Conflict Reading List. Part 3: Conflict Response: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding

Transcription

1 Conflict Reading List Part 3: Conflict Response: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding Peter Uvin, Tufts University May 2008

2 Acknowledgements This list was developed by Prof Peter Uvin (Tuft s University, Boston) and his colleagues, originally for use by Conflict Advisers in the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and subsequently published for wider dissemination. The list is based on initial research by Zoe Scott (Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)). All summaries were produced by the GSDRC and should not be reproduced without permission. All abstracts are author s own. This reading list is available online at: Accessing Documents Most of the materials recommended in this reading list are freely available online, and where this is the case links are provided for accessing the full text. Some of the materials in the list aren t available online (for example, book chapters and journal articles) but can be ordered directly from the publisher or, alternatively, through the British Library for Development Studies Document Delivery Service. Further details are available online at or by ing docdel@ids.ac.uk. Organisations in developing and transition countries can use this delivery service at no cost. 2

3 Part 3: Conflict Response: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding Contents 1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements Formation, Implementation and Consolidation Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Post-conflict Stabilisation, Assessment and Planning Transition from Humanitarian Assistance to Full Recovery Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants Transitional Justice and Reconciliation and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence Security Sector and Justice Sector Reform and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence Security sector Justice sector Small Arms and Light Weapons Programmes and their Role in Mitigating Risks of Violence

4 1. Direct and Third Party Peace Processes, Ceasefires, Mediation and Peace Agreements Formation, Implementation and Consolidation Core readings The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars B Jones (2001) International actors face recurrent challenges coordinating their efforts to implement peace agreements to end civil wars. This InternationalPeaceAcademy paper identifies strategic coordination amongst third-party actors as a critical element of successful peace implementation. Incoherence and inconsistency in strategy can undermine the viability or the effectiveness of implementation efforts. Strategic coordination is a growing policy challenge due to the increasing proliferation of actors with overlapping mandates, competitive relations and minimal accountability. Strategic coordination is a critical to the capacity of implementers to stave off opposition. Opponents of peace will tend to exploit divisions amongst implementers and take advantage of confusion or disagreement. The ability of international actors to meet the growing complexity of strategic coordination depends on their ability to overcome three recurring challenges. These are: incoherence between the negotiation and implementation phases of a peace process; divergence of strategies within a given phase; and contradictory efforts to implement a given strategy. The effectiveness of strategic coordination varies according to external conditions, including: the difficulty of the implementation environment; the degree of commitment of major and regional powers; and the correspondence of interests and objectives among those powers: Past cases show that specific features of the coordination mechanism employed can help mitigate environmental constraints. Strategic coordination of peace implementation will be easier where there is: a clearly defined lead agency; continuity of third-party actors between negotiation and implementation phases; and an established forum for policy consultation amongst implementers. Strategic coordination has been successful where implementation has been guided by a lead state whose authority to establish priorities and resolve disputes is recognised by other key implementers. Although the lead state approach is unplanned by definition, positive past experiences suggest it is an important alternative to United Nations (UN) coordination. Where the UN enjoys a central, authoritative role a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) can provide important policy coordination. This is best achieved where the SRSG is involved in both negotiation and implementation. Most cases of successful strategic coordination have featured "Friends Groups" the bringing together of key governments to ensure focus and commonality of approaches. 4

5 Without effective coordination by the UN, a comparable regional or international organisation, or a lead state, the effectiveness of implementation efforts will be heavily constrained: Ideally strategic coordination should establish clear lead actors to set and pursue priorities, provide consistency across phases and resolve disputes. Neither the UN nor any other actor is currently equipped to do this. The capacity of the UN to perform essential strategic coordination functions is constrained by its own weakened authority, the proliferation of third-party actors and competition between powers. This is unlikely to change substantially in the near future. The UN and other international actors have experimented with different models of strategic coordination. Within the UN two distinct models have emerged: the Strategic Frameworks Initiative and the Integrated Mission. Recent efforts to enhance structures for strategic coordination on the ground have been frustrated by: the number of actors involved; the limited acceptance of the coordinating authority of the UN, or an analogous body; and the absence of policycoordination at headquarters level. Source: Jones, B.D., 2001, 'The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars', International Peace Academy and Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, New York Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations I Johnstone (2006) Abstract Not available online (please see accessing documents section) The Center on International Cooperation s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than forty UN and non-un peacekeeping missions in 2005 including the Darfur region of the Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo among others. Its purpose is to inform policymakers, members of the media, academics and peace-keepers in the field as the international community debates the growing role of peace operations around the world. Source: Johnstone, I., 2006, Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) L Brahimi (2001) Abstract The United Nations (UN) was founded to save communities and nations from the scourge of war. Yet, over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and 5

6 can do no better today. Why has the UN failed? What can be done to accomplish the UN s mission? The report commissioned by the UN Secretary-General assesses the shortcomings of the existing peacekeeping system and makes recommendations for change. Force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built. Member states have to summon the political will to support the UN politically, financially and operationally to enable the United Nations to be truly credible as a force for peace. There is an urgent need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention and peacekeeping, in both the long and short terms. Findings from the report include: Some UN operations in the past did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. Factors that should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping include the consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only for self-defence. Reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor has deeply damaged the standing and credibility of UN peacekeeping. The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord are often the most critical ones for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during that period are hard to regain. The current approach to funding and staff for peacekeeping seems to confuse the temporary nature of specific operations with the evident permanence of peacekeeping and other peace operations activities. Gaps in strategy, policy and practice impede the effective use of modern information technology in missions. Policy pointers to strengthen the permanent capacity of the UN to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies include: Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN contingents to cede the initiative of their attackers. Mandates should specify an operation s authority to use force to stop violence against civilians. A new information-gathering and analysis entity should be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the ECPS. The leadership of a new mission has to be assembled as early as possible at the UN Headquarters, to participate in shaping the mission s concept of operation, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance. Traditional peacekeeping operations should be rapidly and effectively deployed. On-call lists of experts, military officers and police officers should be created, and mechanisms to rapidly recruit civilian field personnel should be put in place. Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the UN, and therefore the majority of its resource requirements should be funded through the regular budget of the Organisation. Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) has to be created to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment. Information technology has to be well utilised to achieve the objectives. Source: Brahimi, L. et al 2000, 'Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations', United Nations, New York 6

7 The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments W Zartman (2001) How can the timing of peace initiatives help to resolve conflicts? This Global Review of Ethnopolitics article argues that parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do so when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked. Practitioners need to take advantage of this ripe moment when it exists, or help produce it, or stand ready to act on it when it does not exist. The concept of a ripe moment centres on the relative parties perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimistically associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe. The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory, and this deadlock is painful to both of them, they seek an alternative policy or a way out. Diplomatic memoirs have explicitly referred to ripeness through its MHS component and they provide examples of when a MHS has brought parties to seek a way out: Chester A Crocker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa between 1981 and 1989, mediated an agreement for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and of South African troops from Namibia, then to become independent. It was only when military escalations ended in stalemate that the position ripened paving the way for negotiation to begin. Alvaro de Soto, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs at the United Nations (UN), also endorsed the necessity of ripeness in his mission to mediate a peace in El Salvador. The conflict was ripe for a negotiated settlement only when each side realised that they could not defeat each other and that its persistence was causing pain that could no longer be endured. In Yugoslavia, it took the 1995 Croatian offensive, coupled with NATO bombing, to create a MHS composed of a temporary Serb setback and a temporary Croat advance that could not be sustained. Practitioners need to employ all their skills and apply the concepts of negotiation and mediation to take advantage of the necessary but insufficient condition of ripeness. Evidence suggests that perception of a MHS occurs either (and optimally) at a low level of conflict, where it is relatively easy to begin problem-solving, or, in salient cases, at rather high levels of conflict. To ripen high level conflicts for resolution, practitioners must raise the level of conflict until a stalemate is reached. Then further through the perception of hurt, then to the perception of pain, and finally to create a perception of an impending catastrophe. The ripe moment becomes the godchild of brinkmanship. A MHS can be a very fleeting opportunity, a moment to be seized lest it pass, or it can be of a long duration, waiting to be noticed and acted upon. Failure to seize the moment often hastens its passing, as parties lose faith in negotiating a way out or regain hope in the possibility of unilateral escalation. Unripeness should not constitute an excuse for second or third parties inaction. In the absence of a promising situation, either the second party that is alone in feeling hurt or the third party should ripen or position themselves. Positioning options include becoming an indispensable channel for negotiation. 7

8 Source: Zartman, I. W, 2001, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments', The Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, pp Supplementary readings Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes K Banaszak and A-M Goetz (2005) How and why should women be involved in peace processes? This paper from the United Nations Development Fund for Women highlights the importance of involving women at every stage of peace negotiations and gives recommendations for how this might be achieved in practice. It argues that when approaching the task of ending war, the stakes are too high to neglect the resources that women have to offer. Women are major stakeholders in the resolution of armed conflict: as victims, survivors and even wagers of war. Women have much to offer peace efforts: Women s organisations persistently advocate for peace; women often build foundations for peace negotiations and build ties amongst different factions; they bring a different perspective to negotiations; their involvement can lead to long-term advances for gender equality; and they can foster reconciliation and provide an example for society to move forward. The international community is in a critical position to support women s participation at the peace table, to build women s capacity as participants and to ensure that women s needs and contributions are not overlooked. The report gives a number of recommendations on how to amplify women's voices and create an enabling environment to allow their concerns to be addressed: Women are more likely to have an impact when they organise as women with a common agenda for peace. The international community should encourage female delegates to meet with women s organisations; facilitate exchanges of information between national stakeholders and international partners; and convene nationwide consultations of women. Identifying strategic entry points for women early in the peace process is vital to enhance their access to negotiations and impact on the accords. Recommendations include: Advocating for a minimum 30% women s representation in delegations; brokering meetings between women s groups and negotiating parties for women to request representation; assisting women s groups in awareness-raising campaigns. Structures and mechanisms within the office of the facilitator can enhance the integration of a gender perspective in peace negotiations. The facilitator can be crucial in getting women to the peace table. Training on the importance of a gender perspective should be offered to participants in negotiations, and gender sensitive rules of procedure should be encouraged. There should be gender balance and expertise within the facilitation team. Women require specific forms of support to maximise their participation in peace negotiations. They must enjoy protection from security threats; sufficient resources 8

9 to maximise their efforts; political space in which to organise; and access to decision makers. There are also often important capacity building needs, and courses should include: Conflict resolution and gender-sensitive peace building; thematic post-conflict issues; political issues and organisational skills. Women s involvement must be sustained during implementation. Women have specific needs, priorities and strategies that must be included in the peace agreement to guarantee their fulfilment during implementation. There should be gender balance and expertise on the drafting committee, and clear provisions in the peace agreement to ensure women s participation in post-conflict mechanisms. After a peace agreement has been signed, there are opportunities to maximise women s participation in implementation and monitoring. The international community should establish mechanisms to guarantee women s involvement throughout the implementation phase. Key facets of the agreement, such as timeframe and distribution of funds should make reference to gender issues. The international community is often invited to verify fulfilment of steps in the accords to help prevent a return to violence. Women must be involved in these processes. International commitments to gender equality in peace processes are in place. Necessary political will should now be exercised through provision of technical, financial and moral support. Source: Banaszak, K. et al (ed), 2005, 'Securing the Peace: Guiding the International Community towards Women's Effective Participation throughout Peace Processes,' United Nations Development Fund for Women Leashing the Dogs of War C A Crocker et al (2007) Is it possible to fight war and manage conflict at the same time? This book from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) explores the causes of conflict and the critical role of conflict management in volatile political environments. Peacemaking and conflict management are essential for creating a less divided, less conflicted world despite the complexities and high odds against success. The international community can check hostile adversaries of the international order and make peace at the same time. When the Cold War ended, many hoped for the beginning of a more peaceful chapter in world history. However, sectarian violence in the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East, the emergence of a more lethal, global brand of terrorism and a growing cultural divide between Islam and the West have put pay to such aspirations. Meanwhile, international norms and institutions are eroding, and a number of states are on the verge of crossing the nuclear threshold. A new kind of strategic political resource in international relations is needed to leash the contemporary dogs of war. Smart Power effectively engages the multiple assets and instruments of official and non-official diplomacy and military power. It is attentive to the 9

10 timing of mediated, negotiated interventions and the resources, capabilities and strengths that different actors bring to conflict management. As such, it merits consideration as a comprehensive conflict management mechanism. The current international conflict landscape is characterised by: Security challenges: a heightened sense of insecurity in the international system; anti-western sentiment; the emergence of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and the Middle East; the growth of paramilitary organisations; continued regional instability; and an increasingly permissive violent environment. Global conflict trends: a decline in global conflicts and their lethality; a shift in the locus of violence; the increasing risk that nuclear technologies may fall into the wrong hands; and an increase in outside intervention and conflict management. Role of coercive force: the recognition that while military and economic tools may be essential, some challenges may respond to a blend of coercive power and political-diplomatic initiatives, including conflict management. The role of institutions: Increased engagement of international institutions, regional and sub-regional organisations and small-state/non-state actors in peaceful resolution processes. The role of state building and democratic governance: the recognition that it is no longer acceptable to allow failed states to flounder; discussion about the role of outsiders in building effective democratic polities. Framing the conflict management challenge: global frames of reference are diverging; there is a declining degree of consensus on priorities for conflict management. Conflict management in a time of transition: major powers, international organisations and non-governmental organisations are now re-defining their roles in providing security for their citizens and constituencies. In this context, it is important to recognise that: Military force alone can not deal effectively with the problems of failed and ailing states The international community needs to apply conflict management and prevention to failed states and those regions where intractable conflicts endure Official and non-official diplomacy are important to building international coalitions, mobilising political will, building internal capacity to handle conflict, securing political legitimacy and promoting negotiation and mediation of interstate and intrastate disputes Consensus and the support of the international community, including nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), is an important component of effective action. Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P., 2007, 'Leashing the Dogs of War', Introduction in Crocker, C., Osler Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds.) 'Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World', United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. 10

11 Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements S Stedman (2002) Abstract Not available online (please see accessing documents section) Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars, while others fail? What strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements, which are the most important? These and related questions--life and death issues for millions of people today--are the subject of Ending Civil Wars. Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive, systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements--of what happens after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors find that failure most often is related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major powers' perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war. Source: Stedman, S.J., 2002, Introduction. In Stedman, S.J. et al. (eds.) (2002) Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, pp United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines Un Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2007) Abstract This document aims to set out the guiding principles and core objectives of United Nations peacekeeping operations as well the main factors contributing to their success in the field. It also provides a basis for the development of training materials for military, police and civilian personnel preparing to serve in the field. This document was drafted in close consultation with field missions, Troop and Police Contributing Countries, UN system partners and other key stakeholders. It also draws on seminal documents such as "An Agenda for Peace", "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" and "the Brahimi Report", as well as internal lessons learned materials, external research and academic commentary. Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2007, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, Consultation Draft 29 June 2007, United Nations, New York. 11

12 International Mediation W Zartman and S Touval (2007) Abstract Not available online (please see accessing documents section) This book assesses the nature and extent of the changes wrought by 9/11 and its aftermath, and explores their wide-ranging implications. For the United States, of course, the changes have been dramatic. It has engaged in a war on terrorism and has become both a third party in certain conflict arenas and a direct party to the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. But these events have also affected other actors, from the United Nations to humanitarian NGOs to collective defence and security organizations such as NATO and the OSCE. At the same time, some things have not changed. Failed states, economic stagnation, weapons proliferation, nuclear missiles, and identity-based conflicts continue to threaten global security. Looking at the combination of old and new threats, are traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement still effective in managing and resolving conflict? How do conflict management efforts and the campaign against terrorism interact in various security environments? Are our institutions be they states, coalitions of the willing, international organizations, or NGOs capable of creating and implementing a peacemaking strategy? All these questions are addressed in this new volume. Source: Zartman, W, and Touval, S., 2007, International Mediation. In Crocker, Chester, Osler Hampson, Fen. and Aall, Pamela. (eds.) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace, pp

13 2. Understanding Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Core readings Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? M Barnett and H Kim (2007) Not available online (please see accessing documents section) How is peacebuilding interpreted in meaning and practice? To what extent has it been institutionalised? Peacebuilding is generically defined as external interventions designed to prevent armed conflict. This article, published in Global Governance, surveys twentyfour governmental and intergovernmental bodies that are active in peacebuilding. It analyses how they conceptualise and operationalise their peacebuilding mandate, along with mapping areas of potential concern. It finds that most programmes have focused on the immediate or underlying causes of conflict, to the relative neglect of state institutions. Peacebuilding is increasingly institutionalised across the international landscape. An impressive number of organisations use the concept to frame and organise their postconflict activities. However, there are critical differences among actors regarding the conceptualisation and operationalisation of peacebuilding. There are even greater divisions regarding the specific approaches that may achieve it. Different agencies use a wide variety of terms related to but not necessarily synonymous with peacebuilding. Some use the same term, peacebuilding, in slightly different ways: Different groupings clearly emerge: the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, UN specialised agencies, European organisations and member states. Although there are various reasons for differing priorities, organisational mandates and networks are important parts of the explanation. This will heavily influence an organisation s reception to, definition and revision of the concept of peacebuilding. Organisations are nested in structured relationships; those that are linked have tended to converge on a consensus definition. Different interpretations over the operationalisation of peacebuilding lead to different strategies and priorities. The growing number of international structures whose mandates include peacebuilding might easily mask essential differences regarding the concept s meaning and practice. There are three dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding: stability creation; restoration of state institutions; and addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict. To date there has been more focus on the kind of the state (the organising principles that structure the relationship between state and society) being built, than the degree of the state (its capacity to control society): Some have argued in favour of a more sequenced and strategic peacebuilding project that emphasises the establishment of security and stable institutions before seeking liberalisation and democracy. Agencies must focus more on creating state institutions that can deliver basic public goods in an equitable manner. Although the state is not the only institution that underpins stability, pursuing peacebuilding without an institutional foundation is a recipe for failure. 13

14 How peacebuilding is implemented must be settled by recipient states themselves, with support from international actors, rather than by bureaucratic and political power. Much of the interest in peacebuilding is at the level of rhetoric rather than resources. There is a danger that it receives little meaningful financial and political support relative to the costs of renewed conflict. The proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission is mandated to help coordinate the post conflict activities of relevant agencies. This is likely to both improve the implementation of peacebuilding activities and clarify differences among agencies. Scholars and policymakers need to monitor which version of peacebuilding is being institutionalised and ensure that alternative understandings are kept alive to enable reasoned choices. Source: Barnett, M., Kim, H., O'Donnell, M., and Sitea, L., 2007, 'Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?', Global Governance, 13, pp Ending Wars and Building Peace C Call and E Cousens (2007) How effective are international efforts to build peace? This paper, published by the International Peace Academy, assesses the status of international peace efforts and highlights chronic weaknesses in peacekeeping processes. In recent years, international and bi-lateral institutions have made efforts to fine-tune their peacebuilding processes. However, systemic issues of international political will and attention, resource allocation and a failure to recognise local contexts continue to affect the ability of international and national actors to establish enduring peace. Peacebuilding is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalise peace and a modicum of participatory politics that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation. While the number and intensity of wars has declined by roughly half since 1990, between one-third and one-half of all ended conflicts revert to war within five years. While there is increasing evidence that international involvement can be an important factor in preventing recurrence of war, this evidence is correlative rather than causal. The United Nations, international financial institutions and bi-lateral donors now recognise that the intricacies of peacebuilding policies, planning and implementation materially affect both the possibility of success and the cost of the failure of peacebuilding. There has been a recent series of reform efforts to improve peacebuilding apparatus. However, both experience and scholarship point to a series of chronic problems in international peace efforts, including the issue of state-building as an integral part of peacebuilding. Whether external actors currently have the knowledge, tools, resources or legitimacy to contribute to state-building is central to the question of the efficacy of international peacebuilding. Other problems include: 14

15 Will and attention: Peacebuilding efforts often suffer from short-lived, crisis-driven attention spans and are prone to weaken in the medium-term, two to three years after the ending of hostilities. More adequate, flexible resources: International institutions and bilateral donors have recently improved their allocation procedures for financial and human resources; however, their budget processes are still slow and lack flexibility. Interagency and departmental stovepipes within institutions cause difficulties in prioritising among competing needs and adequately sequencing international involvement. Gaps in civilian capacity: While peacebuilding requires civilian expertise in critical functional areas, local capacity is still largely inadequate. Gaps in contextual knowledge: External actors generally do not recognise the importance of country contexts. They tend not to engage local experts knowledgeable about culture and context in programme planning and implementation. Evaluating state capacity, legitimacy and effectiveness: It is difficult for international actors to develop reliable indicators of state effectiveness and citizen polls to measure state legitimacy. The future effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts will depend on whether the current trend of decreasing armed conflict continues. An increase in proxy wars against terrorists and other armed conflicts will fuel the demand for more peacebuilding efforts occurring simultaneously. Given the present status of peacebuilding policies and programmes, it is not at all clear that we are anywhere close to having international policy machinery or instruments that can reliably handle multiple high-profile peacebuilding operations successfully. Source: Call, C.T., E.M. Cousens, 2007, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace?', Working with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, New York Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 Riots D Chigas (2006) Did deficiencies in peacebuilding programmes contribute to the March 2004 riots in Kosovo? This paper, published by Care International and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, reports on a study conducted in the aftermath of the riots to determine any peacebuilding programme gaps that inadvertently contributed to the recurrence of violence. While the riots should not be the only benchmark for assessing peacebuilding in Kosovo, peacebuilding programmes need to re-consider their heavy focus on multiethnicity as the core of their strategy. While Kosovo embarked on a period of relative calm in the aftermath of the civil war, heightened tensions continued between the Albanian and Serb populations. In 2004, the combination of ethnic tensions, high unemployment and frustration over delays in defining the status of Kosovo Albanians resulted in a four days of riots. The violence resulted in 19 dead, 900 wounded and extensive destruction of property. 15

16 International peacebuilding missions have been very active in Kosovo for several years, implementing programmes in inter-ethnic dialogue, peace education, multi-ethnic projects and institutions, democratic governance and capacity-building and the media. The following findings indicate that peacebuilding programmes did not contribute significantly to prevention of inter-ethnic violence and missed the mark in a number of programme areas: Perceptions of improvements in inter-ethnic violence from masked the reality of a steady level of inter-ethnic violence during that time. Contrary to expectations, communities with greater inter-ethnic contact, whether in the form of business/economic ties or personal relationships, did not experience less violence. Intra-ethnic social networks were more important than inter-ethnic engagement in preventing violence. Peacebuilding programmes did not address key driving factors of conflict and failed to transform individual ties into networks of civic engagement. Rather than improving relations, the heavy peacebuilding focus on multi-ethnicity and the returning Kosovo Albanians increased ethnic divisions. Mono-ethnic areas of Kosovo, considered to be more extreme politically, did not receive the same levels of assistance as more mixed areas. Programmes did not engage many key people and areas and did not focus on the hard to reach population. As Kosovo Albanians and Serbs continue to struggle to find ways to coexist, peacebuilding programmes assisting them should consider the following recommendations for revised strategies: Shift programme focus. Re-think the attention currently paid to multi-ethnicity and refugees and internally displaced persons, even while maintaining the pursuit of democracy and European standards as a strong goal. Deal directly with driving forces of conflict and identify ways to deal more directly with political issues. This work would enhance the impact of work on inter-ethnic tension in the medium-term, if not in the short-term. Re-consider the targeting of areas and programme beneficiaries. Focus not on targeting the easy to reach people, but on facilitating their evolution into a peace constituency. Identify innovators and informal leaders in communities and target the hard to reach. Transform individual ties into networks of inter-ethnic engagement that can proactively resist violence. A critical mass of young people exists that can be mobilised for violence. Develop a strategy that turns individual ties into meaningful bridging social capital that provides a counterforce. Work with intra-ethnic networks on conflict issues. Intra-ethnic networks of trust and reciprocity are likely to be more important than inter-ethnic relations in preventing and mitigating violence. Source: Chigas, D. et al., 2006, 'Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo? A Study of Peacebuilding and the March 2004 Riots', CARE International and CDA- Collaborative Learning Projects, Pristina 16

17 Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications L Kriesberg (2007) Not available online (please see accessing documents section) What are conflict resolution (CR) strategies and how do they benefit those involved in wars? This chapter looks at the expanding field of CR in recent decades. CR offers many strategies that are relevant for combatants as well as for the intermediaries trying to mitigate destructive conflicts. CR ideas are increasingly influential and new developments are largely a response to the changing international environment. However, they are still insufficiently understood and utilised. Conflict resolution is an area with a diverse range of practice, theory and research. In the late 1970s the CR field was focused on negotiation and mediation. Practitioners and theorists applied the CR approach to a variety of organisational, community and national disputes. As CR workers turned to civil and international wars they gave attention to ways in which intermediaries and partisans can reduce the intensity of conflict and move towards negotiations for an agreement. In the later years of the Cold War, attention was given to interrupting or avoiding destruction escalation, which included enhancing crisis management systems. Recently, attention has been paid to fostering constructive escalation and conflict transformation, for example in public demonstrations to oust an authoritarian government. A major area of CR expansion is aiding reconciliation between former enemies. Although there is not a consensus about ideas and practices of CR, there are some shared understandings about analysing conflicts and about how to wage or intervene in them so as to minimise their adverse consequences and maximise their benefits. Conflicts are inevitable in social life and often serve to advance and sustain important human values including security, freedom and economic well-being. Conflicts can become destructive of the values that they are trying to further. Partisans blame each other for the bad things that happen in a conflict, including their own conduct. Such self-victimisation reduces the ways to resist the antagonists attacks. A conflict needs to be analysed to ensure that CR policies will be effective. There needs to be information about the stakeholders interests as well as theoretical analysis. The social construction of parties to a conflict is not as homogenous as might appear. Adversaries wage conflicts within a larger social context. Intermediary efforts can be initiated with subgroups. Conflicts are waged by a mixture of coercive and noncoercive inducements. Recent global developments, including the end of the Cold War, the impact of technology on war-making and the role of non-state transnational actors, have changed the nature of CR applications. Collective engagement by outside parties which are seen to be legitimate is crucial in averting destructive conflicts. Multilateral agreements to reduce the availability of weapons to groups who might use them in societal or international wars are important. Governments unwillingness to sign such agreements should be addressed. 17

18 Acts by leaders of one side directed at leaders of the other side are particularly important in the context of rapidly increasing channels of mass and interpersonal communication. Attention should be paid to this new information and a high priority given to responding to it. To bring a destructive conflict to an agreed end, the adversaries need to believe that peace will offer more than war. Institutions and the rule of law are needed to implement and sustain agreements. Kriesberg, L., 2007, 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution Applications' in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. O., and All, P. (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies J Lederarch (1997) Not available online (please see accessing documents section) How can peacebuilding adapt to the realities and dilemmas posed by contemporary conflicts? This United States Institute of Peace Press article argues that building peace requires a comprehensive approach. It provides strategic and practical approaches to peacebuilding that help establish an infrastructure for sustainable transformation and which take seriously the immediate and deep-rooted needs of divided societies. Peacebuilding faces systemic issues of how to deal with the production, transfer, and ready availability of weapons for war making, which fuel and make possible an extraordinary level of armed violence. For the most part, these are internal conflicts, built around identity groups and often characterised as ethnic and/or religious in nature. These are truly deep-rooted conflicts, which for us pose two central questions: What conceptual framework is most useful for dealing with the structural and psychological nature of contemporary conflict? What practical approaches and activities have the greatest potential for moving these conflicts towards peaceful outcomes? The answer might well lie in the development of a comprehensive, integrative, and strategic approach to the transformation of conflict. This approach is built on a conceptual framework composed of an interdependent set of perspectives and activities identified as structure, process, reconciliation, resources and coordination. Structure is concerned with the systemic elements of how one approaches a setting of protracted conflict. Process brings into focus the long-term nature of the progression of conflict. Reconciliation stresses that relationship, in its full range of psychological dimensions, is central to transformation. Resource focuses on the fact that although financial support is necessary, more important is the development of new ways of thinking about categories, responsibilities, and strategic commitment to peacebuilding. Coordination emphasises the need to have specific mechanisms whereby the above four components can intersect, interact, and cross-fertilise. Several basics proposals lie at the heart of the framework and argument presented here: 18

19 The nature of contemporary conflict requires the development of theories and praxis of the middle ranges. Middle-range actors have the capacity to impact processes and people at both the top and the grassroots levels. If mobilised strategically for peacebuilding, middle-range leaders could lay the foundation for long-term, sustainable conflict transformation. There is a need for subsystem strategies that link immediate issues within the setting to the broader systemic dynamics within which the particular conflict unfolds. The systemic issues must not be ignored but we cannot tackle these macro issues from the sanctuary of intellectual discussion and broad international policy statements. Reconciliation is a central component of dealing with contemporary conflict and reconstructing divided societies. Reconciliation provides a focus and a locus appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding and is instrumental in reframing the conflict and the energies driving the conflict. Innovation is needed in approaching the core nature of deep-rooted conflict in divided societies. To rebuild relationships, we must develop innovative ways of providing space within which the emotional and psychological aspects of the conflict can be addressed. Coordination must be a central component in the effective implementation of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy and in the building of an infrastructure for peace. This calls for not only an understanding of the larger challenge but also an acknowledgement of the need for a multiplicity of roles, for multiple levels of activity, and for diverse strategies and approaches. Source: Lederach, J.P., 1997, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press At War s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict J Lederach Not available online (please see accessing documents section) What is the relationship between liberalisation, institution building and peace in countries that are just emerging from civil conflict. This study, from Colorado University, examines the theoretical foundations of peacebuilding as a way of diagnosing the practical problems in international operations between 1989 and The study argues that while peacebuilders should preserve the broad goal of converting war-shattered states into liberal market democracies, peacebuilding strategies need to build effective institutions before liberalisation takes place. The idea of peacebuilding, which emerged at the end of the 1980s, is based on the belief that promoting liberalisation in countries that have experienced civil war creates the conditions for a lasting peace. Democratisation is expected to shift societal conflicts away from the battlefield into electoral politics. Between 1989 and 1990, fourteen major peacebuilding operations were deployed. They all sought to build liberal market democracies as quickly as possible. In all but three cases (Angola, Rwanda and Liberia) large scale conflict has not resumed. However, the strategy of political and economic liberalisation has increased the likelihood of renewed violence in several of these states. While there is evidence that well-established market democracies are less subject to internal violence than other types of states, it appears that the transition from civil conflict 19

20 to a well-established market democracy makes a state particularly prone to violence. Promoting democratisation and marketisation has the potential to stimulate higher levels of societal competition at a time when states are least equipped to contain such tensions within peaceful bounds. What is needed is a new type of peacebuilding strategy that begins from the premise that democratisation and marketisation are inherently tumultuous transformations that have the potential to undermine a fragile peace. The new strategy would minimise the destabilising effects of liberalisation in several ways. Peacebuilders would: Not immediately unleash political and economic competition Not organise quick elections or economic shock therapy Manage the democratisation and marketisation process as a series of incremental and deliberate steps Delay the introduction of democratic and market reforms until a rudimentary network of domestic institutions has been established Immediately start building governmental institutions that can manage the political and economic reforms. This strategy may appear costly, time-consuming and anti-democratic. However: The higher expense and longer duration must be weighed against the costs in human lives and material resources that would follow a recurrence of large-scale violence If the strategy appears to delay the liberalisation of political and economic life, it will achieve more durable peace in the long term Implementing liberalisation too quickly, in the absence of effect institutions, can counteract efforts to consolidate peace. Source: Paris, R., 2004, At War s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, chapters 1 (pp ), 2 (pp ), 9 (pp ), and 10 (pp ) Constructing Sovereignty for Security B Rubin (2005) Fragmentation and rivalry in the donor community constitutes as big an obstacle to peacebuilding as divisions in war-torn countries. Would the creation of a multilateral decision-making body as a counterpart for governments receiving aid help international state-building efforts? This paper from the International Institute for Strategic Studies supports the establishment of an inter-governmental Peacebuilding Commission to oversee UN operations to rebuild states after conflict. This would provide a useful institutional framework and deliver aid in ways that are accountable to the global community and to reconstructed countries citizens. For centuries, stronger powers have intervened to establish politically acceptable forms of order. The generalisation of the sovereign nation-state and the UN system has altered the environment for latter-day state builders. While they may have differing motivations, all face the problem of maintaining order and security in an increasingly integrated global 20