ALBANIA. Austria Hungary. Romania. Croatia. Bosnia. Bulgaria. Yugoslavia. Macedonia ALBANIA. Greece

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1 50 NATIONS IN TRANSIT ALBANIA Austria Hungary Ljubljana Slovenia Zagreb Croatia Bosnia Sarajevo Belgrade Yugoslavia Danube Adriatic Sea me Skopje Tirana Macedonia ALBANIA Italy Greece Romania Bulgaria Sofia Polity: Presidential-parliamentary democracy Economy: Capitalist-statist (transitional) Population: 3,400,000 GNI per capita at PPP $ (2000): 3,600 Capital: Tirana Ethnic Groups: Albanian (95 percent), Greek (3 percent), other, including Roma, Serb, and Bulgarian (2 percent) Size of private sector as % of GDP (mid-2001): 75 The scores and ratings for this country reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisors, and the author of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author. ââ and áá indicate score changes of.25 or more. â and á indicate changes of less than.25. NATIONS IN TRANSIT SCORES Democratization Rule of Law Economic Liberalization â 4.75 áá 4.38 áá 4.13 á 3.94.na.na 5.50 áá 5.00 á ââ áá 4.17 áá 3.75 KEY ANNUAL INDICATORS GDP per capita ($) Real GDP growth (% change) Inflation rate Exports ($ millions) Imports ($ millions) Foreign Direct Investment ($ millions) Unemployment rate Life Expectancy (years) , , , , , , na

2 ALBANIA 51 INTRODUCTION The Republic of Albania continues to work under difficult conditions toward the consolidation of democratic institutions. The 2001 parliamentary elections were characterized by calm during the campaign and initial round of balloting, but subsequent rounds decayed substantially as numerous election protests were filed and appealed all the way to the Constitutional Court. The atmosphere of the election was charged in part by the upcoming presidential election in Although Parliament is responsible for electing the president, its own election results failed to give any single party the majority that is constitutionally required to select the new executive outright. Improved registration procedures and administrative capacity continued to expand the base of eligible registered voters. Nevertheless, voter turnout was modest and perhaps reflected increased apathy. During the period covered by this report, civil society benefited from long-awaited legislative reform, including a series of changes that established a framework for registering nongovernmental organizations. Although NGOs did participate in this legislative initiative, their influence on the policy-making process remains relatively limited in general. Civil society groups depend to a large extent on foreign assistance, and the media consult NGO experts sparingly. The Albanian public continues to shift toward electronic media as their primary source of news and information because newspapers remain largely partisan political mouthpieces. In May 2000, Albania Radio and Television (RTSH) became an independent public entity; all other electronic media outlets are now private. The legal infrastructure for electronic media continues to improve, and some opposition-oriented stations have been licensed officially. Attacks on the media, while decreasing, persist nonetheless, and the ability of the media to represent itself is limited. Governance and public administration continue to benefit from a solid Constitution and an increasingly sophisticated legal framework, and under this framework the decentralization of authority to local governing institutions has progressed significantly. In particular, the framework clarifies the right of local governments to own and administer property. Several legal decisions on the protection of state secrets were issued during the reporting period, including procedures for declassifying information. The impact of these initiatives on transparency remains unclear at this juncture. The fledgling office of the ombudsman is now fully operational, and the number of claims it receives has been increasing steadily. Overall administrative capacity remains modest, and civil service reform continues to be slow. The government generally respects the panoply of modern human rights that the Constitution sets forth, including private property ownership, and the country s multitiered judicial system and the Constitutional Court are taking an increasingly active role in their enforcement. During the reporting period, the judicial and legal organs clashed and received substantial scrutiny for their respective performances. The judicial system itself, while tested, demonstrated its capacity to address larger institutional conflict in the appropriate venues. The system as a whole continues to labor without adequate resources, but several needed legislative initiatives emerged to address lingering problems. Nevertheless, public confidence in the judicial system remains low. The Albanian public continues to view corruption as a problem that is endemic at all levels of government. It also views doctors, judges, tax officers, and customs officials as generally corrupt. In addition, a public opinion poll taken in 2001 indicated that the public considers corruption to be a central factor affecting the socioeconomic well-being of the country. In 2000, a World Bank study determined that Albania s level of administrative corruption was the highest in Central and Eastern Europe. Under the auspices of the Stability Pact, the Albanian government continues to elaborate plans for addressing corruption, but its efforts thus far have been criticized for lacking specificity and strategic priorities. Although the government also introduced new laws to combat trafficking and money laundering, it has not enforced them effectively. Despite these challenges, Albania s economy continues to improve, and the International Monetary Fund has commended the country for its overall economic performance. Privatization proceeded in 2001 with notable developments in the telecommunications sector, and tax collection exceeded projections. The government limited the budget deficit to 9.2 percent while increasing social spending, and it made visible progress on several long-standing infrastructure projects. Still, Albania remains one of the poorest countries in Europe and continues to struggle with the flight of its nationals to countries that offer more favorable economic conditions. DEMOCRATIZATION Political Process Since the civil instability of 1997, Albania has held presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. Each transition was marked by decreasing incidents of violence and efforts to improve the electoral process, thus indicating an overall increase in political stability. However, continued irregularities in the election process, hostility between the government and the opposition, and a high level of voter apathy show that there is still room for improvement. The most recent parliamentary elections took place in June and July Owing to irregularities, voting extended to five rounds and resulted in the longest election in Albania s post-communist history. Although the international community deemed the elections acceptable, the experience

3 52 ALBANIA highlighted a number of structural weaknesses and led to calls for further review of the country s electoral framework. For example, in its preliminary findings the OSCE noted that the elections mark[ed] progress over past elections in the areas of campaign conduct, media and election administration. However, it also observed that [t]he election process has been protracted, litigious and uncertain. Albania s 1998 Constitution calls for a 140-seat unicameral Parliament, down from the 155-member Parliament that was elected in In the 2001 elections, directly elected candidates filled 100 seats. The remaining 40 seats were divided proportionally among party lists, based on the percentage of votes each party received in the first round of balloting. For a party s list to qualify, the party had to receive no less than 2.5 percent of the votes in the first round. Party coalitions had to receive no less than 4 percent. The Socialist Party (SP), which has led the government since 1997, ran without a coalition, won 73 seats, and thereby retained power. Under the leadership of former President Sali Berisha, the Democratic Party (DP) formed the Union for Victory coalition, which included the Legality Movement Party, the National Front Party, the Republican Party, and the Liberal Union. The coalition received 46 seats. The newly formed New Democrat Party (NDP) won 6 seats. Four smaller parties the Social Democratic Party, the Human Rights Union, the Agrarian Party, and the Democratic Alliance, all former members of the SP-led coalition also met the 2.5 percent threshold and earned 13 seats among them The remaining two seats went to directly elected, independent candidates. Albania s mixed proportional system, which is outlined in the 1998 Constitution, proved to be somewhat problematic in practice. As the election approached, it became apparent that some so-called independent candidates actually had links to political parties. Put simply, the main parties had realized that they could maximize their representation in Parliament by running candidates as independents. On June 12, 2001, 10 parties filed complaints with the Central Election Committee (CEC), alleging that many independent candidates were actually allied with the SP and the DP. In response, the CEC issued regulations on the qualifications for an independent candidacy and announced that it would recognize 109 of the 114 independent candidates as affiliated with a party. Prior to the 2001 elections, there were three party groupings in power. The governing coalition, led by the SP, also included the Human Rights Union, the Democratic Alliance Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party, and the National Unity Party. The primary opposition coalition consisted of the DP, led by Sali Berisha, along with the Legality Party, the Christian Democrats, the Democratic Union Party, and the Social Democratic Union Party. The third grouping, a nonaligned center-right coalition known as the United Right, consisted of the Republican Party, the National Front Party, the Right Democratic Party, and the Movement for Democracy Party. After the 2001 elections, the SP named Ilir Meta as prime minister. Meta had first become prime minister in the fall of 1999, when he replaced Pandeli Majko. The decision to keep Meta as prime minister was made despite continuing tensions between him and SP leader Fatos Nano, who supported the candidacy of former Finance Minister Arben Malaj. These elections were particularly significant given that Parliament elects the president of the republic and that the next presidential elections are scheduled for According to the 1998 Constitution, the president is elected with a three-fifths majority vote of Parliament to serve a five-year term and is eligible for reelection only once. A party must control 84 seats in order to elect the president outright. Since the SP fell short of this goal in 2001, it will have to forge an alliance in order to name the new president in If Parliament fails to reach a majority vote after five attempts, the body is dissolved and new elections are held within 60 days. On July 24, 1997, the date of the last presidential election, the SP-controlled Parliament elected Rexhep Meidani, an independent-minded SP member. Since the advent of democracy in 1990, the government has permitted the formation of independent parties, and a variety have been formed since then. For the 2001 election, the CEC registered 38 parties. Article 46 of the 1998 Constitution guarantees the rights of Albanian citizens to organize for any lawful purpose. However, it prohibits the formation of parties that are totalitarian; incite and support racial, religious, or ethnic hatred; use violence to take power or influence state policies; or are nontransparent or secretive in character. In February 2000, the government promulgated Law No. 8580, For Political Parties, which detailed new procedures for the organization and registration of political parties. Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of women and minorities in government, women continue to face difficulties in being selected as candidates and achieving leadership positions in political parties. The new Parliament includes only eight women. Despite the existence of a variety of political parties, the two largest parties, the SP and the DP, have dominated Albania s political arena. However, popular disillusionment with the SP and the DP has led to the growing popularity of a new party, the NDP. The Reform Movement faction of the DP, along with two other parties created by former Democrats, formed the NDP in early Genc Pollo, former DP deputy chairman, is the party s leader. The NDP portrays itself as a progressive, center-right alternative to the DP, and in the recent parliamentary elections it won 5.2 percent of the vote. The NDP has established itself as a third political force in the country. The relationship between the SP and the DP is characterized by polarization, a situation exacerbated by the most recent elections. DP participation in the political process frequently consists of protests and threats of boycotts. In the lead-up to the October 2000 local elections, the DP

4 ALBANIA 53 heavily criticized the election process. It then attempted to boycott the second round of balloting. Nevertheless, most of the DP candidates for municipal posts ignored the party order and remained in the race. Likewise, DP charges of ballot stuffing and other irregularities in the June 2001 elections caused the party chairman, Sali Berisha, to once again threaten to boycott the election results. Since the 1997 crisis, Albanian authorities have been working to reform the electoral framework, and in May 2000 a new electoral code was promulgated. The code governed the 2000 local elections and the 2001 parliamentary elections. It implemented Article 153 of the Constitution, which established the Central Election Committee as a permanent organ that prepares, supervises, directs, and verifies all aspects that have to do with elections and referenda and declares their results. Although the electoral laws governing both national and local elections guarantee multiparty representation on voting commissions, the composition of the CEC has been a very controversial topic. Reviews of the CEC s performance in the 2000 local elections were mixed, and its actions in the 2001 parliamentary elections have called its efficacy into question. The institution of the first national computerized voter register allowed nearly all voters to cast their ballots in the 2000 local elections. In May 2001, Parliament amended the 2000 electoral code in an attempt to address lingering issues, including last minute voter registration. The amendment to the electoral code outlined procedures that allow voters to register up to 24 hours prior to the election through local courts. As a result, the number of eligible voters increased from 2,329,639 in October 2000 to 2,449,404. Despite this increase in eligible voters, the turnout for the 2001 elections remained fairly low. Some observers of Albanian politics believe these figures reflect voter apathy. Fifty-four percent of eligible voters participated in the first round, and 48 percent voted in the second round. These figures mark a downward trend from reported turnout in past elections. Bearing in mind that the maintenance of accurate voter lists has been historically problematic in Albania, the following figures have been reported for past national elections: 1991 parliamentary, 59 percent; 1992 parliamentary, 95 percent; 1992 local, 70.5 percent; 1994 constitutional referendum, 75 percent; 1996 parliamentary, 89 percent; 1996 local, 75 percent; 1997 parliamentary, 66 percent; and 1998 constitutional referendum, 52 percent. The June 2001 elections highlighted a number of remaining weaknesses in the electoral process, which resulted in a long delay in determining the final composition of Parliament. Complaints to the CEC and the appeals process presented the main problem, and irregularities in a number of districts necessitated multiple rounds of voting. However, the CEC, unclear on its competency in some cases, did not investigate all reported irregularities. In a number of cases that it did investigate, the CEC could not achieve consensus among its members and at times appeared to be coming under political pressure. As a result of these factors, the parties turned to the courts to resolve electoral questions. By the conclusion of the election, nearly 40 electionrelated cases had been filed with the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, the fact that the parties sought redress in the courts rather than through violence or boycotts was a promising development in the Albanian political process. Civil Society Prior to 2001, civil society in Albania had long struggled with formal recognition under the legal system. The abuse of registration provisions by pyramid scheme operators had effectively halted any normal registration of nongovernmental organizations in the post-1997 period. Following an extended dialogue with the government, Parliament passed several pieces of legislation in 2001, including Law No. 8788, On Nonprofit Organizations; Law No. 8789, On the Registration of Nonprofit Organizations; and amendments to the civil code. The new legislative framework recognizes the validity of nonprofit organizations, provides a basis for organizing and operating nonprofits, and explicitly authorizes the ongoing registration of nonprofit entities. The final adoption of this legislation marked significant progress in the creation of an environment that is conducive to the development of an active civil society. According to a survey by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the new laws significantly changed the rules relating to [the] permissibility of economic activities. NGOs may claim exemptions from profit taxes, and the value-added tax generally does not apply to humanitarian aid. Other taxes, such as those on buildings and agricultural land, do apply. There are no legal restrictions on income generation, membership fees, or other types of fund-raising by NGOs. There is very little specific information on existing NGOs and even less on their breakdown by sector. NGOs are responsible for registering with the district courts, and the government does not maintain a central registry. The new NGO law should assist in regulating the collection of information on NGOs; however, it will take time to compile precise information. Current estimates on the number of NGOs operating in the country vary from as low as 400 to as high as 800. The population s level of involvement in volunteer or philanthropic activities is equally difficult to gauge. Albanian NGOs address and undertake advocacy in a broad spectrum of areas, including the environment, juvenile justice, gender, and other social issues. In 2001, there was a noted increase in the involvement of NGOs on matters related to the Stability Pact, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, and anticorruption initiatives.

5 54 ALBANIA The paucity of information on NGOs is also due to the fact that NGOs remain underdeveloped. They lack organizational capacity and are reliant upon foreign donor funding. In addition, there has been little improvement in relations between NGOs and the media. This situation is due primarily to a lack of responsible reporting on the part of journalists and poor public relations skills on the part of NGOs. In light of these issues, a number of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations are working with local NGOs to address the need for organizational development, financial management and accountability, sustainability, and improved public image. These international groups provide technical assistance and training in areas such as developing bylaws and operational procedures, recruiting and training board members, fund-raising, strategic planning, and improving public and media relations. The materials generated for this training exist in the local language. To the extent possible, given these weaknesses, NGOs have been increasingly included in policy making. The recent passage of the NGO law is a case in point. Civil society representatives were involved in the drafting process, including commenting on and discussing the various drafts with the government. Ultimately, the Ministry of Justice agreed to rework the drafts based on this expert input. The 1998 Constitution is, in part, responsible for the increase in civil society s access to government. In the section on fundamental rights, it guarantees the rights of Albanian citizens to attend meetings of elected bodies, organize for any lawful purpose, and petition organs of government. Also, Article 81 of the Constitution provides that any group of 20,000 voters may initiate legislation at the national level. Supplementing the right to initiate national legislation is the right, upon the motion of 50,000 voters, to call a national referendum on the abrogation of a law. The government has taken other steps to improve transparency and create opportunities for NGO input. However, in general, interaction between civil society and the government remains limited. In terms of trade unions, the 1998 Constitution provides for the right to unite freely in labor organizations and gives workers the freedom to strike within some legal boundaries, which may be established to assure the provision of essential social services. In addition, the 1995 labor code sets forth the requirements for unions pertaining to registration, representation of employees interests in court, the raising of tax-exempt funds, and their right to function without interference from the government, employers, or employer organizations. There are two main trade union groups in Albania: the Confederation of the Trade Unions of Albania (KSSH) and the Union of the Independent Trade Unions of Albania (BSPSH). KSSH records membership at approximately 100,000, while BSPSH numbers its members at approximately 118,000. However, membership in both organizations has been declining. The high level of unemployment in Albania in recent years has reduced the effectiveness of trade unions in terms of their ability to engage in collective bargaining. Albania has made some progress in educational reforms. In 2001, for the first time in recent history, the government expressed formal approval for the concept of private universities. The government also approved the development of a national education center for evaluating and testing. Nevertheless, professors continue to voice concern that hiring and admissions decisions are politically influenced. Independent Media In May 2000, Albania Radio and Television (RTSH) became an independent public entity. All other electronic media are private. TVSH is the sole public broadcaster in the country and holds two of the four licenses to broadcast nationally. In November 2000, TV Klan and TV Arberia received the remaining two television licenses. Top Albania Radio also received a national broadcast license. There are currently more than 75 private television channels and 30 private radio channels operating throughout the country at the local level. In terms of print media, political parties, labor unions, associations, and groups publish their own newspapers and magazines. Approximately 200 different publications are available in the main cities, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. There are nine major, daily independent newspapers. The three largest are Shekulli, Gazeta Shqiptare, and Koha Jone. Korrieri, DITA, and Ballkan are the three newest independent newspapers. The partisan papers include Zeri i Popullit (SP), Rilindja Demokratike (DP), Republika (Republican Party), LIRIA (Movement for Legality), ORA e Shqiperise (Demo-Christian Party of Albania), and Alternativa Social Demokrate (Social Democratic Party). The print distribution system is wholly private. Daily newspaper circulation continues to decline due to the opening of new private radio and television stations, an increase in the price of the publications, and a general distrust of the print media. Current daily circulation of newspapers is under 50,000 copies. This figure marks a steady decline over the last three years, from a 1998 figure of 85,000 copies. A recent survey conducted by the Albanian Media Institute shows that 65 percent of the public prefers private electronic media. None of the nation s newspapers are financially viable on their own. Commercial Internet access providers were licensed and began to offer service in 1998 and As of 2000, there were seven Internet service providers. There are no legal restrictions on Internet access, but relatively few people can afford a computer or Internet services, particularly in rural areas. In addition, the poor telecommunications infrastruc-

6 ALBANIA 55 ture hinders Internet access. It is estimated that as of 2000, there were only 2,500 Internet users. The 1998 Constitution enshrines both freedom of the press and the right of the public to access state information, and it explicitly prohibits [p]rior censorship of a means of communication. Furthermore, it specifically allows for the licensing of radio and television stations. In May 1997, Parliament passed Law No. 8221, On Public and Private Radio and Television in the Republic of Albania, which sanctioned private broadcasting for the first time. In September 1998, Law No completely replaced Law No and provided for a politically diverse National Council of Radio and Television to regulate and supervise broadcasting. In November 2000, pursuant to the legal framework, the council reviewed a host of license applications in what was a highly competitive process. Perhaps the most notable feature of this process was that the council issued licenses to stations that have sponsored programming that has been openly critical of the current government. In 2001, regulation of private media was an active arena. Parliament passed amendments to existing legislation that further defined the authority of the chairman of the National Council of Radio and Television and the allocation of frequencies and that set rates for licenses. In addition, since the formal licensing of the media business, many new media outlets had incurred liabilities under the Albanian fee system, and a number of them had found it impossible to make full payment within the allotted schedule. In response, the government established an installment system for the fledgling media industry that permits radio and television operators to pay off their liabilities for 2000 and 2001 over a period of time. The legal framework protects private electronic media stations, as well as Albanian Radio and Television, from outside interference and prohibits censorship. Article 61 of the new Law on Electronic Media also prohibits sponsors (advertisers) from interfering with the content and scheduling of programs. In addition, it bans political parties, religious organizations, and state bodies from operating a private radio or television station and restricts any one owner of a company that holds national or television stations in its portfolio to a maximum of 40 percent of the total capital of the company. Despite legislative restrictions, most media outlets are subsidized by, or otherwise affiliated with, political parties. Party and union newspapers generally espouse their sponsors views, and newspapers report politically polarized stories. A recent survey conducted by the Albanian Media Institute showed that 58 percent of the population believes that public television still speaks on behalf of the government. Although there is a legal foundation for freedom of the press, legal penalties for libeling officials and irresponsible reporting do exist. Law No. 7895, For the Criminal Code, which was enacted in 1995, contains a number of provisions that impose a range of criminal penalties for insulting or defaming public figures and symbols. Defamation of public officials, the president of the republic, and national symbols can result in penalties ranging from a fine to three years in prison. Calls for national hatred and propagating false information may be penalized with a fine or up to five years in prison. At times, the state has applied this law to silence criticism of the government. Journalists and human rights activists are campaigning for libel to become a civil, rather than criminal, offense. Attacks on journalists, while decreasing, remain a significant obstacle to the development of an independent media. Another impediment is a lack of journalistic responsibility. The performance of the media during the election campaign is one useful means of gauging the level of progress in this area. In comparison with the local elections of 2000, there was slight improvement in media coverage at the outset of the 2001 parliamentary elections. However, media coverage deteriorated after the first round. The ability of the media to protest incursions into their freedom is limited. There are three main nongovernmental organizations for the media. These are the Albanian Independent Journalists League, the Association of Professional Journalists of Albania, and the League of Albanian Journalists. In general, professional media associations in Albania are fragmented and do not function as an effective voice for reform or the promotion of an independent press. In its 2001 Annual Survey of Press Freedom, Freedom House rated Albania s media as Partly Free. In the period from 1994 to 1996, Albania s rating was downgraded to Not Free owing to the government s control over the media, including legal restrictions on private electronic media and threats against journalists. Albania s rating has remained Partly Free since Governance and Public Administration Parliament is the chief rule-making organ in Albania. However, although it passes legislation, the majority of the actual drafting takes place in the various ministries. Under the 1998 Constitution, certain organic codes (that is, laws on elections or public functionaries) can be approved or amended only with a vote of three-fifths of all members of Parliament. The president has the right to return legislation for review, but a majority of Parliament can overturn the veto. The 1998 Constitution also restricts the president s power to issue a discrete list of topics that involve the traditional duties of head of state and constitutional guardian. In 1998, Parliament passed new rules of parliamentary procedure that provide for greater transparency and public input in the legislative process. Improved procedural guidelines also more clearly define the process for reviewing draft laws and thereby give parliamentary commissions more time

7 56 ALBANIA to analyze and amend bills. The new rules make Parliament much more transparent by allowing the public and media to attend plenary sessions and permitting radio and television stations to broadcast them. The public and the media may obtain information on draft laws and parliamentary reports, and NGOs and other interested parties may attend commission meetings. Albania s parliamentary commissions may also hold public hearings to gather input on draft legislation or other issues. In mid-1998, Parliament began to make its two-week schedule widely available to interested parties and the press. Despite these provisions, there is no consistent or frequent consultation among the public, interested parties, and Parliament. Parliament lacks the appropriate resources and the public lacks sufficient information to undertake an effective consultation process. Proper publication and distribution of laws and regulations has been a consistent problem in post-communist Albania, and in 2000, a State Publications Office was developed to address the problem. By law, it is responsible for publishing legal information such as High Court decisions and commentaries on all organic codes, legal indexes, and legal reviews. However, due to the limited printing capacity of its equipment and frequent power failures, the office currently publishes only the Official Gazette. In June 1999, Parliament adopted Law No. 8503, On the Right of Information for Official Documents, which allows any person to request official information from the state and obligates the government to make official information public. In 2001, the government issued a number of new rules outlining the state s approach to secret information. These rules describe how one obtains a security clearance and how the state classifies and declassifies information. Specific rules and procedures were promulgated to protect state secrets in industrial zones, computer networks, and electronic communications. It remains to be seen whether this new legislation will be used to restrict access to information or to further define what information is available to the public. To increase government transparency and accountability, the 1998 Constitution also established a national ombudsman, or people s advocate. This official is explicitly authorized to enforce the public s right to information and is generally empowered to defend the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of individuals from unlawful or improper actions or failures to act of the organs of public administration. In an effort to depoliticize the post, the Constitution forbids the ombudsman from involvement in political activities and provides that he or she be elected by a supermajority, or a vote of three-fifths of all members of the Assembly. In February 1999, Parliament passed Law No. 8454, For the People s Advocate, on structuring and implementing the ombudsman s office. Since that time, the government has handed down additional decisions to further clarify the jurisdiction of the people s advocate. The first people s advocate, Ermir Dobjani, was elected in February The work of the office of the people s advocate shows continued progress in the implementation of this legislation, and the number of complaints filed with the office increased steadily. With regard to local government, the 1998 Constitution contains provisions on the establishment of local government units as juridical bodies that possess a number of autonomous powers, including the power to tax, issue local rules, engage in contracts, and conduct local referenda. The creation of autonomous local government structures decentralizes the power of the Albanian state and creates a closer link between citizens and the political structures that govern them. The Basic Principles section of the Constitution also enshrines this concept. In February 1999, Government Decision No. 103 established the National Committee for Local Government Decentralization. In December 1999, Parliament approved the National Strategy for Decentralization and Local Autonomy, and since then Parliament has passed, on schedule, the major framework laws called for under this plan. In July 2000, the government passed Law 8652, For Organizing and Functioning Local Government, and Law 8653, For Administrative-Territorial Division of Local Government in the Republic of Albania, which implement the constitutional provisions described above. In February 2001, Parliament passed two companion pieces of legislation. The first law establishes the parameters of state ownership of property. The second law establishes the legal framework for managing the transfer of property from the central government to local authorities. In August 2001, the state established the Agency for Inventory of State-Owned Real Estate and Transferring Public Real Estate. The transfer of property to local authorities had long been an obstacle to the decentralization effort in Albania, and resolution of this issue marks significant progress in this regard. The most recent local government elections took place in October They were monitored by the OSCE. Although the elections received some criticism regarding transparency in the second round, the international community determined that the elections marked overall progress toward international standards. Moreover, the elections were not followed by widespread dismissals, as has occurred in the past. This continuity should have a positive impact on professionalism and capacity building in local governance. The Constitution specifically prohibits the national government from issuing unfunded mandates to local authorities. Article 112 states, The expenses that are connected with the duties put by law to the organs of local government are covered by the budget of the state. The July 2000 Law on Local Government further outlines funding sources, both national and local. The 2001 budget marked the beginning of the implementation of these fiscal provisions. As a result, local governments continue to suffer from insufficient financial resources. They also lack trained and qualified leaders and civil servants. In June 2000, Government Decision 315 created an Institute of Public

8 ALBANIA 57 Administration to provide training for civil servants. In 1999, the government removed approximately 5,000 positions from the public sector payroll. It removed another 3,000 the following year. In addition, progress in reviewing the salary structure has resulted in increased efficiency. A pay raise in July 2000 and the passage of a new Law on Public Service in November 1999 provide the legal framework for staffing and promotions based on merit, rather than on political or personal influence, and have partially addressed retention concerns. RULE OF LAW Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework The Constitution of the Republic of Albania was passed in a national referendum on November 22, In general, the international community gave Albania high praise for the open and inclusive drafting process. Furthermore, the esteemed Venice Commission of the Council of Europe praised the text itself, stating at the end of parliamentary deliberations that the draft [Constitution], in particular the human rights chapter, is in conformity with European and international standards. Under the new Constitution, a Constitutional Court interprets and enforces the Constitution s provisions. The Constitution provides for a nine-member Court appointed by the president with the consent of Parliament. Judges serve nine-year terms without the right to reelection. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is broadly defined, and individuals are specifically granted the right of petition. However, there is at least one important limit on jurisdiction: The Court does not possess the power to raise cases on its own motion. In February 2000, Parliament passed Law No. 8577, For the Organization and Operation of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania, which among other items provided guidelines for the issuance and execution of Court decisions. In terms of ordinary courts, the 1998 Constitution provides for a three-tier system of district courts, courts of appeals, and a Supreme Court. All judicial decisions must explain how the law applies to the particular set of facts before the court, and decisions of the High Court must be published. In 2000, Parliament passed Law No. 8588, For the Organization and Operation of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Albania, which provides for the composition and structure of the High Court. The Constitution also provides for a High Council of Justice, which, with the approval of the president, selects district and appeals court judges. The president, with the consent of Parliament, selects members of the High Court and its chairman. Judges enjoy immunity that can be lifted only by the organ that appointed them. Under the earlier interim constitutional provisions and laws, the executive exerted influence over the High Council of Justice, and the high council conducted judicial disciplinary procedures without regard to basic standards of due process. International human rights reports noted this infringement upon the independence of the judiciary. In December 1997, though, Parliament passed a new Law on the Operation of the High Council that introduced basic due process protections such as the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. During the winter of 2001, the Constitutional Court and the High Court struggled to define their respective jurisdictional competences. The essence of the conflict revolved around the role of counsel in trials held in absentia. The High Court sought to resolve the issue on the basis of the criminal procedure code, and the Constitutional Court grounded its contrary decision in constitutional due process. In the end, the Constitutional Court issued a scathing decision that charged that the Supreme Court had failed to follow its authoritative pronouncement properly and did so in a manner that creates a dangerous precedent in institutional relations. In summer 2001, the Constitutional Court also took center stage in the parliamentary election contest, which revealed a potentially promising development in the body politic regarding the role of judicial institutions. Many candidates filed challenges to the various election contests with local electoral commissions and their decisions up to the CEC. From there, appeals were lodged with the Constitutional Court, which responded quickly by extending its normal hours of operation to review an unprecedented body of cases. The high volume of complaints lodged in subsequent rounds of the election did extend the process and garner criticism particularly from DP leadership. However, it also represented a necessary commitment to the exhaustion of local judicial remedies. Ironically, these events may represent one of the first times that the opposition DP has satisfied this basic jurisdictional requirement of the European Court of Human Rights, thus highlighting the poverty of their frequently employed boycott strategies. At the day-to-day level, lower courts continue to face a considerable workload without adequate material resources, organization, and discipline. Case management presents an ongoing challenge, and case backlogs are commonplace. In April 2001, the Ministry of Justice issued a regulation that establishes a standard administrative structure for lower courts. The regulation defines basic rules for registering cases, maintaining archives, and budgeting. The judicial budgeting office of the High Court has also begun to develop an independent, comprehensive approach to court budgeting. However, the challenges facing the lower courts are not solely administrative. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that the pressures of bribery and intimidation continue to compromise the judiciary in the areas of judicial

9 58 ALBANIA ethics and discipline. The courts overall marginal administrative performance, coupled with the credible accounts of corruption, causes the general public to hold the judiciary in low regard. At the end of 2000, the Council of Europe issued a report on the status of legal reform activities in the Republic of Albania that highlighted several areas in which additional reforms in the judicial process are needed. Three key areas involved the definition and organization of the judicial police (also referred to as criminal investigators), the enforcement of judgments, and efforts to combat judicial corruption. In the first two areas, the Council of Europe recommended that additional legislative infrastructure be developed as soon as possible. Regarding the third area, the Council of Europe stressed that further attention be given to the EU Council of Europe OCTOPUS anticorruption program, a World Bank proposal, and the Stability Pact Anti- Corruption Initiative. In the same period, Parliament passed legislation clarifying the status of the judicial police. The law defines the criteria for becoming a member of the judicial police and outlined the services that the judicial police are to provide. This clarification supplements the 1995 criminal and criminal procedure codes, which were modeled on analogous Italian codes, and strengthens the investigative capacity of the procuracy. This development further clarified the new, nonmilitary structure of the police forces and made clear their obligation to work in close cooperation with prosecutors. To address the perennially poor enforcement of judicial decisions, Parliament approved legislation establishing a legal infrastructure for a judicial bailiff service that will facilitate prompt enforcement of judicial decisions. The new law sets forth the qualifications of bailiffs, their status particularly vis-à-vis other institutions and disciplinary standards. However, by the end of the period covered by this report, it was still unclear whether the actual execution of judgments had improved over that of the old Zyra Permbarimi (Office of the Executors). The real challenge for the government will be the proper staffing and equipping of this reconfigured office. The government also proffered new legislation to update and elaborate the structure and duties of the Ministry of Justice and the office of the prosecutor-general. Both pieces of draft legislation included provisions that engendered substantial debate. The Ministry of Justice draft contained provisions on judicial inspection functions that resembled those allocated to the High Council of Justice under the Constitution. The draft on the office of the prosecutor-general contained provisions that would have allowed presidents to dismiss prosecutors-general if they were deemed to be failing to fulfill their duties. The president immediately returned the law on the Ministry of Justice for further parliamentary review. In addition to the constitutional concerns, the underlying source of the controversy is that the High Council of Justice s inspectorate has failed to adequately fulfill its disciplinary investigative function owing in large part to a lack of even the most basic resources. The resolution of these competencies and the allocation of necessary resources clearly represent fundamental questions of policy. Parliament passed similar Ministry of Justice legislation again in May However, the precise resolution of the underlying issues languished for the remainder of the reporting period. In contrast, the draft Law on the Office of the Prosecutor-General was modified to omit the controversial provision. Parliament passed a new law in February 2001, thus establishing a complete framework for the prosecutorial service. Central to the new law is the seven-member Council of Prosecutors. The council is composed of five prosecutors elected at a general assembly of prosecutors and two representatives appointed by the Ministry of Justice and the president. The council has authority for organizing competitions for the selection of new prosecutors and reviewing the work of sitting prosecutors. Removal of the prosecutor-general became the subject of additional controversy in the spring of 2001 when a group of center-right parliamentarians called for his removal, alleging that he had improper links to known criminal figures. The prosecutor-general conceded that he had had a personal relationship with one of the individuals in question, but he denied that he had engaged in any activity that compromised his position. He noted the fact that members of his office had proceeded unfettered with the prosecution of this figure during his tenure. At the end of March, Parliament rejected a motion for debate about a proposal on the prosecutor-general s removal. During the same time period, the minister of justice called on Parliament to remove three members of the High Court for their alleged improper involvement in the release of a suspected drug dealer in the southern city of Fier. The High Council of Justice had censured and dismissed lower court judges for their involvement, and the issue sparked a public discussion about the independence of the judiciary versus the need to police judicial conduct. Despite the peculiar circumstances, observers concluded that the justice minister had not made a proper evidentiary case, and the motion failed to garner the two-thirds vote necessary for the judges removal. Paying off court officials is one of the most common types of bribes cited by the Albanian citizenry, and judicial corruption is widely considered to be endemic. As a general proposition, judges are ill prepared to resist external influences and to apply the law impartially, for the majority have received inadequate training in the new system of post-communist legislation. In an attempt to dilute the influence of the old judges from the previous regime, new judges were produced in a six-month crash course in the early 1990s. Many of these new judges had formerly held nonlegal positions. Many new judges have also been drawn from the ranks of new law school graduates, and given the poor state of legal education generally, it is unclear whether these new graduates possess adequate skills. The main law school, the

10 ALBANIA 59 University of Tirana, suffers from a severe lack of materials and facilities, improper influence in admission policies and grading, and outdated courses. In 1996, Parliament authorized the establishment of a magistrates school to provide potential judges with postgraduate training. With assistance from the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the American Bar Association, the school began operation in The first class of 20 graduated in The school is in the process of developing continuing judicial education classes for sitting judges. Cognizant of their poor public image, members of the judiciary have taken internal measures to increase their professionalism. In December 1999, the first National Judicial Conference (NJC) was held, as required under the Constitution. The NJC is a national body that is organized by, and composed of, the members of the judiciary. It has the constitutional responsibility for selecting 9 of the 15 members of the High Council of Justice. During the period covered by this report, the organization held additional regional and committee meetings, and it continued to work on raising public awareness of judicial issues. It is generally acknowledged that the NJC has filled an important void that was created when the Albanian Association of Judges became inactive in the mid-1990s. Despite the judiciary s limitations, the government continues to respect human rights in general, albeit with certain clear exceptions. Reports of arbitrary detentions and arrests remain both credible and relatively widespread, and detainees are kept in overcrowded conditions and subject to beatings. These problems persist despite protections incorporated within the 1995 criminal and criminal procedure codes, which together establish many basic due process protections. For example, under Article 202 of the criminal procedure code, the court may issue a search warrant for a person or premises on the basis of grounded reasons. There are exceptions for cases in which a police officer encounters a crime in progress. In 2000, the government began to address concerns about detention when it passed Law No. 8570, For Some Changes to the Penal Procedure Code of the Republic of Albania, which limits the extension of detention periods. The government addressed the issue of police training with Decision 281, For Organizing and Operating the Police Academy, which sets forth provisions for the organization and management of police training. Moreover, police reform continues to be a priority, and multinational assistance providers supply training, materials, and advice on an ongoing basis. The professional organization of the police continues to improve, with special units like the organized crime unit recognizing the need for refinements in the allocation of limited resources. Also, the Ministry for Public Order s release of the number of police officers disciplined during 2000 highlighted the substantial number of dismissals for improper conduct. These refinements have been credited with increasing arrests and seizures of contraband. There also appears to be a continued decline in the overall crime rate and an increase in the number of cases solved. Persons accused of crimes have a constitutional right to a free defense when [they do] not have sufficient means. However, the government has not established a reliable system to ensure that this right is properly upheld. In accordance with the criminal procedure code, the courts are to be supplied with a list of local lawyers from which they may pick someone to represent a criminal defendant. According to the code, the lawyer is then entitled to payment from the government for any fees the defendant cannot pay, but the government is consistently delinquent. A limited number of nongovernmental clinics have begun providing these types of services, and the results are encouraging. Still, the need continues to exceed supply particularly in civil matters. Consequently, the general constitutional guarantee of human rights protection remains fragile. Part II of the Constitution, Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, enumerates the rights and guarantees that individuals, Albanian or foreign, enjoy against state interference in their lives. Limitations of these rights are permitted only when it is established that they are in the public interest or will protect the rights of others. Any limitation is supposed to be in proportion to the circumstances generating the restriction, and under no circumstance may the limitation exceed the limits accepted in the European Convention on Human Rights. In summer 2000, Parliament ratified Protocol VI of the convention on the abolition of the death penalty. In terms of minority rights, the new Constitution cites coexistence as the basis of the Albanian state. Furthermore, the president of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe suggested specific protective language for all suspect classes. His broad language was incorporated into the Constitution as a prohibition against discrimination based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, language, political, religious or philosophical beliefs, economic conditions, education, social status, or ancestry. Generally, discrimination on these bases does not constitute a significant problem in Albania. With the propensity of Albanian politicians to organize street protests, the balancing of rights to peaceful assembly and free speech with the state s responsibility for preserving public order has remained a sensitive topic. Immediately prior to the 2001 elections, Parliament passed legislation that addresses this issue. The legislation guarantees the rights of any person to organize and participate in a peaceful assembly. However, it also defines the circumstances under which an assembly may be prohibited and outlines the rights and duties of organizers, the police, and the media. The bulk of the provisions seeks to create an administrative structure for the safe management of demonstrations in public areas. At the beginning of 2001, the government committed to a review of existing legislation in order to assess its compatibility with the country s international human rights com-