YUGOSLAVIA. Freedom in the World Ratings, Sanjak Muslim (3.2 percent), Roma, Albanian, others

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1 yugoslavia 655 Freedom in the World Ratings, YUGOSLAVIA Political Rights Civil Liberties Status PF PF NF PF NF NF NF NF NF Polity: Transitional Economy: Transitional Population: 10,655,000 PPP: na Ethnic Groups: Serb (67 percent), Kosovar (18 percent), Montenegrin (6 percent), Sanjak Muslim (3.2 percent), Roma, Albanian, others Capital: Belgrade Political Process 5.00/7 1. When did national legislative elections occur? Were they free and fair? How were they judged by domestic and international monitoring organizations? Who composed the government? In April 1992, Serbian and Montenegrin delegates in what remainded of the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) adopted a constitution for a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), composed of Montenegro and Serbia with its two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. The FRY was proclaimed on April 27, 1992, and in May 1992 elections were held for a body to succeed the SFRY s Federal Assembly. The new FRY constitution created a bicameral Federal Assembly. The upper house comprises a 40-member Chamber of Republics in which Montenegro and Serbia have equal representation. Members of the Chamber of Republics are elected by their respective republican assemblies. Delegates to the 138-member Chamber of Citizens are elected according to a complex formula in which 108 delegates are assigned to Serbia and 30 to Montenegro. In each case, some delegates are popularly elected 54 in Serbia, and 24 in Montenegro while the remainder are elected according to constituency majorities. Delegates in both chambers serve four-year terms. Elections for the Federal Assembly were held in November An alliance composed of the ruling Socijalisticka Partija Srbije (the Socialist Party of Serbia, or SPS), the Jugoslovenska Udruzena Levica (the Yugoslav United Left, or YUL), and Nova Demokratija (New Democracy, or ND) won a plurality of 64 seats in the 138-member Chamber of Citizens. The SPS s sister party in Montenegro, the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore, DPSCG) won an additional 20 seats. The three main opposition parties in the Zajedno (Together) coalition (the Democratic Party, the Serbian Renewal Movement, or SPO, and the Civic Alliance) won 22 seats, while the main right-wing nationalist opposition party, the Srpska Radikalna Stranka (the Serbian Radical Party, or SRS) won 16 seats.

2 656 nations in transit The two republics each have popularly-elected, unicameral assemblies, with delegates serving four-year terms. The Serbian Assembly (Skupstina Srbije) has 250 seats. In the December 1993 elections for the Serbian Skupstina, the SPS won 123 seats; a multiparty opposition movement, the Demokratski Pokret Srbije (the Democratic Movement of Serbia, or DEPOS) won 45; the SRS won 39; the Democratic Party, 29; the Democratic Party of Serbia, 7; the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, 5; and a Sandzak-Moslem Kosovo Albanian coalition, the Party of Democratic Action/Democratic Party of Albanians won 2. The latest elections for the Serbian Skupstina in September 1997 were boycotted by two leading opposition parties: Zoran Djindjic s Democratic Party and Vesna Pesic s Civic Alliance of Serbia. Milosevic s ruling left-wing coalition lost its governing majority, gaining only 110 seats. The SRS, on the other hand, significantly increased its share of power, gaining 82 seats. Vuk Draskovic s SPO also improved its standing, winning 45 seats in the Skupstina. Other smaller parties, including one representing Vojvodina Hungarians and another representing Sandzak Muslims, shared the remaining 13 seats. Serbian politics took a turn to the nationalist right in March 1998, when SRS president Vojislav Seselj was named Deputy Prime Minister in the new Serbian government. In the November 1996 elections for the 71-seat Montenegrin Assembly (Skupstina Crne Gore), the ruling DPSCG won 45 seats; the Liberal Alliance, 19; the Party of Democratic Action, 3; the Democratic Alliance of Montenegro, 2; and the Democratic Union of Albanians, 2. In 1997, the DPSCG broke into pro-milosevic and pro-reform factions, and it is widely believed that new elections for the Montenegrin Skupstina would have to be held sometime in The Kosovo Albanian population has consistently boycotted Serbian and Yugoslav elections. In 1990, Serbian authorities had promulgated a new republican constitution that rescinded the broad autonomy Serbia s two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, had enjoyed since Albanian delegates in the Kosovo Assembly responded by declaring Kosovo a constituent republic in Yugoslavia (but independent of Serbia), to which Serbian authorities responded by dissolving the Kosovo Assembly. In May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held elections for a new assembly, and elected Ibrahim Rugova president of the self-declared Republic of Kosovo. Serbian authorities immediately declared the elections illegal. As of March 1998, no one in the international community had recognized the Kosovo Albanians' self-declared state. Since 1990, the Kosovo Albanians have proceeded to create their own parallel educational, health, and governmental institutions. Serbian authorities generally have not interfered with these efforts. Rugova, for instance, has been allowed to travel freely. In December 1996, however, Serbian security troops did crack down on unauthorized Albanian police forces. A few months earlier, in September 1996, Milosevic and Rugova had reached an agreement providing for an end to the six-year Albanian boycott of state schools. The agreement, however, was never implemented, and the U.S. Department of State blamed both sides for intransigence. Conditions deteriorated in Kosovo during 1997 as the Kosovo Albanian leadership continued to push for independence and the Milosevic regime continued with its repressive policies. At the same time, moderate Albanian leaders urging a policy of non-violence lost influence to more militant factions. During the concurrent anarchy in neighboring Albania in 1997, large stores of weaponry made their way from Albania to Kosovo. By late 1997, an organization called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began attacks on Serbian security forces in Kosovo in which several Serbian policemen were killed. By February 1998, the KLA had claimed responsibility for the assassination of 50 people in the past year, including 20

3 yugoslavia 657 Albanians accused of being loyal to the Serbian government. The KLA was supported in part by Islamic terrorist organizations with ties to Iran and experience in Bosnia. In March 1998, Serbian security forces responded to KLA attacks with a large-scale campaign to wipe out the KLA, and in fact succeeded in killing one of its leaders. Scores of civilians were killed in the fighting, and the international community condemned the Milosevic government for responding to the KLA s attacks with disproportionate force. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia announced that it would begin investigations into the actions of Serbian security forces in Kosovo. On March 9, 1998, the Contact Group imposed new punitive sanctions on Yugoslavia, including denying visas to senior Yugoslav officials believed to be responsible for the crackdown, and an arms embargo. On March 18, 1998, Serbian President Milan Milutinovic called for immediate and unconditional talks on Kosovo based on Serbia s territorial integrity but allowing for self-rule for Kosovo. On March 22, 1998, Serbian officials allowed Kosovo Albanians to hold elections for their self-declared parliament and presidency. Despite a boycott of the elections by several smaller Albanian parties, Rugova was again elected president. 2. When did presidential elections occur? Were they free and fair? The Yugoslav presidency is a largely ceremonial post. The Federal Assembly elects the Yugoslav president, who must obtain the approval of both Montenegrin and Serbian delegates. The Yugoslav president, in turn, nominates the federal prime minister. According to the FRY constitution, the federal president and the federal prime minister cannot be from the same republic, and the federal president is limited to only one four-year term. The first FRY president was Dobrica Cosic, a well-known Serbian writer and dissident during the Titoist period. In June 1993, Cosic was ousted by Milosevic and replaced by Zoran Lilic, a Milosevic protégé with no independent authority. Since Milosevic himself was constitutionally prohibited from serving a third consecutive term as Serbian president, he took over Lilic s position as Yugoslav president in July At the same time, Milosevic s party also proposed constitutional changes so that the Yugoslav president would henceforth be popularly elected. This was widely seen as a precautionary move, given Milosevic s increasing unpopularity in Montenegro. The president of Serbia is popularly elected. In the first multi-party elections in December 1990, Milosevic won the position handily, and was re-elected in December In 1997, Milosevic s SPS nominated Zoran Lilic (see above) as its candidate for the Serbian presidency. After failing to win in the first two rounds in September and October, Lilic was replaced by Milan Milutinovic as the SPS candidate. The primary opponent to both Lilic and Milutinovic was the SRS leader, Vojislav Seselj. In a fourth round of elections in December 1997, Milutinovic beat Seselj amidst widespread rumors of ballot stuffing to assure a 50 percent turnout. Little complaint was heard from the international community, however, because Milutinovic was felt to be an infinitely more acceptable figure than the more nationalist Seselj. The president of Montenegro is also popularly elected. Milo Djukanovic, the former Montenegrin prime minister who broke with Milosevic and his Montenegrin loyalists during the Serbian opposition protests in the winter of , was elected president of Montenegro in multi-party elections in October Djukanovic s victory was disputed by his opponent and predecessor as president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, who accused the Djukanovic camp of widespread vote fraud.

4 658 nations in transit Despite rumors that Bulatovic was planning a coup and that Milosevic wanted to impose a state of emergency in Montenegro, strong international support for Djukanovic helped keep him in office through March None of the elections held in Yugoslavia over the past several years, whether at the national, republican, or municipal levels, can be considered to have been free and fair. Regarding the several rounds of presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in the latter half of 1997, for instance, an OSCE report noted that the overall election process in the Republic of Serbia is fundamentally flawed. Opposition parties are routinely denied access to state-owned media (see below), and the Milosevic regime manipulates the electoral process itself in numerous ways. 3. Is the electoral system multi party-based? Are there at least two viable political parties functioning at all levels of government? The FRY Constitution guarantees citizens freedom of political association (Article 41). At the federal Yugoslav, republican, and municipal levels, several parties compete in elections and participate in government. The actual power and influence of the various parties varies significantly. The SPS, for instance, by virtue of its control over the state security forces, the most important mass media, and the most important segments of the economy, has a disproportionate share of power at all levels of government. Nevertheless, over the past few years, the SPS has lost its exclusive control of government institutions, and has been increasingly forced to form coalitions with opposition parties. 4. How many parties have been legalized? Are any particular parties illegal? As of 1995, there were approximately 200 parties functioning at the federal and republican levels. Many of these, however, were small parties with little or no infrastructure or coherent political platform. Article 42 of the FRY constitution forbids any political parties/organizations that advocate the violent overthrow of the constitutional order. 5. What proportion of the population belongs to political parties? Exact figures on political party membership are difficult to come by because many parties are reluctant to release such data. A good rule of thumb for understanding the Serbian electorate, however, is the rule of fourths provided by Prof. Svetozar Stojanovic. Within Serbia itself, if one excludes the Kosovo Albanian population which has been boycotting elections since 1990, and Hungarians in Vojvodina who vote for their own ethnically-based parties, the Serbian electorate can be divided into four segments. The first consists of those who abstain from voting altogether. The second consists of SPS/YUL voters. The third consists of SRS supporters. The fourth segment votes for the rest of the opposition parties, such as the SPO, the DS, the GSS, etc. The SPS claims a membership of approximately 600,000, making it by far the largest political party in Yugoslavia. Nova Demokratija claims to have 40,000 members. In general terms, however, support for a political party can be determined by analyzing voting results since Public support for Milosevic s SPS, for instance, has declined considerably over the past eight years; in the 1990 elections, the SPS gained over 2.3 million votes, while in the 1997 elections, this number fell to 1,200,000. Vuk Draskovic s SPO has consistently won between 700,000 and one million votes over the past eight years. Support for Vojislav Seselj s SRS also fluctuates considerably; in

5 yugoslavia 659 the elections between 1990 and 1997, the SRS has gained anywhere between 600,000 and 1,038,000. Reliable figures for Montenegrin political parties are also difficult to obtain. Of Montenegro s approximately 450,000 registered voters, however, it is generally assumed that most Montenegrins who identify themselves more as Serbs, or favor close ties with Serbia, vote for Momir Bulatovic s wing of the DPS-CG. Milo Djukanovic s recent electoral successes, on the other hand, are due to the votes his faction of the DPS-CG has received from Albanians, Croats, and Muslims in Montenegro. 6. What has been the trend of voter turnout at the municipal, provincial, and national levels in recent years? Voter turnout throughout the former Yugoslavia was traditionally high. In the 1990 elections, well over 70 percent of the eligible electorate turned out. In more recent elections there have been signs of voter fatigue. Due to the boycott of the September 1997 Serbian elections, for instance, many observers questioned the Republican Electoral Commission s claim that 62 percent of the electorate had turned out. In subsequent runoff elections for the Serbian presidency voter turnout hovered at or below the 50 percent level. In the October 1997 presidential elections in Montenegro, voter turnout was approximately 73 percent. Civil Society 5.00/7 1. How many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have come into existence since 1988? What is the number of charitable/nonprofit organizations? Are there locally led efforts to increase philanthropy and volunteerism? What proportion of the population is active in private voluntary activity (from polling data)? Hundreds of organizations have been formed since 1988, although the exact number and the size of their memberships are difficult to determine. NGOs in the FRY are still officially registered as social organizations or associations of citizens in accord with the terms used during the socialist period. According to the Federal Statistics Office, in 1994 there were 18,937 registered social organizations and 1,349 registered associations of citizens. All of these, however, had originated during the socialist period. Since 1991, observers believe another 500 have been formed, the most numerous being ecological and humanitarian organizations, followed by human rights-oriented NGOs. In 1991, a Belgrade-based Center for Anti-War Action emerged, and a Humanitarian Law Center was also founded. There are also Helsinki Committees active in Belgrade, Pristina, and the Sandzak. The Helsinki Committees in Belgrade and Pristina often collaborate in monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church is active in providing charitable assistance to refugees and the poor. In Kosovo, a predominantly-serbian organization of citizens known as the Serb Resistance Movement has organized to protest the Milosevic regime s policies in that province. The Students' Club in Belgrade and the Independent Union of Students in Kosovo have also played prominent roles over the past several years. Several environmental and women s rights groups are also active, most notably, the Belgrade-based Women in Black, and the Pristina-based League of Albanian Women. 2. What is the legal and regulatory environment for NGOs (i.e., ease of registration, legal rights, government regulation, taxation, procurement and access-to-information issues)? To what extent is NGO activism focused on improving the legal and regulatory environment? In 1997,

6 660 nations in transit there was a mild improvement in the position of NGOs in Serbia proper, as some observers noted that the Milosevic regime allowed more foreigners affiliated with international NGOs to enter the country. International monitoring groups claimed that in general they were free to conduct their activities. On the other hand, domestic NGOs have charged that the government was illegally obstructing their activities. For instance, the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), a Belgrade-based NGO which monitors elections claimed in November 1997 that the government had denied them the right to monitor the presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia in September. In subsequent legal proceedings initiated by CeSID, the Serbian Supreme Court upheld the government s refusal to allow CeSID a role in election monitoring. The situation in Montenegro is markedly different, as the government there has for some time promoted more open and liberal policies. 3. What is the organizational capacity of NGOs? Do management structures clearly delineate authority and responsibility? Is information available on NGO management issues in the native language? Is there a core of experienced practitioners/trainers to serve as consultants or mentor to less developed organizations? Information on this subject is not available. 4. Are NGOs financially viable? What is their tax status? Are they obliged to and do they typically disclose revenue sources? Do government procurement opportunities exist for private, not-for-profit providers of services? Information on this subject is not available. 5. Are there free trade unions? How many workers belong to these unions? Is the number of workers belonging to trade unions growing or decreasing? What is the numerical/proportional membership of farmers groups, small business associations, etc.? Article 41 of the FRY constitution guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. In addition to the government controlled Alliance of Independent Labor Unions with an estimated membership of one million, an independent United Branch of Independent Labor Unions with some 157,000 members exists. Numerous smaller unions representing transportation workers, educational employees, journalists, retirees, and others are very active, at least judging by their proclivity to strike. Independent unions suffer from regime attempts to suppress their activities; for instance, unions are often prohibited from busing their members to strikes or demonstrations held in different parts of the country. 6. What forms of interest group participation in politics are legal? What types of interest groups are active in the political and policy process? Articles 39 and 41 of the FRY constitution grant citizens the freedom to form political parties and organizations, and freedom of assembly. There are numerous organized interest groups in the country, representing ethnic constituencies. Especially prominent groups are those representing Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims, and Roma (gypsies), business interests, such as the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and women s rights groups. 7. How is the not-for-profit/ngo sector perceived by the public and government officials? What is the nature of media coverage of NGOs? To what extent do government officials en-

7 yugoslavia 661 gage with NGOs? Government officials associated with the ruling regime generally view NGOs, especially those with international connections, as suspect. Often they are accused of being traitors or foreign mercenaries. NGOs also suffer from the fact that they are not a traditional form of social activism in these regions; consequently, the local population often views them as mercenaries working for foreign interests. Independent/alternative media treat NGOs more favorably. Independent Media 4.50/7 1. Are there legal protections for press freedom? Articles 36 and 38 of the FRY constitution guarantee freedom of the press and prohibit censorship, with one stipulation: press/media outlets enjoy these freedoms only if they are registered with the government. In practice, independent and alternative media are frequently subjected to numerous forms of legalistic and bureaucratic harassment. A new media law proposed in February 1998, on the allocation of frequencies for TV and radio stations, for example, drew considerable criticism from the independent media because of its ambiguity. The new regulation imposed undisclosed fees for the allocation of frequencies, leaving officials free to price independent media houses out of business. Another feature of the new regulation warned that applications for a frequency would not be processed if technical details i.e., how far the signal of a certain transmitter will carry, in the application were incorrect. Since the methodologies for testing such things vary, this left considerable scope for arbitrary determinations that an application was technically incorrect. 2. Are there legal penalties for libeling officials? Are there legal penalties for irresponsible journalism? Have these laws been enforced to harass journalists? There are laws on the books against slandering private individuals and government officials, but the Milosevic regime has rarely used such forms of harassment. In 1997, there were no publicized cases of journalists being prosecuted for libel; however, the regime seemed intent on reining in the media with new draft legislation circulated in late 1997 called the Law on Public Information. According to the draft legislation, the new law included a vaguely-worded prohibition against journalists insulting the honor or reputation of individuals (Article 20); another prohibition against slander and quasi-slander (Article 5) ostensibly intended to force journalists to be more truthful in their reporting. Other contentious provisions of the new law called for all print media to provide the republican public prosecutor with a copy of their publications which was interpreted by critics as an attempt to encourage journalistic self-censorship, as well as a call to force all media to make public foreign sources of financing (Articles 14, 16, and 17). 3. What proportion of media is privatized? What are the major private newspapers, television stations, and radio stations? Yugoslavia has a plethora of both electronic and print media outlets. According to one estimate, in 1997 there were 300 privately owned radio stations and 100 privately-owned TV stations in Yugoslavia. Belgrade now has 12 daily newspapers. The largest and most influential media in Yugoslavia, however, both electronic and print, are state-owned. The most important TV station is the only government-owned station, Radio-Televizija Srbije (RTS), with a signal covering most of the country. RTS s editorial policy is strictly pro-government. Dur-

8 662 nations in transit ing the 1997 electoral campaign, for instance, the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade claimed that all of the opposition parties combined received only one-fourth of the airtime RTS devoted to the ruling SPS coalition. A primary demand by the opposition since 1990 has been greater access to state-owned media. The most memorable feature of the winter opposition protests was the sight of tens of thousands of demonstrators rattling pots and pans and blowing their car horns during the broadcast of RTS s main evening news program. Montenegro and each of the provinces have their own state television services as well. In 1997, the relationship between Montenegro s state-run television network, TV Crna Gora, and the Miloseviccontrolled RTS soured, and TV Crna Gora is now broadcasting a much more objective and open news information program. Under TV Crna Gora s new editorial leadership, more coverage is devoted to opposition political parties, and collaboration with independent news media in Belgrade, such as Radio B-92 or Belgrade s Studio B television station, is being expanded. By way of contrast, TV Crna Gora in 1997 stopped rebroadcasting RTS s main nightly news program. In both Kosovo and Vojvodina, there are RTS broadcasts in Albanian or Magyar, respectively, although the editorial slant is pro-milosevic. Yugoslavia also has numerous print media for ethnic minorities published in their native languages, e.g., Novi Sad s Magyar Szo, a Hungarian language daily with an estimated circulation of 26,000, or Pristina s Koha Ditore, an Albanian language newsmagazine edited by a well-known Albanian activist, Veton Surroi. The largest print daily in Yugoslavia is the Belgrade-based Politika with an estimated circulation of ,000, again with a pro-milosevic editorial line. There are a variety of opposition publications, and their popularity has increased in recent years. According to one report, the overall circulation of the independent press surpassed that of the state media in Most important in this category are Nasa Borba, a daily formed by the journalists and staff of Borba when the Milosevic regime took that paper over. The Belgrade-based newsweeklies Vreme and NIN are also strongly anti-regime. In recent years, tabloids such as Belgrade s Blic have also gained in popularity. Among the most important privately-owned electronic media are Belgrade s B-92 radio station and Studio B independent television station. B-92 has long been noted for its strong anti-war stance, and during the winter of Belgrade demonstrations actually gained many new listeners as people tuned in to get more objective reporting as to what was going on around the country. B- 92 has also organized a network of 24 opposition radio stations throughout Serbia, Vojvodina, and Montenegro. All told, the network s program reaches 70 percent of Serbia s population. Over the past several years, Studio B has provided opposition parties with much more coverage than they could receive on RTS. Studio B s signal, however, only reaches limited parts of Belgrade, and over the past several years the government has repeatedly refused to allow Studio B to obtain a stronger transmitter. Opposition cadres from the Zajedno coalition took charge of Studio B after the results of the 1996 municipal elections were recognized, but in September 1996, squabbling among opposition parties led Vuk Draskovic s SPO to purge the station of Zoran Djindjic s supporters. The most important privately-owned television station is BK Television, owned by three brothers who made their fortune in banking. Although originally close to Milosevic, their television station increasingly began to criticize regime policies, and in March 1997, the state temporarily suspended BK television s broadcasts outside of Belgrade to prevent Serbia s wider population from

9 yugoslavia 663 learning about the extent of the opposition movement. One interesting development in 1997 was the growing popularity of entertainment-oriented TV and radio stations, and the corresponding decrease in the popularity of news and information-oriented media. For instance, according to some public opinion polls, Radio B-92, which in the immediate aftermath of the Belgrade demonstrations had been the most listened-to radio station in Belgrade, fell to fourth place by September Similarly, whereas news programs drew the most TV viewers at the beginning of the year, by September 1997, foreign soap operas had become much more popular. Most analysts attributed this turnaround to the electorates growing disenchantment with politics. 4. Are the private media financially viable? Only a very few, such as BK Television are financially viable. Many, such as Vreme and Radio B-92, depend on foreign donations to survive. In March 1997, the Serbian government proposed new draft legislation requiring the various media to disclose any funding they receive from abroad. Another feature of the proposed legislation, prohibiting any radio or television station from broadcasting to more than 25 percent of the population, had to be dropped after the Zajedno coalition threatened to boycott the upcoming elections. 5. Are the media editorially independent? Are the media s news gathering functions affected by interference from government or private owners? State-owned media tow the government/ party line. Private and independent media, on the other hand, have completely independent editorial policies. Many newspapers, magazines, and radio stations are vehemently anti-regime. The Milosevic government tolerates this state of affairs because these same media have relatively little impact on public opinion. The limited impact of independent media is mainly the result of two factors. First, given the economic situation, most people simply cannot afford to buy alternative/independent publications. Second, Yugoslavia s rural population relies mainly on state-owned media for information. Nevertheless, on some occasions the regime decides not to take any chances; thus, in the run-up to the Serbian elections in the summer of 1997, the Milosevic government temporarily shut down 77 private radio and television stations around the country. 6. Is the distribution system for newspapers privately or governmentally controlled? Newspapers and other print media are disseminated through several well-established distribution chains, most of which are government affiliated, e.g., the Politika publishing house s kiosk chain. In larger cities, independent publications are easily obtained, even at state-owned kiosks. A more common form of government harassment has been to deny independent publications newsprint, or to make the cost of newsprint prohibitively expensive. 7. What proportion of the population is connected to the Internet? Are there any restrictions on Internet access to private citizens? Limited access to the Internet is more the result of a lack of computers than of government restrictions. Although Yugoslav citizens had been in the first wave of Internet users in the early 1990s, a permanent satellite link to the Internet was only established in February 1996, courtesy of a Norwegian provider. According to one estimate, one Yugoslav citizen in one thousand is a regular Internet user. Early in 1998, Yugoslavia s largest Internet ser-

10 664 nations in transit vices provider, EUNET, signed up its 20,000 th subscriber. Many individuals have access to the Internet through academic and governmental institutions, or through various business enterprises; according to some informal estimates, the total figure stands at approximately 300,000 people. Belgrade also has a cyber café where people can stop by and log on. When Radio B-92 was temporarily closed down by the regime in February 1997, its employees resorted to the Internet to publicize what was going on. Rumors, which were impossible to confirm, circulated at the time that the regime had pressured Internet service providers into disconnecting Serbia from the world wide web. 8. What has been the trend in press freedom as measured by Freedom House s Survey of Press Freedom? Yugoslavia has been rated as "Not Free" from Governance and Public Administration 5.00/7 1. Is the legislature the effective rule-making institution? The trend in recent years, and especially in 1997, has been for the SPS party leadership, and especially Milosevic himself, to determine the outlines of policy, which the SPS-dominated Federal Assembly then rubberstamps. In 1997, the Federal Assembly convened only one time, and one report charged that decisions are taken at one power center and then take the shape of decrees, written or oral instructions, many of which are not even published. This state of affairs has become more pronounced as the Milosevic regime has slowly lost its exclusive monopoly on state institutions and has had to allow opposition forces into government institutions. In Montenegro, for instance, the reformist victory in October 1997 forced Milosevic loyalists out of office. In Serbia, the opposition parties victory in the November 1996 municipal elections gave them a toe-hold on power at local levels, and the September 1997 Serbian parliamentary elections gave non-sps parties a majority in the Serbian Skupstina. 2. Is substantial power decentralized to subnational levels of government? What specific authority do subnational levels have? According to the FRY constitution, the republics enjoy considerable autonomy, and the right to local self-government is guaranteed (Article 6). In practice, however, while Milosevic s Montenegrin protégé, Momir Bulatovic, was president in Serbia s federal partner, most decision-making was centralized. After October 1997, the Djukanovic leadership began to reassert its authority and standing as an equal partner in the federation. Within the republics, there is a high degree of centralization. For instance, the republican education ministries play the determining role in developing school curricula, textbooks, etc., which then have to be implemented throughout the republic. Similarly, prices for various utilities are determined at the republic level, not at the municipality level. Most importantly, the police forces in both republics are highly centralized. Most political parties are highly centralized because of the fact that the support they garner is more a function of their leader s charisma than the party s political program per se. 3. Are subnational officials chosen in free and fair elections? As noted above, the ruling party has numerous ways to influence the outcome of elections. For instance, the OSCE s special representative for Yugoslavia, Felipe Gonzalez, noted in his December 1996 report after a fact-finding trip to Yugoslavia the existence of deficiencies (of a structural nature) in the electoral system that make it possible to falsify or circumvent the sovereign will of the citizens. Similarly, a recent analysis

11 yugoslavia 665 of the human rights situation in Yugoslavia noted that in practice, citizens cannot exercise their right to change their government. Since the first multi-party elections in 1990 at the beginning of the post-communist era, opposition parties have consistently charged the regime with committing outright vote fraud. The most notorious case of vote fraud came after the November 1996 municipal elections in Serbia. Opposition parties won power in most of Serbia s largest urban areas, including Belgrade, Nis, and Kragujevac. The Milosevic regime, however, refused to acknowledge defeat and declared the elections invalid. Wide-scale, massive protests then erupted throughout Serbia, developing into a three-month long protest movement, with nightly marches and demonstrations by opposition parties. In February 1997, under severe international pressure, Milosevic was forced to back down, and a lex specialis i.e., a special law was passed in the Serbian Skupstina accepting the opposition parties victory the constitutionality of the law itself, however, was questioned by most observers. 4. Do the executive and legislative bodies operate openly and with transparency? Is draft legislation easily accessible to the media and the public? Sessions of the Federal Yugoslav Assembly, or the Serbian or Montenegrin Skupstina s, are frequently televised or otherwise covered by the press; however, much of the actual decision making takes place behind closed doors. Milosevic s SPS often tries to act unilaterally. For a recent appearance of Yugoslav delegates before the European Parliament, for instance, the SPS tried to send its own cadres, with their own platform, without including opposition members or Montenegrin officials. Nevertheless, as the opposition has increased its representation in state institutions, the Milosevic regime has had less and less opportunity to write and implement legislation unilaterally. 5. Do municipal governments have sufficient revenues to carry out their duties? Do municipal governments have control of their own local budgets? Do they raise revenues autonomously or from the central state budget? Although municipal governments do raise some revenues autonomously (e.g., turnover taxes from the sale of property, issuing various types of personal identification, the sale of vehicle license plates, setting prices of public transportation, etc.), most rely on supplemental funding from the central government. After losing the 1996 municipal elections in several Serbian cities, Milosevic s SPS cadres essentially emptied municipal coffers before the opposition could take power. The Milosevic regime then resorted to punishing municipalities that had voted for the opposition by denying them funds from the republican budget. Central authorities have also begun a campaign to reduce local competencies. For example, municipal governments recently lost the right to grant foreign companies concessions for communal utility services. 6. Do the elected local leaders and local civil servants know how to manage municipal governments effectively? Generally speaking, yes. After the opposition victory in the 1996 municipal elections, however, there were numerous reports of local municipal councils being deadlocked. It also became apparent that, given the fact that many opposition members had never served in government, they had not developed the necessary political or bureaucratic expertise needed to run local governments effectively. Their situation was made even more difficult by the SPS s concerted efforts to portray opposition leaders as incompetent bunglers. In early 1997, the SPS-led Serbian

12 666 nations in transit government created a new Ministry for Local Self-Government, which critics charged was intended to maintain the regime s control over municipalities in which the opposition had won. 7. When did the constitutional/legislative changes on local power come into effect? Has there been a reform of the civil service code/system? Are local civil servants employees of the local or central government? Local civil servants are the employees of local municipal governments. This allowed the opposition parties in the 1996 municipal elections to engage in a significant purge of SPS officials at the local level in many of Yugoslavia s biggest cities. For instance, soon after the opposition victory in Belgrade was recognized, the opposition quickly installed its own cadres in Belgrade s Studio B television station, which is officially owned by Belgrade s City Assembly. Rule of Law 5.00/7 1. Is there a post-communist constitution? How does the judicial system interpret and enforce the constitution? Are there specific examples of judicial enforcement of the constitution in the last year? A new constitution was promulgated in April As of March 1998, however, the Serbian republican constitution still had not been brought into agreement with the federal constitution. The recent election of Milo Djukanovic as Montenegrin president has significantly complicated the FRY s constitutional system; for instance, Montenegro has recently adopted a law by which it no longer recognizes decisions by federal judicial organs. 2. Does the constitutional framework provide for human rights? Do the human rights include business and property rights? The 1992 FRY constitution guarantees Yugoslav citizens all human rights and civil liberties, regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, religion, or political creed, in accordance with international practice. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of assembly, a free press, the right to own property, and national minorities are guaranteed the right to use their own language in educational institutions and in legal proceedings. In practice, however, these rights have been difficult to uphold, most notably in the case of the Kosovo Albanians. The U.S. State Department report on the human rights situation in Yugoslavia for 1997 noted Yugoslavia had a poor record on this note. There were, however, significant differences between the human rights records in Serbia and Montenegro, as the latter s security apparatus was found to have a relatively clean human rights record since Has there been basic reform of the criminal code/criminal law? Who authorizes searches and issues warrants? Are suspects and prisoners beaten or abused? Are there excessive delays in the criminal justice system? The former SFRY s Federal Criminal Code remains in force, although work on a new criminal code has been ongoing for the past several years. The FRY constitution prohibits the use of torture against detainees or criminal suspects, but human rights organizations have documented numerous cases of abuse and beatings by security forces, especially in Kosovo and in Belgrade during the winter demonstrations. In theory, searches are authorized and warrants are issued by judicial authorities; in practice, the police often do these on their own. The criminal justice system is also hampered by the fact that it often takes months, or

13 yugoslavia 667 even years, for cases to reach the courts, and executive institutions generally show little interest in enforcing judicial decisions. 4. Do most judges rule fairly and impartially? Do many remain from the Communist era? The majority of judges are holdovers from the Communist era. Most observers believe that judges do rule fairly and impartially on cases that do not concern politics. Court proceedings are conducted in public, unless there is a perceived need to protect government secrets, public order, or public morality. There have been charges that in the early 1990s many non-serb judges were dismissed from their positions, particularly in Vojvodina. Throughout 1997, defense attorneys frequently complained that they were denied access to detainees or had difficulties acquiring copies of official indictments. Some judges were also found to be preventing defense attorneys from reading court files. The judicial system also seems more willing to support human and civil rights in Serbia proper, whereas in Kosovo and the Sandzak, judges frequently are seen to be supporting the actions of the state security apparatus. On several occasions, judges have proven to be fairly independent of the ruling party. For instance, in a 1998 case in Sremska Mitrovica, the Federal Ministry for Telecommunications confiscated the transmitter and other equipment of a local independent radio station. The local judge, however, ruled in the radio station s favor and ordered the ministry to return the equipment. In February 1998, judges in Novi Sad and Vrsac refused to enforce the controversial Decree on Measures of Financial Discipline (see below). 5. Are the courts free of political control and influence? Are the courts linked directly to the Ministry of Justice or any other executive body? According to the FRY constitution, there is a strict separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government (Article 12), and justices in the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Court, and the Federal Public Prosecutor are not allowed to belong to political parties (Article 42). In practice, however, on matters of political importance to the regime, the judicial system often acts as an adjunct of the SPS. Since the tenure of judges and their salaries are not fixed, they are susceptible to regime pressure when deciding on cases with political implications. The prime example of this came in the wake of the 1996 municipal elections when the court system overturned the opposition s victories in several cities throughout Serbia. Similarly, despite the fact that over 60 criminal charges were filed in 1997 in the Serbian court system against Belgrade policemen for using excessive force against demonstrators during the winter demonstrations, as of November 1997, no one had yet been held accountable for these abuses as of November In another example of a judicial ruling having political undertones, in December 1997, the federal state prosecutor overturned a decision by the Montenegrin Supreme Court which declared the anti-milosevic wing of the DPSCG to be the legitimate successor to the formerly united party. The OSCE s Gonzalez Report noted that reform of the judicial system with regard to the election process was one of the most urgently needed reforms for Yugoslavia. Over the past several years, criminal investigations have been used to intimidate and harass political opponents of the Milosevic regime. All of the major opposition leaders, including Vuk Draskovic, Zoran Djindjic, and Vojislav Seselj in Serbia, Novak Kilibarda in Montenegro, and

14 668 nations in transit Azem Vlasi in Kosovo, have been charged with criminal wrongdoing for their activities. More recently, in February 1998, the former Montenegrin president, Momir Bulatovic, was also charged with actions destabilizing the constitutional order (Article 114 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code) for allegedly organizing a protest demonstration in Podgorica in which several people were hurt. 6. What proportion of lawyers is in private practice? How does this compare with the previous year? Most lawyers are in private practice. In Belgrade alone, there are some 2,900 practicing lawyers. 7. Does the state provide public defenders? Yes. The state is obligated to provide the accused with a public defender if he/she cannot provide his/her own. The accused also has the right to have court proceedings translated into his/her native language. 8. Are there effective anti-bias/discrimination laws, including protection of ethnic minority rights? Numerous anti-bias/discrimination laws exist; for instance, Articles guarantee national minorities the right to education and information media in their native language, the right to form educational and cultural institutions, and the right to foster relations with co-nationals outside the borders of the FRY. Article 50 also makes incitement or encouragement of national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance unconstitutional. It has often proven difficult, however, to enforce these rights in practice. Corruption D 1. What is the magnitude of official corruption in the civil service? Must an average citizen pay a bribe to a bureaucrat in order to receive a service? What services are subject to bribe requests for example, university entrance, hospital admission, telephone installation, obtaining a license to operate a business, applying for a passport or other official documents? What is the average salary of civil servants at various levels?) Corruption in Yugoslavia has grown over the past several years, partly as a result of the sanctions, and partly as a result of internal corruption within the regime itself. The extent to which corruption in official circles has proliferated is indicated by the fact that in 1997, several close associates of the Milosevic family were gunned down, gangland style, on the streets of Belgrade. No one has been held responsible for these killings. Corruption takes numerous forms in Yugoslavia. A longtime Milosevic loyalist, for instance, is in charge of the federal customs agency, which allows Milosevic and the SPS to control the flow of goods into and out of the country and to impose arbitrary financial penalties and fees on individuals crossing the border. Although not officially bribes, a common practice throughout the former Yugoslavia was to provide doctors and nurses with gifts as an inducement to provide patients with better care. This practice has become even more widespread since sanctions were imposed in 1992 and the health system has broken down. There have also been charges that some professors at Belgrade University are charging students bribes for passing grades. Protection rackets have become common in larger cities, and municipal authorities often charge kiosk operators considerable sums for the privilege of operating on city property. Because of the overall economic depres-

15 yugoslavia 669 sion, salaries for civil servants have declined considerably. Instructors at Belgrade University, for instance, were reported to have refused to collect their salaries because they were insultingly low. The average monthly salary of a government employee in 1996 was 901 dinars, or (approximately $163 according to December 1996 exchange rates). 2. Do top policy makers (the president, ministers, vice-ministers, top court justices, and heads of agencies and commissions) have direct ties to businesses? How strong are such connections and what kinds of businesses are these? Many leading members of the Milosevic regime are the directors of large state-owned enterprises. Directors and top management of other leading economic enterprises also owe their positions to their support for the regime. These ties are especially important in several strategic sectors of the economy, notably those that involve the import of products such as fuel or pharmaceuticals. Enterprises in these sectors have the right to draw hard currency from the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) to pay for their imports at the official exchange rate. They can then quickly sell the hard currency on the black market for a hefty profit. Similar monopolies exist for basic staples such as sugar, or for highly taxed items such as coffee and cigarettes. In 1997, the Yugoslav government decided that henceforth enterprises would only be able to draw hard currency from the NBY for the import of pharmaceutical products and fuel, indicating that they might be trying to clamp down on widespread abuse of the system. A typical example of the close ties between the Milosevic family, large businesses, and organized crime was Zoran Todorovic, the director of a Belgrade oil company, who was also the secretary-general of YUL, the left-wing political movement founded by Milosevic s wife, Mira Markovic. Todorovic was assassinated in Belgrade in October Mirko Marjanovic, the premier of the Serbian republican government, is also the director of the Progres enterprise, which has exclusive control of the Yugoslav fuel trade market with Russia. The vice-president of the Serbian government, Slobodan Radulovic, is also the director of S Markets, a chain of small grocery stores. Milorad Vucelic, the vice-president of the SPS, is the owner and director of the Komuna publishing conglomerate. Dragan Tomic, the speaker of the Serbian Skupstina, is also the director of Jugopetrol, one of Yugoslavia s largest oil companies. 3. Do laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflict of interest exist? Have publicized anticorruption cases been pursued? To what conclusion? Many prominent officials have been arrested and tried for corruption recently, although some critics charge they were arrested because they had fallen afoul of the regime politically rather than for their criminal activities. In February 1998, for instance, Nenad Djordjevic, the vice-president of YUL and a close political associate of Mira Markovic, Slobodan Milosevic s wife, was arrested for embezzling millions from the republic health insurance fund. Rumors circulating in Belgrade, which were impossible to confirm, however, suggested that Djordjevic s demise was the result of his close ties to the new, anti-milosevic Montenegrin leadership. Numerous similar such cases have been publicized as well. 4. What major anticorruption initiatives have been implemented? How often are anticorruption laws and decrees adopted? Both government and opposition figures frequently call for crackdowns on corruption. Milan Milutinovic, the SPS candidate for the Serbian presidency in