SECURING NATO'S ROLE AND RELEVANCE

Transcription

1 POLITICAL 175 PC 05 E Original: English NATO Parliamentary Assembly SECURING NATO'S ROLE AND RELEVANCE DRAFT GENERAL REPORT BERT KOENDERS (NETHERLANDS) GENERAL RAPPORTEUR* International Secretariat 31 October 2005 * Until this document has been approved by the Political Commitee, it represents only the views of the Rapporteur. Assembly documents are available on its website,

2 175 PC 05 E i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE NEXT SUMMITS... 1 II. A MORE POLITICAL NATO... 2 III. TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES... 3 IV. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS... 4 V. ESDP: PARTNER OR COMPETITOR?... 5 VI. ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?... 6 A. IRAQ... 6 B. THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST... 7 C. AFRICA - AND BEYOND... 7 VII. OPERATIONAL LESSONS... 7 VIII. AN ENLARGED ALLIANCE... 9 IX. CONCLUSIONS...9

3 175 PC 05 E 1 I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE NEXT SUMMITS 1. NATO is developing more and more as a pragmatic organisation which answers to unexpected and new challenges. In the midst of a complicated and risky extension of its mission to the south of Afghanistan, NATO has answered to natural disasters in the US and Pakistan (providing logistical assistance after hurricane Katrina and after the earthquake in Kashmir). In Darfur, NATO has assisted the African Union (AU) with strategic airlift. This pragmatic evolution of NATO is to be welcomed. Codification of all new developments and challenges might lead to endless diplomatic discussion with no end. However, pragmatism can only deliver success if key questions regarding the future of NATO are tackled. For example, the Spanish NATO Response Force (NRF) contribution to the Pakistan relief effort shows the need for a solution to the problem of common funding. But also more fundamental problems regarding the future of NATO will have to be solved in order for pragmatism to succeed, not least the issue of an improved transatlantic political dialogue on priorities and the role of NATO. 2. It was hoped that the visit of President Bush to NATO and the European Union in February would breathe a new sense of harmony into transatlantic relations and a new sense of purpose into the Atlantic Alliance. Unfortunately the jury is still out as to whether either expectation has been realised. Alliance atmospherics appear better than a year ago although many issues remain for Alliance friction to thrive on. Iraq continues to cast a deep shadow in both political and operational terms. However, while substantial differences over the rationale for the war remain, they have gradually been put to one side in the recognition that it is in everyone's interest to prevent Iraq descending even further into the abyss. 3. Iraq apart, NATO faces challenges on a number of fronts. The single most important challenge is the prevailing perception that the Alliance is no longer the primary forum for consultation among allies. Chancellor Schröder elaborated publicly what many had been saying privately when he commented last February that NATO "is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies". The question provoked two immediate reactions: if this is true what can be done to reverse the situation, and if nothing can be done, was there an alternative? 4. The NATO Secretary General's response was immediate make NATO more relevant by making it more political. Accordingly, he set in train internal studies to see where further changes could be made to achieve this objective. Making NATO more political and therefore a more central forum for consultation is a worthy goal in itself. But it is not enough. The relevance of the Alliance is inextricably linked to its performance. Goals must be matched by means. 5. The military and operational dimension is easier to define. If the Alliance is to handle situations such as Afghanistan, then, it must deliver the forces and the capabilities in sufficient numbers, unfettered by national reservations and restrictions on their operational use. While it is true that transformation has brought improvements and while Alliance forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan are doing a commendable job, the overall picture remains discouraging. Alliance resources are stretched to the hilt, making a response to sudden emergencies problematic. This shortfall has been seen in the response to the Pakistan emergency, where scarce assets have had to be deployed from Afghanistan. There are no magic solutions to improving our capabilities and no additional resources for defence forthcoming from our national coffers. Spending better and wiser, learning lessons from existing deployments and insisting that the collective "good" provided by the Alliance take precedence over national interests would appear to offer the best way of ensuring better capabilities. 6. With NATO Summits looming in 2006 and again in 2008, a clear road map is needed that will confirm and underpin the centrality of the Alliance to contemporary challenges. This road map must address several elements, including agreements on: what "making NATO more political" means for the internal consultation and decision-making structures; how we can improve

4 175 PC 05 E 2 transatlantic dialogue and resolve transatlantic differences; how we shape the future membership of the Alliance and how we develop partnerships; how we develop relations with other organisations, especially with the EU on the basis of genuine partnership and cooperation - not competition and duplication. The road map s elements also must address the breadth and scope of NATO's operations and the circumstances under which NATO capabilities can be used, particularly in operations that include other organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU). Last, but not least we must apply the lessons of current deployments and ensure that the military means available match political aspirations. Successfully addressing these elements will ensure that NATO is sufficiently equipped to continue to play a pivotal role in ensuring our collective security. 7. In brief, it is up to the 26 member nations to define the future role of the NATO Alliance and decide what measures should be taken that will reassert the centrality of the Alliance. The reality is that NATO will be seen to be relevant to the degree that it is used; and it will be used to the degree that it is seen to be relevant responsibility for this lies, as always, with its member nations. 8. This report will provide an assessment of these different elements; greater details of certain aspects are provided by the Sub-Committee reports this year. II. A MORE POLITICAL NATO 9. At the Prague and Istanbul Summits, NATO Heads of State and Governments have agreed to make the Allied militaries more responsive to the threats and challenges of the 21 st century. Your Rapporteur notes that military transformation remains crucial, but is not sufficient in itself. If the Alliance wants to maintain its role as key forum for transatlantic co-ordination and common action, it needs to complement its ongoing military transformation by a profound political one. A political transformation is urgently needed to adapt NATO s consensus building and decision-making processes to today s and tomorrow s security environment, which is radically different from the time the Alliance was founded. New, asymmetric threats, the resulting mix of military and non-military operations to respond these threats and new security actors demand a review of NATO s way to do business. 10. Political transformation will require the adaptation of existing structures and procedures at NATO Headquarters. To this end, the NATO Secretary General has launched the Secretary General s Reform Group led by former Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr. The group consists of personnel from the international and military staff and former senior experts and it reviews how the efficiency of NATO Headquarters can be improved. More specifically, the group examines NAC consultations and decision-making, NATO s committee structure, the coherence of existing budgetary and resource processes, and the organisation of the staff. Your Rapporteur welcomes the political transformation at NATO Headquarters initiated by the NATO Secretary General. However, he would caution that the results are likely to be limited and may not address all the key issues. First, we need the broadest agreement possible for NATO's agenda for consultation. And second, we need to examine whether and how NATO action is possible if not all allies agree. In other words: how does NATO act or react - if there is no consensus among Allies? Delays in decision-making are fundamentally related to political differences among Allies on the issues at hand rather than to the mechanisms and procedures of decision-making. We must therefore address the question of how can we avoid paralysis when there is no unanimity among member countries. 11. Some suggestions to strengthen NATO s role as the prime forum for transatlantic security dialogue - or as Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said, to make it more political - have been put on the table. Among the suggestions under discussions are a new Strategic Concept which would substitute the one from 1999 or a report produced by a team of independent

5 175 PC 05 E 3 senior experts for eventual NAC review (similar to the Harmel report of 1967), or as Chancellor Schröder has suggested, a high-ranking panel of independent figures from both sides of the Atlantic to help us find a solution. 12. However, each of these solutions would risk long exacerbating transatlantic debates which would hinder, rather than promote, Allied consensus building. This is even more likely as time and personnel resources required for agreeing on a new Harmel Report or negotiating a new Strategic Concept would be difficult and time-consuming, at a time when NATO is occupied with its numerous operations in the Balkans and out-of-area as well as with its relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the EU, to name a few. In fact, the Alliance is revising its Strategic Concept through actions on the ground, through practice rather than theory. 13. Any consideration of changing NATO's practices will have to start from the assumption that consensus will remain the guiding principle of Alliance decision-making (the 'catch 22' situation, there will be no consensus to move away from consensus!). Nevertheless, we need try to reform the decision-making process so as to improve NATO s ability to take decisions quickly and to deploy capable forces rapidly. 14. Therefore, NATO s political dialogue must be expanded so that the Allies will be able to discuss any issue that may impact the security of the Alliance. A new strategic vision could be perhaps submitted at a later stage, after continuing discussions at NAC. 15. There are more crises in the world than NATO Allies have the will or resources to manage and it is therefore essential to start discussion on first priorities. No agreement exists on the best way to tackle terrorism and countries with WMD. Some nations believe that the way in which the current fight against terrorism is framed might actually lead to more terrorism. No agreement exists on the relevance of the concepts of containment and deterrence in case of new proliferators. Except for Afghanistan, failing states have received little, if any, attention from NATO. Human rights, detention policy and respect for the Geneva Conventions are dividing the transatlantic Allies and require discussion especially when a further link between ISAF and OEF is planned in Afghanistan. 16. The Allies may also discuss whether, and if so how, to manage change i.e. how we may deal with the rise of new emerging powers like China and India and their growing importance for security. NATO could provide a forum for finding concerted diplomatic and multi-lateral approach to make them net contributors to effective multilateralism. III. TRANSATLANTIC DIFFERENCES 17. Despite the charm offensive of US President Bush earlier this year, the number of unresolved issues among the Allies has not diminished. What is more, some consider NATO merely as a toolkit or promote coalitions of the willing which can be assembled on an ad-hoc basis to deal with upcoming crises. Disagreement among Allies also exists on more specific questions such as if combating terrorist groups is primarily done by military means or by law enforcement measures. 18. In Afghanistan, security is still critical in many areas, as your Rapporteur has witnessed during a recent visit. NATO operations there have revealed serious gaps between political rhetoric and actual commitment. It is a shame that we have not been able to remove national restrictions on troops provided to NATO operations. Moreover, we cannot agree on a joint command in Afghanistan for the US-led counter-terrorism Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO-led International Security Force (ISAF). Also, detention policy is still under debate.

6 175 PC 05 E Capabilities, particularly the gap between the military strength of US and its Allies, remain a contentious issue. The NRF, designed as a catalyst to advance military capabilities of NATO forces, has made good progress. However, the setting of political priorities and consensus making on when and where to deploy is still weak. Furthermore, the US is not involved in the NRF with troops, and divisions of labour are not yet clarified. 20. These pending security issues are embedded in the overall political context in which the Alliance is operating. Other disputes are unlikely to facilitate reconciliation among NATO partners. While the Allies share the view that the so-called Broader Middle East poses a crucial security challenge and urgently needs assistance to reform, there is no agreement about how to best achieve this. On Iran, everyone agrees that nuclear-armed Republican Guards would pose a high security challenge, but there is insufficient consensus on how to instigate Teheran to abandon its current plans. The IAEA has a vital role to play and the EU and US positions should be closely coordinated. Simultaneously human rights policy should receive more attention especially since the election of the new fundamentalist Iranian president who has shocked the world by strong anti-semitism. 21. European and Canadian allies are also concerned over a perceived US-American à-la-carte multilateralism, which they consider particularly damaging for existing arms control instruments like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). On the other hand, Americans criticise that the EU considers allowing European firms to sell arms to China. 22. But the reasons for lack of trust are more complex. Perhaps the US feels the risks more immediate than its partners and is willing to employ military force for its defence and places less emphasis on international institutions. Perhaps Europeans fear being dragged into new risks by the US which in turn considers its allies appeasing and free-riding as Harvey Sapolski, Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, maintained in a meeting with the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations. 23. The relevance of the Alliance will depend on how effective it will be in meeting the security challenges it is facing. As spillover of crises from the regions of Europe s periphery appears likely, NATO will be involved in peacekeeping and post-conflict operations. Missions will increasingly be out-of-area and will include longer-term deployments with both military and non-military components. In addition to applying the lessons learned in previous missions for future ones, NATO needs to find its role in meeting the new security challenges, particularly those stemming from international terrorist groups and WMD proliferation. IV. RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 24. Iraq and Afghanistan are resounding reminders no single nation or group of nations can win the peace, nor tackle root causes for future conflicts alone. Most of today s conflicts are within states rather than between them. Dealing with today's threats requires broad, deep and sustained global cooperation. Therefore, NATO needs to also broaden its political and strategic debate with other international organisations. For example, the nature and complexity of today s post-conflict operations call for broadest possible international collaboration. While NATO is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers, it has no capacity for civil implementation and depends upon other organisations, particularly the UN or the EU, to perform the non-military functions essential to the success of any nation-building operation. The challenge is also to achieve seamless transition from possible combat operations to peace enforcing. Close co-operation with partners, particularly the EU, but also the UN and the OSCE, is required. This demands a clear delineation of tasks among participating actors and that the efforts of participating

7 175 PC 05 E 5 organisations complement and do not compete against each other. Moreover, their mandates must be compatible to each other and mutually reinforcing. The United Nations (UN) 25. In the broadest terms, the UN provides a platform not only for aid development, promoting human rights, democracy and arms control, but also for common action to fight international terrorists, strengthen non-proliferation, and bring peace to war-torn areas. Despite its shortcomings, the UN has a key role in conflict prevention. The UN is also key as a legitimator of international military action. 26. Your Rapporteur regrets the failure of the recent UN reform summit. The final document was much weaker than first envisage and did not produce agreement on a strategy to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons nor on a common definition of terrorism. As the UN s ability for broadest international action in the security realm remains underdeveloped, NATO member countries should discuss how they and the Alliance, as an organisation, can help building effective multilateralism. One possibility may be to create caucuses of NATO-member countries in the respective UN structures to advance issues on terrorism and non-proliferation. In addition, a closer institutional relationship between the Alliance and the UN should be welcome. Your Rapporteur therefore welcomes the announcement between Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Kofi Annan to pursue a deeper and more structured relationship between the two organisations. A practical step for NATO would be to expand its liaison office at the UN Headquarters in New York, which is currently staffed by one person only. The NRF should play an increasingly important role in strengthening UN Peacekeeping and training and cooperation with the AU should also be developed seriously. V. ESDP: PARTNER OR COMPETITOR? 27. The nature and complexity of current security challenges also calls for deeper NATO-EU co-operation. Overall, the NATO-EU relationship has made great strides towards an effective partnership. The generally smooth transfer of the stabilisation mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO to the EU sets a precedent for potential subsequent handovers. NATO s new role is to facilitate Bosnian defence reform and conduct operational tasks in co-operation with the EU related to apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs), counter-terrorism, and intelligence sharing. Although political differences over the mandate initially delayed implementation of the transfer, the ongoing collaboration in Bosnia and Herzegovina signals that it is possible for NATO and the EU to work together NATO Allies are also members of the EU. As each country commands only one set of forces, the EU and NATO coordinate the generation of forces. It is therefore crucially important that NATO and the EU co-ordinate their force planning in a way that avoids discrepancies or duplication. An improved co-ordination is necessary on the NRF and the EU battle groups as well as a broad discussion between the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary-General of the European Council. 29. One can argue that NATO has agreed to function as a toolbox for EU operations when the Alliance as a whole is not involved. When we contemplate how to further strengthen the NATO-EU co-operation, we should consider the (non-military) capabilities that the EU can bring to bear in crisis prevention and in post-conflict operations. 30. Improved co-operation is also essential in the areas of WMD and Terrorism where NATO is only a part of the wider solution. Fighting terrorist groups requires the full range of policy instruments, some of which NATO does not have. NATO is not the right venue to discuss

8 175 PC 05 E 6 coordination of actions to track terrorist finances or how to best support elections in Afghanistan or Iraq. 31. Similarly, NATO s contribution to tackle WMD proliferation is rather limited. However, it could become a platform to find convergent, primarily diplomatic, approaches to prevent WMD proliferation. This is particularly important in the case of Iran, which could become the most difficult challenge to the Western Alliance since the Cuban missile crisis, particularly as negotiations between the EU-3 and Teheran are at an impasse. 32. NATO s primary role should be that of a facilitator to make existing non-proliferation regimes more effective. Bi-lateral agreements between governments can be helpful to supplement existing international agreements, but should not be undermining them if there is no agreed replacement. In this context, your Rapporteur is sceptical that the agreement between the US administration and India may undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the long-term without providing a viable alternative to this multilateral agreement. 33. More NATO may also be possible, if not necessary, in homeland defence and disaster relief. The military is increasingly becoming involved in disaster relief efforts as in the Indian ocean tsunami last December, Hurricane Katrina or the earth quake in northern Pakistan this year have proven. The Alliance already has limited responsibility in disaster relief and is co-operating with countries like Ukraine in this area. NATO does not hold any responsibility in homeland defence, but your Rapporteur believes that we should explore possible synergies that can be generated by first responses and disaster relief. However, the Alliance should discuss whether NATO Headquarters can take on a role as policy co-ordinator. VI. ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT: WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES? A. IRAQ 34. Following the low point in transatlantic relations over the Iraq war all NATO member states have now pledged support in some form for the training of Iraqi security forces. By providing communications, logistical and intelligence support to the Polish-led multinational division in Iraq, NATO is replicating the assistance it had given to the German/Dutch-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan in In addition, NATO has engaged in the Training Implementation Mission, now called the NATO Training Mission Iraq. Since August 2004, approximately 50 officers have been working on the ground in Baghdad. There are plans to expand the mission to include some 300 personnel deployed in Iraq. 35. Thus far, NATO s role in Iraq remains rather limited, because agreement on NATO s role is only the least common denominator among Allies who previously disagreed over the Iraq war. But we must recognise that all NATO partners have a stake in securing and stabilising Iraq. Whether we will succeed or fail will significantly influence the stability in the region and beyond. However, given the fragile security situation on the ground and the unclarity over the duration and character of the US-led coalition s presence in the country, we must not make Iraq a make or break issue for NATO as an organisation. What is needed is increased assistance to the Iraqi government, especially in the sectors that are relevant for reconstruction and development. We also need a constructive debate on what the Alliance as an organisation can do more to support the Iraqi people. This also applies to the EU whose involvement has thus far only been rather minimal. A positive example is its EUJUST LEX mission, operational since 1 July 2005, which trains up to 770 senior officials of the Iraqi police, justice and penitentiary in four-week courses outside the country. Of course, we must not impose ourselves, and any NATO or other action should be based on Iraqi demands.

9 175 PC 05 E 7 B. THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST 36. The Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf have become much more relevant for our security, particularly as the most likely challenges, those stemming from terrorism and WMD proliferation, originate from there. NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) are a recognition of this. But NATO s role in the Mediterranean and the Gulf is still developing, and achievements thus far have been rather limited. With regard to the so-called Broader Middle East (BME), there are different views about whether NATO as an organisation could take on a role and, if so, what that role could be and how that may relate to activities of other international organisations. 37. There is also talk of NATO playing a critical role in bringing greater stability to the BME, perhaps also in the Middle East conflict. Necessary preconditions before NATO could envisage any contribution to addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should certainly include a lasting peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Moreover, any involvement should be based on agreement and request for a NATO involvement by both parties, as well as a UN mandate on which NATO operation would be legally based. Your Rapporteur would consider a NATO role in the Middle-East peace process positively. As a preliminary step NATO could train Palestinian security forces to help them establish a military that can contribute to regional stability as well as defence of the national territory. C. AFRICA - AND BEYOND 38. NATO s involvement in Africa is also a demonstration of the changing transatlantic security agenda. There is growing interest in NATO supporting stabilisation operations in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. Following a formal request by the AU on 26 April 2005 to assist its mission in Darfur, NATO has airlifted peacekeepers from contributing countries to support the AU s mission in Sudan. Moreover NATO as well as the EU are supporting the combined air movement co-ordination cell which operates under the AU s leadership in Addis Abeba. NATO is also training AU troops in how to run a multinational military headquarters and how to manage intelligence. Because of the training programme s success, the AU has asked NATO to broaden it. 39. The current operation in Darfur is both an example for good NATO-EU co-operation and a reminder that we need to avoid competition between the two organisations. In the run-up to the agreement on NATO assistance, several EU member countries tried to block any NATO involvement in the operations. With a growing interest in security in Africa, NATO will look for ways to strengthen regional military capabilities to develop an African response to conflicts on the continent. Lack of available resources are likely to limit NATO s direct involvement in Africa, but it may be in a position to help and facilitate deployment of forces by other international organisations. NATO should increase its existing enabler capabilities and further its capacity to train security forces of partner countries and regional organisations (such as the AU) to tackle crises in their own backyard. There is a need to have a strong political dialogue about NATO s tasks and priorities in Africa and the possible co-operation with other international actors, particularly the EU, the UN, and the AU. VII. OPERATIONAL LESSONS

10 175 PC 05 E NATO Allies recognise that geographically remote areas can have a direct impact on their security, as Afghanistan has demonstrated. Failing states can be breeding grounds for internationally active terrorist groups. NATO s post Cold-War operations have not only been instigators for reforms, they are part and parcel of the debate on the transformation of the Alliance. Getting the operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan right is not only important because NATO s success or possible failure would heavily impact on its credibility and its military as well as political cohesion. Moreover, the operations in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq are central for the security of the Alliance. 41. NATO-led operations cannot be successful without prior agreement on clear political goals and precisely defined military missions. Deployed forces must operate under a robust mandate that allows quick adaptation to changing circumstances if required. Rules of engagement should provide a maximum of flexibility allowing commanders to deal with the broadest spectrum of operations, from peacekeeping to counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations. At the same time, it is essential that peacekeeping, stabilisation and counter-terrorism should not be confused. It is also important that NATO defends its values, and respects the Geneva Conventions at all times. 42. National caveats: Achieving the highest degree possible of interoperability among NATO forces is not only desirable but the sine qua non for the successful implementation of operations. We must therefore eliminate, or at least considerably reduce, so-called national caveats i.e. restrictions that member nations put on the use of national contingents in joint NATO operations. The majority of caveats relates to rules of engagement (i.e. peacekeeping rather than war fighting) and geographical mobility. In addition, there are also caveats that limit participation in NATO s integrated command structure, even though there is NAC agreement on that operation. 43. Although NATO member states appear to have tackled the problem of national caveats in the Balkans, the issue remains critical in Afghanistan. This is particularly important as ISAF is expanding to the West and South of the country until the first half of This will bring it into direct contact with OEF, the US-led counter-terrorism operation. Some NATO member countries contributing to ISAF have restricted their participation to exclude combat operations. Expressing reservations about using ISAF forces to help fight the Taliban-led insurgency in the south of Afghanistan, German Defence Minister Peter Struck said at the September Defence Ministerial in Berlin that he would not like to expose our soldiers to more danger by linking these two mandates together. 44. Funding of operations: Success or failure of operations heavily depends on the sufficient allocation of resources. Your Rapporteur must sadly state that some NATO member countries have not matched political commitments with necessary resources. Although NATO Allies unanimously agreed on a greater role for the Alliance in Afghanistan, the allocation of troops and equipment was considerably delayed, as was the case in Iraq. 45. Under current NATO regulations, a member state is responsible for financing its personnel and equipment on a mission. In contrast, those countries not participating in a NATO mission incur no costs, even though they have agreed to the operation in the NAC. Placing the financial burden only on participating members is unfair and creates a disincentive for countries to contribute. What is more, it undermines the very logic of NATO as an alliance in which burdens are shared equitably and fairly. 46. NATO must urgently review the issue of common funding for joint operations with the aim to avoid punishing contributing countries, especially those which provide key enablers. One possible solution to deal with existing shortcomings, in the medium-term may be to further expand the NATO s commonly funded projects.

11 175 PC 05 E 9 VIII. AN ENLARGED ALLIANCE 47. The Alliance has a taken on a crucial and increasingly important role for the protection of security and stability beyond its borders. NATO s geographical and topical enlargements also pose the question where NATO ends. With the application of Albania, Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia, the enlargement of the Alliance continues. Moreover, as NATO relations with Kyiv have entered a qualitatively new phase after the Orange Revolution with the Intensified Dialogue, Ukraine s future membership is not excluded. There is also interest in countries of the Southern Caucasus to join the Alliance. We need to agree on future enlargements of the Alliance. But enlargement must avoid raising new barriers within Europe. 48. Partnerships, including NATO s special relationships with the Russian Federation and Ukraine, must evolve further. Over the years, the Alliance developed specific programmes of co-operation on defence reform, including in areas like combating transborder crime, tightening border security, promoting civil-military relations, and the democratic control of the armed forces. However, NATO might consider expanding its activities geared towards strengthening democratic standards. This is especially the case with regard to the Central Asian republics, which benefit from NATO s assistance in the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP). To that end, NATO might, in the long run, explore possible co-ordination with other international organisations, especially the OSCE and the EU. This would not only avoid possible duplication of efforts undertaken by these organisations, but could also contribute to slowly developing more democratic structures and the rule of law. There is ample room for closer collaboration as NATO commands the necessary military and security expertise, and the EU already provides critical economic, financial and other assistance. IX. CONCLUSIONS 49. If NATO wants to re-gain its rightful role as the prime transatlantic security forum it must further transform. Transformation is about adapting existing structures and processes, but it is first and foremost about transformation of our minds, i.e. how we think about security. Political consensus among the Allies remains crucial, but it can only be a result of continued, meaningful dialogue among member states. Whether or not we will succeed in rebuilding trust will depend on affirmative action, i.e. the increase in military capabilities, and on our ability for a true debate among equals. 50. In the military field, building additional capabilities as agreed upon in the Istanbul Summit must be an absolute priority and is a sine qua non for NATO s effectiveness as well as for its credibility. The goal must be to modernise our forces to make them more mobile and interoperable so they will be able to perform a broader spectrum of tasks that ranges from war fighting to peace keeping, but also disaster relief operations. Modernising the force generation process by improving co-ordination and planning national contributions to joint missions is necessary. Moreover, the funding mechanism must urgently be improved, including particularly the financing of joint infrastructure and joint operations. 51. NATO must adapt its political process and should strengthen the role of the NAC as a forum for debate at different levels. Reform at NATO Headquarters can facilitate Allied decision-making but it cannot substitute consensus. The Alliance can only be as effective as its member countries allow. Governments and Parliaments are responsible for making NATO a success. Intensified discourse on NATO s priorities and missions within NATO must be at the same time supplemented by improved public diplomacy efforts. This is crucial to garner lasting support for NATO s activities and commitments among our own population, but also to explain NATO to our partner countries. Parliaments should play an active role in the debates on the future of NATO and should discuss in depth the new missions of the NRF.

12 175 PC 05 E As the Alliance will increasingly operate in a global strategic environment and because available resources will be limited, we need to put a premium on conflict prevention. NATO should expand its set of instruments in this area. At NATO headquarters some divisions could be strengthened, such as the WMD Centre or the divisions that are responsible for assisting in defence reform. More generally, NATO and member countries need to better co-ordinate assistance to its partner countries and organisations to avoid redundancy. On the diplomatic level, identifying special regional representatives, e.g., for Africa, may be helpful. In addition to strengthening its own role in areas outlined above, NATO should advance the institutional dialogue with the UN and the AU. 53. But our guiding principle must be practicality, which is we must avoid duplicating what other organisations can do and can do better. Further strengthening of co-operation and co-ordination with other actors, particularly with the EU, is therefore necessary. Intensifying the institutional dialogue between NATO and the EU is an important responsibility for the 19 member states that are member of both organisations. It is crucial that no NATO or EU Member further blocks broad discussions between NATO and the EU. NATO must also further develop co-operation with partner countries and develop existing programmes like the ICI and the Mediterranean Dialogue. 54. As outlined above, more, not less, NATO is needed. To achieve this, the political dialogue must be strengthened with the aim to (re-) build consensus on what NATO is for - and what it is not for. In this context we must agree on priorities and the necessary means to employ. Time is an essential factor and the process must be led to successful conclusions by the two NATO summits that will address military transformation in 2006 and political transformation in The overdue debate will have to take place within NATO structures and particularly among member governments. But parliaments, too, have important contributions to make. The task we have before us is huge, but we must not shy away from it or we risk the slow decline of the Alliance.