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1 REPORT RELATING TO OPERATION KERRY THE GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE INVESTIGATION INTO MATTERS SURROUNDING THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY IN MANCHESTER IN OCTOBER 1998 FINAL VERSION 13/06/15 1

2 1. INTRODUCTION AND EVENTS LEADING TO OPERATION KERRY INVESTIGATION 1.1. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and Events in The Commission for Racial Equality investigation in Employment Tribunal Evidence in 2004 and Judgement in Summary of Events in 2012 and SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION AND OTHER SIMILAR INVESTIGATIONS 2.1. Gold Strategy 2.2. Structure of Investigation 2.3. IPCC Referral 2.4. The Home Office Letter 2.5. Operation Herne 2.6. Mark Ellison QC 2.7. Other Police Forces and Units 2.8. The Home Secretary s Speech to Parliament on 6 th March Manchester Evening News reporting in March THE INVESTIGATION 3.1. The 1998 MSS Message 3.2. Witness Interviews and Resulting Enquiries 3.3. Keyword and Physical Searches to all GMP staff 4. CONTEXTUAL ISSUES AND STAFF EXPERIENCES DISCOVERED DURING THE INVESTIGATION 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Context and Background Information 4.3. Some Experiences of GMP Staff on the Rochdale Division Some Experiences of GMP Staff in Special Branch GMP Staff Records 2

3 5. STAFF SURVEY FEBRUARY Background 5.2. Survey Responses 5.3. General Findings 5.4. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Recollections 5.5. Organisational Approach to Equality and Fairness at the Time 5.6. Internal Reaction to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry 5.7. General Cultural Indications and Behaviours at the Time 5.8. Personal Impact of Cultural Indications and Behaviours at the Time 5.9. Have Improvements Been Made? 6. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1. Findings 6.2. What would be different now? 6.3. Conclusion and Recommendations APPENDICES A. Gold Strategy dated 04/07/2013 B. Correspondence with the IPCC C. Home Office Letter dated 03/07/2013 D. GMP Response to Home Office Letter dated 10/07/2013 E. The MSS Message sent on 07/10/1998 retrieved on 08/10/1998 F. Witness Strategies G. Report by PS Mir dated 14/10/1998 H. Report by CS Kane to CS Mellor dated 07/12/1998 I. Special Branch Guidelines published by the Home Office and Scottish Office in 1994 J. Letter from Metropolitan Police to Greater Manchester Police dated 08/09/1998 K. Criteria for searches of GMP s documentary and computer records L. The Operation Kerry Staff Survey 3

4 1. INTRODUCTION AND EVENTS LEADING TO OPERATION KERRY INVESTIGATION 1.1. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and Events in Stephen Lawrence was murdered during a racist attack in London in April After failures in the initial investigation and allegations of corruption and racism on the part of the investigation team, a Public Inquiry was ordered by the Home Secretary and was held in 1998, chaired by Sir William Macpherson. This was known as the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the Macpherson Inquiry, the preference being for the former. The Macpherson Report was published in 1999 and stated that the Metropolitan Police was institutionally racist and made several recommendations with major ramifications across policing and the wider criminal justice system As well as being held in London, the Inquiry sat in other cities, including in Manchester on October 13 th Several prominent public figures gave evidence during these days, including the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (Sir) David Wilmot, and Nasrullah Khan Moghal of the Manchester Council for Community Relations. It was at these hearings in Manchester that Mr. Wilmot first publically used the phrase institutional racism in the context of policing, attracting worldwide media coverage On 7 th October 1998, prior to the hearing in Manchester, an electronic message was circulated across Greater Manchester Police to each police division and unit. This message gave some background into the forthcoming local sitting of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, before requesting that: information or intelligence regarding groups or individuals, who are likely to attend the enquiry (sic), be forwarded to DCI P***** at Special Branch It should be noted at this stage that all references to this officer s name, and those of others whose previous or current roles in Special Branch or counter terrorism units are relevant, have had their names removed or where necessary redacted to include the first letter of their surname followed by a generic number of asterisks. This is to take into account the current terrorism threat level. This 4

5 does not necessarily apply to non-counter terrorism officers, whose names are often public knowledge Greater Manchester Police Constable Charles Crichlow (future president of the National Black Police Association, then a Police Constable based at Rochdale Police Station) saw this message whilst on duty and was concerned about its content and brought it to the attention of his supervisor Sergeant Nadeem Mir. In response to a request from PC Crichlow, Sergeant Mir wrote a report on 14 th October 1998 expressing concerns in relation to the wording of the message, which was subsequently forwarded to his Divisional Commander Chief Superintendent Kane. It should be noted that this was done in the context of other matters mentioned below in paragraphs onwards On 7 th December 1998, almost 2 months after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry had sat in Manchester, Chief Superintendent Kane submitted a typed memorandum to Chief Superintendent Mellor of the Greater Manchester Police Community Affairs Branch, a headquarters department with the remit of managing GMP s community and race relations. In this memorandum he stated that although he was not initially concerned with the content of the Special Branch message, on reflection he could understand how PC Crichlow reached his conclusion that if he attended the hearings as an interested party, he would become of interest to Special Branch No records exist to show what happened in respect of this memorandum, and Chief Superintendent Kane, Sergeant Mir and Constable Crichlow did not receive any further correspondence on the issue, although they did meet to discuss the matter in more detail There is no record or recollection of the concerns being raised with Special Branch generally or DCI P***** specifically. 5

6 1.2. Commission for Racial Equality investigation in In October 2003 a BBC Panorama documentary entitled The Secret Policeman was broadcast. It detailed the work of undercover report Mark Daly, who secretly joined Greater Manchester Police with the sole intention of discovering whether progress on race relations and equality issues had been made since the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report. His reporting uncovered racism at both the police training college where he carried out his initial training, and the Stockport division where he was posted. As a result eleven officers from GMP faced disciplinary sanctions, and officers from surrounding forces were also disciplined As a result the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) subsequently instigated an Inquiry and made 125 recommendations for further changes to the police service Charles Crichlow, at this time representing the GMP Black and Asian Police Association (BAPA), gave evidence to the CRE Inquiry in July 2004, and quoted from the same Special Branch message from 1998, putting forward his concerns that it demonstrated ongoing issues within the police service in terms of racism Employment Tribunal Evidence in 2004 and Judgement in Charles Crichlow submitted an Employment Tribunal claim relating to racial discrimination and victimisation in 2001 which was heard in 2004, and on which judgement was passed in 2005, stating that GMP did discriminate against Mr Crichlow in 2000 and 2001 by not properly investigating earlier claims of racial discrimination, although this was not deemed to be racially motivated in itself In his statement to the tribunal, Charles Crichlow stated the following by way of context: "In August 1998 the Steven Lawrence enquiry (sic) was proceeding. A message was sent via officers that the enquiry would visit Manchester and a hearing would take place at a hotel in the City. On this message there was a request 6

7 that information or intelligence regarding groups or individuals who were likely to attend the enquiry should be forwarded to CI P*****." He also added: "As a result of this I did not attend the meeting. The message clearly had connotations that those who would attend would be monitored perhaps as potential trouble makers" Having considered the 1998 message the Tribunal commented:- "We found the following facts. In August 1998 the Lawrence Enquiry was due to sit in Manchester and we accept police officers in GMP were asked to give Special Branch information on people likely to attend it The circular which was sent to officers came initially from Special Branch and was circulated to Police officers generally. Allowing the Special Branch memorandum in what appears to be a general form to be circulated in our view, might be less than sensitive to minority ethnic officers who were likely to have a heightened interest in the Inquiry" There is no record of this public mention of the 1998 message in either the CRE Inquiry or the subsequent Employment Tribunal resulting in an investigation into the message, its context, what preceded it or what resulted from it Summary of Events in 2012 and In July 2012, following the conviction of some of those responsible for the murder of Stephen Lawrence, the Home Secretary had tasked Mark Ellison QC to examine the allegations of deliberate incompetence and corruption on the part of officers involved in the original murder investigation, and whether material had been withheld from the subsequent Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Mr. Ellison was due to report on these matters in July 2013, however in light of the allegations arising in the June of that year (see paragraph below), his remit was expanded to include aspects of undercover policing, surveillance activity and intelligence gathering relating to the Stephen Lawrence family and the 7

8 Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Mr. Ellison completed his report in February 2014 and the findings were made public in March In June 2013, the Guardian newspaper published allegations by a former undercover officer Peter Francis to the effect that he had been deliberately tasked by the Metropolitan Police to gather information and intelligence with the intent to smear the Stephen Lawrence family campaign for justice, which has started after Stephen s murder in Prior to this and due to separate allegations concerning the covert use of the identities of dead children by undercover officers, and the revelation that undercover officers had fathered children whilst deployed, an Inquiry into this area of policing was already under way, supervised by Derbyshire Chief Constable Mick Creedon. Named Operation Herne, its remit was to review 40 years of undercover policing methods between 1968 and 2008, plus individual cases including those relating to the Lawrence family. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is itself supervising a number of specific investigations within this remit relating to allegations against individual undercover officers. Operation Herne s second report was concluded at the end of December 2013, and sent to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police prior to being published in March A third report was published in July Also in June 2013, the previous concerns raised by Charles Crichlow at the CRE Inquiry in 2004 were reported again in the Daily Mirror, in light of the parallel allegations concerning undercover officers. This prompted GMP Deputy Chief Constable Ian Hopkins to respond to the effect that the 1998 message was in all likelihood...routine and was referring to the arrangements for the policing of the Macpherson Inquiry hearing which was held in Manchester and understanding what arrangements the force would need to put in place. This also led to the instigation of Operation Kerry, an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the 1998 message overseen by Assistant Chief 1 See section 2.6 for more details of this. 2 See section 2.5 for more details of this. 8

9 Constable Dawn Copley who also holds the role of Appropriate Authority within GMP and oversight of the Professional Standards Branch. 2. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION AND OTHER SIMILAR INVESTIGATIONS 2.1. Gold Strategy ACC. Copley set up a meeting structure and published a Gold Strategy which was amended and finalised on 4 th July 2013, which is reproduced in full (including rationale) in Appendix A. This provides some background to the GMP investigation, and outlines its aims and objectives. These include: To conduct a thorough investigation into this matter to determine:- Who was involved (including their roles and responsibilities). What happened? Why it happened. What, if any, intelligence was gathered and what use it was put to. Whether any policing activity undertaken amounts to misconduct or criminal matters. Furthermore, the investigation will seek to establish whether, or not, the policing activity was legitimate in its aim and whether it was in any way connected to the allegations that the MPS used undercover policing tactics to gather intelligence on the family of Stephen Lawrence and their supporters with a view to smearing them. To conduct a thorough search within GMP (including the North West Counter Terrorism Unit or NWCTU) to identify, locate, secure and preserve all evidence that may assist in the investigation into these concerns. This will include searches of IT systems, archives and documents, as well as identifying those police officers and staff who may be able to provide information and assist the investigation in due course. To invite independent investigation and scrutiny of this matter via a voluntary referral to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. To provide support to the two officers who raised the original concerns back in Support will also be offered to any other affected/involved members 9

10 of GMP. To actively engage the Staff Associations and Unions in offering support. To engage with the Black and Asian Police Association (BAPA) and the Muslim Police Association (MPA) to offer advice and support on diversity issues that arise from this matter and to invite them to act as a critical friend to the Gold process in considering the impact that this may have on community and internal relationships. To inform and update other Forces as necessary, including the MPS and to ensure effective co-ordination across Forces through the evidence gathering and investigative processes. To establish an effective media strategy. To ensure that key stakeholders are kept informed of progress. To influence and encourage a cohesive national approach to investigating this, and other potentially connected matters. To provide timely, meaningful updates to the staff of GMP and the communities of Greater Manchester. This will enable us to provide reassurance that the matter is being taken seriously and will help us to better understand the impact this has on confidence internally and externally. That enhanced understanding will inform activities that will be undertaken to address those impacts. To establish whether lessons can now be learned from the events of Structure of Investigation To support the Gold Strategy, ACC Copley set up a Gold/Silver/Bronze command structure, which was as follows: - Gold Commander ACC Copley - Silver Commander Detective Chief Superintendent Rumney from the GMP Professional Standards Branch (PSB) - Bronze (Investigation Senior Investigating Officer) - a Detective Chief Inspector from the NWCTU with responsibility for setting the priorities and parameters of the investigation, maintaining a policy book containing details of all decisions and associated rationale, and setting up the investigative structure. 10

11 A Detective Inspector from the NWCTU was appointed as Deputy SIO for resilience purposes A team of dedicated investigators were appointed from the PSB to conduct witness enquiries In terms of searches, persons in key positions and subject matter experts were appointed, tasked and additionally invited to the regular Gold meetings. The units and areas represented were: - The North Manchester Division the GMP policing area where the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry sat in The Counter Terrorism Branch (formerly known as Special Branch) now incorporated into the North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU). - The Information Services Branch responsible for computer hardware and software across the force - The Specialist Protective Services Branch, incorporating the Serious Crime Division and Force Intelligence Bureau, covering the force s intelligence, surveillance and covert investigation capabilities - The Specialist Operations Branch, now also incorporated into the Specialist Protective Services Branch covering the operational and contingency planning areas - The Professional Standards Branch who oversee complaints and misconduct issues - The Command Support Team, who act as a secretariat to GMP s chief officer team From the outset it was not known whether the investigation would later be incorporated or otherwise joined with any parallel investigations taking place across the UK. Because of this, it was decided that an account would be set up on the HOLMES system to cater for the cataloguing of material generated and action management. In doing so, an auditable record of the investigation would be created. This could then be linked with similarly run investigations across the UK should it become necessary, as the HOLMES system is nationally recognised and can link with other forces as well as the IPCC. 11

12 2.3. IPCC Referral On 25 th June 2013 GMP s Appropriate Authority ACC Copley made a referral to the IPCC in relation to the 1998 message from Special Branch, effectively asking them to consider the appropriate mode of investigation for the GMP matter On 26 th July the Deputy Chair of the IPCC, Deborah Glass, published an open letter to all relevant parties in respect of the numerous Lawrence/Macpherson related investigations occurring across the country. In respect of the GMP investigation, the IPCC referred the matter back stating that there did not appear to be any recordable conduct (as defined in the Statutory Guidance document on the IPCC website), which is the threshold for mandatory IPCC referral On 5 th August ACC Copley and GMP Police and Crime Commissioner Tony Lloyd wrote to Deborah Glass asking her to reconsider her decision and asking her to take this matter as an independent IPCC investigation. The letter stressed the considerable public interest in the case On 16 th August Deborah Glass responded and reiterated her previous position with additional rationale, adding that at this time, in the absence of any clear recordable conduct, the IPCC had no standing to take any responsibility for the GMP investigation Copies of the relevant correspondence with the IPCC are included in Appendix B Liaison with the IPCC was maintained throughout this investigation by Detective Superintendent Matthews (now retired), of the Professional Standards Branch. 12

13 2.4. The Home Office Letter On 3 rd July 2013 the Home Secretary wrote a letter to all Chief Constables asking that each force undertake an urgent but exhaustive search of records and archives to ascertain whether any material is held that suggests intelligence or surveillance activity was ordered or carried out in respect of the Macpherson Inquiry, Stephen Lawrence s family or any others connected to the Inquiry or the family. Responses were required by 10 th July This letter was clearly directed to all Chief Constables in the UK, however the focus was clearly on the forces covering the cities in which the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry sat, namely London, Manchester, Bradford, Bristol and Birmingham Each of the main forces concerned (the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police, West Yorkshire Police, Avon and Somerset Police and West Midlands Police) each replied to the Home Secretary to the effect that no relevant material had been found Further details of the investigation that led to the GMP response and continued afterwards, Operation Kerry, can be found in section 3 below A copy of the Home Office letter dated 3 rd July 2013, and the GMP response to it dated 10 th July 2013, can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D respectively Operation Herne As mentioned briefly in section above, Operation Herne is a wide ranging Inquiry into undercover policing supervised by Derbyshire Chief Constable Mick Creedon assisted by SIO Detective Superintendent Steven Craddock of the Metropolitan Police It has responsibility for reviewing 40 years of undercover policing methods between 1968 and 2008, including the methods and practices of the Special 13

14 Demonstration Squad (SDS) who undertook the undercover policing requirement of the Metropolitan Police, and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) who did the same but on a national basis under the responsibility of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). In addition, Operation Herne has responsibility for investigating specific allegations and complaints against officers and staff working in this area of policing, including the allegations relating to the Lawrence Family Although several matters in the scope of Operation Herne have been referred to the IPCC and are now supervised investigations, the IPCC declined to oversee the allegation made by the former undercover officer in relation to the Lawrence family, but requested that they are informed should any indication of recordable conduct come to light Chief Constable Creedon reported more findings of Operation Herne to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police at the end of December These findings were made public on 6 th March 2014, on the same day as the Home Secretary revealed the findings of Mark Ellison QC to Parliament. See section 2.8 below for the outcome of this. A third Operation Herne report was published in July 2014 outlining detail behind the examination of the allegations made by former undercover officer Peter Francis, relating to the potential infiltration of justice campaign groups Liaison with the Operation Herne team has been maintained throughout this investigation by the SIO Mark Ellison QC As mentioned in section above, Mark Ellison QC was the barrister who successfully prosecuted the case against those who murdered Stephen Lawrence in a trial that concluded in January In July 2012 he was commissioned by the Home Secretary to conduct an independent Inquiry into the following areas: 14

15 - The possibility of reasonable suspicion of corruption on the part of any officers involved in the initial investigation into the Stephen Lawrence murder - Whether there are any further lines of enquiry to follow in respect of any such suspicions - Whether the subsequent Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was supplied with all possible material relating to any such corruption and whether any withholding of such material would have had an impact on that Inquiry. This report was due to the Home Secretary in July Prior to him responding, in June 2013 Mr. Ellison s remit was expanded to include the following areas: - The role of undercover policing in the Lawrence case and disclosure of such involvement to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry - The extent of intelligence or surveillance activity ordered or carried out by police forces nationally in respect of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Stephen Lawrence s family or any others connected with the Inquiry or the family - The nature of any surveillance of Duwayne Brooks and his solicitor (as referred to briefly in section above) It should be noted that the wording of the second bullet point above is duplicated in the letter from the Home Secretary as outlined in section This definition was also used as a starting point for the Operation Kerry investigation The exact remit of Mark Ellison s Inquiry is copied in full within the letter from the IPCC. of 26 th July included in Appendix B Mr Ellison reported to the Home Secretary in February 2014, and his findings were made public during the Home Secretary s speech to Parliament on 6 th March See section 2.8 below for a summary of this. 15

16 Liaison with Mark Ellison and his link with the Metropolitan Police, Detective Superintendent Robson, has been maintained throughout this investigation by the SIO Other Police Forces and Units The Metropolitan Police undercover policing matters have been referred to above and fall within the remit of both Operation Herne and the inquiry being conducted by Mark Ellison QC. Liaison with the Metropolitan Police has been maintained via Detective Superintendent Robson as above Avon and Somerset Police conducted an investigation in response to the aforementioned letter from the Home Secretary dated 3 rd July Despite an extensive investigation, they were unable to find any material suggesting intelligence or surveillance activity had been carried out in respect of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry visiting Bristol, and responded as such to the Home Office. Liaison with Avon and Somerset Police has been maintained with the SIO DCI Williams West Midlands Police conducted an investigation akin to that carried out by Avon and Somerset Police, and Chief Constable Chris Sims responded to the Home Office to this effect on 8 th July. Liaison has been maintained with SIO throughout West Yorkshire Police conducted an investigation in response to the Home Office letter, with a negative response sent to the Home Office from ACC John Robins. However a referral was made to the IPCC concerning potentially inappropriate intelligence gathering concerning a witness to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Bradford. The IPCC independently investigated this allegation, and published a report in June 2014 concluding that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary there was no case to answer for gross misconduct and no organisational learning for West Yorkshire Police. A full copy of their report can be found here: 16

17 _reports/wyp%20intelligence%20report%20- %20approved%20final%20IPCC%20report.pdf Contact has been maintained with the West Yorkshire Police SIO throughout South Yorkshire Police conducted an internal investigation into possible monitoring of extreme left wing groups attending events peripheral to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. There was no indication of recordable conduct and no perceived relevance to the Lawrence family and the IPCC have kept this matter under review. Contact has been maintained with DCI Foster from South Yorkshire Police Professional Standards Department Other forces were written to by the Home Secretary on 3 rd July, however as the Inquiry did not visit these areas, no contact has been made with these forces as part of Operation Kerry The London-based National Public Order Unit (NPOU) was set up in 1999 as a national policing unit to gather intelligence on criminality associated with protests. It was supervised by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Since then it has gone through several incarnations, including the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), and is currently known as the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) after merging with other units. It is currently part of the Counter Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police. As it was not formed until one year after the period relevant to this investigation, its records are not relevant to Operation Kerry The Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) have conducted detailed searches for the other investigations listed above and were also specifically tasked in relation to whether they had any material relating to the 1998 GMP MSS message in terms of preceding it (i.e. a tasking) or following it. They have not been able to discover any records of either. 17

18 2.8. The Home Secretary s Speech to Parliament on 6 th March On 6 th March 2014 the Home Secretary Theresa May gave a widely reported speech to Parliament outlining the findings of Mark Ellison s report. The report discusses issues around corruption in the initial Lawrence murder investigation, Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) deployments into the Lawrence family and associates, issues surrounding Duwayne Brooks and activities in police forces nationwide. A link to Mr. Ellison s report can be found here: /stephen_lawrence_review_summary.pdf Specific to GMP, Mr Ellison s report makes brief mention of the fact that records in GMP and West Yorkshire Police indicate that some research was carried out into the background of a limited number of individuals who it was thought might attend the hearings. This would appear to be an amalgamation of the findings in GMP and WYP so far, and he concludes that the motive for this appears to have been simply to scope and plan for potential public disorder Operation Herne reported publicly later on the same day, its findings based on the allegations of former undercover officer Peter Francis. Interestingly, they did not have the opportunity to speak with Peter Francis himself (he instead chose to speak with Mark Ellison) and were also, like Mr Ellison, unable to find any evidence to back the claim made by him that he was tasked to smear the Lawrence family. However they were able to uncover material regarding undercover officers indulging in inappropriate sexual relationships. A third and final report by the Operation Herne team is to be produced by March 2015, and will cover areas such as SDS tasking, recruitment and working practices in general. A link to the second Operation Herne report can be found here: Report-2---Allegations-of-Peter-Francis.pdf 3 It should be noted that the authors of this report relating to Operation Kerry were unable find evidence to support or contradict this conclusion. 18

19 The Home Secretary announced that Mark Ellison, along with the Crown Prosecution Service, was to conduct an investigation into whether specific prosecutions have been affected by improper behaviour of undercover officers, and whether any miscarriages of justice have taken place as a result. They are to report to the Attorney General The Home Secretary also announced that a judge-led public Inquiry into undercover policing and the operation of the SDS would commence at the conclusion of Mark Ellison s further work and once Operation Herne s third report is published. A link to the full speech can be found here: In March 2015 The Home Secretary announced that the judge-led Inquiry would begin before Mark Ellison QC completed his additional work due to the scale of the task, and stated that it would be led by Lord Justice Pitchford The records of the Operation Kerry investigation will be made readily available to this Inquiry Manchester Evening News reporting in March On 19 th March 2014 the Manchester Evening News reported details of GMP having deployed undercover officers in 2002 to assist the Metropolitan Police in their on-going investigation into the Stephen Lawrence murder. The coverage can be seen here: It should be stressed that the police position on such matters is to neither confirm nor deny information about police undercover operations. Although it can be seen how any reporting on undercover policing coupled with the Stephen Lawrence murder would be a sensitive issue, it is clear that this report covers a tactic targeting Stephen Lawrence s murderers and not his family. It was not seen as falling into the remit of Operation Kerry at the outset, but reference to the reporting has been included here for completeness. It is assessed that this matter has no bearing on the scope of this investigation. 19

20 3. THE INVESTIGATION OPERATION KERRY 3.1. The 1998 MSS Message In 1998 and for many years before and afterwards, Greater Manchester Police made use of a Message Switch System (MSS) for broadcasting information across the force to specific groups of recipients, or to individual departments. This system was part of the GMP Integrated Computer System (GMPICS) which had many uses including crime recording and local intelligence management, and is still in use to this day for incident recording purposes Uses of MSS messages included the circulation of operational summaries and logs, details of wanted persons and stolen property, and dissemination of important messages from senior officers or other police forces MSS messages could be sent to one or a number of printer addresses denoted by a two letter code. For example DN referred to a singular address for the Tactical Vehicle Crime Unit, and ZF was a group code for each Divisional Training Unit across the force The intended recipients of an MSS message would receive a printed copy on the designated printer for that unit or department, and would also be able to retrieve the message using the GMPICS system, which allowed searches to take place for messages sent to a given address over a specified time period At the outset of the investigation, the only record of the wording of the MSS message in question was a quote from it contained in the records of Charles Crichlow, specifically in a record of his testimony to the CRE Inquiry in 2004 (see paragraph 1.3.2) On 10 th July 2013 an electronic copy of the MSS message itself was retrieved from Charles Crichlow s legal representative, and is reproduced in Appendix E. This is an apparent photocopy of a retrieved version of the message annotated with the note P1. This denotes the P1 subdivision of the Rochdale Division where Charles Crichlow worked in

21 The data on the message reveals that it was sent on 7 th October 1998 and this copy retrieved on the following day Further data on the message, coupled with checking of MSS address lists shows that the message s intended recipients were three groups and one singular address: - ZS - Branch Commanders the leaders of each police division across GMP - ZD - All CID all divisional detectives across GMP - ZE All Uniform Operations units across GMP, e.g. all additional support functions - XB - Contingency Planning a headquarters department Effectively the message was sent to the vast majority of operational staff across GMP The text of the message, entitled The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry reads as follows: The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry headed by Sir William Macpherson will visit Manchester on Monday 12 th and Tuesday 13 th October The hearing will take place at the Jarvis Piccadilly Hotel, Piccadilly Gardens, Manchester, and its purpose is to take evidence from local organisations and groups who have an interest in the Inquiry. The hearing will be held in public. It is requested that information or intelligence regarding groups or individuals, who are likely to attend the enquiry, (sic) be forwarded to D.C.I. P***** at Special Branch, Chester House on ext , fax Please bring this message to the attention of divisional/sub divisional and departmental command From staff recollection the telephone and facsimile number referred to are believed to have related to the Detective Inspector covering the Special Branch Irish Desk and the Special Branch facsimile machine for the whole office. 21

22 3.2. Witness Interviews and Resulting Enquiries Over 130 witnesses were interviewed during this investigation. The witness strategy documents included in Appendix F outline the scope of these interviews, and the aims behind them, which were to discover who sent the message, why they did so, what its objectives were (and whether they were legitimate) and what followed as a result. This section deals with those witnesses who were pertinent to the MSS message. Other witnesses or additional testimony relating to the prevailing culture at the time are included in section 4 below Charles Crichlow has provided a lengthy statement outlining his experiences as a GMP officer over the years and his recollection of his discovery on the 1998 message whilst on duty at Rochdale Police Station. He recalls bringing it to the attention of his sergeant Nadeem Mir, who in turn submitted a copy of the MSS message along with a covering report to the divisional commander Chief Superintendent Anthony Kane. Mr. Crichlow also recalls subsequently meeting Mr. Kane and discussing the message and explaining his concerns, namely that he, his colleagues, members of his community and anti-racist organisations would be subjected to Special Branch activities. Mr. Crichlow was unimpressed by Mr. Kane s response, which consisted of writing a report for the attention of Chief Superintendent Mellor of the Community Affair Branch. His concerns were that the matter had been swept under the carpet by Mr. Kane. Charles Crichlow also tells of events surrounding his employment tribunal in 2004/5 and how he became aware in June 2013 of reporting about surveillance against the Lawrence family, his subsequent dealings with reporters in his capacity as president of the National Black Police Association, and how the 1998 MSS message again came into the public forum, and led to the instigation of Operation Kerry. It is worth noting that PC Crichlow was also concerned by the initial GMP response to the renewed media interest in the 1998 message in the summer of 22

23 2013, when Deputy Chief Constable Ian Hopkins stated publicly that the message was likely to have been routine and relating to the operational policing of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry visit to Manchester. In fact he took steps to contact DCC Hopkins to seek to clarify the situation, such was his strength of feeling on the matter. Regrettably PC Crichlow has since expressed a lack of confidence in Operation Kerry. See section 4.3 below in relation to some of Charles Crichlow s other experiences from around this time Nadeem Mir was a sergeant on the Rochdale division in 1998 as described above. He has recently retired as a Chief Inspector within GMP, still serving at Rochdale. His report concerning the MSS message dated 14/10/1998 can be seen in Appendix G. In it he outlined the possible interpretation of the wording of the message to the effect that Special Branch would be gathering information on all persons attending the hearing, and questioned the wording, the intended meaning of the word information in the message, and warned of the negative implications of such wording. He recalls that he later spoke with Mr. Kane, who informed him that he had sent a further report on to Community Affairs, and Mr. Mir states that he questioned this as he thought it more an issue for Special Branch themselves as they had written the message and his concerns were about what the wording meant, which Community Affairs would not, in his opinion, be able to answer. He adds that he was left none the wiser as to why the original message was sent, and got the impression that Special Branch was not to be questioned as to their reasons. Similarly, see section 4.3 below in relation to some of Nadeem Mir s other experiences from around this time Anthony Kane was a Chief Superintendent and the divisional commander of the Rochdale Division in His report concerning the MSS message dated 07/12/1998, which was sent to Chief Superintendent Mellor of the Community Affairs Branch, can be seen in Appendix H. In it he states that upon initial reading he found the message clear and unambiguous, but adds that when 23

24 discussing it with the officer who first raised concerns, he could see how he arrived at the conclusion that Special Branch would open files on all those attending the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Manchester. In his final paragraph, Mr. Kane states that he is sure there was no sinister intention in the mind of the sender. However, he did not discuss the message switch with Special Branch, make them aware of the concerns that had been raised or feed back to them the worry it had created. Nor does it appear that any action was generated to ensure that there was nothing inappropriate being tasked or reported on within Special Branch. When interviewed in 2013, Mr. Kane had limited recollection of the MSS message or his subsequent report, and could only recall meeting Sgt. Mir about the issue Former Chief Superintendent David Mellor was head of GMP s Community Affairs Branch between 1997 and 1998 and his unit had responsibility for managing community and race relations, and he personally worked with representatives of ethnic minority groups in the Greater Manchester area. He adds that he followed the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry closely with professional interest, and in fact gave evidence to the Inquiry when it came to Manchester. In terms of the MSS message, Mr. Mellor states that he cannot recall it, adding that he can see how the wording of it would seem sinister now, but perhaps would not have done so in He adds that he feels that it would have been legitimate to find out who was giving evidence to the Inquiry to plan ahead for any criticism or challenges to GMP, but nothing more. See section below for more information relevant to this area As mentioned in paragraph above, the text P1 appears on the sheet of paper containing the copy of the MSS message, denoting the Rochdale subdivision of the wider Rochdale Division. Nadeem Mir was of the opinion that this had been written by Superintendent Chris Taylor who at that time worked on the division. Mr Taylor has been traced and cannot recall the MSS message or writing on the sheet of paper, stating that he would usually use an official office stamp for such correspondence. 24

25 Detective Chief Inspector P***** worked in GMP s Special Branch between 1993 and At that time Special Branch consisted of a number of desks with specific responsibilities. At this time DCI P***** was responsible for supervising the International Desk, which in today s parlance would be known as International Counter Terrorism. The other units at that time were the Irish Desk, the Domestic Desk and the Surveillance Unit. Mr. P***** recalls that his role, and that of the other DCIs, included being the duty officer responsible for managing live incidents as they occurred. Mr P***** states that although he was the manager of the surveillance unit, which in itself could lead to a suspicion that they would be utilised for undertaking covert activity around the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, he indicates that they would not have been so used for a situation such as this, and that his management of that unit was as a separate strand of the Special Branch structure. He added that the tasking of this unit was agreed with other Special Branch managers at a weekly management meeting. Mr. P***** states that Special Branch would only become involved in public order situations if politics or national issues were involved or if there was an awareness of potential disorder that divisional staff needed to be aware of, in which case the MSS system would be utilised. The remit of Special Branches at the time is expanded upon further in section 4.2 below and Appendix I. Mr. P***** states that he would never type the MSS messages himself, but would occasionally dictate them or write them out and ask others to type them. He added that he would also occasionally authorise messages to be sent by junior staff, but would always ask for the reason and content before allowing his name and rank to be used to authorise the message, and would keep a written record when such authority was given. Mr. P***** could not recall the MSS message in question and stated that he could not recall having any involvement in the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in any capacity (i.e. in any of the areas he was responsible for, including surveillance), and could not explain why his name appears on the message. He added that he does not retain any records from that time, nor have any archived notebooks 25

26 or similar kept by DCI P***** or others been found in GMP Special Branch archives (see section 3.3. below) Sir David Wilmot was the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police in He too gave evidence to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Manchester, which was widely reported at the time. When interviewed in 2013 he stated that he had no recollection of the MSS message. He was subsequently interviewed about a further development (see paragraph below) A number of other senior GMP officers in the command team in 1998 have been interviewed concerning the MSS message, including former DCC McCrone, former ACCs Sweeney, Taylor, Green and Phillips. None can recall the message or any circumstances surrounding it A total of 21 people gave evidence to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Manchester, including four senior police officers and representatives of statutory, public and voluntary bodies relevant to the subject matter under scrutiny. Attempts have been made to contact each of them to ascertain whether, at the hearings or before or afterwards, they felt that there was any inappropriate police activity. One respondent stated that he was approached by a number of people who informed him that police officers had been asking them questions, seemingly for intelligence gathering purposes, but could provide no further details. None of the other witnesses to the Inquiry could recall any incidents relevant to this investigation During interviews with other officers, former GMP DCI David Jones, now Chief Constable of North Yorkshire Police, was identified as the person tasked in 1998 with preparing the GMP response to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, including the role of briefing the senior officers who were giving evidence. From documentation he retained from this period Mr Jones was able to find a letter sent from the Metropolitan Police to the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police dated 08/09/1998. This letter is reproduced in Appendix J. 26

27 The letter, sent by the Lawrence Review Team, offers assistance in relation to the policing of the Inquiry based on the Metropolitan Police s recent experience, and mentioned those involved in the policing of the event and the organising of the event itself. The letter is stamped as having been received by the Chief Constable s Office on 11/09/1998, and contains a number of additional handwritten notes, which appear to read: Copies to Ch. Supt. M/C North & SB, No difficulties anticipated x the Inquiry Team, and Experience and policing x Met somewhat different Please note that the letter x is used to denote the word by. The first of these notes suggests that copies of this message were sent to the Divisional Commander for the North Manchester Division (covering the area and hotel where the Inquiry was due to sit) and to the head of Special Branch (also known as SB ). It should be noted that nowhere in this documentation is it suggested that efforts were made to identify witnesses giving evidence to the Inquiry. In any event the identity of those giving evidence to the Inquiry were in the public domain as they were published by the organisers in advance of 13 th of October Mr Jones entire archives relating to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry were searched for relevant information. Only one piece of documentation contained any reference to the policing of the Inquiry sitting in Manchester, contained within the following two phrases: Policing arrangements by NMCR Special Events Team, and A threat assessment is being undertaken by SB Former GMP Chief Superintendent Christopher Cross was staff officer to Mr. Wilmot in He has been interviewed and has identified the handwriting on the Metropolitan Police letter as his own, but can add no other details 27

28 other than his opinion that his writing would reflect the instructions of the Chief Constable in respect of the correspondence Former Chief Constable Sir David Wilmot was re-contacted in respect of the letter from the Metropolitan Police and Mr Cross s writing on it, and could not recall it, but added that he would have sent such a letter on to the divisional commander of the North Manchester Division Former Chief Superintendent John Cantrell was the Divisional Commander on the North Manchester Division in He cannot recall the MSS message or the letter from the Metropolitan Police and cannot recall anything of note surrounding the Inquiry sitting in Manchester Detective Chief Superintendent B**** was head of GMP Special Branch in He states that he does not recall the MSS message or the letter from the Metropolitan Police, but stated that in this situation such a letter would be passed to the person in charge of the Special Branch Public Order Desk, who at this time he recalled being DCI P***** As a result of this information suggesting that DCI P***** had in fact been responsible for the Public Order Desk at this time, he was re-interviewed and stated that he did not recall the letter from the Metropolitan Police, and reiterated that his responsibility was for the International Desk, but added that he was also responsible for the Surveillance Unit and Aliens Registration Office, but not the Public Order Desk, and could add nothing further Former DCI M***** states that he was responsible for the Special Branch desk covering domestic extremism issues (including public order) at the relevant time but does not recall the MSS message or the surrounding circumstances other than a general recollection of the Inquiry sitting in Manchester. He added that an MSS message such as this would require the authority of the Branch Commander or his or her deputy (i.e. the Chief Superintendent or Superintendent) A large number of officers, staff and former officers and staff from GMP Special Branch have been interviewed with a view to ascertaining the 28

29 structure of the branch, the standard procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of all personnel. Despite this extensive research, and some discrepancies in terms of unit names and responsibilities, none were able to recall or shed any light on the MSS message in terms of who typed it, sent it, what led to it being created, or what followed in terms of information gathered as a result of it effectively being sent to all GMP staff The North Manchester Special Events Team mentioned in the document found in the archives of Mr Jones were a unit responsible for the complex area of policing one-off or annual events in the City Centre area of Manchester. All staff identified as working in this unit at the time of the Inquiry sitting in Manchester have been interviewed. None can recall policing the event, or any other involvement or any correspondence relating to planning for it A member of staff working as the security manager at the Jarvis Hotel (commonly referred to as the Piccadilly Hotel) recalls the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry sitting in the International Suite on the third floor of the venue. He recalls ten or so Asian males protesting outside the venue who he believed were from the Nation of Islam group. He recalls that other than being rather vocal, the protests passed without incident. He also stated that he recalls that there was a booking in system operated by the organisers of the event. The occurrence of this protest (which is similar in nature to that mentioned in section below) has not been corroborated by any other witness or by any records of events at that time. This investigation in conjunction with Mark Ellison s Inquiry, has been unable to establish formally whether or not a list of those attending the Manchester sitting of the Inquiry existed, or whether those attending were asked to sign in or register in any way. Therefore at this time it cannot be said whether definitive records of who attended (whether to give evidence, in another official capacity or as observers) ever existed. However, records have recently been discovered in the National Archives by the Home Office which may lead to new lines of enquiry in this area, including 29

30 names of those invited as observers, potential further speakers, and organisers behind the scenes. Further enquiries are being made into this matter, and these are listed as a recommendation in section 6.3 below Keyword and Physical Searches Extensive and thorough searches of documentary stores and records and computer systems were conducted initially in response to the Home Secretary s letter with an extremely short deadline, and were then expanded as the investigation continued Initial searching focused on departments and units likely to have initiated or maintained records of any intelligence or surveillance activity carried out, but was not limited to these units alone. The relevant departments and units, as highlighted in section above, were: - The North Manchester Division - The Counter Terrorism Branch - The Information Services Branch (conducting searches on intelligence handling systems, and also across shared folders on divisions and for the GMP Command Team) - The Specialist Protective Services Branch, incorporating the Serious Crime Division and Force Intelligence Bureau (incorporating surveillance and covert policing), - The Specialist Operations Branch (incorporating what was Contingency Planning ) - The Professional Standards Branch - The Command Support Team The keywords used for computer record searches were based upon key aspects of the Stephen Lawrence murder, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, the MSS message and those who gave evidence to the Inquiry in Manchester. For computer searches and documentary searches, the definition as to what might constitute relevant material and the SIO s time parameters for searching were also stipulated in instructions to representatives of each of the units listed in the previous section, and are reproduced in Appendix K. 30

31 None of the above units were able to find any further records (documentary or otherwise) or information relevant to this investigation, i.e. suggesting that intelligence or surveillance activity was ordered or carried out in respect of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Stephen Lawrence s family or any others connected to the Inquiry or the family. It should be noted that across each division, department and unit, a significant amount of weeding had taken place, and therefore it must be stressed that absence of evidence does not infer evidence of absence Policing divisions across GMP were also asked to conduct a scoping exercise to ascertain whether any records existed in archives such as officers notebooks or daybooks or other journals, which might contain reference to the 1998 message. All replied to the effect that no such organised archives going back as far as 1998 existed. Further speculative searching of any remaining disorganised archives was not carried out as it was deemed speculative and disproportionate It should be noted that the legislation and guidelines governing the retention and disposal of policing and non-policing information are and were varied. It would also appear that adherence to these laws and guidelines also varied. Regardless of this, no relevant records were discovered in Greater Manchester Police s archives. More details are included in section 6 below to all GMP staff On 15/07/2013 an message was sent to all GMP staff asking for any information or evidence to assist in the investigation. Despite the wide circulation of this request no positive replies were received. 31

32 4. CONTEXTUAL ISSUES AND STAFF EXPERIENCES DISCOVERED DURING THE INVESTIGATION 4.1. Introduction In this section potentially relevant background information and the testimony of witnesses interviewed during the course of this investigation is listed without comment, this is to provide some background in terms of context, and details of experiences of staff working on the Rochdale division and within GMP Special Branch in the late nineties To assist with this process, staff who self-identified as being from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) backgrounds working at Rochdale or in Special Branch at the relevant time were approached with a view to sharing their experiences in order to contribute to the learning process, for which we are extremely grateful. Operation Kerry is grateful to those staff (past and present) who shared their experiences in order to assist this investigation, and is also appreciative of the support given to this process by GMP s Black and Asian Police Association It should be noted that not all of those accounts are included in this report, as some who responded felt that they did not wish for their accounts to be made public Context and Background Information In July 1994 the Home Office and the Scottish Office jointly issued a four page document entitled: Guidelines on Special Branch Work in Great Britain. This document is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix I. As well as outlining the general functions of Special Branches across Great Britain, paragraphs 13 and 14 outline responsibilities relating to public order In paragraph 13 the document states that Chief Officers, in order to maintain the Queen s Peace, need accurate assessments of the public order implications of events such as marches or demonstrations in order to ensure, 32

33 amongst other things, that: proportionate and cost-effective policing arrangements are made to deal with any likely disorder or violence Paragraph 14 states: The collection and analysis of intelligence for Chief Officers about threats to public order remains a key Special Branch responsibility On Monday 29 th June at the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry hearings in London, a disturbance took place outside the venue when a number of members of the Nation of Islam group demanded to be allowed entry into the packed auditorium. Subsequent scuffles let to the police using CS spray and two arrests being made (BBC News: As mentioned from paragraph onwards, in documentation discovered in the personal archives of Chief Constable Jones, a letter from the Metropolitan Police to the GMP Chief Constable dated 08/09/1998, was annotated and apparently sent to the divisional commander for the North Manchester division and the head of Special Branch Also in that documentation, an undated briefing paper contains the following in relation to the Manchester based hearing: Policing arrangements for the day are the responsibility of the North Manchester Special Events Team. A threat assessment is being undertaken by Special Branch 4.3. Some Experiences of GMP Staff on the Rochdale Division Officer A started his employment with Greater Manchester Police in 1996, and was stationed on the Rochdale division. Officer A described how he had struggled with some aspects of the paperwork associated with his role. At one point Officer A stated that his tutor constable said you guys can t do it referring to Asian officers. Officer A had no other concerns during his employment with the force however does feel that he could have been given support to address his weaknesses. Officer A left the force in 1997 as a result of these issues. 33

34 Officer B describes an incident whilst he was working as a Special Sergeant on the Rochdale division in During the incident officer B was driving a police personnel carrier in company with approximately seven Special Constabulary colleagues, policing the Rochdale night time economy during a busy weekend. Whilst in the vehicle and during a general conversation one of the female officers said I m not going to that club, it s full of P***s. Officer B was shocked at the comments, coming from a Pakistani background himself, and stopped the vehicle at the side of the road, turned to the female officer and asked Who s it full of? expecting an apology. The female officer replied by saying P***s provocatively Officer B did not report the matter to his line manager due to shock and disbelief. The following day he was contacted by a senior Special Constable and asked about the incident. It transpired that another officer that overheard the comments had reported the matter. Officer B later provided his account and limited action was taken by senior colleagues. Sometime later officer B spoke to a member of the Divisional Senior Leadership Team to address his concerns at the lack of action that had been taken against the female officer. During that meeting a senior officer stated that the word P*** was an acceptable term. Officer B later received a verbal apology from one of the Assistant Chief Constables due to the way the incident had been handled. Sometime later officer B discovered that the female officer was still employed by the force and had been moved to another division PC Charles Crichlow, when stationed at Rochdale in the late nineties, was tasked by Special Branch in his capacity as a local divisional officer to indiscriminately record the registration numbers of vehicle parked on or near a premises where a public meeting was being held at the Kashmir Youth Project. He did not carry out this request but instead referred it to his sergeant, Nadeem Mir PC Crichlow also states that he received threatening telephone calls at his home address, and experienced open hostility from some of his colleagues and supervisors after raising the matter above and the wording of the MSS message. Mr Crichlow has been invited to take this and any other matters further, either as a conduct investigation or to the new Hate Incident 34

35 Governance Panel, but has stated that he will choose whether or not to do so once he has studied this report In the late nineties Nadeem Mir was a sergeant at Rochdale and himself recalls the Kashmir Youth Project incident and also recalls numerous occasions when inappropriate language was used by officers on incident logs and racist language was used by officers patrolling the town centre area Some Experiences of GMP Staff in Special Branch Officer C worked at Manchester Airport Special Branch between 1996 and 2001 and outlined a number of concerns from her time there. One of these related to the way that the number of inbound passengers examined was measured as a performance indicator. Officer C states that this led to a practice within the branch of inappropriately targeting flights from areas such as Pakistan and the Republic of Ireland without any justification or proper profiling. She was concerned that this target driven and competitive culture led to disproportionate police activity Officer C adds that when it was anticipated that the arrivals area would become particularly busy with families and friends waiting for passengers awaiting incoming flights (including the Pakistan International Airlines flights) she learned that an agreement was reached with the airport that the heating would be turned down in that area to discourage large number of people waiting there 4. Officer C is aware that this matter was raised formally with the Community Affairs Department 5. 4 Enquiries with police and staff at Manchester Airport have located no corroborative records relating to this and no persons with any recollection of this practice at this time, and it is not current practice today. From a present engineering perspective, changing the temperature of the arrivals hall would alter the temperature in the whole building and would take hours or even days to achieve. 5 Officer C states that she is not aware what happened as a result of this matter being passed to the Community Affairs Department, and limited enquiries have revealed that no-one who worked in that unit at the time has any recollection of such a matter being passed to them. 35

36 Officer C also states that whilst at Manchester Airport she was subjected to racist insults and discrimination and as a result brought this to the attention of her supervisors, who agreed to report the matter to the Equal Opportunities Department as a matter suitable for local resolution. Officer C adds that when she attempted to obtain a copy of the report from the Equal Opportunities Department she was informed that they had no record of it. She states that a senior supervisor subsequently explained to her that he was told not to submit his report by senior management as there were a number of other complaints of racism within Manchester Airport Special Branch being dealt with at the time and a further issue would make things appear worse. Officer C, demoralised with her treatment, took out what was then called an Industrial Tribunal against GMP Officer C states that she subsequently felt unable to continue working at the airport and applied for a post in the Diversity Training Unit, and attended a GMP Trainers course in order to prepare for the role, adding that on the last day of this course she was invited by the Chief Superintendent to take up the post in Diversity Training straight away, such was the concern for her welfare Officer C states that before the industrial tribunal was due to start, the internal investigation into the conduct she had reported (and the subsequent counterallegation made by the other officer) was brought to a conclusion. She states that she was advised to accept management advice (an informal recording of admonishment from a senior officer), along with the other officer concerned. She states that she was told that if she did not accept this advice she would not be able to get promoted. Officer C felt she had no choice but to accept this, although she was able to state on the associated paperwork that she refuted the counter-allegation, had never been spoken to about it and was unaware what the allegation against her was Officer C subsequently withdrew her industrial tribunal after the Police Federation stated they would not fund it on the basis that Court costs would outweigh any possible compensation 6. 6 Management of such issues are dealt with by the relevant national Police Federation claims department, and were (and still are) assessed as a whole in terms of benefit to the individual, the Federation membership and the organisation as a whole, with appropriate legal advice and cost/benefit analysis. 36

37 Some years later, Officer C asked that the internal investigation above be looked into again, in terms of how she was forced to accept the management advice and in terms of the issue itself not being investigated properly. This was done, and it was found in Officer C s favour and this matter corrected on her personal record Officer D is an ex GMP employee. The officer retired as medically unfit in 2001 and states this was as a direct result of stress caused by racism within GMP s Special Branch at Manchester Airport between 1995 and It is reported that this individual witnessed first-hand senior officers using racist language and discriminatory behaviour. The officer submitted a grievance report and believes this led to him being subjected to unwarranted surveillance activities at his home address. The officer believes that by reporting racist practices his police career was adversely affected, limiting his opportunities GMP Staff Records Checks were made to ascertain whether any relevant information could be obtained from any staff who left GMP during the late nineties (specifically ), staff from ethnic minorities who worked on the Rochdale Division or in Special Branch at the time, and staff who were party to employment tribunals or grievances. GMP records were subsequently searched for staff and former staff fitting into these categories Human Resources (HR) records were checked and self-identified staff from ethnic minorities who had left GMP between 1997 and 1999 were contacted where possible. Relevant testimony of those interviewed is included in the two preceding sections (4.3 and 4.4 above) Staff from ethnic minority backgrounds working on the Rochdale Division and in Special Branch in the late nineties were also identified from HR records, and again where relevant, their accounts are included in the two preceding sections. 37

38 Unfortunately, searchable records concerning employment tribunals from this period were not available due to weeding. As a matter of routine, the case files relating to employment tribunals are only retained for a period of twelve months after closure. All that remains after that are records that can only be searched on via their claim number Similarly, records concerning formally investigated staff grievances from this period were not available, due to the implementation of a structured weeding process in line with current guidelines, which means that documentation relating to such matters preceding 2005 have been disposed of. See sections below covering record retention as a whole. 5. STAFF SURVEY FEBRUARY Background The Operation Kerry survey (see Appendix L) was commissioned to provide an organisational context to the enquiries and findings of the Operation Kerry investigation conducted within Greater Manchester Police The survey was intended to compliment the investigative process and provide some insight into the culture of the organisation at the time of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and a sense of how staff felt at the time. The survey was designed to generate quantitative and qualitative responses. It contained closed questions requiring a yes or no response, but also deliberately invited free text responses for a number of questions in order that staff had the freedom to comment on the issues relating to the Operation Kerry in the way they wished to The survey was sent to just over 4,000 serving GMP police officers and police staff, who have had continuous service with GMP since 1998, the year the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry came to Manchester. Survey responses were anonymous. An invitation to complete the survey was also sent via NARPO to retired GMP officers from that time and a number expressed interest in 38

39 contributing, although we cannot identify those retired officers that did because the survey was anonymous Survey Responses In total, 948 staff responded to the survey, 32 stated they were a BME member staff and 128 identified as a female staff member The survey captured only the ethnicity and gender of respondents, however some of the free text responses indicate that staff from other protected groups responded and that their protected characteristics were relevant to the observations that they made about the organisation at the time and their experiences within the organisation A significant number of respondents gave free text responses to all or some of the questions where the option to comment was available. These responses have been assessed in detail and coded into categories of response to generate an overview of nature of the comments made to each question. However some of the statements made in response to this survey have been retained in this summary because of the impact that they have in indicating the sense of feeling at the time A level of concern existed about the anonymity of the survey that may have impacted on response rates. The concern was based on the existence of 3ami (key stroke monitoring) on the majority of GMP computer terminals. Reassurance was circulated that the 3ami system would not be used to identify respondents but staff responses to this issue made it clear that there remains an issue of trust within the organisation General Findings It is evident that GMP staff serving at the time of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry had very different memories of the experiences and feelings about working for GMP, both positive and negative. Some remember positively the impact of the 39

40 Inquiry on the organisation and can cite the changes that have happened since as a result of the Inquiry, whilst others have memories of the impact on staff who felt unfairly labelled as part of an institution whose leader accepted the definition of institutionalised racism during the Inquiry It is also clear that there are staff who have very clear memories of their experiences of unfairness and discrimination within the organisation at the time. These memories remain in their minds and continue to have an impact on how they view the organisation, the perceived level of change achieved within the organisation and the level of trust in there being a sustained change in culture The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Recollections Of those that responded to the survey, 68.8% (652 respondents) were not aware that the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry came to Manchester to hear evidence at all, 30.1% (291 respondents) were aware and a small number did not respond. It seems that basic awareness levels of the role GMP played in the Inquiry was low, therefore, the importance of the Inquiry and potential impact on policing in GMP and the UK more widely may not have been understood by all staff that were serving at the time There was a significant difference in the awareness levels of the Inquiry of BME staff compared to overall awareness showing an almost reversed trend. 59.4% or 19 BME staff (compared to 30.1% overall) were aware the Inquiry visited Manchester, but 40.6% or 13 BME staff were not aware that Manchester specifically played a role in the Inquiry % of female staff (36) were aware of the Inquiry and 71.65% of female staff (91) were not, similar to the overall proportion within the survey Respondents were asked to state how and why they were aware of the Inquiry coming to Manchester. 176 respondents commented on this question, of which, 18 were BME staff and 34 female Some respondents were in a role that meant they had some awareness of the Inquiry coming to Manchester, however the vast majority stated they were most 40

41 aware from information they had seen/heard in external media. Very few staff recalled any internal communication within the organisation at that time Respondents were also asked for their observations and recollections about the preparation for the Inquiry and the Inquiry hearing itself. 28 BME staff and 107 female staff responded to this question Similarly, the majority of respondents have no recollection of the force s preparation for the Inquiry. Those who did recollect Force preparation for the Inquiry made the following comments: It appeared Special Branch were looking for local information around who would be attending the Inquiry. (Q3, 9) Information was being sought by Special Branch as to who from the local community was likely to attend. (Q3, 141) There was very little that occurred [in room 901 Special Branch at Chester House] that was not in the knowledge of National Security in some capacity, and how they were monitoring any National risk will never be in the public knowledge So stating the obvious why SB should circulate a note may have some higher explanation which I don t think would be to Wilmot s advantage/ purpose How you unravel it I have no idea. (Q6, 10) I have a vague recollection at the time that I wanted to attend the enquiry (sic) but was firmly told that it would be detrimental to my standing and that everyone attending was being monitored. I was disappointed as I did want to attend but feared repercussions. (302 a BME member of staff). There was a great deal of concern at the time, many Black and Asian staff had been complaining about racist treatment by the organisation and about failure to address such issues. The force was nervous about this causing embarrassment. The Chief Constable wanted to be in control of the situation. It was known that there was widespread community concern about the way GMP dealt with racist incidents. Attacks on minority businesses were widespread and 41

42 there were many horrific cases where GMP had done nothing to protect victims. The community affairs department were tasked with making sure that this story did not completely embarrass the force in terms of what information was presented to Macpherson. (81) The preparations I observed were very much relating to the statements and evidence being provided to the Inquiry hearing. I can recall some concern about potential disorder linked to the hearing in Manchester. (116) It is clear from the few responses given to this question, that there was a lack of overall knowledge across the organisation about how GMP was preparing for the Inquiry hearing and what this meant to GMP and policing more widely. The comments above indicate that there was some level of awareness and understanding in the hands of a few staff that had been involved in some aspect of the preparations or had an interest in the Inquiry Organisational Approach to Equality and Fairness at the Time The survey moved on to ask for respondents observations on GMP's approach to fairness and equality at the time of the Inquiry. 398 people responded, of which 30 were BME staff and 120 were female Many respondents stated that they perceived GMP to have been fair at the time of the Inquiry (some of those responses came from BME and female staff) whilst others stated that it wasn t fair or appropriate The responses to this question reflected key themes and some respondents referred to more than one theme within the response. These responses have been coded and an overview of the indications from this has been summarised below In total 30 of the 32 BME staff who responded to this question gave a response to this question, 50% (15) described GMP culture as unfair and inappropriate at the time of the Inquiry, whilst 43.3% (13) described the culture as fair and appropriate. One stated that they couldn t respond due to the date they started 42

43 in GMP, and one stated it was typical of the era deplorable but commensurate with many other public institutions at that time A further non-bme respondent was the only one who stated it was unfair to majority as I have always been treated fair by GMP, but there are officers who use their gender/ethnic background to their advantage Of the 120 female responses, 52.5% (63) stated GMP to be fair and appropriate and 27.5% (33) stated GMP to be unfair and inappropriate. 14 female respondents were unable to comment, a further 2 stated it was typical of the era, 5 stated that is was unfair to majority and 4 that favouritism was shown to some: Before David Wilmot arrived in GMP the feeling was that if you were a straight, white, male and perhaps also in the Mason s then you were assured of success in your role, outside of this it was an uphill struggle, not very fair or equal It is clear from the responses above that a proportion of both BME staff and female staff perceived the culture in GMP at the time of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry to be unfair and inappropriate and a greater proportion of BME staff felt this than female staff. It is also evident that there was a sense of resentment and perceived unfairness that existed in other ways within the organisation and also staff that seemed to be accepting of some of these circumstances as normal within an organisation like GMP Internal Reaction to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Respondents commented on their memories of the reaction observed in GMP following the Inquiry. In total 389 people responded to this question, 30 of which were BME staff and 115 female The majority of respondents felt the statement made by Chief Constable Sir David Wilmot, relating to the acknowledgement and acceptance of the concept of institutional racism was unfair and offensive to many staff within the organisation. The level of emotion expressed by respondents relating to this admission was significant, words such as hurt, bitterness, outrage, anger, 43

44 distrust, shock, upset, frustration, disappointment, horrified, disgust are used frequently throughout the comments made to describe how staff felt when they first heard the statement made by Sir David Wilmot There is still clearly a lack of understanding by many as to what he actually meant by his statement and only a few respondents accept that the Chief Constable s statement was misunderstood by some staff. This was balanced by a number of responses regarding the Chief Constable s statement, indicating a belief in the positive impact that this statement has had, such as:- The profile of racism was raised and the openness of the Chief Constable at the time was refreshing, (93) Sadly, a few responses demonstrated that some GMP staff did not accept at the time the issues raised during the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, and believed there to have been a lot of attention on one single murder. That perspective has since remained and there was some indication of a small number of respondents being unsupportive of accepting the lessons learnt. The comment below is indicative of the tone of those responses:- This debate has beaten us enough without a good coat of self flagellation!! (Q7, 131) 5.7. General Cultural Indications and Behaviours at the Time Respondents were asked to consider and recall examples of attitudes, behaviours, decisions, actions or practices (intentional or unwitting) that they would now recognise as unfair or inappropriate and that may have disadvantaged any specific community, since the acceptance of the problems by Sir David Wilmot during the Inquiry Out of the 948 survey respondents, 43.5% (413) responded to this question. Of those, 22.7% (94) respondents said they could think of examples of attitudes, behaviours, decisions, actions or practices (intentional and unwitting) that they recognised as unfair or inappropriate and that may have disadvantaged any specific community. 44

45 Respondents gave examples of internal and external practices which they perceived to be unfair and/or inappropriate. This ranged from call handlers putting inappropriate comments on FWINs, through to the lack of thought given to the minimal number of visible BME Senior officers. A number of respondents also recall this being a time when inappropriate language began to be challenged with the force. An example of one such comment is below:- Going back to perhaps 10 years prior to this visit there was open racist remarks made by officers against Black, Asian members of the public (and as above Homophobic and Sexist) The TV show Life on Mars gave a good insight to the culture...however I would say that this was being addressed by peer pressure and from training given to new recruits so that by 1998 there was a change from the culture that I first met and instances of open racism by officers was very rare and I do not recall any incidents from around the mid 90 s. (88) Other respondents perceived GMP to overcompensate where there were concerns relating to fairness and equality and some perceived positive action as positive discrimination. I believe this environment caused the pendulum to swing too far in the opposite direction. It brought about Positive Discrimination, that affected the whole recruitment processes and career advancement and how BMEs are treated and viewed, at times it effected individuals and created situations where they felt less integrated. (49) Minority groups getting positive discrimination at the expense of majority of workforce based on their minority status as opposed to merit due to ability. (62) There was a perception by a few respondents that GMP became reluctant, on occasions, to enforce the law in fear of being called racist :..I think GMP buckled under the pressure and instead of standing up for decent officers and supporting them when they were acting appropriately they allowed members of ethnic communities to use the Inquiry findings to their advantage to claim the racist card to prevent them being effectively searched or arrested 45

46 especially for dealing class A drugs because GMP was frightened it would be called racist. (52) Of the 32 BME respondents, 29 BME responded to this question, 44.83% (13) stating that they had witnessed the types of attitudes and behaviours that would be inappropriate and amount to unfairness and discrimination. However 55.17% (16) stated that they had not. Of those who responded yes to this question, the majority described racial discrimination internally and externally. Whilst BME respondents did not explicitly refer to an inappropriate police culture, there are responses that overall fall into this theme; recalling general parade room banter that would now be seen as inappropriate; the emphasis on a drinking culture within the job; and the stop search of certain young men of black ethnicity as being common practice at that time female staff responded, 22.58% (28) stating that they had witnessed the types of attitudes and behaviours that would be inappropriate and amount to unfairness and discrimination. However, 77.42% (96) indicate that they could not recall any such behaviour. Within those 28 responses, 14 refer to race discrimination, 16 to other forms of discrimination i.e. sexism, 2 refer to a deficient organisational response (i.e. the calling of certain areas of a division no go areas and the total lack of understanding overall of cultural issues), 10 had no examples they could provide and 3 refer to (unfair) negative public views of police. One referred to the perception that entry levels were reduced to allow for more BME staff to join and gain promotion. This was seen as a disadvantage to BME staff as their achievements were seen as tokenism rather than through their own hard work. Reference is also made again by one to the stop search of young black males being common practice Personal Impact of Cultural Indications and Behaviours at the Time To follow on from the previous question, respondents were asked to recall examples of situations when they personally experienced attitudes, behaviours or circumstances (intentional or unwitting) that they would now recognise as unfair or inappropriate. 416 respondents gave a yes or no response to this question. 131 stating yes and 285 stating no. 46

47 % (17) of the BME staff that responded to this question stated that they could recall examples and 43.33% (13) said that they couldn t % (44) of the 125 female staff who responded said yes and 64.80% (81) stated no to the question Within the responses given by staff, the examples shared involve racial discrimination, homophobia, sexism, sexual harassment and disparaging comments/behaviour towards disabled staff and police (civilian) staff One response stated that There was a culture of bullying The culture has depleted upon the retirement of officers within a certain generation. (Response 94), though one responded that These practices have not gone away; the same attitudes are still here they are just more covert. (Response 20) Other responses revealed behaviours that included but are not limited to: A lack of intervention or challenge of inappropriate behaviour by supervisors and work colleagues. A perception of an underlying culture that victims/witnesses could not speak out for fear of a lack of support and potential impact upon their career progression. Discriminatory attitudes and workplace practises towards staff from protected characteristic groups. Bullying within the workplace sometimes leading to assault. Staff experiencing discriminatory attitudes/bullying resigning from the force. Negative stereotyping by staff towards colleagues from a protected characteristic group. A perception of limited opportunities within the organisation by those who share a protected characteristic and those that did not Have Improvements Been Made? Respondents were finally asked to consider if GMP had made positive improvements in relation to fairness and equality as a result of the Stephen 47

48 Lawrence Inquiry learning or since that time as a result of other subsequent events Of the 389 who did respond, 65.6% (255) stated that positive improvements had been made but 34.4% (134) stated they had not % (17) BME staff replied yes and 43.33% (13) replied no to the question. 120 female staff responded with 74.17% (89) replying yes and 25.83% (31) replying no to the question The free text responses to this question varied considerably. Responses in some cases at parallel opposites, some who state that they have witnessed no improvements in the force and those who believe the entire organisation has changed in its mindset and practices. Many believe that improvements have been very positive, whilst others state that change is still very much needed and some who believe GMP has gone too far with change to the detriment of many The responses to this question, taken together, provide an overall indication that some issues relating to inclusiveness, fairness and equality remain a concern for staff. These issues should form the basis for further work for the force and include but are not limited to: Lack of effective internal communication emphasising that equality and diversity issues are a priority for the force, that this will continue to be the case, and why we do certain things in relation to equality and fairness, for example:- o effectively explaining the reasons behind taking positive action and what constitutes positive action o how we can learn from organisational experiences relating to equality and fairness, e.g. employment tribunal findings o the value the Staff Associations, Unions and Support Networks bring to the organisation in professionally challenging unfairness and inequality within the workplace o potential division between some staff groups and the Team GMP approach working together 48

49 The need to identify conscious and unconscious bias and raise the awareness of individuals to their own internal attitudes and how this can impact on their behaviour. The lack of understanding that some staff show in relation to the need for inequality to be tackled. 6. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6.1. Findings The existence of the 1998 MSS message was corroborated, in that a copy was retrieved from the legal representative of Charles Crichlow. The detail of the message confirms that it was sent across Greater Manchester Police, effectively to every operational officer in the whole force The wording of the message, and specifically the section which asks for information or intelligence regarding groups or individuals who are likely to attend the Inquiry to be forwarded to Special Branch, is ambiguously worded at best, and it is easy to see, in the context of the times and in any event, how that wording could be interpreted as targeting individuals from ethnic minority backgrounds Despite exhaustive efforts, no material was found or testimony obtained to suggest what caused the message to be written and distributed in the first place. Also, nothing was found in terms of any material gathered or action taken after the message was sent. This could be interpreted as a positive outcome, however the weeding of records in the intervening fifteen years could account for the lack of any information covering any such activity, just as its absence could be attributed to a lack of any such activity taking place It should also be noted that no intelligence was found on any GMP systems relating to those who gave evidence at the Inquiry in Manchester or those directly or indirectly connected to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry or the murder of Stephen Lawrence itself. The system used to manage nominal and 49

50 intelligence records on individuals has changed since 1998, and any records of deletions of such records have long since been weeded themselves National guidelines were in force at the time which mandated that Special Branches were to collect intelligence about threats to public order. Further documentation, albeit with little detail, suggests that GMP Special Branch were indeed conducting a threat assessment ahead of the Manchester hearing. Although this cannot be definitively linked to the MSS message, this does indicate that Special Branch would have had a legitimate interest in gathering intelligence ahead of the hearing Nothing was found during the investigation to link the MSS message to any non-legitimate aims, or to link it in any way to the matters under investigation by Mark Ellison QC or Operation Herne When concerns were raised about the message, these were not properly dealt with. No clarity was sought from the message s author. A formal memo was sent to the incorrect department (Community Affairs rather than Special Branch itself) two months after concerns were raised, and in any event after the Manchester hearing. Limited effort was made to understand the issue raised and the complainants were left unsatisfied, with genuinely held questions left unanswered. The opportunity to deal with this in a timely and considered way was missed. This has led to prevailing concerns, suspicion and mistrust over the intervening years At the time that this message was distributed (see section above), there was an underlying degree of suspicion about the role and activities of Special Branch. It is easy to see how the tasking requests mentioned in sections and above gave rise to further concerns about who was being monitored and why. It therefore follows that the publication of this message could easily add to this suspicion, particularly given the high-profile nature of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry During the investigation, it became apparent that DCI P*****, named as the originator of the MSS message, was also responsible for the Special Branch 50

51 Surveillance Unit at the time the message was sent. This in itself could be seen to compound the suspicions that the MSS message had a sinister purpose However it is worth noting that DCI P***** outlined that any surveillance was authorised at a weekly meeting with other Special Branch managers (see section 3.2.7). Mr. P***** had no recollection of the MSS message in any context In 1998 records and information in Greater Manchester Police were held on a multiplicity of computer systems and also paper records. This was a time of considerable change in terms of IT infrastructure. As a result it was not immediately clear how or where to search for records pertaining to the MSS message, and this searching uncovered a varied approach to record retention across IT and paper-based systems In 1998 and in subsequent years the retention of records was governed in the main by the Data Protection Act 1998 for personal information and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 in relation to material relating to criminal investigations. However there was no formal records management retention and disposal schedule in place until the first version was introduced in As such records would have, in the main been kept for as long as necessary under DPA or as dictated by CPIA Had this investigation taken place any number of years earlier and therefore closer in time to 1998, there is a possibility that it would have reached a more satisfactory conclusion, in that documentation, computer records and even witness recollections may have been more readily available if they existed, and although some records do exist from that time, none relate to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry or the matters under review by Operation Kerry Notwithstanding any legislation or guidelines dictating when, where and for how long records should be kept, it is clear from this investigation that the corporate memory of Greater Manchester Police is not sufficient to cater for the requirements of an in-depth investigation such as this fifteen years after the event. 51

52 The media release by Deputy Chief Constable Ian Hopkins (see section above) stated that the message was routine and referred to the policing arrangements for the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. This release was authorised before any formal investigation had started and purely in response to a news organisation asking for a quote on the matter. In hindsight a more open form of words may have been appropriate, however it should be pointed out that even at the end of a lengthy investigation, it cannot be determined that the MSS message was not sent out for a legitimate purpose As a result of the Operation Kerry investigation, it should be pointed out that due to the passage of time, the lack of records and recollection, or the lack of actual activity, no misconduct issues relating to the MSS message or the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Manchester were discovered. However, matters have come to light (particularly in sections 4.3 and 4.4) which would appear to amount to misconduct, and if they occurred now and were reported would result in a Professional Standards Branch conduct investigation All other aspects of the Gold Strategy set out in section 2.1 and Appendix A were addressed through the regular Gold meetings The following findings result from the outcome of the staff survey commissioned as part of Operation Kerry and outlined in detail in section 5 above The responses from the survey indicate that there was a low level of awareness at the time about the importance of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry to policing and the relationship the police service has with minority communities There is very limited recall of the actual preparations for the Inquiry, this was limited to a handful of responses to the survey and will not substantially add anything to the main investigation into Operation Kerry, other than to confirm the perceptions of the motivation behind the release of the message switch and the role of Special Branch in requesting and gathering information It seems that some of the issues that the Inquiry dealt with and attempted to change were understood to be necessary by some staff at the time, whilst 52

53 others had a very negative reaction to statements made in the Inquiry specifically the acceptance by Sir David Wilmot that GMP was institutionally racist. There was and in some cases, still is, a real sense of misunderstanding about the statement made, what it meant and means for the Service, the force and the individual. Internal communication methods that may have been used at the time to explain the statement do not appear to have reached some of the staff who responded to this survey There are different levels of perception of unfairness and discrimination at the time from BME and female staff, with over half of BME officers feeling that this existed overtly and just over a quarter of female staff The survey responses make it clear that discriminatory attitudes and behaviours existed within GMP at the time of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and though such practices seem to have diminished there remains concern that some forms of discrimination still exist in a more covert and subtle form. Overall just over a quarter of all respondents had seen these attitudes and behaviours in the organisation at the time of the Inquiry, however this was higher for BME staff with over half of BME having seen such behaviours in the organisation. Those who had experienced attitudes or behaviours that impacted on them personally were over half of BME staff and over a third of female staff The organisation that the survey depicts is one where a significant proportion of staff recognised the existence of overt prejudice and discrimination at the time if this is the case, we cannot rule out the possibility that, whatever the intention of the message switch (if not motivated in itself by discrimination), when received into the organisation at that time might have been responded to in such a way that resulted in someone acting on it in a discriminatory way. Whilst no evidence of this was found, this cannot be ruled out as a possibility Since 1998, it is clear, from the survey responses that GMP has taken many steps to achieve positive changes and continue to develop and mature as an organisation. The feedback received points to a more positive and forward thinking organisation since the time of the Inquiry. Turnover within the workforce has brought with it greater understanding of diversity and equality. The sense of improvement from respondents varied however, in that two thirds 53

54 of staff felt that GMP had made positive improvements, however this was lower for BME staff, only half of whom felt that there was an improvement The survey has enabled us to consider the type of organisation GMP was at the time of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and use this information to assess how far we have come and how we can continue to move forward beyond the Operation Kerry investigation to make positive improvements on the journey to changing our culture What would be different now? If an event similar to the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry were to take place in Manchester now, then the process by which it would be managed has altered significantly. An event of this significance would be likely to have oversight from an Assistance Chief Constable as Gold Commander, with a command structure including a Silver Commander, and individual Bronze Commanders to deal with particular aspects of the operation (e.g. event liaison, public order policing, roads policing, media, community impact etc ) This process would be managed on a computerised action management log (using software known as CLIO), allowing auditable, timed and dated records to be kept for posterity. Any intelligence collected to support the policing operation would be gathered by the Force Intelligence Bureau s Community Intelligence Team, who would not routinely request information from staff as per the 1998 MSS message, unless there were specific reasons for doing so. All intelligence would also be added to the CLIO system, graded and given a force repository number and fed into the intelligence packs presented to the Gold and Silver Commanders to assist with tactical and resourcing decisions The Force Intelligence Bureau has formal links with the NWCTU to allow information sharing where appropriate. For example if concerns were evident that matters relating to national security or domestic extremism were a contributory factor to the event and its policing, then information sharing would take place. 54

55 If concerns such as those of Charles Crichlow were raised now, the matter would have been considered as an internal hate incident and recorded within appropriate processes as such. In addition, a number of reporting avenues exist (in addition to line management) which either did not exist in 1998 or were perhaps less sophisticated. These include: GMP Professional Standards Branch GMP Confidence and Equality Board GMP Ethics Committee GMP Hate Incident Governance Panel Police and Crime Commissioner Staff Networks Independent Advisory Groups IPCC HMIC Integrity Line The governance of police records has changed massively since 1998, as has the way in which records are stored in the first instance, dictated by the pace of technological change and introduction of new guidelines and legislation Principle 5 of the Data Protection Act states that personal information must be kept no longer than necessary. In 2006 the Management of Police Information (MOPI) guidelines were introduced following the Soham murders and the subsequent Bichard Inquiry. These govern how policing records (i.e. operational material, prosecution files and other associated crime records) should be reviewed, retained and disposed of as per pre-defined MOPI groupings. These are incorporated into GMP policy within guidance for the retention and disposal of policing records. This policy also contains a retention schedule covering a wide range of other policing records. Greater Manchester Police also have a policy on the retention and disposal of non-policing records with retention schedules in place broken down by function dictating when records of each type containing personal information should be disposed of Notwithstanding the legislation governing the retention of relevant material to crimes, GMP retain information relating to more serious crimes (including sexual 55

56 offences) for 100 years, and retain information relating to less serious crimes for seven years. Custody records are kept for seven years Intelligence on individuals is kept for as long as deemed necessary by the owner of that intelligence, and it is worthy of note that when such intelligence is the only reason why a record of a person is kept, then when the intelligence is weeded, the nominal record is then deleted, although a record of the deletion will be retained in a skeleton report In relation to the specific circumstances of this case, the MSS message would be retained for as long as necessary as per DPA, or if criminal proceedings were under consideration then as long as is necessary for that to be decided. Similarly if disciplinary proceedings were under consideration then relevant records would be kept for as long as any warning was in place or in the case of dismissal another six years. The subsequent message sent by Chief Superintendent Kane (or similar) would count as general correspondence and would be retained for two years unless any of the above caveats applied Material relating to surveillance and other operational matters should be retained as per CPIA legislation, i.e. until a decision is taken whether to institute proceedings or if a prosecution follows for as long as the specific legislation dictates Operational orders for events and related material should be retained for ten years It should be noted that the Public Records Act, which currently applies to a number of institutions but only the Metropolitan Police Service, is likely to be rolled out nationally in the near future. This will dictate that records of public interest will be retained for twenty years and then sent to the National Archives. In anticipation of this, GMP is currently drafting a Records Management Policy in order to prepare for the introduction of this legislation. In addition, there is a specific records management unit with responsibility for oversight in this area Another relevant and recent development is the on-going implementation of SharePoint records centres to allow electronic records outside of core systems 56

57 to fulfil their retention periods whilst being protected from amendment and deletion. This will revolutionise the use of and document storage procedures in GMP, and its very nature should prevent the almost immediate loss of corporate memory that results when an officer s or staff member s account is deleted one month after they leave service In terms of the staff survey and more broadly, following the publication of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry report there were significant changes required in policing. GMP put in immediate measures in the form of a scoping study and then an implementation programme (Operation Catalyst) to deliver the changes within the 70 recommendations from the Inquiry report. Many of these changes are so much a part of the way the service now operates and are reflected in the business as usual practices described in this section of the report. Recent assessment of the 70 recommendations at national level (in 2013, 20 years after Stephen s Murder) has indicated that 67 of the recommendations lead to specific changes in practices or the law and that whilst it has collectively had a profound impact on the service, the police service has struggled to keep up with the pace of this change In GMP, this programme later continued under a new name to further embed and drive improvements as the Respect Programme and grew once more into the formation of a unit called Diversity Command under the direct leadership of the Chief Officer Team. Significant legislative changes were brought in the intervening years in relation to race equality (Race Relations Amendment Act 2000), gender equality (Gender Equality Duty 2007) and disability discrimination (Disability Discrimination Act 2005), more recently integrated into a single legislative framework under the Equality Act 2010 that now provides a clear legal framework under which GMP and all public bodies operate One of the key recommendations that emanated from the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was the development of a definition of what we now know as Hate Crime or Hate Incidents (racist incidents at the time). The definition recommended in the Inquiry forms the basis of the national common definition (ACPO) for hate crimes and incidents that all forces recognise and use, as do other justice agencies or statutory partners. What has followed since is years of work on improving the reporting, recording, investigation, prosecution and prevention of 57

58 hate crime The work the service and specifically GMP have done since the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and throughout the legislative developments that followed has resulted in improvements that have been sustained in GMP. However in 2014, in recognition of the issues still faced by GMP, the force has developed and published a new Equality, Diversity and Human Rights (EDHR) Strategy. The strategy clearly sets out the baseline of where we are now and the aspiration/vision for where we want to be and has set challenging objectives to achieve greater sustainable outcomes for the force. One vital part of this strategy relates to the recruitment, retention and progression of minority staff within GMP (currently led by Operation Peel) and any issues like this (that impact on the trust and confidence of minority staff within the service) arising now would be considered as part of this strategy The EDHR Strategy is governed through the newly re-formed Confidence and Equalities Board and any issues arising now relating to equality and fairness would fall within the scope of the board and if not already covered by an existing objective, would be added to the action plan and monitored Conclusions and Recommendations In 1998 the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry came to Manchester after hearings in London which attracted heavy media attention. Records concerning the policing of this event no longer exist, nor have any recollections of its organisation been uncovered In anticipation of this hearing, an MSS message was sent across GMP asking, in an inappropriate way, for information on those attending the event to be forwarded to Special Branch. This created understandable concerns for more than one individual, and the way in which these concerns were addressed then and subsequently were below the required standard. This has created an unnecessary level of mistrust in the way GMP deal with matters across the board, not least in the area of racial discrimination. 58

59 The evidence suggests that Special Branch did have a formal and legitimate role in planning for the Inquiry, but the wording of the message switch resulted in concern about exactly what activity that included. The opportunity to address this at the time was missed, and it is now not possible to say with certainty whether any action was legitimate or questionable due to the lack of records available some 17 years later GMP has improved in many relevant areas since 1998, in terms of procedures, education, equality and other areas, however a level of mistrust remains The recommendations below have arisen from the investigation into the MSS message and relevant areas set out in the Gold Strategy. General RECOMMENDATION 1: This report should be checked by interested parties via the Gold Group set up for Operation Kerry and published on the GMP website for public viewing, as well as being shared with interested parties such as Charles Crichlow, Nadeem Mir, Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon and Mr Neville Lawrence, and the IPCC. Consideration should also be given to associated media releases and community impact assessments. Due to its impactive nature, it should also be shared with the Chief Officer Group (COG) prior to publication RECOMMENDATION 2: In addition to the sharing of the report, GMP Equality lead ACC Shewan should hold meetings with Charles Crichlow and Nadeem Mir to formally share the report and its findings, and to formally acknowledge errors that were made RECOMMENDATION 3: The findings, conclusions and recommendations from this report should be presented to and reviewed by the GMP Senior Leadership Team and the membership of the Confidence and Equalities Board to determine if the existing EDHR Strategy vision and objectives require 59

60 revision. Any subsequent feedback from stakeholders and other interested parties should also be considered and reviewed in this way RECOMMENDATION 4: Those who attended the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in Manchester to give evidence should be contacted individually to inform them of the outcome of Operation Kerry, particularly as it relates to them as individuals and address any concerns they may have around the obtaining and retention of intelligence RECOMMENDATION 5: Letters should be sent to those conducting parallel Inquiries offering our assistance and the sharing of relevant information and findings. Information retention RECOMMENDATION 6: Consideration will be given to increasing the corporate memory of the Greater Manchester Police for critical incidents and other matters which may attract scrutiny in the near or distant future. This must include the retention of all Command and Divisional Gold minutes in a central repository for transparency, plus the capability to search for them. As per the entries in the previous section, this could involve the use of the CLIO system or SharePoint, and the application of the relevant legislation under MOPI, CPIA and DPA. These concerns around record retention will be brought to the attention of the relevant Chief Officer for review and a refresh of corporate standards in this area. Issues Arising from the Staff Survey RECOMMENDATION 7: GMP will review the nature and effectiveness of all internal communications and methods for disseminating matters to staff relating to all issues of equality and fairness within GMP RECOMMENDATION 8: GMP will consider methods of obtaining feedback on the results of this survey with staff that were not part of the survey group to help shape further organisational response and findings presented to the Confidence and Equalities Board for consideration. 60

61 RECOMMENDATION 9: GMP will provide the full free text results from the survey to an internal advisory group from Staff Associations and Networks for critical read and assessment to ensure a broad perspective of important learning points has been captured RECOMMENDATION 10: GMP will review the Operation Peel learning from Unconscious Bias Training and develop a proposal on embedding this for all staff RECOMMENDATION 11: GMP will work to build on the positive feedback in relation to Diversity Training and consider the viability of existing training (SDE days) being offered to a wider audience in GMP within the wider Training Needs Analysis already in commission in relation to EDHR related learning and development RECOMMENDATION 12: GMP will assess the role and perceptions of its Staff Support Networks in collaboration with the SSN Chairs as a group and determine together a vision for their role going forward, and support the promotion of positive messages relating to the role of the SSN s within GMP. Miscellaneous RECOMMENDATION 13: The recently recovered records from the National Archives as mentioned in paragraph will be reviewed by the Operation Kerry team and any relevant lines of enquiry pursued. 61

62 APPENDICES A. Gold Strategy dated 04/07/2013 B. Correspondence with the IPCC C. Home Office Letter dated 03/07/2013 D. GMP Response to Home Office Letter dated 10/07/2013 E. The MSS Message sent on 07/10/1998 retrieved on 08/10/1998 F. Witness Strategies G. Report by PS Mir dated 14/10/1998 H. Report by CS Kane to CS Mellor dated 07/12/1998 I. Special Branch Guidelines published by the Home Office and Scottish Office in 1994 J. Letter from Metropolitan Police to Greater Manchester Police dated 08/09/1998 K. Criteria for searches of GMP s documentary and computer records L. The Operation Kerry Staff Survey 62

63 A. Gold Strategy dated 04/07/2013 As the Gold Commander, I am responsible for all GMP activity that will now take place following the concerns that have been raised about Special Branch tasking of GMP officers to gather intelligence on individuals or groups attending the McPherson hearings when they were held in Manchester in This matter has been raised within GMP twice previously, in 1998 and in There are concerns about how the Force dealt with the issue then. It is imperative that the Force takes these issues seriously and ensures they are fully investigated. It is also important that those who raised the concerns are kept updated of our progress and offered appropriate levels of support should they require it. There is considerable public and national media interest concerning the allegations that the Metropolitan Police Service used undercover officers to gather intelligence on the family of Stephen Lawrence, and those supporting them, with a view to smearing them. It is imperative that this GMP investigation is co-ordinated with the MPS/IPCC investigations to ensure that if there is any connection between these matters it is identified at the earliest opportunity and fully investigated. At this stage we do not have a copy of the Message Switch that caused the initial concern and it is important to locate it. However, the more pertinent issue is to understand the legitimacy of the policing activity at that time, or not, and what was its purpose. This will also include a need to identify where the tasking came from, who sanctioned it and whether there is any connection between this and the issues currently under investigation in the Metropolitan Police Service. The IPCC have confirmed that it may take up to 4 weeks for them to determine the mode of investigation into this matter. It is therefore now appropriate for GMP to commence a formal investigation. This can, and will be, handed over to the IPCC or other investigative lead as necessary in due course. I have therefore now appointed [an] SIO for this investigation with immediate effect. There are calls for a Public Inquiry to take place and the Home Secretary is involved in the decision making re this. 63

64 At this time the amended Gold Strategy is therefore:- To conduct a thorough investigation into this matter to determine:- Who was involved (incl. their roles and responsibilities). What happened? Why it happened. What, if any, intelligence was gathered and what use it was put to. Whether any policing activity undertaken amounts to misconduct or criminal matters. Furthermore, the investigation will seek to establish whether, or not, the policing activity was legitimate in its aim and whether it was in any way connected to the allegations that the MPS used undercover policing tactics to gather intelligence on the family of Stephen Lawrence and their supporters with a view to smearing them. To conduct a thorough search within GMP (including the NWCTU) to identify, locate, secure and preserve all evidence that may assist in the investigation into these concerns. This will include searches of IT systems, archives and documents, as well as identifying those police officers and staff who may be able to provide information and assist the investigation in due course. To invite independent investigation and scrutiny of this matter via a voluntary referral to the Independent Police Complaints Commission. To provide support to the two officers who raised the original concerns back in Support will also be offered to any other affected/involved members of GMP. To actively engage the Staff Associations and Unions in offering support. To engage BAPA and the MPA to offer advice and support on diversity issues that arise from this matter and to invite them to act as a critical friend to the Gold process in considering the impact that this may have community and internal relationships. To inform and update other Forces as necessary, including the MPS and to ensure effective co-ordination across Forces through the evidence gathering and investigative processes. To establish an effective media strategy. To ensure that key stakeholders are kept informed of progress. To influence and encourage a cohesive national approach to investigating this, and other potentially connected matters. To provide timely, meaningful updates to the staff of GMP and the communities of Greater Manchester. This will enable us to provide reassurance that the matter is being taken seriously and will help us to better understand the impact this has on 64

65 confidence internally and externally. That enhanced understanding will inform activities that will be undertaken to address those impacts. To establish whether lessons can now be learned from the events of ACC Dawn Copley Gold Strategy updated following the Gold Meeting on Thursday 4 July

66 B. Correspondence with the IPCC IPCC Decision on Referrals Connected to the Investigation into the Murder of Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson Inquiry Introduction On 24 June 2013, The Guardian newspaper published allegations by a former Metropolitan Police undercover officer, Peter Francis, about his activities while undercover in the 1990s. These included allegations that the Metropolitan Police Service deliberately tasked Mr Francis to gather information and intelligence with the intent to 'smear' the Stephen Lawrence Campaign, which had begun after Stephen s murder in The public response to these allegations was overwhelming; politicians and media commentators expressed outrage and disgust. As Home Secretary Theresa May told the House of Commons on 24 June:.I know the whole House will want to convey their support for the Lawrence family. They experienced an unspeakable tragedy, their pain was compounded by the many years in which justice was not done, and these latest allegations still coming twenty years after Stephen s murder only add to their suffering. 66

67 At the time these allegations were published, undercover policing was already subject to an inquiry named Operation Herne, a major review which began in October 2011, since February 2013 led by Derbyshire Chief Constable Mick Creedon, of 40 years of undercover policing between 1968 and 2008, involving tens of thousands of documents and some 30 officers and staff. The IPCC is not supervising Operation Herne, but is supervising four specific investigations concerning the activities of undercover officers in relation to a range of allegations including offences including fraud, forming inappropriate sexual relationships, and providing evidence in court using a pseudonym. The mode of investigation in these cases is being kept under close review. In addition to Operation Herne, in July 2012 the Home Secretary had tasked Mark Ellison QC, the barrister who successfully prosecuted Gary Dobson and David Norris for the murder of Stephen Lawrence, to examine the allegations of deliberate incompetence and corruption on the part of officers involved in the original investigation into the murder and whether material had been withheld from the Macpherson Inquiry. That review was originally scheduled to be completed in July On 25 June 2013 the Metropolitan Police referred the allegations made by Mr Francis connected to the Stephen Lawrence murder to the IPCC. Concerns then began to circulate widely about the possibility of other inappropriate surveillance or information-gathering connected to the Macpherson Inquiry, which had also held hearings in Manchester, Bradford, Bristol and Birmingham. On 28 June 2013, Greater Manchester Police made a referral to the IPCC in response to concerns about special branch officers being tasked to monitor individuals and groups attending the hearings in Manchester in On 3 July, West Yorkshire Police and the West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner made a referral about a potentially inappropriate report on a witness to the Inquiry. 67

68 Also on 3 July 2013 the Home Secretary wrote to all Chief Constables, requesting all forces to carry out an urgent but exhaustive search of records and archives for any material suggesting intelligence-gathering or surveillance activity in respect of the Lawrence family or anyone connected with the Inquiry. One further referral followed, from South Yorkshire Police on 9 July, in relation to Special Branch tasking of extreme left wing groups attending events peripheral to the Inquiry. West Midlands Police and Avon and Somerset Police reported that they had not found anything to refer in relation to the hearings in Birmingham and Bristol. Referrals The specific referrals for which a decision is required are: from the MPS about the allegations made by Peter Francis in the Dispatches programme that: o The MPS deliberately tasked Mr Francis to gather information and intelligence with the intent to 'smear' the Stephen Lawrence Campaign; o The MPS deliberately tasked Mr Francis to gather information and intelligence on Duwayne Brooks with the intention to 'smear him'; o That when Mr Francis suggested these matters be brought to the attention of the Macpherson Inquiry in 1999, senior officers instructed him not to do it. from Greater Manchester Police relating to officers being tasked to gather intelligence on groups or individuals likely to attend the Macpherson Inquiry hearing in Manchester in 1998; from West Yorkshire Police (in relation to junior officers), and West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner (in relation to Sir Norman Bettison), about a potentially inappropriate report on a witness to the Macpherson Inquiry. 68

69 from South Yorkshire Police in relation to possible Special Branch tasking of extreme left wing groups attending events peripheral to the Macpherson Inquiry. It is now the responsibility of the IPCC to decide how to deal with the referrals. Each could be subject to an independent, managed or supervised investigation, or referred back to the force to deal with locally. In making these decisions I have considered the supporting documentation provided by the forces and the remit of the IPCC as set out in the Police Reform Act I have also spoken to Mark Ellison QC and Chief Constable Mick Creedon, and considered their respective terms of reference. I have also considered the views publicly expressed by Doreen and Neville Lawrence, information available via print and broadcast media, and the evidence given on this subject to the Home Affairs Select Committee. Assessment Operation Herne s terms of reference are wide-ranging and include the overall operations of the Special Demonstration Squad, how they were tasked and deployed, their oversight and accountability mechanisms and the organisations, groups and subjects they were targeting or reporting on. Chief Constable Creedon has confirmed that his work includes the specific allegations made by Peter Francis. He has also advised that his officers have sought to interview Mr Francis about his allegations, but that to date he has declined to speak to them. Mark Ellison s terms of reference were set in July 2012 as follows: 1. Is there evidence providing reasonable grounds for suspecting that any officer associated with the initial investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence acted corruptly? 2. Are there any further lines of investigation connected to the issue of possible corrupt activity by any officer associated with the initial investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence? 69

70 3. Was the Macpherson Inquiry provided with all relevant material connected to the issue of possible corrupt activity by any officer associated with the initial investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence? If not, what impact might that have had on the Inquiry? Following publication of the recent allegations, they were amended to include: 4. What was the role of undercover policing in the Lawrence case, who ordered it and why? Was information on the involvement of undercover police withheld from the Macpherson Inquiry, and if it had been made available what impact might that have had on the Inquiry? 5. What was the extent of intelligence or surveillance activity ordered or carried out by police forces nationally in respect of the Macpherson Inquiry, Stephen Lawrence s family or any others connected with the Inquiry or the family? 6. What was the extent, purpose and authorisation for any surveillance of Duwayne Brooks and his solicitor? In carrying out this work, Mr Ellison s review team has full access to all files held by the MPS relating to the investigations into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and any other files they consider necessary to carry out the review, can speak to anyone, including serving police officers, if they wish. It will also work closely with Operation Herne. It must be noted however that Mr Ellison s review would not investigate criminality or misconduct; in the event that evidence of criminality or misconduct came to light, this would require investigation by either the police or the IPCC. Doreen and Neville Lawrence s views in response to the latest allegations have been very clear. They would like these matters to be considered by a judge-led public inquiry and both have stated that they have no confidence in any investigation short of this. 70

71 Decisions Metropolitan Police Service referrals There can be little doubt about the cumulative effect on the public mind about the series of revelations about undercover officers and inappropriate surveillance. There is a considerable public interest in ensuring that any investigation is robust, thorough, and answers the many questions that have been asked about the actions of undercover officers. It is also vital to public confidence that any wrongdoers are brought to book. The IPCC has to identify what is, and is not, conduct that needs to be investigated (recordable conduct), and if an investigation is required, who is placed to do it most effectively. While the MPS has made a referral of the allegations made by Mr Francis in the Dispatches programme, it has made no assessment of why they amount to recordable conduct. Essentially the issue is whether the televised allegations are sufficient to amount to an indication that unknown persons serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. At this stage, we are aware of the following: o according to Chief Constable Creedon, both directly to the IPCC and to the Home Affairs Select Committee, there is as yet no evidence that undercover officers were involved in smearing the Lawrence family; and o Peter Francis has declined to talk to Chief Constable Creedon. Given the above, I have written to Mr Francis to ask if he would be willing to speak to the IPCC. I have not yet had a response, so can only rely on his statements as reported in The Guardian that he is only willing to assist a public inquiry. To my knowledge, Mr Francis has not specified who tasked him to undertake the intelligence gathering he has alleged. 71

72 While the allegations are serious, and indicate potential grave misconduct, there is as yet no information or evidence to support them and the fact that the maker of the allegations is unwilling to talk to anyone in a position to investigate them means that their credibility cannot properly be assessed at this stage. Given their seriousness they should, however, be investigated as far as practicable and it is clear from Mr Ellison s revised terms of reference that his review will be examining these issues. Operation Herne is also looking into the specific allegations which have been referred. I am advised that both inquiries are due to report their findings by the end of this year, and in the case of Mr Ellison s review, will also report on whether it has identified any information that should lead to further action. In the circumstances I have determined that the allegations which have been referred do not, at this stage, amount to an indication of recordable conduct. However, I have notified the MPS that if any recordable conduct comes to light in the course of either of the two current inquiries, this must be immediately referred to the IPCC for further consideration. I do understand that both Mr and Mrs Lawrence s wish is for a judge-led public inquiry, which is of course not a matter for the IPCC. Greater Manchester Police referral GMP has made a referral in relation to officers being tasked to gather intelligence on groups or individuals likely to attend the Macpherson Inquiry hearing in Manchester in At the time, a message was apparently sent to all staff stating that: The special branch have requested information on groups or individuals who were likely to attend the public enquiry. Concern was raised at the time as to the appropriateness of this message by an individual officer to his supervisor. The supervisor, a sergeant, then raised this further up the ranks: 72

73 .I question the wording of the message and what is meant by information, and the implications of interpretation. The concern appears to have been taken seriously at the time and it was accepted that the message could be negatively perceived. A memo from a chief superintendent in 1998 confirms this: During these sensitive times, it is even more important than usual that we take care to ensure our messages about race and similar matters are appropriate, clear and unambiguous. The use of language is fundamental to this process When I read the enclosed message switch, I did not identify anything inappropriate in the wording. I have since spoken, in confidence, to the officer mentioned in the report, who interpreted the message in an entirely different way. He changed his mind about attending the public hearing because he feared that he may become the subject of a Special Branch file were he to do so. Having re-read the message, I understand how he arrived at that interpretation. There is no evidence at this stage that the MPS asked GMP to gather the information as requested, although this is possible. It appears to have been routine for intelligence requests to be sent out in the lead-up to high profile events to assist in assessing the threat of disorder. There is however no evidence of any request for covert work to be undertaken, and the message does not task anyone with any specific work. At this stage, therefore, there does not appear to be an indication of recordable conduct. In the event that GMP s investigation, or Mr Ellison s, should produce any evidence of conduct matters they should be the subject of referral. South Yorkshire Police referral The referral from South Yorkshire Police is in relation to possible Special Branch tasking of monitoring extreme left wing groups attending events peripheral to the Macpherson Inquiry. 73

74 On the face of it, there is no indication of recordable conduct as there is nothing to suggest that there was any tasking relating to the Lawrence family or those connected with the family. There appears to have been monitoring of extreme left wing groups but there is no evidence at this stage that this was inappropriate. I am asking South Yorkshire Police to do further work on these issues so the matter can be kept under review. In the event that those enquiries, or Mr Ellison s, should produce any evidence of conduct matters it should be the subject of referral. West Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner referral West Yorkshire Police and the West Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner have made connected referrals concerning the commissioning by former Assistant Chief Constable Norman Bettison (as he was in 1998) of a report concerning a witness to the Macpherson Inquiry in Bradford. None of the intelligence gathering undertaken concerned the Lawrence family or anyone other than the witness. From the evidence provided in support of the referral, although there is a suggestion that the reason for carrying out the research was to risk assess the likelihood of any public disorder, the intelligence gathering requested appears to have been both inappropriate and intrusive. In the absence of legitimate justification for the research there is an indication of misuse of police information systems and unlawful processing of the witness s (sensitive) personal data by all involved. This would be a clear indication of recordable conduct concerning this tasking. This matter therefore requires investigation. It does not form part of Operation Herne and is clearly separate from it. Given the considerable public interest in this matter and the potential damage to public confidence in allegations of inappropriate surveillance or intelligencegathering, I have decided this should be independently investigated by the IPCC. The 74

75 investigation should also consider whether the tasking was motivated or influenced by racial discrimination. Deborah Glass Deputy Chair Independent Police Complaints Commission 26 July

76 Dawn Copley MSc Assistant Chief Constable Ms Deborah Glass Deputy Chair Independent Police Complaints Commission 90 High Holborn London WC1V 6BH Your Ref: Our Ref:- DC/LB 5 th August 2013 Dear Ms Glass, RE: IPCC DECISION ON REFERRALS CONNECTED TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE MURDER OF STEPHEN LAWRENCE AND THE MACPHERSON INQUIRY We are writing to you regarding your decision on the above matter which was referred to the IPCC by Greater Manchester Police on 28 th June The decision to refer this matter was based on:- The level of public concern following the recent serious allegations that covert methods had been employed to gather intelligence against the Lawrence family and their supporters. The concerns raised about the tasking of GMP officers to gather intelligence on individuals or groups attending the Macpherson Inquiry hearings when they were held in Manchester in 1998, and The potential connectivity between these two issues and any other similar tasking in other police force areas. We were, and remain, of the view that an independent investigation of these issues would best serve the public interest. We would like to place on record our concerns about how the matter was dealt with when it was raised in Our view is that the issue of the language and interpretation of the message switch was considered by Chief Superintendent Kane in his report, but that there is no evidence that the fundamental concern about the 76

77 bona fides of the tasking was addressed. We are also concerned that the assertion it appears to have been routine for intelligence requests to be sent out in the leadup to high profile events to assist in assessing the threat of disorder can yet be satisfactorily determined as relevant in this case. We do fully accept that at this stage there does not appear to be an indication of recordable conduct, however there is an allegation that the tasking was inappropriate. Investigation may lead to conduct issues being identified. A local investigation has been ongoing in GMP for some weeks now, but we remain concerned that the likelihood of identifying any potential connectivity that may exist between each of the matters above is reduced if a series of unconnected investigations take place. The initial concerns about the GMP issue were raised back in 1998 by PC Charles Crichlow, who is now the President of the National Black Police Association. We understand that Charles in unhappy that the IPCC s decision was made without him being consulted and that the NBPA may raise this with you directly. We ask that the decision to leave this matter as a local investigation be reconsidered and will be pleased to provide any further information you may require to assist any further deliberations. We look forward to hearing from you. Yours sincerely Tony Lloyd Police and Crime Commissioner Dawn Copley Assistant Chief Constable 77

78 78

79 79

80 C. Home Office Letter dated 03/07/

81 D. GMP Response to Home Office Letter dated 10/07/

82 82

83 E. The MSS Message sent on 07/10/1998 retrieved on 08/10/