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1 Chapter 1 : The Nuclear Debate - World Nuclear Association The Debate with Arnab Goswami. If there is a definitive debate on issues that matter to the people of India and the world, then it is The Debate with Arnab Goswami. August, India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. India has a sizable and growing nuclear arsenal, primarily because of decades of conflict with neighboring Pakistan, which also possesses nuclear weapons. The first prototype fast-breeder reactor at Kudankulam did not meet its September deadline to start commercial operation due to technological issues. When India tested its first fission device in May, Indian scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons kt ; however, some Indian officials later stated that the figure was closer to 8 to 10 kt, while other independent analysts estimate that the yield was as low as between 4 and 6 kt. Iyengar, former chief of the Department of Atomic Energy, and in by K. Santhanam, field director of the tests, that the tests did not achieve the desired results. Chidambaram, former leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission AEC, have consistently disputed these claims, maintaining that their original estimates were correct and that further testing is unnecessary. The primary focus of the program was the production of inexpensive electricity; however, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to pursue nuclear weapons. On the one hand, the scientific establishment wanted to prove that it was technically capable of detonating a nuclear device, and hawks within Parliament pointed to security developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a nuclear deterrent. This, along with the indefinite extension of the NPT, reignited domestic political pressure for India to risk economic sanctions by conducting further tests. In return, New Delhi agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that are classified as "civilian" in purpose. The remaining "military" facilities remain off-limits to international inspectors. The agreement process required navigating a number of diplomatic and legal hurdles. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January to exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U. Atomic Energy Act, allowing for the adoption of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in August Recent Developments and Current Status India continues to participate in international nuclear trade. In April, Canada and India signed a bilateral safeguards agreement for trade in nuclear materials and technology used in IAEA safeguarded facilities. It has maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and supports negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FMCT that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable. Oxford,, www. The Impact on Global Proliferation Berkeley: University of California Press, Routledge,, p. Stanford University Press, Praeger Security International, Page 1

2 Chapter 2 : Indian Nuclear Weapons Program India Outside Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NTI An interesting debate is taking place in India on the future of its nuclear doctrine. A number of factors have added a new sense of urgency to this debate - a center-right government in New. A group of prominent personalities have come together to petition the Supreme Court in New Delhi. There is skepticism whether nuclear power generated through the expensive imported reactors is affordable for the ordinary Indian. The government so far managed to blithely glide over this criticism. At the critical final stages of the negotiations over the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the US, the Indian government made an extraordinary commitment to Washington in writing that the country would import nuclear reactors from America alone for producing at least megawatts of power. How the government could make a blanket pledge on a matter that is commercial still remains unanswered, but this commitment is today sticking out like a sore thumb in the US-India ties with secretary of state Hillary Clinton reminding Delhi even last week to fulfill the promise. America, Russia and France were the countries that we made mediators in these efforts to lift sanctions, and hence, for the nurturing of their business interests, we made deals with them for nuclear projects. Three factors can be noted. One, the petitioners sought a court ruling to freeze the construction of all power projects till the completion of the safety-and-cost-benefit analysis. If the court grants a stay order, it affects all projects in the pipeline. Two, the petitioners have questioned the constitutional propriety of the nuclear liability law legislated by the government last year. They complained that the existing legislation limits the liability of the operator to an abysmally low figure of approximately million dollars the remaining damages are to be made good by the Government at the cost of exchequer, and also excludes the liability of the operators in certain circumstances. The petitioners alleged that the nuclear liability law was drafted under the influence of the foreign nuclear industry and, in effect, it provides a huge subsidy to the foreign reactor manufacturers, as it exempts them from the likely burden of an accident liability, and also provides a huge disincentive to them to invest in safety technologies that are usually expensive. The petition comes at a most awkward time for the Indian government. On the one hand, it lacks the kind of political clout that is needed to amend the nuclear liability law in the directions that the US is demanding. On the other hand, there is relentless American pressure to fulfill the Faustian promise that as quid pro quo for the nuclear deal, India would generate tens of billions of dollars worth business for the US nuclear industry. Converging streams The third and most immediate fallout is going to be on the Koodankulam nuclear power plant, which is being built by Russia. The agitators have blockaded access to the construction site. A confrontational situation may develop, with risk of violence. What seemed a local agitation is poised to transform as a national issue. Political parties have been dancing around the Koodankulam issue, but the time is coming for them to take a stance. The US-India relationship is at low ebb currently and the two sides have been keenly searching for means to give new verve to it. Much hope was placed on this sphere of cooperation to lift the entire dynamics of India-Russia economic ties, which have been listless through much of the past two decades. Nuclear cooperation is a key agenda item in the annual India-Russia summits, including the forthcoming one in Moscow in December. In immediate terms, the interests devolve upon the situation around Koodankulam. Page 2

3 Chapter 3 : TRANSCEND MEDIA SERVICE » A NEW NUCLEAR DEBATE IN INDIA India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb (War and International Politics in South Asia) - Kindle edition by Priyanjali Malik. Download it once and read it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Such as during the Cold-War era nuclear capability was used to deter and maintain the balance of power among two symmetric adversaries and nuclear doctrine of the states was perusing state-centric policy. Another significant shift has seen that nuclear capability is acquired to deal with regional security concerns. Nuclear weapon plays pivotal role in national security as it is the significant component of integrated defence policy that is comprised of conventional forces and diplomacy including the nuclear capability. Nuclear armed states aims to decrease proliferation of nuclear weapons under the Non-proliferation treaty. But the steady hike has been observed in the nuclear spending of these states. The hike in nuclear spending reflects two dominating facts. First, nuclear capability has stabilizing effects among states relations by making the conflict unacceptably catastrophic. Secondly, states negate the conventional military superiority through the deterrence. Rising nuclear budget proves that these both factors are operational in South Asia. Rising defense budget reflects that states are facing security dilemma. South Asia is significant for unparalleled nuclear build up between two nuclear rivals: Regional security dimensions revolve around the triangular relations between China, India and Pakistan. Security dilemma in South Asia is operational between two nuclear powers of region and adversarial bilateral relations have resulted in conventional and nuclear arms race. Conventional military imbalance is one of the significant factors that Pakistan is forced to respond the arms buildup triggered by India. Defence budget is considered as most important element of national security in South Asia. Since, India has increased its defence budget around Indian war-prone military strategies and its modernization drive have not only widened conventional asymmetry, but have compelled Pakistan to enhance its defensive strength. There is possibility that a constant focus on modernizing and enhancing armed forces, might give India enough courage to wage a limited conflict against Pakistan. Although, Pakistan has always rejected a conventional or nuclear arms race with India, but it cannot compromise over its minimum credible and sufficient conventional and nuclear deterrence. Pakistan tries to fill the defence production gap through maintaining its credible nuclear deterrence. Additionally, many factors have compelled Pakistan to increase its dependence on nuclear weapon. Page 3

4 Chapter 4 : India's Nuclear Debate : Priyanjali Malik : Though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian strategic community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate no longer produces new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New Delhi faces: countering Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons. Though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian strategic community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate no longer produces new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New Delhi faces: So any indication of change in the doctrine is a cause for concern. It suggests that though there continue to be significant disagreements within the Indian strategic community about many elements of nuclear doctrine, the debate has stagnated, and no longer produces new ideas about how to deal with the most pressing dilemma that New Delhi faces: India might need to shift its massive retaliation nuclear strategy to some form of modulated retaliation to deal with this challenge. I begin with a brief overview of the official Indian nuclear doctrine. Indian perspectives on the nuclear doctrine can be broadly divided into two camps: As with any exercise in taxonomy, this is a necessarily crude effort, and not everyone within each camp might agree with others in their group on all aspects of doctrine. I conclude with an assessment of the prospects for changes in the doctrine. In January, New Delhi released its official nuclear doctrine. These included suggesting that India might use nuclear weapons to retaliate against attacks using chemical and biological weapons CBW, and that Indian retaliation to any nuclear attack would be massive. He outlined the makeup of the Strategic Programme Staff, which carries out the general staff work of the NCA, and of the Strategic Armament Safety Authority, which looks after the safety and security aspects of nuclear weapons. Despite many contestations over the nuclear doctrine, the dominant view within India broadly endorses the current Indian nuclear doctrine, with one exception: The following considers opposing perspectives on six major issues that agitate the Indian debate: The inclusion of a CBW attack as a reason for nuclear retaliation is considered in a later section; here, I consider the arguments over the usefulness of the NFU pledge itself. Moderates and expansionists disagree with great vigor over NFU. Moderates tend to be nuclear deterrence optimists who generally expect that achieving deterrence is relatively easy as long as nuclear weapons capability exist. They are not particularly concerned about the possibility that not striking first has any great deterrence disadvantages. As the late K. Subrahmanyam pointed out, deterrence is more about perception than numbers, and as long as the other side perceives a survivable nuclear capability, deterrence will hold. As Manpreet Sethi points out, the most important advantage is that it obviates the need for the expensive nuclear weapons infrastructure that is associated with a first-use doctrine. Further, there is little need for India to have nuclear forces on hair-trigger alerts, which are always risky. These and similar points are reflected in the writings of many moderates. Admiral Verghese Koithara, who wrote a well-received book on the Indian nuclear forces, suggests that NFU avoids the need for war-fighting approaches that use TNWs and counterforce targeting philosophies, both of which add to the size and complexity of a nuclear arsenal. NFU also reduces the difficulties and expenses associated with a complicated command-and-control system. Rajiv Nayan points out that, by making the NFU conditional, India lost an advantage without gaining any strategic or security value. He believes that Pakistan could even deploy TNWs without fear that India might attack them, though he does not appear to consider the possibility that India could use conventional military forces for such contingencies. They believe, in short, that NFU is a solution that makes the problem worse. In response to the often-expressed fear that NFU will prevent India from acting against an imminent nuclear attack, Subrahmanyam points out that such a preemptive strike would not prevent retaliation. Subrahmanyam, however, did not consider the possibility than striking first could potentially reduce the lethality of the retaliation. Much more important, he points out that it is always possible that an adversary might decide not to launch an attack at the very last moment but that a preemptive strike will force them to retaliate. He rightly points out that there is no major difference between Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployment styles in peacetime. In wartime, India can be expected to deploy its weapons much the same way as Pakistan does. In essence, then, beyond of declaratory policy, there is no real difference between India and Page 4

5 Pakistan in how they deploy nuclear weapons. This is another important argument that expansionists ignore: As deterrence optimists, moderates are generally less concerned about the quantity or quality of nuclear weapons. All India has to worry about is maintaining an assured capability for counterstrike. Ali Ahmed argues that cultural factors have already led to a more assertive Indian military doctrine. As he puts it: Compellence directly contradicts minimum deterrence. Some moderates submit that the CMD concept itself might be a problem because of the possible contradiction between minimum and credible. Moderates have suggested that such an expansive arsenal is unnecessary for the purposes of deterrence. This expansion is something to which moderates have objected, but it is also an issue on which not much debate has been generated. Expansionists have not developed arguments about the CBW issue, but they would presumably support nuclear use in response to a CBW attackâ arguing, as some officials reportedly have done, that nuclear retaliation for CBW attack is simply leaving an option open since India has given up its CBW capacity. None of the moderates, however, have written on the specifics of these arrangements. Military doctrines are, after all, about how military forces are to be used in war. There are several subissues within the command-and-control debate. Menon identifies the lack of a chief of defence staff as a serious lacuna. He also dismisses other presumed benefits of a de-alerted and de-mated nuclear force, such as the greater safety of such a force and its reduced vulnerability to theft and inadvertent use or misuse. He suggests that it is easier to protect fewer mated weapons than a large number of distributed components, and that the Indian military has a good record of protecting its hardware. In addition, he also points out that in a nuclear war, India will have to go to war with whatever forces it has on handâ there will be no time to increase manufacturing. It is not manifestly clear why this would be a hindrance since the components would already be manufactured. Most analysts in both camps fear the threat to be empty. Though Karnad does not spell out his reasoning, he presumably means that a small nuclear force cannot produce massive attacks. This is clear from the various contributions to the only book-length study of the TNW problem, an edited volume by Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria. He proposes that such TNWs be maintained under central control rather than delegated to local commanders. One solution that does not appear to have been seriously considered in this debate yet is the possibility of considering some Indian version of the flexible response doctrine. This requires no change in Indian nuclear force structure or command-and-control arrangements, which are the biggest problems with TNWs. India could conduct such a proportional retaliation with low-yield gravity nuclear bombs delivered by aircraft. At worst, this requires India to develop such a low-yield weapon, if one is not in its inventory. The added benefit to such a change is that it also alters the one element of the doctrine that both moderates and expansionists dislike: This does not mean, however, that everyone in the strategic community agrees that the doctrine needs to be revised. At the least, there is no consensus about the direction any revision would take. To the extent that there is a desire to change the NFU, moderates would like to reorient the doctrine more in the direction of the DND and abandon some of the expansion that the official doctrine introduced, such as nuclear retaliation for CBW attacks and references to massive retaliation. Expansionists, on the other hand, would prefer abandoning the NFU altogether and retaining a much more flexible approach toward nuclear force expansion. On one hand, it appears as if the Indian government was indeed responding to public criticism when it released the official doctrine in On the other hand, despite several years of vigorous debate, there is little public indication that there is any effort at the official level to respond to criticisms from either the moderates or the expansionists. If a new edition of the doctrine does come out, it will hopefully correct some of the errors and contradictions in the previous edition, thereby strengthening the doctrine as a whole. Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas: Election Manifesto New Delhi: Bharatiya Janata Party,, Praeger Security International,, An Alternative Blueprint New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Preventing Deterrence Breakdown New Delhi: Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Brookings Institution Press,, 84â Macmillan,, Stirrings of Change Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,, http: Routledge,, 69â Other than Chellaney, the others are all former senior military officers. Is a Review Necessary? Keywords and Concepts New Delhi: Conflict Redux New Delhi: Knowledge World,, 1â Kanwal and Chansoria, 19â Kanwal and Chansoria, â Page 5

6 Chapter 5 : Does India need nuclear energy? racedaydvl.com Making the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party's nuclear tests in its starting point, this book examines how opinion amongst India's 'attentive' public shifted from supporting nuclear abstinence to accepting â and even feeling a need for â a more assertive policy, by examining the. The Nuclear Debate Updated April The underlying question is how electricity is best produced now and in the years to come. Between and electricity demand doubled. It is expected to roughly double again by At present, about two-thirds of electricity is produced from the burning of fossil fuels. All low carbon sources of energy are needed to successfully replace fossil fuels in the system. It is also the sector that can most readily be decarbonised. The scale of the challenge requires growth of all available clean energy technologies. Whole lifecycle CO2 emissions associated with nuclear energy are among the lowest of all forms of electricity generation, similar to onshore wind 3. Economics A supportive energy policy environment that promotes investment in long-term, capital-intensive projects is essential for new nuclear build. Almost all nuclear reactors operating today were built in state-controlled or regulated markets. Similar to many forms of renewable energy, the majority of costs are upfront capital. Nuclear power plants can operate for decades â in the USA, operation to 80 years are being considered â during which time operational costs are generally very low. Over the lifetime of a project, nuclear energy is among the most cost-competitive forms of generating low carbon electricity 4. Safety Major studies all conclude that nuclear is an exceptionally safe way to produce electricity on an industrial scale. Nuclear has by far the lowest number of direct fatalities of any major energy source per kwh of energy produced â over times less than hydro and liquefied natural gas 5. Serious nuclear accidents are very rare, and not particularly dangerous. The April Chernobyl accident in Ukraine is the only nuclear accident that has ever led to measurable health effects: Waste All forms of electricity generation produce some form of waste. Nuclear power is the only energy-producing industry that takes full responsibility for managing all its waste. Civil nuclear waste has been managed without a significant environmental release for six decades. Nuclear waste is categorised as low, intermediate or high, according to its level of radioactivity. There are final disposal facilities in operation for low- and intermediate-level waste. Most high-level waste is used reactor fuel. The amount of reactor fuel requiring disposal is relatively small; the total amount produced by the US nuclear industry over the last 40 years would, if stacked side by side, cover a football field to a height of about seven metres. The international scientific consensus is for high-level waste to be disposed of in deep geological repositories. The first such repository is due to open in Finland in the s. Proliferation Safeguards are effective, and the nuclear power industry does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. North Korea has developed nuclear weapons but has never had nuclear electricity. Over 30 countries have power reactors but only eight are known to have nuclear weapons. Weapons programs were developed first in most of those countries. While certain facilities enrichment and reprocessing can be used in the production of weapons, the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are effective at policing these. Nuclear plants can help in eliminating warheads. Environmental Impact Nuclear plants have a small environmental footprint and keep the air clean. They require only a small amount of fuel compared to gas or coal, and take up a fraction of the space required for wind and solar farms. Per unit of area, Hinkley Point C will generate approximately times more electricity than the London Array wind farm. By preventing the emission of pollutants from other sources, nuclear energy has up to now averted about 2 million pollution-related deaths, and by, is likely to prevent a further 7 million Radiation Radiation is a naturally occuring phenomen. While radiation is dangerous in high doses, there is no evidence of adverse health effects at low doses. Radiation can be used beneficially in technologies that produce energy, aid medical diagnoses, improve industry and agricultural performance, and help us learn more about our universe. Nuclear power plants release extremely small levels of radiation. The nuclear industry is responsible for less than 0. Diversity of supply All forms of low carbon electricity generation will need to grow significantly if the world is to control anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Renewables, in particular solar and wind, will play an important role, but are not the whole solution. Two key considerations Page 6

7 for energy policy makers are energy density and intermittency: Solar and wind are inately diffuse sources of energy. Powering a modern, and increasingly urban society with renewable energy alone would require many hundreds of times more space than doing so by either fossil fuels or nuclear. Solar and wind are intermittent sources of energy that require backup. Calculating the additional costs of integrating intermittent renewable electricity sources into an energy system is complicated. Integrating low percentages of renewable energy incurs low costs, but the expense increases non-linearly as penetration grows and very significant backup or storage solutions are required. Page 7

8 Chapter 6 : Nuclear vs conventional weapons: Debate on Indiaâ s defense budget hike - Foreign Policy When news emerges that Pakistan has tested another short-range missile or increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons, debate resumes in New Delhi over whether India should revise its nuclear. Overview[ edit ] The Henry J. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India and in particular to negotiate a Agreement to operationalize the Joint Statement. As per the Vienna Convention, an international agreement such as the Agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. The agreement will also help India meet its goal of adding 25, MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act". Background[ edit ] Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have signed the NPT, India argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles. Led by the U. In addition to impelling India to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China [40] [41] and North Korea, [42] [43] India conducted five more nuclear tests in May at Pokhran. India was subject to international sanctions after its May nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously refusing to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear technology[ edit ] Dr. Senate Committee in that the United States might benefit from access to Indian nuclear technology: Such technical views should help to advice the diplomatic efforts with India. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China,[ citation needed ] and a potential client and job creator. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming â 68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85â 12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support. Bush for final approval. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U. Opposition to the Indo-US civilian agreement in India The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress I supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the Page 8

9 face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal. The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by â after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute. As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement: As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine, [77] explained: India will not be able to escape from the U. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front, whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state, [] while former U. State Department made it very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state". Hyde Act in the final waiver. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward. No, it absolutely does not. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement. We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG] statement. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent. Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest". Afrasiabi, who has taught political science at Tehran University, has argued the agreement will set a new precedent for other states, adding that the agreement represents a diplomatic boon for Tehran. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. Congress[ edit ] The Bush Administration told Congress in January that the United States may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The Administration further said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items. The State Department had requested they remain secret even though they were not classified. House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a letter to U. Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation, said that there needed to be clear consequences if India broke its commitments or resumed nuclear testing. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the U. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the U. Secretary Rice and Indian Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee after signing the agreement in Washington on October 10, There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This the deal was only passed in our Congress two days ago. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries. Please Page 9

10 help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. July July 18, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington. Bush visits India for the first time. Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament. President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament. The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal. The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress. The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal. Left parties in India withdraw support to government. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament. India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent. India launches full blast lobbying among the nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce. IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement. The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries. The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys. US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against. Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared. President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement. Page 10

11 Chapter 7 : Nuclear Power in India Indian Nuclear Energy - World Nuclear Association Pakistan Scared Of India's Nuclear Triad? The Debate Republic World. Loading Unsubscribe from Republic World? Cancel Unsubscribe. Working Subscribe Subscribed Unsubscribe K. The root of the problem is the substantial gap that exists between Indian offensive conventional military planning for Pakistan contingencies and its defensive nuclear policy that seeks to deter aggression with threat of massive retaliation. Indians know that nuclear weapons are not suited to deter terrorism. Rather, nuclear weapons back up the threat to project conventional military forces into Pakistan in response to another major terrorist attack, as envisioned by proactive defence plans proffered by figures in and around the Indian Army. In the parlance of nuclear theorists, India is missing rungs on its conflict escalation ladder. Some Indian and American strategists argue that India should develop its own tactical nuclear weapons to provide options below massive retaliation. Such options, if developed, could bridge the gap between Cold Start and massive nuclear retaliation in a way â according to the theory â that would strengthen Indian deterrence. However, the gap between the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence is substantial, at least when it comes to keeping an escalating nuclear conflict limited. There simply is â fortunately â no real-world data to draw upon. If India were take this leap into the unknown, its leaders and military planners would need to address important questions about necessary capabilities and the logic of limited nuclear war. India does not today possess all of the technical capability it would need to employ tactical nuclear weapons. To be sure, it has accurate delivery platforms, such as the Prahaar battlefield missile system, which many Pakistanis already believe will be used for nuclear weapons. Harder would be the development and integration of information and decision-making networks that would allow for the successful targeting of mobile military targets in Pakistan, which is much more difficult than targeting cities with massive retaliation. Necessary real-time information fusion, relying on satellites, and other technical and human intelligence to link up with civilian and military decision-making systems, is incredibly complex to engineer. India certainly has many capable scientists and engineers, but to date it has not accorded its nuclear program this level of budget priority. The decision-making factors are invariably harder. If deterrence fails and India is faced with the decision to retaliate proportionally after a Pakistani nuclear first strike, how could Indian leaders be confident that there would not be further nuclear escalation, resulting in casualties and damage of greater magnitude than the instigating terrorism incident? Would Indian nuclear weapons and the threat of punitive retaliation increase the likelihood that Pakistani commanders would use a greater number of its nuclear weapons first, rather than risk losing them in an Indian counterstrike? There are no easy answers to these questions. Even if Indian decision makers decide to develop tactical nuclear weapons, as did American, Soviet and now Pakistani leaders, it is not clear that an evolved deterrence doctrine and force posture would address the cross-border terrorism issue. Nuclear weapons are useful for deterring large-scale military invasions. Pakistani leaders and militants have perceived this. They believe that nuclear deterrence has favoured Pakistan in crises and conflict since the early s. Nuclear debates in India have covered this ground, but remain unresolved. Fundamentally these challenges are unresolvable, at least as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. India clearly needs options to motivate Pakistan to do more to prevent cross-border terrorism, but its political and military leaders are wise to continue looking for alternatives â ranging from coercion to inducement â that do not carry the same risks of conflict. Page 11

12 Chapter 8 : Indian Strategic Studies: Indiaâ s Nuclear Doctrine Debate India's nuclear doctrine is an important variable determining nuclear stability in South Asia, especially because the doctrine is generally considered to be restrained. Sri Raman As an anti-nuclear-weapon activist of India, I am abashed to admit this. But the main nuclear debate in the major South Asian country has not been the one between nuclear militarists and their opponents. It has been the one between two schools of nuclear militarism. The debate has acquired a new dimension, with the hawks of all these years suddenly made to appear doves. The US has figured in the debate all through. Bush initiated the earlier polemics by presenting a nuclear deal to India, the current controversy has a Barack Obama connection. These, however, led to no national debate. The voice of the anti-nuke agitators was drowned in the high-decibel celebrations of Pokharan II as the test series was named, Pokharan I was given as the title of the "peaceful nuclear explosion" conducted at the same site in Yes, we in the anti-nuke camp declared war on the deal, too. We did so because the deal gave India the dubiously high status of a nuclear-weapon state, with which Washington and its allies were willing to do nuclear business. Our case was a cry in the wilderness, only faintly heard in the mainstream media with headlines reserved for the war of militarists. The main discourse was dominated by opposition to the deal from a point of view diametrically opposite to ours. It is over the issue of testing again that the current, second major Indian nuclear debate has erupted. The sides, however, are not he same. The BJP and the Congress are now on the same aide of the barricades. Some prominent individuals, too, have switched sides, most notably former President A. But the party and Kalam are making common cause in the current controversy. No mystery shrouds their motive. Both of them share a stake in preserving Pokharan II as a symbol of Indian pride. And the controversy has put that avowed achievement in question. It all began when K. Santhanam, a scientist who worked under Kalam in, was reported on August 27 as trashing the test series. He was quoted as alleging, in effect, that the leaders of the then BJP-headed government and the nuclear establishment had lied to the nation about the tests. According to him, as many foreign experts had said at the time, the thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb tests had ended in a "fizzle. The yield is the amount of energy discharged when a nuclear weapon is detonated, with the amount being expressed in kilotons thousands of tons or megatons millions of tons of trinitrotoluene TNT. A hydrogen bomb can produce far greater destructive power than an atom bomb. The biggest bomb tested by the Soviet Union is said to have produced 50 megatons of explosive power â nearly 3, times more destructive power than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which killed 80, people instantly, according to the most conservative estimate. This is the weapon India has, the BJP and its band claim. It is what India has yet to acquire, Santhanam and others wail. Santhanam put the yield at 15 to 20 kilotons, or less than half the officially claimed 45 kilotons. The pride-puncturing estimate has the predicted reactions from everyone with a reputation resting on Pokharan II. It has also been rejected by the reigning nuclear establishment. Past heads of the establishment, however, have condemned official claims on Pokjaran II almost in a chorus. Iyengar, has also added a political dimension to the debate that is bound to embarrass the Pakistan-obsessed BJP. Added to this, perhaps, is an anti-china angle. The controversy has broken out around the same time as India is witnessing a media-powered campaign to create new tensions between New Delhi and Beijing. The best answer to this bogey comes, ironically, from a security analyst long associated with the bomb lobby. Subrahmanyam, in a newspaper article co-authored with scientist V. Therefore, the Indian deterrent posture will not lose its credibility if India is compelled to rely on fission weapons only. It is difficult to control or regulate the firing of the missiles since both sides are under compulsion to use the missiles before they are eliminated by the enemy strike. As soon as the first city is hit, populations of all cities would attempt to empty out into the countryside since there will be panic that their own city will be the next target in the next few minutes. The anti-nuclear-weapon activists, meanwhile, can only hope at the most to have their say in the alternative media. Chapter 9 : Japan sparks India's nuclear debate Page 12

13 Read "India's Nuclear Debate Exceptionalism and the Bomb" by Priyanjali Malik with Rakuten Kobo. Making the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party's nuclear tests in its starting point, this book examines how opinion. Page 13