IIEB WORKING PAPER 22

Transcription

1 INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN POLICY PARKSTRAAT 45 PO BOX 3602 B-3000 LEUVEN BELGIUM T +32 (0) F +32 (0) IIEB WORKING PAPER 22 Stephan Keukeleire EU Core Groups Specialization and division of labour in European Union foreign policy April 2007 IIEB IS PART OF THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN Other IIEB working papers can be found at Comments are welcome: stephan.keukeleire@soc.kuleuven.be

2 Paper presented at the EU-CONSENT Conference The CFSP: Representation and Responsibility University of Cambridge April

3 Contents Abstract Introduction Disregarded underlying political problems of EU foreign policy Uncommon interests and mutual obstructionism Vertical inconsistency, non-coordination and non-cooperation The growing irrelevance of the Council and of national representatives Creating a system of EU Core Groups Composition Criteria or conditions for creating EU Core Groups Functions of EU Core Groups Relationship with the legal and institutional framework of the EU and the general policies adopted within the EU Differences with enhanced cooperation and other flexibility clauses Advantages of the EU Core Group mechanism Increasing the relevance of EU foreign policy Increasing the member states sense of ownership Increasing the effectiveness and external credibility of EU foreign policy Alleviating institutional constraints of the Council structures Strengthening the impact of Commission initiatives Reducing the cleavage between large & small member states Limitations and risks Tensions between EC/EU policies and EU Core Group policies A renationalization of foreign policy? Conclusion...26 References

4 Abstract 1 Close foreign policy cooperation between a limited number of EU member states is generally looked upon with suspicion as it is associated with directoires of large member states. The central argument of this paper is that, under certain conditions, specialisation and division of labour between the member states can strengthen both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the foreign policy of the EU. This paper proposes the establishment of a system of small specialized EU Core Groups that focus on particular foreign policy issues. An EU Core Group consists of (representatives of) the High Representative, the Commission and the Presidency and of a limited number of EU member states that are both willing and able to devote extra efforts and resources to a specific foreign policy matter. A system of EU Core Groups can help to alleviate some major problems of EU foreign policy: the cleavage between large and middle-sized or small member states, the predominance of uncommon interests, non-cooperation and vertical inconsistency, and the growing irrelevance of the Council in an EU with 27 member states. 1 This paper is part of a long-term research project on core groups and networks in EU foreign policy (see also Keukeleire 2000 & 2001, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008). This paper is a slightly amended version of an earlier publication (CEPS Working Document 252, October 2006). Stephan Keukeleire is a Jean Monnet Professor in European Integration and EU foreign policy at the Catholic University of Leuven (Institute for International and European Policy). He is a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. 3

5 1. Introduction An analysis of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU) points to the rising importance of small groups of member states that take the lead in the operationalization of EU foreign policy or in tackling the most delicate aspects of foreign policy matters. The best-known examples are the directoire/directorate - type activities of France, the UK and Germany in the context of the EU3 negotiations with Iran (together with the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and of the Contact Group for the Balkans (together with Italy, the US and Russia). 2 Besides, there are other, less visible informal groups that include smaller member states and representatives of EU institutions too. Examples are the informal Contact groups on Afghanistan and on the DRCongo, and the EU core group on Somalia. 3 The latter was to some extent legitimatized by the Council, which in March 2006 welcomed the establishment of an EU contact group on Somalia in Nairobi to engage on behalf of the EU and in consultation with EU Heads of Mission in direct dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government. 4 The activities of these kind of informal groups are often seen as undermining the common foreign policy of the European Union. However, this paper claims that, under certain conditions, the creation and functioning of small groups of countries and representatives of the EU institutions can be turned into strength for the foreign policy of the EU. The central argument of this paper is that the introduction of specialisation and division of labour between the member states of the EU can strengthen both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU s foreign policy. Specialisation and division of labour can be considered as necessary for two sets of reasons. Firstly, specialization and division of labour are necessary to allow for a more operational and dynamic foreign policy in an EU with 27 or more member states. They are indispensable to cope with the major differences in the member states foreign policy capabilities and interests, the growing cleavage between large and smaller countries, and the growing tension between the objective of a common foreign policy and the needs of an operational foreign policy. This is 2 In both cases, also the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, or one of his representatives, is also involved in the deliberations. For an analysis of the arguments pro and contra directorates, see Keukeleire (2001). For the Contact Group on the Balkans, see Schwegmann (2000), Keukeleire (2001) and Gégout (2002). For the EU3 on Iran, see Delpech (2004, 2005), Borda (2005) and Posch (2006). 3 The informal Contact Group on Afghanistan includes the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, the Council Secretariat and the Commission with the first three being its key members. The informal Contact group on the DRCongo has France, the UK, Belgium and the Council s Secretariat General as its key members. The EU Core Group on Somalia, which was created early 2004, now consists primarily of the UK, Italy, Sweden and the European Commission. 4 Council of the European Union (General Affairs and External Relations), Somalia Council conclusions, Press Release, 2718th Council Meeting, Brussels, 20 March 2006 (7033/06 (Presse 68)), pp

6 even more important in view of the non-ratification of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe and the doubts about a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and a European External Action Service (EEAS) leading to the need for other devises to strengthen EU foreign policy. Secondly, specialisation and division of labour are necessary to tackle some fundamental problems of EU foreign policy that are often disregarded and that also were not or not sufficiently tackled by the Constitutional Treaty: the predominance of uncommon interests, the member states lack of interest in each others foreign policy priorities, the problem of vertical consistency (between EU and national foreign policies), and the problems of legitimacy, credibility and internal visibility. This paper proposes a method to organise specialisation and division of labour through a flexible system of small specialized EU Core Groups (or EU Liaising Groups 5 ) that focus on particular foreign policy matters. An EU Core Group consists of (representatives of) the High Representative, the Commission and the Presidency or of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs if the post would be created and of a limited number of EU member states that are both willing and able to devote extra efforts and national resources to a specific foreign policy matter (i.e. a country, region, conflict, or thematic issue). This implies that different EU Core Groups will include different sets of member states. The main function of EU Core Groups is to take special responsibility in developing a more dynamic, coherent and (pro)active policy towards a specific policy matter: firstly through the support for the preparation, elaboration, implementation and follow-up of EU policy, and secondly through the intensification, pooling and stronger coordination of the national efforts and assets of the EU Core Group s member states. The first section of this paper focuses on various underlying but often neglected political problems of EU foreign policy, in order to explain more clearly the need for and added value of specialized EU Core Groups. Secondly, the various dimensions of the proposal to establish a system of EU Core Groups are explored: their composition, conditions for creating a EU Core Group, their functions, their relationship with the EU s existing institutional framework and policies, and differences from other flexibility mechanisms (such as enhanced cooperation ). This, thirdly, is followed by an overview of the various advantages of a system of EU Core Groups, as well as the limitations and potential risks. 5 The idea of EU Liaising Groups has been launched by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel De Gucht in his speech Towards greater effect and appeal Strengthening EU foreign policy (Helsinki, 27 October 2005) ( towards_greater_effect_and_appeal/). The label EU Liaison Group has the advantage to avoid the link with the concept of a 'core Europe' (which is often perceived as excluding member states). Another possible label for EU Core Croups is EU Contact Group, but this name has an even more negative connotation. 5

7 The analysis will lead to some at first sight paradoxical conclusions. It will demonstrate that a mechanism of EU Core Groups can not only increase the role of member states but can also strengthen the relevance of the community method and of the institutions and procedures of the EU s first pillar. It will illuminate that bringing national diplomacies more to the centre of EU foreign policy can reverse a continued nationalisation (or renationalisation) of foreign policy. And it will reveal that accepting diversity in member states foreign policy interests and capabilities, together with introducing division of labour and specialization, can actually bring more unity and consistency in EU foreign policy. 2. Disregarded underlying political problems of EU foreign policy Before going into detail on the proposal to create a system of EU Core Groups, it is useful to explore some fundamental problems of EU foreign policy that in political debates and academic analysis receive less attention than they deserve Uncommon interests and mutual obstructionism A first set of problems is often lumped together under the headings lack of common interest or lack of political will. However, a closer look at these problems reveals that there is far more to it. Particularly the factor lack of political will of member states is too easily used to explain the constraints and failures of the EU, which hinders both an accurate diagnosis and the search of possible solutions. 6 Diverging interests and sometimes outright disagreements between member states explain the lack of common policy towards some major foreign policy issues (such as the Iraq war in 2004) and the weakness of some of the existing policies (such as towards Russia). In many cases, however, it is not the existence of opposing interests and substantial disagreements that impedes the development of a more dynamic foreign policy. Particularly in foreign policy matters that are situated slightly lower on the international agenda, the real reason is simply the lack of interest in a certain foreign policy issue. Historical, geographical, economic and other factors explain why most member states are only actively interested in a limited number of third countries and foreign policy issues, which are often of limited interest for other member states. To give one example: developments in East Timor might attract much attention in Portugal and a couple of other member states, but politicians and public opinion in most other EU states do not really care about what happens in that country and may not even be able to situate East Timor on a world map. 6 For the (ab)use of the lack of political will and lack of common interests as explanations for the problems of EU foreign policy, see Keukeleire, 2002 &

8 This lack of interest in each others foreign policy priorities explains why Member States that want a more dynamic EU policy towards certain issues, often see there efforts blocked or slowed down by the other Member States that are not interested in the issue and have no interests to defend. As a result, EU foreign policy does often not surpass the level of declaratory diplomacy, political dialogue and traditional contractual relations with a country or region. The development of new military and civilian crisis management instruments and the growing role played by the High Representative and his staff have allowed the EU to develop a policy towards issues that initially received only limited attention from a majority of member states (such as the DRCongo). However, many foreign policy priorities of member states are left out. And even when an initial lack of interest can be overcome, member states discover that it remains difficult to find support from the other partners to further upgrade the EU policy and develop a more comprehensive and dynamic policy. The mutual indifference of member states towards each other s issues and the resulting obstruction of a more activist EU foreign policy have a major negative impact. Firstly, it leads to disappointment and frustration in those member states demanding a dynamic EU policy towards a specific third country, region or issue. By not sufficiently taking serious member states traditional national foreign policy objectives, 7 the EU undermines the relevance, credibility and legitimacy of its foreign policy and of the EU as such. After all, from a member states perspective, what is the point of having an EU foreign policy that does not contribute to tackling problems and crises in areas that it considers of crucial importance? Secondly, disappointment and frustration about the limited added-value of EU foreign policy for national foreign policy priorities partially explains member states limited commitment towards EU foreign policy in general and their limited willingness to support initiatives proposed by other states. This often leads to mutual obstructionism. To be concrete: why should the Scandinavian countries support a more activist policy towards Mediterranean countries if these member states are reluctant to prioritise the Northern Dimension in EU foreign policy? Thirdly, this situation is one explanation for member states choice of unilateralism, initiatives with other countries, ad hoc formulas and contact groups outside the EU framework. This, in turn, further increases distrust and tension between member states, and further undermines the credibility and relevance of the EU as an international actor. 7 I.e. the Northern Dimension for the Scandinavian and Baltic states; the Mediterranean area for the Southern member states; Africa for France, the UK, Portugal and Belgium; Latin-America for Spain and Portugal; Asia for the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal; the former Soviet republics for the new member states; specific international conferences for Germany and the Scandinavian countries; etc. 7

9 Fourthly, there are also negative consequences in terms of visibility of EU foreign policy. National press in general focuses on the major international conflicts and crises (where the EU is often absent) or on those countries, regions or issues that are a foreign policy priority of that member state (where the EU is generally inactive too). Together, this means that the public literally does not see (in TV or newspapers) that there is an EU foreign policy, which again undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the EU. This is problematic for the EU as public opinion polls demonstrate that foreign and security policy is one of the domains where the European population wants an active EU. 8 This is also one of the major problems for the EU s quickly developing European Security and Defence Policy. The EU is increasingly involved in crises management operations in different parts of the world, but this is barely visible for the general public. For instance: how many EU citizens have seen television images of the EU s Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia or of the EU s largest military operation, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Considering these disadvantages, the EU might profit not only from focussing attention on the common interests of the EU, but also from devising methods to take important uncommon interests more seriously: interests which are highly important for only a number of member states. The challenge is thus to find a method for turning the differences in member states foreign policy interests and capabilities from obstacles into assets for the foreign policy of the EU. Increasing in this way the added value of EU foreign policy for the member states may also contribute to tackle their so-called lack of political will. From the perspective of the preceding analysis, the question is indeed not whether member states demonstrate sufficient political will to support EU foreign policy, but whether there are sufficient incentives for national politicians and diplomats to generate the necessary political will. The question is how the EU s foreign policy system can develop mechanisms to facilitate this generation of this political will and to increase the commitment of member states Vertical inconsistency, non-coordination and non-cooperation A second set of problems is related to the consistency and coherence in EU foreign policy. When this issue is discussed, most attention goes to institutional and horizontal consistency. This is the consistency between the policies developed in the EU s first pillar and second pillar by different political and bureaucratic systems, and the consistency between the various policies of the EU: development policy, trade policy, common foreign and security policy (CFSP), etc. There is, however, much less focus on the problems of vertical consistency between EU and 8 See the EU s bi-annual Eurobarometer: 8

10 national foreign policies and of horizontal consistency between the different national foreign policies. 9 However, these two dimensions of consistency are at least as important as the other dimensions, given the fact that foreign policy is a shared competence of the EU and its member states, 10 that the foreign policy capabilities are still limited, and that in specific domains of international relations the member states foreign policies remain essential. For the effectiveness and credibility of EU foreign policy, vertical consistency between policy agreed within the EU institutions and the policies of all 27 member states is needed. However, for many foreign policy issues, what really counts is the consistency between the policies of the central EU actors (High Representative, Council Secretariat and European Commission) and of the often limited number of member states that are really interested in the issue and that can make a difference in that dossier - as a result of their economic leverage, their special relationship with a third country, etc. One of the weaknesses of the existing EU system is exactly that it does not contain sufficient mechanisms to guarantee and foster this vertical consistency between policies of the central EU actors and the limited (and varying set) of relevant member states. 11 The same reasoning applies to the horizontal consistency between national foreign policy and the resulting need for close cooperation and coordination between national foreign policies. EU foreign policy not only relies on common action via common instruments and common actors, but also on strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in the conduct of policy (art. 12 TEU). Again, not all member states are relevant for all foreign policy dossiers. To be effective it is imperative that particularly the relevant member states do cooperate systematically and do strengthen their cooperation and coordination. However, the existing EU system does not at all provide mechanisms and structures to practically facilitate cooperation and coordination between limited numbers of relevant member states. This is related to the constraints of the current set-up of the Council and its sub-structures The growing irrelevance of the Council and of national representatives The third set of problems is related to the policy-making in the Council and its substructures, which suffers from the fatal dual disease of too many Ministers (and other national representatives) and too many items on the agenda. 9 For an analysis of the various aspects of consistency, see Simon Nuttall (2005). 10 For the tensions in EU external competences, see Gauttier (2004) and Duke (2006). 11 Except for the informal (but not very transparent) mechanisms achieved via (former) national diplomats who are members of the Council Secretariat General and the private staff and Planning Unit of the High Representative. 9

11 It is clear that in a Council meeting with 27 Ministers, real debates are nearly impossible and are indeed also becoming rare. This also implies that the decisionmaking and problem-solving capabilities of the Council of Ministers are under strain. Because of the large number of participants, the possibility for national ministers to intervene in the Council debates and to express and defend national interests and positions is more limited than before. This not only causes Ministers of Foreign Affairs to feel increasingly irrelevant in the Council meetings, it also makes the Council meetings and their participation in it increasingly irrelevant for Member States. This growing feeling of irrelevance in an expanding EU is not only true for meetings of the Council of Ministers, but also for the meetings of the various substructures of the Council: the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the Political and Security Committee (PCS) and the many working groups. However, the psychological effect on the national Ministers of Foreign Affairs is much more significant and potentially harming for the EU, as these ministers are not really used to feel irrelevant. In short: in addition to the diminished output legitimacy (because of its limited problem-solving capacity), the Council structures are thus also faced with a diminished input legitimacy, which threatens to undermine the legitimacy and acceptability of the Council decisions and of the EU as a foreign policy forum as such. Obviously, this also induces member states to use other forums to promote national foreign policy goals, such as other international organisations and ad hoc forums with a limited number of states. The too many participants problem is further exacerbated by the too many issues obstacle. As a result of the expansion of the foreign policy instruments and activities of the EU, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs as well as the various substructures of the Council are confronted with an increasingly overloaded and impossible agenda. 12 The example of the agenda of a recent meeting of the Africa Working Group (of 13 September 2006) illuminates the problem. During this meeting, the Working Group had to discuss: Sudan, DRCongo, Burundi, Côte d'ivoire, Somalia, Malawi, Madagascar, Togo, the progress report on the Joint EU- Africa Strategy, the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, the Commission Communication on Governance (as part of the EU Strategy for Africa), and the EU Electoral Observation programme for 2006 and Member states that have a strong interest in a particular African country or issue thus see their foreign policy priority drown in the large number of agenda points. It is evident that it is impossible for the Working Group to grasp the details of all these issues and to 12 See also the analysis in Gomez and Peterson (2001). 10

12 discuss them all in a serious way. A setting with 27 or more participants is not at all appropriate to develop towards such a large number of complex issues an operational policy that goes beyond generalities (such as the wish to promote peace, stability and democracy). It is also clear that the Council Presidency cannot be expected to take the lead in all these foreign policy dossiers, except if the Presidency is held by London or Paris with their extensive central services and diplomatic network in Africa. Moreover, the merely bi-monthly meetings of the Africa Working Group are not sufficient in case developments in a specific country or EU involvement in intensive mediation efforts require the EU to react swiftly and in a flexible way. In this context, it is not surprising that member states will see these meetings as insufficient and will turn to other forums and informal groupings to tackle their foreign policy priority in a more serious way and this inside or outside the EU foreign policy setting. 3. Creating a system of EU Core Groups Summing up the previous analysis, EU foreign policy is challenged to devise methods to focus more on uncommon interests, to increase its added value and relevance for the member states, to facilitate the generation of political will, to increase vertical consistency and cooperation between national foreign policies, and to adapt the Council structures. The argument developed in this paper is that the introduction of specialisation and division of labour through the creation of a system of EU Core Groups can contribute to take up this challenge. This section spells out in detail the various dimensions of the creation and functioning of EU Core Groups Composition An EU Core Group consists of (representatives of) the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the Commission and the Presidency of the Council, as well as a number of member states that accept the commitment to intensify the foreign policy efforts towards a certain foreign policy matter (a country, region, crisis or thematic issue). These member states have to be willing and capable over a longer period of time, firstly, to devote extra energy, time, money and other national resources in support of the EU s policy towards a specific foreign policy matter (a country, region or issue) and, secondly, to step up, coordinate and pool their national foreign policy efforts towards that foreign policy matter beyond the efforts that are already done by the member states and the EU as a whole. The European Commission can be excluded from an EU Core Group if the main focus of the Core Group is military crisis management or if it is concerned with strategic military matters. Membership in EU Core Groups can 11

13 change over time, in function of the evolving requirements of the subject area and the evolving attention of the EU Core Group. To alleviate member states concerns that EU Core Groups would become restricted playgrounds for former colonial powers or for EU countries that border the third country or region that is the subject of the EU Core Group, it can be decided that an EU Core Group should also include at least one EU member state with no historical links to or direct borders with the third country or region concerned i.e. a country with a more neutral status. This may also be useful as an additional guarantee that the activities of an EU Core Group do not conflict with the general foreign policy of the EU. The involvement of countries with no direct historic or geographic ties to the subjects of an EU Core Group requires, however, that these countries commit themselves to the issue or area and have the capacity to make special efforts in its regard. The Northern member states of the EU (Sweden, Finland, Denmark) prove that this is not impossible by their very active foreign policy towards several non- European countries with which they have no particular historical links and no specific economic or other interests at stake (e.g. Indonesia, Somalia, the Great Lakes region in Africa). At the highest political level, an EU Core Group consists of the High Representative, the Commissioner for External Relations (and/or the Commissioner for Development), the minister of the country that assumes the Presidency of the Council, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or other relevant ministers of the member states that take part in the EU Core Group. In the EU Core Group, the High Representative can be represented by an EU Special Representative who works under his authority. In case of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty - or the creation of the function of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or a comparable function outside the Constitution Treaty s framework - the Union Minister takes the place of the High Representative, the responsible Commissioner and the Presidency. In case the Constitutional Treaty is not ratified, the Council can decide that the Presidency of the Council does not take part in the EU Core Group activities and that the High Representative (or the EU Special Representative who works under his authority) is the Council s central representative in the EU Core Group. At lower diplomatic and administrative levels, an EU Core Group consists of specialized diplomats or civil servants from: the participating member states, the High Representative s Policy Unit or personal secretariat, the Council Secretariat and the administration of the Commission. In case the European External Action Service (EEAS) is created, then part of these diplomats or civil servants should be replaced by diplomats or civil servants from the EEAS (depending on the form this EEAS will assume). The Council can also decide to involve representatives of the 12

14 various military structures or other bodies of the EU in the activities of the EU Core Group. Diplomats from the participating countries and institutions will not only meet in Brussels. They can also meet and act in other relevant places, such as in the third country or region that is the subject of the EU Core Group, or in New York to coordinate with and within the UN bodies and other international organisations. The members of an EU Core Group agree among themselves on the management of their group and activities. Within an EU Core Group, there can be further specialisation and division of labour among the participant countries and institutions, with different (sets of) actors focusing on different dimensions of the policy towards this area or issue, depending on their competences and expertise. This specialisation and division of labour is particularly useful when an EU Core Group focuses on various dimensions of the external action vis-à-vis an area or issue. Depending on the need and circumstances, these dimensions can be related to mediation or reconciliation efforts, civilian and military crisis-management, postwar reconstruction, institution building, development cooperation, technical cooperation, environmental protection initiatives, etc. Depending on the dimensions tackled by an EU Core Group, different specialized actors (ministers, diplomats, civil servants, agencies, experts) from the participating member states and EU institutions can be involved Criteria or conditions for creating EU Core Groups An EU Core Group can be created when the following conditions are met: when a number of member states (for instance, from 3 member states upwards), the High Representative and the responsible Commissioner judge that a specific geographic area or foreign policy issue requires a more active EU policy and more extensive pooling and coordination of their efforts and resources; or when the Council asks a number of member states, the High Representative and the Commissioner to intensify the policy of the EU towards a specific area or issue and/or to take the lead in developing a more active policy towards this area or issue; and when these Member States, firstly, accept the commitment to devote in a concerted way and over a longer period of time additional efforts and national resources to this priority area and, secondly, also have the capabilities to do so in terms of personnel, financial means and other national assets (e.g. diplomatic or military leverage, close formal and informal political contacts with the elites in a third country, economic support or leverage, technical expertise, credibility to act as a mediator in a region, observers or peace-keeping forces, development cooperation, etc.). 13

15 EU Core Groups can concentrate on specific geographical areas, on thematic foreign policy issues, or on a combination of both. Geographically organized EU Core Groups can focus their efforts on a specific country, group of countries, or a specific region within a country or set of countries (for instance, a conflict area surpassing the borders of countries). Examples of thematic foreign policy issues that may be the subject of an EU Core Group are the spread of light weapons, security sector reform efforts (SSR), child soldiers in conflict areas, institutionbuilding, the link between conflicts and the production of narcotics. The focus of an EU Core Group can be rather broad and comprehensive or rather limited in scope. EU Core Groups cannot be established for all foreign policy areas, as this will not always be possible, desirable or useful. The creation of a particular EU Core Group may be excluded in the case of fundamental differences in interests and approaches among EU member states with regard to that foreign policy issue. When could this formula of division of labour and functional specialization then be used? A mechanism of specialized EU Core Groups can be particularly useful for the many foreign policy domains that are situated slightly lower on the international agenda and that are considered of major importance by only a limited number of member states. An EU Core Group can even be useful for wellestablished EU foreign policy areas (such as the Balkans or the Middle East), when it is seen as beneficial or necessary to intensify efforts in a specific sub-dimension to achieve EU s foreign policy goals towards that area. The creation of an EU Core Group may also be considered for policy issues which already are the subject of informal contact groups or friends of -groups (e.g. in the context of the UN), created by a number of EU and non-eu countries. 13 In such cases closer interaction between the various EU actors involved and a closer link with the broader EU policy can be useful too. EU Core Groups can be created in several ways. One possibility and probably the most logical and natural is that an EU Core Group is established incrementally and organically from below, based on practical experience and concrete needs and opportunities. This means that an EU Core Group on a specific foreign policy issue gradually crystallizes on the basis of closer interaction and cooperation between diplomats and civil servants from some Member States and the EU institutions. 13 Examples of such groups are the Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia/Abchazia (including - beside non-eu countries - France, Germany and the UK), the Group of Friends of Darfur (incl. France, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, the EU Council Presidency and the European Commission), the International Contact Group on Liberia (incl. France, the UK, the EU Council Presidency and the Commission), the Grupo de Amigos on Venezuela (incl. Spain and Portugal), the Core Group on Northern Uganda (incl. the Netherlands and the U.K.), the Core Group on Lebanon (incl. France, the U.K., Italy, the EU Council Presidency and the Commission), and the Friends of the Nairobi Declaration on the fight against the traffic of small arms (incl. seven EU countries and the Commission). 14

16 Another possibility is that political leaders decide to create an EU Core Group when at a certain moment the need is felt by some Member States or the Council to intensify policy towards a specific foreign policy issue. In order to guarantee the required flexibility and avoid protracted and difficult formal negotiations, the EU Core Group has to be created by a political agreement rather than through a formal legal agreement or detailed mandate by the Council Functions of EU Core Groups The function of an EU Core Group is to take special responsibility in developing a more intensive, dynamic, coherent and (pro)active policy towards a specific area or issue: through its support for the preparation, elaboration, implementation and follow-up of EU policy, and through the intensification and pooling of the own efforts and assets of the EU Core Group s members. An EU Core Group can fulfil this function in different ways, depending on the specific needs of the area or policy issue. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of possible tasks for an EU Core Group: support for the Council, the Council s substructures, the High Representative (or EU Special Representative) and/or the Commission in preparing new EU initiatives and decisions, and/or in concretising, implementing and assuring the follow-up of the decisions of the EU vis-à-vis this area or issue; examine, propose and apply measures to strengthen the various dimensions of horizontal and vertical consistency with a special focus on the consistency of the national policies of the member states in the EU Core Group; pool more intensively the policy measures and efforts of the members of the EU Core Group and/or adopt new measures to further the objectives of the EU towards this area or issue particularly through measures by member states in policy domains where the EU as such has little or no competences or capabilities, but where some coordination with EU policies is useful or essential; broaden and intensify the political dialogue with third countries or regions, allowing less formal, more frequent and flexible, and more intensive and purposive interaction, in addition to the political dialogue conducted by the Council (or Presidency or Troika) or Commission as is formally foreseen in the agreements with these partners; mediate or negotiate more intensively with third parties to promote, elaborate or propose concrete solutions for specific problems; intensify in a systematic way the coordination with other external actors that are active with regard to the area or issue at stake (such as other third countries, other regional organisations, UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, NGO s); 15

17 intensify the dialogue among the EU Core Group s member states, to increase the convergence of views about the area or issue, to diminish differences in approach and narrow divergences in interests and, in this way, to increase the possibility of a more coherent and active common EU policy; implement any other tasks which the Council may assign to an EU Core Group Relationship with the legal and institutional framework of the EU and the general policies adopted within the EU In order to assure that an EU Core Group does strengthen and not undermine EU foreign policy and in order to dispel distrust of a division of labour and specialisation within the EU, it is of great importance to clearly define the position of an EU Core Group within the broader institutional, legal and policy framework of the EU and to define the perimeters of an EU Core Group. Firstly, an EU Core Group shall respect the principles of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 14 the legislation and other decisions adopted in the context of these treaties, as well as the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those member states which do not participate in it. An EU Core Group does not affect the formal competences of the Council, European Parliament (EP) or European Commission. It cannot replace the Council, EP or Commission in adopting binding decisions for the EU as a whole, and it cannot adopt political, financial or other commitments for the EU as a whole or for other member states that are not part of the EU Core Group. Secondly, through the Council, all member states remain involved in the policymaking process towards the geographic area or policy issue that is subject of the EU Core Group. The formal decisions and commitments adopted in the framework of the EC and EU Treaties are basic components of the activities of the EU Core Group. Although an EU Core Group can contribute to looking for and suggesting new courses of action to tackle a specific foreign policy issue, when actions fall under the formal competences of the EC or EU, the formal decision-making procedures must be followed. It is equally important that all EU member states remain responsible for implementing and complying with the formal EU and EC decisions with regard to these areas and issues. In other words, the creation of an EU Core Group for a specific issue does not diminish or remove the obligations and responsibilities of all EU member states to respect and implement commitments adopted within the EU and to support the Union s policy towards that issue. 14 Or in the framework of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in case this Treaty will be ratified and come into force. 16

18 Thirdly, within the framework of the Council s activities, the High Representative, Presidency and/or the Commission shall ensure that all member states are regularly informed about the EU Core Group activities and that the functioning of the EU Core Group does not run counter to the above mentioned principles and restrictions. Like any EU member state, they can submit an initiative of an EU Core Group for discussion in the Council framework in case it is thought to go against these principles and restrictions. Fourthly, the High Representative, Presidency and/or the Commission shall ensure that the competent parliamentary committees of the European Parliament and the interparliamentary delegations are regularly informed about the activities of the EU Core Group and that it takes into consideration the resolutions, reports and other findings of the EP. When the EU Core Group focuses on a specific third country or region, it can assure close involvement of and coordination with the relevant interparliamentary delegation for that third country or region, as this can contribute to the successful functioning of the EU Core Group. The EU Core Group can thus provide a flexible setting, which facilitates the interplay with the parliamentary actors and allows the relevant interparliamentary delegation to be more closely involved in EU foreign policy. Finally, it is clear that the member states representatives in the EU Core Group are responsible for the relationship with, input of and feedback for their own domestic political institutions, non-governmental organisations, and particularly their national parliaments. The latter is crucial for several reasons. Intensive interaction with the parliaments of the EU Core Group member states can increase the legitimacy of the actions of an EU Core Group and of EU foreign policy in general. It will assure the national members of parliaments that their country plays a major role in the shaping of EU foreign policy and that the foreign policy priority and interests of their country are taken seriously in the EU context. Moreover, the close interaction with the relevant national parliaments can also contribute to and even be necessary for these governments to step up the own efforts Differences with enhanced cooperation and other flexibility clauses A next point that needs clarification is the distinction with the flexibility clauses that are foreseen in the existing treaties and particularly with the formula of enhanced cooperation. 15 The enhanced cooperation clause had to facilitate foreign policy-making in cases where not all member states wanted to proceed. However, 15 For the relevant treaty articles on enhanced cooperation, see articles 27a-e, 40, 40a-b & TEU and articles 11 & 11a TEC. The other flexibility clause, the formula of constructive abstention (art. 23 TEU), is more limited in scope. For CFSP issues (except for decisions having military or defence implications) it allows for the possibility under specific and limited conditions that a country abstains from voting and is subsequently not obliged to apply the decision adopted in the Council. 17

19 it did not provide the flexibility several member states had hoped for, because of its narrow scope and the heavy procedures and strict requirements for establishing it. 16 This also explains why the clause has not been used in practice. A system of specialized EU Core Groups has several advantages compared to the system of enhanced cooperation. EU Core Groups can be created in a more flexible and informal way, without the heavy procedures and without the minimum of eight member states required for enhanced cooperation. In contrast to enhanced cooperation, an EU Core Group makes it possible for the participating countries in the EU Core Group to act beyond the limits of the powers of the EU, as they can agree together about initiatives or measures which only commit themselves (if they at least respect the decisions and policies agreed in common in the EU). The scope of enhanced cooperation is restricted to the implementation of joint actions and common positions, excluding matters with military implications restrictions that do not apply to EU Core Groups. In contrast to enhanced cooperation, the system of EU Core Groups is not necessarily a last resort mechanism: policy fields that already are the subject of a dynamic EU policy can also profit from the specialisation and division of labour of an EU Core Group. Finally, although in EU Core Groups decisions are to be adopted by consensus (whereas under the enhanced cooperation formula qualified majority voting is formally allowed), the limited number of actors involved in an EU Core Group should facilitate decision-making. It is interesting in this regard to have a look at the provisions on flexibility that were included in the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe. The amendments to the provisions on enhanced cooperation did not substantially increase the prospect of a greater usefulness of this formula. 17 In its section on the Common Security and Defence Policy, however, the Treaty did include a major innovation which goes to some extent in the direction of the flexibility proposed in the EU Core Group formula. After enumerating in Article III-309 the tasks in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, Article III-310 reads as follows: Within the framework of the European decision adopted in accordance with Article III-309, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task For an analysis of the enhanced cooperation clause in the Nice Treaty and an account of the underlying motivations, see Stubb (2002) and Jaeger (2002). 17 Articles I-44, III of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe. See also Törö, The second paragraph of this article goes as follows: Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of is progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined 18

20 This provision could be a major step in the direction of increased flexibility. It is, however, not as far-reaching as the formula of specialized EU Core Groups presented here. A system of specialized EU Core Groups has two major advantages. Firstly, it allows for the support of the general EU policy towards a specific geographic area or policy issue over a longer period of time (and is thus not restricted to the implementation of a specific European decision as in the case of Article III-310). Secondly, a system of Core Groups allows for a comprehensive and integrated approach that includes the various policy domains (and is thereby not restricted to the common security and defence policy). However, as the chances of a ratification of the Constitutional Treaty are rather slim, this comparison becomes rather irrelevant - with the EU losing even this limited but nevertheless useful flexibility clause. 4. Advantages of the EU Core Group mechanism After elaborating on the various features of a mechanism of specialized EU Core Groups, it is necessary to illuminate more extensively the various potential advantages of such a mechanism as well as its potential limitations, drawback and risks Increasing the relevance of EU foreign policy A system of EU Core Groups provides the EU with a device to overcome the obstacles analysed in the first section of this paper: the predominance of uncommon interests, the member states lack of interest in each other s foreign policy objectives, the resulting obstructionism of EU foreign policy making, and the impression of member states that the EU is not promoting their foreign policy priorities. EU Core Groups make it possible to develop a more dynamic foreign policy in dossiers considered important by a limited number of member states, which increases the relevance of EU foreign policy for the member states. While remaining committed to and involved in the foreign policy of the EU as a whole, member states can, within the EU foreign policy framework, focus their efforts more intensively on areas that are important for them. Vice versa, a system of EU Core Groups also increases the relevance of national foreign policy actors within the EU as it assures a more prominent role to individual member states within EU foreign policy. A system of EU Core Groups can strengthen the feeling of national diplomats and Ministers of Foreign Affairs that, in an EU with 27 or more member states, they can make a difference. In view of the limited number of participants in a EU Core Group and of the valuable assets for the task in the European decisions referred to in paragraph I. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions. 19