While the scope of the alliance has expanded, its purpose as an instrument to assert Latin America s sovereignty from United States imposition is still expressed throughout all of its operations. Institutionally, ALBA now includes the ALBA Bank, which operates with a new regional monetary unit known as the SUCRE, 14 and the Peoples Trade Treaty. 15 It has also created grannational (as opposed to multinational) companies that operate in social, cultural, and economic projects aimed at strengthening national and regional sovereignty within ALBA. 16 Through all of its projects and institutions, ALBA has been successful in its efforts to keep the United States impositions out of its member states. Unity Against a Common Threat The member states of ALBA are spread throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and have different economic and political contexts; however, they are united by a common ideology. ALBA s name itself is symbolic of the ideology supported by this group of countries. The term Bolivarian pays tribute to Simón Bolívar, who liberated much of South America from Spanish rule in the early 19 th Century. Bolívar wanted to integrate all of Latin America into one Big Homeland that was sovereign and free from colonial powers. 17 He believed Latin America s only way to prosper was if it became integrated into one single nation that was powerful enough to stand up to the United States. 18 Related to this idea, Our America comes 7 The term pink tide refers to the trend of socialist governments that came to power in Latin America during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In general, these governments were strongly opposed to American hegemony and its neoliberal ideology, but they did not fundamentally change the capitalist system in each of their countries. By 2011, leftist governments were in power in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Peru. 8 Goodchild, What is the ALBA? 9 Ibid. 10 Hirst, A Guide to ALBA. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 The SUCRE, or United System of Regional Payment Compensation (in Spanish), is a virtual regional currency used for trade between the central banks of ALBA member states. It was intended to replace the US dollar as the common currency in Latin America, but so far has had little market penetration outside of trade between Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As of its creation in 2009, 1 SUCRE is equivalent to 1.25 USD. 15 Hirst, A Guide to ALBA. 16ALBA-TCP, Principles of the ALBA. 17 Ibid. 18 Hirst, A Guide to ALBA. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 23

32 Veronica Lopez Gamboa from José Martí s concept that Latin America should be owned and governed by its own people and not by foreign interests. 19 This concept makes a clear distinction between our America and the other America, whose actions are guided by imperialist ideas. 20 In essence, ALBA is of Latin America and for Latin America, and the members are united in a common struggle to defend their sovereignty and independence from foreign intervention. ALBA s member states are all former colonies of European powers, so they have experienced the conditions of inequality, exploitation, and underdevelopment that are associated with imperialism. In contrast to the United States and much of the Global North, ALBA s politics and economy are intended to prioritize solidarity and mutual benefit, and seek to complement productivity through fair and sustainable natural resource use. 21 In its effort to fully integrate its member nations, ALBA wants to overcome national borders and local barriers by merging their economies. 22 In this way, ALBA aims to meet the social and economic needs of the largest possible majority of people in the region. 23 As utopian as these policies sound, in practice ALBA states have had mixed results in achieving the goals stated in their regional unity discourse. As ALBA itself states, there is an affinity among its members to do away with the fiction of the free market, globalization, and neoliberalism, all of which are Northern ideals. 24 This fundamental difference in ideology has caused many analysts to classify ALBA s economic scheme as one that happens outside of the classical theory of trade and capitalism. Some authors even claim that ALBA wants to create a new Bolivarian world order that is a fundamental threat to American freedom and productivity. 25 Despite all of this discourse, ALBA s radically anticapitalist and anti-imperialist discourse has not materialized into a new world order opposed to Northern ideals. ALBA and Climate Change Although ALBA is now mostly a political alliance for sovereign economic and social development, the heads of state from member countries decided in 2009 to create the People s Trade Treaty, which declares that trade among member states should promote harmony between men and nature, in addition to respect for the rights of Mother Earth. 26 Trade should be conducted in such a way that it generates both economic growth and sustainability. Since this first mention of environmental protection, environmental issues and more specifically climate change have taken a larger role in the alliance as a whole. In addition, ALBA has determined that the members have to coordinate their positions in international negotiations, particularly those that take place within the United Nations and its agencies. 27 The World Peoples Conference on Climate Change In April of 2010, the Bolivian Government organized the World Peoples Conference on Climate Change. The Conference followed the failed United Nations Framework Convention 19 Goodchild, What is the ALBA? 20 ALBA-TCP, Principles of the ALBA. 21 Linares, The ALBA Alliance, ALBA-TCP, Principles of the ALBA. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Hirst, The Bolivarian Alliance and the United States of America, ALBA-TCP, Principles of the ALBA. 27 Ibid. 24 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

33 Little Victories Against Capitalism on Climate Change s (UNFCCC) conference in Copenhagen from Over 30,000 participants from 100 countries came together to find alternative ways to address climate change. The participants included environmental activists, indigenous leaders, representatives from NGOs and cultural organizations, scientists, and official government staff. 28 The principal aims of the conference were to discuss a project of Universal Declaration of Mother Earth Rights, analyze the systemic and structural drivers of climate change, and agree on new commitments for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol. 29 The Conference united stakeholders who are usually left out from the decision-making process at formal UNFCCC negotiations. Very early on, it became evident that the conference would be framed in terms of climate justice and differentiated responsibilities for different states. As Pablo Solón, Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations, stated at the start of the conference: The main point of the conference is to convince developed countries to make and meet commitments to reduce emissions, and we have observed that this will not happen without pressure from civil society. Those who are already suffering from global warming will have the chance to speak out. 30 Solón s statement makes it clear that developing countries place the blame for climate change and the responsibility for its mitigation on the developed world. The Conference took a new approach by allowing all the interested parties, most of them individual citizens from areas that were already experiencing the effects of climate change, to express their concerns in the more than seventeen working group sessions. 31 In line with the ideology of ALBA, the participants at the conference looked critically at the role of the global neoliberal economy in creating the current conditions of climate change. 32 The Conference produced declarations on indigenous issues, agriculture, and the rights of Mother Earth, which could then be used to pressure governments at the UNFCCC negotiations. A Unified Front Against Climate Change The most important document that was produced during the Conference is the Peoples Agreement (2010). This declaration became the basis for ALBA s position on climate change at all subsequent negotiations. The Agreement is very critical of capitalism, consumerism, and materialism. It encourages the world to give up capitalism in favor of a new system known as Living Well. 33 Living Well is a popular concept among Andean countries that frames the development strategies of both Ecuador and Bolivia. It recognizes that Mother Earth is a living being and advocates for collective well-being and universal satisfaction of basic needs, solidarity and equality among all, as well as the elimination of colonialism, imperialism, and interventionism. 34 The Agreement also demands that developed countries commit to the following: 28 United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, World Peoples Conference on Climate Change. 29 IISD, World Peoples Conference on Climate Change. 30 Ibid. 31 Peoples World Conference on Climate Change, Peoples Agreement. 32 Global Justice Ecology Project, Climate Justice. 33 Peoples World Conference on Climate Change, Peoples Agreement. 34 Ibid. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 25

34 Veronica Lopez Gamboa Restore the atmospheric space occupied by their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, Assume the costs of missed development opportunities for the developing world and provide technology transfers to developing countries, Take responsibility for the millions of people who will be forced to migrate due to climate change, Assume their climate debt by giving developing countries the means to adapt, and Adopt and implement the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth. 35 These demands are clear in assigning the responsibility for climate change on developed countries. They specifically call for monetary payments from developed countries to compensate developing countries for past environmental damage, as well as current and future climate change adaptation needs. Specifically in UNFCCC negotiations, ALBA countries have pushed the international community for more transparency, wider participation of developing states, and greater respect for the process of adoption by consensus. 36 They also advocate for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, continuing the Kyoto Protocol, and the need for developed countries to provide sufficient amounts of financing to developing countries. 37 Although ALBA shares the need for financing with other groups of developing countries, it is generally stricter in its demands for the temperature limit and the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, in which developed countries have mandatory GHG emissions reduction targets. The Peoples Agreement presented a radical break in traditional climate change politics because it took a strong position on climate debt and the principle of differentiated but common responsibilities. The 1992 Rio Declaration was the first to define the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which then served as the basis for the Kyoto Protocol s distributional approach. This system separated countries into two annexes, where the 37 developed countries of Annex 1 had specific and mandatory emissions reduction targets, and all other states in Annex 2 were not required to take any specific action. 38 The distinction between Annex 1 and Annex 2 was made based on historical levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which meant that those states who contributed the most GHG emissions had the greatest responsibility to reduce them, hence the distributional approach. 39 After the failure of the Kyoto Protocol and its system of annexes, the international community moved away from that particular system in favor of a more universal plan of action through the Paris Agreement. 40 ALBA keeps the distinction alive even post-paris, and continues to demand that Annex 1 countries be the ones responsible for taking action to mitigate climate change. 41 As shown below, this demand in particular has led ALBA to oppose climate negotiations on several occasions. In addition to a strong belief in differentiated responsibilities, ALBA believes that developed countries owe developing ones a climate debt for having contributed more to climate change. 42 This belief guides their other radical demands in international negotiations, such as the creation of an International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal and an International Tribunal of Conscience. Both would have the legal capacity to judge and penalize both states and industries whose actions cause climate change and who violate the rights of climate migrants 35 Ibid. 36 Edwards and Roberts, A Fragmented Continent, Ibid., CISDL, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. 39 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol. 40 Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, Peoples World Conference on Climate Change, Peoples Agreement. 42 Ibid. 26 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

35 Little Victories Against Capitalism and refugees. 43 The courts would give developing countries much more power against abuses and violations by the developed world and its industries. Considering that the United States alone holds over 40 percent of the global climate debt, 44 many of the cases brought to court would specifically target the United States and demand that it repay its debt to developing countries. 45 Hirst considers that these international courts, based on a new regime of planetary rights, are an affront to the international system based on the Western values of the Enlightenment, which placed the importance on human rationality rather than on the natural world. 46 ALBA in the UNFCCC Negotiations After the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 failed to produce a new global regime to govern climate change, many people became disappointed in the way the negotiations had traditionally been done. While Copenhagen is widely considered a failure, it did succeed in creating the system of voluntary pledges that grew into the Paris Agreement of This system was developed throughout the following years at the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) in Cancún, Durban, Doha, Warsaw, and Lima. 48 After the creation of the Peoples Agreement in 2010, ALBA was ready to negotiate as a cohesive bloc and introduce the ideas of climate justice and debt into the discussions. 49 ALBA s opposition in the negotiations leading up to Paris was very unified in Cancún, but slowly fragmented by the time of the Lima COP four years later. Opposition in Cancún The Cancún COP took place between November 29 and December 11, 2010, and had close to 12,000 participants from governments, NGOs, UN agencies, and the press. 50 The aim of the conference was to enhance long-term cooperation under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Although Copenhagen had failed to renew the reduction commitments for Annex 1 countries in the Kyoto Protocol, there was hope that these would finally be established during the conference in Cancún. While this conference was not expected to produce any legally-binding agreements, negotiations took place on topics covering emissions from land use change in developing countries, technology, financing, mitigation, and adaptation strategies. 51 During the second week of the negotiations, the ministers of developed countries were paired with ministers from developing countries in an effort to facilitate the negotiation process through a better understanding of their counterparts interests. 52 The ALBA countries were opposed to many of the negotiations that took place in Cancún. Bolivia, as a representative of the ALBA group, initially stated that any legally-binding agreement that was to be produced would have no credibility or legitimacy unless the second 43 Ibid. 44 Climate debt refers to the idea that wealthy countries should pay reparations to poor countries for climate change. The idea is common among developing countries, who believe that all the adaptation costs need to be borne by the countries who caused the current crisis. Monetary values can be assigned to each ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted by each country, and thus can be used to calculate the climate debt owed by each developed country. 45 Matthews, Quantifying Historical Carbon and Climate Debts Among Nations, Hirst, The Bolivarian Alliance and the United States of America, Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, Ibid. 49 Peoples World Conference on Climate Change, Peoples Agreement. 50 IISD, Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 27

36 Veronica Lopez Gamboa period of reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by the Annex 1 countries. 53 In response, the United States, one of the largest GHG emitters, stated that it would not be willing to undertake any commitments that focused solely on reductions for developed countries and did not include any commitments for other countries with growing economies. 54 After informal conversations, the parties agreed that further discussion was necessary and would be extended for one more year until the next conference in Durban. Toward the end of the conference, the Kyoto Protocol working group declared that it had been unable to agree on any amendments for the second period of emissions reductions, but it presented several documents that were intended to serve as a draft for future amendments. 55 Bolivia again opposed the documents, declaring that they were nothing but a step backwards since they postponed the second period of commitments indefinitely and were a move toward a more flexible and voluntary regime based on a pledge-and review-system. 56 Considering that the documents also made references to commitments that did not exist yet, Bolivia was vehemently opposed to accepting them without knowing their content. Despite Bolivia s opposition as representative of the ALBA countries, the decisions were accepted by consensus, with the COP President Patricia Espinosa stating that she could not ignore the will of the more than 190 parties that had reached an agreement. 57 As bad as the decisions of Cancún were for ALBA s interests, the opposition to the agreements represented a symbolic declaration for the bloc. Fragmentation in Lima After the Cancún conference, the ALBA countries continued to express their position against the various decisions taken by the international community regarding climate change governance, but the bloc began to slowly lose cohesion. The Lima COP took place between December 1st and 14th of 2014, and it brought together 11,000 participants from governments, NGOs, and the media. 58 ALBA was still united in many of its demands, but some countries within the group began to take on more progressive positions. Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, remained obstructive, while Venezuela took a more open stance in favor of reaching a global agreement. 59 ALBA s varied positions shows that the bloc respects the individual circumstances of each member state. 60 During the Lima conference, the ALBA countries took different positions on the methods and strategies that were proposed for mitigation and adaptation. As a whole, ALBA rejects REDD+ and Clean Development Mechanism programs, as well as all market-based instruments. 61 REDD+ programs aim to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation by allowing international aid organizations to buy carbon credits from activities that protect the forest. 62 These initiatives rely on the involvement of foreign entities and have been criticized for failing to protect the rights of people living in the areas where REDD+ is implemented. 63 While Bolivia and Venezuela continue to oppose market-based mechanisms, 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 IISD, Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference. 59 Herold, Cames, and Cook, The Development of Climate Negotiations, Edwards and Roberts, A Fragmented Continent, Herold, Cames, and Cook, The Development of Climate Negotiations, Wells and Brands, Seeing REDD. 63 Ibid. 28 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

37 Little Victories Against Capitalism Ecuador has implemented several Clean Development Mechanism projects. 64 Bolivia has also moved toward support for the adaptation mechanism of loss and damage, which serves to promote education on climate risks. This involves all stakeholders in decision-making and enhances international action and support for the adverse effects of climate change. 65 This shift toward more individually-determined positions mirrored the transition that was also happening in the climate governance sphere from legally-binding reductions to the voluntary commitments that would become the basis for the Paris Agreement. ALBA under the Paris Agreement Under the Paris Agreement, all parties to the conference were required to submit pledges known as nationally-determined contributions (NDCs). Each state can determine how much it wants to contribute to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions and mitigate climate change. 66 Having learned from the distributional challenges of the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC s Paris Agreement avoided top-down regulations and instead decentralized the climate regime. 67 Although the process was made more democratic and should have been welcomed by ALBA countries as a way to make their individual voices heard, they did not waiver in their opposition to the voluntary pledges, which they had expressed since the COP in Cancún in Although they were initially reluctant to submit their NDCs, all of the ALBA countries, with the exception of Nicaragua, have now done so. The following section will provide an overview of the content of the NDCs of the ALBA countries, looking specifically at the ways in which they framed their pledges within their anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideology. Individual Contributions to the Paris Agreement The commitments reflected in the NDCs submitted under the Paris Agreement show a wide array of individual positions and beliefs that call into question the ideological unity of the ALBA group. Table 1 shows the per capita emissions for each state (based on data from CAIT), 69 whether the NDC mentions anti-capitalism or alternatives to the capitalist system, if and how emissions reductions will be achieved, whether the actions are framed through a development focus, whether adaptation strategies are included, and whether the actions are dependent on financial and/or technological support (all based on the states NDCs). Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador frame their pledges squarely within an anti-capitalist framework, but none of the small island states have any mention of this ideological standpoint. With the exception of Bolivia, these countries are all committed to reducing their own GHG emissions. Although the emissions from these countries are relatively low, their commitment to work toward reducing them shows that they have moved away from their previous position of placing all responsibility on the developed world. Bolivia, in contrast, continues to place the bulk of the mitigation responsibility on Annex 1 countries based on their historical emissions. 64 Edwards and Roberts, A Fragmented Continent, UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism. 66 Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, Ibid., IISD, Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference. 69 CAIT, also known as the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, is an open source program run by the World Resources Institute that tracks the NDCs provided by each party member to the Paris Agreement to gauge the global progress toward the 2 limit. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 29

38 Veronica Lopez Gamboa All countries have pledged to take action to improve their adaptation responses to climate change. While each country mentions different national contexts and climate vulnerabilities, they all consider adaptation strategies to be important for the future. Interestingly, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador frame their adaptation strategies, and all commitments in general, under the framework of development through the ideals of Living Well. The intended contributions will address climate change, but are better aimed at improving the social and economic conditions in these countries. While many of the actions taken by the small island states will have the same effects, they do not mention development as a specific goal. 30 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

39 Little Victories Against Capitalism The analysis of the NDCs submitted by the ALBA countries to the Paris Agreement points to a clear division between the small island states and Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, and Ecuador. While these countries all cooperate in ALBA s regional trade initiative and social programs, it seems that they do not share the same ideology or positions regarding global climate governance. Although in the past the group negotiated as a cohesive bloc, the transition to individual voluntary commitments under the Paris Agreement has generated a rift in the group. While the small island states do not mention the principal goal of the ALBA organization in their NDCs, the other countries are fully committed to using them as an instrument to spread their anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist messages. This is not to say that the island states are moving away from ALBA as a whole. In fact, the Declaration of the Fourteenth Heads of State Summit on March 5, 2017 specifically addresses the vulnerabilities of the island states in the face of the changing climate and promises to work toward helping them reduce their climate risks. 70 The differences in the NDCs reflect the differences in national contexts and necessary responses to climate change, but the solidarity and common purpose to defend their sovereignty is still present among all the ALBA nations. ALBA s Impact on Global Climate Change Governance In general, the ALBA bloc has been a persistent and loud voice in climate change negotiations and has worked cohesively to influence the direction of climate change talks around the globe. 71 Most notably, ALBA blocked the passage of the Copenhagen Accord, which they believed was too weak to have any impact on avoiding dangerous climate change. 72 According to a former negotiator, ALBA has been described as strong, potent, and noisy by other delegations. 73 For a small group of countries, ALBA has been able to successfully block some unfavorable outcomes, as well as insert its concepts of climate justice and the rights of Mother Earth into the preamble of the Paris Agreement. 74 Calling ALBA s participation in the negotiations a success would be misleading, but it has certainly been a major push toward climate justice, thus having a positive influence on the current state of affairs. Since they began negotiating as a unit, the ALBA states have fiercely opposed many of the agreements that have come out of the UNFCCC negotiations. While ALBA has been very critical of the negotiation process itself, its strict demands and strong ideology have (somewhat unintentionally) helped advance the UNFCCC toward a more democratic and participatory system. The ALBA bloc has given a voice to people who have traditionally been left out of the global decision-making process, such as indigenous groups and other minorities. 75 ALBA s insistence on adopting the strict limit of 1.5 degrees Celsius for global temperature increase has also resulted in this figure being included in the final text of the Paris Agreement. Basing their position on climate change upon the foundations of the Peoples Agreement, the ALBA countries have shown that they are truly committed to a more equal and just future. Under the Paris Agreement s new structure of voluntary pledges, the ALBA members will have more room to determine their own positions based on their specific national contexts. While many states have established different mechanisms and strategies for adaptation and 70 Cuba Debate, Declaración Cumbre del ALBA. 71 Edwards and Roberts, A Fragmented Continent, Ibid. 73 Ibid., UNFCCC, Paris Agreement. 75 Edwards and Roberts, A Fragmented Continent, 100. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 31

40 Veronica Lopez Gamboa mitigation, many of these mirror the statements made in the People s Agreement from 2010, on which ALBA has based its position on climate change. Even though the ideology of anticapitalism and anti-imperialism is not shared in all of the member states NDCs, the ALBA leadership continues to support the island states that do not cite the need for alternatives to capitalism and American values as the main goal to be achieved through environmental means. Under the Paris system, ALBA can continue to negotiate as a united bloc to push the international community toward more actionable commitments that address the causes and symptoms of climate change. In addition, they can continue to advocate for alternatives to capitalism. Each country can individually determine what it is willing and able to do. Although there are still some discrepancies among ALBA members regarding mitigation responsibilities, most of them are willing to cooperate by reducing their emissions, no matter how small they might be on a global scale. Since they advocate stronger commitments, we should see ALBA states continuing to call for strict adjustments to the commitments from the United States and other major GHG emitters. Although it has certainly tried through discourse in the negotiation rounds, ALBA has not been successful in overturning the current capitalist system. According to the delegation from the European Union, ALBA s continual opposition to the outcomes of the negotiations was motivated by its incompatibility with the United States and other capitalist economies, and not by a simple dislike of the documents produced in the conferences. 76 ALBA has used climate change as another tool for protesting the capitalist system on a global stage. Venezuela, for example, denounced the way of life in the developed world and their strategies for mitigation and adaptation as an attempt at perpetuating their global hegemony. 77 While much of their rhetoric used in the negotiations and in several of the NDCs is purposefully intended to be anticapitalist and anti-imperialist, ALBA has not achieved its anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist goals through international climate negotiations. ALBA is not likely to achieve its anti-capitalist goals through climate change negotiations, but it is a necessary actor in attempts to move the system of global climate governance toward a more participatory and just future. ALBA is not the first to criticize the capitalist system and will not be the last. A growing number of authors, with Wolfgang Sachs and Naomi Klein among them, have denounced the exploitative and unequal character of capitalism, 78 but it is highly unlikely that we will see the end of capitalism on a global scale. ALBA will certainly not be able to create a global revolution to replace capitalism through climate negotiations, but it should not give up the fight for stricter environmental protections, stronger commitments to action, and universal justice. Many delegations recognize ALBA s strength and dedication year after year, which is a constant reminder that as states, they should all ensure that the governance structures they create are respectful to both humans and the Earth. Conclusion Throughout its analysis, this paper has sought to identify the impact that ALBA has had on the global climate regime through the negotiations under the UNFCCC platform. ALBA is a small political alliance that focuses on regional trade and development, but it has become increasingly important in climate change talks. Although it is strongly committed to an anti- 76 Herold, Cames, and Cook, The Development of Climate Negotiations, Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Contribuciones Previstas Nacionalmente Determinadas de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela. 78 See also: Klein, Naomi, This Changes Everything, and Sachs, Wolfgang, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development. 32 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

41 Little Victories Against Capitalism capitalist message and aims to create a new world order based on solidarity and complementarity, it has not, and will likely not, achieve this goal through environmental governance. Despite this inability to establish an anti-capitalist world order, ALBA has been effective in giving civil society and other non-state actors a voice on the international stage. ALBA s position on climate change aims to have strict international regulations to avoid any further damage to the environment caused by emissions from developed countries. They also aim to receive reparations from developed states to compensate for the all of the damage that has already been caused and to meet the adaptation needs of those who are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. ALBA s participation in the UNFCCC negotiations was critical to the introduction of the concepts of climate justice and the rights of Mother Earth in the preamble of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, ALBA s desire for stricter regulations influenced the mention of a specific limit to temperature increases. The Paris Agreement explicitly has the goal of limiting temperature rise to 2 C, with the aspiration of limiting it to 1.5 C. While it is important to mention that ALBA was not the only actor calling for stricter climate change regulations, its position as a bloc of national governments working cohesively throughout many rounds of UNFCCC negotiations was important to their ability to influence the Paris Agreement. Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, there have been many economic and political changes in Latin America that have undoubtedly affected ALBA. The pink tide has begun to turn toward the right, and Venezuela, one of the strongest proponents of the bloc, is currently experiencing a complicated political situation and a severe economic crisis. It will be interesting to see how ALBA is impacted by these changes, and how the bloc itself responds to them. In the meantime, ALBA should continue to be a voice for indigenous peoples and other civil actors in international negotiations, as it was in the Peoples World Conference on Climate Change. Bibliography Antigua and Barbuda. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). UNFCCC Registry (October 15, 2015). and%20barbuda/1/indc_antigua_barbuda.pdf. Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America-Peoples Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP). Principles of the ALBA. Accessed April 28, The Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL). The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities: Origin and Scope. Accessed April 29, Commonwealth of Dominica. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) of the Commonwealth of Dominica. UNFCCC Registry (September 30, 2015). /Commonwealth%20of%20Dominica- %20Intended%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contributions%20(INDC).pdf. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 33

42 Veronica Lopez Gamboa Cuba Debate. Declaración Cumbre del ALBA: Defendamos la Unión, la Dignidad, y la Soberanía de Nuestra América. March 5, Deluca, Danielle, Anne Miriam Frank, and Agnes Portalewska. Annexed: The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Climate Change Conference Cultural Survival Quarterly 40, no. 2 (2016): Edwards, Guy and J. Timmons Roberts. A Fragmented Continent: Latin America and the Global Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Herold, Anke, Martin Cames, and Vanessa Cook. The Development of Climate Negotiations in View of Cancun (COP 16). Report (Brussels: European Parliament Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy, November 2010). JOIN_ET(2010)447517_EN.pdf. Falkner, Robert. The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics. International Affairs 92, no. 05 (2016): Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis. Intended National Determined Contributions. UNFCCC Registry. tts%20and%20nevis/1/st.%20kitts%20and%20nevis%20indc.pdf. Global Justice Ecology Project. Climate Justice Gobierno Nacional de la República del Ecuador. Ecuador s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). UNFCCC Registry. Ecuador%20INDC% %20-%20english%20unofficial%20translation.pdf. Goodchild, Lawrence. What is the ALBA? ALBA Info. Accessed April 28, Grenada. INDC. UNFCCC Registry. Grenada%20INDC.pdf. Hirst, Joel D. A Guide to ALBA. America s Quarterly Hirst, Joel. D. The Bolivarian Alliance and the United States of America. In Decline of U.S. Hegemony?, ed. Bruce M. Bagley and Magdalena Defort, Lanham: Lexington Books, IISD Knowledge Hub. World Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth. April IISD Reporting Services. Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference. Earth Negotiations Bulletin. December 13, IISD Reporting Services. Summary of the Lima Climate Change Conference. Earth Negotiations Bulletin. December 16, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

43 Little Victories Against Capitalism Linares, Rosalba. The ALBA Alliance and the Construction of a New Latin American Regionalism. International Journal of Cuban Studies, 3, no. 2/3 (2011): Matthews, Damon H. Quantifying Historical Carbon and Climate Debts Among Nations. Nature Climate Change 6 (2016): Peoples World Conference on Climate Change. Peoples Agreement. April 22, Plurinational State of Bolivia. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution from the Plurinational State of Bolivia. UNFCCC Depository. October 12, NDC-Bolivia-english.pdf. República Bolivariana de Venezuela. Contribuciones Previstas Nacionalmente Determinadas de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela para la lucha contra el Cambio Clima tico y sus efectos. UNFCCC Registry. 1/Venezuela%20Diciembre%202015%20(final).pdf. Republica de Cuba. Contribución Nacionalmente Determinada. UNFCCC Registry. public%20of%20cuba-indcs-nov2015.pdf. Saint Lucia. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. UNFCCC Registry. cia/1/saint%20lucia's%20indc%2018th%20november% pdf. St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Intended Nationally Determined Contribution. UNFCCC Registry. ncent%20and%20grenadines/1/svg_indc_final.pdf. UNFCCC. Kyoto Protocol UNFCCC. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts. Loss and Damage United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Paris Agreement. (December 12, 2015). _english_.pdf. United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service. World Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth s-conference-on-climate-change-and-therights-of-mother-earth. Wells, Zachary and Kelly Moore Brands. Seeing REDD. World Watch Institute. World Watch Magazine 22, no. 6 (2009). Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 35

44 36 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

45 To Be or Not to Be: The Ongoing Question of Missile Defense Jarek Buss Jarek Buss is a Pickering Foreign Affairs Graduate Fellow at The George Washington University; upon graduation he will join the Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer. He completed his undergraduate degree in political science at Brigham Young University Hawaii. His master s program in security policy at GWU s Elliott School of International Affairs is concentrated on East Asian and transnational security issues. He speaks French and Mandarin. Abstract This paper discusses U.S. development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly to protect U.S. forces and allies from the intensifying North Korean threat. The first section provides a brief history of the debates surrounding BMD s development, as well as the regional security context in Northeast Asia. The second highlights current developments and trends in BMD, including the shift toward missile defense (MD) tout court. The paper concludes with specific recommendations to improve MD organization and management to protect U.S. interests in a rapidly advancing missile threat environment: The Missile Defense Agency s budget must be increased and its focus returned to research and development (R&D). The responsibility for procurement and operations and management must be shifted to the Services, and MD should be designated as a Major Force Program (MFP) to protect money designated for it in the Services from being redirected. The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization should be empowered to take a leading role in the current Missile Defense Review and in continuing to plan, coordinate, and oversee MD development. Finally, the Secretary of Defense should appoint a Special Assistant for Missile Defense to ensure the continued prioritization of MD. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 37

46 Jarek Buss Ballistic missile defense (BMD) has been a controversial topic since the dawn of the missile age in WWII. Only high technology is able to counter the missile threat, and advocates and detractors have recurrently disputed over possibilities and feasibility, with BMD efforts ebbing and flowing as a result. Meanwhile, the threat has only grown North Korea is a case in point. While current U.S. BMD does provide protection from some attacks, it will take a concerted, sustained effort to mature the system and keep pace with expanding threats. This paper discusses U.S. development of BMD capabilities, particularly to protect U.S. forces and allies from the intensifying North Korean threat. The first section provides a brief history of the debates surrounding BMD s development, as well as the regional security context in Northeast Asia. The second highlights current developments and trends in BMD, including the shift toward missile defense (MD) tout court. The paper concludes with specific recommendations to improve MD organization and management to protect U.S. interests in a rapidly advancing missile threat environment. Background and Context Strategic Restraint: Choosing Who and What to Counter Since the 1960s, the history of BMD has been defined by debates over strategic restraint and threat focus. Not long after the Cuban Missile Crisis, intelligence reports suggested that the Soviet Union was developing an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability that could be operational by Some military and congressional leaders called for the rapid deployment of the Army s Nike-X ABM system in response, but President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed such a move for fear that it would stimulate an expensive arms race. The cost effectiveness and technical feasibility of the system were also in question. These three arguments have been the basis for the case against BMD ever since. Thus, Nike-X was only deployed a few years later and on a restricted scale, as a defense against a limited Chinese not Soviet attack. 2 By 1968, the system (now called Sentinel ) shifted again, moving away from thin urban defense to thick defense of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 3 Sentinel strengthened the U.S. deterrent against a Soviet first-strike by increasing the survivability of the nuclear force, making it a valuable bargaining chip in upcoming arms control negotiations. 4 When President Nixon took office, he emphasized this new mission by renaming the project Safeguard and planning up to twelve deployment sites, conditional on Soviet arms control cooperation. 5 In 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty (ABMT), officially precluding both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from deploying strategic space-based, sea-based, or mobile BMD systems. 6 At first, each side was allowed two fixed missile defense sites, but a 1974 protocol reduced it to just one site and up to 100 interceptors. 1 Dabrowski, Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years, 9. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., Ibid. 5 Ibid., U.S. Department of State, Treaty between the US and USSR, May 26, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

47 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense Having served its political purpose, Safeguard was terminated in 1976; even the one authorized site in Grand Forks, North Dakota was closed for technical reasons. 7 In the background, however, research on BMD continued. Because heated political disagreements over nuclear-armed interceptors threatened to further paralyze BMD projects, by the early 1980s, the Army was increasing its efforts to develop hit-to-kill interceptors and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was exploring the BMD potential of directed energy. 8 These initial technological forays laid the foundation for BMD options still debated today. A change in administration and a convergence of personalities swung the pendulum back away from strategic restraint in the 1980s. Recognizing a growing vulnerability to a Soviet first-strike, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended unanimously to President Reagan in 1983 to begin developing strategic defenses. 9 Already predisposed to strategic defenses, Reagan was further influenced by several prominent missile defense advocates, such as Edward Teller who was not known as a proponent of strategic restraint. 10 On March 23, 1983, Reagan made a televised speech announcing the beginning of a two-year program to determine the technical feasibility of missile defenses. The Department of Defense (DoD) created the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) which, in 1987, proposed a system composed of two space-based sensors, a ground-based sensor, a space-based interceptor, a ground-based interceptor, and a battle management system, collectively called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Phase I Architecture. 11 Full deployment of this system would have required withdrawing from the ABMT, adding to the controversy surrounding it. The final debate was postponed, however, as the system was overtaken by events. With the end of the Cold War in sight, a review of the SDI program recommended transitioning the program into limited defense of the homeland and principal defense of deployed forces. 12 President George H. W. Bush made several changes accordingly, and theater missile defense became a main component of the new program. This trend continued under President Clinton, partly because of the changing threat environment, and partly because the Administration emphasized adherence to the ABMT. 13 The pendulum was moving away once more, so theater missile defense was the main outlet for BMD R&D. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the SDIO would be renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) to reflect this change and signal the end of the SDI decade. 14 The five-year funding for BMD was slashed from $39 billion to $17 billion, requiring major restructuring of the BMDO. 15 Despite these pressures, it was during this time period that the BMDO began work on the familiar theater missile defense systems of today: PAC-3 (upgrading the Army s Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target [PATRIOT] system), Aegis (adapting the air defense system to also counter ballistic missiles), Terminal High 7 Dabrowski, Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years, Ibid., Hoffman, The Dead Hand, Ibid., Dabrowski, Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years, Ibid., Cooper, Active Defenses to Help Counter Proliferation, Baucom, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History, May Ibid. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 39

48 Jarek Buss Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Air-Borne Laser. 16 Another positive initiative of the time was the creation of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) by Secretary William Perry in Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JTAMDO was intended to manage multi-service interests in missile defense (MD) and was responsible for coordinating joint mission capabilities with the Combatant Commanders. 17 In 1996, the now Republican-controlled Congress pushed back against strategic restraint, and theater missile defense was overshadowed by national missile defense. 18 Congress pushed the DoD to prepare a deployable system, and in 1999 passed the National Missile Defense Act, decreeing that it was the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). 19 Spurred on by an increasing threat from rogue states such as North Korea (discussed below), momentum was building to withdraw from the ABMT. In December 2001, President George W. Bush gave Russia notice of the U.S. s intention to pull out of the treaty, and the BMDO was renamed again; it is now known as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The MDA was charged to develop a concept for an integrated, layered defense that would be capable of attacking warheads and missiles in all phases of their flight boost, midcourse, and terminal and was expected to eventually provide global defenses against missiles of all ranges. 20 In December 2002, the DoD announced that it would seek to field initial capabilities in Under President Bush, the MDA and JTAMDO received sustained high levels of funding. 22 The Threat Environment North Korea Since the end of the Cold War, BMD efforts both regional and national have been focused largely on the threat of rogue actors such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (DPRK). Although the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate predicted that a missile threat to the homeland would not appear for 15 years, Republican lawmakers accused it of strong political bias (pro- AMDT) and ordered their own study. 23 The resultant Rumsfield Commission was more dire, claiming that adversaries could develop missile capabilities within five years of deciding to do so. Coincidentally, North Korea tested the Taepodong-1 missile just over a month later, demonstrating important ICBM-related capabilities such as staging. 24 Since then, the situation has only worsened. By 2002, President Bush had labeled North Korea a part of the axis of evil, to which the DPRK responded with the usual threats. 25 In 2003, the DPRK withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (as it had long threatened to do and which it was in violation of anyway), conducting underground nuclear tests in 2006, 16 Dabrowski, Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years, Neuenfeldt, Joint Theater Missile Defense Interoperability, Dabrowski, Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years, Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., Karako, The Color of Money. 23 Baucom, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History, May Ibid. 25 Berger, Horitski, and Romero, The North Korean Missile Threat, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

49 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense 2009, 2013, and On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth and largest underground nuclear detonation, which it claims was a thermonuclear weapon. 27 Some experts now believe North Korea could have between 20 and 25 nuclear warheads, and may be able to properly miniaturize them for an ICBM delivery. 28 North Korea s missile arsenal is also discouraging. As part of the communist bloc, the DPRK has long benefited from Soviet and Chinese assistance in missile technology and has had an endogenous program since the 1960s. In terms of ICBMs, the DPRK successfully put satellites into orbit in 2012 and 2016 with a Taepodong-2 missile. 29 Five tests over the summer of 2017 demonstrated two new missiles: the Hwasong-12 (up to 4,500 km) and the Hwasong-14 (8,000-10,000 km). 30 Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) also form part of the arsenal, totaling perhaps 50 intermediate-range (two variants) and 200 medium-range missiles. 31 The full operability, accuracy, and effectiveness of these weapons is doubtful, but combined with some 600 short-range Scud variants, the threat to South Korea and Japan cannot be underestimated, especially if equipped with nuclear payloads. 32 The threat to the United States is growing as the newest missiles enter the stockpile. North Korea s actions are indicative of the changing global threat environment. On the one hand, its large arsenal of short- to intermediate-range missiles poses a real threat to U.S. forces and allies in the Pacific. On the other, it has a nascent capability to hit the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon. As time goes on, its capabilities are only progressing. Yet this threat is not limited to North Korea missile technology is proliferating around the globe, potentially enabling a much broader array of adversaries (including non-state actors) to strike at the United States. Meanwhile, traditional missile adversaries such as Russia and China are also exploring next-generation missile technologies such as hypersonic glide vehicles. 33 The era of fewer, less capable threats is fading fast. 34 Current Developments, Future Trajectory Broadened Response As a direct result of this changing threat environment, in 2008, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved a change in the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization s charter, and the organization became the JIAMDO replacing the word Theater with Integrated. 35 In 2010, Rear Admiral Archer Macy, former director of JIAMDO, said: 26 Ibid., North Korea s missile and nuclear programme, September 15, Warrick, Nakashima, and Fifield, North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, August 8, Berger, Horitski, and Romero, The North Korean Missile Threat, North Korea s missile and nuclear programme, September 15, Berger, Horitski, and Romero, The North Korean Missile Threat, Ibid. 33 Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation, Weiss, Seeing 2020, , Liang, Pentagon Beginning New Missile Defense Capability Study. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 41

50 Jarek Buss The theater ballistic missile threat is evolving and one of its principal characteristics is increasing range, which enables a threat country to attack targets thousands of miles away. This attack could be crossing through one or more combatant commanders area of operations or theaters, which has made the term theater missile defense obsolete. 36 The change in name therefore reflected DoD s desired shift to address longer-range ballistic missile threats. 37 While the word theater faded perhaps from view, the term regional did not. Indeed, also in 2010, Robert Gates clearly states in the opening statement in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that, I have made defending against near-term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities. 38 At the same time, it is important to sustain and enhance the U.S. military s ability to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range ballistic missiles. 39 Integrated, then, refers to systems and capabilities, while regional and homeland refer to missions. The growing DoD ideal for missile defense is to have a large, interconnected system that is able to protect both regionally deployed forces and the homeland. This idea gained further momentum in a 2013 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision As denoted by the word vision, this document outlines the Joint Chiefs aspirations for MD by As discussed below, the capabilities it describes are still merely aspirational, but they do indicate MD s potential trajectory. Integration is again the word that sums up this trend. Vision 2020 calls for a recognition of the expanded [global] battlespace, and states categorically that IAMD [integrated air and missile defense] forces will be expected to be able to plan and allocate forces for a specific theater with the awareness that adjustments may be required to accommodate Regional, Trans-Regional, and Homeland operations. 40 Integrated defense also implies an expansion of the types of missiles threatening U.S. forces; hence the important Air and included in both JIAMDO s charter and Vision The DoD and the greater security community are recognizing that the proliferation of cruise missiles and development of hypersonic glide vehicles make Ballistic MD only a partial response. This is clearly reflected in the December 23, 2016 defense authorization act s requirement for a Missile Defeat Review (MDR). The change to missile defeat is a major break from the 2010 review, which was clearly limited to ballistic missiles. The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act stipulates that the review examine the integration of offensive and defensive forces for the defeat of ballistic missiles, including against weapons initially deployed on ballistic missiles, such as hypersonic glide vehicles; and [the] cruise missile defense of the homeland. 41 Noticeable too is the substitution of the word defeat. There is a growing recognition that missile defense can only be one part of a larger strategy. Defense dominance against missiles is not operationally, technologically, or fiscally viable and is not the stated goal of MD Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review, i. 39 Ibid. 40 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Karako, Missile Defense and Defeat, Ibid., The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

51 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense The MDR is thus required to review left- and right-of-launch ballistic missile defense for both regional and homeland purposes and the full range of active, passive, kinetic, and nonkinetic defense measures across the full spectrum of land-, air-, sea-, and space-based platforms. 43 In contrast, the 2010 BMDR requirements do not have even the slightest allusion to such a broad strategy. 44 Next-Generation Technologies Current trends in MD are clearly toward a seamless battlespace, a broader threat definition, and a greater array of counter-missile capabilities. This is reflected not only in the statements and documents of MD leaders but also in the technologies currently under development or debate within the MDA. Several notable examples are described below. Space-based precision tracking: Current space sensors detect missile launches, calculate approximate impact points, and forward the information to ground-based radars for missile tracking. Space-based tracking systems could follow missiles from birth to death, better distinguish between real warheads and decoys, and significantly expand the operating and defended areas of regional defenses. 45 Such systems could also contribute to tracking more advanced threats, such as maneuvering hypersonics. In 2009, the MDA launched two Space Tracking and Surveillance System demonstration satellites that produced excellent results, validating the feasibility of the concept. 46 Space-based kill layer: The idea of a space-based kill layer has been debated since Reagan s Strategic Defense Initiative. Though insufficient by itself, fielding space-based interceptors or even, eventually, space-based lasers will significantly augment regional and homeland defenses. Like space-based tracking, a space-based kill layer offers the most potential for countering a broad array of missile threats. Though this is a future capability, the development of a space test bed is on the table to begin work on the necessary technologies. 47 Multi-Object Kill Vehicle: The ability to kill multiple missiles, warheads, or decoys with a single booster is compelling enough that the MDA reopened the project after it had been canceled for budgetary reasons in The current contract was awarded to Raytheon in The intent is for the vehicle to fit within existing interceptors, allowing the force to be upgraded without being entirely replaced. The multi-object kill vehicle is a response to adversary advances in missile technology. Directed energy: Like all of the above concepts, directed energy weapons have been grounds for a heated debate over cost, effectiveness, and potential. Detractors point to high costs and far-from-mature development, as exemplified by the Air-Borne Laser (ABL) program in the 2000s. Initial plans scheduled the first ABL lethality test for 2005; it did not occur until 2010 and incurred approximately $1 billion in overruns. 50 Although eventually re-designated as a test bed, it did demonstrate the viability of lasers for MD when it passed tests to acquire and track 43 Ibid., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law , 110th Cong., Karako, Missile Defense and Defeat, Ibid. 47 Ibid., Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. 49 Raytheon, Kill Vehicles. 50 ABL: Lowered Expectations, 30. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 43

52 Jarek Buss a boosting missile, accommodate for atmospheric conditions, and place lethal energy on it. 51 The system was retired in 2011, but the MDA and others are now floating the idea of putting advancing laser technology on high-altitude unmanned aircraft, bypassing many of the technical challenges associated with operating the ABL from a Boeing Directed energies offer the greatest possibilities for boost intercept, a capability that would enormously strengthen MD. Tightened Budgets Although the technologies and MD vision seem to be aligned, budgetary concerns are constraining the advancement of the MD system. This is most apparent within the budget of the MDA. First, funding for the MDA has declined by 23 percent since This is largely the result of cuts in defense spending across the board, and the MDA has been directed to take its share. 54 Second, a significant portion of the MDA s funding (up to nine percent) has been allocated in past years for research and development (R&D) and procurement for Israel s missile defense. 55 Though few leaders are publicly questioning the benefits of MD cooperation, the failure to increase MDA s topline to fully cover increased assistance for Israel risk[s] putting U.S. and Israeli missile defense priorities into competition. 56 Third, the MDA is increasingly responsible for procuring the systems it develops, again without an increased topline. From 2004 to 2008, no MDA money was used for procurement, resulting in between $9 and $10 billion available for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) each year (in adjusted 2017 dollars). 57 Since then, not only has the topline fallen, but procurement is annually eating up over $1 billion, leaving RDT&E with only $6 billion in Senior leaders are voicing warnings over the situation; former Secretary Carter likened it to eat[ing] our seed corn. 59 Procurement is also suffering from the arrangement. Because of competition with RDT&E (and Israel), procurement funding for Aegis systems fell by $337 million in FY 2017, relative to the 2016 projected request, and there is no plan in place to fund the last two of the nine THAAD systems requested by the Army. 60 Yet the MDA is taking the lead in procurement of these systems because the Services are neglecting to do so: Although the Services frequently proclaim the importance of the ballistic missile defense mission, their budgets for missile defense assets have not reflected it. 61 Contrary to initial intentions, the transfer of successful programs to the Services has not taken place, as it did with PATRIOT. 62 As the MDA fills the gap as best it can, both RDT&E and procurement are under-resourced. 51 Missile Defense Agency, Frequently Asked Questions. 52 Karako, Missile Defense and Defeat, Karako, The Color of Money, Karako, FY17 Budget Squeezes MDA s Research and Development. 55 Karako, The Color of Money, Ibid. 57 Ibid., Ibid. 59 Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid. 44 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

53 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense MDA and the Services are obviously not alone in facing tighter budgets; JIAMDO has also seen drastic reductions in funding since This critical organization has lost over 70 percent of its budget, falling from $109.3 million in 2010 to $32.8 million in Important projects, such as development of homeland surveillance technologies, have ceased as a result. 63 Overall, a likely continued trajectory of tightened budgets calls for organizational innovation and astute prioritization in order to leverage available resources to keep missile defense relevant in the face of expanding threats. Recommendations In order to keep pace with or even stay ahead of the dynamic threat environment, and expanding North Korean missile capabilities in particular, it is imperative to make changes to the current management of missile defense. The ongoing MDR is a springboard to draw attention to the threats, highlight current needs, and provide the impetus for change. The MDA s budget must be increased and its focus returned to R&D. The responsibility for procurement and operations and maintenance must be shifted to the Services, and MD should be designated as a Major Force Program (MFP) to protect money designated for it in the Services from being redirected. JIAMDO should be empowered to take a leading role in the current MDR and in continuing to plan, coordinate, and oversee MD development. Finally, the Secretary of Defense should appoint a Special Assistant for Missile Defense to ensure the continued prioritization of MD. 1) Budget The MDA budget s downward trend must be arrested and reversed, putting the MDA back on a sustainable path. A 23 percent budget decrease since 2007 is entirely incommensurate with the growing missile threat. 64 Without sufficient financial support, the MDA will simply be unable to develop the technology and systems necessary to counter this threat. If the MDA budget continues to atrophy, the United States will be woefully unprepared to defend against advanced missile-capable adversaries in the future, whether North Korea or China. Of the $54 billion the Administration has requested be transferred from other agencies to the DoD, at least $3 billion should go to the MDA, restoring the agency to its peak-level funding of $10.5 billion (in 2017 dollars). 65 For the DoD this is new money MDA s budget can be significantly increased for a relatively small slice of the transferred funds and without reducing spending in other DoD programs. This solution should also be politically viable given President Trump s campaign promises to improve missile defense and the heightened public interest surrounding tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The missile threat environment has substantially worsened since the late 2000s; it is high time for the budget to reflect this priority. 63 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Request, Karako, Missile Defense and Defeat, Karako, The Color of Money, 5. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 45

54 Jarek Buss 2) Focus With this influx of funds, the MDA s focus must be returned almost exclusively to R&D. The MDA is the sole agency directly responsible for developing the technology for nextgeneration missile defenses if it does not do it, no one will. The promising MD technologies of the future space-based tracking, space-based kill, multi-object kill vehicles, and high-altitude directed energy UAV platforms require devoted resources and attention. The MDA must be allowed to concentrate its budget and time on these programs so that they can be brought online as soon as possible. Responsibility for procurement, operations, and management must be shifted to the Services, as originally intended, freeing up for RDT&E the one-third of MDA s budget they currently consume. Within this refocus, MDA s charter should be redefined to include responses to the expanding cruise and hypersonic glide missile threats. Many of the next-generation MD programs listed above have great potential for countering more than just ballistic missiles. These capabilities should not be left to fall by the wayside because of rigid bureaucratic turf conceptions. A redefinition that emboldens the MDA to push ahead with new technologies, free from questions of strategic restraint, opens the door to technological breakthroughs. While questions of strategic restraint will continue to be addressed by politicians, it should be recognized that in the post-cold War world, it is U.S. advantage that has generated stability, not parity. The MDA s mission must be updated to reflect the current threat environment, or the organization risks operational irrelevance at worst and incompleteness at best. 3) Major Force Program Transferring responsibility for procurement and operations and management (O&M) to the Services carries the risk that money set aside for these activities will be redirected at the Services discretion toward their own preferred projects, especially given tighter defense budgets all around. To counter this, additional appropriations must first be allocated to give the Services purchasing power without cutting other programs. This will go a long way toward avoiding resentment and hostility for the MD mission, which is critical to its long-term success. Funding for this in the MDA currently stands around $1 billion; adding this amount to the Services budgets should be easily feasible if the aforementioned $54 billion increase in the defense budget comes about. 66 If possible, procurement funding should even be increased to $1.5 or $2 billion to enable the acceleration of MD procurement that Service leaders profess to want. 67 Second, this funding must be protected by law from reallocation within the Services. The precedent for doing this is to designate missile defense as a Major Force Program (MFP), as was done with Special Operations. 68 An MFP designation aggregates program elements that reflect a force or support mission of the DoD and contains the resources necessary to achieve an objective or plan. 69 This action will largely ensure that the newly-appropriated funding will indeed go to the procurement of MD platforms, creating a robust operational capability over the long term. 66 Karako, The Color of Money, Weiss, Seeing Karako, Missile Defense and Defeat, Ibid. 46 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

55 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense 4) JIAMDO Money and manpower must be returned to JIAMDO. It is the organizational mechanism to coordinate the efforts and needs of the many players implicated in missile defense the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the MDA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, the Combatant Commands, the interagency, academia, and even the defense industry. 70 Weakening JIAMDO has negative repercussions for the entire spectrum of MD. Its proven track record is a compelling argument for continuing to support it, as summarized by a recent think tank report: JIAMDO is the only organization operating across the entirety of DoD s requirements processes. They have proven themselves to be a trusted, disinterested agent able to influence research and development while vetting requirements and monitoring acquisition with no vested interests or agendas other than implementing the chairman s vision for IAMD. 71 JIAMDO s budget should be restored, perhaps even to its 2010 level of approximately $100 million ($70 million more than currently allocated). 72 Increased funding opens the door to continue and expand projects such as Nimble Fire, the Department s only joint integrated air and missile defense operator-in-the-loop simulation that is comprised of current and future land, sea, and air weapon systems representing each of the Services AMD capabilities. 73 This project alone has been used to assess homeland defense capabilities against cruise missiles, improve Electronic Warfare capabilities, train carrier strike groups in MD, and explore the impacts of emerging MD capabilities from electronic attack to offensive cyber operations to THAAD- Extended Range. 74 The benefits of continuing such programs are obvious. Yet JIAMDO is more than a wargame workshop. As the only organization positioned and tasked to view MD from a military-wide perspective, with its knowledge of the operational environment JIAMDO provides the crucial link between the MDA (RDT&E) and the Services (procurement). JIAMDO s broad MD expertise should be leveraged in the current MDR. Giving JIAMDO a leading role in this review will not only enhance its accuracy and soundness but also demonstrate the organization s continued relevance, advancing its preeminence in MD coordination and oversight. If the downward trajectory of JIAMDO s budget and sense of purpose are not reversed, the chain of development, procurement, and operability risks breaking down. This organization is key to a truly integrated missile defense system. 5) Special Assistant to the Secretary Finally, to sustain top-level knowledge and prioritization of MD development, procurement, deployment, and strategy, Secretary of Defense Mattis should appoint a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Missile Defense (SAMD). Patterned after President Eisenhower s original Special Assistant for Science and Technology, a SAMD will keep MD a DoD priority, 70 Ibid., Ibid. 72 Ibid., Joint Staff, PE J, Ibid., Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 47

56 Jarek Buss defending it to the Secretary from competing demands. The SAMD could be appointed from within the military (past JIAMDO leaders are likely candidates) or from outside (e.g. Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). This sort of candidate would be chosen for his MD expertise. An alternative selection criterion could be for a SAMD familiar with basic MD but much more qualified in administration and program management, as James Killian was for President Eisenhower. 75 If desired, the SAMD could even head a small advisory council to provide a fresh set of eyes for the entirety of the DoD s missile defense efforts. While it is true that JIAMDO is well-qualified to supply this sort of analysis, its organizational location under the Joint Chiefs of Staff distances it from the Secretary and creates the possibility of factional disputes if one leg of the tripod seems to be attempting to rise above the other two (MDA under OSD, and the Services). A SAMD and a MD advisory council reporting directly to the Secretary would bypass these issues and avoid unnecessary conflict. A SAMD should be appointed right away so that he can be fully involved in the ongoing MDR. The more the SAMD is engaged in the MDR, the better positioned he will be to advise on and oversee the follow-up deemed necessary by the report. Participating in the review should motivate the candidate, make him intimately aware of the issues, and give him a vested interest in advancing MD according to the review s recommendations. Most importantly, appointing a SAMD sets a precedent that will greatly contribute to MD s ongoing prioritization and sustainability. While many top DoD leaders frequently reference the need for concerted effort on MD, it is a simple truth that the leadership is confronted with constant demands from a broad array of actors combatting disparate threats. Without a consistent advocate, MD can fall by the wayside and receive little more than lip service as is evidenced by dramatically decreasing budgets and the lack of progress toward the Joint Staff s IAMD Vision 2020 goals. A SAMD will have the Secretary s ear, maintaining the level of prioritization missile defense deserves. As a top-level advocate for MD, the SAMD will be crucial for maintaining financial and institutional support for these programs. Perhaps he can be available to testify before Congress in an effort to sustain budgetary approval and prevent frequent interference in the work of the MDA, the Services, and JIAMDO, giving them the necessary breathing room to get things done. Arguably, this is riskier than keeping a low profile, but the heightened levels of funding MD requires will trigger heightened congressional scrutiny regardless. It is better to offer goodwill and try to build on current bipartisan interest and consensus on the need for MD. The SAMD will be a key player in building a coalition to support MD long into the future. Conclusion Clearly dividing the three overarching MD responsibilities RDT&E, procurement, and coordination among the MDA, the Services, and JIAMDO is the optimal organization and management structure for advancing U.S. missile defense capabilities. The MDA must focus on research and development, while the Services are in charge of procurement and O&M, and 75 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower. 48 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

57 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense JIAMDO analyzes and coordinates all MD efforts. In these missions, each must be supported with appropriate funding. This clear delineation will concentrate resources in each organization along its comparative advantage and facilitate rapid improvements in real, operational MD capabilities. Meanwhile a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Missile Defense will keep MD a highpriority issue, preventing it from being buried beneath a mountain of competing demands. Without this, the momentum generated from the MDR and a new administration risks petering out, as it has before, leaving MD an aspirational capability unequipped to deal with the worsening threat environment. Acronym List ABL ABM ABMT BMD BMDO BMDR DARPA DoD DPRK IAMD ICBM IRBM JIAMDO Air-Borne Laser Anti-Ballistic Missile Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Ballistic Missile Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Ballistic Missile Defense Review Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Department of Defense Democratic People s Republic of Korea Integrated Air and Missile Defense Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization JTAMDO MD MDA MDR MFP MOKV MRBM O&M OSD SAMD SDIO THAAD UAV Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization Missile Defense Missile Defense Agency Missile Defense Review Major Force Program Multi-object Kill Vehicle Medium-range Ballistic Missile Operations and Management Office of the Secretary of Defense Special Assistant to the Secretary for Missile Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Terminal High Altitude Air Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 49

58 Jarek Buss Bibliography A Laser Defense Hit: The Airborne Laser scores a hit, even as its budget is being cut. Wall Street Journal. August 15, ABL: Lowered Expectations. Aviation Week and Space Technology. May 3, Airborne Laser Under Fire. Aviation Week and Space Technology. January 5, Air Combat Command Unclear How ABL Will Be Used Operationally. Inside Missile Defense. July 23, Aldridge, Pete. Tight Secrecy Makes Sense. USA Today. (New York, NY) June 26, Baucom, Donald R. Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History. Report (Missile Defense Agency, May 2000). Berger, Zachary, Kristin Horitski, and Abel Romero. The North Korean Missile Threat: The Hermit Kingdom s Open Ambition. Report (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, February 2016). defenseadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/north-korea- Country-Brief.pdf. Cooper, Henry F. Active Defenses to Help Counter Proliferation. In Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ed. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, and Alan R. Van Tassel, New York: McGraw-Hill, Dabrowski, John R. Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years. Report (Missile Defense Agency, August 2013). Department of Defense. Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Report (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, February 2010). _26JAN10_0630_for_web.pdf. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations. Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2017). mendment/fy17_march_amendment.pdf. Hoffman, David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision Report (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, December 2013). Documents/Publications/JointIAMDVision2020.pdf. Joint Staff. PE J: Joint Integrated Air & Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO). Report (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2012). Karako, Thomas. FY17 Budget Squeezes MDA s Research and Development. Commentary (blog), Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 18, csis.org/analysis/fy17- budget-squeezes-mda%e2%80%99sresearch-and-development. Karako, Thomas. Missile Defense and Defeat: Considerations for the New Policy Review. Report (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). Karako, Thomas. The Missile Defense Agency and the Color of Money: Fewer Resources, More Responsibility, and a Growing Budget Squeeze. Report (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). Killian, James R. Jr. Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

59 Ongoing Question of Missile Defense Liang, John. Pentagon Beginning New Missile Defense Capability Study. Inside the Pentagon 26, no. 16 (2010). Mazol, James and Jeff Keuter. Airborne Laser Approaches Pivotal Test. Report (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, 2009). Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. 2/multiple-kill-vehicle-mkv/. Missile Defense Agency. Frequently Asked Questions: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB). Accessed April 27, Neuenfeldt, Brian D. Joint Theater Missile Defense Interoperability. Report (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1998). North Korea s missile and nuclear programme. BBC News (United Kingdom). September 15, 2017: Pentagon Policy Wrongly Shields Missile Defense Data. USA Today (New York, New York). June 26, Raytheon. Kill Vehicles: First Line of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles. Sanger, David E. and Michael Wines. With A Shrug, A Monument to Cold War Fades Away. New York Times (New York, New York), June 14, 2002: Speier, Richard H., George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee, and Richard M. Moore. Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation. Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017). Spring, Baker. Sixteen Steps to Comprehensive Missile Defense: What the FY 2012 Budget Should Fund. Report (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, March 2011). Tirpak, John A. Setting a Course for the Airborne Laser, Air Force Magazine. September Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T U.S. Department of State. Remarks at Close of United Nations Security Council Ministerial Session on D.P.R.K. April 28, Warrick, Joby, Ellen Nakashima, and Anna Fifield. North Korea now making missile-ready nuclear weapons, U.S. analysts say. Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), August 8, 2017: making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b- 11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.fe09bc76b08e. Weiss, Geoffrey F. Seeing 2020: America s New Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense. JFQ 76, (2015): Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 51

60 52 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

61 Enhancement of Marine Sinks in International Climate Policy Chelsey Bryson Chelsey Bryson is a recent graduate of American University s M.A. Global Environmental Policy program where she focused on the intersections between international climate change and marine conservation. Abstract It is increasingly likely that the world will fail to meet the target of well below 2 degrees Celsius of warming put forth by the Paris Agreement without a swift and enormous change in policy and perspective. It is also increasingly evident that the ocean s ability to adapt to and mitigate a high carbon world is weakening. Policy options that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, as well as increase ocean resilience should be better researched and included in the climate discussion. Enhancement of coastal and marine systems is an attractive set of options for removing atmospheric carbon dioxide and reducing ocean vulnerability. Management options in this sphere include conventional approaches, such as increasing protected marine areas of ecological and carbon importance, and unconventional approaches, such as ocean-based carbon dioxide removal (CDR). However, international governance bodies, like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have failed to include a discussion of how to regulate and govern marine CDR approaches. This research recommends that the UNFCCC further emphasize and better integrate marine sinks in greenhouse gas accounting and the Paris Rulebook, in addition to creating a working group to evaluate CDR projects and integrate existing environmental principles. This will allow better inclusion of marine sinks across scales, with a uniform and measurable process. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 53

62 Chelsey Bryson Introduction Global climate change presents the largest environmental, social, and economic challenge in modern human history. In light of the possibly devastating consequences of a warming world, recent decades have seen unprecedented global cooperation. However, this impressive international effort still fails to catalyze the transformation needed to stay within the global temperature target of well under two degrees Celsius, as set by the Paris Agreement. 1 Recent reports show that to limit warming to 1.5 C, global greenhouse gas emissions must peak by However, locked-in warming may already be up to 1.3 C, suggesting we may surpass this target much sooner than previously thought due to our failure to reduce emissions. 3 While the ideal scenario remains prevention of greenhouse gas or carbon emissions, it is increasingly likely that the use of Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs) will be required in order to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. 4 Inexorably linked to the climate crisis are our oceans, the earth s water storehouse, climate driver, and largest carbon sink. Even if the global temperature increase is kept to two degrees Celsius, virtually all tropical coral reefs are projected to be at risk of severe degradation from this increased warming. 5 Oceans have mitigated much of the climate change felt on land, absorbing 26 percent of anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions, as well as over 90 percent of the additional energy stored in the climate system. 6 However, this absorption is beginning to slow as waters become warmer, and there are many consequences to the increase in carbon. One such consequence is emissions-driven ocean acidification, or the other CO 2 problem. This has devastating effects on a variety of marine life, particularly organisms with calcium carbonate shells, which the acidity dissolves. 7 Oceans are now approximately 30 percent more acidic on average than they were in the 1750s, equivalent to a 0.1 ph unit reduction with an additional decrease of ph expected by Yet, while there have been scientific studies on the importance of marine services and marine sinks or ocean-based carbon reservoirs for climate regulation processes, there has been little discussion on the inclusion of marine systems, such as coastal wetlands, kelp forests, or coral reefs, within relevant climate frameworks and governance. Innovative climate solutions that foster ocean health and climate change mitigation should be better researched in the natural sciences and, crucially, better discussed in international policy. The important role of marine ecosystems in climate adaptation and mitigation highlights the need to conserve and manage these resources for resilience and ecosystem health. In addition, natural ocean sinks can be enhanced, and natural sequestration processes can be accelerated in order to address atmospheric CO 2 and ocean acidification. Enhancement of marine systems emerges as an attractive approach to climate change and marine conservation, and thus should be better integrated into international climate governance. 1 UNFCC, The Paris Agreement, The Emissions Gap Report, 9. 3 Mauritsen and Pincus, Committed Warming Inferred from Observations, 1. 4 Craik and Burns, Climate Engineering under the Paris Agreement, 5. 5 Schleussner et al., Differential climate impacts, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Ibid., Orr et al., Anthropogenic Ocean Acidification, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

63 Enhancement of Marine Sinks Background: Carbon Dioxide Removal Climate negotiations have historically focused on mitigation, or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and more recently adaptation, or the response to existing climate change to limit vulnerability, but some scholars and policy makers are shifting attention toward a group of approaches that fall broadly under geoengineering or climate engineering. 9 The term has received endless criticism and avoidance, and understandably so; the threat of a state- or private-led climate engineering approach, without sufficient scientific understanding or governance to ensure responsible deployment, could lead to catastrophic consequences that are potentially more severe than the impacts of climate change itself. However, as many scholars have pointed out, the lack of political will to discuss and research these methods increases the risk of a rushed, mismanaged, or cursory deployment. 10 It is first crucial to define the scope of these approaches, as climate engineering is a broad term encompassing various types of responses. A common definition provided by a Royal Society report from 2009 is, Deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change. 11 This definition underscores two important aspects of the term: scalability and intent. While the climate engineering umbrella is large, it can be divided into two main categories: Solar Radiation Management (SRM), which aims to reduce the impacts of climate change through the reflection of radiation back into space but does not reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the second, Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR). 12 CDR includes techniques which reduce the levels of carbon dioxide (CO 2) in the atmosphere, allowing outgoing long-wave (thermal infrared) heat radiation to escape more easily. 13 While mitigation prevents the emission of greenhouse gases, CDR removes existing emissions. Under this definition, all forest-based mitigation fits within the CDR definition. Indeed, as many CDR technologies inherently parallel the aims and outcomes of natural sinks (carbon sequestration and storage), the line between mitigation and CDR becomes blurred and the answer to whether CDR is geoengineering looks more like a no. However, while almost 90 percent of the climate models in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change s (IPCC) latest report include some form of NET, there remains no governance structure for addressing the use of these technologies. 14 Without downplaying the real and serious dangers in anthropogenic climate forcing, or changing the balance between energy absorbed by earth and energy radiated out to space, it is important to remember the planetary-scale change humans have already caused. More importantly, it is crucial to consider the danger in denial. One argument against developing climate engineering methods is the slippery slope argument. That is, field trials of the methods begin to look more and more like implementation, particularly as funding, political momentum, and vested interests increase. 15 Not without merit, this argument is also not unique to the world of climate engineering. The uncertain and 9 Meysman and Montserrat, Negative CO2 emissions, Keith, A Case for Climate Engineering, Geoengineering the Climate, Ibid., ix. 13 Ibid., Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Keith, A Case for Climate Engineering, 150. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 55

64 Chelsey Bryson potentially risky nature of these methods demands discussion and should be the very impetus to regulate them. Second, the moral hazard argument against climate engineering is that it can be used to justify continuing emissions. 16 Interestingly, this is the same argument that was initially made against adaptation that if adapting to impacts was the focus, mitigation would be deprioritized. However, to date there has been no evidence of this. In fact, ten years after this argument was initially introduced, adaptation still struggles to compete with mitigation for attention, particularly in terms of finance. 17 If avoiding risky technologies is the aim, this conversation should provoke more urgency and ambition to decrease emissions, not less. Finally, many of the arguments against climate engineering are made in the context of SRM not CDR. This points to the danger of the umbrella term as it is not yet clear whether marine CDR methods are truly climate engineering or if they are new mitigation methods. Regardless of the name, the growing support for the inclusion of these methods from the science community has yet to be translated into a policy platform. While this conversation is largely absent in climate policy discourse, the IPCC has increasingly included CDR techniques in its assessments, namely Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS). 18 However, these storage technologies do not address ocean acidification, can be costly, and have significant risks. Furthermore, marine carbon capture and storage, while there is lack of sufficient data, could potentially disrupt deep sea chemistry and harm nearby ecosystems. 19 There are many marinebased CDR methods that have been discussed with various levels of potential, including ocean fertilization, microbubbles to increase ocean albedo, and ocean upwelling. Ocean fertilization has been explored the most extensively in the context of conceptual models, as well as some field projects. However, field trials have not been overwhelmingly successful. 20 In addition, many of these techniques pose significant ecological risks and do not contribute to mitigating ocean acidification. 21 The following section will focus on two types of marine CDR that have the potential to mitigate atmospheric CO 2 emissions, as well as ocean acidification: blue carbon and accelerated marine weathering with artificial ocean alkalization. Enhancement of Marine Sinks Blue Carbon In recent years, natural climate solutions have gained increasing attention in the environmental advocacy and action space, but few are able to directly address emissions and acidification. One conventional approach that potentially mitigates both atmospheric CO 2 and addresses local ocean acidification is what has been termed blue carbon. 22 Blue carbon, or the 16 Ibid., UNFCCC, Fact Sheet: Financing Climate Change Action. 18 Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Herr and Galland, The ocean and climate change, Nicholson, The Promises and Perils of Geoengineering, Williamson and Turley, Ocean acidification in a geoengineering context, Mcleod et al., A blueprint for blue carbon, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

65 Enhancement of Marine Sinks carbon sequestered and stored in coastal wetland ecosystems including mangroves, seagrass beds, and salt marshes, has the potential to be a low-cost carbon dioxide removal tool, as well as provide conservation and livelihood co-benefits. Coastal wetland systems sequester and store blue carbon at much higher rates than their terrestrial counterparts. 23 It is estimated that 50 percent of carbon sequestered from the atmosphere is cycled through oceans, and 70 percent of this is in coastal wetlands. 24 This is a significant amount, as coastal waters comprise only seven percent of the world s oceans and are only 0.05 percent of plant biomass on land. 25 Because these systems remove atmospheric carbon at such high rates, their protection is paramount. In addition to the ability of mangroves to filter nutrients in coastal waters, it has been found that seagrasses, specifically, are crucial in coastal calcium carbonate chemistry. Through an empirical model, one study found that these highly productive tropical seagrasses were responsible for an increase in ph of up to 0.38 units. 26 Depending on tidal fluctuations and water depth, this was found to potentially increase coral growth by approximately 18 percent. 27 This enhancement of coral reef resilience is an important finding and needs to be further researched. However, these highly valuable, carbon-rich systems represent only a small portion of earth s surface. Unfortunately, they are also some of the most threatened systems on earth, with as much as 50 percent of all coastal wetlands having been lost over the past 50 years. 28 The loss of these ecosystems results in a variety of damages, not least of which is increased emissions. While blue carbon is sequestered and stored at relatively high rates, carbon from coastal wetlands is also emitted at a higher rate than from terrestrial systems when degraded. It is estimated that up to 19 percent of global emissions from deforestation are from coastal wetland loss, resulting in up to US$42 billion annually in damages, further underscoring the need to protect these systems. 29 There is a growing range of other economic valuation estimates that these systems provide, but increasingly, it is being found that marine ecosystems have been historically undervalued and actually represent a large portion of food, transportation, energy, tourism, and other markets. 30 It is unclear how the blue carbon solution should be categorized. In many cases, coastal wetlands are conserved in order to help alleviate sea level rise and erosion, falling squarely in adaptation. Other projects expressly cite sequestration as their main aim. But if this is the case, is that sequestration carbon dioxide removal or mitigation? If it is mitigation, it can be supported within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Again, the line between these two strategies is softened, begging the question of distinction for policymakers. 23 Ibid., Ibid. 25 Nellemann and Corcoran, Blue Carbon: A Rapid Response Assessment, Unsworth et al., Tropical seagrass meadows, Ibid., Mcleod et al., A blueprint for blue carbon, Pendleton et al., Estimating Global Blue Carbon Emissions, Reuchlin-Hugenholtz and McKenzie, Marine Protected Areas, 5. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 57

66 Chelsey Bryson Accelerated Marine Weathering and Enhanced Alkalization Chemical weathering the breakdown of rocks and minerals over time is a natural process which stores carbon in the seafloor, but which occurs over long geologic time scales, far slower than the rate of anthropogenic CO 2 emissions. 31 Accelerated weathering and enhanced alkalization are a collection of techniques that accelerate these already present carbonate and silicate weathering reactions. These techniques span a spectrum of methodologies, principally to introduce additional, globally abundant base minerals into this cycle. In doing so, the carbon uptake that naturally occurs happens faster and seawater alkalinity increases with the introduction of additional carbon-based ions, combatting ocean acidification. 32 There are many different variants of this model, most of which remain theoretical, though there have been some promising field trials including for liming the addition of calcium carbonate to coastal waters and olivine weathering the addition of olivine materials. However, there are also significant drawbacks. The largest barriers are surrounding cost and scale. In order for weathering to be implemented on a scale large enough for significant mitigation and alkalization, the state of the technology now would be close to the cost of CCS, but with less storage potential. 33 Additionally, the acquisition and transport of necessary mineral material would likely require enormous amounts of energy use and mining. Similarly, in terms of alkalization, counteracting the changes in acidity of an average uptake of two gigatons (Gt) of carbon per year would require roughly 20 Gt of calcium carbonate (CaCO 3) per year. For a limestone layer 100 meters thick, this would require the removal of roughly 60 km 2 each year. 34 For this to be feasible, source material would need to be coastally located, otherwise transportation costs and footprint would be prohibitive. This approach might be better suited for local or regional ocean acidification mitigation purposes on the reef, fishery, or ecosystem level, with an added benefit of sequestration. 35 The mechanism behind this process has been confirmed in numerous studies and models, but there are still several important challenges in understanding and quantifying these methods. A better understanding of CO 2 sequestration efficiency under field conditions needs to be more closely monitored. 36 Conventional methods, such as sustainable fisheries management and protection of coastal wetlands, should be employed to build resilience in these systems while simultaneously conducting further research into more unconventional marine CDR methods, such as accelerated weathering. Marine CDR in the UNFCCC Due to the transboundary and global character of marine systems and processes, marine sinks and CDR should be considered within the scope of international law. While the creation of large bureaucratic institutions to tackle environmental issues takes enormous amounts of political will, logistical capacity, and resources, existing institutions provide the framework 31 Geoengineering the Climate, Meysman and Montserrat, Negative CO2 emissions, Billé et al., Taking Action Against Ocean Acidification, Ocean Acidification, Feng et al., Could artificial ocean alkalinization protect, Meysman and Montserrat, Negative CO2 emissions, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

67 Enhancement of Marine Sinks necessary to expand and structure the conversation around the ocean-climate nexus. There are multiple possible entry points for enhancement of marine sinks in the context of emissions removals under current international treaties. The following section will review entry points into international climate policy, as this research is specific to the carbon sink capacity of marine systems. However, it is important to note that other environmental regimes, most notably the Convention on Biological Diversity, the London Convention, and the Law of the Sea, are also necessary to consider for marine CDR, as well as other ocean-climate linkages. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the most appropriate regime for enhancement of marine sinks specifically, as it has a wide participation of 197 parties to the convention, a large scope, and shares the main objectives of CDR: preventing dangerous interference with the climate system and allowing ecosystems to adapt to climate change. This parallel can be seen in the Convention itself, under Article 2, The Objective: The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 37 The importance of oceans can be found throughout the Convention, starting with the special emphasis it puts on the climate system as a whole. It also specifically recognizes the importance of oceans as sinks and reservoirs, stating in the Preamble that the parties are aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. 38 It is also noted in Article 4.d. that they aim to: Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems. 39 This is a clear acknowledgement of the need to protect and enhance marine sinks. As the Conference of Parties (COP), the governing body of the UNFCCC, has grown, new entry points for enhancement of marine sinks have emerged under the UNFCCC. At COP 17, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) invited parties to: Provide information on the technical and scientific aspects of emissions by sources, removals by sinks, and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases, including emissions and removals from coastal and marine ecosystems such as mangroves, tidal salt marshes, wetlands and seagrass meadows United Nations, UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2; emphasis added by author. 38 United Nations, UNFCCC, 1992, Preamble. 39 United Nations, UNFCCC, 1992, Article Report of the Subsidiary Body, Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 59

68 Chelsey Bryson Since then, multiple parties and negotiating blocs, such as Norway, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN), and The Gambia have given informal, independent submissions on coastal marine sinks to the UNFCCC. 41 Perhaps the most notable entry point for marine CDR within the UNFCCC is within the very goals of the Paris Agreement and the global temperature goal of well below 2 degrees. 42 While the two-degree goal is reported as the benchmark of the Paris Agreement, the long-term cooperative action goal of net-zero emissions by the second half of the century is also important. Unfortunately, the Agreement offers no direction if this target is not achieved. Likewise, while the ambition mechanism and review process have timelines, there is no timeline to reach individual or global targets. However, the long-term goal does highlight science, equity, and sinks: In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. 43 While this does not explicitly call for CDR technologies, it sets precedent to act under the best available science, as well as the central role of removals by sinks. It also does not specify in what way the balance of sources and sinks will be achieved. Under the definition of mitigation, sinks are included, again raising the question of whether CDR is really another type of mitigation. 44 CDR de facto represents an implementation mechanism for meeting the objective of the UNFCCC. 45 While enhancement of sinks is clearly included, the Convention does not make specific reference to CDR, again underlying a need for clarification of the difference. Furthermore, many components of the UNFCCC and subsequent agreements are implicitly relevant to CDR, such as the importance of natural sinks and efforts to minimize adverse effects to the environment. Certain qualities of marine CDR can contribute to a successful enabling environment, including science-based targets, enhancing coverage of sectors, promotion of mitigation actions with an emphasis on co-benefits, and common rules for accounting, all of which enhancement of marine sinks can contribute to. 46 In addition, the core elements of the Paris Agreement an ambitious target, the inclusion of removals, and the commitment to achieve a balance between emissions and removals all include marine CDR. These provide the framework for future development and expansion, including procedural mechanisms and an emphasis on capacity building and transparency, as is discussed in further detail below. 41 UNFCCC, Submissions from Parties, UNFCCC, The Paris Agreement, 2015, Article UNFCCC, The Paris Agreement, 2015, Article Craik and Burns, Climate Engineering under the Paris Agreement, Ibid. 46 Murray and Vegh, Incorporating Blue Carbon as a Mitigation Action, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

69 Enhancement of Marine Sinks Marine CDR in the UNFCCC: Recommendations At the broadest level, the UNFCCC Conference of Parties should draft a decision on the importance of oceans to both the climate system and to livelihoods and vulnerable populations. This would signal a recognition to the ocean policy and science communities that may motivate a more robust effort to incorporate ocean conservation into strategies and catalyze additional emissions reductions, increasing ambition. Increased ambition, as referenced in climate policy, refers to the collective will to cut greenhouse gas emissions in order to meet the temperature goal. 47 In the context of marine sinks, party-level ambition should be met with strengthened high level guidance as multiple parties have expressed interest in better inclusion of domestic marine sinks, but often lack sufficient instruction from the UNFCCC on how to do so. Similarly, as the UNFCCC is the main international instrument responsible for governing greenhouse gases, ocean acidification should be better discussed. Soon after ocean acidification first gained recognition from the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) in 2009, it was recognized as a slow onset event, but is still viewed as a symptom of climate change, rather than a concurrent problem. 48 Shifting this perception would allow states to better incorporate ocean acidification into their strategies and would encourage drastic emissions reductions. 49 Scholars have proposed various recommendations for addressing ocean acidification specifically in the UNFCCC, including a working group in SBSTA to provide ocean acidification priorities. 50 Ocean acidification and other ocean impacts should also be considered under the contexts of adaptation and even loss and damage, the current framework to address slow-onset impacts, climate-induced migration, non-economic losses, and other damages that can relate to ocean populations. 51 Others have argued that while temperature is an appropriate target for atmospheric carbon emissions, there should be additional scientifically-determined targets or goals to reinforce the action needed for oceans. This could be a more symbolic target or an empirical one such as ph, recognizing that current goals may not be enough to combat ocean acidification. 52 In terms of blue carbon specifically, many Parties have included coastal and marine ecosystems in independent submissions, as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), to the Paris Agreement. 53 However, there remains a large gap in blue carbon inclusion from coastal countries, underscoring the need for an international approach. 54 In order to facilitate this, the IPCC Task Force on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories released a 2013 Wetlands Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. This supplement provides updated methodological guidance specific to coastal wetlands, including prevention of double counting, effects of different management practices, and 47 Cameron and DeAngelis, What is Ambition?, November 26, UNFCCC, Submissions from Parties, Billé et al., Taking Action Against Ocean Acidification, Williamson and Turley, Ocean acidification in a geoengineering context, UNFCCC, Warsaw International Mechanism, Harrould-Kolieb, Ocean Acidification and the UNFCCC, 14; Harrould-Kolieb and Herr, Ocean acidification and climate change, Herr and Landis, Coastal blue carbon ecosystems, Ibid., 25. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 61

70 Chelsey Bryson restoration methodologies. 55 To date, these accounting guidelines are voluntary and the UNFCCC is currently accepting submissions on the experience and lessons learned by parties in relation to the supplement so that they can be updated in This period of review is helpful, and coastal accounting should continue to be discussed across parties so that the next version can be improved and perhaps made mandatory. Workshops around the guidelines implementation would be helpful to share knowledge and progress their use. In addition to national accounting, the IPCC should continue to cover marine CDR in its assessment and special reports. There are clear signals of this, including the upcoming Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 degrees Celsius, as well as the Special Report on Oceans and the Cryosphere. According to the publically available outlines, these reports are set to include topics such as ocean climate linkages and feedbacks, ecosystem services including carbon uptake, and marine mitigation. They will also address nature-based mitigation like blue carbon including changes in carbon stocks and fluxes under emission pathways, their relevance for greenhouse gas inventories and accounting, and technologies including climate engineering techniques, their feasibility and risks, ethical aspects. 56 Finally, the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report is to be completed in time for the upcoming Global Stocktake in 2023, which will also help advance the discussion of enhancement of marine sinks. Together, these reports outlining the latest science and the current state of play will likely inform and shape the long-term mitigation goals as well as parties responses. Marine CDR should also be considered in the Paris Rulebook, the framework currently under negotiation that will ultimately decide the operationalization of the agreement, which includes the rules, processes, and guidelines for parties on how to proceed. Perhaps most importantly, the rulebook will guide ambition, including the implementation of current NDCs, the development of the next round of NDCs, and long term action strategies. Accordingly, the rulebook should address how to include marine CDR in terms of both adaptation and mitigation in the context of the ambition mechanism, including NDCs, long term actions, and other submissions. Finally, with additional research, marine sinks could be better included in finance flows and cooperative action. Though currently rare in the ocean context, market mechanisms, such as nutrient trading and payments through user fees or taxes on commercial enterprises, could be effective if used responsibly. Market-based mechanisms for a blue carbon Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), modeled off of the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) program, may also be possible in the near future. Ideally, a long-term financial mechanism with an emphasis on public-private partnerships for increased research and inclusion of marine sink projects for climate funding would be included under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Conclusion A UNFCCC working group on removal technologies is needed to construct a regulatory framework for these technologies before deployment, particularly in the context of marine CDR. An assessment of different methodologies and their respective effectiveness, feasibility, Supplements to the 2016 IPCC Guidelines: Wetlands, IPCC, Publications and Data, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

71 Enhancement of Marine Sinks scalability, cost, and sustainability is necessary through the research phase. Further, as recommended by the Forum for Climate Engineering, a decision-making body under the UNFCCC that can negotiate deployment, as well as a monitoring, review, and verification process are crucial. Through these measures, specific proposals including various types of CDR can be debated, while encouraging low-risk, high-reward projects. It is widely accepted that the best response to the mounting problems from the rising global temperature is to decrease emissions from burning fossil fuels and degraded natural systems. Unfortunately, we have passed the point of needing emissions reductions alone, and have entered an era that requires an honest conversation on next steps in light of this urgency. These steps are better inclusion of the earth s largest carbon sink, the oceans, into the Paris Agreement and the reshaping of the discussion around adaptation, mitigation, and CDR. Perhaps instead of three distinct groups, these strategies can form synergies with projects seeking to have components of all of them. Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Simon Nicholson for his guidance to this work and contribution to this field. I would also like to thank Dr. Wil Burns, Dr. Carol Turley, Dr. Phil Williamson, and Dr. Greg Rau for their meaningful input and in helping me better understand these issues. Table of Abbreviations AOSIS BECCS CCS CDR CfRN COP IPCC NDCs NET REDD+ SBSTA SRM UNFCCC VCS Association of Small Island States Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage Carbon Capture and Storage Carbon Dioxide Removal Coalition for Rainforest Nations Conference of Parties Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Nationally Determined Contributions Negative Emissions Technologies Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice Solar Radiation Management United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Verified Carbon Standard Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 63

72 Chelsey Bryson Bibliography 2013 Supplement to the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories: Wetlands. Report (Switzerland: IPCC, 2013). wetlands_supplement_ws_oct2013_rev2.pdf. Billé, Raphaël, Ryan Kelly, Arne Biastoch, Ellycia Harrould-Kolieb, Dorothée Herr, Fortunat Joos, Kristy Kroeker, and Dan Laffoley. Taking Action Against Ocean Acidification: A review of management and policy options. Environmental Management 52, no. 4 (2013): Burns, Wil. The Paris Agreement and Climate Geoengineering Governance: The Need for A Human Rights-Based Component. CIGI Papers no. 111 (2016): Caldeira, Ken and Greg Rau. Accelerating carbonate dissolution to sequester carbon dioxide in the ocean: Geochemical implications. Geophysical Research Letters no. 27 (2000): Cameron, Edward and Kate DeAngelis. What is Ambition in the Context of Change? Insights (blog), World Resources Institute. November 26, 2012: blog/2012/11/what-ambition-context-climate-change. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC. Report (Geneva: IPCC, 2014). Craik, Neil and Wil Burns. Climate Engineering under the Paris Agreement: A Legal and Policy Primer. Report (Waterloo: Center for International Governance Innovation, 2016). er%20-%20special%20report.pdf. The Emissions Gap Report. Report (Nairobi: UNEP, 2016). Feng, Ellias, David Keller, Woldgang Koeve, and Andreas Oschlies. Could artificial ocean alkalinization protect tropical coral ecosystems from ocean acidification? Environmental Research Letters 11, no. 7 (2015). Geoengineering the climate: Science, governance and uncertainty. Report (London: The Royal Society, 2009). publications/2009/8693.pdf. Harrould-Kolieb, Ellycia. Ocean Acidification and the UNFCCC: Finding Legal clarity in the twilight zone. Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 6, no. 2 (2016): Harrould-Kolieb, Ellycia and Dorothée Herr. Ocean acidification and climate change: synergies and challenges of addressing both under the UNFCCC. Climate Policy 12, no. 3 (2012): Hastings, Jesse, Sebastian Thomas, Valerie Burgener, Kristina Gjerde, Dan Laffoley, Rod Salm, Laurence McCook, Lida Pet-Soede, William M. Eichbaum, Mariska Bottema, Ginette Hemley, John Tanzer, Callum Roberts, Hugh Govan, and Helen E. Fox. 64 The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

73 Enhancement of Marine Sinks Safeguarding the blue planet: Six strategies for accelerating ocean protection. Parks 18, no. 1 (2012): Herr, Dorothée and Grantly Galland. The ocean and climate change: Tools and Guidelines for Action. Report (Gland: IUCN, 2009). _and_climate_change.pdf. Herr, Dorothee and Emily Landis. Coastal blue carbon ecosystems: Opportunities for Nationally Determined Contributions. Report (Gland and Washington, D.C.: IUCN and TNC, 2016). Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Publications and Data Keith, David. A Case for Climate Engineering. Cambridge: The MIT Press, Mauritsen, Thorsten and Robert Pincus. Committed Warming Inferred from Observations. Nature Climate Change 7 (2017): Mcleod, Elizabeth, Gail Chmura, Steven Bouillon, Rodney Salm, Mats Björk, Carols Duarte, Catherine Lovelock, William Schlesinger, and Brian Silliman. A blueprint for blue carbon: toward an improved understanding of the role of vegetated coastal habitats in sequestering CO 2. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 9, no. 10 (2011): Meysman, Filip, and Francesc Montserrat. Negative CO2 emissions via enhanced silicate weathering in coastal environments. Biological Letters 13, no. 4 (2017). Murray, Brian and Tibor Vegh. Incorporating Blue Carbon as a Mitigation Action under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Report (Durham: Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, 2012). Nellemann, Christian and Emily Corcoran. Blue Carbon: A Rapid Response Assessment. Report (Norway: United Nations Environment Programme and GRID-Arendal, 2009). arbon_screen.pdf? Nicholson, Simon. The Promises and Perils of Geoengineering. In The State of the World, ed. Lisa Mastny, Washington, D.C.: Island Press, Ocean acidification due to increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide. Report (London: The Royal Society, 2005). /9634.pdf. Orr, James, Victoria Fabry, Olivier Aumont, Laurent Bopp, Scott Doney, Richard Feely, Anand Gnanadesikan, Nicolas Gruber, Akio Ishida, Fortunat Joos, Robert Key, Keith Lindsay, Ernst Maier-Reimer, Richard Matear, Patrick Monfray, Anne Mouchet, Raymond Najjar, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Keith Rodgers, Christopher Sabine, Jorge Sarmiento, Reiner Schlitzer, Richard Slater, Ian Totterdell, Marie-France Weirig, Yasuhiro Yamanaka, and Andrew Yool. Anthropogenic ocean acidification over the Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 65

74 Chelsey Bryson twenty-first century and its impact on calcifying organisms. Nature 437 (2005): Pendleton, Linwood, Daniel C. Donato, Brian C. Murray, Stephen Crooks, W. Aaron Jenkins, Samantha Sifleet, Christopher Craft, James W. Fourqurean, J. Boone Kauffman, Núria Marbà, Patrick Megonigal, Emily Pidgeon, Dorothee Herr, David Gordon, and Alexis Baldera. Estimating Global Blue Carbon; Emissions from Conversion and Degradation of Vegetated Coastal Ecosystems. PLOS ONE 7, no. 9 (2012). Proelss, Alexander. Geoengineering and International Law. Security and Peace 30, no. 4 (2012): Renforth, Phil and Tim Kruger. Coupling mineral carbonation and ocean liming. Energy Fuel 27, no. 8 (2013): Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its thirty-fifth session, held in Durban from 28 November to 3 December Report (Durban: UNFCCC, 2011). Reuchlin-Hugenholtz, Emilie, and Emily McKenzie. Marine protected areas: Smart investments in ocean health. Report (Gland: World Wildlife Fund, 2015). WWF_Marine_Protected_Areas_LR_SP.pdf. Schleussner, Carl-Friedrich, Tabea K. Lissner, Erich M. Fischer, Jan Wohland, Mahé Perrette, Antonius Golly, Joeri Rogelj, Katelin Childers, Jacob Schewe, Katja Frieler, Matthias Mengel, William Hare, and Michiel Schaeffer. Differential climate impacts for policyrelevant limits to global warming: the case of 1.5C and 2C. Earth System Dynamics 7 (2016): United Nations. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Adopted May 9, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Fact sheet: Financing climate change action: Investment and financial flows for a strengthened response to climate change United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Paris Agreement. Adopted December 12, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Submissions from Parties Unsworth, Richard, Catherine Collier, Gideon Henderson, and Len McKenzie. Tropical seagrass meadows modify seawater carbon chemistry: implications for coral reefs impacted by ocean acidification. Environmental Research Letters 7, no 2. (2012). Williamson, Philip and Carol Mary Turley. Ocean acidification in a geoengineering context. Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society 370 (2012): The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

75 DPRK Nuclear Strategy: The Objectives and Limits of Risk Manipulation Jordan Routt and James Keagle Jordan Routt is pursuing his master's degree in International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and received his bachelor's degree in Asian studies from Brigham Young University. Jordan is the recipient of the Roberson Fellowship, the Critical Language Scholarship, and the Foreign Language and Area Studies Scholarship, and is a former infantry marine. His interests include East Asian security, nuclear strategy, and national parks. Jordan will graduate in May 2018 and is looking for a career in public service. Dr. James M. Keagle is Professor of National Security Strategy and Policy at the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University. Prior to this position, Dr. Keagle served for nine years as the National Defense University s Provost (effective 2004) and Vice President for Academic Affairs (effective 1999). Prior to these positions, he served as a professor of National Security Strategy at NDU, a member of Ambassador Holbrooke's diplomatic negotiating team for the Balkans, and is a combat wounded veteran of Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989). He retired after 26 years in the USAF in 2000 at the rank of Colonel. Abstract The Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has recently improved its ability to threaten the United States with intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests and an alleged thermonuclear device. The DPRK s missiles now have a longer range and its warheads are significantly more destructive. This research paper tackles the following question: What is the DPRK s nuclear strategy? In order to do so, this paper introduces the current debate on the country s nuclear strategy, a framework for analyzing any nuclear strategy, and the most relevant school of thought from Thomas Schelling s Arms and Influence. This paper finds that the DPRK s nuclear strategy manipulates the risk of escalation to make up for inadequacies in the survivability and credibility of its small nuclear forces. The DPRK, however, is limited in its ability to completely manipulate risk by giving tactical nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders with authority due to its authoritarian military and centralized civilian command and control. The DPRK s targeting policy suggests prioritizing cities that have counterforce targets as a bonus. The DPRK s capability is evolving while its strategy is not. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 67

76 Jordan Routt and James Keagle Known Unknowns On July 28, 2017, the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK) tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that analysts claim can reliably reach the United States mainland. 1 With this recent test, the game has changed. Now, the DPRK has more credibility in its threats toward the U.S. mainland. U.S. officials, however, still have not come to a consensus on how to deal with the situation. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley claimed all options were on the table, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated the United States was not seeking regime change, CIA Director Mike Pompeo hinted that regime change was on the table, and U.S. Vice President Mike Pence stated there would be no talks with the DPRK. 2 Lack of consensus about the DPRK is not a new phenomenon. Since the 1990s, scholars, analysts, and government officials have argued about what the U.S. response should be while speculating about which strategy and purpose the DPRK would employ for its nuclear weapons if it built them. There is evidence to support many different theories about the DPRK s intentions. A comprehensive review of the available evidence supports an argument that the DPRK s nuclear strategy is designed to deter a powerful foreign threat. In order to do so, the DPRK pursues a strategy of manipulating the risk of escalation to make up for inadequacies in the survivability and credibility of its small nuclear forces. However, the DPRK is limited in its ability to completely manipulate risk by giving tactical nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders with authority for use, due to its authoritarian military and centralized civilian command and control. The finding of this paper is that the DPRK s capability is evolving but its strategy is not; its ability to carry out its desired strategy is simply improving to reflect its long-term goals. The Debate The DPRK s strategy remains a difficult and speculative field of study. Most recently, Scott Sagan of Stanford University, argued that the primary driver of the DPRK s nuclear strategy is the fear of a U.S. attack. The goal is to prevent a foreign attack or disrupt or delay an advance by bombing military bases and port cities. If this strategy fails, the DPRK can threaten revenge on cities as a last effort. 3 Vipin Narang argues that North Korea pursues an asymmetric escalation strategy. 4 This strategy is a posture explicitly designed to deter conventional attacks by enabling a state to respond with rapid, asymmetric escalation to first use of nuclear weapons against conventional and/or strategic targets. 5 Narang also argues that the DPRK s strategy appears to be modeled after Pakistan s, with the goals of repelling a conventional invasion, and deterring nuclear first use and retaliation from the United States. 6 Shane Smith builds on Narang s strategies to argue that, despite changes over time, the DPRK s policies suggest a nuclear strategy focused on survivable second-strike capability. This allows the DPRK to deter attacks and coercion aimed at the regime by communicating intent to deal deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression. 7 Smith also argues that the DPRK may pursue a nuclear 1 Lewis, North Korean Nuclear Weapons Can Hit the U.S., August 3, Reuters Staff, Haley Says All Options on Table, March 8, 2017; Morello and Gearan, Tillerson to North Korea, August 1, 2017; Sokolsky and Miller, Regime Change in North Korea, August 2, 2017; Nicholas, Pence Says U.S. Won t Hold Talks, August 2, Sagan, Korean Missile Crisis, Panda, Go First and Go Nuclear, April 30, Narang, What Does it Take to Deter?, Berkowitz, Karklis, and Meko, North Korea showed off, May 18, Smith, North Korea s Evolving Nuclear Strategy, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

77 DPRK Nuclear Strategy war-fighting strategy by threatening first use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, but for now war fighting is still too expensive and risky. 8 Jeffrey Lewis argues that the DPRK plans to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces in East Asia in the early moments of conflict, and that the DPRK s strategy depends on using nuclear weapons early, for fear of losing them. 9 Terence Roehrig, however, argues that the DPRK s nuclear force is too small and not accurate enough to consider counterforce targets. Instead, the DPRK will most likely target cities and bases in Asia to hold targets at risk through assured retaliation. 10 Lastly, Michael Cohen argues that the likelihood of the DPRK using nuclear weapons in a crisis depends on how Kim Jong-un experiences fear of imminent nuclear war in a nuclear crisis and his beliefs of how much control he has over nuclear escalation. 11 In a nuclear crisis, if Kim Jong-un experiences fear of imminent nuclear or conventional war and believes he has no control over escalation, then he is more likely to use weapons in a desperate move to save the regime or inflict damage. This debate is an important baseline for understanding how the DPRK s nuclear strategy is understood today. What is Nuclear Strategy? Nuclear strategy is informed by national security interests and is the means used to accomplish desired ends. Castillo and Molander define the fundamental elements of nuclear strategy as: employment (targeting) policy, forces, force posture, and command and control. 12 I adapt their framework to include the factors of risk tolerance, targeting policy, command and control, forces, survivability, and drivers. Drivers and risk tolerance are important because strategy is more than the sum of the technical capabilities that a state possesses. This debate is not new; Bernard Brodie wrote in 1944 that, Inventions in military or materiel rarely determine foreign policy; they merely permit certain courses of action which might otherwise be impossible. 13 Capabilities are easier to focus on and analyze, but can exaggerate the low probability high impact scenarios based solely on what is technically possible. Capability-focused analysis gives less weight to intentions and direction, but trajectory is an essential element for understanding the nuclear strategies of new nuclear states. Risk tolerance from Tversky and Kahneman s work on prospect theory is helpful to understand what is at stake and whether or not the DPRK sees itself in the domain of gains or the domain of losses. Schools of Thought The DPRK has several different options available to pursue for its nuclear strategy. The first significant difference between conventional Cold War strategies and the strategies the DPRK is likely to take is that the DPRK and the United States are not in a state of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Based on the total number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, the United States has the nuclear capability to destroy the DPRK, and the best the DPRK could hope for is some type of unacceptable retaliation on allies and potentially the U.S. mainland. Among the many concepts related to nuclear strategy, risk manipulation emerges as the concept most supported by available evidence. This concept comes from Thomas Schelling s ideas on nuclear strategy. Risk manipulation is not about which state has the most capability to 8 Ibid., Lewis, North Korea Is Practicing for Nuclear War, March 9, Roehrig, North Korea s Nuclear Weapons Program, Cohen, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and No Good Options?, Castillo and Molander, Flexible Response Revisited, Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age, 252. Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 69

78 Jordan Routt and James Keagle use force, but which state is most willing to use it. 14 Manipulating the threat of force, or the risk of nuclear escalation, sees the road to war as a process, not a single event, that reduces but does not eliminate the need for credible first strike or a survivable second strike. 15 This strategy removes victory as a prerequisite for hurting the enemy. 16 Even if a state is likely to lose, it can threaten violence at high cost. Risk manipulation sees violence as most successful when it is threatened but not used, 17 and exaggerates the historical novelty of deterrence and the balance of terror. 18 It intentionally makes the problem worse by arms racing, using more aggressive rhetoric, and making the threat of first use unpredictable. 19 Deterrence and war change from being a contest of strength to a contest of nerve, risk-taking, and endurance. 20 This strategy intentionally limits options; it is a strategy of making retreat impossible for yourself by drawing red lines that make the state s response automatic. 21 The next step is to use available evidence to analyze four factors that inform nuclear strategy: risk tolerance, targeting policy, command and control, and drivers. Risk Tolerance A central component of any nuclear strategy is the state s tolerance for risk. One of the best theories for analyzing tolerance for risk comes from Tversky and Kahneman s prospect theory. 22 Prospect theory predicts that individuals tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains, or when things are going well, and relatively risk seeking in a domain of losses, as when a leader is in the midst of a crisis. 23 According to prospect theory, the likelihood of success and how options are framed change the preference for risk. The first factor that influences the likelihood of success and pushes the DPRK into the domain of losses is the conventional military balance. The International Institute for Strategic Studies Military Balance estimates that the DPRK has a one million person military. 24 Despite this large military, most analysts predict that the DPRK would lose in a conventional war with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States. The DPRK has dealt with this conventional inferiority since the end of the Korean war. The 60 year likelihood of losing in a conventional military conflict is a significant factor that contributes to the DPRK s feeling to be in the domain of losses. The next factor in prospect theory is framing. Framing is significant because focusing on how much will be lost versus how much can be gained changes the tolerance for risk. How the DPRK frames its security situation will be essential to know whether it perceives itself in the domain of gains or domain of losses. The difference in framing will be evident in the language used in propaganda. On March 31, 2013, Kim Jong-un said, Nuclear weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people s happy life. 25 The DPRK frames its nuclear weapons in terms of swords, guarantees, and resisting aggression. Its propaganda and statements focus on the lack of formal peace agreements after the Korean War, resisting foreign threats and intimidation, defending its 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Tversky and Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory, McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016, Mansourov, Kim Jong Un s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, December 16, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

79 DPRK Nuclear Strategy socialist ideology, preventing the Korean people from becoming victims or modern slaves, and defending all other socialist treasures won at the cost of blood and safeguard the nation s right to existence and its time-honored history and brilliant culture. 26 The DPRK equates the success of its nuclear program to survival of the state and its citizens, putting it into the domain of losses. This lens increases the DPRK s sensitivity and the way it frames its messages and propaganda. Framing, however, works both ways. On the one hand, the DPRK sees and frames its own situation. On the other hand, the United States and Western countries frame the DPRK threat to the world. The United States speaks about the DPRK as a failed or rogue state, and waits for the DPRK to collapse. These ideas further reinforce the DPRK s framing into the domain of losses since both sides view the conflict as high stakes. If states frame every struggle as being about life or death, they will be more open to risk-seeking because they will perceive the potential for loss as very high. The DPRK intentionally frames foreign threats to any one part of the regime to be a threat to all of the DPRK. The regime appears to be manipulating risk and intentionally burning the bridge to limit options so the only thing it can do is defend itself. 27 Another indicator of the DPRK s risk tolerance is its stated policy on first use. In 2013, the DPRK stated: Nuclear weapons serve the purpose of deterring and repelling aggression and retaliating against enemies and, nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapons states unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion of the DPRK. 28 The DPRK states that nuclear weapons are for retaliation but does not clarify what joining a hostile state means. This manipulates the risk to the ROK and Japan if conflict escalates. The DPRK s policy on first use suggests a baseline assured retaliation strategy in theory but a strategy of manipulated risk in practice. This first use policy is also consistent with manipulated risk in the way it seeks to weaken an adversary s commitment while strengthening its own. Another way the DPRK frames the security situation is through its apparent irrationality and aggressiveness. Schelling points out that, It does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of one s self or one s country. 29 The DPRK s narrative at home and abroad has not dispelled the image of the DPRK regime as irrational or ruthless which in turn has strengthened its ability to deter aggression. Only recently have scholars and journalists begun questioning whether the DPRK is irrational. 30 Some U.S. officials seem to confuse cruelty with irrationality, and risk-seeking behavior with being undeterrable. The DPRK views itself in the domain of losses because of the conventional military balance, the way it frames the situation, and the way the United States frames the situation. Targeting Policy: Two Birds, One Stone Another factor that indicates that the DPRK pursues a risk manipulation strategy is its targeting policy. The DPRK sends signals through propaganda and official statements about what its targets will be in the event of a nuclear conflict. Since 2000, the DPRK has threatened to turn Seoul into a sea of fire in response to tension between the North and the South. 31 The DPRK also specifically threatened the city of Pusan, South Korea by revealing a map in which the distance the missile traveled out to sea was the exact distance to Pusan. 32 In addition to 26 Ibid. 27 Schelling, Arms and Influence, Kim, North Korea s Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy, Schelling, Arms and Influence, Evans, Is North Korea s leader Kim Jong-un rational?, March 18, Scarr et al., North Korea s Other Threat, May 26, Berkowitz, Karklis, and Meko, North Korea showed off a lot of missiles, May 18, Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 71

80 Jordan Routt and James Keagle specific regional cities named as targets, the DPRK also communicates vaguely about threats to the whole region: If we push the buttons to annihilate the enemies even right now, all bases of provocations will be reduced to seas in flames and ashes in a moment. 33 To address the U.S. threat, the DPRK released propaganda in 2013 that included a targeting map of the United States mainland in the background. This was a significant indicator of targeting policy for its ICBM program. The map included targets in Hawaii, San Diego, and Washington D.C. The DPRK also released propaganda videos that show nuclear missiles striking Washington D.C., 34 New York, 35 and San Francisco. 36 According to its propaganda, the DPRK s regional targets are Seoul, Pusan, and Tokyo specifically, along with the rest of the region generally. Once the DPRK has reliable ICBMs and miniaturized warheads, it has signaled it will target Hawaii, San Francisco, San Diego, New York, and Washington D.C. Lewis argues that the DPRK s targets will also include U.S. regional ports, airfields, and bases in East Asia. 37 Lewis s view is consistent with the DPRK statement from October 2014 when the National Defense Commission stated that, The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK had already declared before the world that an operational plan for striking all the bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces in the Pacific targeting the DPRK and the main cities of the U.S. mainland where war maniacs are stationed was ratified. 38 The DPRK s signaling suggests it will prioritize countervalue targets, or cities, while other statements and veiled threats suggest a counterforce strategy that targets military assets. The strongest argument to make sense of such mixed signals is a targeting strategy based on efficiency. The DPRK will target cities that would result in strategic military and command and control losses as a bonus. This is a reversal of Joseph Loftus s Emergency War Plan of 1952 that initially focused on counterforce, but where targeting programmers slightly moved the aim points away from the air bases and toward cities. 39 Similarly, the DPRK can target cities and gain military targets as a bonus. Seoul is the capital of South Korea and the base for the U.S. Yongsan Garrison. Pusan is South Korea s second largest city and home to one of the main ports the United States would use for an amphibious landing. Yokota Air Base, Yokosuka Naval Base, Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Camp Zama, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Office all vital strategic assets in the Pacific Theater are all located in parts of Tokyo. 40 Hawaii is the home of Pearl Harbor-Hickam Joint Base and the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. San Diego is the home port of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Washington D.C. is valuable for both counterforce and countervalue targeting. This suggests that the DPRK prioritizes cities first as targets, but chooses cities that include a secondary strategic military value as a bonus. On July 28, 2017, the DPRK tested a new ICBM that analysts claim can hit most of the U.S. mainland. 41 This further confirms that the DPRK is seeking a cities strategy first because an ICBM is not needed if the DPRK would only focus on regional military targets. The analysis of statements, propaganda, and missile development priorities, supports the claim that the DPRK is pursuing a nuclear strategy of manipulating risk. 33 Ellyatt, North Korea threatens nuclear strike on U.S., March 7, Hancocks, North Korea threatens war with U.S., March 29, Santora and Choe, North Korea Propaganda Video, February 5, Yuhas, North Korea nuclear threat, April 20, Berkowitz, Karklis, and Meko, North Korea showed off a lot of missiles, May 18, Mansourov, Kim Jong Un s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, December 16, Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Berkowitz, Karklis, and Meko, North Korea showed off a lot of missiles, May 18, Lewis, North Korea s Terrifying Reveal, July 28, The Pardee Periodical Journal of Global Affairs

81 DPRK Nuclear Strategy Command and Control The technical aspect of the DPRK s command and control structure is difficult to analyze, but assumptions can be made about policies based on statements from the DPRK and how the regime controls its citizens and military. According to state law, Kim Jong-un, as Supreme Commander, is the only person who can order the use of nuclear weapons to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes. 42 The DPRK s nuclear weapons are controlled by the Strategic Force, which is equal to other branches such as its air command and naval command; these subordinate commands are organized directly under the General Staff Department. (See below) 43 In addition to the command structure, in 2013, the DPRK s Supreme People s Assembly adopted the Nuclear Weapons State Law which states: Nuclear weapons are a self-defensive means of coping with the hostile policy of and nuclear threat from the United States. Nuclear weapons serve the purpose of deterring and repelling aggression and retaliating against enemies. The DPRK is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and retaliatory strike power in both quality and quantity. Nuclear weapons will only be used on the final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People s Army. Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapons states unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion of the DPRK. 44 The DPRK s nuclear weapons are centralized under the control of Kim Jong-un through formal laws and the Strategic Force. The regime strengthens its ability to keep nuclear weapons under centralized civilian control through purges and loyalty pledges that stress personal loyalty above competence. 45 Kim Jong-un has purged the military regularly since he took power in 2011 by eliminating numerous senior generals from Kim Jong-il s regime that could be potential leaders of military coups. This limits the DPRK in effectively pursuing a risk manipulation strategy because of its military posture and command structure. The DPRK trades its ability to 42 Choi and Grisafi, North Korea s nuclear force reshuffles its politics, February 11, Defense White Paper, Kim, North Korea s Nuclear Doctrine and Revisionist Strategy, Taylor, Kim Jong-un Is Having Serious Trouble, November 20, Fall 2017 Volume II, Issue 2 73