The impact of informal actors in the EU anticorruption policies: The case of Western Balkans

Transcription

1 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers University of Alberta Number 3, 2016 The impact of informal actors in the EU anticorruption policies: The case of Western Balkans Daniela Irrera, Ph.D. EUROPEAN UNION Centre of Excellence

2 The European Union Centre of Excellence has been co-funded with the assistance of the European Commission. The contents of this working paper are the sole responsibility of the author and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Commission. Daniela Irrera, Ph.D., European Union Centre of Excellence, University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta, September, 2016 European Union Centre of Excellence University of Alberta HM Tory Building University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada

3 The impact of informal actors in the EU anticorruption policies: The case of Western Balkans 1 Daniela Irrera, Ph.D., University of Catania, Italy Abstract: After twenty years of political and military interventions, the Western Balkans (WB) countries continue to be at the core of the European Union regional strategy. The legacy of communist political regimes, the influence of ethnic fragmentation, the need to manage a subtle transition to democracy has led WB towards a troubled period of adaptation. The need to face high level of corruption is still part of the efforts which are required to fulfill the enlargement criteria. What happened in the WB is an example of how informal actors may flourish in a post-war context, by severely influencing all aspects of the State system and weakening the rule of law. The Working Paper aims at assessing the improvements made by WB states in the policies against corruption and organized crime, by stressing the role of key actors. Keywords: Western Balkans; European Union; corruption; civil society; norms. After several decades of political and military interventions and despite the crises which have arisen along the way, the Western Balkans (WB) countries are still an important target of the European Union (EU) regional strategy. The post-war settlement is, notably, an environment in which the promises of democratic political elections and economic reconstruction are extremely high. Peacekeepers and external actors invest their efforts on long-term projects and arrangements which emphasize the involvement of local stakeholders through a top-down conditionality. It is also an environment in which different kinds of actors may easily establish patterns of behavior which profit from state weakness and affect public interest. The legacy of communist 1 This working paper builds on ideas presented during my research stay at EUCE in May I am extremely grateful to the EUCE at the University of Alberta, and its Director Prof. Lori Thorlakson, for inspiring conversations. I also wish to thank Ms. Skirmante Tamelyte for facilitating all aspects of my visit. Page 4 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

4 political regimes, the influence of ethnic fragmentation, the need to face and manage a subtle transition to democracy has led WB towards a difficult and troubled period of adaptation and evolution. Inexperienced political élites have been helped to turn weak institutions and inefficient bureaucracies into modern ones, to fulfill the requested criteria and, more importantly, to satisfy the needs and aspirations of a vivid civil society. The same conditions did not inhibit a variety of groups which have used the conflicts as a means to profit from illicit activities to flourish in all countries, building a set of criminal networks aimed at smuggling all kinds of illicit goods. Drug routes and relationships with local police officers, civil servants, businessmen, and former intelligence officers were one of the biggest concerns for the EU at the beginning of its intervention in the area and they are still on the agenda. The need to face high level of corruption, involving political élites at local, federal and national levels is still part of the efforts which are required to fulfill the enlargement criteria. The historical events which affected WB over the last twenty years demonstrate how informal actors may flourish in a post-war context, by severely influencing all aspects of the State system and weakening the rule of law. It also demonstrates how external intervention may significantly suffer to reduce their impact and, paradoxically, to avoid to benefit them. This working paper aims at assessing the improvements made by WB states in the policies against corruption and organized crime, by stressing the role of key actors and aims at promoting a deeper debate on the factors which impact the real efficiency and efficacy of such policies, in a region which is expected to be closer to the EU. It is particularly focused on the ways through which policies and practices promoted by European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 5

5 the EU are likely to become norms and on the actors which are involved, at various levels, in this process. This investigation concerns the policy field of anticorruption policies, since it is deals with the establishment of those basic conditions which allow political and social institutions to properly perform and represents a preliminary circumstance for the implementation of successive policies. The main assumption is that those actors, which are formally entitled to be the recipient of EU policies and to promote norms, are not effectively able to pursue their real implementation. Those actors which move in an informal environment and benefit from a deeper trust within local communities are rather far from policy-making cycles. Therefore, an assessment of the EU impact in the WB, two decades after its beginning, requires a broader perspective which involves the role of a set of different actors, both formal and informal ones. The paper is divided into three parts. Firstly, the notion of informal actors is theoretically discussed and applied to the political context of Western Balkans. A special focus is devoted to the role of civil society and NGOs in the region. Secondly, empirical data provided by international agencies are used to describe the current condition of corruption influence in the WB. The last part completes the analysis by assessing the impact of EU polices and local response. Therefore, it is manly based on three research questions: - Which actors are more relevant in tackling corruption and organized crime in the Western Balkans? - Are they formal or informal ones? - Do they play a role within the EU policies and strategies in the region? Page 6 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

6 1. Formal and informal actors: a theoretical overview The conflicts which affected the WB region, imposed complex and long-term interventions, both in terms of peace support missions and state-building policies. The dominant theoretical paradigm under which such exogenous policies have been read, in the last decades, follow the Liberal Peace theory, according to which the building up of political institutions is required as a preliminary condition to improve democracy reforms (Paris, 2004). They are, therefore, essential to the establishment of a new equitable political and economic setting. However, the cases which flourished since the end of the Cold War demonstrate that such aid paradigm, based on the assumption that security, stability and rule of law are prerequisites for development has not always and not everywhere - produced suitable results. This approach put more emphasis on the security sector as a tool for change, but this transformative potential may increase the power of local actors, even without sufficient control (Cooper and Pug, 2002). It may, additionally, create those conditions in which a culture of dependency benefits some local actors and deprives others (Chandler, 2001). In other words, the nature of democratic settlement that long- term interventions currently aim to achieve can only be defined as hybrid. Liberal peace can be hardly established tout court. It rather creates the conditions in which long-term measures can enhance political and social dialogue. The involvement of various actors - local, regional and international is necessary to shape negotiations and a hybrid form of peace as a context in which different interests coalesce, conflict and re- coalesce (Attinà, 2012). The assessment of the EU involvement in the WB offers a clear example of how hybrid peace was established, shaped and reshaped in several forms. The EU was particularly involved in the region, since the Dayton agreement, as a peace and security provider and, going beyond the post-conflict phase, as a democracy promoter within a broader European perspective, made of institution-building, rule of law, governance, anticorruption measures. European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 7

7 The role of local actors mainly in terms of aid recipient remains crucial. Analyses on policy interventions stress the importance of local ownership, which is sometimes only functionally declared and, most of the times, idealized. As comparative studies have evaluated, external actors usually refer to local authorities and political elites: thus, they become both recipients of aid policies, and responsible for conditionality and compliance to criteria. This applies to the WB, in which international policymakers who have mainly conceived and promoted the transition and state-building process - continue to address only formal institution building (Rossi, 2015). The difference among formal and informal actors is particularly remarkable and essential for understanding the factors which marked the post-conflict period in the area and the performances of these countries towards the EU requests. It also sheds light on the EU approach itself. The literature has extensively investigated the phenomenon of informality, encompassing a wide variety of issues and policy fields. The term informal institution has been, in particular, used to label both positive and negative actors, culture, networks, clientelism, corruption, criminal clans (Taylor, 1992; Borocs, 2000). By using a broad definition, a formal actor is the one who holds official statesanctioned political power and has an obligation to act in the state s public interest, while an informal actor plays the same roles, but without holding formal office or mandate (Cheng, 2012). Therefore, formal actors refer to state bodies, agencies and rules, while informal ones deal with societal organizations and rules. This definition brings to the notion of non-state actors, and to the ample debate on their ability to play a role in the international affairs, which has expressively grown in the last decades. A first relevant factor is the quality of actors themselves. Civil society groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), interest groups can contribute to the democratization and accountability of global politics and policies. However, the same environment can facilitate and strengthen uncivil groups, as organized crime (Irrera, 2011). Secondly, as scholars have empirically investigated, the interactions with formal actors are a phenomenon which cannot be avoided and, on the contrary, can become very productive (Way, 2002). In the WB, reconstruction and state- Page 8 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

8 building policies are primarily addressed to formal local political élites, but with the inevitable involvement of a large informal environment. In the region, many positive actors can exert an influence which can be transformative and direct. The role of civil society is particularly relevant and controversial at the same time. Their contribution largely depends on their ability to serve as being capable of serve as watchdogs and to engage with government in anticorruption reforms. However, some (or several) informal actors may easily act against the public interest for personal or group gain. Driving such positive and negative influence from the top can make the difference in the short and long period and, ultimately, impact the efficiency and efficacy of policies, particularly of those promoted by the EU. 2. Formal and informal actors and corruption: an empirical analysis Even though several important achievements in the region, particularly as for the stabilization of democratic institutions and cooperation with EU institutions for the adoption of laws in key anticorruption areas, WB countries are still far from consolidate anticorruption legislation and good governance reforms, and from seriously fighting corruption among elected politicians and states officers. However, the phenomenon is a structural one, it cannot be confined to single cases and deserves a deeper investigation. Corruption is commonly defined as the act of a public charge to gain a private benefit, and is the mode used by organized crime to spread throughout the State, and reach its apex. The most serious results are evident when every sector and every institution of a State have become corrupted. When regular productive capacity is reduced and competent national institutions are unable to manage resources on their own, the fiscal system becomes inefficient or nonexistent. In such a case, the most likely probability is an economy where any resource and activity, legal or illegal, will be accepted to maintain survival. This grave situation is often associated with total corruption (Gupta et al, 1998). European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 9

9 In post-conflict countries, political and institutional corruption is one of the most devious and lasting problems. Therefore, the analysis here focuses on the implications of grand corruption, which involves local political, social actors, that is to say police, customs officials, judges, tax officers and even doctors in the use of illegal practices of corrupt practices. Corrupt practices include all services a citizen ordinarily requires in daily life: health, public administration, taxes, etc. The inefficacy and inefficiency, or the lack of appropriate social control at the crucial legislative, judicial and administrative levels are important factors behind the profusion of corruption. Ultimately, low salaries create the strongest impetus for corruption. Public servants, in many cases, attempt to supplement their low salaries with bribes a diffuse practice that is often justified as a personal necessity. The analysis of corruption perception is also dealing with those factors which cause it and, at the same time, with actors which are expected to be more involved in anticorruption policies and practices. Corruption is not always perceived as driven by financial necessity and the very low level of tolerance of corruption in different sectors in almost all countries is a good example for understanding which institutions should be free from corruption. Corruption is, in principle, unacceptable among those institutions which are supposed to provide public services or to represent local interests on national levels. Investigations made by scholars and reports produced by agency like World Bank, IMF and UNODC have investigated how, over the last twenty years, in the WB, bribery has become the most frequent and rapid tool in the provision of any public service, in all sectors. According to reports produced by independent NGOs, in 2016, the 48% of population in the South Eastern Europe region consider corruption as a major concern, which should be prioritized by local governments (SELDI, 2016). Page 10 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

10 Low salaries are usually indicated as the first origin of corruption, since public servants, attempt to supplement with bribes and justify such practice as a personal necessity. This may affect all services a citizen ordinarily requires in daily life. However, grand corruption is a different and more serious phenomenon. The inefficacy and/or the lack of proper social control at the crucial legislative, judicial and administrative levels are important factors which may not only expand corrupt practices, but also affect the expected institutional performances and decrease its legitimacy and popular trust. Therefore, the relation between the rising of corruption and the performance of political institutions in the WB countries should be preliminarily evaluated. The last Corruption Perception Index 2015, compiled by Transparency International, mark a continuity in the undesirable conditions which have been reported in the last years (Table 1). Tab. 1 - Corruption in Western Balkan countries Country Rank Score Albania 88/167 36/100 Bosnia and Herzegovina 76/167 38/100 Macedonia 66/167 42/100 Croatia 50/167 51/100 Serbia 71/167 40/100 Montenegro 61/177 44/100 Kosovo 103/167 33/100 Source: Transparency International, 2016 Tab. 1 provides a set of information, which is relevant to identify the position the country is covering on a global scale and, at the same time, to understand the level of political control in fostering corruption and illegal practices. The country score indicates the perceived level of corruption in the public sector on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. The country s rank indicates its position compared to other countries included in the index. European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 11

11 According to data, among the WB countries, Kosovo is the one producing the worst result, together with Albania. Serbia and Bosnia are slowly ameliorating; Macedonia and Montenegro are probably the most stable cases, while Croatia is the best one, as it is expected from a EU member state. It is worth reminding that data depicts countries which are enormously diversified among each other, going from an EU member to a country in which a civilian mission is still deployed. However, from a regional point of view, they all collocate in a specific part of the Index. Perception of corruption is always a volatile variable and needs to be combined with additional data in order to provide a more precise overview of the phenomenon. At the same time, scholars and practitioners are aware of the difficulty in having reliable and updated data on corruption in this region. Here, the analysis is integrated with data offered by independent NGOs. The Southeast Europe Leadership for Development and Integrity (SELDI) is an anti-corruption and good governance initiative created by civil society organizations actively involved in WB countries. Their first concern is dealing with the assessment of the impact of corruption on daily life and in the provision of basic services and is based on survey conducted on local communities in all countries (Fig. 1). Page 12 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

12 Fig. 1 Perception of corruption in the WB 2 Source: SELDI, 2016 Data are referred to the involvement (attitude of giving a bribe) and the pressure (request of giving a bribe). According to the analysis made by SELDI, these are the main factors which affect daily life of citizens and contribute to the rise of corruption. Pressure from officials (in order to receive a service) is the main factor that statistically influences the level of involvement, but at the same time, both involvement and pressure are relevant for determining the level of resilience to corruption in a given country. Tab. 1 reveals that pressure is considerably high in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, while the percentages decrease (below 30%) in the other countries. Croatia demonstrates a better performance. Percentages about involvement reflect the same situation and are only marginally lower. The general overview reveals a region marked by scores of corruption, still not compatible with a democratic and stable regime (and even nor with a hybrid one) and which require additional measures and interventions. 2 Percentages of the population +18 who has been asked to give a bribe or has given a bribe in the previous year. European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 13

13 As stressed by SELDI report, pressure and involvement are relevant for measuring the level of resilience, which reflects the prevailing social attitudes to honesty and the propensity to respect the rule of law. On its turn, this is the result of the efforts made by civil society and local authorities to promote and increase anticorruption awareness. Corruption may be driven by financial necessity and, as a consequence, justified by people, but it is unacceptable among those institutions which should be accountable and represent local interests on a national level and are requested to provide public services. Figure 2 is a summary of the estimated perception of corruption among major political and administrative actors per country. Fig.2 Estimates of corruption major institution Ministers Government Political parties Local political leaders Members of Parliament Tax officials Customs officers Police officers Judges Albania Bosnia-Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia Croatia Kosovo Macedonia Source: SELDI, 2016 The report measures the perception of corruption on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 is Almost no one is involved and 4 is Almost everybody is involved. The general Page 14 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

14 overview, which can be read through Fig. 2, is extremely interesting. Firstly, data are mostly coherent with those on the corruption index and reflect the general trends of the region, marked by some states which are more affected (Albania and Kosovo), some others which are performing slightly better (Serbia and Montenegro) and a member state which tries to fulfill EU expectations (Croatia). Secondly, almost all formal institutions are perceived as non-transparent and non-accountable and unable to provide services or fulfill their duties without using corruption. Thirdly, the performance of those actors which are expected to monitor all process that is to say judges and judiciary institutions is worryingly perceived as very bad and can significantly distress the legitimacy of norm implementation. To complete the analysis and expand the evaluation to informal actors, data are compared to those of the Nations on Transit Report, issued in 2016, by Freedom House. Here countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. All major institutions, formal and informal, including civil society and independent media, are evaluated. The average of these ratings is each country s Democracy Score (DS). Data are referred to the period from 1 January through 31 December 2015 and are listed in Table 2. Tab. 2 - Democracy scores in Western Balkans Country DS EP CS IM NGOV LGOV JFI CO Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia Croatia Serbia Montenegro Kosovo Source: Freedom House, EP Electoral Process - CS - Civil Society IM - Independent Media NDG - National Democratic Governance LDG - Local Democratic Governance - JFI - Judicial Framework and Independence - CO Corruption European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 15

15 In the report, democracy score is rated as the result of a broader transition process, in which several actors are involved at various levels, and the set of relationship is extremely important in terms of impact on policy-making and implementation of norms promoted by the EU. Corruption (again its public perception) is scored as one of the factors of the overall process, together with formal and informal actors: on one hand, the interests of top policymakers, the legal and political environment in which they function, their performances during the electoral processes; the independence of judicial framework; on the other, the roles of civil society organizations and independent media. In terms of overall Democracy Score, Kosovo presents the worst result, followed by Albania, while Croatia provides a score which is still not perfectly satisfactory, even though it has the lowest level of corruption if compared to others. It is not surprising that political institutions, both national and local governments, continue to be considered as not truly democratic and close to the spread of corruption, especially in Kosovo, Bosnia and Albania. Those responsible for judicial framework deal with very similar scores. Performances are significantly better in the case of informal actors, even though not everyone. Independent media disclose a quite controversial level of democratic advancement, almost everywhere, with the worst result in Macedonia and Kosovo and the best one in Croatia. Civil society organizations are rather considered more advanced in terms of democracy progress, and they are still associated to the role of impartial watchdog, even though Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo are still critical cases. This analysis emphasizes the influence which corruption may exert on political and social life, by stressing the quality of actors. Preliminary investigations confirm that Page 16 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

16 in the WB corruption is still a major concern and considerably affect the democratic performance of political and social institutions in all countries. The difference between formal and informal actors is relevant in terms of practical implications and in respect to the EU conditionality. 3. EU anticorruption policies in the Western Balkans: what is not working? As already anticipated in the first paragraph, the quality of actors and the relationship among formal and informal ones are essential to measure the progress in a transition process. In previous analyses, the approach developed by the EU towards the WB has been evaluated by stressing the relevance of both institutional ties and economic assistance (Irrera, 2010). The relations between EU and the WB are characterized by a complex mixture of programs, practices and measures under which the EU has tried to follow and sustain the region from the resolution of conflicts to the formal entry, passing through transition to democracy. In this framework, the fight against organized crime and corruption is a preliminary and crucial step. The strengthening of the rule of law through the adoption, the implementation and the internalization of norms is at the core of anticorruption policies and practices. Almost everywhere in the region, Anticorruption Agencies provided with the task of promoting legislative, judicial and law enforcement measures are established. In some specific cases, in Kosovo, such programs are combined with a widespread package of Security Sector Reform, based on short and long term actions and on cross-pillar (community, external relations and judicial) cooperation. European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 17

17 The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) was designed to provide specific financial assistance for supporting transition and institution-building and the crossborder cooperation. The launch of IPA II in 2014 was expected to invest about 11.7 billions in the period , and a new system of incentives will award those countries which can actually demonstrate their advanced path to reform. The renewed strategy, launched in 2013, was particularly focused on the roles of institutions and based on the development of independent and accountable framework at national and regional level (EU Commission, 2013). Except Croatia which shares benefits and responsibilities of being a member state, all other countries are slowly progressing in their relation with the EU, according to different conditions and commitment. There are still many doubts on the part of the EU towards Kosovo. Even though the country is recognized as a potential candidate for membership, a final determination about the country s statehood is missing. The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has made some progress, but the social fragmentation is still high and the EU impact continues to be unpopular inside Kosovo. The result is that much more attention is current given to issues like EU visa liberalization and is rather distracted from much-needed reforms, particularly those related to fighting corruption. In other countries, like Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, local political élites tries to overlook ruthless performances and drop of legitimacy arguing that, in times of crisis for the EU, they represent the only possible choice. Indeed, the failure of reaching the expected results is due to a combination of different factors. The report from the European Court of Auditors on the European Commission s anti-corruption efforts in the Western Balkans, published in September 2016, officially declares that the strategy itself is based on the wrong approach. According to the Court, only a small slice of the Commission s IPA (about 485 million) is invested on the so-called rule of law projects, while around 2% of the total budget is devoted to Page 18 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

18 the fight against corruption and organized crime (European Court of Auditors, 2016). The Court provides several clear explanations for this lack of expected results. The Western Balkans is a region made up of countries that are all aspiring to join the EU and are firstly committed to fulfill conditionality clauses. Therefore, the Commission has so far encouraged regional cooperation and the improvement of administrative capacity, focusing, however, on local actors which are still producing a bad impact and this deprives the entire process. Although some progress has been achieved during the years, particularly as for public administration reform, political dialogue in the region had a limited impact on the rule of law (European Court of Auditors, 2016). In other words, the Court shares the same conclusions with SELDI and Freedom House and confirms data previously analyzed. Free media and a strong civil society are certainly not the only actors, but they represent the key drivers for raising public awareness of corruption and organized crime, since their monitoring role can often encourage anti-corruption agencies and the public prosecution to act. As denounced in the report by SELDI, the Court sustains that a very limited funding (0.5 % of total allocations) is destined to media freedom and civil society in the WB and not all allocations are directly related to the fight against corruption (2 %) and to the support for public prosecution services (1 %). Therefore, those projects that were funded to improve anti-corruption institutions were at the same time compromised by political interfering and lack of independence. What happened and is still happening in the WB countries quite clearly demonstrate how the transition process and the political change are strongly determined by the quality of actors, the impact of their relationship and the ability of international agencies to drive such impact toward the right direction. European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 19

19 According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the process of norm implementation is a lifecycle which is started by the emergence of a norm, passes through it acceptance and ends with its internalization. The level of norm internalization depends on the acceptance by actors and the gradual achievement of a taken-for granted quality (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2007). However, the crucial point, particularly for WB countries, is the fact that change, at each stage, is driven by different actors, motivation and mechanisms. The emergence of norms is here given by the need for the WB to fulfill EU conditionality and becoming member states. In principle, many agencies and bodies supported by the EU in the country would seem to be a positive and effective response to many problems, firstly the problem of corruption. Not only should the appropriate allocation of funds for officially approved projects be monitored, but also that budget requests are reasonable and in line with actual spending. Given that oversight are managed by local authorities albeit under the supervision of the EU there is no doubt that success will vary according to local factors. In other words, in the case of the fight against corruption, norms seem not to be completed accepted, even though the constant and vigilant presence of EU external influence. The role played by domestic actors is, in this sense, predominant. According to Magen and Morlino, the influence exerted by veto players could constitute an obstacle, while change agents mobilize decision-makers to adopt democratic rules, but also engage them in the process of persuasion and social learning to redefine their interests and identities (Magen and Morlino, 2008). It is clear that local governments are making strong efforts to demonstrate that its engagement in the fight against corruption is fully active, but they have often been criticized for corruption by international organizations. Veto players are presently considered as the most corrupted and are still affected by the communist legacy. Thus, the resistance they show obstacles the effective internalization of norms against corruption. While NGO and other civil society organizations are considered as the less Page 20 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

20 corrupt and more committed and can be envisaged as change actors. The political role they can play is, however, very limited and confined only to some procedures of the Anti-corruption bodies and programs. There are few doubts on the fact that, almost everywhere, formal actors are making strong efforts to demonstrate their full and proactive engagement in the fight against corruption and organized crime. However, they are still waving between the convenience of fulfilling the EU conditionality and the profits provided by the corruption network, which flourished in the previous decades. This translates into a resistance to the effective internalization and implementation of norms against corruption as well as the improvements of law enforcement measures and practices. This fatal combination of formal actors and negative informal ones is balanced by the pressure exerted by other positive informal actors, namely NGO and other civil society organizations which can be envisaged as tool for control and change. Their official role is, however, still limited and far from recognition. Conclusions The WB region represented one of the most investigated and evaluated case, by scholars and practitioners, in order to understand how to manage post-conflict transition. The spreading of corruption, criminal infiltrations into politics, frequent violations of the rule of law have created a condition of insecurity in which the EU has slowly and exhaustingly played the role of peace provider and democracy promoter. This analysis focused on grand corruption and discussed how an effective commitment in this field has a major impact on the democratization process. The main assumption here is that an assessment of the EU impact in the WB, two decades after its beginning, European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 21

21 requires a broader perspective which involves the role of a set of different actors, both formal and informal ones. A very specific and sensitive policy field, like the fight against organized crime and grand corruption, demonstrate that positive and negative influence of both types can combine and cross. The EU has already experienced and identified the impact of criminals and corrupt officers and politicians. Without underestimating or idealizing the role of informal actors, it should recognize their ability to influence the formal ones and turn it into a potentiality. References Attinà F. (ed.) (2012), The Politics and Policies of Relief, Aid and Reconstruction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Borocz J. (2000), Informality Rules, East European Politics and Societies, 14, pp Chandler D. (2001), Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox, Current History, 100 (644), pp Cheng C. (2012), Private and Public Interests Informal Actors, Informal Influence, and Economic Order after War in Zaum, D. and Berdal, M., (eds.), Political economy of state-building: power after peace. Routledge, Abingdon, pp Cooper, N. and Pug, M. (2002), Security-sector transformation in post-conflict societies, London: The Conflict, Security & Development Group. EU Commission (2013), Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges , , COM(2013) 700 final Page 22 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers

22 European Court of Auditors (2016), EU pre-accession assistance for strengthening administrative capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit, available at EN.pdf Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K. (2007), International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, International Organization, 52, pp Freedom House (2016), Nations in Transit 2016, available at org/sites/default/files/fh_nit2016_final_fweb.pdf Gupta S., Davoody H. and. Alonso-Terme R. (eds), Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?, IMF Working Paper, WP/1998/76. Irrera D. (2010), EU and Albania facing corruption and organised crime in Transitions, Vol. L.1, pp Irrera D. (2011), The EU Strategy in Tackling Organized Crime in the Framework of Multilateralism, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12(4), pp Magen A. and Morlino L. (eds)(2008), International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy, Routledge, London. Paris R. (2004), At War s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge University Press, New York. Rossi R. (2015), The EU, Non-state Actors, and Peace-Support Policies in the Western Balkans, European Foreign Affairs Review, 20 (4), pp European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers Page 23

23 SELDI (2016), Shadow Power - Assessment of Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe, available at Publications/Shadow_Power/SHADOW_POWER_FINAL_2016.pdf Taylor M. (1992), Formal versus Informal Incentive Structures and Informal Legislator Behavior, Journal of Politics 54 (4), pp Transparency International (2016), Corruption Perception Index 2015, available at Way L. (2002), The Dilemmas of Reform in Weak States: The Case of Post-Soviet Fiscal Decentralization, Politics and Society, 30 (4), pp Page 24 European Union Centre of Excellence Working Papers