Headscarf regimes in Europe: Diversity policies at the intersection of gender, culture and religion

Transcription

1 Original Article Headscarf regimes in Europe: Diversity policies at the intersection of gender, culture and religion Birgit Sauer Institut fu r Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße 7, Vienna A-1010, Austria. Abstract The headscarf issue became an arena of heated controversies over the politics of integration and religious and cultural differences since the mid-1980s. Most interestingly, these struggles are deeply connected to gender differences. Although all European countries are consolidated, liberal democracies, different institutional settings have translated into different approaches of headscarf policies. The main aim of this paper is first to explain differences and similarities in regulating the headscarf issue by analyzing three paradigmatic countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. By selecting these countries, the paper aims, secondly, to contribute to a refined methodology explaining the different types of headscarf regulation. The third aim is to detect the gendered narrative of the policy debates. The comparison shows that an ethno-cultural citizenship regime does not always lead to a prohibitive regulation (Austria) and cooperative state church relations do not always result in the accommodation of the headscarf (Germany). To explain headscarf regulations, it is important to take gender equality and antidiscrimination policies and women s movements into account, especially the cooperation of majority and minority women s movement actors. Finally, the analysis shows that gendering the issue is used as a strategy to construct a different other. Comparative European Politics (2009) 7, doi: /cep Keywords: headscarf regimes; multiculturalism; citizenship regime; church state relations; women s policy; policy frames Introduction The headscarf issue has been on the agenda of European countries since the mid-1980s. The debates about Muslim body covering like hijab, niqab and burqa 1 have accelerated since 2004, when the French National Assembly and Senate voted in favor of a law to ban ostensible religious symbols in public spaces. Today, most European countries have regulated the wearing of r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

2 Sauer headscarves in the public sphere, that is, at schools and universities, in the public service jobs or in courtrooms. The headscarf has become an arena of passionate controversies about the politics of integration and religious and cultural differences (Klausen, 2005, p. 171). Most interestingly, these struggles are deeply connected to gender differences (Benhabib, 2002). The bodies of Muslim women became a battlefield of conflicts over values and identity politics. Liberal norms and values such as religious freedom, state neutrality and gender equality are not only challenged, but also re-negotiated and reassured in these debates. Moreover, the controversies over the Muslim headscarf are part of identity politics of Muslim communities to create a common us, while the dominant/majority society is marking the other by questioning the presence of Islamic symbols in the public sphere. The headscarf issue is highly contested among feminists. Although studies show that the motives for body covering among Muslim women are rather diverse (Ho glinger, 2002), feminist debates are locked in dichotomous frames: The headscarf is either seen as a freely chosen expression of women s religious identity and a shield from the lustful gaze of men (for example Moghadam, 1994) or it is perceived as a sexist religious tradition, which the Quran does not demand, and an emblem of female oppression denying women full access to the public sphere (for example Mernissi, 1991). What makes female Muslim body coverings so controversial? As a highly visible sign, the headscarf is a symbol for the religious difference of Islam. Thus, the issue has to be contextualized in recent developments in Western European countries and their relation to Islam. All Western European countries have become countries of immigration and the privilege of family reunion resulted in a feminization of migration. Moreover, migrant families stay permanently in Western Europe disproving the idea of the guest worker. Additionally, welfare-state retrenchment and neo-liberal restructuring of European societies increased the feelings of social insecurity as well as resentments towards immigrants. Another reason for the highlighted awareness of the Muslim headscarf is the new political context throughout the world after 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, and the assassination of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands. The politicization of Islam strengthened perceptions that Islam is not only incompatible with democracy and human rights but also a threat to the security and safety of people (Read, 2007, p. 231). Muslim headscarves touch on three contested policies of European democracies: first policies of integration, second the governance of religious difference and the role of religion in public life and third gender equality and antidiscrimination policies. First, recent conflicts over Muslim headscarves are accompanied by a retreat from multiculturalism (Saharso, 2003b; Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 2005, p. 49). Questions of integration, recognition and toleration thus have become issues of major importance (Kymlicka, 1995; May 76 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

3 Headscarf regimes in Europe et al, 2004; Bader, 2007). Multiculturalist policies are not perceived as an appropriate approach to religious, cultural and ethnic differences any more (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005, p. 3). To the contrary, multiculturalism is associated with ghettoization and parallel societies, where fundamental rights are infringed by illiberal cultural practices. Body covering is now interpreted as a visible sign of disrespect to democratic values and the unwillingness to integrate into majority society. Second, most of the European countries respect the right of religious freedom and define themselves as secular. They have developed various institutions of church state relations such as laicite, state neutrality and state church models. Although the secularization of European states went along with the privatization of religious beliefs (Amireaux, 2007, p. 132), covered Muslim women put religion (again) on the public agenda and might lead to a re-sacralization of the public sphere and therefore might threaten secular liberal democracies. Third, gender equality and antidiscrimination policies are also challenged by the new developments. Although the European Union implemented laws for gender equality and antidiscrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, age and disability, these policies are rather contested in some of the member states. Although the antidiscrimination directives still have to be transposed into national law, gender equality policies are more and more challenged since the mid-1990s (Outshoorn and Kantola, 2007). Debates about body covering and other so-called traditional practices shifted the attention to migrant women and female victims of traditional violence, and hence discursively denied the necessity for equal opportunity policies at the same time (Verloo and Roggeband, 2007). The major question of this paper is how European countries deal with the headscarf issue. Although all European countries refer to the tradition of liberal democracies and fundamental human rights, different institutional settings have translated into different approaches of headscarf policies. Three models can be distinguished across Europe (Skjeie, 2007, p. 130). First, a prohibitive approach bans all forms of Muslim body covering in public institutions. Countries such as France, Turkey and some German federal states belong to this category. Second, the soft or selective approach applies prohibitive measures only to certain kinds of body covering as for instance full face or body covering. Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands fall into this category. Third, we find non-restrictive, tolerant models where the wearing of head and body covering is not restricted, like in Denmark and Austria. Some empirical research exists on how European countries accommodate Islamic religious culture and how they regulate the headscarf issue. Most of the studies are national case studies, such as Altinordu (2004), Amireaux (2007), Berghahn (2004), Mushaben (2004) and Amir-Moazami (2005) on headscarf policies in Germany, Go le (1997) and Saktanber (2002) for Turkey, and Scott r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

4 Sauer (2007) and Poulter (1997) for France. Although a number of two-country comparisons try to explain differences and similarities, such as Amir-Moazami (2007) and Joppke (2007) comparing France and Germany, Saharso (2006) and Lettinga and Saharso (2008) comparing the Netherlands with Germany, and Skjeie s (2007) comparison of Nordic countries, no systematic comparison of headscarf policies across Europe exists. The main aim of this paper, therefore, is first to explain differences and similarities in regulating the headscarf issue in Europe by analyzing three paradigmatic countries: Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. By selecting these countries, I seek to contribute to a refined methodology explaining the different types of headscarf regulation. The second aim is to detect the gendered narrative of the policy debates. How is gender equality framed and what gender images are presented in these policy debates? My argument is that there are no clear-cut national patterns of institutional settings, such as citizenship models, church state relations or gender regimes, which influence headscarf policies. To the contrary, the comparison of the three paradigmatic countries will show that these models have to be understood as settings, which interact with each other, which might have contradictory outcomes and therefore might lead to different regulations in different countries (Koopmans et al, 2005, p. 9ff.). To analyze headscarf policies, it is also important, as the comparison will show, to scrutinize women s policy agencies and women s movements, which are ignored in the mainstream literature. Moreover, the comparison will show that frames used in the policy debates mediate the interplay of institutions and actors. The analysis will demonstrate that gendered frames are gaining more and more importance in the process of re-designing citizenship and integration policies and that gendering is not always a strategy to bring forward women s equality. My research is situated within the large debate about minority rights, multiculturalism and feminism. This literature has a strong normative focus on political theory arguing for the legitimacy of tolerating minority cultures. I, therefore, first will contextualize my research in this body of literature, which sets the normative horizon for political regulation. Moreover, the literature overview will connect this body of literature to comparative research on gender equality policy (Mazur, 2002) and will develop a methodology for the comparison of headscarf regimes. Next, the paper describes the headscarf regimes in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. Third, I will explain differences and similarities in regulating the headscarf issue, and fourth, I will analyze the use of gendered frames in the policy debates and explain the strategy of gendering. In the conclusion, the interplay between citizenship regimes, women s movement mobilization and church state relations in Muslim headscarf policy will be highlighted in tandem with different strategies for making the policy process on this issue more democratic r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

5 Headscarf regimes in Europe Situating Headscarf Policies: Debates about Secularity, Multiculturalism and Feminism There has been a significant growth in interest in topics like citizenship, justice and recognition of minority groups in the past 15 years (for instance Kymlicka, 1995, 2001, 2005; Parekh, 2002; Joppke and Morawska, 2003; Koopmans et al, 2005; Bodeman and Yurdakul, 2006; Modood 2007). In the first wave of literature on minority rights since the late 1980s, political theorists argued for the accommodation of religious and cultural differences in Western societies and deconstructed the idea of an ethnocultural neutrality of the state as a myth (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 34). A liberal-cultural position argues that interests related to culture are fully consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 31) and that there is no reason why liberal democratic states could not tolerate and accommodate religious difference. Special legal provisions such as public support for linguistic and religious practices or exemptions from general laws, such as hallal slaughter and special holidays, should enable minority groups to practice distinct ways of living and should support individual autonomy of migrants (Kymlicka, 2005, p. 30; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2005; Modood et al, 2006; Amghar et al, 2007). In this perspective, the aim of multicultural citizenship is to provide groups with external protections and not to impose internal restrictions on their members (Kymlicka, 1995, Chapter 3). Empirical research in this tradition started to scrutinize different institutional settings, which might best support multicultural politics. A country s citizenship model and its integration policies were seen as major factors, with regard to the recognition of migrant groups (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans and Statham, 2000). The literature points to three citizenship models, which result in different forms of governance of religious and cultural diversity (Saharso, 2006). The French civic-assimilationist model is open to include migrants as citizens, grants relatively easy access to citizenship (ius soli), but does not foster cultural and religious differences. The German and Austrian ethno-cultural model is based on descent (ius sanguinis) rather than on consent to common values and principles and imposes strict requirements to immigrants. Finally, the multi-cultural model promotes cultural and religious diversity by providing relatively easy access to citizenship and fosters recognition of cultural differences (as in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The literature on citizenship assumes that it is most likely that countries with a ius soli citizenship regime and a multi-cultural approach are dealing in a far more open way with cultural and religious difference, whereas countries with an ethno-cultural citizenship regime are more restrictive towards accommodating Muslim practices. A second factor influencing the institutionalization of minority rights are church state relations and the religious constitution of a country (Berghahn, r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

6 Sauer 2007). Fetzer and Soper (2005, p. 7) found that differences in state accommodation of Muslim practices can be best explained by a church state theory (see also Klausen, 2005; Warner and Wenner, 2006; Koenig, 2007, p. 912). Neutral states that are equally distant to religious communities, and states with a mixed or cooperative system or a concordatory model of state church relations (Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 5) (Netherlands, Germany and Austria) as well as countries with a state church (the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece) are more tolerant towards religious difference than laı c countries with a separation model, such as France and Turkey (Berghahn, 2007). The resources of religious minorities and the status of minority groups are also seen as important for multicultural politics (Fetzer and Soper, 2005, p. 7). Thus, countries that recognize Muslim religious communities might be more tolerant towards Muslim religious symbols in the public sphere than countries where Muslim religious communities have no public standing and therefore no access to policy debates. However, by the end of the 1990s another tonality accompanied the debates on minority rights. The risks and costs for vulnerable group members such as women were put on the agenda (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005, p. 4). Susan Moller Okin (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (1999) were the most vocal feminist critics of multiculturalism. Okin s provocative paper, Is multiculturalism bad for women? sheds light on the blind spots of multiculturalism. She called attention to gendered in-group power relations, to illiberal practices, to intragroup rights violation and to the preservation of patriarchy (see also Shachar, 2007, p. 115f.). The accommodation of cultural and religious difference can be a threat to women s equality, voice and visibility in the public sphere because gender equality policies did not reach the private realm of minority groups, thus undermining the individual autonomy of migrant women. The liberal state should, therefore, not grant special rights to minority groups if they infringe upon women s rights, their freedom, autonomy and choice and therefore Muslim body covering should be prohibited in order to protect Muslim women. Okin s position has provoked heated debates and her work has been criticized by post-colonial and multiculturalist feminists (Shachar, 2007, p. 117). An over-simplified conception of culture contributes to the construction of a radical otherness (ibid., p. 124) by representing immigrants as profoundly different and as pre-modern and patriarchal per se (Phillips, 2007, pp. 2, 24). Migrant women are constructed as mere victims without agency and in need of protection (Shachar, 2001, p. 66; Phillips, 2007, p. 22). Multiculturalist feminists claim that the prohibition of headscarves would privatize identities and would relegate Muslim women to their communities without any choice (Shachar, 2007, p. 128). Multicultural feminists, such as Shachar (2001, 2007) and Seyla Benhabib (2002), who are aware of the multicultural gender paradox demand legal and 80 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

7 Headscarf regimes in Europe institutional changes to promote the openness of minority communities, which allow women access to, and voice in, decision-making processes (Shachar, 2007, p. 127). Monique Deveaux (2005) is one of the most prominent writers in favor of such a deliberative approach to multiculturalism, which might give greater credence to minority women in defining freedom and autonomy. The assumption is that the integration of Muslim women s voices might foster mutual understanding and might lead to a more tolerant regulation. The following comparison rests on these debates; moreover, it is inspired by social science approaches such as neo-institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, resource mobilization, frame theory and gender theory, which provide the methodology of the comparison (Rosenberger and Sauer, 2006; see also Read, 2007, p. 233). My discursive-institutionalist approach analyzes political institutions like citizenship and integration regimes and church state relations as factors to explain variations in regulating the headscarf issue. As the headscarf is a women s issue, actors such as women s policy agencies and women s movements are also analyzed as explanatory factors. Another important variable that shapes policy outcomes are frames, that is, modes of defining problems and structures of organized meanings (Snow and Benford, 1992). Developing this methodology, the paper contributes to comparative gender research by introducing a research perspective at the intersection of gender, ethnicity and religion. The analysis in the following section will compare, (1) citizenship regimes and integration policies, (2) church state relations, (3) the recognition of religious communities, (4) traditions of gender policies and institutions of antidiscrimination, and (5) the role of women s movements, feminist intellectuals and the voices of Muslim women. Headscarf Policies in Germany, the Netherlands and Austria Since the 1960s, the Federal Republic of Germany is one of the major countries of immigration in Western Europe. Around 3.2 million Muslims, mainly from Turkey, live in the country, where they form about 4 per cent of the population (Berghahn and Rostock, 2007, p. 31). In the early 1990s, the headscarf issue appeared on the agenda of schools and since 1993 pupils wearing a headscarf can be exempted from sport lessons (Amireaux, 2007, p. 129). In 1998 Ferestha Ludin, a school teacher of Afghan origin, sued the southern province of Baden-Wu rttemberg, claiming that her exclusion from teaching owing to her headscarf violated her freedom of religious expression. The provincial government, her employer, as well as the administrative court argued that the reason for the ban is state neutrality as well as to protect other pupils from religion (Mushaben, 2004, p. 101). Ludin took her case to the Constitutional Court, which in September 2003 decided that she may not be denied to teach at r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

8 Sauer school with the headscarf. Different from a case in July 2003 in the private business sector, in which the court referred to constitutional principles like the free development of one s personality (Art. 2) and freedom of faith, conscience and creed (Art. 4), declaring the discrimination of Muslim women wearing a headscarf as unconstitutional, the Court argued differently in the Ludin case: A ban was seen as unconstitutional because the German federal states had no legislation that prohibit teachers from wearing a headscarf. Also, the court claimed that the headscarf may have an intense effect on pupils (ibid., p. 103) and therefore may be in conflict with pedagogical neutrality of the state. Immediately after the decision, some German federal states passed laws banning headscarves for teachers, Baden-Wu rttemberg being one of them. Although Berlin bans all religious symbols, states such as Baden-Wu rttemberg and Bavaria do not ban Christian symbols. The picture seemed to change when the administrative court in the city of Stuttgart in June 2006 declared the ban for covered Muslim teachers as unlawful. The court argued that it is discriminating against Muslim teachers, because Catholic nuns can teach in their habit. Then the issue was framed as an issue of non-discrimination and equal rights of Muslims. In 2006, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands exceeded one million, which is around 6 per cent of the population (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 53). The country has no laws prohibiting the wearing of the hijab in public institutions, but the practice is permitted in post offices, city halls and in public schools unless the clothing hinders the fulfilling of the job as for instance in the police force, in ministries and the judiciary (ibid., p. 2). However, private Christian schools may prohibit wearing a headscarf, because it may contradict the religious identity of the institution (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2005, p. 49). After a series of headscarf cases in schools, such as in 1985, when local authorities of Alphen an de Rijn forbade Muslim girls to cover their head at a primary school (ibid.), or in 1997, when the head of a Haarlem school denied a trainee to wear a hijab in class arguing with educational neutrality of the state, the Minister of Education in 2003 delegated the issue of religious clothing to schools, which have to set up a school rule (Kubelka and Schian, 2004, p. 57). Some headscarf cases in schools, courts in 2001, a Muslim law student was denied to cover her head at an internship (ibid., p. 59) and in the police force a Muslim police officer wanted to wear the hijab as part of her uniform (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2005, p. 52) were brought to the Commission for Equal Treatment. In all cases, the commission ruled the ban as a discriminatory practice against Muslims right of freedom of religion and therefore contravening the Dutch constitution (Saharso, 2003a, p. 12). However, in the court case, the Minister of Justice overruled the commission s judgment (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 76). 82 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

9 Headscarf regimes in Europe However, the equality-oriented policy changed in recent years; Dutch multiculturalism became a paradox. In 2003, the Commission for Equal Treatment approved the prohibition of the niqab in public schools and universities (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2005, p. 53). The niqab, it was argued, hinders communication. Moreover, the Netherlands is the first European country where the issue of the burqa came to the agenda: In 2005, the Groep Wilders, a rightist party, asked for a general ban of burqas in the public realm as a means to prevent terrorism and in 2007, the then Minister of Immigration, Rita Verdonk from the conservative party, proposed a similar law. 3 Although the Dutch cabinet rejected the proposal, the issue is still on the agenda and another bill is in the making, banning burqas at schools (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 64). Around Muslim immigrants, 4 per cent of the population, are living in Austria, most of them from Turkey and Bosnia, and of them are women. Different from Germany and the Netherlands, Austria did not have heated public debates over headscarves nor does a ban exist in public institutions, in schools, in universities or in the public service. Public employers tolerate religious symbols. In Vienna, for instance, Muslim women can wear a hijab in public hospitals, the Vienna government developed a uniform for cleaning ladies with a hijab as well as for Sikhs working in the public transport system. The first Austrian headscarf case occurred in the city of Traun in 2001, where a Muslim girl was denied enrollment in a secondary school. After public debates, the ban was lifted. In the city of Linz, a school leader forbade a Muslim pupil to wear the headscarf during class. This case was also solved at the school level and the girl could attend class with the hijab. In the wake of this conflict, the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture issued a decree stating that the headscarf is to be viewed as a religious sign, and therefore is protected by the Basic State Law as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights (Gresch et al, 2008). Only recently a case was in the media: A judge denied a Muslim defendant to appear in the court with a niqab. Major Austrian parties, the Christian-conservatives (ÖVP), the Social Democrats (SPO ) and the Green Party, frame the issue as no problem issue. 4 The deproblematization frame sees the headscarf as apolitical and as an expression of religious belief. Moreover, wearing a headscarf, including Muslim headscarves, is seen as a popular practice: Rural women are wearing headscarves as traditional part of their costumes, all Austrian women wear a headscarf depending on weather conditions and Catholic nuns cover their head. 5 However, in the last election campaign, the right-wing FPO distributed posters, which showed a covered Muslim woman. The legend said: Free women instead of forced headscarf. Liese Prokop, Minister of the Interior, stated in 2005 in an interview that she would be in favor of banning the r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

10 Sauer headscarf in public institutions. After being criticized by her partisan colleagues from the O VP, she had to withdraw her comment. Explaining the Headscarf Puzzle With regard to citizenship and integration policies, Germany and the Netherlands fit the expected patterns: Germany does not define itself as a country of immigration but as ethnically and culturally homogenous. Germany s citizenship regime is based on ius sanguinis (citizenship through family), and only in 2000 the red green coalition modified the citizenship law to enable the so-called second-generation immigrants to apply for German citizenship. Although Germany today has a mixture of ius sanguinis and ius soli (citizenship through place of birth), access to citizenship still rests on the idea of conformity with a set of values that immigrants should adhere to (Leitkultur). Assimilation is still the dominant approach to integration. Different from Germany, the Netherlands has a civic-territorial model of citizenship, based on the ius soli (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 22) and applies a multicultural approach of integration. The country has established institutions for the recognition of cultural, ethnic and religious difference. The Dutch accommodating policies can be explained by the idea of pillarization and consociational democracy. The Dutch society is divided into highly autonomous vertical segments: Catholic, Protestant, socialist and liberal pillars. These religious and ideological communities have the right to express themselves in public and to establish their own institutions such as schools, hospitals, newspapers and broadcasting networks. The Dutch state is supposed to be neutral or equally distant to all these rival definitions of the good (Saharso, 2003a, p. 24ff.). However, since the late 1990s Dutch multicultural politics shifted to a more republican citizenship and integration regime (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 12f.). The Dutch pillar model was called into question by populist politicians such as Pim Fortuyn as well as by the conservative government. When we take the church state relations of the two countries into account, the picture gets more puzzling. According to a church state relation approach, we would expect toleration of Muslim religious symbols in both countries. Germany and the Netherlands define themselves as neutral but not secular states. In both countries, state church relations are guided by the principles of non-identification, religious freedom and equality of religions (Cavanaugh, 2007, p. 6f.). The Dutch state church relations also rest on the idea of pillarization, which grants all pillars public recognition and support including the display of religious symbols in public. The Dutch constitution, for instance, allows religious groups to establish religiously oriented schools, 84 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

11 Headscarf regimes in Europe which are publicly funded (Saharso, 2003a, p. 15). Similarly, in Germany, state and church are intertwined. Christian churches are recognized by the state as public corporations, eligible for tax, which is collected by the state. State and Christian churches cooperate in specific areas, for instance in the health sector and with regard to public child care. Furthermore, Christian religion is taught in public schools. Like Germany and the Netherlands, Austria is not a secular state. State and churches, in particular the Catholic Church, cooperate in different social areas, especially in the educational system. It is thus not seen as an infringement of state neutrality if religious symbols are displayed in public institutions like crucifixes in courts or in classrooms of public schools. Although Germany runs counter the expected toleration of Islamic symbols, Austria fits the expectations. However, Austria blurs the picture again with respect to its restrictive citizenship regime. The country has ethno-cultural citizenship rights based on the ius sanguinis. The latest amendments of Austria s Citizenship Act (2005/ 2006) as well as its recent Asylum Law (2005), the Settlement and Residence Act and the Aliens Police Law to its Aliens Act (2005) continue to require cultural and social integration as a precondition for naturalization. The country expects and strongly encourages the assimilation of migrants to the Austrian culture. Similar to Germany we would not expect accommodation of Muslim headscarves but a more restrictive policy. Another factor that might influence the accommodation of the Islamic headscarf is the tradition of gender equality and antidiscrimination policies and the strength of these policy machineries. In the literature, it is argued that countries with strong equality traditions and institutions of antidiscrimination are less inclined to ban body covering than countries with weak gender equality and antidiscrimination institutions because a ban might be seen as infringing Muslim women s rights and contradicting the basic value of gender equality and nondiscrimination (McGoldrick, 2006; Skjeie, 2007). Here again, Germany and the Netherlands fit the patterns: Although the German Basic Law guaranties equality of the sexes, the country has only weak institutions of gender equality with modest resources and without a say in cases of workplace discrimination (Lang, 2007). Also, Germany has been rather reluctant in transposing European Union directives of antidiscrimination. Only in 2006, the General Equal Treatment Act came into force. However, the enforcement of the new equality law is rather weak. No equality commission exists, which might intervene in favor of Muslim women. Different from Germany, Holland has an Equal Treatment Law since 1994, which prohibits discrimination because of sex, race, ethnic background and religion. The Commission on Equal Treatment, an independent commission of nine experts, which advises the government, decides on the grounds of this r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

12 Sauer law. Although its verdicts are not binding, they are respected, and the commission can apply to courts for binding decisions (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 2). Interestingly, since the implementation of Integration Policy New Style in 2003, immigrant women moved from the margin to the centre of Dutch public debate and policy making (Prins and Saharso, 2008). Austria is again the exception: The Austrian constitution decrees nondiscrimination because of sex and religion, and calls for affirmative action. However, gender equality has always been of secondary importance in the Austrian value system. Like in Germany, women s policy enforcement is rather weak. In December 2003 and in July 2004, the European antidiscrimination directives were transposed into national law. But the institutions to enforce the laws lack resources and capacities. With respect to the weak institutions, one would not expect the accommodation of Muslim headscarves. Austrian exceptionalism might be explained by the recognition of Muslim religious communities (Gresch et al, 2008). The relation between religious communities and the state can be described as pluralistic inclusion of all religions into the public realm (Kalb et al, 2003, pp ). The Islamic Faith Community is recognized in the same way as Christian churches and it takes part in the institutionalized cooperation of state and churches. The recognition of Islam dates back to the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Recognition Law from 1874 grants all religious communities the same treatment and entitlements by the Austrian state, like advantages concerning taxation and school and work laws. Islam was recognized as an official religion in In May 1979, the Islamic Religious Community in Austria was established as the official representation of all Muslims and became part not only of the pluralist religious dialogue but also of the consociational political decision-making process. In Germany, Islam is not recognized as an official religion, because it fails to meet the criteria such as a clear-cut church organizational structure. The German state therefore hardly supports Muslim organizations. Only some Islamic welfare and cultural organizations are funded by the German state. In some provinces, for instance in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin, Islam is taught in public schools (Fetzer and Soper, 2005, p. 6). Such low resources of the Islamic communities in Germany might explain the weak public standing of Islam and its low impact on headscarf policy making. Islam is also integrated in the Dutch pillar structure through the Act Advisory Organs Minority Policy. Islamic groups are state subsidized; they receive resources to organize and they are recognized actors in public debates. Currently, two major Islamic bodies are represented in state consultant bodies such as school boards and broadcasting organizations where they are able to influence public policies and lobby for their interests (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 11ff.). 86 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

13 Headscarf regimes in Europe The three countries differ with respect to the role of the women s movement and the voice of Muslim women. One of the anchor women of Germany s second wave feminism, Alice Schwarzer (2003), who edited the feminist journal Emma, mobilizes against a tolerant approach to the headscarf. The headscarf, she states, is not a religious, but a political symbol of female oppression and a bloody symbol of theocrats. She frames covered women as victims of their patriarchal culture, their families and husbands. This position is supported by secular Turkish female intellectuals, such as the sociologist Necla Kelek (2005) and the Berlin lawyer Seyran Ates, whose live was threatened because she appeared for Muslim women in divorce cases. Claiming a view from inside, the two argue in favor of a headscarf ban. These Turkish intellectuals went into a frame coalition with conservative party members and with the Catholic Church and therefore dominate not only the feminist debate. Women s movement voices in favor of the hijab are weak. In 2003, the former Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, a member of the Green party, Marieluise Beck, together with other female rank and file and NGOs initiated a memorandum for religious diversity and against the prohibition of the headscarf. This triggered a heated and controversial debate within the German women s movement, where the antihijab strand won the controversy. Only recently young Muslim women with headscarves organized to defend their right to cover, but their public visibility is low. Similar to Germany, the Dutch women s movement is divided by the headscarf issue. Ciska Dresselhuys, chief editor of the feminist magazine Opzij, stated in 2001 that she was against headscarves, linking the issue to patriarchal and harmful practices (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 69). This stirred a heated debate over Muslim body covering among Dutch feminists. The prominent female Muslim voice, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, agitated against female body covering and gained a hegemonial position in the media debate. Currently, Islamic women try to organize independently from the Dutch women s movement. In 2006, several covered Muslim women launched an Islamic Women s Manifesto for the emancipation of Muslim women defending their right to cover (ibid., p.43). However, this voice remains rather marginal. Different from Germany s and the Netherlands, the Austrian women s movement did not take a position in the headscarf debate. Moreover, Muslim women do have a voice standing in public debates over religious questions. The Islam Women s Forum was founded in 2005 under the roof of the Islamic Religious Community in Austria. The Forum is lobbying for the right of Muslim women to wear a headscarf. The Islamic Religious Community s public relations manager, Carla Amina Baghajati, takes part in Austrian consensual policy making, she is heard on religious issues and she presents the headscarf as the free choice of religious women, but not as a must ( r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

14 Sauer In sum, the comparison of German, Dutch and Austrian debates and policies regarding Muslim body covering presents a puzzle for existing theories of accommodation policies in Europe. In the Netherlands and in Austria despite its different citizenship regimes and integration policies the most important factor for the accommodation of Muslim headscarves and body covering is the recognition and the voice of the Muslim community in the consociational model of decision making. Moreover, the public dominance of the Catholic Church in Austria is a major reason for the country s moderate public headscarf debates. A ban on headscarves might result in a similar prohibition of Christian symbols. The ban of Muslim headscarves in German public institutions can be understood as an attempt to redefine German national identity after reunification (Rostock and Berghahn, 2008). This identity building seems to need the construction of an Other the Muslim immigrant, which tremendously differs from the German Leitkultur. Both the German and the Dutch debates show that the citizenship models are reshaped through debates over Muslim headgear and body covering. The comparison also showed that women s policy and antidiscrimination agencies have an impact on the regulation if they have a say in the debate and if they frame the issue as discrimination, like in the Netherlands. Gendering Frames Framing the Other In the three countries, four dominant frames appeared in the debates the religious freedom frame, the state neutrality frame, the political frame and the gender equality frame. Prohibitive regulations in Germany are accompanied by the frames of state neutrality and freedom from religion. An antidiscrimination frame either with respect to gender or to religion can be hardly found in German policy debates. Moreover, it is argued by the former minister of culture in Baden-Wu rttemberg, Annette Schavan, that the hijab is less an expression of faith, than a political symbol, while the cross, the habit of nuns and the yarmulke are seen as solely religious symbols, as essential parts of the Western value system and therefore value-neutral (Klausen, 2005, p. 178). Headscarves are seen as symbols of cultural separation, of the development of a parallel society and the unwillingness to integrate into the German society (Schavan cited in Altinordu, 2004, p. 10). Such framing considers the wearing of a headscarf to be against basic principles of the German constitution. In the mixed regimes of the Netherlands until the turn of the century and the tolerant regulations in Austria, the headscarf is framed as the right of women to express their religious conviction and to choose their clothes. The equality of the different religions and antidiscrimination are also major frames. In both countries the political frame and gendered frames are mainly absent; the 88 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

15 Headscarf regimes in Europe headscarf issue is not dominantly framed as an issue of equality between the sexes. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission for instance never considered gender equality in any headscarf conflict. Different from Austria and the Netherlands, gender equality arguments are used rather often in German debates. The conservative minister Schavan, the feminist Alice Schwarzer as well as the Central Committee of German Catholics argue that the headscarf is a symbol of subordination and oppression of women in Islam (Altinordu, 2004, p. 10). Moreover, they state that Muslim women do not freely chose to cover, but they are forced to do so. They are presented as victims of their communities, oppressed by patriarchal norms, and therefore they have to be protected by the German state. In the Netherlands, gendered frames only became an important line of argumentation when Hirsi Ali came into the picture. Since then the headscarf is, like in Germany, framed as a symbol of patriarchy and backwardness of Islam (Saharso and Lettinga, 2007, p. 68). Austrian populist parties also use this frame and present the headscarf as oppressing women, although in the dominant political discourse the gendered frame is absent. Thus, in the past 3 years, the gender frame became more and more ambivalent in all three countries. Gender is rarely raised as an issue of equality between Muslim women and majority women but gendering becomes a strategy to argue against Muslim body covering and to mark Muslim women as the others (see also Lyon and Spini, 2004). The gender equality frame is used to demonstrate the huge gap between minority and majority culture and as a symbol for cultural difference. Sexual difference demarcates the line between us and them, the modern, gender-egalitarian us with autonomous women is put against the pre-modern, sexist and patriarchal other where women have no choice. Gender has moved from being a difference to occupying the universal (Young, 2005, p. 88). The argument of gender equality is ambivalent and twofold: It is, on the one hand, used against the other, to show the huge difference and incompatibility of Muslim and European culture. That way, the issue of gender equality may be utilized to work against the civic recognition of Muslims. On the other hand, gender equality is used to argue that women from the majority society are already equal and do not need affirmative action. Conclusions The analysis shows that stable patterns of institutional settings, which would lead to more accommodative policies, do not exist. On the contrary, some institutional settings interact with other institutional settings and they are reshaped in the course of policy debates. This explains why an ethno-cultural r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,

16 Sauer citizenship regime does not always lead to a prohibitive regulation (Austria) and that cooperative state church relations do not always result in the accommodation of the headscarf (Germany). To explain headscarf regulations it is important to take gender equality and antidiscrimination policies into account. The role of women s movements is also important for regulations with respect to unity around the issue and to cooperation of majority and minority women s movement actors. Finally, the analysis shows that framing and gendering have an impact. Frames are part of the political picture influencing institutional settings as well as policy decisions. However, gendering the issue is used as a strategy to construct a different other. In the light of these findings, I would like to come back to the normative aspect of the headscarf issue. It is most important that covered Muslim women get opportunities and resources to participate in public debates and to integrate their perspectives into policy regulations (Song, 2007, p. 171). Monique Deveaux (2005) argues for a democratic deliberative approach to mediate between different positions and to give attention to the views of the most vulnerable (Okin, 2005, p. 88). Deliberation over cultural conflicts is always a two-way street : state institutions and women s movement actors have to be involved and respect all women s voices. A ban of headscarves contradicts this deliberative plea. Although a deliberative approach has many advantages for Muslim women, Anne Phillips warns that an intercultural dialogue might exaggerate the scale of value conflict (Phillips, 2007, p. 41). Moreover, headscarf debates are not only about liberal values and norms, but also foremost about women and about intersecting structures of domination and discrimination. Therefore, policy debates need a shift away from culture to issues of power that shape women s lives (Phillips, 2005). Iris Marion Young calls this a shift from the politics of cultural difference to politics of positional difference that is the material differences of social positions (Young, 2005, p. 60f.). From such a perspective, many conflicts over cultural toleration and accommodation in contemporary liberal democracies occur within a context of structural inequality between the dominant groups and cultural minorities (ibid., p. 82). About the Author Birgit Sauer is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna. Her research fields include governance and gender, state theory and comparative gender policy analysis. Recent publication is Gendering the State in the Age of Globalization: Women s Movements and State Feminism in Post-Industrial Democracies, edited with Melissa Haussman (Boulder/London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007). 90 r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1, 75 94

17 Headscarf regimes in Europe Notes 1Ahijab is a scarf, which covers hair and shoulders. A niqab is a veil, which covers the whole face, while burqa, jilbab and chador not only cover head and the face but the whole body. These differences in body covering reflect differences and conflicts within Islam. In the following the use of the term headscarf refers to the hijab. 2 The paper draws on the research findings of the VEIL project, funded by the European Commission in the 6th framework ( The VEIL project examines the framing and regulation of headscarves across eight European countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the European Union. 3 It is estimated that 50 women are wearing burqa in the Netherlands (Jurist, Legal News and Research, 26 January 2008). 4 We thank Florian Hahn, who conducted interviews with politicians who are responsible for integration of the Vienna parties ÖVP, SPÖ and Green Party. 5 Interview with Werner Amon, then speaker for education of the O VP, References Altinordu, A. (2004) The meaning(s) of the headscarf: The German Kopftuchstreit. www. research.yale.edu/ccs/workshop/altinordu-headscarf.pdf, accessed May Amghar, S., Boubekeur, A. and Emerson, M. (eds.) (2007) European Islam. Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies. Amir-Moazami, S. (2005) Muslim challenges to the secular consensus: A German case study. Journal for Contemporary European Studies 13(3): Amir-Moazami, S. (2007) Politisierte Religion. Der Kopftuchstreit in Deutschland und Frankreich. Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript. Amireaux, V. (2007) The Headscarf Question: What is Really the Issue? In: S. Amghar, A. Boubekeur and M. Emerson (eds.) European Islam. Challenges for Public Policy and Society. Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies, pp Bader, V. (2007) Secularism or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press. Benhabib, S. (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Berghahn, S. (2004) Verfassungspolitischer Streit um ein Stu ck Stoff: Das Kopftuch der Lehrerin im Konflikt zwischen Grundrechtsschutz, staatlicher Neutralität in Glaubensfragen und fo deraler Gesetzgebung. Femina Politica 13(1): Berghahn, S. (2007) Judicial expertise on current regulations as well as on explanations for varieties in regulations and in the framing of European headscarf debates. VEIL project (typoscript). Berghahn, S. and Rostock, P. (2007) Germany. Country report. VEIL project (typoscript). Bodeman, M. and Yurdakul, G. (eds.) (2006) Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos: Incorporation Regimes in Germany, Western Europe and North America. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cavanaugh, K. (2007) Islam and the European project. Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 4(1): r 2009 Palgrave Macmillan Comparative European Politics Vol. 7, 1,