Distinguishing between political brokerage & political entrepreneurship

Transcription

1 Available online at Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) th & 5 th UK Social Networks Conference Distinguishing between political brokerage & political entrepreneurship Dimitrios Christopoulos a *, Karin Ingold b a Department of Politics, UWE-Bristol, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol BS16 1QY, UK. b Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich, Universitätsstr. 22, Zürich, CH-8092, Switzerland Elsevier use only: Received date here; revised date here; accepted date here Abstract How can we distinguish between political brokers and political entrepreneurs within political space? Examining the role of individual agents, we can identify a number of definitional weaknesses in the entrepreneurship and leadership literature. This leads us to consider the agency determinants of broadly defined exceptional actors. We argue that accounts of exceptional agency have to incorporate information on the psychology, behaviour and relational environment of actors. However, we recognise that collecting complete data on agents is most often not feasible. Since relational data strongly reflect the choices and behaviour actors have been making we concentrate here on the distinction between brokers and entrepreneurs in relational space. Within relational social science however, brokerage has been often confounded with entrepreneurship. Our aim here is to decouple the underlying assumptions and operationalise this distinction in Social Network Analysis (SNA) Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Keywords: Policy change; political entrepreneur; broker; social network analysis; centrality 1. Agency in perspective This article addresses an issue intrinsic to most accounts of political agency: how to identify exceptionality. Going beyond the debates on structure and agency (Giddens, 1979) or those of micro-macro analysis, we tackle here the substantive topic of the role of agency in bringing about policy change. In that context we first examine the limitations of and advances in the literature on policy entrepreneurs and policy brokers. Entrepreneurs and brokers have an instrumental impact on policy change (see Mintrom & Norman, 2009); but we claim it should be differentiated among them in policy process analysis. The aim of this paper is to develop conceptual and empirical guidelines to recognize their distinctive position in policy networks as well as identify the elements of that distinctiveness. Our definition of exceptionality captures the propensity of agents to act, their preferences, the institutions that constrain them and the networks that enable them. And since political action in advanced capitalist democracies is often collective, we also examine the role of belief systems within collective decision making structures. To * Corresponding author. Tel.: UK address: dc.christopoulos@uwe.ac.uk Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. doi: /j.sbspro

2 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) understand the actions of agents that are presumed exceptional a mere description of their decision making is not adequate. To comprehend these actors we have to contextualize them in their personal and professional relational networks. Management of their networks as a resource is vital to their success. A valid research framework should consider specific actions as relatively exceptional and individual actors as having the potential for exceptional behavior. Action and psychological predisposition need to be clearly differentiated. Furthermore an actor s relational context can provide us with information about the constraints and opportunities available to them. In that respect exceptional political behavior is evident when certain actors transcend agency constraints that inhibit most other actors. After a critical examination of the social science literature we propose a synthesis of theoretical viewpoints that incorporate a relational perspective. Through our earlier work on exceptional agency (Christopoulos, 2006 and forthcoming), explaining policy outputs (Ingold, 2007, 2008 and forthcoming) and brokerage (Christopoulos & Quaglia, 2009) we conclude that the field is undertheorised and often misspecified. To determine the role of exceptional agency (henceforth EA) in political action we first make a critical review of the literature on political entrepreneurship (henceforth PE) and brokerage in broadly defined political economy and political science. This leads us to a review of the constraints and opportunities for political agency with specific reference to the heuristic use of policy networks and the growing literature on advocacy coalitions. An assessment of power relations within social network analysis literature allows us to conclude that there are advantages to integrating formal network analysis into an explanation of the impact of political agency. Space constrains us to a cursory look at a number of related key issues such as the role of brokerage in EA, the impact of culture on political motivation, or issues related to the wider structure and agency debate (see Giddens, 1979; Bourdieu, 1977 & 1986; or Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). In the following section we look at past attempts to define political entrepreneurship (PE) and brokerage which have demonstrated a number of theoretical weaknesses. We proceed by tying a definition of exceptional agency with a set of suggestions for operationalising research on exceptional political actors. We conclude with a call for broadening the theoretical framework and sharpening of methodological tools when examining policy making processes. 2. Political entrepreneurship Political entrepreneurship (PE) offers an intuitive interpretation of exceptional behavior but is burdened with conflicting and inconsistent definitions which ignore that PE would invariably be the composite outcome of a multitude of causes. Furthermore, there is lack of consideration for the success of agents due to random chance or indeed adequate attention to the causes of failure. To resolve some of the theoretical incongruity we consider political entrepreneurship as a manifestation of exceptional agency. The idealized portrayal of PEs is as consummate strategists (Salisbury, 1969), while often entrepreneurial actors are assumed to act as flexible opportunists (Kingdon, 1995). However, opportunism could be a suboptimal behaviour in politics due to the nature of the electoral cycle and the reputation element of political capital. Our reservations with the literature are due to frequent instances where PE is employed as a character trait that supposedly describes the actor, but it is often better at describing the act. PE also often confounds actors as agents with acts as events. Furthermore there is an assumption that entrepreneurship is a binary state, which disregards the incremental and temporal nature of this behavioural concept as an actor attribute. In other words there is a failure to account for the degree to which an actor is exhibiting entrepreneurial behaviour, while agent effectiveness cannot be assumed to be uniform in time. In table 1 we consider all variable categories that can be incorporated in a model of agent behaviour. We are particularly concerned here with the research effort and feasibility in collecting data in each of the data categories. It should be apparent that although psychological predispositions are highly desirable, deploying psychometric evaluations of all actors in a policy environment is unfeasible (For considerations of psychological predispositions see Krackhardt & Kilduff (2008) and Kalish & Robins (2006)). Similarly outlining the policy preferences of each actor is very research intensive. On the other hand mapping-out the policy environment and collecting information on transactions and attempts at influence can be seen as a feasible research strategy that would partly reflect the preferences of agents (Weible, 2005; Ingold, 2008).

3 38 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) Table 1. Determinants of political action Psychological predisposition Preferences Social networks Institutional space Agency Assumptions Operationalisation Research Resources Behavioural profile affects propensity for action Political utility function determines the value of different options and likelihood of investing political capital. Relational environment affects an actor s ability to project power and determines the mechanisms of its curtailment through the power of others Institutional structure constrains agency Evaluating behavioural profiles of agents Assessing each actor s policy preferences Assessing information transactions and networks of influence within a policy community Assessing institutional space Major resources Moderate to Major resources Moderate resources Low to Moderate resources Access to agency measurement Problematic Difficult to operationalise preferences Difficult to collect complete data; Facile to collect informant assessments Relatively facile Based on a number of important contributions about policy entrepreneurship, Mintrom & Norman (2009, p. 651) define four key elements that characterise PE action: displaying social acuity, building teams, defining problems, and leading by example. The first two are strongly related to network approaches as policy entrepreneurs make good use of social networks both inside and outside the jurisdictions where they seek to promote policy change. 3. Constraints and opportunities within network structure While mapping institutional space belongs to the mainstream of policy studies and political science (Scott, 2001; Powell, 2007; Baumgardner et al., 2009) mapping of relational space is still an evolving discipline (Knoke et al., 1996; Fenger & Klok, 2001; Henning, 2009; Christopoulos & Quaglia, 2009). The challenges of collecting network data can be associated with the opportunities and constraints that networks afford actors. We should mention that the selection and vetting of alters entails costs, while actors have a limited network horizon (Friedkin,1998). Furthermore, actors are unlikely to have the same status or resources within a policy system, while decision making is reserved for those endowed with decision authority and is therefore concentrated (see Stokman & van den Boos, 1992). This as a matter of fact shows how institutional settings can be linked to network structures constraining actors behaviour or action (Fenger & Klok, 2001; Ingold & Varone, 2009). Social Network Analysis offers, through its insights on brokerage, a methodological adjunct to the theoretical and conceptual tenets of policy entrepreneurship. Furthermore, SNA provides an impressive toolbox for empirical analysis of social network structures and their relevance for opportunities and behavioural choices of actors in policy processes. Different scholars implemented a network approach in order to better reconstruct decision-making processes and stakeholder intervention (Knoke 1996; 1990; Krackhardt 1990; Kriesi 1980). At the same time, SNA allows us to demonstrate that even dense structures are rarely uniform in social systems (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors are selective and strategic when making resource investments of their relational capital while information on the relationship among other actors affects their preference for tie formation and investment of the finite number of ties they make. Examining a policy space poses some major challenges in integrating governance concepts to SNA (Christopoulos, 2008). For one, decision making networks are qualitatively different from influence networks. Furthermore, conflict of competing policy ideas can not easily be mapped through network interaction. Typical conflict relations in policy networks are expressed by convergent and divergent ties between actors. Actors of interest within policy space are those that are most central or those that play brokerage roles

4 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) between different parts of the network. We specify below the degree to which brokerage roles are directly associated with entrepreneurial action. Overall, networks apply a filter to the information reaching actors; ameliorate risks (and potentially lead to impunity of higher risk taking); ameliorate shocks from the transformation of structural/institutional context; facilitate efficient sourcing and allocation of resources; facilitate coalition building; and shape brokerage opportunities for actors (Christopoulos, 2008). Networks operate as a mediating mechanism of elite resource allocation and political capital distribution. Networks can mitigate the risks undertaken from actors by cushioningoff the impact of erroneous or unfortunate decisions. Furthermore, network structure determines the access an actor can have to diverse resources. But it is not only the information and resource allocation mechanisms of networks that affect entrepreneurial risk-taking. Networks also allow for the dissipation of responsibility among network members. Those that have (or appear to have) strong ties with an actor will be sharing both costs and benefits relating to the risks they take. Risk mitigation could therefore be inducing higher risk taking among networked actors. 4. Brokers in policy change Different approaches and frameworks give policy brokers a special role when it comes to explain policy change and instrument choice in negotiation processes. One first and very prominent approach is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993). The ACF argues that policymaking entails policy subsystems. Each subsystem is characterised by coalitions which differ in belief systems and policy preferences. One can imagine that in such a process where different policy objectives are in competition and a multitude of stakeholders interact, a small number of specific actors can facilitate communication and ameliorate the different opinions present in the network. Significantly, learning across coalitions happens when respective belief systems and opinions about the specific policy domain differ. Conflicting belief systems of coalitions are mediated by policy brokers, usually state actors or scientific representatives. Their principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise which will reduce conflict intensity and guarantee the stability of the policy system (Sabatier, 1988, p.133). One main critique of the ACF and its broker definition is however that it neglects motivated behaviour as strategies and interest of actors integrated in a political decision making process (Schlager, 1995; Kübler, 2001; Ingold, 2008; 2009a). Sabatier (2007, p. 197) himself admits that under certain circumstances, interests (perceived utility) may play a crucial role. In their empirical study on offshore petroleum leasing, Jenkins-Smith & St. Clair (1993) conclude that interests can be as important as beliefs: they advance that for more material coalitions (typically motivated by economic purposes), self-interest can be a better indicator for coalitions cooperation than core beliefs. Weible (2005), in contrast, seems to prove that policy core beliefs are a better predictor of coordinated behaviour than perceptions of power. In the Multiple Streams framework (MS), Kingdon (1995, p. 204) defines policy entrepreneurs as much more strategic actors than the ACF brokers; for Kingdon, PE are creative actors motivated by the pursuit of self-serving benefits. The MS states that if ambiguity is pervasive and central to politics, manipulation is the effort to control ambiguity (Zahariadis 2007, p. 69). And typically, in situations of ambiguity, policy entrepreneurs play a crucial role in capturing the attention of policy makers and manipulating it to their advantage. Following the MS, they are more than mere advocates of particular solutions; they are power brokers and manipulators of problematic preferences (ibid, p. 74). From an institutionalist point of view, both, brokers and PE are more successful in influencing policy change and policy outputs if they have access to the centres of power (ibid, p. 78). In that respect policy brokers and entrepreneurs have to deal with hierarchy, which differentiates them from economic brokers in a market system (Holcombe, 2002, p. 143). 5. Differentiating between brokers and political entrepreneurs As ACF and ME, brokers are seen to play different roles in policy networks and subsequently, their impact on policy decision varies. One way to conceptualise the difference between these two types of exceptional actors is to identify each ones specific relational profile and intended behaviour: One of our key hypotheses is that brokers take bridging and/or bonding roles that appear to improve the stability of the policy environment and their position in the

5 40 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) evolving network, while entrepreneurs can be seen as more opportunistic actors interested more in policy decisions and outputs. Of course we recognise that although these may appear as distinct ideal-types in reality actors rarely fit one or the other ideal. In a given decision making process, some entrepreneurs may for example, for strategic reasons, assume overt brokerage roles. We propose below a series of operationalisation strategies that allow us to determine which ideal-type between broker and entrepreneur an exceptional actor would fit best. Entrepreneurial success of an individual does not necessarily imply the success of their firm. Similarly the success of a political actor does not necessarily enhance political institutions and democracy (i.e. Berlusconi). In table 2 we list a series of actor attributes that can be partially captured through network analysis. However, it should be reiterated that in an ideal operationalisation environment, SNA would be but one of a number of methodological tools that should be utilized in capturing an agent s volition, preferences and action. We also recognize that the effects of action can only be captured through longitudinal analysis which is unfortunately beyond the resources of most research projects. Our list of network concepts distinguishes between different types of exceptional agents. In terms of network cognition it should be apparent that an accurate mental map of their relational environment would provide a major advantage to political actors. Our assumption is that this would be one of the distinguishing features between brokers and entrepreneurs. The former would have more accurate cognition than the latter. We assume the exact opposite when looking at the network horizon (Friedkin, 1998) of actors. Our assumption here is that entrepreneurs would be able to have a more accurate view of alters of their own alters. So, in terms of cognition of network topology, brokers would comprehend better the complete network while entrepreneurs would be able to see the benefits they can draw from the relations of their ties. The former would value opportunities of flow across different clusters in the relational topography, while the latter benefits that can be reaped through strong ties. Table 2. Distinguishing brokers from entrepreneurs Brokers Entrepreneurs Operationalisation Network Cognition + _ Accuracy of network map Network Horizon _ + Accuracy of network horizon Relational power _ + Bonacich power Pursuit of political capital _ + Political capital aggrandisement Strategic action + _ Change in centrality & brokerage roles Opportunism _ + Change in centrality & brokerage roles In assessing their pursuit of power and aggrandizement of political capital we consider the Bonacich measure. Bonacich (1987) pays less attention to the number of ties an actor has, and more to the power of alters (for an application see Ingold, 2009b). Two configurations are modelled depending on whether the tie is assumed to be one of influence or control. Influence power is assumed by those connected to central and powerful alters, control power is assumed if an actor is connected to weak and peripheral alters. Brokers are expected to be less apt at relational power than political entrepreneurs. The same assumptions are retained for the pursuit of political capital. Political entrepreneurs are assumed to seek the aggrandizement of their political resources in the short term while brokers to seek a more strategic position, one that would afford them long term benefits. Strategic action and opportunism can be examined through a longitudinal assessment of network positions. The overarching assumption here is that political entrepreneurs are opportunistic, while brokers are strategic.

6 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) Policy context and future directions This paper is a first attempt to theoretically differentiate policy brokers from political entrepreneurs by focussing on their action and behaviour in policy networks. The position of such actors in policy negotiations fundamentally depend on the characteristics of the political system and on specific context factors. For instance, the higher the degree of consensus required, the more the prevalent compromise norms cultivate incentives for broker action across coalitions rather than for opportunistic entrepreneur intervention. This is typically the case in pluralist and corporatist systems, but less so in Westminster or Authoritarian systems (see Lijphart, 1999; Sabatier, 2007). It is of course crucial to factor-in whether a researcher analyses a subsystem exhibiting major conflict among coalitions and looks for brokers who mediate this conflict; or if dealing with policy innovation where the search for so-called policy entrepreneurs would be more relevant. In any case, empirical research is required to substantiate our theoretical assumptions between the two idealtypes of brokerage and entrepreneurial behaviour. Many questions are left pending: Can we generalise from our distinction between brokers and entrepreneurs in politics to the rest of the social sciences? Are such actors conscious of their effect on network stability? Are exceptional actors those able to reconfigure their relational environment? Do brokers have a wider network horizon than entrepreneurs, which benefit more from short term and opportunistic relations? Do political entrepreneurs optimise their position by finding connections to powerful others or by dominating weak alters in a network? Finally and most intriguingly: should we be attempting to measure brokerage across different types of networks? Can in other words brokerage and entrepreneurship only be meaningfully examined across networks of multiplex relations? In this short piece we have generated more questions than we have resolved. Our aim has been to attempt a meaningful and operationalisable distinction between broker and entrepreneur position and action in policy networks. We have and will be putting these hypotheses to the test and hope to be able to improve on them in future work. References Baumgardner, F.R., Berry, J., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D., & Leech, B. (2009). Lobbying and policy change: Who wins, who loses and why. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Bonacich, P. (1987). Power and centrality: a family of measures. American Journal of Sociology, 92(5), Brass, D. J. & Burkhardt, M. (1992). Centrality and power in organizations. In N. Nohria, & R. Eccles (eds), Networks and organizations: Structure, form and action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Carrington, P., Scott, J., & Wasserman, S. (2005). Models and methods in network analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Christopoulos, D. (2009). Exceptional action in policy making: Through the lens of network analysis, forthcoming. Christopoulos, D. (2008). The governance of networks: Heuristic or formal analysis? Political Studies, 54(2), Christopoulos, D. (2006). Governance capacity and regionalist dynamics. Regional and Federal Studies, 16(4), Christopoulos, D. C., & Quaglia, L. (2009). Influence and brokerage: Network constraints in EU banking regulation. Journal of Public Policy, 29(2), Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What is agency. The American Journal of Sociology, 103(4), Fenger, M., & Klok, PJ. (2001). Interdependencies, beliefs, and coalition behaviour: A contribution to the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Sciences, 34(2), Friedkin, N. (1998). A structural theory of social influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Freeman, L. C. (1979). Centrality in social networks: I. Conceptual clarification. Social Networks, 1(3), Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory: Action structure and contradictions in social analysis. London: Macmillan. Henning C. (2009). Networks of power in the CAP system of the EU-15 and EU-27. Journal of Public Policy, 29(1),

7 42 Dimitrios Christopoulos and Karin Ingold / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 10 (2011) Holcombe, R.G. (2002). Political entrepreneurship and the democratic allocation of economic resources. The Review of Austrian Economics, 15(1), Ingold, K. (2009a). Explaining policy outputs: The possibility of combining social network analysis with other methodologies, forthcoming. Ingold, K. (2009b). Understanding advocacy coalitions, policy learning and brokerage: a combination of social network and multicriteria analysis in Swiss climate policy. Conference Paper, PSA Annual Conference, 7-9 April 2009, Manchester. Ingold, K. ( 2008). Les mécanismes de décision: Le cas de la politique climatique Suisse. Zürich: Politikanalysen, Rüegger Verlag. Ingold, K. (2007). The influence of actors coalition on policy choice: The case of the Swiss Climate Policy. In T. Friemel (Ed.) Applications of social network analysis. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft. Ingold, K., & Varone, F. (2009). Bringing policy brokers back in: Evidence from the Swiss climate policy. Conference Paper, ECPR General Conference, September 2009, Potsdam. Kingdon, J. (1995). Agenda, alternatives and public policies. 2 nd ed., New York: Harper Collins. Knoke, D., Pappi, F., Broadbent, J., & Tsujinaka, Y. (1996). Comparing policy networks labour politics in the US, Germany and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knoke, D. (1990). Political networks: The structural perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krackhardt, D. (1990). Assessing the political landscape: Structure, cognition, and power in organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(2), Kriesi, H.-P. (1980). Entscheidungsstrukturen und entscheidungsprozesse in der schweizer politik. Frankfurt: Campus. Kübler, D. (2001). Understanding policy change with the advocacy coalition framework: an application to Swiss drug policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(4), Lijpahrt, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy. government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. Mintrom, M., & Norman Ph. (2009). Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. Policy Studies Journal, 37 (4), Mintrom, M., & Vergari, S. (1996). Advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, and policy change. Policy Studies Journal, 24(3), Powell, W.W. (2007). The new institutionalism. The International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publisher. Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences, 21(1), Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, Ch. M. (2007). The advocacy coalition framework: Innovations and clarifications. In P. A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the policy process, 2 nd ed. (pp ). Boulder: Westview Press. Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1993). Policy change and learning. An advocacy coalition approach. Boulder: Westview Press. Salisbury, R.H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13(1), Schlager, E. (1995). Policy making and collective action: Defining coalitions within the advocacy coalition framework. Policy Sciences, 28(3), Scott, J. (2000). Social network analysis: A handbook. London: Sage. Scott, R. W. (2001). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2 nd ed. Stokman, F. N., & Van den Bos, J. M. (1992). A two stage model of policy making with an empirical test in the Swiss energy-policy domain. Research in Politics and Society, 4, Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). Social network analysis: Method and applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weible, Ch.M. (2005). Beliefs and perceived influence in a natural resource conflict: An advocacy coalition framework approach to policy networks. Political Research Quarterly, 58(3), Zachariadis, N. (2007). The multiple streams framework: Structure, limitations, prospects. In P. A. Sabatier (ed), Theories of the policy process, 2 nd ed. (pp ). Boulder: Westview Press.