Section I: Democratic Governance and Long-Term Reconciliation A Conceptual Approach

Transcription

1 Section I: Democratic Governance and Long-Term Reconciliation A Conceptual Approach

2 Long-term reconciliation: a broader framework As the reconciliation process moves from short term to long term, its framework significantly broadens Short-term, or first generation reconciliation processes: Political mediation Cessation of hostilities Democratic transition (elections) Crucial, but specific, time-bound and narrow Long term, or second generation reconciliation processes: Maintenance of peace Sustainable human development Democratic consolidation Also crucial, but more general, ongoing, and broad 2

3 Long-term reconciliation: the importance of institutions As the reconciliation process moves from short term to long term, the role of democratic institutions becomes more important. Short-term reconciliation may be conducted through ad hoc or temporary institutions Long-term reconciliation, however, depends critically on functioning of democratic institutions (accountable and responsive), Inclusive participation and trust in the state and among citizens 3

4 Long-term reconciliation & democratic development The pursuit of long-term reconciliation is co- dependent with the pursuit of democratic development -- and share the same goals: peace development and democracy Organic vision of post-conflict democratic building based on universal principles: Human Rights Free speech Open political participation Government Transparency 4

5 Challenges to long-term reconciliation In this way, the challenges to long-term reconciliation are similar to the challenges to democratic governance. Key constraints include: Institutional capacity to: Prevent and resolve conflict Promote reconciliation Promote human development Promote meaningful participation in the political system Identify and respond to citizens aspirations, needs and challenges Trust in government institutions 5

6 Section II: Experiences in Latin America Lessons and More: -Guatemala: Peace Agreements as a National Agenda 6

7 Guatemala: Peace Accords turned National Project On December , Guatemala s Peace Accords ended the country s 36-year civil war and opened a new chapter in the country's history. The obligations they impose on the Guatemalan government, including significant constitutional reforms, are written down in black and white. One of the central and long term conditions set in the Peace Accords was the reform and modernization of the Justice System, which conveniently falls in to the wider context of State reform. However, the judicial system remains weak, as evidenced by the widespread impunity of crimes and the inability of the State to control the increasing drug trafficking problem. 7

8 El Salvador - No other solution but a political solution Government-sponsored military oppression unable to militarily overcome dissident groups despite brutal terror actions: documented assassinations in 1980 More than in 1981 Systematic violence only further imbedded discontent and mistrust amongst the population and rallied opposition Between 1982 and 1989, the two main insurgent groups -Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) y el Frente Democrático Revolucionario (FDR)- engaged government parties in over 35 different initiatives to reestablish dialogue and seek a cessation of hostilities 8

9 El Salvador The turning point Even though the regional Esquipulas II conference in 1987served as a catalyst to intensify negotiations between government and insurgent parties, internal violent events thwarted efforts, and 1989 saw the redeployment of an FMLN offensive that intensified the levels of violence Only a focused and dedicated approach by United Nations Secretary- General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar served to managed to create a space for a dialogue conference between the government and the FMLN Carried under the capacities given to him by a Security Council resolution Participation of trusted neutral party allowed both sides to confidently articulate interests and agree to their first agreement of understanding on April The Geneva accords lay the groundwork for multiple initiatives and agreements that followed, each becoming a fundamental step towards achieving better understanding of the social conditions that gave rise to the core conflict, as well as creating a more integral approach to the necessary changes 9

10 El Salvador The pending effort The Chapultepec Accord of January officially culminated the process marked a very clear end to open hostilities in El Salvador Established Forum for Economic and Social Understanding which contemplated clear objectives multi-phased approach towards achieving a series of agreements to promote economic stabilization and engage social marginalization examination of labor laws legal framework to encourage more harmonious environment in-depth analysis to search for long-term solutions towards urban and suburban marginalization Forum composed of government representatives, private sector and laborprivate sector abandoned effort in 1993 to prepare for elections and never rejoined Forum Noticeable lack of pressure from international community- particularly the UN system, which failed to follow-up on the compromises it had encouraged in Vienna originally 10

11 Peru Democracy lacks roots, conflict does not Conflicts during the 1980 s and 1990 s have origins that date back, in many ways, hundreds of years: inequality and racism run deeply across racial, ethnic, cultural and geographic divides Originated in the more marginalized areas of the country (in-land mountainous territories closer to Andean ridge and jungles) two main armed factions: Sendero Luminoso and Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru Fujimori s government emphasized strengthening the military as the only solution to on-going conflict and discouraged trust in democratic institutions through a decade-long propaganda machine devoted to demonizing the enemy and justifying government actions Since the Fujimori government s military and police offensives did manage to disband dissident groups (although Sendero Luminoso leader Abimail Guzman signed a Peace Accord in 1993 as he was held in captivity) there was no nationally consolidated peace accord 11

12 Peru Reconciliation processes only initiated with democratic development Truth and Reconciliation Commission formed in 2001 during Peru s transition to democracy following Alberto Fujimori s government Civil society initiative -journalists and more importantly Human Rights NGOs- embraced initially by Valentín Paniagua s 9-month government and then by Alejandro Toledo s elected government Grass-roots intiative: Human Rights monitors active from 1983 during early years of conflict various organizations, groups networks, consolidated under the National Coordinator 12

13 Peru Purposes of Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission enjoyed legal mandate, granted in its creation, to carry out independent analyses and investigations of violent events, including systematic abuses carried by either of the two dissident groups, as well as by military and defense forces Provided recommendations for institutional reforms necessary for reconciliation which included: Strengthen democratic authority and institutions through all the territory particularly in rural and marginalized areas Promote democratic institutionality and monitoring of National Defense and military sectors Overhaul justice system to guarantee respect for citizen s rights and reestablish rehabilitation as the motivating objective of the prison system Guarantee education and promote information campaigns, particularly in rural and marginalized communities, to deepen understanding of democratic life and governance 13

14 Peru Powerful interests run counter to reconciliation purposes Despite enjoying widespread social support from affected populations, the Commission and its report failed to gain political support at a national level Weakened democratic institutions failed to provide a platform from which to raise awareness of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Report Before Commission's report was ever concluded -29 August former Fujimori government officials, and, retired and active military officials seized on its relative obscurity and initiated a propaganda efforts to discredit and quiet its findings: Claimed report justified actions by dissident groups Linked commission members to left-leaning organizations that were identified as being extensions of SL and MRTA Even so, it is widely recognized by students and political activists as containing fundamental recommendations for continuing to broaden democratic transitions 14

15 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Latin America Argentina National Commission for Forced Disappearances (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) The commission was documented in the Nunca Más (Never Again) report, presented to President Alfonsín on 20 September The report opened the doors to the trial of the military juntas of the dictatorship as it had recorded, case by case, the forced disappearance of about 9,000 persons from 1976 to 1983 Chile National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación; "Rettig Report") National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture ("Valech Report") The Valech Report detailed abuses committed in Chile between 1973 and 1990 by agents of Augusto Pinochet's military regime. The first part of the report was published on November 29, 2004 and detailed the results of a six month investigation. A second part was released on June 1, Testimony has been classified, and will be kept secret for the next 50 years. Therefore, they cannot be used in trials concerning human rights violations. 15

16 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Latin America El Salvador United Nations Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad) Guatemala Historical Clarification Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, CEH) The creation of the CEH was ordered by the Oslo Accords of 1994 that sought to bring an end to Guatemala s three-decade-long Civil War, during which an estimated 200,000 people lost their lives. Its mandate was to investigate the numerous human rights violations perpetrated by both sides in the armed conflict. Panama Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad) Peru Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) This Commission focused on massacres, forced disappearances, human rights violations, terrorist attacks, and violence against women, committed by both the rebel groups as well as the military of Peru. Its work encompassed holding public meetings, collecting testimonies, and making forensic investigations. In it s conclusions it made recommendations for reparations and institutional reforms. 16

17 Section III: Democratic Governance & Long- Term Reconciliation in Latin America: Challenges 17

18 Reconciliation in Latin America Reconciliation is an ongoing process and challenges in various Latin American countries After decades of suffering from dictatorship and/or armed conflict most Latin American countries made their transition to democracy Despite that fact, the achievement of the goals and objectives of long-term reconciliation have not been developed as a fundamental component within national political agendas Democratic development has, therefore, also stalled 18

19 Attrition on Democratic Development Progresses: Free, fair, competitive elections (EDI) High levels of voter turnout; 69.1 % And democracy as a system enjoys a level of support and satisfaction of 53% among Latin Americans 38% of Latin Americans are satisfied with the performance of only 36% have a lot or at least some confidence in their governments (Latinobarometro, 2006) 19

20 Perceptions of government and democratic institutions 19% of citizens throughout the region are both displeased with the results of democratic governments and would be indifferent to the form of government in place 19% also believes democracy s most important task should be to deliver economic environment that can guarantee opportunities for a dignified livelihood 20% believe their governments can solve most problems; only 47% think that, at the very least, their governments can solve some problems And a full 14% feel that the best way to advocate their interests is to participate in protest movements 20

21 Distrust amidst discontent The institutions of democracy are poorly trusted: Judicial system (36%) Congress (27%) Political parties (22%) President is held in middling esteem (47%) Police (37%) In general, Latin Americans distrust institutions because they feel that institutions discriminate 66% of Latin Americans feel discriminated against Nearly 1 in 5 feels discriminated against because of poverty (more than any other factor) 21

22 with no Justice in sight Only 36% of Latin Americans trust their States Judicial Systems 60% do not believe that the courts and processes of law correctly punish and convict the guilty Almost half of Latin Americans believe that when Justice is served, it happens too late 22

23 Root causes for conflict remain Inequality Poverty Exclusion 23

24 Uphill challenges Poverty: 42% of the Latin Americans live in poverty One in four youths neither works nor studies leading to decreased opportunities for economic improvement Inequality: Region has the highest income inequality in the world Access to government services including education and health care remains skewed Exclusion: Burden of inequality and poverty carried disproportionately by marginalized groups Divisions along racial, ethno-cultural, geographic and socioeconomic divisions continue to be grossly evident More than one in six births is not registered, leading to lifetimes of estrangement from the state (Unicef, 2006) 24

25 Long-term reconciliation and democratic governance Dictatorship and armed conflict may have waned, but social conditions and the arrival of democracy have opened up spaces for conflict that is not always being resolved within the institutionality of democracy Lack of progress in resolving the social agenda will continue to erode trust in democratic institutions For long-term reconciliation to be successful, it must be inserted into a national political agenda that is grounded in the objective of deepening democracy The political agenda for long-term reconciliation should serve as an enabler for marginalized groups to be included more fully in their societies. 25

26 Building Lasting Trust in Democratic Institutions Reexamination of relationships: Between citizens, particularly across vertical social strata Between citizens and the State, 26