Corporate response to stability and change

Transcription

1 Corporate response to stability and change Understanding corporate strategic action in response to stability threatening events, a case study of Lonmin Plc. and the Marikana Massacre. Thesis MA Conflict Studies and Human Rights (first Draft) Utrecht University Sanne Marleen Schotting Student number July 2016 A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights

2 Supervisor: Dr. Chris van der Borgh Date of submission: 8 july 2016 Programme trajectory: Internship and Research (15 ECTS) & Thesis Writing (15 ECTS) Word count: words 2

3 Table of Contents List of Abbreviations 4 1. Background and Introduction 5 2. Theory of Fields 9 3. Lonmin and the Marikana Massacre: Results and Analysis Conclusion 36 Bibliography 39 3

4 List of Abbreviations AMCU ANC CSR DGP LRA MNO MPRDA NUM RDO SAF SAPS TEBA Allied Mining and Construction Union African National Congress Corporate Social Responsibility Gross Domestic Product Labour Relations Act Multi National Corporation Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act National Union of Mineworkers Rock Drill Operator Strategic Action Field South African National Police Services The Employment Bureau of Africa 4

5 Chapter 1: Background and Introduction On Thursday 16 August 2012 the MNO Lonmin Plc., a British mining corporation operating a platinum mine in Rustenburg, South Africa, was confronted with a crisis of severe gravity. Following a series of violent events and casualties, the stunning amount of 34 mineworkers were massacred by the South African Police Force (SAPS) and paramilitary units in an alleged attempt to disperse a wildcat strike of Lonmin rock drill operators (RDOs) near Marikana. The Marikana Massacre, is widely regarded as a turning point in South African histrory as it resembled the most violent assault on civilians by the national authorities since the 1960 Sharpville massacre during Apartheid, bringing to an end the era and hopeful prospects of the rainbow nation (Alexander, 2013: 605; Alexander et all, 2013: 150; Hart, 2013: 2; Frankel, 2013: 5). Twenty years of post-apartheid democracy and capitalism had ultimately resulted in little to no change for the poor masses, and some would go as far to say that the racist apartheid had been no more than replaced by an equally repressive capitalist system (Coles, 2013). Indeed, the circumstances at Marikana, where protesters were not occupying any strategic point or mining property, nor holding hostages or posing any direct threat to the environment, leaves little space for any other rationale than risking the manoeuvre to drive strikers back to work at any cost on behalf of the bosses who were anxious to resume profit making operations (Ronnie Kasrils, in Alexander et al, 2013; 140). An independent Commission was appointed by president Zuma to investigate how and why the dispersal of the strike had escalated into such lethal disaster, and to determine who could be held responsible. The outcomes of the commission s investigations and four years of simultaneous research by academics, activists and journalists has shed light on many aspects of the massacre. Reconstruction of the strike and the violent escalation itself, (re)militarisation of the police force, labour union rivalry, governmental stakes and media performance have been thoroughly analysed, as well as the more structural micro-level conditions of the corporation that gave rise to the strike and the violence surrounding the escalation such as working and living conditions at the Lonmin mine, mine-induced environmental degradation, and labour contracting systems of brokering and migration. Furthermore, the macro-level structures of South African society and South African history have been a popular analytical lens to explain the grievances and disappointment with the post-apartheid regime and the related societal tensions that have come to an extreme at the massacre. With such an extensive literature on this undeniably historic event, a remarkable void appears. Against the backdrop of increased attention for corporate performance and business ethics of international and multinational corporations operating outside their national territory, it seems puzzling that the corporation involved in the most lethal violent crisis that South Africa has experienced in 20 years since apartheid, remains relatively un(der)studied. Because Lonmin did not pull the trigger and therefore does 5

6 not bear direct responsibility for the massacre itself, the mining house has been spared severe international scrutiny and (attempts at) prosecution. From previous research on the role that Lonmin played in the Marikana Massacre, the image emerges of Lonmin as a mere bystander in the development of conflict, caught into a violent escalation of a strike gone wrong. Research into these pre-massacre conditions that set the scene for the strike is highly valuable in understanding the case. However, attempts at analysis of the role of the corporation in the development of the conflict has failed to approach the conflict as a gradual process with Lonmin having agency at every moment, from setting the preconditions, throughout the strike, the escalation and the aftermath of the crisis. Hence, this thesis sets out to fill the chasm of Lonmin s part in the development of the drama. It should be clear, that the intention is not to cast blame or to hold Lonmin responsible for what has happened, but to analyse and understand the corporate agency in response to stability threatening events. A careful review of the common theoretical approaches for the analysis of a (corporate) institution remained fruitless in tackling this gap of agency during the development of conflict. As will become clear in the following chapters, the relative new theory by McAdam and Fligstein holds a variety of qualities that adequately fill the theoretical void by using the anatomy of the theory as a literal framework to create a new representation of reality. By conceptualizing the conflict as taking place within a strategic action field, where both powerful and less powerful actors are constantly jockeying for position; incumbents actively protecting and reinforcing their position of power and order, and challengers actively looking to improve their position at any given opportunity. This approach, as designed by McAdams and Fligstein in their theory of fields, enables the researcher to study the interaction between actors in a meso -level social order in the balance between stability and change. With the relationship between stability and change at the core of the approach, a very different image arises of Lonmin; an incumbent actively using social skill, internal governance units and calling upon (state) allies to protect the status quo and stability of the field at any given point in time. This allows for a far more complex and detailed analysis of the corporation s role in the conflict than has been given to date. This new attempt at analysis of Lonmin s role in the Marikana Massacre will be guided by the following research question: How did the British mining company Lonmin Plc. develop a response to (field) stability threatening events surrounding the Marikana Massacre in the strategic action field of the corporation and the broader field environment of the South African Platinum mining industry between 2011 and 2015? To answer this main research question, the following sub questions, sequenced in four stages of stability and change, will need to be answered: Stage 1: The strategic action field and the broader field environment. 6

7 What did the strategic action field look like in times of stability precipitating the crisis and how is it connected to the broader field environment? How did Lonmin protect and reinforce the stability of the field? How did it employ social skill to legitimise its position vis-à-vis the working force? How is Lonmin s position reinforced by governance units, and other external actors/strategic action fields? Stage 2: The onset of contention: exogenous shocks What mix of exogenous shocks and internal processes precipitate the field crisis? What specific social processes mediate between the destabilizing events and the actual mobilization of strikers? Stage 3: The episode of contention and crisis With what forms of action and collective action frames does Lonmin respond to the developing crisis in the form of an unprotected strike? How do these change over the life of the episode? What role do key external actors/strategic action fields play in precipitating the episode and shaping its trajectory, and ultimately helping to affect a new field settlement? Stage 4: Settlement What are the terms of the new settlement? And to what extent does it alter the prior power structure of the strategic action field? How does Lonmin respond to the escalation of the strike vis à vis the victims, the broader workforce and the media? Does the corporation make efforts to legitimise its position in the post-marikana settlement? Towards whom? The rationale behind these sub-questions is the following: The four chronological stages of change (stability, the onset of contention, crisis, and settlement) need to be studied in order to analyse a field-crisis. The contours of each stage are first addressed in one sub - question, whereafter the specific role of Lonmin in that stage is addressed in one or two additional sub-questions. These sub questions are derived from the research questions recommended by McAdam and Fligstein for the analysis of field-crisis (2012:166). To be clear, this study seeks to answer, by way of the questions as defined above, how Lonmin Plc. responded to the (looming) field crisis that culminated in the Marikana Massacre. By using the theory of fields to make sense of the conflict, a new representation of reality will emerge. At the same time, this case-study will serve as a test-case for application of this relative new theory to fill the current conceptual void in analysis of corporations involved in (violent) crisis, highlighting whether the theory and hypotheses posed by McAdam and Fligstein prove useful and consistent within this specific type of field-analysis. 7

8 I propose that the theoretical frame of the theory of fields does not only fill the conceptual void in analysis of corporations agency in the shift between stability and crisis, but that it also helps to tackle the methodological impasse of access to the company. By analysing the meso-level relations in and between the strategic action fields that Lonmin operates in, it is possible to make a representation of reality based on facts of interaction, rather than (biased) information shared by the company itself. After this introductory chapter, this thesis is organised as follows: The second chapter sheds light on how the theory of fields is used as a theoretical framework for the case study of Marikana, as well as the ontological, epistemological and methodological stances underlying the research. Subsequently, the third chapter provides the analysis of the sub-questions divided in four subsequent stages of change as formulated in this introductory chapter. In the fourth and final chapter conclusions on the research question are drawn, limitations of the research are explained and suggestions for future research are proposed. 8

9 Chapter 2: Theory of Fields This chapter is devoted to outline the theory that guides this cases study of Lonmin and the Marikana Massacre. It will start by explaining the ontological and epistemological stance underlying the theory, followed by a general outline of the theory of fields by Doug McAdam and Neil Fligstein (2011/2012), with attention for the particular stage of the field, namely field-crisis, and its application to this specific case study of a corporation in conflict. Ontology The ontological stance underlying this theory is of particular relevance to this endeavour of overcoming the current conceptual void in the analysis of Lonmin s role in the Marikana conflict. Current research on the role of Lonmin leaves a gap of agency between the development of abusive and frustrating structures of employment, and the response to the escalation of the protest. This is in line with institutional theory, which would be the general approach to study institutions and corporations. Institutional theory s view of institutional action is that, once a set of rules and resources become institutionalized, they become taken for granted and fields become powerful systems that reproduce themselves without the need for people to do anything (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012: 179). This is in line with the general image of Lonmin and the Marikana Massacre, where there is little to no attention for what happened between the creation of abusive structures of employment, and the response to escalating conflict. I suggest that this approach is not useful in the study of the role of a corporate actor in th e development of contention, because it suggests that the corporation does not have active agency in between setting the stage (structures), and responding to the escalation derived from these structures. What is needed to close the analytical gap, is an approach that recognises the agency of the corporation (or any actor in the field) as a constant factor, without undermining the basic structures of social order characteristic to institutions. This ontological duality of interaction between agency and structure is precisely what McAdam and Fligstein have sought to operationalise within their theory. They reject the idea that people only have agency when they are helping to form new social fields/ institutions because our everyday experiences suggest that we exercise at least some degree of agency all of the time, and because it ignores the fact that social life is largely played out in fields (2012: 180): Our theory of action stresses that individuals or groups are always acting and they are always looking for an edge. But it is the structuring of those fields that determines which kinds of action make sense. The position we occupy in a field has a huge effect on how we enact our capacity for agency. In settled fields, incumbents will generally work to reproduce their advantage, while challengers can be expected to jockey for position and 9

10 look for signs of any crack in the system that might reward more innovative forms of action (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012: 180) Epistemology This clear account of interaction between structures and agency brings us to the epistemological and methodological implications of the research. This research is a single-case study with a positivist theory-testing potential. It will provide a thick qualitative description of the Marikana case guided by the interpretative frame o f field analysis; the theory helps to make sense of the case. The case study has the potential and goal to test the generic theory and its corresponding hypotheses for application in this particular context; if the theory is useful and hypotheses are correct, this may be interpreted as an explanation for how and why Lonmin responded the way it did. However, it should be clear that the social realities described by this theory are far too complex to be reduced to a positivist testing of hypotheses. If the hypotheses are correct this only indicates that the theory makes sense and is a useful avenue for future qualitative research on similar cases in order to gain better understanding of what type of action makes sense in each unique social context. Method The implications of the theory on the method used to analyse the case have already been touched upon above, where I suggest that the theoretical frame of the theory of fields does not only fill the conceptual void in analysis of corporations agency in the shift between stability and crisis, but that it also helps to tackle the methodological impasse of access to the company. I would like to take it one step further by proposing that from the field analysis perspective, access to the corporation is less relevant than the information obtained from field analysis. According to McAdam and Fligstein, individuals and groups are always acting and interacting while looking for improvement or reinforcement of their position in the field, but it is the structuring of those fields that determines which kinds of action make sense (2012:180). This means that in order to make sense of what happened and why, we need to analyse the actions of the actors in relation to the structuring of the field. By analysing the meso-level relations in and between the strategic action fields in which Lonmin operates, it is possible to make a representation of reality based on facts of interaction, rather than (biased) subjective information shared by the company itself. So the theory does not merely circumvent the problem of access (which does not only derive from the temporal and spatial limits of this particular thesis, but is highly problematic by definition due to the reputational stakes corporations have to deal with nowadays), it deems it less relevant. Hence, the method used for this study is to use the theoretical framework of the theory 10

11 of fields to (l) capture the field structures and (ll) pair the field structures with data on Lonmin s actions and reactions derived from secondary literature, in order to make sense of how Lonmin responded to the unfolding conflict, forming a new representation of reality. This data includes all types of action and interaction by and between Lonmin and other actors inside and outside the field as disclosed by reliable secondary sources. A Theory of Fields According to McAdam and Fligstein, scholars of organisations and social movements and for that matter; any institutional actor in modern society are interested in the same underlying phenomenon to the question of what accounts for stability and change in society: collective strategic action (2011: 2). Yet research is still fundamentally compartmented in distinct theories and approaches unsuitable for mutual reinforcing synthesis. The current literature on Marikana is a good example of this compartmented potpourri of approaches shedding light on isolated forms of collective strategic action rather than adding to an inclusive understanding; each party in the conflict is analysed from a different approach. Field theory is designed to transcend the limits of the myriad of disciplines and theories interested in strategic collective action. The central idea of the integrated theory is that stability and change are achieved by social actors in circumscribed social arenas (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012:3). These social arenas, or strategic action fields, are the fundamental unit(s) of analysis. The structures of any given strategic action field are the same as in any other field regardless of whether or not the field is made up of individual people, groups, organizations, or nation -states (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012:59). This means that the analysis of stability and change and collective strategic action can be approached by a generic method, as the social arenas accommodating strategic collective action, no matter how different, share the same underlying structures by default. So whether we study a social movement, a firm, a market or state, the principles of field-interaction will be the same. Also, by putting the social actors (in this case: corporation) at the centre of a meso-level analysis of social order, an embedded picture of that actor s role and strategy will arise rather than an isolated one: Actors have agency all of the time, but the structure of the field determines which type action or response makes sense, inclining that actors are never isolated in their decisions. So what comprises a strategic action field (hereafter SAF), and which generic principles account for strategic action in the field? McAdam and Fligstein distinguish seven elements of the theory that help to answer these questions and together illustrate how the theory works. These elements will be discussed below. Then the three different stages of stability and change that strategic action fields can shift between will be discussed shortly, zooming in to the stage of crisis, since this is the particular field-state this case study of the Marikana massacre will deal with. It should be noted that the following is not a critical discussion of the theory, but that it is a very brief, and for that matter, incomplete representation of the theory of fields, necessary to familiarise the reader with the theoretical jargon and framework which guides this 11

12 thesis. For a full account of the theory the reader is referred to McAdam and Fligstein (2011, 2012). Central Conceptual Elements of the theory 1. Strategic Action Field Strategic action fields are the fundamental units of collective action in society. So what defines a SAF? In McAdam and Fligstein s definition A strategic action field is a mesolevel social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has power and why), and the field s rules (2011:3). As such, the social constructionist aspects of institutional theory are combined with a focus on how field processes are about who gets what (idem). As McAdam and Fligstein put it, We see SAFs as socially constructed arenas within which actors with varying resource endowments vie for advantage (idem). SAFs do not have fixed boundaries, but change depending on the definition of the situation and the issues at stake. New fields are constructed on a situational basis, as shifting collections of actors come to define new issues and concerns as impor tant. (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 4) Moreover, SAFs are like Russian dolls, where each SAF may be host to a variety of smaller SAFs, and itself be part of many larger SAFs. Again boundaries are not fixed and may shift and overlap depending on the situation. To be more specific, the authors distinguish four aspects of the kind of meanings that underlie SAFs. First of all, there is a diffuse understanding of what is at stake in the field. This does not mean that everyone is content with their position in the field, but at least there is a shared consensus on what is going on in the field (2011: 4). Second, there is a division in sets of actors possessing more (incumbents) or less (challengers) power in the field. Each actor in the field is aware of its position and the position of others, and has an understanding of who its friends, enemies and competitors are. Third, there is a shared understanding of the rules of the field, meaning that actors understand what tactics are possible, understandable and legitimate for all the players in the field. Finally, the interpretative frame that individual and collective actors use to make sense of any other actor s actions is by no means set. Each actor uses its own subjective frame of reference to make sense of what others are doing in the field. The reactions of more and less powerful actors to the actions of others are likely to reflect their social position, and repertoires of behaviour associated with this position of either challenger or incumbent (idem). 2. Incumbents, challengers, and internal governance units As has become clear, the dynamics of order/stability and change/conflict is reflected in a general social composition of the SAF which comprises of more and less powerful actors 12

13 named incumbents, and challengers. Governance Units form a third category to this generic composition. Incumbents, are those actors who wield disproportionate influence within a field and whose interests and views tend to be heavily reflected in the organization of the SAF (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011:6). This means that the purposes of the field are shaped to their interests, the positions in the field are defined by their claims on the lion s share of the resources in the field, the rules tend to favour them, and shared meanings tend to legitimate and support their privileged position within the field (idem). Challengers find themselves on the other end of the power balance, having little influence over the overall operation of the field. While recognising the dominant logic of incumbent actors, they may not agree with it and may perceive an alternative vision of their role on the field (idem). This raises the question why challengers would stay in a position of inequity, and abide rules set by others that do not favour them. This is answered by the logic of prisoner s dilemma ; Challengers contribute to the stability of the field and will shun open revolt, because they are dependent on the structuring of the field for survival. Although their interest would be best served by changing the status quo of the field, this also brings huge risks, inviting the wrath of the incumbents (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 14). Therefore, acceptance of the situation, and waiting for future opportunities that decrease this risk would generally be the best strategy for survival. In addition to incumbents and challengers, many SAFs have internal governance units. Formal governance units are organisations and associations within the field that are charged with overseeing compliance with field rules and to ensure routine stability and order in the SAF (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 6; 2012: 76). Overall internal governance units can serve administrative, informative, and regulative internal functions, as well as executing enforcing, and certificating functions. Being internal to the SAF, these governance units are also usually the facilitators of interaction between the SAFs and various external state fields (idem). 3. Social skill Social skill is an important element of the theory. Departing from Fligstein s definition of strategic action, as the attempt by social actors to create and maintain stable social worlds by securing the cooperation of others (Fligstein, 2001), the need to operationalise this effort to influence others into cooperation emerges. This is what McAdam and Fligstein coined as social skill. It is central to the theory because it endorses the ontological principal that structures, once institutionalised in a stable field do not reinforce themselves, but need constant effort by strategic actors in order to maintain and legitimate the social order as it is. To do this, simply enforcing your will on others is not enough. Strategic actors must think beyond their own interest and be able to find some collective definition of interest that speaks to all the actors involved. McAdam and 13

14 Fligstein define this social skill as how individuals or collective actors possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the service of these action frames ( ). These frames involve understandings that offer other actors identities (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 7). 4. The broader field environment All fields are conceived as embedded in complex webs of other fields. The theory offers three sets of binary distinctions that help to characterize the nature of these other fields and the relationships between them. This includes proximate and distant fields, vertical and horizontal fields, and state and non-state fields (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 8). The first distinction of proximate and distant fields, refers to the level of connection between respective fields. Proximate fields have close or recurring ties to each other, and actions in one field have impact on the other. Logically, distant fields lack ties and the capacity to influence each other. (Idem). The second distinction of vertical and horizontal fields refers to the type of hierarchical relations that exist between fields. In a vertically linked set of proximate fields one field exercises authority over the other which, consequently, is in a subordinate position. If this is not the case and a set of fields is mutually dependent upon each other, they are horizontally connected. The third and last distinction is between state and non-state fields. In the modern world, barring situations of conflict and war, state actors alone have formal authority to set rules, intervene in, and pronounce on the legitimacy and viability of non-state fields. This grants to states considerable and generally unrivalled potential to impact the stability of most SAFs (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 8). However, instead of reifying the notion of singular, hegemonic states, McAdam and Fligstein stress the fact that states are themselves made up of myriad social orders and SAFs which can be described as proximate or distant, horizontally or vertically connected, and whose relations can be as conflictual and constraining as any other field (Idem). The relationships between fields are also an important aspect of the theory, giving it a more contextual, embedded character than most existing conceptions of fields. As Fligstein and McAdam explain: For all the attention paid to meso-level orders by other analysts, the failure to take seriously the constraints (and opportunities) imposed on those orders by the myriad ties they share to other fields significantly truncates our understanding of field dynamics, in particular, the potential for conflict and change in any given field (2011: 8). In this view, the stability of a field is largely dependent on its relations to other fields. While fields can move into a state of conflict as a result of internal processes, a crisis is also commonly the result of an exogenous shock emanating from a proximate field (idem). 14

15 5. Exogenous shocks, field ruptures, and the onset of contention The main theoretical implication of the interdependence of fields described above, is that a significant change in any given SAF is like a stone thrown in a still pond, sending ripples outward to all proximate fields (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 9). Hence destabilisation of a field often emanates from outside the field itself. Yet most exogenous shocks are not intense enough to threat the stability of proximate fields. Especially because incumbents are generally able to withstand destabilising pressures due to their significant resource advantages over field challengers, or even the mere perception by challengers that incumbents are secure in their power (Idem). Also, incumbents are fortified in their position by the support of loyal allies within governance units both internal to the field and embedded in proximate state fields (idem). Hence, only rare instances of extremely heavy exogenous shocks have the potential to threaten the stability of social order in one or more proximate fields, especially to those fields that have a vertically dependent relationship (idem). There are three principal external sources of field destabilization: invasion by outside groups, changes in fields upon which the strategic action field in question is dependent, and rare macro -events like war and depression, that serve to destabilize the broader social/political context in which the field is embedded (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012:99). Rather than leading to an instant crisis of social order, severe exogenous shocks tend to unfold a process that addresses the capacity for social construction and strategic agency that is central to this perspective (Idem). The onset of contention is a highly contingent outcome of an ongoing process of interaction involving at least one incumbent and one challenger (Idem). The process is shaped by three key mechanisms: The collective construction/attribution of threat or opportunity, organizational appropriation, and innovative action. First of all, the threat to stability, or possibility thereof, must be recognised by at least one player in the field. This should be followed by active mobilisation of organisational resources that are needed to mobilise and sustain action in the face of the perceived opportunity or threat. Organizational appropriation is thus the process by which the emergent definition of either threat or opportunity becomes anchored within a specific organisational vehicle. The next step in the process of contention is the violation of field rules by certain actors in defence or support of their group interests, engaging in innovative action (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011:9). Once one actor starts to violate the field rules by innovative practices, this is likely to mobilise others to respond setting off an episode of contention. 6. Episodes of contention Drawing from the early definition by Sidney Tarrow, collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave in ways that fundamentally change others (1994:2). This definition is in line with the conception of innovative action and contention within field theory, although field theory emphasised the idea that the 15

16 contention can start at both ends of the social order as incumbents may just as well be the first to perceive a change in the proximate environment as a threat to their position and interests and start to act in innovative ways. Besides innovative action on either side of the power balance, McAdam and Fligstein recognise two other hallmarks of an episode of contention, namely shared sense of uncertainty/crisis regarding the rules and power relations governing the field, and sustained mobilization by incumbents and challengers (2011:10). Hence, a contentious episode can often feed on itself and lasts as long as there is a shared sense of uncertainty regarding the structure and dominant logic of the field (idem). Also McAdam and Fligstein eloquently describe how this process of contention and innovative action tends to corrode the taken-for-granted social order: Along with the generalized sense of uncertainty, perceived threats and opportunities generally change the consciousness of field actors by exposing rules that had been taken for granted, calling into question the perceived benefits of those rules, and undermining the calculations on which field relations had been based (McAdam and Scott 2005:18 19 in: McAdam and Fligstein, 2011:10). A central form of action in the contentious episode is framing. All parties to the field crisis are expected to be keen to seek and propose a certain new conception of the field, and try to build consensus on this new frame. Again Incumbents are usually resourced with ties to powerful state allies and governance units who may even be in a position to impose a new settlement to the field crisis. But challengers may well succeed in sustained mobilisation against the dominant logic of the field which can even lead to the institutionalisation of new practices and rules according to their frames of change and innovation (Idem). 7. Settlement Contention ends when sustained mobilisation or outside imposition gravitates towards a new or refurbished institutional settlement regarding field rules and cultural norms (2011). We can say that a field is no longer in crisis when a generalized sense of o rder and certainty returns (McAdam and Scott 2005: 18 19; Schneiberg and Soule 2005: in: McAdam and Fligstein, 2011). The authors stress that settlements are not necessarily consensual, but reflect a relative acceptance of a new status quo (2012: 19). This will be elaborated on in more detail below. Change and Stability in Strategic Action Fields. Having elaborated on the basic conceptual elements of the theory, we move on to a brief description of the conditions that account for stability and change in SAFs, as well as the role that strategic actors potentially play in these processes. First of all, we have to take into account the fact that SAFs are situational and changeable, and can be placed on a continuum of stages of stability and change. Roughly, three basic stages or conditions of the field can be discerned: Emergence, stability, and rupture or crisis. This distinction is made because each stage raises different questions for analysis of a SAF. In this case 16

17 study of Marikana, the SAF of interest falls into the third category as it will focus on the moment where the stability of the field is compromised and a crisis unfolds. Clearly, the analysis of the destabilisation of a SAF is only possible when we understand the point of departure; the composition of the SAF in times of stability. For this reason, I will briefly touch upon the state of emergence, and elaborate more thoroughly on the stages of stability and rupture and crisis relevant to this thesis. Field emergence Unorganized social spaces may tend towards field emergence when two or more actors occupy a social space in which they are oriented towards each other, but where agreement over the social order and basic conditions of the SAF have not been settled yet. For example, a new market may arise over a new commodity, where emerging competitors will have to take account of each other s existence in the emerging SAF. Another example would be a legislative change that will touch certain set of formerly unrelated actors, which causes them to unify around this new shared cause and form a new SAF (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 11). Towards settlement and stability Once a new SAF is emergent, the actors involved will take part in a process of finding consensus over the rules and order of the field. This process is typically informed by a sequence of four factors, including the resource disparity between the parties, the social skill of the negotiating actors, the extent to which state actors intervene to help effect or impede a settlement; and the creation of internal governance units to help routinize and implement the terms of the settlement (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012: 96). The results of the settlement can produce a continuum of outcomes, from strongly hierarchical, imposed settlement to more consensual coalition-based cooperation. What McAdam and Fligstein emphasize in contrast to the idea of institutional logic 1, is that the nature of any settlement is much more about competition and conflict. This is because consensus and settlement concern a relative acceptance (2012: 90). This is in line with the basic envision of the SAF as an organised social space where more and less powerful actors constantly vie for advantage (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 3). Hence, field stability is a relative concept, because it requires constant action of incumbents to maintain the status quo of the field as acceptance of the order of things is not taken for granted and less privileged actors may constantly seek opportunities to improve their situation at the expense of others. Field rupture and Crisis. Once a SAF is settled and relatively stable, it is likely to prove highly resistant to challenge because the whole field is directed towards the incumbent s interests. Only 1 Institutional logic refers to the idea that once a settlement over social order is reached, this is based on consensus 17

18 heavy exogenous shocks are likely to create a threat to this deeply sustained settlement. Incumbents are well positioned to withstand pressures and to react to challenges based on their privileged resources in terms of money and strategic allies with governance units, state actors and other incumbents in and outside the SAF. Challengers on the other hand operate from less resourceful and highly fragile positions as their survival is mainly dependant on the incumbents they seek to oppose. This does not mean that a stable field is static as the status quo does not reify and sustain itself and incumbents constantly worry to maintain their advantage and challengers constantly seek for tiny cracks in the system to advance their position, causing a constant flow of change and adjustment in the field (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012: 96). In this view actual destabilisation of the SAF is normally only caused by external forces or: exogenous shocks. As mentioned before, the three main external sources of field destabilisation are invasion by outside groups, changes in fields upon which the SAF in question is dependent, and rare macro events like war and depression. As explained earlier, SAFs are embedded in a broader field environment made up of other SAFs, including state fields, and a change or crisis will send out ripples to other fields, like a stone thrown in water. If severe enough, this may have the effect of destabilizing relations within the SAF in question, as both challengers and incumbents may realise (or perceive) that the current state of affairs may be under pressure (McAdam and Fligstein, 2012: 104). In this scenario, incumbents are likely to call upon their allies, especially within the state, for help. As mentioned, state actors are often key to ending a field crisis as they are resourced and formally entitled to enforce a new settlement. However, a field crisis may also catalyse such a strong oppositional force that enforced (re)settlement along the lines of the pre-crisis SAF is untenable. McAdam and Fligstein offer a set of 4 propositions on the possible outcomes of a field crisis and the type of settlement that is forged. The first scenario is a re-imposition of the old order with some adjustments. The second scenario will see the SAF break down into unorganized social space, which will eventually lead to the migration of groups to other social spaces. The third scenario is that the SAF is partitioned into several social spaces. The final scenario is that challengers manage to build a coalition to produce a new SAF (McAdam and Fligstein, 2011: 19). In conclusion, this chapter has offered two things. It has illustrated on the basis of ontological and methodological considerations why the theory of fields should be used to study the response of Lonmin to the destabilising events surrounding the crisis in Marikana. Secondly, this chapter has offered a condensed overview of the main features of the theory. Off course the theory of fields in far more detailed and elaborate than described in this chapter. Hence, the following chapter will go into more depth and detail on the theory where needed. 18

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20 Chapter 3: Results and Analysis This chapter seeks to answer the sub-questions of this thesis in the sequence as described in the introduction, so that in the concluding chapter a thorough answer can be given to the main research question. The first part will provide an interpretation of how the strategic action field and the broader field environment surrounding Lonmin was organised in times of relative stability precipitating the Marikana crisis. This is a crucial exercise because it will show how field stability was institutionalised and maintained, and provides a canvas against which changes in stability and strategy can be measured. Here the first four basic elements of the theory serve as an analytical guide. Then, the onset of contention is discussed, which entails an analysis of the exogenous shocks that destabilized the SAF. Thirdly, a corporate-focused account is given of the episode of contention and crisis that results from the destabilisation. This does not only focus on the 5 days of protest at Marikana, but includes the entire process of destabilisation sprouting from the exogenous shocks that set the field into motion. The final part then elaborates on the settlement of the crisis and how this affects the composition of the field. 1. Stage 1: Defining the strategic action field and the broader field environment The first question that needs to be answered in order to study what happens when stability is under threat is what the SAF looked like in times of stability precipitating the crisis and how it was connected to the broader field environment. Defining a SAF is tricky as boundaries shift depending to the issue at stake and every SAF is embedded inand host to- many other SAFs. I am aware that many choices can be made at this point to study Lonmin, therefore I will start with a clarification of the rationale behind this specific decision to study the SAF that captures the corporation Lonmin as a whole. The elaboration starts with defining what is meant exactly with Lonmin, which is the core focus of this thesis. Broadly speaking, Lonmin Plc. is a British mining corporation that operates a platinum mine in Rustenburg, South Africa. The company split from the mining conglomerate Lonhro and acquired a leasing agreement to mine in Marikana in 1969 (Chinguno, 2013, 4). On a closer look, this corporation is made up of a pyramid shaped, complex hierarchy of employers and employees. Often when referred to Lonmin analysts actually refer to the owners, or those individuals in power at the top of the pyramid instead of the entire corporation, as is the case in this thesis. Other interchangeable markers for this top of the pyramid found in literature are management, executives, mine-owners, employers and senior-managers. The rest of the pyramid covers over employees of whom the majority are unskilled workers who perform physical work under harsh conditions underground for relative low wages. 20

21 This is the rough division that often appears in literature on Marikana, as the strike was organised by Rock Drill operators (RDOs) who represent the lowest part of the pyramid, and were demanding direct dialogue with the top executives of the corporation. Obviously this binary division between low-payed physical work and powerful rich managers cuts short of the many levels of employment between the two hierarchical extremes. There is a rich variety of team-leaders and supervisors, office clerks, junior, medior and senior managers that gradually cover the middle ranks of the pyramid. In this thesis a diffuse distinction between the lower workforce and senior management will be maintained for the reason that researchers have unanimously pointed out that the lower workforce and management above ground are literally worlds apart, referring to the stark contrast between the harsh conditions underground and the airconditioned offices of management, and the fact that communication up and down the pyramid is ill-organised, with managers often having no clue of what goes on underground (Frankel, 2013: 57). The sharp contrasts between the top management and the unprivileged workforce in the context of a former racially segregated nation makes a compelling case to approach the corporation itself as a SAF. In this SAF Incumbents are those in charge at the top of the pyramid. The boundary between who is in charge, and who is under pressure to follow up orders in the line of command remains diffuse because the stakes of making profit exceed far beyond the senior management and owners, to shareholders and even the national economy. Also, along the way, boundaries and power positions may shift. This shows how this case study of Lonmin cannot be done in isolation of the broader field environment, but it also means that the exact definition of the Lonmin s top management remains vague. The working definition of the incumbents in this context will refer to those in high ranking senior and executive positions at Lonmin that have the power to make important decisions, and who have access to the lion s share of resources, both financial and strategically to regulate the corporation and to maintain order. Logically, the lower workforce at Lonmin finds itself on the other end of the power balance and are the so called challengers of the field. Their interests would be best served if the profits of the mine would be more equally divided between rank and file, but open revolt against those in power is a risky path as the Massacre at Marikana has shown. More importantly, the hard physical and dangerous underground work for low wages mainly attracts un-educated, dirt-poor (mainly migrant) workers that are reliant on their job for the livelihood of one or more families, and have little to no other options of employment. Combined with the ease in which Lonmin fires and hires these workers, they do not possess a good bargaining position to improve their situation. In line with McAdam and Fligsteins conception of a SAF, both incumbents and challengers are aware of who has more power and why, and have a general sense of what is at stake in the field: Precious ores are obtained from the soil and brought to the surface to be processed and sold on the world market for profits. This sense is general because workers are aware of the huge differences between the profits the owners and 21

22 managers make from this process, and the meagre subsistence wages they earn themselves. They have less knowledge of what happens to profits when the market for platinum plunges like it did in Lonmin s top management is aware of the consequences of market plunges and the profit it needs to make to maintain the company (as well as royal salaries and revenues for the top), and has proven willing to retrench at the expense of the lower workforce in a variety of ways that will be discussed later on. Here, it suffices to say that everyone in the SAF is reliant on- and oriented towards the same goal of processing ore for profits, although in different proportions, and that individuals and collectives use their own interpretative frame to make sense of what other actors in the field are doing and why. Less self evident than the concept of incumbents and challengers is the concept of governance units. Governance units are internal to the SAF and ensure some level order and compliance with field rules. In my opinion the trade unions, that have special significance in South Africa since the Labour movement has been crucial to the ending of Apartheid little more than 20 years ago, could be regarded as governance units in this SAF. The right to join trade unions and for trade unions to collectively bargain and strike is recognised within the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, and has translated into the Labour Relations Act, that prescribes the framework for industrial relations for both employers and unions. As such, the trade unions are the designated avenue for legal collective bargaining and dialogue with the employers. At the Lonmin mine the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) used to be the dominant trade union, but the conflict at Marikana has been associated with union rivalry between NUM and the newly established Allied Mining and Construction Union (AMCU). Alexander et al. show that the union rivalry argument for provoking the Marikana crisis has been flawed on several grounds (2013: 137), which will not be elaborated on in more detail in this thesis. However, as will be discussed in more detail later, NUM had a central role in the escalation of conflict in the 5 days before the massacre. I would argue that these unions, that are also entire SAFs in themselves, are internal to the field due to their deep intertwining and presence at all levels of the mine, including close relations between senior officials and the mining management. In terms of the broader field environment of the SAF in question, Lonmin is embedded in a larger commodity market SAF with the 4 other large platinum mines of South Africa; Anglo platinum, Impala Platinum, Xstrata, and Aquarius. These mines are all located along the Rustenburg platinum belt or Bushvelt complex and together produce more that 80% of the worlds platinum. Although this SAF is relevant to Lonmin as its competitive market, the horizontally organised character of more or less equal competitors is of less interest to understand the destabilisation in the platinum industry than the vertical relations between the mines upper-class management and lower workforce (Chinguno, 2013: 4). In this view the competing mines in the Rustenburg area each represent proximate SAFs, that share similar internal structures to the Lonmin SAF. 22