MAF 2010 THESES 1. KEYNOTE 2. POWER 3. POWER

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1 MAF 2010 THESES 1. KEYNOTE Europe s leadership culture is deeply rooted in Plato s political philosophy. In his politeia (The Republic) the foundation for the military per se has been laid (cf. the Guardians, featuring the virtue of bravery) as an integral and essential part of politics. What is more, his paideia (The Education) gave birth to leadership competence to be acquired by individual education rather than by social rank or status. In doing so, he identifies education as the one and only criterion for the moral acquisition of leadership competence and consequently for the authority as a leader. Hereinafter, the dimension of education as a catalyst for legitimately acquired leadership competence shall be elucidated. 2. POWER According to Max Weber, power can be described as the ability to enforce one s will even against resistance. The social concept of power can mainly be found in vertical social relationships (Otto von Gierke), i.e. in rulership. In any case, rulership needs to be legitimised by way of reaching some sort of consensus, which in effect is nothing but allegiance. Unless such legitimate, consensual allegiance is reached, the only way to exercise power then will be way of sheer force. In a first step power will be physically created, thereafter solidified by establishing rules and regulations, and finally interpreted. In a military context, this third step may be the make or break of mission success: In the essence, power need not be physically present, but only interpreted as such. That is why power could likewise be defined as the projected, interpreted authority, whether such perception is based on fiction or facts. Not only does power need to be perceived as such, also means of power need to be recognised in order to be effective (deterrence, dissuasion, prevention).it is all about communicating one s potential and power while accepting somebody else s power. Such acceptance, however, is rooted in practical philosophy ( fight for acceptance ), being profoundly human in nature and reaching farther than one might expect power and military competence to go. As a matter of fact it is all about becoming a human being, able to reflect upon one s behaviour and to interact with your neighbour the alter ego. Without indulging too much on practical philosophy one could clearly state that proper acceptance or recognition, which generates responsibility, can only be achieved by not exercising one s factual or administrative power, even though one would have the freedom to do so, just for the sake of observing morality. 3. POWER An indispensable prerequisite for the above mentioned rulershiplegitimising consensus is the operational availability of facts and figures and its reasonable context (information). As early as in the nomoi (The Laws) by Plato the fact became evident that proper obedience and allegiance by citizens and soldiers can only be achieved by appealing to their understanding so that the led have a clear picture of the leader s intent and reasoning. That is why legitimate rulership and thus leadership can only arise from reasonable rules and regulations. Or to interpret Max Weber proper understanding the raison d etre of facts and figures is essential for leadership. Such understanding can only be arrived at if the led are able to process enormous amounts of data and more importantly, if they are highly educated and trained. Only then will it be possible for the receiver to artificially generate data as

2 well as to check and assess them. It is in particular the norms of power and obedience that contribute to the success of military leadership. This applies not just to the discipline of military units, but also to mission success or military victory per se. The latter can only be perceived as such if it can be transformed into an enforcement of the political will as suggested by Clausewitz. Thus, a battlefield evacuated of all casualties and combatants can hardly be considered a victory, let alone a proper foundation for a lasting peace and a return to normal conditions in the region. Consequently, a just peace can only be attained by the exercise of just power and authority. 4. LAW It stands to reason that legitimising military authority by law, entails limiting it as well. By setting the legal framework for the exercise of military power its agents are cast into a normative straightjacket that provides beyond its mere functional dimension a proper legitimisation through accountability. It is this responsibility that is at the core of the Clausewitzian concept of war being profoundly political in nature. Especially, if one considers the military as the executive, operational arm of the political decision-makers. Law understood as a normative regulator for actions, can only be conceived in combination with freedom, meaning the led or the subordinate has the liberty of choice either to observe the law or to break it. Ever since the concept of liberty entered human thinking in the Age of Enlightenment in the mid of the 18 th Century, military and political leaders have been trying hard to achieve a maximum of freedom by imposing regulations, while being free in their choice of regulations: One of such consistent efforts resulted in the foundation of the Theresan Military Academy, in December 1751, in order to combine training with education so as to yield fine officers (military skills) and righteous men (moral values), respectively. Such liberty in the military context manifests itself in mission command or missiontype tactics (German: Auftragstaktik) as opposed to order command. 5. LAW While politicians are to give strategic guidance to the military without micromanaging it, legal experts are to provide transparent and clear instructions for the sake of creating a basis and a framework for legal certainty under the rule of law. However, our peacetime bureaucracy has come to take the military into a stranglehold by issuing an ever-growing number of democratic rules and regulations that hamper rather than help the military leaders in efficiently and effectively discharging their duties. This is in total contradiction to mission command or mission-type tactics (German: Auftragstaktik) that prevails Western hemisphere. In mission-type tactics, the military commander gives their subordinate leaders a clearly defined goal (the mission), the forces needed to accomplish that goal and a time frame within which the goal must be reached. The subordinate leaders then implement the order independently. The subordinate leader is given, to a large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in execution which allows a high-degree of flexibility. Mission-type orders free the higher leadership from tactical details. For the success of the mission-type tactics it is especially important that the subordinate leaders understand the intent of the orders and are given proper guidance and that they are trained so they can act independently. In contrast to the mission-type tactics is Command and control used by U.S. armed forces. The success of the doctrine rests

3 upon the receiver of orders understanding the intent of the issuer of the orders and acting to achieve their goal. In this context of mission-type tactics law should provide clear guidance and limitations for military actions. However, micromanagement, by issuing regulations in abundance as is common practice in the EU, does not contribute to clarity: Such centralisation deprives both the leader and the led of any initiative and responsibility and technocracy as well as bureaucracy prevail. Such setting is detrimental to military success and, more importantly, poses a tremendous threat to the lives and limbs of both soldiers and civilians. Thus the military culture and its underlying legal provisions urgently need reconsidering. Currently military leaders act true to the motto He who hesitates is lost and he who makes fewer mistakes remains victorious!. Yielding more responsibility to highly-qualified leaders could remedy the situation. 6. ETHICS Ever since the polis of the antiquity the one and only raison d etre of the state is defending its citizens against internal or external enemies. To this end it is to establish and maintain the military as an integral and essential part of politics. The soldier as a citizen in uniform (or in extremis the citizen as a soldier in civvies) may thus be considered republicanism at its best. The people of the state need to be aware that it is the organisational form that allows best the pursuit of freedom for its citizens provided they are fully committed to it. This symbiotic interdependence between citizens and state boils down to the formula: State without citizens is weak, and citizens without state likewise. As early as in the 16 th Century Machiavelli (as did Spinoza in the 17 th Century) postulated a strong citizenship for a strong republic with strong in the sense of reasonable. Thus the state or the republic is well-advised to train and educate its citizens accordingly. 7. ETHICS Given the fact that the state s purpose is security in a comprehensive sense, it stands to reason that it uses its Guardians maintain or restore security externally with soldiers and internally with policemen. The Guardians are to undergo life-long training so as to form the proper ethos and to develop the skills and tools required for the coping of all security challenges. Furthermore, during this life-long training those moral values are instilled in the Guardians that enable them to defend their society. Hence it is no wonder that military ranks and promotions are dependent on performance in combat or in class. Proper performance in leadership is judged upon military success, i.e. victory, but also on social (soft) skills, i.e. on remaining humane. Military discipline and effectiveness is built on the foundation of obedience to orders. The military leader in an equally critical way has to obey loyally and to command responsibly. He who is not used to obeying, will not be able to give sensible orders. The common soldier the grunt, who at the lower end of the chain of command follows orders in defence of the community, is morally entitled to the best possible training, equipment, and leadership through his officers. In return, the officer may rightfully expect discipline and obedience from the soldier. It is this very interdependence of loyalty, resulting in obedience, and leadership, resulting in responsible orders, that make up what has come to be called the military ethos.

4 8. CULTURE The modern European military of the 21st Century is again facing cultural diversity: On the one hand even national units are set up "multi-culturally" (due to naturalised immigrants), on the other hand operations be the EU-, UN-, or NATO-led are exclusively conducted by multi-national, so-called combined task forces. This means a dual challenge for the leader and his leadership performance. It should not go unnoticed that the Austro-Hungarian Army provides historical precedence of successfully managing cultural diversity. It s a time-proven fact that military leadership in order to be successful must be based on intercultural competence. The first step towards such competence is to become aware of one s own cultural background. By differentiating from the Other, one s own identity becomes evident. It is the difference that makes the difference and creates the perception of my own Being. This finding of one s being different may come as a painful sentiment and may lead to revisiting values and attitudes inculturated earlier. In order to prevent such sentiments from becoming life-threatening due to the emergency situation of military combat, modern militaries are well-advised to raise cultural awareness as early as in peacetime. Otherwise the soldiers will not be able to function properly, let alone allow confidence and reliability in the form of comradeship to develop. 9. CULTURE Another cultural dimension opens up when dealing with the so-called Petersberg tasks of modern European military operations. These are not meant to indiscriminately deploy hard-power tools, but rather to launch peace operations, based on political and socio-economic deliberations. In doing so in a prudent way, order and security structures will gradually develop and consolidate, thereby assisting the infant or failing state to slowly recover and adopt a minimum of liberal-democratic standards. Such efforts do not result from a euro-centristic hybris nor from a post-colonial neoimperialism, but rather from sound reasoning upon safeguarding fundamental rights. This intercultural competence is not only helpful in peace operations, but also in outright war, i.e. in massive military campaigns preceding them. Success in combat, aka victory, as shown in recent years by UK, France and the US in the framework of NATO, is dependent on intercultural awareness at all levels, the political, strategic, operational, and tactical one. Thus intercultural competence may be truly considered a conditio sine qua non for attaining both the strategic objective (victory) and the political purpose (peace and stability). 10. CONCLUSION In concluding one could state that military leadership, in order to be reasonable and not just legitimate (=morally justified), but also sustainable (=prudent), requires competences that go beyond the mere military hardcore skills to also include legal, ethical, political, and cultural ones.

5 Only then will military leadership live up to is classical vocation of providing comprehensive security and a lasting and fair peace.