Africa Regional Summary

Transcription

1 Africa Regional Summary January 2016 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office:

2 Executive Summary The month of December witnessed a number of significant political developments in Sub- Saharan Africa. The much-delayed elections in CAR transpired peacefully, a historical achievement following the country s civil war. In Burkina Faso, President Kabore was sworn in and obtained the backing of a coalition of small parties. A political rapprochement was recorded in South Sudan, where a team of the opposition SPLM-IO movement arrived to Juba to lay the foundations of a transitional unity government despite President Kiir s controversial re-division of the country s territory. A proposed change to the municipal boundaries of Ethiopia s capital Addis Ababa sparked renewed large-scale protests in the Oromia Region. On a smaller scale, Uganda recorded a crackdown on campaigning events by challengers to President Museveni s reelection bid. In the DRC, a broad coalition was formed to oppose President Kabila s attempt to extend his stay in power. Tanzanian President Magufuli formed reduced the size of his new cabinet so as to limit public spending, while negotiations over the cancelled elections in Zanzibar persist. Sudan s National Dialogue was claimed to make HIGH significant RISK progress, yet the suppression of opposition, media and NGO activities continue. Meanwhile, alleged coup plotters were arrested in Niger ahead of elections in February While Somalia registered positive steps towards the holding of elections in 2016, al-shabaab intensified attacks in Mogadishu. The militant group also attacked northeastern Kenya, which experienced high alert levels during the holiday season. Similar threats led Mali to declare a state of emergency on December 21, while fighting between Islamist and Tuareg groups was recorded in the north. Meanwhile, a fake bomb on a plane departing from Mauritius raised concerns of militancy on the island, following the discovery of an Islamic State (IS) recruitment cell and an IS video urging Mauritians to join the group. IS-affiliated Boko Haram continued to strike the north of Cameroon, while neighboring Chad s increased security measures likely led 2 to Pa adecline g e in attacks. In Nigeria, President Buhari claimed a technical defeat of Boko Haram, yet shortly thereafter the group launched a series of major attacks in the northeast. The country also recorded tensions with its Shiite community following heavy clashes with security forces in Zaria, which reportedly killed at least dozens of people. Security forces in Burundi were accused of dozens of extrajudicial killings, following coordinated attacks against military bases in Bujumbura, following which at least 87 people were reported dead. 2Page Lastly, economic developments dominated events in southern Africa. The South African rand plummeted as the country s finance minister was replaced twice, while capital outflows led Mozambique to impose restrictions on international card payments. In Angola, a recent increase in kidnappings of Chinese nationals threatened to further impact foreign investment in the country. In turn, Beijing wrote off a Zimbabwean debt of 40 million USD after the country adopted the Chinese yuan as a legal tender.

3 The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name below. EXTREME RISK CAR... 5 Somalia... 6 South Sudan... 7 HIGH RISK Burundi... 8 DRC... 9 Mali Nigeria Sudan MEDIUM RISK Angola Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Ethiopia Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya Mozambique Niger Senegal South Africa Uganda Page

4 LOW RISK Equatorial Guinea Ghana Guinea-Bissau Mauritius Sierra Leone Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Notable Dates for January Page

5 EXTREME RISK CAR Repeatedly delayed constitutional referendum, elections transpire peacefully, marking historic accomplishment after country s civil war. We continue to advise against all travel to CAR at this time given extreme security risks and volatility resulting from militia activity and sectarian violence. If travel is unavoidable, it is advised to remain within the confines of the Bangui s Centre Ville. Elections transpire peacefully amid instances of localized violence Pope Francis visited Bangui in late November and called for reconciliation between Christians and Muslims in the country. The trip transpired peacefully, yet shortly after a Muslim was killed in Bangui s PK5 area, further highlighting persisting sectarian tensions. On December 4, Noureddine Adam, the former second-in-command of the Seleka rebel coalition and leader of the Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) group, stated he would not allow voting for the elections to take place in areas under his control. On December 13 the referendum on a new constitution witnessed violence in Bangui, while significant disruptions transpired throughout CAR, especially in FRPC-controlled areas. The new constitution was approved by an overwhelming 93 percent majority, yet only 38 percent of registered voters participated. The following day, Adam declared an autonomous state in CAR s northeast, named the Republic of Logone. This drew intense criticism from national authorities and the international community, and after a meeting with the representative for CAR of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Adam announced his support for elections and retracted his declaration of autonomy. This paved way for the peaceful transpiring on December 30 of the repeatedly delayed and much-awaited elections, with reports indicating a large turnout despite logistical difficulties. All in all, these developments highlight the fragility as well as the uncertainty which marred the prolonged transitional period in the country. While insecurity still characterizes the country, including the capital Bangui, transitional authorities along with UN Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) successfully completed the arduous task of organizing relatively free and fair elections, marking a historic achievement following the country s civil war. Moreover, the retraction of Adam as well as the notable absence of retaliatory large-scale violence following instances of violence in December may indicate a trend of relative relaxation of tensions and thus mark a turning page in the CAR. That said, reconciliation between segments of Central African society, the persisting insecurity in outlying regions, the grave humanitarian situation are all significant challenges that will face the winners of the first elections since the largescale conflict in the country. 5Page

6 EXTREME RISK Somalia Advances made regarding upcoming elections, formation of new federal state. Security efforts, US drone strikes countered by repeated targeting of Mogadishu. We advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying regions. Progress on electoral model, formation of new Hiran & Middle Shabelle State Two main political developments were recorded in December. The first was the reaching of an understanding regarding elections by the National Consultative Forum. While final details will be discussed in a conference in Kismayo on January 10, elections were set for 2016, with a mixed model whereby the composition of parliament will balance clan and constituency representation. Furthermore, while an electoral college will have voting powers in 2016, a commitment was reached for universal suffrage in Secondly, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud decreed on December 19 that Bulo-Burde would be the capital of the new federal state to be formed by the merger of Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions, and that Jowhar would host a conference on the state s formation in January. The electoral understandings reached thus far, while not finalized, are notable for ending speculation over an extension of the current administration s mandate, and also for committing to universal suffrage in In parallel, the formation of the new state in central Somalia would be an important step in the federalization of the country. Nevertheless, remaining tensions over the choice of the capital of the new state may delay this process. Lastly, we assess that already common inter-clan disputes, recorded this month in Marka, Beledweyne, and Buhodle, are liable to intensify since devolution of authority into federal states may increase regional power struggles. Mogadishu particularly hit by attacks, as US drone strikes target senior militant leaders Al-Shabaab continued conducting attacks throughout Somalia, and Mogadishu was particularly hit by assassinations and bombings, with an unofficial count of 34 people killed in December. Those targeted included UN and aid workers, security personnel, international troops, senior government officials, and journalists. Meanwhile, the US confirmed an airstrike on December 2 that killed senior al-shabaab leader Abdirahman Sandhere. A suspected US drone strike was also reported on December 22, allegedly killing another high-ranked militant. These US drone attacks, combined with another strike in November, seem to point to an intensification of involvement in counterinsurgency efforts in Somalia. Given a proven efficacy of the US in targeting senior militant leaders, this could further weaken the group in a time of ongoing efforts to displace them from their last remaining strongholds and of infighting between pro-al-qaeda and pro-islamic State factions. These circumstances likely raise al- Shabaab s motivation to demonstrate its strength, including by innovative means such as an alleged seaborne attack, thus maintaining the extreme militant threat level in the country. 6Page

7 EXTREME RISK Notable Dates South Sudan SPLM-IO members return to Juba, 28 states redivision decree implemented, as additional armed groups reinforce activity in Eastern and Western Equatoria states. It is advised to restrict travel to Juba at this time given persistent insecurity in outlying areas due to residual volatility from the ongoing internal conflict. 28 new state governors appointed by President Salva Kiir as rebel delegation arrives in Juba; general insecurity persists throughout country On December 21, 150 members of the advance team of the Sudan People s Liberation Movement In Opposition (SPLM-IO) arrived in Juba, a repeatedly postponed step to the formation of the transitional unity government that had been. However, three days later, the implementation of the 28 states redivision decree and the immediate appointment of new state governors was announced by President Salva Kiir. SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar condemned the declaration, yet a group official in Juba stated that it would not undermine the agreement. Furthermore, while none of the new governors comes from the rebel s ranks, Kiir is quoted as stating, during their sweating in ceremony, that the appointees in Unity and Upper Nile states should be ready for a replacement by an SPLM-IO governor. Additionally, the South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) rebel group, which split from the SPLM-IO and seized numerous localities in Eastern Equatoria State in early December, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government calling for peace negotiations between them. Separately, the Arrow Boys rebel group affiliated with the SPLM-IO claimed to control certain areas of Western Equatoria State. Both groups recorded several clashes with government forces during December. Meanwhile, the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was until July 2016, with the slated deployment of additional 1,100 peacekeepers. Separately, three significant incidents of intercommunal clashes were reported, more specifically in Abyei and Lakes State, allegedly leaving more than 37 people killed. Lastly, the US Embassy in Juba warned of risks to civil aviation in South Sudanese airspace due to the ongoing conflict. The restrained reaction of the rebels to the implementation of the 28 states decree is notable, since this issue was one of the biggest threats to the recently signed peace agreement. Furthermore, Kiir s comments regarding the appointment of SPLM-IO officials is likely aimed at ending disagreements over the redivision by ensuring that the previously agreed upon power sharing quotas in the former Unity and Upper Nile States will be respected. Nevertheless, the implementation of this step may still generate power struggles, which overall also remain likely ahead and after the formation of the transitional government. Meanwhile, other armed groups, such as the SSAF and the Arrow Boys, who feel left out of the peace deal, are attempting to strengthen their positions in order to equally obtain concessions from the government in their areas of influence. As ethnic groups continue to feel marginalized by the peace deal and the redivision of states, the likelihood of additional violence remains high over the coming weeks and months. 7Page

8 HIGH RISK Burundi Over 87 killed in crackdown after military bases attacked, marking escalation in violence. President Nkurunziza rejects AU peacekeepers as dialogue efforts face early setbacks. Travel to Burundi should be restricted to essential purposes only given the volatile security situation while avoiding all travel to outlying areas and those in the capital prone to opposition unrest, including the Cibitoke, Jabe, Kanyosha, Musaga, Mutakura, Ngagara and Nyakabiga neighborhoods. Coordinated attacks on military installations leave at least 87 dead on December 11 Simultaneous attacks were reportedly carried out against military barracks in Ngagara and Muha districts of Bujumbura, as well as the Higher Institute of Military Cadres (ISCAM) in Musaga and an outpost in Mujejuru, Bujumbura Rural Province. International rights organizations allege that 150 people remain missing and 154 died, contrasting official reports of 87 killed, among which 79 insurgents. The coordination, scale and choice of military targets, point to the involvement of dissident factions within the security establishment, particularly given the military s increasing ethnic and political divides. Bujumbura experienced a period of relative calm after a crackdown immediately after the December 11 attacks, until recent reports of police operations and localized unrest in Mutakura, Cibitoke and Ngagara. We assess that this lull can likely be attributed to the severity of the security response, as well as scaled-back police operations amidst heightened scrutiny of government actions and the threat of international intervention to quell the violence. In outlying regions, opposition officials continued to be targeted, reflecting the geographic scope and political nature of ongoing violence. Such incidents include the arrest of the vice president of the Movement for Solidarity and Development (MSD) party in Karuzi Province on December 23, a failed assassination attempt on a Union for National Progress (UPRONA) party official in Kirundo Province on December 20, and the killing of the president of the local MSD branch in Gitega Province on December 19. Government rejects African Union (AU) peacekeeper deployment as Uganda-mediated dialogue begins amidst setbacks over participation, date of commencement of negotiations On the political level, the December 11 violence was the likely trigger event for the AU Peace and Security Council proposal to deploy 5,000 peacekeepers to Burundi, which was promptly rejected by the Nkurunziza government. Such a deployment faces significant hurdles, namely UN Security Council approval and a two-thirds majority vote by AU heads of state given Burundi s opposition. Meanwhile, Ugandan President Museveni began dialogue talks in Kampala on December 29, amid government threats of a boycott if alleged coup leaders were included and a rejection of January 6 as the start date for substantive negotiations. Given Museveni s ineffectual mediation efforts to date, coupled with the deadlock over Nkurunziza s political future, we assess a political compromise is likely to remain elusive. 8Page

9 HIGH RISK Notable Dates DRC 'Citizens Front 2016' coalition unites factions opposed to President Kabila s attempts to extend his rule. Counterinsurgency offensive in North Kivu Province prompts uptick in ADF rebel attacks. Travel to Kinshasa and Lubumbashi can continue at this time while adhering to necessary security protocols regarding criminal activity. We advise against nonessential travel to outlying areas, given the high levels of criminality and insecurity from armed groups. 'Citizens Front 2016' coalition unites 27 opposition, civil society leaders against Kabila s rule; reflects more concerted movement yet threat to political stability largely unchanged The issue of President Kabila s tenure in power, faced with constitutional term limits prohibiting him from running in elections slated for November 2016, has been a source of political instability, intermittent protests and harsh security crackdowns over the past year. However, the opposition movement has suffered from internal divides, particularly between the main Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) opposition party and the Opposition Dynamic (DO) coalition of 20 other parties and civil society groups. For example, the UDPS has intermittently engaged in Kabila s dialogue on electoral issues, which the DO coalition boycotts, and it has refused to back DO-led anti-kabila protests. In this context, the formation on December 19 of the Citizens Front 2016 coalition, which includes the head of the UDPS party as well as the popular former Governor of Katanga Province Moise Katumbi, constitutes a notable development in uniting different opposition factions. That said, the coalition has not yet called for protests and details remain scarce as to its general plan of action. Moreover, in the face of increasingly harsh security crackdowns and arrests of Kabila s critics, the opposition camp has not succeeded in mobilizing significant protests since demonstrations in Kinshasa s Sainte Therese Square on September 15. As such, in the absence of a trigger such as the announcement of further delays in the electoral calendar, or signs of a more assertive grassroots mobilization against Kabila, the coalition does not, in and of itself, significantly increase the threat of political instability and unruly protests in the immediate future. UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) intensify operations against ADF rebels near Beni, North Kivu, triggering backlash While rebel attacks are not uncommon in the insecure eastern DRC, there was a moderate uptick in Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks over the past month. Such attacks on civilian or FARDC targets were reported near Beni on December 13, 24 and 26, following heavy clashes in Eringeti on November 29 with MONUSCO and FARDC that left at least 23 people dead. Additional reprisal attacks by the resilient ADF fighters, particularly against soft civilian targets, are likely to be recorded near Beni, despite the ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. 9Page

10 HIGH RISK Notable Dates Mali Islamist militants target Tuareg, military positions in Kidal Region amid increasing competition over smuggling routes, broader regional challenge posed by Islamic State (IS). Travel to Bamako may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy. Islamist militants carry out several attacks targeting MNLA Tuareg rebels in north amid announcements of security warnings, state of emergency due to Islamist threat Following the killing of 22 mostly foreign nationals at Bamako s Radisson Blu Hotel on November 20, in an attack claimed by both the al-mourabitoun and Macina Liberation Front (MLF) Islamist groups, Mali has been under a heightened state of alert. On December 21, the Malian Ministerial Council declared a ten-day nationwide state of emergency, later extended for three months, citing recent threats by Islamist groups and an alleged meeting of top jihadists in the northern Kidal region. This also follows a security message by the US Embassy in Bamako on December 12 warning of potential militant attacks against Westerners during the holiday season, citing specific threats against Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu. In spite of these enhanced security measures, as well as ongoing French-led counterinsurgency operations, several attacks were carried out by Islamist militant groups from December These included a December 13 ambush of a military outpost in Niono, Segou Region, a December 24 attack leaving at least six National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) members dead in the Kidal Region near the Algerian border, and the subsequent killing of four MNLA members of a reinforcement convoy in the remote border village of Talahandak. The sustained targeting of MNLA positions represents a new development in Mali s restive northern regions, in which Islamists have historically targeted international and government forces. Several motivating factors may be behind this shift, such as the MNLA s perceived support and assistance to international crusaders following the signing of a peace deal with government forces, as well as competition over lucrative smuggling routes and control of strategic border towns. Moreover, the high-profile Bamako attacks and increased recent activity also point to significant efforts aimed at demonstrating their continued strength and relevance in the Islamist militant landscape amid the regional challenge posed by IS in Africa. By way of context, the al-qaeda-is rivalry has triggered internal clashes within the Somali-based al-shabaab militant group, and Nigeria s Boko Haram has pledged its allegiance to IS, referring to itself as the Islamic State - West Africa Province. We therefore assess that the Islamist militant groups motivation and threat level remain high across Mali s north and east regions, with an underlying threat of further attacks in Bamako. 10Page

11 HIGH RISK Nigeria Despite government claim of victory, Boko Haram remains deadly in northeastern Nigeria. Volatile relations with Shiite community erupt in Zaria, Kaduna State. Arrest of leader is likely to act as a rallying cry for protests over coming weeks. Travel to Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance for militancy and crime and following general security protocols. Buhari s claim of technical victory against Boko Haram challenged in series attacks On December 24, President Muhammadu Buhari claimed the battle against Boko Haram had been technically won. According to Buhari, a threat remains from improvised explosive device (IED) and suicide attacks in Borno State, yet Boko Haram no longer possesses the capacity to attack security forces or population centers. In a series of attacks in the days that followed, Boko Haram appeared set to prove its resilient capacity and thus discrediting the government claims. Most notably, large scale attacks took place in Borno State capital Maiduguri and Adamawa State s Madagali on December While casualty counts vary widely, some local sources are cited as describing 80 dead in the multiple attacks. Should this resurgence of Boko Haram attacks continue, it is useful to note that the group likely wields operational infrastructure in key cities in the northern and middle belt regions of Nigeria, such as Kano and Jos. To a lesser extent, some evidence point towards militant presence in Lagos and Abuja, where an attack remains a distinct possibility. Members of Shiite community clash with security forces in Zaria, Kaduna State On December 12-13, clashes took place between Nigerian army troops and members of the Shiite community in the city of Zaria, Kaduna State. Sources, citing local hospital officials, indicate that as many as 60 people may have been killed in the clashes. In a press statement, the army has claimed that unrest ensued after Shiites tried to assassinate the Chief of Army Staff in Zaria on December 12. Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, a prominent Shiite cleric and leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), was reportedly detained following the clashes. According to the IMN, Zakzaky is still in custody as of December 31. On December 15, thousands of Shiite Muslims reportedly protested in Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi and Kebbi states, calling for his release and denouncing the recent killings. Smaller scale protests have been reported during the remainder of the month, including in Niger and Yobe states. This is not the first such instance of deadly clashes between Zaria s Shiite community and the Nigerian security forces. In the immediate term, the continued detention of Zakzaky may serve as a rallying cry for greater Shiite mobilization, increasing the threat that protests calling for his release will be met with forcible crackdowns over the coming weeks. More broadly, it increases the volatility of relations with the Shiite minority in Nigeria, which carry the potential to deteriorate into an additional source of sectarian violence in the country. 11Page

12 HIGH RISK Notable Dates Sudan Political crackdown on opposition, media and NGOs amidst ongoing National Dialogue underscores low chances of increased freedoms. Travel to Khartoum may continue while adhering to stringent security protocols regarding the threat of criminality. Crackdown on opposition, media and non-governmental organization (NGOs) persists, as National Dialogue extended, talks with SPLM-N deemed constructive Over the past month several instances of political intolerance towards opposition movements were reported. On November 30, security forces dispersed an opposition protest outside Khartoum s Ministry of Justice. In addition, on December 9, Sudanese security agents prevented a protest organized by the opposition Sudanese Republican Party (SPR) from taking place in Khartoum, with two protesters reportedly being arrested. Moreover, President Omar al-bashir issued a statement warning local media outlets against government criticism, while the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) seized copies of two local newspaper in Khartoum and arrested two of their chief editors, who may now face the death penalty. Additionally, the offices of a UKbased NGO in Nierteti locality of Central Darfur were reportedly raided by security forces, who seized the equipment and detained staff members. Meanwhile, the chairman of the ongoing National Dialogue between pro-government and opposition parties claimed the reaching of a unanimous agreement regarding the drafting a new constitution adhering to the principles of good governance. Another member of the dialogue is cited as claiming that the success of the meetings had exceeded 85 [percent]. Moreover, the talks were extended indefinitely, despite a previously stated January 10 deadline. However, despite the announced progress, most of the main opposition parties have rejected participation in dialogue and have remained outside the ongoing talks. Separately, informal talks in mid-december between the government and Sudan People s Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N) rebels reportedly led to broad understandings, following a deadlock in official talks in November. That said, the rebel group claimed to have confronted government forces on December 3, 6-8, 19 and 28. The abovementioned crackdown on the opposition and the media and NGOs reflects the continued persecution to those perceived as a threat to Bashir s regime, as well as the severe limitations on press freedom in Sudan. Meanwhile, the raid on the NGO s office, the last in a series of similar incidents, is further indicative of general intolerance towards foreign aid organizations, which are often perceived as critical of the government. Given this repressive precedent, the absence of major opposition parties in the National Dialogue, and despite the alleged success of the national dialogue, we assess that a significant move toward greater personal and institutional liberties remains unlikely. Therefore, the political landscape in Sudan is likely to remain unchanged in the foreseeable future. 12Page

13 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Angola Latest multiple kidnaps of Chinese nationals may threaten country s investment in Angola. Shortage of local kwanza currency, USD recorded in Uige northwestern Province Travel to Luanda can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions. China threatens to reduce investments following wave of abductions of Chinese nationals According to reports released on December 2, the Angolan police is investigating an ongoing trend of abduction of Chinese citizens. During the two months preceding the report, 11 people were reportedly abducted in the capital Luanda, six of whom were Chinese nationals. Sources citing the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Angola claimed that the current financial setback in Angola, a result of the ongoing low oil prices, led to an increase in the number of kidnappers who demand high ransoms of up to 750,000 USD. In this context, Chinese officials have reportedly indicated that a continuation of this trend, with local authorities failing to secure the safety of Chinese nationals, may have a significant impact on the future of Chinese investments in Angola. While this may pressure Angolan authorities to increase efforts to curb the abduction of foreigners, the threat to Chinese and other foreign nationals is set to continue at this time, as many of the underlying factors facilitating the phenomena remain unchanged. Uige Province suffers shortage of kwanza (AOA), USD in banks Sources from December 16 indicate that a shortage in kwanza and USD currencies in the northwestern Uige Province led to long queues in ATMs. The reason behind the shortage has not been disclosed, yet some sources indicated that it is a result of the high demand for money during the current holiday season. This development follows the Angolan Association of Banks (ABANC) announcement from November 5 regarding continued restrictions on withdrawals of foreign currency as well a previous devaluation of the Kwanza in order to halt its weakening. While the holiday season may represent a reasonable explanation for the aforementioned shortage of money, we assess that the situation may have been exacerbated by the ongoing economic crisis in Angola, as highlighted by the abovementioned restrictions and devaluation of the kwanza. More broadly, multiple reports suggest that limited access to USD is experienced by business across the country and in various industries, further underscoring that scarcity is not limited to Uige Province, and that holiday season demand is not its sole contributing factor. 13Page

14 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Burkina Faso Burkina Faso faces new challenges as President-elect Kabore sworn in, forms a new governing coalition. Travel to Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso may continue at this time while adhering to standard security precautions regarding crime. Burkina Faso faces new challenges as President-elect Kabore sworn in, formed a governing coalition After the peaceful conduction of the first general elections in Burkina Faso after former President Compaore was ousted during the 2014 Burkinabe uprising and the turbulent transitional period that followed it, President-elect Roch Christian Marc Kabore was sworn in on December 29. His People's Movement for Progress (MPP) party garnered 55 of the 127 parliamentary seats, being followed by Diabre s Union for Progress and Change s (UPC) party, which received 33 seats, and by the former ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) party, which got 18 seats. Due to ideological differences and UPC s interest to lead the opposition, Kabore could not rely on the runner-up to form a coalition. Furthermore, it was also not in his interest to form a coalition with Compaore s CDP party, given that, despite a shared history and ideologies, this would come at a great political cost. This is mainly since the MPP s campaign was based on a message of change and the party counted on the support of those who partook in the Burkinabe uprising. Therefore, the MPP turned to small parties in order to garner the nine additional seats necessary to form a majority at the National Assembly. In this context, on December 28, a parliamentary group called Burkindlim, comprising seven minor parties that hold 14 parliamentary seats, was announced in support of Kabore, thus guaranteeing him a governing majority. Nevertheless, a reliance on an eight-party coalition with only a slight majority during Kabore s five-year mandate may signify a set of obstacles to governing the country in its new democratic phase. Kabore is expected to tackle Burkina Faso s severe social and economic problems, altering the country s status quo. However, the current optimistic atmosphere can easily morph into disillusionment should Kabore not fulfill the unrealistic near-term expectations held by the population. If this is the case, and considering Burkina Faso s unstable political history and the notable achievements of popular movements in the 2014 Burkinabe uprising, new protest movements may arise and thus potentially have an adverse effect on stability. 14Page

15 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Cameroon Boko Haram continues to target border locales in Extreme North Region, as Cameroonian troops are accused of indiscriminate killings in Nigeria s Borno State. Travel to Douala and Yaounde may continue, while refraining from nonessential travel to outlying areas, and avoiding all travel to the Extreme North Region due to Boko Haram activity and the eastern border areas due to risks of cross-border militia violence. Boko Haram continues to target border communities, Cameroonian troops accused of killing over 200 Nigerian villagers in cross border incursion Throughout December, the Islamist militant sect Boko Haram continued to attack locales in Cameroon s North Extreme Region, using Female Suicide bombers and armed raids. Notable attacks were recorded in Waza, Gouzoudou, Kolofata and Nguetchewe, all situated in close proximity to the Nigerian border. The continuation of Boko Haram attacks, even at a lower scale than in previous months, outlines the Islamist sect s expanded theater of operations in Cameroon. Together with Chad s Lac Region and the southern parts of Niger s Diffa Region, the Extreme North Region represents the regional reach of the Nigerian based militant group, over and above northeastern Nigeria. In parallel, severe allegations of indiscriminate killings in Nigerian territory were made against the Cameroonian forces. Local Nigerian sources alleged that Cameroonian troops killed over 200 villagers in two different incidents on November 30 and December 20, near the town of Banki and in Kirawa-Jimni village respectively, both situated in Borno State. The alleged killings reportedly took place following a cross border operations against Boko Haram members fleeing from the Extreme North Region. Cameroonian forces have denied the allegations. While neither the details of the incidents nor the death toll can be corroborated, we assess that the similarity of descriptions provided in both incidents, as well as their geographic proximity (Kirawa is located less than 30 km southwest of Banki), increase the likelihood that Cameroonian forces are operating in the area, and may be prone to use indiscriminate force. This highlights the still lacking cooperation in the counterinsurgency efforts against the militant sect, which has plagued the regional campaign from its outset. In addition, it is indicative of the likely growing difficulty in distinguishing Boko Haram fighters from the surrounding civilian population, particularly in uncharted territory across the border. Such difficulty is particularly acute as the sect cements a return to his militant and guerilla-style tactical roots. 15Page

16 MEDIUM RISK Chad Overall decline in Boko Haram attacks reported in Lake Chad region likely due to increased security measures although underlying threat against Bol and smaller villages remains. Travel to N Djamena and Mondou may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security measures regarding potential militant attacks, civil unrest. Boko Haram s attempt to reach Lac Region capital shows desire to attack symbolic targets amid overall decline in number of militant attacks near Lake Chad Throughout December there has been a continued decrease in reports of Boko Haram attacks in the vicinity of Lake Chad following the declaration of a state of emergency in the Lac Region on November 9. Nevertheless, on December 5 at least 30 were reportedly killed following suicide bomb attacks on a weekly market in the Lake Chad island of Koulfoua. Moreover, four Boko Haram militants detonated suicide bombs after being intercepted by locals on their way from the Lake Chad island of Yogo to a weekly market in Bol, the capital of the Lac Region. Three of the attackers were killed with no other casualties reported. Despite the reported incidents, Lake Chad continues to record a gradual but notable decrease in militant activity, particularly as compared with the six attacks over a 30-day period prior to the state of emergency. We continue to assess that this decline can be partially attributed to increased security measures in the Lac Region, particularly in light of the withdrawal of 5,000 Chadian troops from Cameroon. We further assess the political capital invested by President Deby in the Lake Chad region, through his public declarations, state of emergency and the disbursement of around 4.8 million USD for local development projects, are likely to result in a continued security focus in the area and corresponding decline in the risk of attacks. Nevertheless, given the porous borders and marshy terrain in the vast Lake Chad region, the underlying threat of further militant attacks remains. With this in mind, the aforementioned attempt to attack the Lac Region capital of Bol also showcases a tangible attempt to target the most symbolically and strategically important city within the Lake Chad Region itself, rendering it vulnerable to further attempts by Boko Haram militants. 16Page

17 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Ethiopia Wave of protests in Oromia Region harshly cracked down upon by security forces amid highly disputed death toll, yet movement fails to affect capital Addis Ababa. Travel to Addis Ababa may continue while adhering to general security protocols with regards to risk of civil unrest and the underlying threat of militant attacks. Wave of unruly protests affects Oromia Region, subsides after harsh crackdown Numerous locations in Oromia Region were affected by demonstrations of varying sizes and levels of unrest, aimed at opposing the Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Plan (IRDP), also called the Master Plan, which seeks to include more than 30 neighboring towns from Oromia in the capital s expanded administrative area. Beginning on November 19, the protests expanded in size and geographic reach, and were transpiring on a daily basis during the first weeks of December, having allegedly affected over 100 locations. During the height of demonstrations, the Oromia Regional State government affirmed that the Master Plan would not be implemented without a consensus of the public. The protests prompted a significant increase in the deployment of security forces use of harsh forcible dispersal measures, allegedly including the use of tear gas and live ammunition. According to Bekele Nega, a leader of the opposition Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), at least 86 people have been killed since November, while government minister Getachew Reda claimed on December 14 that only five people had been confirmed as killed, a number that has yet to be updated. Additionally, sources affiliated with the opposition have claimed that authorities are disrupting communication networks, that an unofficial curfew is in place, and that security forces are conducting large-scale arrest operations throughout the region. Unconfirmed reports from December 28 claim that the number of arrested individuals surpasses 4,000, yet this cannot be corroborated. Furthermore, sources claim that tensions surfaced between the Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization (OPDO) and other members of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition. Lastly, opposition parties attempted to capitalize on the Oromia unrest and conduct a protest in Addis Ababa on December 27, yet such attempts were unsuccessful. The Oromia protests underscore persistent tensions with regards to the Master Plan, which is perceived as a land grab that will affect the livelihoods of local farmers. Underlying this immediate reason are longstanding perceptions of marginalization by authorities vis-à-vis the Oromo, which constitute the country s largest ethnic group. Thus, we assess that a consensus on the issue will not be achieved in the near term. Nevertheless, authorities are likely to eventually carry out the plan despite its alleged suspension. Overall, we assess that the heavy security crackdown, which is characteristic of the government s response to dissent, is the main reason that the movement has subsided. Such measures are likely to continue in order to suppress the wave of demonstrations and deter other ethnic groups from embarking on protests of their own. 17Page

18 MEDIUM RISK Guinea WHO declares country as Ebola-free after 42-day period with no new cases, potential for additional cases remains. President Alpha Conde appoints Mamady Youla to head new government. Travel to Conakry may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to general security protocols. As a general security precaution, we advise to avoid all large gatherings and protests given the associated security risks. World Health Organization (WHO) declares country Ebola-free yet potential for additional cases remains On December 29, the country obtained the Ebola-free status after completing a 42-day period with no new cases, with the last case being recorded on November 1. According to the WHO, the country will now enter a 90-day of heightened monitoring in order to identify any potential new outbreaks during that period. In total, there have been 3,804 Ebola cases in the country and 2,536 deaths since the virus emerged in the remote village of Meliandou in December All in all, these developments highlight the significant efforts by Guinean authorities, WHO, aid agencies as well as health professionals to being declared Ebola-free. That said, emerging research indicates that a new form of transmission of the virus may persist beyond the 42-day incubation period. In line with this, Liberia was declared Ebola-free both in May and September, yet recorded subsequent cases of the disease. Therefore, we continue to assess that while the declaration of Guinea as an Ebola-free country marks a notable and encouraging development, there remains the potential for additional cases to emerge during the 90-day heightened vigilance period. President Alpha Conde appoints Mamady Youla as new Prime Minister On December 26, President Conde appointed Mamady Youla, a 54 year old economist who worked for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was the CEO of an international mining firm operating in Guinea, and held government positions in recent years. Youla replaced Mohamed Said Fofana who resigned a few days prior in unclear circumstances. Meanwhile, Cellou Dalein Diallo, leader of the main opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), welcomed Youla s appointment. Another opposition leader, Sydia Toure, of the third largest party Union of Republican Forces (UFR), expressed his inclination to cooperate with the new government. In line with his background in the private sector, Youla s appointment may be an attempt to encourage foreign investment in the country. In addition, while tensions between Conde and Diallo will likely persist, the positive comments as well as Toure s statements regarding potential cooperation may indicate the commencement of positive relationship between the newly formed government and the opposition that would bring to a soothing of political tensions in the near term. 18Page

19 MEDIUM RISK Ivory Coast Attack on military base in Olodio underscores porous border with Liberia, insecurity in southwestern regions. Travel to Abidjan may continue, while maintaining heightened vigilance for crime and social unrest. Military base in southwestern region attacked by unknown gunmen, additional violence, highlight insecurity in area During the early morning hours of December 2, at least 15 unidentified gunmen launched an attack on a military base in Olodio, situated roughly 380 km west of Abidjan in Bas-Sassandra District s Tabou Department and 10 km east of the Liberian border. The troops returned fire and heavy clashes took place for about an hour. As a result, six soldiers and four assailants were killed while six assailants were also captured. On December 8, UN Operation in Cote D Ivoire (ONUCI) exchanged gunfire with suspected armed robbers in the same district. Lastly, Liberian authorities reportedly arrested three people allegedly recruiting young Ivoirians, living in refugee camps in Liberia s Grand Gedeh County, to carry out attacks in neighboring Ivory Coast. Following the post-electoral violence in the Ivory Coast, thousands of supporters of former President Laurent Gbagbo fled the country to neighboring Liberia. These events highlight the insecurity plaguing large swathes of area adjacent to Liberia s border. While the Olodio clashes remain the most severe recent incident, clashes also broke out between troops and unknown gunmen in the nearby town of Grabo on at least three occasions in January and February. Moreover, in 2014, several attacks on military and other targets as well as numerous roadside robberies occurred in the region. The Olodio incident as well as the exchanges of gunfire with ONUCI troops highlight the audacity of these unknown armed groups operating in the region but may also underscore their tactical inexperience. While it remains possible that they may be partially financed by elements aiming to destabilize the porous border region for political means, we maintain our assessment that the gunmen, likely marginalized Ivoirian youth from harsh refugee camps in Liberia, are primarily criminally motivated. All in all, as highlighted by the irregular interval between the attacks allegedly carried out by the armed men, we assess that the threat of intermittent violence in these restive border areas will likely persistent for the foreseeable future. 19Page

20 MEDIUM RISK Kenya High alert of militant attacks as Inspector General of Police claims al-shabaab in Kenya has split into two groups, including a pro-islamic State faction. Travel to Nairobi and Mombasa may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security protocols due to high levels of criminality. Security alerts issued, militant attacks rise as al-shabaab allegedly splits into two factions Throughout December several security alerts were issued in regards to various regions in Kenya amid concerns of multiple attacks being carried out by militant elements, particularly infiltrators from Somalia. The northeastern counties of Lamu and Mandera recorded numerous attacks by suspected al-shabaab militants, mainly against security forces, but also against civilian targets in the latter county. Moreover, several attacks involved the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Furthermore, on December 25, Inspector General of Police Joseph Boinnet announced that militants operating in the northeast have split into two groups, with a pro-islamic State (IS) faction operating in Mandera County and al-shabaab operating from within the Boni Forest, which covers areas of Garissa and Lamu counties. Additional alerts were issued in other regions of the country, including in regards to Nairobi, Mombasa and the western counties of Kakamega, Bungoma, Busia and Vihiga during the festive season. In conjunction, increased security measures nationwide were announced by officials. Moreover, on December 20 an improvised explosive device (IED) was discovered in a catholic church in the town of Kutus, located in Kirinyaga County, yet at this time criminal motivations seem more likely than militancy. Separately, sources quote Interior Cabinet Secretary Joseph Nkaissery as stating on December 22 that security forces had thwarted hundreds of al-shabaab attacks in The reported uptick of IED and armed attacks in Lamu and Mandera counties underline Boinnet s announced split among the militants and his warning of an increased likelihood of attacks. In line with this, we assess that both militant groups are attempting to showcase their operational capabilities for the sake of prestige and attracting recruits. As a consequence, we assess that the upsurge of militant attacks in the northeast, which remains the most prominently threatened region of the country, is likely to be recorded. Nevertheless, the multiple security warnings regarding other regions of the country highlight an increased militant threat in areas where al-shabaab has been less active. In line with this, we assess that the potential exists for attacks in other areas of Kenya, including in the capital Nairobi and in Mombasa, yet increased vigilance by security forces will continue to play a role in mitigating this threat, even if Nkaissery s claims of the foiling of hundreds of attacks not being independently corroborated. 20Page

21 MEDIUM RISK Mozambique Dhlakama threatens to seize territory as the warring sides diverge on international mediation. Use of national credit, debit card for international payments to be to be restricted beginning January 1, 2015 Travel to Mozambique may continue while adhering to stringent security protocols, and refraining from nonessential travel to outlying areas. Notwithstanding Dhlakama threats to seize territory, opposition seeks mediation in hope that international actors will pressure government On December 17, Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the opposition Renamo movement, threatened that he would seize central and northern provinces by March or April without firing a shot. Dhlakama was referencing areas considered as opposition strongholds, yet given his previous threats to forcefully assume control of areas in the country that did not materialized, and his general aggressive rhetoric, we assess that full-scale fighting between the two sides remain unlikely. Instead, this is better understood as an additional facet of the ongoing indirect process towards negotiations between Renamo and the ruling Frelimo party. The most pressing disagreement between the two sides at this time is whether they should enter direct negotiations or use mediation. On December 21, Renamo spokesperson cited an October letter to President Nyusi which recommended South African President Jacob Zuma as a mediator due to his success in resolving Zimbabwe s 2009 election crisis. The Catholic Church has also been proposed by the opposition given its contribution to reaching the 1992 peace agreement. Former Frelimo heads of state met with President Filipe Nyusi on December 18 and urged him to resume a direct dialogue between Renamo and the government. We assess that the opposition seeks mediation in the hope that an international actor will be better positioned to pressure the government into concessions so as to resolve the current stalemate. In his insistence on direct negotiations, Nyusi likely seeks to avoid such pressure. International purchases with Mozambican credit, debit cards to be restricted from January 1 The Bank of Mozambique (BM) announced on December 7 that international payments using Mozambican credit and debit cards will be restricted beginning on January 1, According to the statement, international payments of both individuals and companies will be limited to 700,000 Mozambican Meticais (MZN), approximately 15,900 USD, per year per entity. Furthermore, the BM stated that the aim of the measure is to halt the overuse of such cards given their role in capital outflow and financial crimes. Given the relatively low limit imposed by the bank, we assess that individuals and firms in Mozambique are likely to experience significant disruptions to their activities. Moreover, we assess that the move is likely aimed at preventing a depreciation of the local currency in the already difficult financial situation in the country. 21Page

22 MEDIUM RISK Niger Uptick in arrests of alleged coup plotters, opposition activists mark increasing crackdown by security forces ahead of elections in February Travel to Niamey may continue at this time, while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to stringent security precautions given the threat of militancy and crime. Arrests of alleged coup leaders, journalists, opposition activists reflects President Issoufou s attempts to marginalize political opponents, strengthen grip on power ahead of elections On December 17, President Mahamadou Issoufou announced that his government had arrested alleged coup plotters who planned to seize control of state institutions through use of aerial firepower, including senior military officers. Separately, on December 9, Niger s Supreme Court rejected the bail application of opposition leader Hama Amadou, the leader of the opposition Moden Fa Lumana (MFL) party who has been detained on baby-trafficking charges since returning to Niger on November 14. Moreover, since the President s announcement of the foiled coup attempt, sources indicate that additional arrests of journalists and five members of the MFL party were carried out on undisclosed charges. Additionally, Hama Amadou was reported undergoing questioning by security forces in connection with the coup attempt. Lastly, sources from December 29 indicate that experts from the Intergovernmental Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) would conduct an audit of the voter lists for the February 2016 elections, fulfilling one of the demands of the opposition National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) party leader Seyni Oumarou. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) had reportedly requested OIF assistance following the December 12 decision of the opposition Republic Patriotic Front (FPR) coalition, which includes both Oumarou, Amadou and expresident Mahamane Ousmane, to suspend of its participation in the joint audit committee, citing the lack of time and experts in the government s audit plan. The aforementioned series of arrests against military officers, journalists and opposition figures underscore President Issoufou s attempts to strengthen his grip on power in the midst of rising political tensions and instability ahead of the February 2016 elections. While Oumarou s acceptance of the Francophonie audit of the voter list partially reduces political tensions and the risk of unrest, he only represents one faction of the FPR opposition camp. The potential nevertheless remains for other opposition parties and civil society groups to launch protests related to other electoral issues, such as the alleged progovernment leanings of CENI. Moreover, there remains an ongoing risk of supporters of arrested presidential aspirant Amadou and the five MFL officials to demonstrate against their ongoing detention, particularly should Amadou not be granted bail during his hearing on January Page

23 MEDIUM RISK Senegal International corruption controversy heightens political tensions between President Macky Sall s government, opposition Democratic Party of Senegal (PDS). Travel to Dakar may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to general security protocols. International corruption controversy heightens political tensions between President Macky Sall s government, opposition PDS On December 18, a prominent French newspaper published statements by Lamine Diack, a known Senegalese public figure and President of the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) arrested in France in November, in which he alleges that Russian bribes were paid in return for covering positive drug tests. These illegal funds were allegedly used in order to finance opposition against then Senegalese President and PDS leader Abdoulaye Wade in the 2012 presidential and legislative elections. Following these allegations, the PDS issued a press statement on December 18 accusing incumbent President Sall of financing his electoral campaign with dirty money and called for the immediate and unconditional release of incarcerated Karim Wade, son of Abdoulaye Wade, who is serving a six-year prison sentence for corruption charges. The day following the publishing of the PDS s communique, Oumar Sarr, the Adjoin Secretary General and second in command of the PDS, was arrested for spreading false information. In addition to Sarr's arrest, several journalists were also called for questioning by authorities. These events highlight the underlying political tensions between Macky Sall's administration and the opposition PDS. While these tensions have simmered during Karim Wade's trial and arrest, they have relatively relaxed in recent months. We assess that while the allegations against the then-opposition against Abdoulaye Wade remain vague and unspecific, the PDS is attempting to capitalize on these developments to garner political capital and potentially mobilize its supporters. That said, no protests have yet been called for by the PDS, despite their capacity to mobilize supporters and stage wellattended protests in Dakar. Separately, the relatively harsh response by Sall's government may indicate their concerns and attempts to reduce the exposure of these allegations. All in all, while these developments may lead to the mobilization of PDS supporters, we continue to assess that a significant uptick in political tensions, potentially resulting in violence, remains unlikely in the near-term. 23Page

24 MEDIUM RISK South Africa Rand plummets to record lows after appointment of a new finance minister. Unruly protest, strenuous relations continue to plague mining sector. Travel to Pretoria, Johannesburg and Cape Town can continue as normal while adhering to heightened vigilance against possible criminality. Reshuffling of finance ministers leads to currency falling, anti-zuma demonstrations On the Day of Reconciliation holiday on December 16, thousands of demonstrators marched in the streets of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria and several other cities against President Jacob Zuma s perceived corrupt practices. The protest, named Zuma Must Fall, was organized by the civil society group Unite Against Corruption and was aimed at demanding Zuma s resignation following a turmoil at the Finance Minister s Office. While expressions of public dissatisfaction over President Zuma s alleged corrupt acts have been common over recent years, the mobilization witnessed on December 16 underscores a deep mistrust among some segments of the population. The immediate trigger for the multiple demonstrations was the plummeting of the South African rand (ZAR) to historic lows against the USD, after Zuma fired Minister of Finance Nhalanhla Nene on December 9. It is thought that Nene was removed for his refusal to accommodate the state-bailed South African Airways (SAA) new aircrafts deal, as well as voicing opposition to Zuma s push for South Africa to obtain costly nuclear plants. Initially, David van Rooyen, a relatively unexperienced and less known parliamentarian, was appointed to the position, yet he too was removed following public pressure. On December 13, Pravin Gordhan, who served as the finance minister during , was appointed, in a move that is said to have eased investor concerns. Gordhan upheld Nene s stand regarding the SAA deal, and thus defied a close Zuma ally. Unruly protest, strenuous relations continue to plague mining sector On December 18, local residents reportedly protested along the R71 road near the town of Phalaborwa, in the Limpopo Province. The participants, who allegedly threw stones on passing vehicles and set cars ablaze, reportedly denounced the hiring procedures of a mining company operating in the area, calling for more locals to be hired. While the Phalaborwa protests remained localized, tensions relating to the mining sector in South Africa, concerning local communities as well as workers unions, remained a contentious issue over the past month. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), for example, threatened to hold a march and commence a nationwide strike over the potential closure of the Arnot Coal Mine near Middelburg in Mpumalanga Province, which would have resulted in the loss of 1,700 jobs. Most notably, a South African multinational mining cooperation, which maintains the largest share of its operations in the country, have announced that it would scale down more than half of its global operations. It can be expected that South Africa will experience much of the burden of these layoffs, further straining relations in the country s instrumental mining sector. 24Page

25 MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates Uganda Crackdown on opposition activities recorded amid ongoing campaign period for February 2016 general elections, trend likely to persist in January. Travel to Kampala may continue while adhering to general security protocols with regards to the threat from criminal elements. Mbabazi s security chief detained, as opposition s campaign facilities raided by security forces As the campaign period progresses ahead of the February 2016 general elections in Uganda, several instances of political persecution were reported during December. In particular, several members of The Democratic Alliance (TDA) opposition coalition, of presidential candidate Amama Mbabazi, were reportedly arrested on December 15, allegedly connection to clashes with National Resistance Movement (NMR) cadres loyal to President Yoweri Museveni. Two days later, Mbabazi s security chief was reportedly detained in Kampala. Also on December 17, police raided a locale in Fort Portal where supporters of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) candidate Kizza Besigye were lodged, seizing campaign materials ahead of a rally by Besigye s in the town. Lastly, on December 21 police arrested 20 TDA s members during a raid on the party s headquarters in Kampala, while tear gas was reportedly used, and live ammunition allegedly, against a rally by Mbabazi in Dokolo on December 28. The campaign period thus far has remained relatively devoid of clashes between supporters of the different candidates, with the most notable exception being clashes between NRM and TDA supporters in Ntungamo, Western Region, on December 13. Nevertheless, the abovementioned incidents indicate a trend of strong crackdown and disruptions to the nationwide activities of the opposition camps. We assess this is part of the government s attempts to diminish the efficacy of campaigns of opposition s candidates and to complicate efforts by the opposition to hold future rallies. In particular, the TDA and Mbabazi seem to have been particularly targeted, which likely stems from him being perceived as a strong candidate in the challenge against Museveni s re-election. In this context, we assess that further politically motivated actions, such as raids on opposition affiliated facilities and arrests aimed at constraining opposition mobilization, are liable to persist in January and to potentially to intensify as elections approach. 25Page

26 LOW RISK Equatorial Guinea Set of security measures introduced in the country, including border closures, military checkpoints in Bata, yet overall threats remain low. Travel to Bata and Malabo can continue while adhering to basic security precautions against crime. Closure of borders implemented, increased checkpoints in Bata alleged Following the previously announced closure of the land borders with Cameroon and Gabon in early November, on the occasion of the extraordinary congress of the ruling Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (PDGE), a new, stricter set of security measures was introduced for December. On November 27, a presidential decree instituted the closure of all borders, with the exception of special cases. This encompasses all land crossings, while normally scheduled and authorized aerial and sea routes were exempted. As of the time of writing, the measures remain in place. Moreover, unconfirmed reports indicate that checkpoints were installed in Bata in mid-december, with significant traffic disruptions consequently reported in the city. The latter measure was allegedly aimed at identifying internal and external enemies. Further measures, such as residential searches without prior warrants, were allegedly also implemented based on alleged security threats and terrorist activities in the country. In spite of the increased security measures and raised alert, there are no reports corroborating the thesis that militant groups are active in the country, and there are no indications of a marked increase in criminality to justify the new regulations. In this context, despite the economic and social impacts that such measures have, they are likely motivated by perceived threats against the stability of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema s 36-year rule, and as such enhance the already high control over public life exercised by authorities. As the country will head to presidential elections in November 2016, we assess similar measures will likely continue to be implemented. 26Page

27 LOW RISK Ghana Renewed political tensions recorded within opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), as well as with ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) party. Travel to Accra may continue at this time while avoiding nonessential travel to outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions. Renewed political tensions recorded within opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), as well as with ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) Following a relative de-escalation in violent incidents within the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) after the death of a supporter of newly appointed NPP chairman Freddie Blay on November 6, renewed tensions were recorded in December. On December 7, suspended NPP chairman Paul Afoko reportedly filed a suit against the party over the perceived illegal procedures adopted against him. Further reports indicate that, on December 8, a prominent member of the party was prevented of holding a press conference, allegedly aimed at denouncing Afoko s suspension, after youth members of the party invaded the location of the press conference. Although no injuries were recorded during the incident, gunshots were heard in the area. In order to de-escalate the tensions, on December 19, the NPP s presidential candidate, Nana Addo Dankwa Afuko reportedly made a conciliatory speech and called on the party to unite ahead of the November 2016 general elections. Despite the use of force on December 8, violent incidents are likely to remain localized as tensions within the NPP have mainly been witnessed on the rhetorical level. Moreover, with the proximity of elections, although latent divergences are likely to persist, such tensions are expected to be controlled in order not to harm the party s electoral performance. Furthermore, in what concerns inter-party tensions, reports indicated that, during the December 17 by-elections in the Wassa Amenfi West District, an NPP polling agent was beaten by ruling National Democratic Congress s (NDC) cadres. Moreover, as details pertaining to an alleged discovery of weapons in the NPP headquarters remain vague, the NDC s general secretary called on the police to investigate the case. All in all, the aforementioned events underscore the gradual build-up of tensions between the two parties, which are likely to increase ahead of the highly-disputed elections. Additionally, should the discovery of weapons in the NPP headquarters be confirmed, this would further showcase the concerning uptick in tensions that may encourage the sides to arm themselves. 27Page

28 LOW RISK Notable Dates Guinea-Bissau Political tension within ruling PAIGC party may prompt third PM departure in six months. Travel to Bissau may continue while maintaining vigilance and following general security protocols particularly in evening and night hours. Political tension within ruling PAIGC threatens continuity of Prime Minister Carlos Correia On December 23, 15 members of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) abstained from a parliamentary vote to approve the executive agenda of Prime Minister (PM) Carlos Correia and his government. As a result, the government proposal received 56 abstentions against 45 votes in favor, raising concerns over its legal validity. If the proposal fails to pass by January 6, President Jose Mario Vaz will be constitutional bound to dismiss the PM. Following a PAIGC meeting on December 29, the party s National Jurisdiction Council (CNJ) initiated a disciplinary process against the dissident party members. For their part, the 15 abstaining parliamentarians reportedly required the removal of party president and former PM Domingos Simoes Pereira due to allegations of corruption. This chain of events highlights the deep divisions within the ruling party between Correia and Pereira on the one hand, and Vaz on the other. Correia assumed office in August despite Vaz s wish to appoint a different candidate, and thus a constitutional mandate to dismiss the PM may serve the president s interests. In contrast, Pereira is unlikely to leave his position as party president, particularly given his entranced position within party bureaucracy. These divisions are likely to reach yet another boiling point in January, and carry the potential to bring about the fall of a third PM within six months. These developments are in tandem with Guinea-Bissau s longstanding history of political instability, in which no president was able to finish his mandate since the country s independence in Page

29 LOW RISK Notable Dates Mauritius Fake bomb forces Air France plane to make emergency landing in Kenya, as IS recruitment cell discovered in the island. Travel to Port Louis may continue at this time while adhering to standard security protocols given the threat of crime. Flight from Mauritius to Paris makes emergency landing in Kenya due to bomb scare amidst recent discovery of Islamic State (IS) recruitment cell An Air France flight from Mauritius to Paris was forced to land in Mombasa, Kenya, on December 20 after a passenger located a suspicious device resembling a bomb in the plane s toilet. Several passengers were taken into questioning and a couple was reportedly arrested, but no charges have been pressed at the time of writing and the couple was released. Following the flight s emergency landing in Mombasa, an Air France official confirmed that the device did not contain explosives. Nevertheless, Mauritian authorities reportedly enhanced security at Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport (MRU) in Port Louis. Earlier on December 14, sources indicated that the National Security Service (NSS) discovered an Islamic State (IS) recruitment cell in the island, aimed at recruiting youths into joining IS in Syria. According to these sources, a dozen people from the network are currently under the surveillance of the NSS. Moreover, an IS video was reportedly published at the beginning of December, showing a Mauritian citizen abroad urging his compatriots to join the militant group. The available information regarding the Air France bomb scare indicates that the incident was more likely a prank and thus not militant in nature. Nevertheless, the detection of a militant cell in the country and the IS video released indicate a small extent of support for the militant group in the island. Nevertheless, at this time there are no indications that Mauritius has become a target and a hub for militant attacks, as these actions do not fit the current strategic goals of groups such as IS. Furthermore, the awareness of Mauritian authorities to this possibility as well as their reported actions aimed at preventing any future threats contribute to the assessment that the risk of such attack in the island remain low at this time. 29Page

30 LOW RISK Sierra Leone Violence recorded, journalist arrested preceding Kono District s by-elections. Travel to Freetown may continue at this time, while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity, and practicing heightened health precautions and proper hygiene due to the latent threat of new Ebola cases. Violence recorded, journalist arrested preceding Kono District s by-elections The December 19 by-elections in the villages of Sewage and Goram, Eastern Province s Kono District, were marred by severe instances of violence in the days and weeks preceding them. Unconfirmed reports indicate that three people were killed, the house of an opposition figure as well as a government vehicle were set alight, and several residents were injured. These instances of politically motivated violence underscore latent tensions between government and opposition supporters, which in this case were fomented by the electoral period. Moreover, reports indicate that a newspaper editor was arrested on December 17 under the charges of publishing false information regarding the aforementioned violent incidents in Kono District. The arrest was followed by demonstrations of media organizations and journalists calling for his immediate and unconditional release. Overall, the arrest highlights the relative lack of freedom of press in Sierra Leone, as well as authorities likely aim to reduce the exposure of politically motivated violence in the country. 30Page

31 LOW RISK Notable Dates Tanzania Lean government announced by President John Magufuli amidst continued talks in Zanzibar regarding political stalemate over cancellation of local elections. Cholera outbreak affecting 21 out of 30 regions, as cases continue to rise. Travel to Dar es Salaam and Dodoma can continue at this time while adhering to general security precautions with regards to risks associated with criminality, low-level militancy and political unrest. Magufuli names lean cabinet as Zanzibar electoral crisis remains unsolved On December 10, President John Magufuli announced his new cabinet, a month after being sworn into office. The new government will be composed of 19 ministers, as opposed to 30 in the government of previous President Jakaya Kikwete, while the ministers of finance; public works; education; and national resources and tourism have yet to be determined. According to reports, Magufuli explained that the aforementioned change in the size of the cabinet was due to his will to reduce government spending. While the lean government structure continues to highlight Magufuli s will to decrease public expenditures and thus differentiate himself from his predecessors, we assess that economy-wide austerity measures remain unlikely at this time, particularly as a finance minister has not yet been appointed. Meanwhile, in the semi-autonomous archipelago of Zanzibar, negotiations between the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) remain ongoing, after the elections for Zanzibar President in October were nullified. The exact content of negotiations was not announced, yet both sides have urged for patience and a CUF official was cited as claiming that an agreement would likely be reached. In contrast, a CCM official is cited as calling o party members to be ready for a new vote. We continue to assess that the CUF will reject the possibility of rerun elections, while the CCM, following the cancellation of the previous vote, is unlikely to grant control over the archipelago to the opposition. Furthermore, should the government push through with a new vote, political tensions will intensify and unrest is likely to re-emerge. Cholera virus spreads in Tanzania, likely to persist in coming weeks Reports released on December 12 indicate that Cholera is continuously spreading in Tanzania and is currently affecting 21 out of 30 region. As of December 8, more than 10,412 cases had been recorded in the country, 4,500 of them in Dar es Salaam, and a total death toll of 159 since the beginning of the epidemic. Given this high numbers of cases and the disease s highly contagious nature, we assess that the Cholera will continue spreading over the coming weeks. 31Page

32 LOW RISK Zambia Large scale, nationwide power outages experienced on December 11, 22; while result of specific failures, reflects fragility of Zambian energy infrastructure. Travel to Lusaka may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance against crime and in the vicinity of political gatherings, given the increased potential for unrest. Large scale, nationwide power outages experienced on December 11, 22; while result of specific failures, reflects fragility of Zambian energy infrastructure On December 22, Zambia experienced a nationwide blackout, including in the capital Lusaka and in the vital Copperbelt Province, yet excluding the Southern and Western provinces. A nationwide power disruption was also reported on December 11, alongside frequent smaller scale load shedding exercises. Following a preliminary investigation of the December 22 outage Zambia s state owned power company, ZESCO, pointed to a failure at its Leopards Hill substation in Lusaka. Over and above the immediate trigger for the power failure, the December 11 and December 22 nationwide disruptions highlight the fragility of Zambia s electricity infrastructure. This fragility stems from a number of factors, the most immediate of which is the severe drought experienced across southern Africa, hindering Zambia s hydro power production. More broadly, decaying facilities renders the system vulnerable to frequent failures, while even at maximum capacity, electricity production in the country struggles to meet Zambia s growing demands. To a large extent, under-investment in the energy sector is the results of electricity tariffs which are not cost-reflective, and subsequent ill-afforded government subsidies. In a country brief on Zambia issued in December 2015, the World Bank notes the detrimental impact of persisting load shedding, deeming it a key driver of the economic slowdown experienced in the country, and a hindrance to improvements in health care and education. In view of the factors listed above, disruptions to normal power supply are likely to persist in the coming months. 32Page

33 China writes-off 40 million USD debt after Chinese yuan announced as a legal tender. Finance Minister announces March 31, 2016 deadline for foreign companies to sell 51 percent of shares to local investors. LOW RISK Zimbabwe Travel to Harare and Bulawayo can continue while adhering to basic security precautions against common criminality. As a general security precaution avoid large gatherings given potential for politically motivated unrest. Chinese yuan formally declared legal tender as China erases 40 million USD debt On December 21, the government announced that it is adopting the Chinese yuan (CNY) as legal tender while China has written off a 40 million USD debt owned by Zimbabwe. That said, the yuan was already approved for use in Zimbabwe in 2014, together with seven other currencies, after the Zimbabwean dollar (ZWL) was abandoned due to unprecedented hyperinflation. Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Zimbabwe and signed a one billion USD low-interest loan in order to invest in energy infrastructure in the country. Given that the yuan was accepted into the Zimbabwean monetary system prior to the latest announcement, we assess that the act was a symbolic measure aimed at showing the latter s support for China as a leading global power, as well as attracting Chinese investments. Government set March deadline for selling 51 percent shares in foreign firms Reports released on December 24 indicate that the Finance Minister announced March 31, 2016, as a deadline for foreign companies to sell 51 percent of their shares to local investors, according to the 2008 Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act. That said, firms that have been active for five years or less would be allowed to continue operating as before by paying an indigenization compliance levy. Moreover, new foreign investors would be barred from certain industry sectors unless approved by the government. Given the longstanding financial crisis experienced in Zimbabwe, we assess that the decision joins previous government announcements aimed at curbing a further economic deterioration by transferring companies holdings to local owners. 33Page