Institutionalizing societal activism within global governance structures: Amnesty International and the United Nations system

Transcription

1 Institutionalizing societal activism within global governance structures: Amnesty International and the United Nations system Kerstin Martens Collaborative Research Centre Transformations of the State, University of Bremen, PO Box , Bremen D-28334, Germany. Since the 1990s, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly participated within the forums of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Whereas most studies have focused on demonstrating that NGOs shape the processes and programmes of IGOs, little research has been conducted to examine how they accomplish this. Applying social movement theory, I develop an approach for examining NGO institutionalization within structures of global governance as provided by IGOs. This angle emphasizes the professionalization of NGOs on one hand and the formalization of regulations with intergovernmental institutions on the other as the factors explaining changes in their pattern of activities as regards IGOs. In the empirical part, the theoretical propositions are evaluated in relation to one of the most prominent and active NGOs in the United Nations (UN) context: Amnesty International. The paper is based on semi-structured expert interviews held with NGO representatives to the UN. Journal of International Relations and Development (2006) 9, doi: /palgrave.jird Keywords: Amnesty International; institutionalism; NGOs; professionalization; social movements; United Nations Introduction Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 1 have become an integral part of the United Nations (UN) system over the course of the last decade. Since their participation at a series of world conferences in the early 1990s, they have been increasingly recognized as significant actors in the international sphere. The UN has gradually integrated NGOs into many of its processes and procedures. Today, NGOs regularly collaborate with the UN in agenda-setting activities and advise its commissions and committees. Moreover, they also assist UN institutions during drafting processes and provide them with information on issues of their concern. NGOs even work in co-operation with operational UN agencies and implement projects together. The Cardoso report, released in Journal of International Relations and Development, 2006, 9, ( ) r 2006 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd /06 $

2 372 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, , favoured new guidelines and practices that affect NGO access to and participation in UN processes and provides the basis for current discussions about reforming the UN system for NGO activities (UN Doc. A/58/817). If NGOs are now closely integrated into intergovernmental forums such as the UN, in what way does that affect their capacities for policy-making in the international sphere? Most of the existing literature aims to demonstrate that NGOs have significant options to exercise an influence on the policies and programmes of the UN; this article looks at the NGO/UN relationship from a different perspective and investigates how NGOs take advantage of such opportunities to interact with the UN. 2 It thus seeks to examine in what way NGOs work in and through the UN system today and how they have adapted their patterns of activity with the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). By doing so, the emphasis is laid not only on NGO influence as such but takes into account how the NGOs themselves change and what pressures are put on them because of closer integration with the UN system. In a wider picture, the aim of this analysis is hence to explore the way societal actors have increasingly become part of the structures of global governance, as provided by IGOs. The article is structured as follows: in the first section, I develop a theoretical approach to what I call NGO institutionalization within the UN system. Social movement theory serves as a basis in this part in line with current research on NGOs in international relations. It lays the focus on two possible explanatory factors for adapting NGO patterns of activities when interaction with the UN increases, namely the internal processes of NGOs on one hand, and the external demands put on NGOs on the other. In the second section, I explore the relationship between NGOs and the UN regarding one of the most prominent and active organizations in the UN context: Amnesty International (AI). UN documents, NGO materials as well as semi-standardized expert interviews with Amnesty representatives provided the data for the empirical section. 3 In the concluding third section, I briefly compare AI with other NGOs to show that my case is not a one-off phenomenon. I also reflect upon the implications of my findings in view of the theoretical propositions laid out in the first part of this article, while indicating further subjects for research. NGO Institutionalization into the UN System Theoretical Framework Social movement theory has to date been the dominant theoretical approach used to examine NGOs and their involvement in international affairs. Drawing analogies from classic works on social movements has significantly advanced the study of NGOs and their impact on IGOs (Smith et al. 1997; della Porta et al. 1999). These perspectives have in common that they explain why NGOs seek a greater involvement with IGOs, for example that they gain greater opportunities to advance their objectives and goals by interacting with IGOs.

3 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 373 Similarly, with the support of these approaches it has also been argued that NGOs are able to bring forward their concerns to officials and pressure governmental delegates regarding their cause. Social movement studies, however, have also developed another body of literature explaining the consequences of processes and dynamics that enable increased interaction between societal actors and the government. Captured by the notion of institutionalization, scholars have explored and identified the setting in which societal actors enhance their interaction with governmental actors. In these works, the main proposition is that societal actors adapt their pattern of activities with their official counterpart when conditions change and allow for more interaction. Following this line of argument, parallels from the institutionalization of social movement are drawn in order to study NGOs institutionalization into the UN system. 4 Such works identify two major lines of reasoning for these adaptations. (1) Similar to classic models on societal activism, resource mobilization theory argues that interaction between societal actors and official institutions depends on the organizational structures of societal actors (McCarthy and Zald 1987). It highlights factors such as professionalization and bureaucratization that lead to new types of interaction with the governmental actor. (2) Following a neoinstitutionalist interpretation of social movement research, adaptations are due to institutional channelling such as rules and regulations for relations between societal actors and official institutions (McCarthy et al. 1991). These scholars focus on the prospects of official recognition and indirect legitimization for societal actors which, in turn, cause them to change their ways of interacting with official actors. Institutionalization as an internal process The interaction between societal actors and official institutions is a subject with a long tradition in social research. Many scholars draw attention to the internal structures of societal actors in this context. They argue that, as a movement grows, finds ways for its participation in society and thus intensifies interaction with the outer world, it must as a consequence establish organizational structures to keep up with the demands for co-ordination. Developments within the movement, such as the division of labour, bureaucratic structures and professional leadership, are necessary to ensure ongoing success. In such approaches, institutionalization is considered a gradual process within social movements such that they develop through a series of phases: starting as diffuse and scattered phenomena, they slowly adopt organizational structures and finally end up as large institutions with bureaucratic structures. In his classic study on the sociology of parties in modern democracies, Michels (1911/1970) for example argues that organizations will always

4 374 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 differentiate internally and establish hierarchical structures (the iron law of oligarchy ). 5 According to Michels, this is an organic tendency within each organization and hence also progressive organizations will establish them even though hierarchical structures are considered contrary to their ideological principles (Michels 1911/1970: 371). The establishment of hierarchical structures within the organization is seen as a gradual development. The increased size calls for a division of labour, with sophisticated systems of selfadministration and professional leadership. For Michels, the unavoidable consequences for societal actors of such institutionalization are that the main objective of the organization becomes its own consolidation at this stage and prevails over the idealistic aims that had initially started the movement. 6 Thus, such classic approaches studying the institutionalization of societal actors are concerned with the dimensions of organizational changes, which eventually have implications for their activities. In these models, internal factors constitute the reasons for societal actors to adjust their pattern of activities. Due to intensified interaction with other actors (including governmental institutions), societal actors establish organizational structures to keep up with the demands for co-ordination. Scholars representing this classic approach take a pessimistic view by stressing that institutionalization is considered the final stage of a process within which social actors are characterized by changing their goals from working for a good cause to preserving themselves. 7 Various scholars have translated such concepts to study today s societal actors. Building upon these classic models, they have further explored the significance of the organizational structures of societal actors and the effects on their modes of interaction. Resource mobilization theorists assert that both the creation of and activities undertaken by social movements depend on their capacity to mobilize resources (McCarthy and Zald 1987). These scholars presume that political dissatisfaction and social conflict are inherent to every society. Thus, the formation of social movements does not depend on the existence of interests but on the creation of organizations to mobilize their potential (McCarthy and Zald 1987: 18). In this view, organizations are seen as existing in a changing environment to which they adapt; the adaptations, however, depend on the internal structures of organizations (Zald and Ash 1987: 122). Thus, resource mobilization theory is similar to classic models in that internal aspects represent significant explanatory factors for the performance of societal actors vis-a`-vis the authorities. Exploring social movements through the lenses of resource mobilization theory, scholars seek to clarify which factors influence the performance of societal actors. They examine the availability of critical resources for both mobilization and maturation. However, to resource mobilization theorists, internal developments do not necessarily make organizations less effective.

5 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 375 Zald and Ash (1987) argued in this respect that elaborated internal structures can, in fact, give rise to more radical goals and the use of more aggressive tactics. For example, the establishment of a hierarchy, which allows for leadership positions and charismatic leaders may enable individuals to shape the goals and activities of the organization to become radical. Accordingly, resource mobilization theorists argue too that the re-arrangement of internal structures leads to changes in the pattern of activities. Unlike the classic studies on social movements, however, their approach is not fatalistic. Rather, it concentrates on specifying the conditions in which alternative transformation processes take place (McCarthy and Zald 1987: 19 20; Zald and Ash 1987: 122). Either way, both scholars argue that internal arrangements determine the performance of the organization in relation to governmental actors and they emphasize aspects such as professionalization and bureaucratization as important features (Staggenborg 1997). Professionalization, in this respect, is seen as a process by which problems are dealt with according to subject-specific knowledge in order to maintain quality standards and quality work. Consequently, it has effects on the maintenance, strategies and tactics of movement organizations (Rucht et al. 1997: 55; Staggenborg 1997: 421). Professionalization, in fact, has two meanings: on one hand, it refers to the making of a profession out of a previously voluntary position and, on the other hand, it implies that staff are recruited on the basis of educational qualifications rather than prior experience with political activism (Meyer and Tarrow 1998: 16; Rucht and Roose 1999: 78). Moreover, bureaucratic structures enable societal actors to perform certain tasks routinely and to continue to function despite changes in staff. The process of bureaucratization hence encompasses procedures for decision making and a developed division of labour with clearly defined positions and functions (Zald and Ash 1987: 122; Staggenborg 1997: 425). From such perspectives, institutionalization is an internal process of gradual stabilization of institutional structures within the organization. It refers to the way organizations increasingly professionalize and bureaucratize their structures. Such internal factors lead to adjustments in patterns of activities in relation to official institutions. I apply such a conceptualization of institutionalization for studying the NGO/UN relationship in that professionalization accordingly encompasses the appointing of specialists for NGO/UN relations on the basis of their education and qualifications. Similarly, the bureaucratization of relations with the UN is the process by which NGOs set up defined practices for dealing with the UN as an institution. Thus, in order to capture the degree to which NGOs have internally institutionalized their relations to the UN, issues such as the number of NGO offices, departments and people in UN locations, as well as the number of employees, departments

6 376 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 and sections at the international secretariat need to be examined. Other indicators of the degree to which NGOs professionalize their UN representation include the individual educational and professional background of NGO staff working with the UN, their experience and knowledge of the UN system, as well as work experience with the NGO. Institutionalization as an external demand Whereas in resource mobilization theory the emphasis is placed on internal factors, other scholars have identified external demands as the sources of adaptation. During the 1970s, the dominant perspectives changed to emphasize the impact of external demands on the performance of societal actors. Instead of focusing on hierarchical structures and working processes within the organizations, research on social movement organizations applied the new institutionalist perspective which highlighted the pressures deriving from external forces, and scholars explored the role played by institutional environments in determining organizations behaviour (Finnemore 1996: 329; Hall and Taylor 1996: 946). Neo-institutionalists have explored the significance of external pressure using the notion of isomorphism. Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 149). Applied to social movement organizations, these scholars argue that increased cooperation and activities with official institutions lead to isomorphism with the environment because organizations adapt to legitimated modes of interaction. As a result, institutional isomorphism promotes the success and survival of organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977/1991). International organizations like the UN can in fact act as regulatory systems (Scott 1995: xv) because they create the rules and conditions for the interaction with NGOs. Especially through coercive isomorphism, societal actors adapt their pattern of activities in relation to governmental institutions. Through official regulations, external pressure is exerted on societal actors seeking to conform to or to meet requirements (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 150). Isomorphism thus describes the direct imposition of standard operating procedures by powerful organizations in the field as well as more subtle pressure for conformity. Thus, neo-institutionalists put the emphasis on the rules and regulations regarding the relationship between organizations and their environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991: 12). In contrast to older models of institutionalization, this perspective also contains a sociological perception emphasizing the shared systems of rules that constrain both the inclination and the capacity of actors (Finnemore 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996). Neo-institutionalists

7 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 377 therefore often concentrate on examining state-legitimated categories for societal actors, as rules and recognition are structured along the lines of the most legitimate procedures (McCarthy et al. 1991: 49; McCarthy 1997: 253). Therefore, institutionalization encompasses the formalization of relations between social movement organizations and the state. Building upon these accounts, others have explored the external conditions in which societal activism takes place. Legal requirements or recognition by official institutions have been described as institutional channelling through an external governmental body (McCarthy and McPhail 1998: 85). That is to say, organizations receive an acknowledged status and adhere to categories legitimized by some official actor (McCarthy et al. 1991: 49). Channelling mechanisms thus encompass the body of rules and regulations determining the setting in which societal activism is recognized as taking place legally. That body of law can take different forms and includes special benefits. For example, when organizations comply with the rules in Section 501 of the US Internal Revenue Code, they gain the benefits of being tax-exempt, such as special postal rates (McCarthy et al. 1991: 52). 8 As societal actors are regularly tested concerning the appropriateness of their aims and activities, they adapt their goals to fit the regulations so as to receive the benefits of recognition. In addition, a formal status stands for the increased acceptance of societal actors and their activities and serves as an external source of reputation (Kubik 1998: 134). Sometimes, it is even a requirement of third parties before starting an interaction with social movement organizations. 9 However, it also represents negative pressure on the NGO in question as their official status can be revoked (McCarthy et al. 1991: 55). The body of regulations is also not static; it continues to evolve and may change over time (McCarthy and McPhail 1998: 101). For example, changes to the legal context through amendments to the codes, changes in requirements, extensive case law and rulings (McCarthy et al. 1991: 53). From this view, institutionalization has been regarded as the process of establishing regulations for relations between societal actors and official institutions. Diverse ways of acknowledging and legitimizing societal actors strengthen their recognition. Fulfilling the external demands of recognition, however, implies that societal actors adjust their pattern of activities. I apply such concepts of institutional channelling to the NGO/UN relations by focusing on the process of formalizing NGO/UN co-operation through rules and regulations. The UN associates NGOs in three ways: consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), associate status with the Department of Public Information and affiliation with the Nongovernmental Liaison Service. Of these, ECOSOC status is the highest form of the officially recognized status at the UN level because NGOs must go through a formal application process in which they are tested by UN officials. Thus, suitable

8 378 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 indicators to measure the degree to which an NGO has institutionalized its UN relationship externally are the NGO s status at the UN, the development of the status with up-grading and down-grading, the importance the NGO places on having this status (also outside the UN context) and threats of losing the status. In the following empirical part, I apply these two different conceptualizations of institutionalizing societal actors and their resulting adaptations in their pattern of activities in order to evaluate NGO institutionalization in the UN system. I explore changes in the interaction with the UN, internal factors and external demands on one specific NGO: Amnesty International. I trace the development of its relationship with the UN, the organizational structures providing for interaction and its official status with the IGO over time to examine if and to what extent these variables have changed. By examining AI, I have chosen one of the most active NGOs in the UN context. It therefore serves not only as an explorative case study to evaluate the theoretical propositions laid out above but also as a model case for other NGOs. Amnesty International and the UN The UN and its human rights-related bodies have always played a key role in AI s activities in the international sphere. As Amnesty International perceives interaction with IGOs as highly important for promoting human rights standards, co-operation with them forms part of its mandate. Laid out in its statutes, AI seeks to encourage intergovernmental organizations y to support and respect human rights (Amnesty International 2005). The NGO drives a large programme of activities with IGOs including the UN, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Organization of American States. It also works together with specialized agencies of the UN such as the International Labour Organization and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. AI has maintained relations with the UN since the 1960s when it recognized it could use the UN mechanisms to achieve its objectives. As a former AI staff member put it, [f]rom its earliest days, Amnesty recognized the importance of working directly in and through the UN system, both to expose violations and to advance the frontiers of human rights protection (Cook 1996: 183). Over the years, it has established a leading position among internationally operating human rights NGOs. Today, it is one of the largest and most active human rights organizations operating within the UN context. AI s activities at the level of international organizations today include: (1) the development and implementation of human rights standards in countries domestic national legislation; (2) the provision of information about human rights abuses and

9 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 379 (3) lobbying and supporting UN bodies and committees dealing with human rights issues through advice and recommendations. In this section, I explore if and to what extent AI has adapted its pattern of activities as regards the UN since the 1990s. From campaigning for human rights standards to drafting them A major part of AI s work at the UN has always focused on the ratification and development of legal instruments for human rights protection. Over the last few decades, AI has remarkably shaped such mechanisms through its activities. In fact, AI s campaigns on banning torture beginning in the 1970s have repeatedly been interpreted as the most successful initiatives ever undertaken by an NGO. 10 AI started its first worldwide campaign to proclaim a total ban on torture in December 1972 by pressuring governments to enforce Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which forbids torture. Its secretariat prepared an extensive report about the practice of torture in all regions of the world, and AI sections around the world appealed to the UN to draw up a convention prohibiting torture. When the UN General Assembly adopted a first resolution against torture in November the following year, AI, in response, started its Urgent Action against torture so that cases could be made public and the NGO could hold governments responsible. Partial success was reached when in 1975 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subject to Torture in response to the brutality of the regime in Chile. But since the declaration was not binding, AI continued to call for a treaty, which was eventually finalized in 1984 and came into force in AI was also one of the driving forces for establishing the post of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. During preparations for the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, AI began to campaign extensively for the establishment of such a post. At the African regional meeting in October 1992, for example, it called for the creation of such a position and at the conference in Vienna itself the NGO continued its intensive lobbying so that NGOs would be able to observe the working group on the issue. Similarly, AI was particularly active in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The NGO began working on the ICC in 1994 by publishing position papers and documents advocating the establishment of the court. Between 1998 and 2001, the NGO s networks and associations of lawyers played a key role in campaigning for the ICC and had a significant impact on the adoption of the Rome Statute. In fact, AI was one of the main NGOs pushing for the establishment of the ICC, as it lobbied the UN and member states and collected over a million signatures for a petition (Winston 2001: 27).

10 380 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 Since the 1990s, AI has also participated in drafting processes of legal instruments. 11 In fact, the NGO is today often approached by the UN for its expertise and knowledge. AI is involved in more drafting processes than other NGOs and usually participates throughout the entire process, whereas other NGOs have neither the resources nor the means to do so. Especially since the mid-1990s, when the post of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established, AI has often been asked for its advice. For example, before a mission of the High Commissioner to a particular country NGOs may be given 48 hours notice to provide a briefing on certain subjects. In general, only a limited number of NGOs four to six organizations are invited to these informal consultations and AI is usually one of them (Interview AI-6). From providing occasional information to making strategic choices AI was one of the first human rights NGOs to begin to supply the UN with data on human rights abuses from the early 1980s onwards. Over the years, it has become the principle supplier of documentation to all formal mechanisms, and no other international NGO has matched it in the number of submissions made (Korey 1998: 260). Until the 1990s, AI mainly focused on classic human rights mechanisms within the UN system which had a clear human rights agenda such as the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council), 12 its sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights, and the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The NGO often made statements at the Commission on Human Rights during its annual six-week sessions in Geneva in which it addressed countries with particularly bad human rights records. It adopted a neutral approach in that it worked on those countries already on the Commission s agenda. In the early 1990s, however, AI changed its strategy and began trying to influence the agenda of the Commission. It pushed for specific countries with bad human rights records to be on the agenda instead of following the Commission s recommendations in that regard. AI chose five countries (one per region) to be addressed during the annual sessions of the Commission on Human Rights. It selected these countries six months beforehand in order to prepare detailed reports on their human rights situation (Interview AI-5). Researchers in London and in the field worked on these countries, analyzed information about human rights violations and transmitted the relevant information to Geneva where it was presented. At the same time, AI mobilized the membership and openly campaigned for the Commission on Human Rights to take action on these countries. In the mid-1990s, AI revised its UN approach again and significantly reduced its submissions to the Commission on Human Rights. Due to the enormous rise in written statements at the Commission since the opening of the

11 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 381 UN to national NGOs, AI regarded single statements as less significant. Until the mid-1990s, the NGO prepared and delivered three to five single-authored statements before the commission each year in which it addressed the countries chosen; since 1997, AI has not contributed any individual statements and only delivered joint statements with other NGOs, if at all. The NGO has instead expanded its information provision to the treaty bodies, because it considered them more suitable to use its material for the support of human rights compliance. Although these are the major bodies for monitoring the human rights treaties, they have become more aggressive in monitoring the human rights obligations taken on by states only over the last decade (Clapham 2000). Today, AI supplies them with its research and is regularly cited in their reports as source of information. Information is also often exchanged on an informal basis. In particular, personal contacts between AI representatives and UN officials allow the NGO to gain and feed in information which would otherwise not be accessible or distributed. An AI representative in Geneva, for example, spends about three days a week at the UN trying to gain information about current debates, often mainly by just chatting around with the respective UN officials, seeing and speaking to UN desk officers who are in charge of the various issues or themes surrounding human rights (Interview AI-6). By doing the tour of duty, thus seeing and speaking to UN desk officers who are in charge of the various issues or themes surrounding human rights (Interview AI-6), AI insures that information is exchanged on an almost daily basis. From lobbying to supporting UN bodies and committees AI s work at the UN also includes lobbying UN officials and governmental representatives and supplying them with additional material on a matter of concern. Informal talks with official representatives can provide a way to get AI s concerns through (Interview AI-7). Lobbying usually involves an AI researcher with appropriate expertise studying in depth the human rights situation of a country or a specific event of abuse and prepares a report and recommendations for the UN. A representative of the NGO provides a friendly government with the information in order to bring it forward in UN contexts (Interview AI-7). Many activities thus take place on an informal basis and personal relations between AI staff and governmental representatives are, therefore, important factors. Often it is not the entire government or all diplomats of a delegation interacting with AI, but only an individual delegation member who has good relations with a single AI representative. For example, communications to the EU went mostly through Austria for a period of time because AI staff in New York had particularly good connections to that nation s representative (Interview AI-7).

12 382 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 As a result of these tight bonds between the UN and AI, information provision is mutual; in fact, AI is often given information UN officials are unable to use. They supply it with the details and let the NGO take the initiative. The reasons for this practice can be due to a lack of resources at the UN to deal with additional matters, but it is more often the case that AI is provided with this information for political reasons. For example, when a topic is too sensitive to be discussed in a forum of governmental delegates, UN officials encourage AI to write an open letter to the High Commissioner who then has to respond to the issue (Interview AI-7). Since the late 1990s, the NGO has also been regularly involved in semiformal consultation processes, which often include high-ranking UN officials and governmental diplomats. Most importantly, AI participates at meetings with the Security Council on the basis of the Arria Formula. For some years now, this formula has provided a new forum for NGO/UN relations. It is an informal arrangement, which allows the Security Council greater flexibility to be briefed on international peace and security issues. 13 Only a limited number of NGOs working in different issue areas participate with the UN through this format. AI, in fact, was the first NGO to brief the Security Council officially at an Arria Formula briefing in 1997 (Global Policy Forum, 2001). Until today, Amnesty is one of the most vivid participants of Arria Formulas and has frequently been asked for briefings in recent years. In 2004, for example, two of the six Arria meetings included presentations by AI (Amnesty International 2004a, b; Global Policy Forum 2006). In brief, AI has responded to the changing UN context of the 1990s by adjusting its pattern of activities vis-a`-vis the IGO. While the NGO has been active at the UN for many decades, it has expanded its range of interaction with the IGO in recent years. In the past it mainly concentrated on selected modes of interaction, whereas today it is also active through various informal ways such as drafting processes and consultancy. In the following part, I examine to what extent these adjustments in activities can be explained by internal factors such as organizational structures for representation to the UN and by external demands as presented by the ECOSCO consultative status, according to the guiding theoretical framework of this article on NGO institutionalization. Professionalization of NGO Representation at the UN Level As explored in the theoretical section of this article, internal factors can have an impact on the interaction of societal actors with governmental actors. Most importantly, the resources mobilized by the societal actor for such purposes determine if and how it is able to adapt its pattern of activities. In this section,

13 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 383 I show that AI s representation to the UN has expanded significantly over the years. It began on a voluntary basis and has progressively become professionalized responding to the possibilities for interaction with the UN. Today, the NGO is represented by regular staff members in the two UN cities New York and Geneva in which human rights are dealt with. The aim of such posts is to present and promote the organization s goals within the UN institutions and its human rights mechanisms. Such professionalized representation of the NGO is essential for understanding its adapted pattern of activities with the UN. Most importantly, it provides the NGO with the opportunity to maintain constant contact with governmental delegates and UN officials. From volunteers to professionals organizational provisions for Amnesty International s representation to the UN AI s resources for its representation to the UN were very limited at first. In the early days of interacting with the UN, local AI members volunteered to represent their NGO to the IGO. In New York, for example, the NGO s representation started in the early 1960s and was first conducted by a retired international bureaucrat who due to his professional career was familiar with the UN system (Interview AI-1). In the mid-1970s, a professor of Russian history was assigned to this voluntary position and represented the NGO to the UN in his spare time. Similarly, in Geneva AI was represented to UN bodies from the 1980s on by a local member who was given support by the NGO s Swiss section based in Bern. Later, an Irish diplomat and jurist volunteered as a liaison for AI, whereas by profession he was actually the Secretary-General of another NGO. When in the late 1970s the international discourse on human rights had advanced significantly, AI recognized that more opportunities to work through the UN Commission on Human Rights would arise. The NGO quickly realized that such an undertaking required more work than could be handled by volunteer members or staff flying in from London for special occasions. As a result, it invested more resources into its representation to the UN and professionalized it: the offices in New York and Geneva changed from being led by volunteers to becoming led by entirely paid staff members working full time. The New York office was professionalized in 1977; professional representatives for the bureau in Geneva were hired in The appointment of professional representatives in major UN locations had an immediate effect on AI s pattern of activities with the UN: the NGO was now able to better use the opportunities for working in and through the IGO. As AI was constantly represented at the UN, it knew exactly what was going on at UN level (Interview AI-4). Through its permanent representation, the

14 384 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 NGO was able to ensure a continuous flow of information and to better spot avenues where AI could have an impact (Interview AI-4). In return, the NGO s stabilized presence at the UN also fed back into working procedures within the NGO and other parts of the organizations became more involved with the UN as well. Researchers in London, for example, started to prepare background information specifically designed for the NGO s UN work such as written reports to the treaty bodies. Over the years, AI invested more and more resources in its UN representation and gradually increased the number of staff working on its international representation. Today s Geneva office employs two people working on UN relations, supported by one or two interns. The New York office employs three permanent UN representatives and several interns working on six-month contracts. Moreover, during important sessions and for special events, staff from headquarters supports the permanent representatives in their work. For instance, London staffers flew in to help out during the six-week session of the Commission on Human Rights in March and April each year. In addition to its representatives in New York and Geneva, structures at headquarters level have also been installed for maintaining relations with the UN. In London, the NGO maintains a programme on Legal and International Organizations (LIO), which leads and guides AI s work with IGOs. On the whole, the department maintains a permanent body of staff of around twenty people and some trainees. Three people of this division are specifically employed for NGO/UN relations but, depending on their individual tasks, other staff members may also spend up to 30percent of their time on UNrelated matters (Interview AI-3). Today, AI has clear procedures for its interaction with the UN. The LIO programme provides legal advice on special procedures and supervises the design of documents (Interview AI-3). Legal advisers approve all documents, statements and press releases to make sure that everything is ok (Interview AI-6). In practice, this means that the preparation of contributions by AI at the UN level on a particular issue may take up to several weeks. For example, when the representative in Geneva prepares a statement it will first be sent to London, where it is examined by the legal department before it can be delivered to the UN. The same process takes place when the initiative for a statement to the UN comes from a researcher or from national sections of AI (Interview AI-3). From amateurs to specifically trained staff recruitment factors for Amnesty International s representatives to the UN When AI started to hire professional representatives, it also began to apply selection criteria for this post based on training and skills rather than on active

15 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 385 support for the NGO. Today, its professional representatives at the UN are highly skilled people with specific training necessary for their positions: they have gone through programmes of higher education, hold postgraduate degrees and most of them have studied law or subjects with an international focus such as international relations or development studies. Whereas the volunteers represented the NGO more because of their presence in a UN location and less because of their educational background, the majority of the latest full-time representatives hold a Master of Laws (LLM) degree in international law. An increasing number of them are even specialized in human rights studies. Such [f]ull-time professional staff, including legal experts, enable Amnesty to field well briefed, experienced representation at the UN. They have the necessary political, technical or country specialization and can build and maintain contacts with governmental delegates, UN staff, NGOs and the media (Cook 1996: 186). Although a legal background is not formally required, it is desirable due to the nature of work which AI s representatives to the UN conduct. Because of the experience and knowledge needed for this position, it happens to be in most cases people trained in jurisprudence who represent AI before the UN (Interview AI-5). AI s work on UN peacekeeping and on the ICC during the early 1990s, for instance, required profound legal knowledge in order to be effective. Similarly, staff members of the LIO programme are also generally trained in legal or international studies and usually have some years of experience working with legal matters. Experience with the UN system is also highly desirable as a qualification for the post as AI s representative at the UN. Representatives are required to be familiar with the UN and its mechanisms so that they can make use of the intergovernmental machinery to further its goals and to develop appropriate strategies for campaigning. As Cook explains, in order to make an impact, it is important for an NGO to send delegates with a real grasp of the issue and with expertise in drafting and, as far as possible, to maintain continuity in its delegates, building on their familiarity of the issue, the process and the other players involved (Cook 1996: 192). Whereas educational background and knowledge of the UN system are extremely important selection criteria today, prior involvement with AI presents no precondition for the post of the representative to the UN. In fact, most professional representatives had not been actively involved with the NGO before having taken up that position. Only a few AI representatives had had some sort of experience at the local level with letter writing which, however, was not a decisive factor for their recruitment. In addition, none of the professional representatives had experience in headquarters. Instead, new recruits today receive training by attending a general introduction in London.

16 386 Journal of International Relations and Development Volume 9, Number 4, 2006 Official Recognition of NGOs at The UN Level External demands can also influence the way societal actors interact with official institutions. As explored in the theoretical part of this article, rules and regulations may have constraining power in that societal actors adapt their patterns of activities accordingly. In this section, I show that consultative status although it is needed by AI to legitimize its interaction with the UN today presents more of a formality than a coercive force. AI acquired consultative status with ECOSOC in 1964, three years after it was founded. As a human rights NGO specializing in political prisoners, the UN perceives AI as being concerned with one specific issue only. For this reason, it has always maintained the second highest status of relations with the UN, which is reserved for NGOs working in only a few ECOSOC issue areas. Most importantly, by having consultative status Amnesty s interaction with the UN is formally legitimized, but it does not ally with the NGO as a source of reputation or as a means of threat today. From a source of reputation to a fact of life significance of consultative status for Amnesty International Formal recognition by the UN as presented by the ECOSOC consultative status primarily has practical relevance for AI. It represents the entrance key to the UN and enables the NGO to physically enter UN buildings. Because of the status, AI representatives receive an accreditation badge which allows them to attend conferences and hearings and meet with other actors: they can discuss issues informally with governmental delegates, exchange information with them and lobby them for their objectives. Consultative status also allows AI to receive all official documents, to feed its own information into the UN machinery, to make interventions in ECOSOC meetings and to give speeches at the Commission and its sub-commissions. In recent years, however, consultative status has lost some of its value for the organization. It is no longer a necessary precondition for many AI activities at the UN level. For instance, in order to work with bodies such as the Security Council on the basis of the Arria Formula, having consultative status with the UN is not a decisive factor for being invited to consultations; AI participates in their meetings because of its international reputation and the information it is able to provide. Many UN institutions today do not interact with NGOs because of their formal status but because of the specific support they are expecting from them. As a source of reputation, consultative status with the UN does not play a role for AI any longer. In the early years, since fewer organizations had obtained the status and AI was still not widely known, consultative status was

17 Kerstin Martens Amnesty International and UN system 387 considered an important source of reputation. However, since its reputation is high today accreditation on the scheme of the consultative status at the UN does not add any additional recognition to the general public s perception of AI. Therefore, AI does not include the consultative status on its letterheads or its internet homepage: 14 Amnesty has no need for using the status as a source of reputation (Interview AI-2). From a means of threat to a mere formality? Amnesty International s perception of its consultative status Despite the fact that AI depends on having the ECOSOC consultative status so that its representatives are able to enter UN buildings, it does not expose the NGO to coercive pressures. A withdrawal of this status presents no real threat for the NGO today (Interview AI-9). As the major NGO for human rights, AI is simply too credible, too high profile, and has a too good reputation (Interview AI-7) to be expelled from the UN in response to the criticism of governments. Unlike many other human rights organizations, AI has the luxury (Interview AI-6) of not having to fear a withdrawal of its consultative status. However, this perception of such external demands as presented by consultative status and its unlikelihood of status withdrawal has changed over time. During its early days at the UN, there were, in fact, several instances in which the status was nearly removed. One took place in 1978 when the USSR and Argentine delegations actively sought to expel AI and some other human rights organizations from the UN. The Argentine delegation had been angered by the criticism from certain human rights NGOs and insisted that a long-neglected provision of the consultative arrangements in 1968 would be implemented. This required NGOs in category I and II to submit quadrennial reports of their activities to the Committee on NGOs, which until then none of the organizations had actually done (Chiang 1981: 172). In this context, the USSR representative charged AI, the International League for Human Rights, and the Anti-Slavery Society with the abuse of their status by engaging in political attacks on member states. The representative threatened the NGOs with the remark that the consultative status could be withdrawn in the case of improper use and accused AI of having abused its status at the World Conference on Religion and Peace in February In detail, the USSR delegation accused AI of engaging in politically based activities, defaming socialist countries and carrying out overt sabotage of decisions of UN bodies (Chiang 1981: 197). As a consequence of these accusations, the USSR representative and some other delegates therefore proposed that its status be annulled.