SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND REMOTE INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IS THE THIRD WAY THE RIGHT WAY?

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1 SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND REMOTE INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IS THE THIRD WAY THE RIGHT WAY? Paper presented at the Social Policy Research Conference, University of NSW, Thursday 10 th July Jane Robbins School of Political & International Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide

2 Abstract Australian social policy has embraced what have loosely been termed Third Way initiatives over the last few years. The Howard government has announced a tripartate Social Coalition of government, business and community sectors as its chosen model for addressing social disadvantage and exclusion. Mutual obligation, social entrepreneurialsm, partnerships and capacity building are concepts which have become familiar in the rhetoric of social reform. A broad political and popular consensus appears to have developed which is comfortable with the direction of change. Indigenous programs have also been drawn into this trend. The highly publicised comments of Cape York leader Noel Pearson have lent support to the view that passive welfare and economic dependency have been a pernicious influence on Indigenous communities. The perceived solution is to set in place a framework of measures that will give communities the responsibility for their own salvation, largely through reform of institutions of governance and the facilitation of economic partnerships. This paper will address this debate, giving particular consideration to the impact of these ideas on remote and isolated indigenous communities. 2

3 Introduction For some years Noel Pearson has been challenging the left to reconsider its position on welfare in general and on Aboriginal policy in particular (Pearson 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; 2001a; 2001b; 2002a). His particular concern is the reluctance of those who hold what he calls sloppy leftist and progressive ideas (2001b:) to confront the inadequacy of their traditional responses to the appalling social conditions which currently exist in many Aboriginal communities. While refraining from an unqualified endorsement of the current Coalition government s policies, Pearson gives it credit for taking steps in the right direction, especially on the issue of welfare reform (2002c). He has also acknowledged some common ground with the Third Way politics espoused by Blair, Clinton and, in Australia, ALP MP Mark Latham, although he declines the label for his own ideas (2002a). The objective of this paper is to contribute to this important discussion in a constructive way by exploring some of these ideas. In particular, I will examine the concepts of mutual obligation and social partnerships in the context of the need for a constructive reform agenda to address Aboriginal welfare dependency. Pearson s analysis Pearson s accusation of policy failure cannot be refuted the evidence of ineffectiveness is there for all to see in any analysis of Indigenous social indicators, especially those of remote areas. The stark statistic that in the life expectancy of an Indigenous Australian was twenty years shorter than that of a non-indigenous person (ABS 2001) clearly demonstrates that there has been a long-term failure of policy. What has made Pearson s analysis so confronting is that he sees the current situation not just as a failure of implementation or inadequate resourcing (in other words a failure of political commitment) but, rather, as fundamental error in core values and ideological paradigms. In his view, the Indigenous policy agenda pursued by Australian Labor Party (ALP) and other groups influenced by progressivist thinking is not merely inadequate, it is actively harmful in key areas such as welfare dependency and substance abuse (2002b). Pearson s strongest criticisms are that the Left has failed to embrace the principle of reciprocity as the basis of Indigenous welfare policy and that it shies away from zero tolerance of substance abuse (2002c). Observation of his own Cape York Peninsula communities has convinced him that measures giving effect to these principles are imperative if social catastrophe is to be overcome (2000a; 2000b). Pearson denounces the conventional welfare regime on the grounds that it has produced a gammon or false economy for Cape York communities, unlike the real economies of traditional Aboriginal culture. He sees it as more damaging than the culture of poverty associated with the poorly paid pastoral work which was the mainstay of many Indigenous families before the introduction of equal pay in 1969 (see also Jebb 2002): After we became citizens with equal rights and equal pay, we lost our place in the real economy. What is the exception among white fellas almost complete dependence on cash handouts from the government is the rule for us. There is no responsibility and reciprocity built in to our present artificial economy, which is based on passive welfare (money for nothing). [ ] 3

4 Passive welfare and grog and drugs are finally tearing our society apart. We were dispossessed and discriminated against before we were included in the Welfare State, but our Law: trust, respect and mutual help was better honoured during those times of hardship and guardianship than it is today. Our struggle for rights is not over and must continue but we must also struggle to restore our traditional values of responsibility. We have to be as forthright and unequivocal about our responsibilities as we are about our rights otherwise our society will fall apart while we are still fighting for our rights. We do not have a right to passive welfare indeed, we can no longer accept it. We have a right to a real economy, we have a right to build a real economy (2000a: np). In Pearson s analysis the passive welfare paradigm consists of three dynamics: a nonreciprocal economic relationship in which [u]nlike commercial transactions, no mechanisms promote rational and constructive behaviour either on the hand of the recipient or on the hand of the provider ; a method of governance in which power, initiative and resources are in the hands of bureaucrats increasingly [ ] a method of managing marginalised groups at minimal cost without even maintaining the fiction that a lasting solution to their problems is sought and, thirdly, a mentality of acceptance of incapacity which is internalised by both welfare recipients and the bureaucrats who wield the power (2000a: 21). This is a set of relationships which saps the initiative and vitality of welfare recipients and undermines traditional social responsibilities, leaving the way open for a culture of aimlessness and substance abuse. Pearson s agenda for reform consequently emphasises the need for economic development access to the real economy where reciprocal relationships prevail. He also advocates transformation of the Indigenous relationship with government to one of holistic policy processes and partnerships rather than a bureaucrat/client relationship (2000a; 67-92). In addition, he looks for tough measures against substance abuse (2001b). Third way ideas There is an obvious resonance between Pearson s thinking and that of the so-called Third Way school, associated with the academic work of Anthony Giddens (e.g.1998) and the New Labour politics of Tony Blair in Britain. Pearson has drawn a connection between his own thinking and that of Mark Latham, perhaps the best known Australian proponent of Third Way ideas, although Pearson prefers to label his own view as an old-fashioned class-analysis (20002a). While the expression of a Third Way ideology has not emerged with sufficient clarity to make it a precise recipe for political action (Latham 2001; 14), it is characterised by a synthesis of what have been seen as right and left approaches to politics. Third way thinkers are prepared to accept the market economy as tool for achieving their purposes. They see the policies of the past as inadequate to address the modern political crises developing from forces of globalisation, ecological stresses, changing social order and identities. Like Pearson, they also place much emphasis on the problems of passive welfare, arguing that paternalistic policies have produced high levels of social dependency and exclusion which have demoralised and disadvantaged many recipients (Robbins 2002). 4

5 Giddens response is to argue that A social investment welfare state should be created to pursue a positive welfare agenda based on investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than the direct provision of economic maintenance (cited Orchard ). The appropriate role for government is to become a facilitator, supporting individuals in the development of self-reliance or social capacity. The notion of reciprocity or mutual obligation is fundamental to the achievement of social participation on a more active and positive footing. This has been summed up in the phrase no rights without responsibilities (Giddens cited in Macintyre 2001: 83). Latham argues that the central philosophy of the Third Way is that the true socialist principle of our time is the dispersal of economic, social and political power (2001:14). Australia s Welfare Reforms While the Prime Minister, John Howard, has never advocated a Third Way agenda it is clear that the reforms that have been initiated in the Australian welfare system have much in common with that approach. A land mark development was the introduction of the Work for the Dole program which explicitly linked the receipt of welfare benefits to a requirement of obligatory work for categories of young unemployed people - the mutual obligation principle (McMahon et al 2000: 47). This scheme has been gradually extended to further categories of people. In early 2000 the Prime Minister announced a formal policy of social coalition which, he said:..describes a partnership of individuals, families, business, government, welfare and charitable organisations, each contributing their unique resources and expertise to tackle disadvantage at its source (Australian 12/1/00). Together these measures represented a significant shift in the ideological underpinnings of Australian welfare. Not only was the government declaring that the responsibility for social protection was a shared one in which public, private and community sectors each had obligations - but also that it was instituting a regime which made welfare rights conditional on meeting responsibilities. This direction was confirmed in 2000 when the government accepted the five principles laid down in the McClure Report Participation Support for a More Equitable Society: Individualised service delivery. Income support and related services will activate, enhance and support social and economic participation, consistent with individual capacities and circumstances. Service delivery will focus on meeting the needs of individuals and on helping them to identify and achieve participation goals. This will include greater emphasis on prevention and early intervention to improve people s capacity for self-reliance over the course of their lives. A simpler income support structure that is more responsive to individual needs, circumstances and aspirations. We envision a dynamic and holistic system that will recognise and respond to people s changing circumstances over their life cycle and within their own family and community context. Incentives and financial assistance to encourage and enable participation. Social support structures will ensure a fair return from paid work, while maintaining fair 5

6 relativities between people in different circumstances, and take account of the additional costs of participation. Mutual obligations underpinned by the concept of social obligations. Governments, businesses, communities and individuals all have roles. Governments will have a responsibility to continue to invest significant resources to support participation. Employers and communities will have a responsibility to provide opportunities and support. Income support recipients will have a responsibility to take-up the opportunities provided by government, business and community, consistent with community values and their own capacity. Social partnerships are a key strategy for building community capacity to increase opportunities for social and economic participation. We have identified four processes through which social partners may work to enhance community capacity: community economic development, fostering micro-businesses, community business partnerships and social entrepreneurship (McClure ). This confirmed the shift to what Honner has described as welfare as participation support (2000: 32). There are strong grounds for concluding that there is much that is shared in the vision of Pearson, Latham and the current Howard government. Does this mean that the groundwork has now been laid for the renewal of Indigenous social and economic wellbeing? I fear this is far from the case. Neither the principle of mutual obligation nor the concept of social partnership that has been instituted at present has the capacity to achieve the transformation many wish to see. Some of the reasons for this view will now be considered. Mutual Obligation & the real economy One of Pearson s most emphatic goals is that Indigenous people be given the opportunity to participate in the real economy and have access to resources which will enable this to happen (2000a: 95). To participate in passive welfare, in his view, is to engage in an irrational economy. How well has his version of reciprocity been captured in recent welfare reforms? The principle of mutual obligation that has been implemented by the current government does not directly address the issue of economic reciprocity, in that it only requires that individuals comply with an approved program of activity. Government accepts no reciprocal obligation to ensure what Pearson would call participation in a real economy. Because of this, the Australian mutual obligation regime could be seen as having more emphasis on behavioural compliance than on genuine economic transformation of socially excluded groups. This is a point Pearson himself has raised in commenting about the Howard government s reform agenda: My sense of the rhetoric of welfare reform is that there is an assumption that reciprocity is a social, attitudinal principle that needs to be restored as a matter of moral imperative. Mutual obligation is therefore seen as a social or political value that can be enforced without reference to whether it involves engagement in a reciprocal economy (2000d: 1-2). O Connor has addressed this issue in his discussion of the Howard government s welfare reforms, which he sees as unduly influenced by U.S. debates on welfare dependency, despite significantly different circumstances in the Australian situation. 6

7 Typically such a focus indicates the greater concern of policy-makers with the behaviour and lifestyles of welfare recipients or, more correctly, on the perceived behaviour and lifestyles of the unemployed and poor than with more fundamental issues like job creation or structural inequalities (O Connor 2001). In other words mutual obligation regimes can be constructed in many forms and do not necessarily prioritise the transformation of economic relationships (see also Braithwaite et al. 2002; Mendes 2002). In this context it is worth considering the experience of the Community Development Employment Projects Scheme (CDEP). As a number of authors have pointed out this long standing project provides some useful insights into the application of a mutual obligation scheme well before its application to the broader Australian society (Morphy & Sanders 2001; Arthur 2002; Altman et al. 2002; Rowse 2002). Begun in 1977, 30,000 Indigenous people now participate in CDEP schemes, many of them in remote areas (Arthur 2002: 1). When a community participates in a CDEP scheme it must designate a schedule of work programs for approval by ATSIC. An amount of money equivalent to the welfare benefits of individual participants is then provided to the responsible organisation, plus additional administrative costs (Arthur 2002: 4). Capital grants can be applied for to fund equipment and other needs. CDEP involves a growing proportion of the indigenous workforce which is predicted to rise from 20.6 per cent in 1996 to 27 per cent by 2006 (Taylor & Hunter cited in Arthur 2002: 1). CDEP participants are not counted in the unemployment statistics. In November 2000 Peter Shergold, CEO of the Department of Employment and former head of ATSIC described the scheme as a failure because less than 1 per cent of participants had managed to move into the paid workforce (The Australian, 9/11/00: 9). Ironically this is a scheme specifically endorsed by the McClure report as fulfilling mutual obligation requirements (McClure 2000: 42). There may be other reasons to see CDEP in a more favourable light. Arthur, for example, suggests that one of the important aspects of the scheme is that it establishes community organisations as employers and CDEP participants as employees (Arthur 20002: 4). Altman et al. find that CDEP participants have higher levels of income than those of the unemployed (2000: 356). They also make the important point that one of the reasons this better outcome is achieved is by the flexibility of the rules that allow organisations to develop enterprises and enter in to service contracts, resulting in an increased pool of money for wages (2000: 357). Neither Pearson, nor his countryman Richard Ah Mat, Executive director of the Cape York Land Council, find CDEP a satisfactory solution to their economic problems, although they endorse some aspects of the scheme. Ah Mat suggests that CDEP does not give people the skills or confidence required for mainstream employment (Ah Mat 2003: 5) while Pearson believes the scheme is undermined by the availability of other social security benefits (2000a: 87-8). He has also suggested that in practice it has little difference in operation to the ordinary dole because The work that is organised within CDEP is often unimaginative and inefficient. The CDEP money is not seen as a valuable asset by the Council or the work force it is just CDEP. Effectively it is passive welfare (2000e: 8). 7

8 Pearson s emphasis on purposeful activity as a necessary quality of reciprocity is a valid one, especially in the practice of CDEP. There are difficulties in attaining this goal, however, which should be acknowledged. For decades government policy has recognised the centrality of economic development as the key to Indigenous circumstances. It may also be true that economic development has not been pursued in appropriate or effective ways, but what Pearson s analysis seems to gloss over is the problem of creating real economic opportunities in many of the remote areas where many traditional communities are located. The point about genuine market transactions is that they have to be efficient according to principles of supply and demand. It is not merely a question of developing the necessary attitudes the locational obstacles to remote communities economic health need to be better elaborated. Remoteness, limited local economies and, in some cases, a lack of exploitable economic advantage are hard obstacles to overcome. This is not suggesting that location should be seen as a reason why real jobs should not be the goal, but that it needs to be factored in to a strategic solution. The role of government in facilitating remote regional economic development needs to be elaborated. Communities need help to identify economic opportunities that fit their particular locational position as well as ideas to promote the formation of capital. It could be said that what is most urgently needed is not an ideological change, but a detailed economic strategy. Mutual Obligation & Individualism Another feature of mutual obligation regimes that needs to be considered carefully is the conceptualisation of community and individual in the structural relationship that is imposed. A number of commentators have suggested that the Australian mutual obligation regime is constructed on a concept of reciprocal obligations between government and the individual, presenting problems for the agency of community. Martin, for example, writes: Mutual obligation is thus held to obtain essentially between the individual, as an autonomous actor, and the state, representing an undifferentiated community. [ ] It is also consistent with a view of the individual as being abstracted from particular networks and communities and from a commitment to particular values and locales. Rather, people are to take their place as individuals in an increasingly mobile workforce within a globalised economic order (2001: 12). Macintyre sees this not only as feature of the Howard government s mutual obligation initiatives, but as an inherent component of Third Way thinking (2001: 92-3). Bacchi sees problems in the way Third Way advocates like Latham have theorised difference, reducing race, gender and culture to individual characteristics rather than public, relational and collective characteristics (2001: 115). Since the individual is held responsible for her or his own success, Latham downplays the suggestion that membership of a particular social group, such as women or Aboriginal peoples, can in any way be considered responsible for one s social location (2001: 118-9). The primacy of the state/individual paradigm in concepts of mutual obligation presents obvious difficulties in any interface with Indigenous cultural and social community agencies. Collectivism is seen as one of the definitional characteristics of Indigenous society and through measures like the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1977, 8

9 ATSIC and the CDEP scheme, has been built into existing arrangements for Indigenous governance. Rowse discusses this issue in relation to the recommendations of the McClure report. He finds a duality in the models of mutual obligation discussed there which he sees as indicative of a willingness, at least on the part of the authors of the report, to delegate to non-government community bodies or brokers the responsibility for representing the individual and his/her needs and capacities (Rowse:2002). However, he also points to the comment of Mark Lyons, a McClure reference group member, who suggests that this would require governments to shift to a more facilitative model of governance compared to the current command model of government (cited Rowse: 2002). In his book Our Right to Take Responsibility, Pearson states that the primary relationships of reciprocity and responsibility in his experience are between the individual and family and community. He argues that government is too remote and lacking in transparency to exert a valid moral authority and that the only effective model of reciprocity is one which is defined and imposed by the Aboriginal people of Cape York Peninsula and their leaders, possibly in partnership with government. This is justified in terms of an objective of the restoration of traditional values of reciprocity rather than imposing alien white fella values (2000a: 87). Pearson obviously believes in the salience of Indigenous cultural associations and groupings and appears to suggest that processes of governance should be established to accommodate Indigenous social and cultural processes. One of his most important prescriptions for reform is to establish partnerships with governments that embed the relevance of Indigenous community governance structures (2000a 67-82). This raises questions of how well communal, collectivist structures operate within the dynamics not only of an individualistic mutual obligation regime, but in the broader context of market economics. This issue was explored forcefully by Richard Ah Mat in his speech to the Native Title on the Ground Conference in Alice Springs in June this year. Ah Mat reiterated Pearson s emphasis on the destructive impact of passive welfare, but also considered the significance of Indigenous collectivism in the failure to achieve economic success. There is [] a frequently unresolved tension between private enterprise and communal assets and opportunities. This often results in privately owned enterprises being resented or opposed by community members or organisations. It results in many enterprise opportunities not being developed because of disputation or opposition on the grounds that the opportunity that is proposed to be taken up belongs to the community, not to the private individual (2003: 6). Ah Mat further suggests: I would temper the idea that our governance structures must be made to suit our social and cultural arrangements. In relation to business organisation, we must also ensure that our governance structures suit successful enterprise operation and management. Indigenous social and cultural imperatives often result in the creation of decision-making and ownership structures that make enterprise ownership and management inefficient, unwieldy, impossible. In fact I am prepared to argue that the overwhelming majority of indigenous enterprise structures are unsuited to successful business and are completely unrealistic about commercial realities (2003: 7) 9

10 This is a strongly controversial proposal, but one which suggests fruitful directions for further discussion. It raises many questions about the defining characteristics of Indigenous society and exactly how a successful interface between government, economy and Indigenous people should be conceptualised. One conclusion that might be drawn is that the processes of government that are designed to implement reciprocal obligations need to be flexible enough to embrace these differences. It remains to be seen whether the current mutual obligation regime can meet that challenge. Social Partnerships The McClure report identifies social partnerships between government, communities and business as a key issue for welfare reform and as a complementary measure to the income support system. Through a strategy of community capacity building it is envisaged that improved opportunities for social and economic participation will be enhanced (McClure 2000: 45). A key component is the concept of social entrepreneurship, which is intended to harness individual leadership and initiative in creative ways to revitalise communities (2000: 50). Along with measures for the wider community, the government has moved to implement mechanisms to develop these opportunities in Indigenous communities. Firstly, in 2000 the Council of Australia Governments (COAG) endorsed the approach (FACS 2003:3). In 2001 the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) announced its welfare reform package Australians Working Together, which contained an initiative for the development of Indigenous Community Participation Agreements (Smith 2001). In 2002 this initiative was reinforced as one of the seven Key Commitments of the department in its Statement of Commitment to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People (FACS 2003). FACS will provide financial support for the development of partnerships between individuals or key stakeholders who might include indigenous people, communities and organisations, a range of government agencies or research bodies etc.(facs 2003: 7). In addition, in 2002, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs announced an Inquiry into Capacity Building in Indigenous Communities. Partnerships are also a key process in Pearson s blueprint, seen as the basis of a new interface between Indigenous governance and the State. Pearson sees current organisational structures as being in need of review as, in his view, many of them reflect the passive welfare relationships of the past. New institutions of governance need to be representative, accountable, simple in structure, localised (at village, clan. family and individual levels) and founded on principles of holistic action (2000a: 67-8). The notion of a partnership interface in the Cape York Peninsula context is described as one in which a relationship between the Commonwealth government, the Queensland government. ATSIC and the Cape York Indigenous society is formalised in a statutory agreement. All government programs and inputs are to be channelled through this interface (70). The role of government in this relationship is expected to be that of a junior partner the provider of resources rather than the dictator of terms (71). 10

11 Considerable progress has been made to date in the Cape York Partnerships process, with the Queensland government making a commitment to the partnership in 1999 and an inaugural Community Negotiation Table being held in November An important aspect of the negotiations was participation of senior bureaucrats from Commonwealth and State agencies, allowing effective negotiation to take place(cyp: 2000). The most recent reports on the process are, however, not so encouraging, with suggestions that progress has stalled (Courier-Mail: 20/6/03). However, a number of other community based partnerships are evolving notably the Mutitjulu Agreement in the NT (Smith 2001). If the number and scope of partnerships being negotiated at present is any indication, this initiative must be seen as having struck a positive chord with government and community organisations. Partnerships have been enjoying popularity in a broad range of contexts they appear to have become a vehicle for the management of many areas of government service delivery in Indigenous programs. In the most recent Social justice report, Commissioner Jonas devotes a whole appendix of many pages to a list of partnerships and agreements between Indigenous organisations and state or territory governments (HREOC 2003). It is tempting to query whether this represents anything other than happened previously, dressed up in a fancy title. However, to the extent that this trend indicates a willingness for governments as service deliverers and resource allocators to formally consult and coordinate their decisions with a range of other agencies and stakeholders, it can be seen as complying with the spirit of holistic government and capacity building. Social Partnerships A critique While Pearson is a strong supporter of the merits of social partnership and capacity building, others are critical of the conceptualisation of these principles in the government s welfare measures. Bettina Cass and Deborah Brennan criticise the narrow focus of the welfare reform vision in the McClure report which, they feel acknowledges that there are deep divisions and inequalities in Australia, but [] seems unaware that these cannot be overcome by social policy alone, without recourse to employment, education and training, tax, industry or wages policy (2002: 278) They also consider the problem of community trust in local organisations if they become co-opted in to the enforcement of mutual obligation requirements and are required to administer breach penalties. This is an issue which frequently arises in the administration of CDEP schemes as many community councils struggle to apply formal rules of accountability in the face of strong community pressure to ignore compliance requirements. Cass and Brennan are also concerned that welfare rhetoric identifies, but provides no satisfactory answer, to the obvious problem that disadvantaged communities will have difficulty in marshalling the necessary resources for partnership activities and for social and economic participation. They see the social partnership and capacity building recipe as having a spiral effect in disadvantaged communities a circular logic which places the burden of obligations predominantly on the shoulders of those most deleteriously affected by market and policy transformations (2002: 262?). It is essentially saying that you need social capacity to build social capacity. 11

12 These are matters which need serious consideration if the obstacles to Indigenous economic and social disadvantage are to be overcome through the partnership model. While the logic of partnership has the potential for Indigenous empowerment, it also carries a heavy requirement of community participation and commitment. This may not be available, especially in very small, remote communities, or those affected by substance abuse. It would be unfortunate if, rather than facilitating a structural response to disadvantage, a social partnerships regime further exacerbates a winners and losers dichotomy. There is also the question of an overload of responsibilities on structures of community governance. In a speech in the NT parliament John Ah Kit voiced the opinion that Aboriginal community councils have been given far too much to do (2002: 6). One of the contributing factors to this situation in remote communities is that many service delivery responsibilities are not normalised and basic infrastructure and municipal services fall to community councils or resource agencies to provide (c.f. Robbins 2000). This can sometimes lead to an impossible load on stressed local organisation and create obstacles to engagement in additional governance or capacity building activities. There is no reason why this should be the case. Indigenous groups should be freed from unreasonable expectations to allow strategic participation in more constructive activities. Finally, the social partnership model in the broader community relies heavily on the concept of social entrepreneurship and the activity of voluntary non-profit organisations. In both of these cases the locational remoteness can be a disadvantage preventing Indigenous communities from accessing the same level of opportunities as other groups. The social entrepreneur is usually portrayed as an energetic and inspired leader who makes things happen. Of course there is no reason why individuals with these characteristics cannot emerge in remote communities Pearson is himself an obvious example. It would seem to be common sense, however, that small isolated communities and some Indigenous communities are extremely small and very remote - do not have the critical mass make this a reliable formula. Social entrepreneurs are usually understood to tap into unused or innovative resources in achieving their purposes. Importantly, this often involves volunteer organisations and philanthropic organisations. Clearly, distance and inaccessibility is a major problem for Indigenous communities attempting to attract an equitable share of the nation s volunteer and philanthropic resources. Research by Schwab and Sutherland indicates that few of the major Australian non-government development agencies have historically been willing to invest in Indigenous projects in Australia (2002). These points are raised not to discourage the development of social partnerships but to suggest some of the areas where further action and better facilitation could occur. Addressing Indigenous social exclusion some conclusions The gap between Pearson s ideas and the measures that have been implemented by the Howard government in its welfare reform package are considerable. The mutual obligation regime that forms the foundation of the new Australian welfare deal is far different from the concept of reciprocity in a real economic relationship articulated by Pearson. 12

13 The components that are most conspicuously absent are new approaches to job creation in remote areas and the lack of a strategy to promote Indigenous capital formation. That is not to say that Indigenous people have not been pursuing these objectives in their own right. There are some excellent examples of both of these types of activities which have been taking place as a result of local Indigenous initiative. Many of them deserve to be promoted and supported in a more rigorous way. In the East Kimberley, for example the local ATSIC Regional Council has created a nonprofit organisation, the Wunan Foundation, with the aim of establishing an independent and self-sustaining economic base for the local Indigenous people. It has now achieved an investment pool of $5 million, which is on-target for its goal of $10 million by The funds are invested in local projects where possible and the objective is to use profits for strategic support of community development projects (Wunan 2002). The same Regional Council has been operating a Group Training scheme for a number of years that has had considerable success in placing Indigenous youth in traineeships and apprenticeships. These are the kind of examples an enabling state would develop as models for others to follow. The development of social partnerships, on the other hand, does seem to have been embraced enthusiastically on both sides of the government/community divide. They vary enormously in scope and focus, many of them being negotiated under the auspices of Native Title processes. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the partnerships program sponsored by the department of Family and Community Services as part of its Commitment to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People, but it is apparent that this provides a mechanism that can be accessed by a wider range of communities. To sum up, then, it would appear that the Howard agenda of welfare contains some elements that would meet the requirements of Pearson s vision. On the whole, however, it fails to meet his central concern which is to transcend the oppressive experience of passive welfare. This would require far more radical measures than the Howard government has shown itself prepared to consider. 13

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