MIDTERM EXAM: Political Economy Winter 2013
|
|
- Sophia Morton
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Name: MIDTERM EXAM: Political Economy Winter 2013 Student Number: You must always show your thinking to get full credit. You have one hour and twenty minutes to complete all questions.
2 This page is for your grade. Leave it blank please.
3 Question 1 Electoral Rules You will compare a single member electoral system (one seat for one district) under two different electoral rules. Assume four candidates (A,B,C,D) are running in a district. The first voting rule is first-past-the-post election, i.e. the candidate with the largest number of preferences wins. The second rule is single transferable vote. In this system voters rank all four candidates on the ballot in order of preference. If one of the four candidates reaches 50% of first preferences, he wins. If not, the last candidate in terms of first preferences, call her A, is eliminated and the preferences on her ballot are allocated to the other three candidates (so the second preferences to B on ballot that list A first go to B, the second preferences to C go to C, etc.). If a candidate reaches 50% of the first and second preferences she is elected, otherwise the last candidate is eliminated and his preferences reallocated, and so on. Explain what are the likely differences in electoral outcomes and political alignment of parties under FPTP and STV. Are winners under FPTP going to be likely coincide with STV ones? What is the role for party coalitions (assuming candidates come from four different parties)? Are there ways under STV for parties to form alliances across districts? How? [30 points].
4 Question 2 Modernization Hypothesis This is the argument according to which economic development (i.e. higher income levels per capita) causally determines the creation and consolidation of democratic institutions. Do you believe the hypothesis is true? Present empirical or anecdotal evidence in favor and/or against this hypothesis and discuss. [30 points]
5
6 Question 3 Bargaining in legislatures over policy (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) Consider a legislature of n (odd) members that deliberates with a simple majority rule. The goal is to share a cake, of value normalized to 1, across the members. Time is discrete and discounting happens at rate d < 1. At each time t a formateur i is randomly chosen (recognized) for deciding on how to split the cake. The proposal presented by i is indicated as x i = (x i 1, x i 2,, x i n) such that S n x i j 1 and we let x i j indicate the share accruing to j under i s proposal. Preferences of member j are given by u j (t, x i ) = d t x i j Notice that delay is costly in this setup because for given share of the pie waiting another period reduces the payoff by a factor d < 1. The proposal is voted upon immediately and it cannot be amended (a closed amendment rule). If i s proposal is approved by other (n-1)/2 members, it passes and payoffs realize. If the proposal fails, the period ends and the next time period starts anew (so another formateur is picked at random, a new proposal is presented and voted upon, and so on ). If no proposal is approved the status quo payoff is 0. We will focus on characterizing the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of this game. [20 points each answer] a) Suppose time is finite and the bargaining is at the last period T. Do you agree that the optimal strategy of formateur i is to set for (n-1)/2 members j i x i j = arbitrarily close to 0 and keep essentially the whole cake (of value 1) for himself? Why?
7 b) The recognition probability of every player is 1/n and the discount factor is d. What is the discounted continuation value v j for any j=1,,n at T-1? Consider that j could be the formateur, could be in the coalition but not the formateur, or j could be out.
8 c) Characterize the equilibrium of this game for T=2 based on your answer to points a) and b). Importantly, do specify the strategy of the formateur and that of the members at t=1.
9 d) A stationary equilibrium for infinite T will require that for j to accept the proposal x i j dv j Note that the present value of rejecting a proposal for member j must be equal to the continuation value of rejecting at the next period or v j = 1/n*[1- v j *(n-1)/2] + (n-1)/2n*[ v j ] Can you characterize the (stationary SPE) equilibrium of this game now? [Hint: as a formateur you have to make the other members in your minimum winning coalitions indifferent between accepting your proposal or rejecting and continue playing.]
10 Question 4 China s Demise? Please comment on this HuffPost.com entry by Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson in light of our discussion on institutions and China. With reference to our discussion in class, how strong is the link between property rights protection and economic development? How strong is the link between political rights protection, democracy, and economic development? Do you believe there is sufficient empirical evidence for Acemoglu and Robinson to seal the deal on their main hypothesis? [ ] According to the Economist magazine and the International Monetary Fund, China will overtake the U.S. as the largest economy in the world within the next decade. This outlook overstates China's potential for continued economic growth, however. Our research on national economies throughout world history shows that long-term economic growth, while indeed based on technological innovation, only sustains itself in the presence of democratic political institutions that provide people with incentives to innovate. China may continue to grow in the near term, but the limited rights it affords its citizens places major restrictions on the country's longer-term possibilities for prosperity. [ ]Chinese growth has not come simply by government fiat, but also because, starting with Deng's government, China has made changes allowing people -- from farmers to industrial leaders -- more incentives and autonomy to start using their land, capital, and talents. China can also export goods globally, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War; these larger markets may allow for more growth. China's growth may also be higher because it had even more technological catching up to do than the Soviets. Still, while China has implemented policies that seem radical compared to the ones it maintained in the mid-1970s, Chinese growth, like Soviet growth, has occurred under authoritarian political institutions. The country still lacks an independent judiciary and an independent media. Entrepreneurs have been jailed for dubious reasons -- not coincidentally when they went against businesses with stronger political backing. Many key economic decisions are still made by party elites who can change the CEOs of its largest companies on a whim. There will be limits on how much innovation such a system can generate, even if China keeps growing this decade. For all its changes, China still has what we term "extractive" political institutions, those that direct resources away from the people and toward the state and a small number of its elites. History is littered with states that have had some democratic or "inclusive" features, but remained essentially extractive: from ancient Rome to early-modern Venice to many authoritarian nations within the last century, these states have ultimately failed to deliver sustained growth. By their nature, extractive states are against the kind of innovation that leads to widespread prosperity: this kind of change threatens the hold on political and economic power that elites in such states fight to maintain. And fight they will: contra Steffens and others who have argued that some economic modernization leads to political reform, history shows this is not an inevitable pattern. Watching Xi and China's other senior leaders is important. However, the biggest questions about China's future growth do not involve its next economic investments, but rather, its political essence. Unless China fundamentally reforms its political institutions, a change that seems unlikely in the short term, a trajectory of economic growth followed by relative decline is more likely than a trajectory of long-term increasing prosperity [30 points]
11
MIDTERM EXAM 1: Political Economy Winter 2017
Name: MIDTERM EXAM 1: Political Economy Winter 2017 Student Number: You must always show your thinking to get full credit. You have one hour and twenty minutes to complete all questions. All questions
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 11: Economic Policy under Representative Democracy
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 11: Economic Policy under Representative Democracy Daron Acemoglu MIT October 16, 2017. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lecture 11 October 16, 2017.
More information1 Grim Trigger Practice 2. 2 Issue Linkage 3. 3 Institutions as Interaction Accelerators 5. 4 Perverse Incentives 6.
Contents 1 Grim Trigger Practice 2 2 Issue Linkage 3 3 Institutions as Interaction Accelerators 5 4 Perverse Incentives 6 5 Moral Hazard 7 6 Gatekeeping versus Veto Power 8 7 Mechanism Design Practice
More informationIntroduction to Political Economy Problem Set 3
Introduction to Political Economy 14.770 Problem Set 3 Due date: October 27, 2017. Question 1: Consider an alternative model of lobbying (compared to the Grossman and Helpman model with enforceable contracts),
More informationEcon 554: Political Economy, Institutions and Business: Solution to Final Exam
Econ 554: Political Economy, Institutions and Business: Solution to Final Exam April 22, 2015 Question 1 (Persson and Tabellini) a) A winning candidate with income y i will implement a policy solving:
More informationBargaining and vetoing
Bargaining and vetoing Hankyoung Sung The Ohio State University April 30, 004 Abstract This paper studies the bargaining game between the president and the congress when these two players have conflicting
More informationSupporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study
Supporting Information Political Quid Pro Quo Agreements: An Experimental Study Jens Großer Florida State University and IAS, Princeton Ernesto Reuben Columbia University and IZA Agnieszka Tymula New York
More informationGamson s Law versus Non-Cooperative. Bargaining Theory
Gamson s Law versus Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory Guillaume R. Fréchette New York University John H. Kagel Ohio State University Massimo Morelli Ohio State University September 24, 2004 Morelli s research
More informationUnit 1 Introduction to Comparative Politics Test Multiple Choice 2 pts each
Unit 1 Introduction to Comparative Politics Test Multiple Choice 2 pts each 1. Which of the following is NOT considered to be an aspect of globalization? A. Increased speed and magnitude of cross-border
More informationELECTIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND PARLIAMENTS IN PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS*
ELECTIONS, GOVERNMENTS, AND PARLIAMENTS IN PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS* DAVID P. BARON AND DANIEL DIERMEIER This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation
More informationCoalition Governments and Political Rents
Coalition Governments and Political Rents Dr. Refik Emre Aytimur Georg-August-Universität Göttingen January 01 Abstract We analyze the impact of coalition governments on the ability of political competition
More informationClassical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
The identity of politicians is endogenized Typical approach: any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost. There is no pre-commitment on the platforms, and winner implements his or her ideal policy.
More informationCandidate Citizen Models
Candidate Citizen Models General setup Number of candidates is endogenous Candidates are unable to make binding campaign promises whoever wins office implements her ideal policy Citizens preferences are
More informationPre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining 1
Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining 1 Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay 2 Kalyan Chatterjee Tomas Sjöström 4 October 1, 2010 1 We thank Facundo Albornoz, Ralph Bailey, Jayasri Dutta, John Fender,
More informationCommon Agency Lobbying over Coalitions and Policy
Common Agency Lobbying over Coalitions and Policy David P. Baron and Alexander V. Hirsch July 12, 2009 Abstract This paper presents a theory of common agency lobbying in which policy-interested lobbies
More informationBargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games Sergiu Hart July 2008 Revised: January 2009 SERGIU HART c 2007 p. 1 Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games Sergiu Hart Center of Rationality,
More informationPOLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL SECURITY WITH MIGRATION
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM SOCIAL SECURITY WITH MIGRATION Laura Marsiliani University of Durham laura.marsiliani@durham.ac.uk Thomas I. Renström University of Durham and CEPR t.i.renstrom@durham.ac.uk We analyze
More informationEnriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania. March 9, 2000
Campaign Rhetoric: a model of reputation Enriqueta Aragones Harvard University and Universitat Pompeu Fabra Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania March 9, 2000 Abstract We develop a model of infinitely
More informationSENIORITY AND INCUMBENCY IN LEGISLATURES
ECONOMICS & POLITICS DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12024 Volume 0 XXXX 2013 No. 0 SENIORITY AND INCUMBENCY IN LEGISLATURES ABHINAY MUTHOO* AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of
More informationInternational Cooperation, Parties and. Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete
International Cooperation, Parties and Ideology - Very preliminary and incomplete Jan Klingelhöfer RWTH Aachen University February 15, 2015 Abstract I combine a model of international cooperation with
More informationPublished in Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), Copyright c 1995 by Canadian Economics Association
Published in Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1995), 261 301. Copyright c 1995 by Canadian Economics Association Spatial Models of Political Competition Under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations
More informationCommittee proposals and restrictive rules
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA Vol. 96, pp. 8295 8300, July 1999 Political Sciences Committee proposals and restrictive rules JEFFREY S. BANKS Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency Daron Acemoglu MIT October 2 and 4, 2018. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9 October 2 and 4, 2018. 1 /
More informationAs you may have heard, there has been some discussion about possibly changing Canada's electoral system. We want to ask people their views on this.
Ballot Testing and Voting System Survey [Screen for PC-only won't work on mobile] [Intro Screen] As you may have heard, there has been some discussion about possibly changing Canada's electoral system.
More informationGAME THEORY. Analysis of Conflict ROGER B. MYERSON. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
GAME THEORY Analysis of Conflict ROGER B. MYERSON HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England Contents Preface 1 Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence
More informationPSC/IR 106: The Democratic Peace Theory. William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/ps /
PSC/IR 106: The Democratic Peace Theory William Spaniel https://williamspaniel.com/classes/ps-0500-2017/ Outline Brief History of IR Theory The Democratic Peace Explanations for the Democratic Peace? Correlation
More informationPart Three (continued): Electoral Systems & Linkage Institutions
Part Three (continued): Electoral Systems & Linkage Institutions Our political institutions work remarkably well. They are designed to clang against each other. The noise is democracy at work. -- Michael
More informationHow do parties contribute to democratic politics?
Chapter Objectives Evaluate how political parties both contribute to and detract from democratic politics Trace the history of political parties in the U.S. and assess the contemporary system Compare and
More informationA Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games
A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games Ecole Polytechnique Simposio de Analisis Económico December 2008 Matías Núñez () A Study of Approval voting on Large Poisson Games 1 / 15 A controversy
More informationAn Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature. Abstract
An Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature Luca Murrau Ministry of Economy and Finance - Rome Abstract This work presents a review of the literature on political process formation and the
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationFINAL EXAM: Political Economy Winter 2017
FINAL EXAM: Political Economy Winter 2017 Name: You must always show your thinking to get full credit. You have two hours and thirty minutes to complete all questions. This page is for your grade. Leave
More informationUniversity of Toronto Department of Economics. Party formation in single-issue politics [revised]
University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper 296 Party formation in single-issue politics [revised] By Martin J. Osborne and Rabee Tourky July 13, 2007 Party formation in single-issue politics
More informationThe Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative. Electoral Incentives
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico March 10, 2000 American Economic Review, forthcoming ABSTRACT Politicians who care about the spoils
More informationVoting rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision:
rules: (Dixit and Skeath, ch 14) Recall parkland provision decision: Assume - n=10; - total cost of proposed parkland=38; - if provided, each pays equal share = 3.8 - there are two groups of individuals
More informationPolitical Science 381: The Politics of Electoral Systems. Course Description
Political Science 381: The Politics of Electoral Systems Dr. Brian F. Crisp 285 Siegle Hall crisp@wustl.edu Office Hours: Thursdays 2:30-3:30 or by appointment Course Description It is impossible to appreciate
More informationProf. Bryan Caplan Econ 812
Prof. Bryan Caplan bcaplan@gmu.edu http://www.bcaplan.com Econ 812 Week 14: Economics of Politics I. The Median Voter Theorem A. Assume that voters' preferences are "single-peaked." This means that voters
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationNotes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem
Notes for Session 7 Basic Voting Theory and Arrow s Theorem We follow up the Impossibility (Session 6) of pooling expert probabilities, while preserving unanimities in both unconditional and conditional
More informationGOVERNMENT & POLITICS UNIT 1 GLOSSARY
NAME: GOVERNMENT & POLITICS UNIT 1 GLOSSARY TASK Over the summer holiday complete the definitions for the words for the FOUR topics AND more importantly learn these key words with their definitions! There
More informationLecture 16: Voting systems
Lecture 16: Voting systems Economics 336 Economics 336 (Toronto) Lecture 16: Voting systems 1 / 18 Introduction Last lecture we looked at the basic theory of majority voting: instability in voting: Condorcet
More informationSincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially
Soc Choice Welf (2013) 40:745 751 DOI 10.1007/s00355-011-0639-x ORIGINAL PAPER Sincere versus sophisticated voting when legislators vote sequentially Tim Groseclose Jeffrey Milyo Received: 27 August 2010
More informationBuying Supermajorities
Presenter: Jordan Ou Tim Groseclose 1 James M. Snyder, Jr. 2 1 Ohio State University 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology March 6, 2014 Introduction Introduction Motivation and Implication Critical
More informationSincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially
Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting When Legislators Vote Sequentially Tim Groseclose Departments of Political Science and Economics UCLA Jeffrey Milyo Department of Economics University of Missouri September
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 12: Political Compromise
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lecture 12: Political Compromise Daron Acemoglu MIT October 18, 2017. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lecture 12 October 18, 2017. 1 / 22 Introduction Political
More information1 Electoral Competition under Certainty
1 Electoral Competition under Certainty We begin with models of electoral competition. This chapter explores electoral competition when voting behavior is deterministic; the following chapter considers
More informationMultilateral Bargaining: Veto Power PS132
Multilateral Bargaining: Veto Power PS132 Introduction Some members have veto right - ability to block decisions even when a proposal has secured the necessary majority Introduction Some members have veto
More informationSeniority and Incumbency in Legislatures
Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures Abhinay Muthoo and Kenneth A. Shepsle December 28, 2012 Abstract In this paper we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority,
More informationReputation and Rhetoric in Elections
Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections Enriqueta Aragonès Institut d Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC Andrew Postlewaite University of Pennsylvania April 11, 2005 Thomas R. Palfrey Princeton University Earlier versions
More informationECO/PSC 582 Political Economy II
ECO/PSC 582 Political Economy II Jean Guillaume Forand Spring 2011, Rochester Lectures: TBA. Office Hours: By appointment, or drop by my office. Course Outline: This course, a companion to ECO/PSC 575,
More informationVeto Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University
Power in Committees: An Experimental Study* John H. Kagel Department of Economics Ohio State University Hankyoung Sung Department of Economics Ohio State University Eyal Winter Department of Economics
More informationStrategy in Law and Business Problem Set 1 February 14, Find the Nash equilibria for the following Games:
Strategy in Law and Business Problem Set 1 February 14, 2006 1. Find the Nash equilibria for the following Games: A: Criminal Suspect 1 Criminal Suspect 2 Remain Silent Confess Confess 0, -10-8, -8 Remain
More informationONLINE APPENDIX: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness
CeNTRe for APPlieD MACRo - AND PeTRoleuM economics (CAMP) CAMP Working Paper Series No 2/2013 ONLINE APPENDIX: Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? Extensions and Robustness Daron Acemoglu, James
More informationElections and Durable Governments in Parliamentary Democracies
Elections and Durable Governments in Parliamentary Democracies David P. Baron Stanford University July 7, 014 Preliminary. Please do not cite. Abstract This paper provides a theory of a parliamentary government
More informationPolitical Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Georgy Egorov (Harvard University) Konstantin Sonin (New Economic School) June 4, 2009. NASM Boston Introduction James Madison
More informationThe Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations. Branislav L. Slantchev Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations Branislav L. Slantchev Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego March 25, 2003 1 War s very objective is victory not prolonged
More informationCommunication in Multilateral Bargaining
Communication in Multilateral Bargaining Marina Agranov Caltech Chloe Tergiman UBC September 2013 Abstract One of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is
More informationPolitical Change, Stability and Democracy
Political Change, Stability and Democracy Daron Acemoglu (MIT) MIT February, 13, 2013. Acemoglu (MIT) Political Change, Stability and Democracy February, 13, 2013. 1 / 50 Motivation Political Change, Stability
More informationEndogenous agendas and seniority advantage
Endogenous agendas and seniority advantage Jon X. Eguia New York University Kenneth Shepsle Harvard University August 1, 01 Abstract We study a legislative assembly that chooses its agenda protocol endogenously.
More informationHOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT
HOTELLING-DOWNS MODEL OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE OPTION TO QUIT ABHIJIT SENGUPTA AND KUNAL SENGUPTA SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY SYDNEY, NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA Abstract.
More informationChapter 6 Democratic Regimes. Copyright 2015 W.W. Norton, Inc.
Chapter 6 Democratic Regimes 1. Democracy Clicker question: A state with should be defined as a nondemocracy. A.a hereditary monarch B.an official, state-sanctioned religion C.a legislative body that is
More informationPreferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems
Soc Choice Welf (018) 50:81 303 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1084- ORIGINAL PAPER Preferential votes and minority representation in open list proportional representation systems Margherita Negri
More informationPS 124A Midterm, Fall 2013
PS 124A Midterm, Fall 2013 Choose the best answer and fill in the appropriate bubble. Each question is worth 4 points. 1. The dominant economic power in the first Age of Globalization was a. Rome b. Spain
More informationPolitical Economics II Spring Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency. Torsten Persson, IIES
Lectures 4-5_190213.pdf Political Economics II Spring 2019 Lectures 4-5 Part II Partisan Politics and Political Agency Torsten Persson, IIES 1 Introduction: Partisan Politics Aims continue exploring policy
More informationElectoral Reform Brief
2016 Electoral Reform Brief Ron Campbell csm.ron30@yahoo.ca 7/1/2016 Summary We need to look at the cause of the problems that our current system has, in order to know what needs modifying. If we do not
More informationStrategic Sequential Voting
Strategic Sequential Voting Julio González-Díaz, Florian Herold and Diego Domínguez Working Paper No. 113 July 2016 0 b k* B A M B AMBERG E CONOMIC RESEARCH ROUP G k BERG Working Paper Series Bamberg Economic
More informationIMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS)
IMPERFECT INFORMATION (SIGNALING GAMES AND APPLICATIONS) 1 Equilibrium concepts Concept Best responses Beliefs Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Perfect Bayesian equilibrium On the equilibrium
More informationShould Fiscal Policy be Set by Politicians?
Should Fiscal Policy be Set by Politicians? E. Maskin Harvard University Jean Monnet Lecture European Central Bank Frankfurt September 29, 2016 European Union an enormous success 2 European Union an enormous
More informationElectoral Uncertainty and the Stability of Coalition Governments
Electoral Uncertainty and the Stability of Coalition Governments Daniela Iorio Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona January 2009 Abstract In multiparty parliamentary democracies government coalitions frequently
More informationIntroduction Why Don t Electoral Rules Have the Same Effects in All Countries?
Introduction Why Don t Electoral Rules Have the Same Effects in All Countries? In the early 1990s, Japan and Russia each adopted a very similar version of a mixed-member electoral system. In the form used
More informationChoosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games
Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games July 17, 1996 Eric Rasmusen Abstract Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points
More informationElecting the President. Chapter 12 Mathematical Modeling
Electing the President Chapter 12 Mathematical Modeling Phases of the Election 1. State Primaries seeking nomination how to position the candidate to gather momentum in a set of contests 2. Conventions
More informationBargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules*
Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules* Guillaume R. Frechette Ohio State University John H. Kagel Ohio State University Steven F. Lehrer University
More informationNotes on Strategic and Sincere Voting
Notes on Strategic and Sincere Voting Francesco Trebbi March 8, 2019 Idea Kawai and Watanabe (AER 2013): Inferring Strategic Voting. They structurally estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify
More informationSocial Rankings in Human-Computer Committees
Social Rankings in Human-Computer Committees Moshe Bitan 1, Ya akov (Kobi) Gal 3 and Elad Dokow 4, and Sarit Kraus 1,2 1 Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University, Israel 2 Institute for Advanced
More informationISSN , Volume 13, Number 2
ISSN 1386-4157, Volume 13, Number 2 This article was published in the above mentioned Springer issue. The material, including all portions thereof, is protected by copyright; all rights are held exclusively
More informationRhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 1
Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information 1 Ying Chen Arizona State University yingchen@asu.edu Hülya Eraslan Johns Hopkins University eraslan@jhu.edu June 22, 2010 1 We thank Ming
More informationAre Second-Best Tariffs Good Enough?
Are Second-Best Tariffs Good Enough? Alan V. Deardorff The University of Michigan Paper prepared for the Conference Celebrating Professor Rachel McCulloch International Business School Brandeis University
More informationCommunication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results
Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results César Martinelli Thomas R. Palfrey August 5, 2018 1 Introduction Voting games and other collective decision
More informationNew Zealand Germany 2013
There is a budding campaign to change the UK electoral system from a First Past the Post system (FPTP) to one that is based on Proportional Representation (PR) 1. The campaign makes many valid points.
More informationAndrzej Baranski & John H. Kagel
Communication in legislative bargaining Andrzej Baranski & John H. Kagel Journal of the Economic Science Association A Companion Journal to Experimental Economics ISSN 2199-6776 Volume 1 Number 1 J Econ
More informationHomework 6 Answers PS 30 November 2012
Homework 6 Answers PS 30 November 2012 1. Say that Townsville is deciding how many coal-fired energy plants to build to supply its energy needs. Some people are more environmentally oriented and thus prefer
More informationElectoral Reform National Dialogue INFORMATION BOOKLET
Electoral Reform National Dialogue INFORMATION BOOKLET Thank you for joining us in this historic dialogue. Federal electoral reform in Canada Canada is a great nation with a rich democratic history, and
More informationI assume familiarity with multivariate calculus and intermediate microeconomics.
Prof. Bryan Caplan bcaplan@gmu.edu Econ 812 http://www.bcaplan.com Micro Theory II Syllabus Course Focus: This course covers basic game theory and information economics; it also explores some of these
More information4.1 THE DUTCH CONSTITUTION. The part of the government that makes sure laws are carried out 1 mark.
4.1 THE DUTCH CONSTITUTION POLITICS GAME 1 1 Your teacher will show you how to play the Politics game. Complete this table during the game. Type of player at the end of round 1 at the end of round 2 at
More informationconnect the people to the government. These institutions include: elections, political parties, interest groups, and the media.
Overriding Questions 1. How has the decline of political parties influenced elections and campaigning? 2. How do political parties positively influence campaigns and elections and how do they negatively
More informationSequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks
Sequential Voting with Externalities: Herding in Social Networks Noga Alon Moshe Babaioff Ron Karidi Ron Lavi Moshe Tennenholtz February 7, 01 Abstract We study sequential voting with two alternatives,
More informationModernizing Canada s Electoral System: Instant Runoff Voting as the Best Alternative. By Maxime Dubé, as an individual
Modernizing Canada s Electoral System: Instant Runoff Voting as the Best Alternative Summary By Maxime Dubé, as an individual In the context of electoral reform brought about by the current government,
More informationFinal exam: Political Economy of Development. Question 2:
Question 2: Since the 1970s the concept of the Third World has been widely criticized for not capturing the increasing differentiation among developing countries. Consider the figure below (Norman & Stiglitz
More informationNEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REFERENDUM 2017 DISPELLING THE MYTHS By Peter J. Galie and Christopher Bopst Oct. 7, 2017
NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION REFERENDUM 2017 DISPELLING THE MYTHS By Peter J. Galie and Christopher Bopst Oct. 7, 2017 On Election Day, November 7, 2017, all New Yorkers who go to the polls
More informationVoting. Suppose that the outcome is determined by the mean of all voter s positions.
Voting Suppose that the voters are voting on a single-dimensional issue. (Say 0 is extreme left and 100 is extreme right for example.) Each voter has a favorite point on the spectrum and the closer the
More informationMATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics
MATH 1340 Mathematics & Politics Lecture 1 June 22, 2015 Slides prepared by Iian Smythe for MATH 1340, Summer 2015, at Cornell University 1 Course Information Instructor: Iian Smythe ismythe@math.cornell.edu
More informationSpring 2017 SOCI Social Science Inquiry III
Spring 2017 SOCI 30900 Social Science Inquiry III Professor Nalepa mnalepa@uchicago.edu The University of Chicago T, Th: 9:00-10:20 a.m. Wieboldt Hall 130 Office hours: Tuesday 3-5 p.m. TA: Ji Xue jixue@uchicago.edu
More informationThe determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games
J Econ Sci Assoc (2017) 3:26 43 DOI 10.1007/s40881-017-0038-x ORIGINAL PAPER The determinants of voting in multilateral bargaining games Guillaume R. Fréchette 1 Emanuel Vespa 2 Received: 24 February 2017
More informationBCGEU surveyed its own members on electoral reform. They reported widespread disaffection with the current provincial electoral system.
BCGEU SUBMISSION ON THE ELECTORAL REFORM REFERENDUM OF 2018 February, 2018 The BCGEU applauds our government s commitment to allowing British Columbians a direct say in how they vote. As one of the largest
More informationMaintaining Control. Putin s Strategy for Holding Power Past 2008
Maintaining Control Putin s Strategy for Holding Power Past 2008 PONARS Policy Memo No. 397 Regina Smyth Pennsylvania State University December 2005 There is little question that Vladimir Putin s Kremlin
More informationPolicy Stability under Different Electoral Systems Λ Massimo Morelli? and Michele Tertilt??? Ohio State University?? University of Minnesota OSU Worki
Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems Λ Massimo Morelli? and Michele Tertilt??? Ohio State University?? University of Minnesota OSU Working Paper no. 00-13, October 2000 Abstract This paper
More informationContents. Acknowledgments
Contents Figures Tables Acknowledgments page xiii xv xvii 1 Introduction: The Anatomy of Dictatorship 1 1.1 The Two Problems of Authoritarian Rule 3 1.1.1 The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing 5 1.1.2
More informationThree Essays in Collective Decision Making
Three Essays in Collective Decision Making Niall Hughes Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute Florence, November
More informationThe Origins of the Modern State
The Origins of the Modern State Max Weber: The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. A state is an entity
More information