Asia s Competing Communities and Why Asian Regionalism Matters Amitav Acharya

Transcription

1 Asia s Competing Communities and Why Asian Regionalism Matters Amitav Acharya Australia Versus Japan The just concluded 4 th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Thailand will long be remembered as the venue for seemingly competing ideas from Australia and Japan for re-organizing regional cooperation in Asia. But will it also be known for having altered the course of Asian multilateralism? At one level, the two proposals, Australia s Asia-Pacific Community, and Japan s East Asian Community, are both timely. Multilateral institutions in Asia seem to have hit a cross-roads. APEC, whose leaders summit meets next month, shows clear signs of having outlived its usefulness and purpose. And the East Asian Summit has not set any clear and concrete goals. ASEAN remains active and useful, but its capacity to lead wider regional institutions has increasingly come under question. Both proposals were spurred in part by regime change in the respective countries. Both the Rudd and Hatoyama governments are seeking to distance themselves from their predecessors. In Australia, Rudd s predecessor John Howard gained regional notoriety as America s self-proclaimed deputy sheriff. And in Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi s government once indicated that its regional relationships will be secondary to its alliance with the US. In this respect at least, the two proposals are welcome news for those who would like to see the advancement of multilateralism in the region. The Australian proposal was clearly the first on the table, yet the Hatoyama government does not seem to address how its idea of an East Asian community, which includes Australia, will relate to the latter s own Asia-Pacific Community idea. This is a little odd, because Australia and Japan have been close partners in ideas and initiatives for regional cooperation in the past. Both were central to the idea of the Pacific Community of the 1970s and 80s which paved the way for APEC. And only very recently, they have held close consultations with each other in creating a coalition of democracies in the region. But there are at least four issues which will decide which of the proposals survives and in what form. First, the rationale and specifics of the two proposals will matter a lot. While the Australian proposal has been on the table for some time, and it has gone through some revisions, there is still no clear sense of what the region is being asked to support. Initially, it seemed, at least to those not terribly familiar with Rudd s thinking, that Canberra may be proposing a brand new institution. But more recently, the Australians suggest that the Asia-Pacific community could be a rationalization of existing institutions, rather than setting up a brand new one. The Australians are understandably cautious, especially after the initial response to their idea from Southeast Asia, which was decided mixed. In advancing the rationale for the Asia Pacific Community idea, one suggestion from Australia is that there is no existing institution that covers the whole region (including India) and different issue area, such as economic, security and environment? But APEC does have an annual summit that has discussed security issues, such as East Timor and 9/11 attacks, and it has addressed a host of issues aside from trade. And lest we forget, APEC was an Australian initiative. Turning to the Japanese idea, Hatoyama is certainly not the first Asian leader to propose an East Asian Community. After all, the October 2001 report of the East Asian Vision Group set up at the suggestion of the late South Korean leader Kim Dae Jung was titled: Towards an East Asian 1

2 Community. And Hatoyama s idea contains elements of uncertainty and even contradiction. In his UN Speech in September, the Japanese envisaged an European Union style grouping. Later in an article in the New York Times, he, based its rationale on the era of U.S.-led globalism coming to an end. Yet in Thailand, he noted that that Washington remained the "cornerstone" of Japanese policy, and a Japanese foreign ministry official said Tokyo will closely discuss and coordinate its idea with the U.S. While nothing prevents Japan from pursuing close alliance relationship with the US while advancing East Asian multilateralism, there will come a time when adjustments to the alliance relationship have to be made, if Japan is to secure genuine Chinese support for the East Asian Community idea. Second, and this goes without saying, China s role and attitude will be crucial to the success or failure of the two ideas. So far, Beijing has welcomed the Japanese idea. On October 21, Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that China is positive and open to the establishment of an East Asian community. But whether it will really go for a regional body that includes India and Australia remains to be seen. Recently, Beijing has favoured the ASEAN Plus Three, rather than the broader East Asian Summit, as the basis for an East Asian Community. Beijing also seems to be somewhat lukewarm towards the Australian proposal, which more clearly allows space for US participation. Third, whither the US? The Obama administration has shown greater support for Asian multilateral institutions than its predecessor. But despite showing greater engagement with ASEAN, it has not indicated which institutional route it might take. Theoretically, it could seek a revitalization of APEC, or join the EAS (the road now being cleared by its accession to ASEAN s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), or it could sign on to the Rudd proposal. It can also do all of the above. To quote Kurt Campbell, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: "I just want to assure you... the United States is going to be part of this party. We are an active player and we're going to want an invitation as well." But Washington has other institutional preoccupation, especially making sure the success of the fledgling G-20 forum. And there is also the question of whether the US will be invited in. The Australia proposal clearly includes the US, while the Japanese proposal is ambivalent. It is not impossible to imagine an East Asian Community without US participation, but failure to take advantage of the positive US attitude towards Asian multilateral institutions by denying it membership may amount to a historic blunder on the part of Japan and other proponents. Fourth, what might the role of ASEAN in the proposed architecture? ASEAN and other nations have been presented with a choice, and a difficult one at that. ASEAN has little interest in taking sides in a competition between Japan and Australia. Japan is a valued partner and an Asian nation. But Australia s proposal includes the US, which will be important factor for ASEAN. Indonesia, the largest ASEAN member, has developed too close a rapport with Australia not to take the Rudd proposal seriously. Indonesia would support whichever proposal gives it a bigger role to play. Indonesia s own idea for reorganizing Asian multilateralism would be a minilateral group of leading Asia Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan, US, and of course itself. Lately, Jakarta has shown a little impatience with ASEAN, after fellow members forced a substantial dilution of Jakarta s initial proposal for an ASEAN Security Community which stressed greater commitment to democracy and stronger security cooperation like an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. But ASEAN as a whole will also be seriously concerned about its leadership role in Asian multilateralism. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva said at the Hua Hin summit that Both Japan and Australia proposed bigger communities, which is a test for us Asean must be firmly integrated when we enter a bigger community. While he and other leaders "listened carefully and attentively" to the Australian and Japanese leaders, they also emphasised that it wasn't all that important to decide on some kind of rigid structure at the moment, but to be aware that the regional architecture would continue to evolve." 2

3 Non-ASEAN members have grown a little frustrated with ASEAN s lack of resolve is shaping the direction of Asian multilateralism. But as in the past, competing ideas from the outside have been good for ASEAN, as it puts ASEAN in a position to make the difference. Both Australia and Japan needs ASEAN s support to make their proposals fly. Past proposals for regional cooperation, such as Australia-Japanese idea of open regionalism and Canadian-Australian idea of cooperative security, had to be brought to ASEAN and modified (localized) to suit ASEAN s purpose before they could lead to concrete institutions such as APEC and ARF respectively. It is thus likely that the Rudd and Hatoyama proposals would go through a lengthy period of debate and negotiation, and allow considerable space for existing ASEAN institutions before they lead to something. And the outcome is unlikely to be a revolutionary change in Asian multilateralism, a la an European Union in the east, but an adaptation and modification of extant bodies, based upon a reconciliation between the competing Japanese and Australian ideas, especially if both come to accept American participation. Community, Concert or What? A new Asia Pacific regional grouping is being debated as a direct consequence of recent developments in Asia Pacific diplomacy around the Australian proposal for an Asia Pacific community (APc) and the emergence of the G-20 global forum. As is well known now, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd idea of an Asia Pacific Community, first proposed in June 2008 but revised and made more flexible since, proposes the creation of an overarching, brand new institution which will include all the principal countries of the region, and deal with all the key challenges, economic, security, ecological, etc. We can no longer afford to have the interests of the region dealt with in separate silos, he said in his opening address to a meeting of government officials and experts convened by Australia during 3-5 December in Sydney to discuss the Asia-Pacific Community idea. Almost parallel to the Rudd initiative, the world has witnessed the emergence of the G-20, propelled by the global economic crisis since mid Depending on which region one is talking about, either eight or ten members of the G-20 are from Asia Pacific. The number is nine if one counts such natural Asia Pacific countries as Australia, Canada (?), China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. The number is ten if one includes Mexico (a member of APEC). At the Sydney conference, one particularly controversial idea, originally mooted by Australia and reiterated by Michael Wesley, the Australian co-chair of the conference, was that of an Asia-Pacific concert of powers. This would presumably bring together eight of the biggest powers of the Asia- Pacific the US, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Indonesia and Australia, all of which are members of G-20. According to the official Australian drafted summary 1 of the Sydney Conference, Wesley (some suggest that he was using a draft prepared for him by Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) saw the most compelling current challenge facing the Asia-Pacific as the rapid realignment of the region s great powers. [emphasis original] The realignment and intersecting interests of the five great powers was potentially a combustible mix and all regional countries had an interest in its management. To address this development, he was attracted to the idea of a concert of powers, including smaller states as well as the great powers. 1 Available at % %20CONFERENCE% 20SUMMARY%20RECORD%20_final_.pdf 3

4 This idea run into particularly vocal opposition from Singapore, which felt smaller Southeast Asian countries such as itself would be marginalized in such a system. According to veteran Singaporean diplomat Tommy Koh: The idea to replace ASEAN with a G8 of the Asia Pacific is both impractical and a violation of the Pacific ethos of equality and consensus. Koh argued that there was noting wrong with the region s current multi-layered or multiplex system, which also existed in Europe. (Koh s speech was drafted even before Wesley made his sympathy for a Asia-Pacific concert of powers known at the end of the conference. His Singaporean colleague, Simon Tay, who used the term directorate to describe the concert, joined in: there is, in my view, a strong case against not for -- a non-inclusive fora among the major powers to seek to direct events in all fields. The idea of a concert is not new. American scholar and former U.S. State Department official Susan Shirk in an essay in 1997, and this writer in an article in Survival in 1999, had examined the idea of an Asia-Pacific and an Asian Concert respectively. I had argued, and still hold, that while a concert recognizes the de facto inequality of nations and is useful in regulating relations among the great powers themselves, it is likely to fail if it tries to manage the region as a whole as a great power club. The only exception was, and remains the management of Korean peninsula security (as through the four- and six- party talks featuring the US, Russia, China and Japan). Matters have changed since then, we now have India and perhaps even Indonesia joining the club of Asian rising powers. And existing Asian institutions have not progressed as well as expected. Still my skepticism about the then or the recent idea of a concert of powers in Asia (or Asia-Pacific) are three-fold: First, concerts usually come about after a great power has been defeated in a major war, like the defeat of Napoleon that triggered the European Concert at the Congress of Vienna in Subsequently, the P-5 framework for the UN Security Council in 1945, like the League of Nations permanent council, both of which can be regarded as examples of a Concert system, came about after the two World Wars. No such war has mercifully taken place in Asia-Pacific. Instead, the challenge today is to avert such a conflict. Second, while Wesley envisages an Asia-Pacific concert that includes the region s smaller states as well as the great powers, in reality, concerts by definition either exclude smaller nations or reduce them to the status of objects, rather than subjects, of a regional diplomatic system. This runs contrary to the trajectory of Asia Pacific security cooperation, in which ASEAN countries have acted as a normative and institutional hub. While Against this backdrop, Singapore s complaint against the Asian concert idea is hardly surprising. Third, a concert in Asia may be impractical because it requires policy and ideological agreement among the major Asian powers. While some such agreement may exist among Asian great powers over economic issues, it is absent over key security issues (recent Sino-Indian tensions over border issues and US-China tensions over Taiwan arms sales are useful reminders). The European Concert of Powers weakened and eventually collapsed over ideological differences between Russia and Britain. This has its parallel in the current ideological divide between China and the US (and many other Asia- Pacific nations) over human rights and democracy as well as Asian values. The Sydney conference registered a widely-expressed view that it was necessary to define the meaning of community [emphasis original]. It is hard to find another concept subject to such gross misunderstanding, manipulation and abuse yet which is so commonplace in Asia Pacific security proposals. The true approximation of a community, based on tight economic integration, renunciation and inadmissibility of armed force to settle disputes, a sense of collective identity, and similar domestic political systems, is an unrealistic goal for Asia, at least for the foreseeable future. But if one has to have an organizing idea to replace the term community or concert, then I would propose the term consociation, (admittedly more unwieldy than community or concert). This term can be defined as the political order of a culturally diverse region that rests on respect and representation for all member states, big or small, political and economic interdependence, 4

5 institutional arrangements and the cooperative attitudes of elites/leaders reconciling their parochial national thinking with the regional common purpose. A consociation does not require ideological convergence or collective identity, the prerequisite of a community. Unlike a concert, it calls for power-sharing, as opposed to power balancing. In a consociation, the stronger members/groups of a society domestic or international show tolerance for the interests and wishes of weaker groups. In consociational political orders, examples of which can be found in the domestic political systems of Switzerland, Austria, Canada, India and Malaysia, weaker groups are not ignored or marginalized but respected and represented in the councils of decision-making. (more on this idea: amitavacharyaacademic.blogspot.com) While a measure of understanding among the great powers is Asia today is necessary and indispensable to the region s stability, it is not clear whether such an understanding would come about through a concert system, in the absence of the neutral and moderating influence of existing institutions that are good examples of Asia s evolving consociational regional order. It is perhaps better to strengthen than displace them. Asia in the New American Moment Secretary of State Hillary Clinton s new American moment in international relations speech, delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington D.C. on 8 September, is going to be widely discussed and debated. As Stewart Patrick of the Council sees it, it may be as memorable (and controversial) as Charles Krauthammer s unipolar moment article in Foreign Affairs in To me, considering the differences in America s power position in 1990 relative to that today, the real issue might not be whether it s going to be a new moment in international relations, but whether it will be a new American moment. But aspects of the speech signal important changes in the way America looks at Asia, especially its regional architecture. One thing that struck me as unusual and important about the Clinton speech was the amount of space devoted to regions and regional organizations in general. 2 It is hard to remember another general agenda-setting foreign policy speech by a US Secretary of State which lays so much stress on regional architecture as a platform for US foreign policy. Declaring that Few, if any, of today's challenges can be understood or solved without working through a regional context, Clinton mentioned region (including region, regional, regionally, regions, etc) no less than 24 times in her speech. There is an entire section on Strengthening Regional Architecture, (excluding discussion of NATO, which is under a separate preceding section on alliances, although NATO is basically a regional organization), and this section is longer than that on Global Institutions in the 21st Century. And in discussing the role of emerging powers, Clinton warns: "Countries like China and Brazil have their own notions about what regional institutions should look like, and they are busy pursuing those ideas." This is another reason for the US remain robustly engaged and to help chart the way forward in shaping regional architecture. This is a logic that applies especially to Asia today. Moreover, the regional architecture section of her speech is broad and not Eurocentric. If anything, it is Asia-centric. The EU is mentioned in the speech four times (NATO also four times) compared to seven references to Asia Pacific institutions, (including three references to ASEAN, two references to the East Asia Summit (EAS), and one reference each to APEC and the Trans-Pacific Partnership). (For 2 Text at 5

6 those who care, overall, Europe is mentioned 10 times in the speech, compared to 8 for Asia, including Asia-Pacific and East Asia.) It is instructive to compare this speech with one she gave to the Council on Foreign Relations just over a year ago on 15 July Then, she had mentioned region only four times, compared to 24 in the 2010 speech. In the 2009 speech, she had mentioned APEC once, and ASEAN once (although according to a note that accompanies the transcript posted at the Council website, she pronounced it as ASIAN). 3 The EAS was not mentioned at all. NATO was mentioned in the 2009 speech three times, EU once. Equally striking is the fact that regional institutions found more space relative to bilateral alliances in her 2010 speech, compared to her speech than a year ago. In the 2009 speech, each of America s bilateral allies in Asia were mentioned by name: we are working with our key treaty allies, Japan and Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and other partners to strengthen our bilateral relationships In the 2010 speech, only three allies are mentioned: We reaffirmed our bonds with close allies like South Korea, Japan and Australia. Perhaps one should not read too much into words here. The Obama administration is not pushing for regional multilateral institutions at the expense of America s bilateral alliances. Asian regional institutions are mentioned more frequently may be because they are newer, weaker and more of a challenge to an America which wants to make multilateralism more important and visible in its foreign policy. Clinton in her 2010 speech acknowledges that: The Asia-Pacific has few robust institutions to foster effective cooperation, build trust, and reduce the friction of competition. But she adds: So with our partners, we began working to build a more coherent regional architecture that will strengthen both economic and political ties. Bilateralism remains robust in the US regional security architecture in Asia. But the Clinton speech does clarify the situation with respect to the regional architecture in Asia. Both the Kevin Rudd proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community, and the Hatoyama proposal for an East Asian Community, which dominated the debate about the regional architecture this time last year, now seem history, despite the fact that Rudd is now Australia s Foreign Minister and may even have a free hand in running foreign policy under Julia Gillard, who is said to be more focused on domestic issues. Clinton clarified that the US would continue to value APEC, but supplement it with the TPP, as the leading vehicles for its multilateral economic and trade engagement in Asia. If so, then the EAS becomes the main forum for its multilateral security engagement with Asia. Although the US (along with Russia) does not formally join the EAS until 2011, Clinton will represent the US will be at the 2010 EAS to be held in Hanoi in October this year. Clinton sets up an ambitious goal for the EAS: the US would be encouraging its development into a foundational security and political institution for the region, capable of resolving disputes and preventing them before they arise. (Yet, a senior US official tells me that the initial US role would be modest, to listen and learn, rather than to tell others what to do or set its agenda.) Clinton did say that the US will be represented at the presidential level at the EAS in 2011, which will be in Indonesia (This would be opportune for Obama, as he finally makes good on his promise to visit Indonesia, the frequent cancellations of which has cast a shadow over the administration s renewed engagement policy in Southeast Asia.) A final note: with the demise of the Rudd proposal, the idea of an Asia Pacific concert of powers might seem dead, but could others fill the role? Instead of the a core minilateral group comprising 3 For text: see e_hillary_clinton.html), 6

7 both big players like China, Japan, India, US and lesser ones like Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, might we see a group of mid-size powers playing an active role in the development of regional architecture? According to one senior US State Department source (not to be named), who hints at such a possibility, the three most obvious mid-size countries (read powers) would be South Korea, Indonesia and (you guessed it) Australia. To some extent this makes sense, mid-size powers may be less controversial as chaperons of regional architecture than major powers like US, China, Japan and India. They are likely to play their role in different but complimentary ways, South Korea through the G-20, where it is emerging as an influential member, Indonesia through ASEAN (hopefully the idea of a post-asean foreign policy for Jakarta has been laid to rest), and Australia as a useful bridge between the West and Asia, with a demonstrated high capacity for practical regional action. But where that leaves countries such as Singapore, Malaysia or Vietnam is another matter. Why Asian Regionalism Matters In an article published in the Winter issue of International Security, Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University, contrasted Europe s thick alphabet soup of institutions with Asia s thin gruel. Some two decades later, no one would now describe Asia s institutional landscape as a thin gruel. It too is an alphabet soup of sorts, with names like ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), APT (ASEAN Plus Three), EAS (East Asian Summit), APc (Asia Pacific community - yes, with a small c) and EAC (East Asian Community), crowding conversations about Asia s present and future regional architecture. But are these institutions mere talk shops or genuine forces for stability and security? I begin with a quick recount of some of the most familiar criticisms of Asian regional institutions. The first is that they have not played a role in the major and long-standing regional conflicts, especially those which are holdovers from the Cold War period, such as the PRC-Taiwan conflict, North and South Korea, India and Pakistan. Neither have they mattered in the management of maritime territorial disputes such as the Spratly Islands dispute involving China Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Brunei, Similarly, territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Daoyutai islands or between Korea and Japan over Takeshime/Tokdo islands have not been addressed by any of the regional groupings. A second criticism relates to their failure in making use of available instruments of conflict prevention and resolution. For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum has not moved beyond its confidence-building mode to a preventive diplomacy mode, as was clearly envisaged when it was set up in ASEAN itself is yet to use it dispute settlement mechanism to resolve bilateral territorial disputes, such as that between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple or the Singapore-Malaysia dispute over Pedra Branca/Palau Batuh Putih in the South China Sea. In the last two cases, the parties have replied instead on the International Court of Justice. Third, the failure of regional trust-building which is supposed to have been brought about by regional groups like the ASEAN or ARF is reflected in the emergence of what seems to be a significant arms race building in the region. China is investing massively in its military, increasing its defense budget by double digit percentages year after year, and building a blue water navy. Japan has effectively crossed the 1000 nautical miles limit for its naval operational radius. A naval completion for the dominance of the Indian Ocean may be emerging between India and China. In Southeast Asia, countries like Singapore and Malaysia are engaged in competitive arms acquisitions. Fourth, on the economic front, there has been no regional free trade area under the auspices of APEC, which was created partly with that objective in mind. Instead, bilateral trade arrangements have flourished thereby undercutting the rationale for wider regional arrangements. Regional financial cooperation has emerged, but the multilateral currency reserve that is intended to deter 7

8 and fight currency speculation is limited especially compared to the nearly 1 trillion Euro reserve put up by the EU in response to the Greek crisis. Fifth, while the region is regularly visited by natural calamities, there is no standing regional humanitarian and disaster assistance mechanism in place, despite periodic attempts to create such a mechanism. Transnational threats such as illegal migration, terrorism, and pandemics continue to be dealt on an ad hoc or on a bilateral basis, without significant multilateral action. While there have been statements and declarations, addressed to such challenges, such as the ASEAN Counterterrorism Convention, or a East Asian disease surveillance framework or a tsunami early warning system, joint action is not automatic or assured. There is also no regional peacekeeping force or even a more limited stand-by arrangement. Finally, on human rights and social issues, Asia continues to lag behind other regions, including Africa and Latin America, not to mention Europe, in developing regional human rights promotion and protection mechanisms. The recently created ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission of Human Rights is merely a body for the promotion rather than protection of human rights, lacking any enforcement authority. Asian regional institutions have not undertaken any significant social agenda, like the development of social safety nets to protect people impoverished by economic downturns. Neither have they addressed the vital issue of environmental degradation, climate change and energy security. At least multilateral agreements and action have not succeeded in preventing forest fires from Indonesia, or competition for energy resources between India and China. Climate change efforts, limited at best at any level, are pursued mainly at the global, rather than regional level. Yet, skepticism about Asian s fledgling regionalism should not obscure its contributions to regional order. One major contribution has been the socialization of China. In the early 1990s, China was wary of regional multilateral cooperation. It viewed regional institutions like ARF or ASEAN as ways for the regions weaker states to gang up against Chinese interests and territorial rights. Yet, China significantly revised its view of Asian regionalism and has now became a key player driving it. Without engagement in this nascent regionalism, China would have little option but to deal with its neighbours on a strictly bilateral basis, which would have given it far more leverage and coercive ability over its individual neighbours at a time of rapidly expanding national wealth and power. In that event, China s re-emergence as a great power might have been much more rough and contentious. Many Chinese analysts agree that involvement in Asian regional institutions was a major learning experience for China in wider international cooperation. Moreover, Chinese participation in multilateralism encouraged its Southeast Asian neighbours, at least some of them, to argue against a policy of containment, as initially envisaged by the US after the end of the Cold War. Such an American policy, if undertaken in preference to either engagement or hedging would have stoked Chinese nationalism and evoked a more hardline stance towards its neighbours. Chinese cooperation on a host of transnational issues facing the region, such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2003 SARS pandemic, and its approach to the South China Sea territorial dispute, might have been more uncertain and uncooperative. Skeptics may argue that the Chinese charm offensive that flowed in conjunction with its participation in regional multilateral institutions is little more than a time buying tactics, until such time as China needs to build up its economic and military muscle to show its true aggressive colours. They might also argue that China has not stopped dealing with its neighbours on a bilateral basis and that instead of acting as a follower to ASEAN s leadership in regionalism, China now or may soon want to lead them and mould them to its own advantage. Chinese desire to develop an East Asian community to the exclusion of the US, India and Australia, is said to be one clue to such an approach. There is thus but a thin line separating the Chinese charm offensive from a de facto Chinese sphere of influence. 8

9 But such skepticism can be challenged. Which country would totally eschew bilateralism in its foreign affairs? And which country, great power or not, wants to forsake aspiring to some sort of a leadership role in international cooperation, at least over some key issue areas? And while China may have initially made some strategic calculations about its interest in regional participation, it is not immune to the logic of socialization and learning fostered through the habits of dialogue and continuous interaction. Chinese policymakers are aware of the costs of switching from a policy of engagement to a posture of confrontation and violate the normative commitments that they have have assumed by signing onto ASEAN s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, or the Declaration on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. To be sure, such instruments are not enforceable, but their violation carries reputational and diplomatic costs which no major power rising or sitting, can afford to ignore. Asian regional groups are not problem-solving or law-enforcing mechanisms, but norm-making and socializing agents. In this respect, they do conform to the general model of international organizations, which generally lack coercive enforcement power, but act as instruments of socialization and legitimation. Asian regionalism is often compared, mostly unfavorably, with the European variety. Yet, even the much vaunted EU is not without significant shortcomings. Compare for example the EU s approach to Russia and Asia s approach to China. Both China and Russia are large problem countries confronting a group of small or medium-sized countries in their neighborhood who are worried about their potential for regional dominance. But whilst China was invited and integrated unconditionally as a full-fledged member of the Asian institutions, including as a full dialogue partner of ASEAN, a full member of Asia Pacific Economic Community and the ASEAN Regional Forum, Russia even at its weakest moment was denied membership of EU or NATO and had to contend with only a strategic partnership agreement. One consequence of the failure to co-opt Russia was the Europe is still faced with a potential Cold War like divide, in sharp contrast to China s dynamic and cooperative citizenship of Asia. Of late, there has been a great deal of talk about the European Union assuming the role of a global normative power. Such a role would eschew the traditional geopolitical role of a great power concert and project such European values as rule of law, human rights and democracy and good governance. Yet, the vast majority of EU members also happen to be members of NATO and vice versa. Hence the EU wants to have the best of both the worlds and play it both ways, dealing with soft security challenges through the EU s normative means, while keeping hard security challenges to be dealt through NATO. Such duality undermines its aspirations to be a global normative power hardly credible. European regional institutions especially the EU with its success in eliminating the danger of intermember conflict may be an inspiration for Asian institutions. But the EU is hardly the model that Asia, or any other part the world, can emulate. At the same time, the regional institutions in Asia do not simply reflect the prevailing balance of power in the region. They also shape it. Institutions can also provide avenues for socialization of new powers such as China and India. They moderate great power competition, as was the case when multilateralism acted as a pressure point against any temptation to contain China. Another question that must be considered when judging the relevance of Asian regional bodies is whether the region would be better off without them. What is the alternative way of building security and prosperity in Asia? Realists thinkers and policymakers frequently point to the need for a a balance of power system in Asia underpinned by US military alliances. They argue that it was the US military presence and its alliance network involving Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand, which not only protected the region from a communist takeover during the Cold War, and thereby allowed regional governments time and space to build up their economic resilience and 9

10 political legitimacy. The US presence also remains vital to the future security and prosperity of the region. Any precipitate US withdrawal from the region and the weakening of its alliances would trigger a regional arms race and embolden regional powers like China, Japan and India fill up the vaccum. But this line of argument suffers from two limitations. First, the future of US alliances in the region cannot be taken for granted. The fortunes of these alliances are subject to domestic political developments in the allied nations such as Japan, South Korea and Philippines. Although they are unlikely to be dismantled, domestic political opinion against the kind of intrusion and dependence an alliance relationship entails creates uncertainties that would detract from their credibility. Moreover, China s diplomacy and economic clout might undercut allied support for the use of these these alliances by the US against Chinese power. For example, would Thailand a longtime ally of the U.S. - or Singapore and India, which have only recently developed strong military ties with the US, allow the use of their naval and air facilities to US forces in the event of a Sino-US confrontation in the Taiwan Straits? Second, the relationship between US military presence and alliance structure in the region and the development of multilateral institutions in Asia is not a zero-sum situation. Indeed, in recent years, U.S. military assets in Asia and the Pacific have been increasingly used for addressing common regional challenges, such as natural disasters like the Indian Ocean Tsunami in US military exercises like the Cobra Gold have expanded beyond its original mission (of supporting Thailand) to include a range of other regional countries and serve as a platform for multilateral coordination. Multilateral cooperation to ensure maritime security in vulnerable parts of Asia such as the Straits of Malacca featuring American forces and those of non-allied nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia has been on the rise. The rationale for regional security institutions need not conflict with US military alliances; instead, the two can be mutually supportive. None of the above assertions would imply that Asian regionalism is in no need for reform and change. To be more meaningful and relevant, Asian institutions need to address four challenges. The first is the challenge to overcome the 19 th century mindset of sovereignty and non-intervention. Transnational issues facing the region today, such as pollution, terrorism, illegal migration and pandemics, defy national boundaries and must be dealt with by the pooling of sovereignty and making some principled departures from it. Second, Asia needs to reconcile competing proposals for regional architecture that have cropped up since Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan proposed his vision of an East Asian Community in 2009, thereby effectively countering his Australian counterpart Kevin Rudd s 2008 idea of an Asia Pacific Community. The Australian proposal was clearly the first on the table, yet the Hatoyama government did not bother to address how its idea of an East Asian community, which includes Australia, might relate to the latter s own Asia-Pacific Community idea. Given that Australia and Japan have in the past jointly provided leadership in regional economic cooperation, including the development of Asia Pacific economic cooperation, their failure to coordinate these new initiatives is confusing. Despite recent clarifications about the Australian proposal that it need not entail the creation of a brand new institution, but the rationalization and merger of existing ones, there is still no clear sense of what the region is being asked to support. The response from Southeast Asia to the Australian proposal has been mixed, but there is little hope that ASEAN would endorse it. In the meantime, the Hatoyama proposal remains mired in contradictions. It does not clarify whether the US will be a part of the East Asian community it envisages, while the US clearly remains the cornerstone of Japanese security posture. Given his recent backdown on the Okinawa issue, there will be serious questions marks over Hatoyama s earlier assertion that an East Asian community might be the logical step to 10

11 replace the the era of U.S.-led globalism and that Japan will look to East Asia rather than the US for developing its future security. In the meantime, the point remains that both Japan and Australia can and should be able to make the most of existing and overlapping (both in terms of membership and function) regional institutions by showing a greater commitment to them in terms of attention and resources. Non-ASEAN members have grown a little frustrated with ASEAN s lack of resolve is shaping the direction of Asian multilateralism. But as in the past, what lies ahead for Asia is not a revolutionary change in Asian multilateralism, like an European Union in the east, but an adaptation and modification of extant bodies, based upon a reconciliation between the new and competing Japanese and Australian ideas. Third, Asian institutions need to move beyond ASEAN Way of informal, strictly consensus-drive cooperation and adopt greater institutionalization and legalization. Asia s institutions continue to be based on ASEAN model, which espouses a strong attachment to sovereignty and noninterference and avoid formal and legalistic approaches to problem-solving. ASEAN has taken an important first step in this direction by adopting an ASEAN Charter, but it remains to be seen whether ASEAN members can and will take up the challenge of complying with the obligations of ASEAN s numerous treaties and agreements. The ARF, APEC, the ASEAN-Plus-Three and the fledgling East Asian Summit could also benefit by developing greater institutionalization and fostering a culture of compliance. Finally, Asian regional institutions should widen their focus to embrace transnational issues and move beyond a forum for consultations and dialogue to instruments of problem solving. Without needing to go as far as NATO, EU or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they should nonetheless develop collective mechanisms for disaster management, peacekeeping, and protection of human rights and environment. To sum up, criticisms of Asian regionalism and regional institutions are not without merit. Yet, they do not warrant the view that investing in Asian regionalism is a waste of resources and time or that the Asian institutions have not made positive contributions to regional stability and prosperity. Much depends on what sort of yardstick we use to judge their performance. In general, the benefits of regionalism and continued institution-building far outweigh its costs and the region will be a more dangerous and uncertain place without them. 11