Language as a Tool in Constructing a Collective Political Identity in the European Union

Transcription

1 Language as a Tool in Constructing a Collective Political Identity in the European Union Paper to be presented at the workshop on Political Identity and Legitimacy in the Politics of the European Union ECPR Joint Sessions Nicosia, April 2006 Draft please do not quote without the author s permission Cornelia Bruell Institute for European Integration Research Austrian Academy of Sciences Prinz Eugen Strasse Vienna Phone: cornelia.bruell@oeaw.ac.at 1

2 1. Introduction 2. Hegemony and identity Ernesto Laclau 3. Language and contingency Richard Rorty 4. Reading Laclau through Rorty and vice versa 5. Empirical analysis 6. The European Union à venir 7. References 1. Introduction 1 The condition of a EU-identity is its impossibility. This notion not only holds true in a mere theoretical or ontological sense of identity-forming-processes, but also, as I will argue in this paper, for the construction of a possible horizon a social imaginary enabling European Union s citizens to build a collective EU-identity. To avoid being accused of using apparent paradoxa to impress and/or confuse the audience, I will add more precision to my introductory statement: In Laclau s theory of identities and entities in general we find the idea that no system can truly or finally be closed. This impossibility of closure is the main precondition for an endless attempt of stabilizing and fixing manageable entities. By using language-philosophical positions, I will argue in this paper, that the closure is an apparent one and thus strongly linked to the subject s perspective. This paper is composed of three essential steps: The first one being the notion of the subject in Laclau s theory, due to its crucial importance for any identity. In addition I will try to supplement this concept with linguistic-(theoretical) considerations, using Davidson s and Rorty s notion of the metaphor as a crucial concept for identity constructions. Second, I will 1 The following considerations are mainly based on Ernesto Laclau 1990, 1996 and Laclau in Mouffe 1996 and Richard Rorty 1989 and Davdison and Rorty

3 present some first results of my ongoing empirical study on the presence and dimensions of EU- and European discourses in the Financial Times and Le monde diplomatique. And finally as a third step I will try to offer a new social imaginary or metaphor for the construction of a EU-identity by introducing Derrida s concept of the democracy to come. Before we begin, let me first say a few words about the political necessity of a EUidentity. Obviously the EU has a problem of legitimacy, because its citizens lack confidence in its institutions and do not feel represented. Thus, there is an ever widening gap between EU-elites and the people, what also contributes to the lack of collective identification. There is a wide range of possible factors that contribute to the creation of a collective political identity - few of them are: (1) information can guarantee a certain kind of transparency, (2) information can contribute to the engagement in the political system and public debates, (3) through discourse, in the sense of also including social practice, collective identifications are created and provided. Conversely, the EU s claim for enhanced democratic accountability and representation must fail due to the absence of a clear people s mandate. (Walkenhorst 2004: 6) There have already been launched a number of initiatives to promote the citizen s EU consciousness from the EU institutional side. Since the late 1980s the European Commission and the European Parliament have been trying to establish a basis for identity constructions by introducing EU symbols, myths, language courses and education policies. In 1989, for instance, the EU Commission stated that, besides a civil consciousness one of the major goals to be achieved by the European process of integration was the development of a feeling of belonging to a community (Commission 1989). (Walkenhorst 2004: 7f.) However the policy-package Europe of the citizens launched at the onset of the 1990s was rather a collection of initiatives than a structural approach. Still, it is important to see that the EU oviously tries to overcome the huge gap between political elites and citizens. From a EUperspective we can conclude that the necessity of collective identification is obvious if the political community is to be experienced and supported as an entity. From a linguistic perspective the EU encounters its first obstacle on the quest for identity by its very own name the equivocal Europe. The attempt to use a historically and traditionally determined word like Europe in order to coin such a different project, has been misplaced from the very beginning. Not least because of this naming there is such a variety of approaches to the creation of a EU-identity. From a linguistic point of view there is nothing to wonder about why the endless attempts of re-describing traditional European narratives so far have not worked out as the identification-donating treasure chest. In order to transpose a diffuse demand for change, or for the identification with ongoing changes, a radical re- 3

4 description is required, because traditional vocabularies and discourses have turned inefficient. Without neologisms or the application of sedimented vocabularies in a radical alternate context, so that signifieds can radically change, no new contents, meanings and identifications are possible. In other words: there has to be something like a revolutionary act of signification. 2. Hegemony and identity Ernesto Laclau s theory Main categories of the theory To delineate the theory, I will split it into five key elements, like Torfing (2005: 15) did: (1) System of signification: Any articulation is dependent on and constructing a relational system. As a consequence, the two basic categories of every system are difference and equivalence. Through difference elements can identify themselves with regard to/ apart from other elements. Through equivalence they can identify a constitutive outside of the system they are located in. The differences of the system are structured as equivalences around a nodal point, the one element of discourse every other element can identify with in one way or another. (2) Hegemony: We have to ask: why is one of these elements so important or powerful that it is able to structure the entire discourse? The basic reason for this possibility can be found in the fact that power relations are not prescribed by anything outside of discourse, thus the place of power is in principle empty. Consequently there is an endless struggle to occupy this empty place here we talk about the political. Once one of these articulations is being accepted by and representative for the participating elements, we call it hegemonic. (3) Antagonism: In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe state that a hegemonic articulation can only maintain its position, if it is at the same time able to exclude a threatening Other. By this exclusion the system can stabilize itself as a system. However, since New Reflections (1990) Laclau conceptualises identity as constitutive lack and thus constant dislocation Antagonism is then only one way to master the closure of a system (New Reflections: 39-41, 44f., 65) discursively. There are also other possibilities to heal the rift in the social, as for example the divine. 2 However, antagonism or the external in general, while 2 In his recent work Laclau also introduced the notion of heterogeneity. Lasse Thomassen shows in From antagonism to heterogeneity (2005) that for discourse analysis heterogeneity is more useful to investigate than antagonism. However, I cannot see the novelty the introduction of the term heterogeneity adds to the discussion. It seems to be nothing else than a signifier for the ever remaining differential character in a system. 4

5 being the condition of a possible closure of the system are, at the same time, responsible for the failure of an absolute closure - because of the absolute necessity of the Other the system fails to find final closure. This openness provokes the contingency to become visible. (4) Dislocations: A hegemonic discourse is dislocated, if it is confronted with new events it cannot explain, represent, or in other ways domesticate. As a consequence formerly stable elements acquire again a floating character and the free play of occupying the empty place is reopened. The agent engaged in all these movements is the subject. (5) Subject as a lack: To him the subject emerges exactly in the moment of dislocation, producing a gap in the structure that can only be healed by a decision. Because of the impossibility to close any system, the subject is always split in the attempt of constructing a full identity and her failure she is traumatised by the lack of fullness. By identification the subject tries to recapture this fullness, but since the structure with which she may identify is dislocated, any act of identification will be partial and incomplete (Norval 2004: 10). 3. Language and contingency Richard Rorty Language and truth Neo-pragmatists like Rorty believe that language is a part of the world a tool (Wittgenstein 2003) we use to master our environment with, allowing us to make more accurate predictions, e.g. about the other s behaviours. He argues that truth and meaning are always context and interest bound and that there is in fact nothing to be said in general. We can only deal with descriptions of things and actions and change the current vocabulary that is built up of sets of similar theories, discourses and concepts. A descriptive vocabulary is useful insofar as the patterns it highlights are considered useful by creatures that share our needs and interests. Any vocabulary is a tool for a purpose and therefore subject to teleological assessment. The metaphor To create a new vocabulary Rorty borrows Davidson s notion of the metaphor. Davidson rejects the idea that metaphors have certain meaning within a language. To Davidson words in a metaphorical expression retain their literal sense and gain metaphorical status by virtue of their usage in unfamiliar ways. As they have no place in the current language game, new metaphors make us think in new ways. Eventually, they create a new language game and then take on a logical value in it. According to Rorty, being outside the 5

6 realm of meaningful cognitive discourse, metaphors do not represent thoughts; they are not propositions. However, they cause us to create propositions as we interpret them. In the Davidsonian account of metaphor [ ], when a metaphor is created it does not express something which previously existed, although, of course, it is caused by something that previously existed. (Rorty 1989: 36) If a metaphor is picked up or becomes popular, it can eventually find an established place in a language game. It becomes meaningful and crosses the line from being a cause of a belief to a reason for a belief. Once a metaphor crosses this line it becomes inactive as a metaphor. It becomes literalized and subsequently turns into a dead metaphor. A metaphor becoming established and part of a system of beliefs, is therefore not because the metaphor expresses some truth. Rather it may prove to be useful in some way and become incorporated into a language-game. To visualise the concept of metaphor, Rorty explains (1989: 16): Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus of culture, as Darwin taught us to think of the history of a coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, and then serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors. The strong poet The creation of a new vocabulary is a creative act based upon contingency. The decision for a specific language game is neither arbitrary nor an expression of the deep within. The exchange of language games is not an act of volition a question of decision, but rather a question of usefulness. Rorty argues that revolutionary vocabularies arise from the interference of two or more old vocabularies. However, this invention of a new vocabulary is nothing other than a hegemonic act by repressing alternatives. According to Rorty, only two characters are able to change the traditional vocabulary: the strong poet and the utopian. From the agent s viewpoint this change is autonomously creative. Still, at some point I will also depart Rorty s theory. It is the essential, but in my opinion dispensable, differentiation between the public and the private, I do not agree upon with Richard Rotry. Like Critchley and Mouffe I also think that we would lose a great part of potentiality for democracy if we ignore central effects of concepts such as deconstruction. Furthermore it is hard to imagine that one person is able to use two language games, the private and the public, without influencing one another. 4. Reading Laclau through Rorty and vice versa 6

7 Rorty and Laclau start to differ as Laclau s theory ends with theoretical considerations on society and democracy. In contrast Rorty moves one step further and provides a normative content the concept of democracy should rely on. 1. Let us first compare Laclau s concept of dislocation with Rorty s notion of the collision of old vocabularies: To Laclau, hegemonic discourses are dislocated, if new events cannot be integrated, explained or domesticated by the traditional discursive system. This insufficiency of the discursive system can absolutely be compared to Rorty s notion of the uselessness of traditional vocabularies the latter is only a more pragmatic version. 2. The second parallel we can identify is located in Laclau s concept of decision and Rorty s notion of creation: While Rorty bases the formation of the self on vocabularies, Laclau explains the emergence of the subject by the moment of decision. Both processes are embedded in the contingent historical background. They are causally dependent on existing constellations, yet interventions become necessary due to the broken structure. 3. The subject needs to have the illusion of her capability to heal the structure by its own decisions or by the creation of a new vocabulary. Although Laclau insists on the nondeterministic nature of any decision, we can assume that this freedom to decide is strongly linked to the subject s perspective. In Rorty s argumentations we can recognise the same phenomenon. In other words, there are causes for decisions and interventions that deterime the outcome, but as they are not obvious, the subject s creativity is demanded to decide. Consequently the subject creates the reasons for this decision retro-actively. Anything from the sound of a word through the colour of a leaf to the feel of a piece of skin can, as Freud showed us, serve to dramatize and crystallize a human being s sense of self-identity. [ ] Any seemingly random constellation of such things can set the tone of a life. Any such constellation can set up an unconditional commandment to whose service a life may be devoted a commandment no less unconditional because it may be intelligible to, at most, only one person. (Rorty 1989: 37) For a better understanding we can image the subject as a wave that appears from the observer s perspective like a closed entity. Yet from a materialistic viewpoint there is a constant exchange of matter the wave is always also the surrounding context, the ocean. Despite of this ongoing movement and exchange the wave seems to be an entity because of the continuity of its form - till it bursts. And again the perspective is crucial. 5. Empirical analysis 7

8 To understand the influence structure has on hegemonic articulation, thus on decision, we have to ask how the structure is composed. Thomassen (2005: 11) points out that, when a particular content takes on a universal function, this does not happen on a level playing field, but in a terrain that is itself the result of prior hegemonic articulation. Discourse analysis should show, if there is a hegemonic representation at all, and, if yes, why some signifiers come to represent the whole while others do not. Dependent on the context there are different kinds of wholes, also called entities. There can be an apparently closed national EU-discourse, in the sense that in the national context we can identify a hegemonic imaginary horizon of the European Union. There can also be a hegemonic EU-concept in the context of certain political camps. In my empirical study I will try to locate such hegemonic articulations and their diffusion and the crucial question will be: is there a EU-discourse in a transnational sense? Laclau and Mouffe s theory has often been criticised for its lack of a methodology. Howarth, for example, states that thus far the only clear methodological rule consists in a non-rule : rules can never be simply applied to cases, but have to be articulated in the research process (Howarth 1998: 291). In general, discourse theorists favour a theoretical frame that remains as open as possible and adjusts to specific research questions, due to their radical rejection of essentialism. Still, it is important to connect theoretical assumptions to empirical application. For that reason I will try to work with Laclau s terminology, inspired by Howarth s considerations on discourse analysis (Howarth 2000: 7ff.). In the analysis I will focus on four key elements: - Moments, as the differential positions that appear articulated within discourse are already structured around a nodal point. We have to count the interlinked moments in discourse, because it is by repetition that every hegemonic articulation tries to naturalise the own project. - Elements as those differences that are not discursively articulated because of the floating character they acquire in periods of social crisis and dislocation. If elements are not even mentioned, we cannot survey them. But we can watch the process when elements turn into moments, i.e. arguments, concepts etc. taken from different contexts and interlinked in a new way to the object of investigation, e.g. the Constitution. - Nodal points as necessities for the structuration of elements into a meaningful system of moments, into a discourse. They are privileged signifiers or reference points that bind together a particular system of meaning or chain of signification. A nodal point can acquire the quality of an empty signifier, a master signifier the emptier a signifier, the more meanings and connotations it can subsume. At the same time this emptiness is responsible for 8

9 losing power, because with the loss of meaning it is highly vulnerable to attacks from other signifiers. - Antagonisms as being constructed by the chains of equivalences: different elements/moments become equivalent by the exclusion of the pure negativity of the discursive system. The logic of difference then works against that logic of equivalence. It works through the expansion of a given system of differences by dissolving existing chains of equivalence. Although antagonism is not absolute necessary for identity constructions, it can be an indication for the attempt of closing a discourse. With this analytical strategy we will be able to examine, if we can talk about a singular EU-discourse or about national discourses revolved around EU-topics. In addition to this kind of analysis we have to consider the categories developed by introducing Richard Rorty. Thus, we will try to answer three questions: (1) Are there any indications in the debates that different vocabularies do not match and consequently would dislocate each other, if they get a chance to be confronted? That is, is there a need for a new vocabulary? (2) How do the discourses depend causally on the historical background? In Rorty s words: How is the foil for new metaphors structured? (3) What are the possibilities for the political subjects to create and construct their own EU-identity? Can references to attempts of self-determination be observed in media debates? Before answering these questions, I have to point out some constraints of the study. First, due to the analysed texts, the analysis is clearly limited to a mere elite discourse. In addition, the effect of the texts on their readers can not be examined. Second, I only focus on the discourses within the media and I exclude, at least in this sample analysis, the implications of media configurations, such as institutional forms of production, distribution and consumption, as well as political regulations and economic forms of ownership and control. The analysis I present here should serve as an example for the application of theoretical considerations on empirical reality. The full study will be presented midyear The sample is composed of five articles per media, taken from the Financial Times and Le monde diplomatique. Both papers circulate all over Europe and have readers from different political camps. I chose articles on the topic of the EU-Constitution and the referenda in France and the Netherlands, published between May and September The codes were not developed in advance but extracted from the given material by using the software Atlas.ti. From certain packages of codes I formed three code-families to get a general idea about the principle topics: (1) The first code-family is called Social and includes codes like: 9

10 EU = unsocial, cuts in social welfare, more social Europe possible, EU-Const. = unsocial, debate: social market economy, etc. (2) code-family: Liberalism: EU = liberal project, arguments against liberalism, globalization trap, No = against liberalism, Constitution = neo-liberal, liberalism as a punching bag, EU: common market not sufficient, (3) code-family: Elites Citizens: EU = elitist, EU: gap between elites and citizens, referendum: emancipation/courage of the citizens, referendum: damper for elites, electorate good informed, electorate bad informed, etc. Not surprisingly social topics and debates on the relationship between elites and citizens are prevalent in Le monde diplomatique, whereas the Financial Times focuses on liberalism. Table 1: number of quotations per family Family: Social Family: Liberalism Family: Elite- Citizens Le monde diplomatique Financial Times The next question is now: how are these debates structured are they comparable? To examine this we have to look at the most frequently assigned codes. The most frequently assigned one in both newspapers was a very general one: assessments of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. I will deal with this code in more detail later. The strongest single codes in the Financial Times are: (1) Constitution = legitimacy and democratisation for the European Union, (2) No: people are afraid of enlargement, (3) EU: economy as core element, (4) EU: gap between elites and citizens. The strongest codes in Le monde diplomatique are: (1) arguments against liberalism, (2) EU: another Europe necessary/possible, (3) referendum: emancipation/courage of the citizens, (4) EU: gap between elites and citizens. From the frequency of the single codes we can also conclude that the papers focus on different focal points. Nevertheless, we have to go into more detail. Therefore we will take a look at frequent co-occurrences of codes, that is, different codes combined in one paragraph or sentence. This will give us a hint as to the structure of argumentation. Since the code EU: gap between elites and citizens is prominent in both papers, we will take it for comparison. Table 2: Co-occurrences in the Financial Times 10

11 Table 3: Co-occurrences in Le monde diplomatique 11

12 The network shows that the reasons provided for this problematic relationship differ widely. The Financial Times bases its argumentation on the effects of an information deficit and national populist debates. That citizens may have other justified interests is not considered. In contrast, Le monde diplomatique produces an entirely different image of the citizen. Citizens raised their voices against elites and called for another Europe. They believe that a more social Europe is possible. Thus, even though both papers are concerned with the gap between citizens and elites, their understanding of this gap is different. We can identify wholly separated discourses, even without taking notice of the other as a contestable agonistic position. In the Financial Times liberalism can be identified as a nodal point, in Le monde diplomatique we find social focal points. However we can not identify a common nodal point for the two papers. As a consequence we also cannot talk about a single discourse, a precariously closed system and ergo the different positions are not negotiable. Rather we could observe something like an antagonistic gap in the social located along ideological lines. The same is observable in the assessment of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. The Financial Times causes the rejection of the Constitution with objections of the citizens to the enlargement, the fear of immigration and national populist debates. According to the Financial Times, the rejection of the Constitution is nothing rational, but owing to a huge information deficit. On the contrary Le monde diplomatique evaluates the rejection as an emancipatory act on the part of the citizens. New images of a possible Europe become delineated and the laissez-faire policy is doomed to an end. 12

13 Back to the theory we can conclude that there are different nodal points in the media that structure similar signifiers as moments around them, but the signifieds differ widely. By examining discursive structures we are able to specify the meanings of signifiers like liberalism, social, elites and citizens. Thus, different vocabularies do not match and do not even have a platform to be confronted upon. As a consequence collective identityconstructions on a EU level are not possible, because the different vocabularies and discourses have no possibility to clash in order to produce new metaphors. As I have already mentioned the sample was so marginal that this analysis and the conclusions can only function as an example for the empirical applicability. For the full study the inquiry period will be extended and more newspapers will be included. Thus, I will now turn to theory and present my conclusions for a EU-identity. 6. Conclusion: The European Union à venir Let us recall: A structure can only be apparently closed because language is ambiguous and blurred. It is characteristic of language, that it constructs virtual entities out of radical openness out of mere dynamic. These virtual entities differ from speaker to speaker, but are transferable by restriction to the signifier. Because we are absolutely dependent on our final vocabulary and only are able to create new out of the old we are also not able to think something radical open not least because we are subject to the closuring character of language. It is as impossible to think radical openness as it is impossible to think infinity. Only by accepting blurredness an infinitely signified can be coined with a finite signifier. As Derrida points out, if totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glace or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field that is, language and a finite language excludes totalization (Derrida 1978: 289) For a political entity like the European Union, this also means that it is not enough to refer to mere pluralism, multiculturalism or differentiation. As described above, difference also always requires equivalence a structure within which different elements can be identified as different from each other. Like Laclau (1996) asserts, the advocates of a strict particularism are holding the wolf by the ears: (1) they already posit the right on difference as universal and (2) for changing law they have to accept the system they intend to fight. Hegemonic operations for changing the system can only become manifest in the system - that is they have to accept it as such. The only chance is to unmask the current hegemonic 13

14 established group as contingent. Consequently, also new theories of democracy can be developed due to the unfolding of the contingency in society and the co-occurring rifts. Let us recall at his point the explored parallels in the theories of Laclau and Rorty and apply them to the European Union: (1) Dislocation collision of old vocabularies: Regarding discourses about and within the European Union we have to consider that traditional discourses, e.g. regional, national or global ones, need to clash in order to bring forth new EUropean ones. This does not mean that old structures are fully replaced, but the additional new one is only possible through a collision of the old ones. The condition for that collision of traditional national vocabularies is the possibility, the space for them to collide, in our case - a EUropean public sphere in a topographical sense. The kind of public sphere I have in mind here is more than a place for the articulation of previously developed positions. Positions, interests and identities are constructed, changed and reconstructed in the political public sphere. Thus a political EUropean public sphere is more than the mere mediation between the will of the citizens and the political system; it is precisely the place where political will is developed by ways of communication. (2) Decision creation and their causality: In the European Union many historical determinants are obvious the emergence of the concept was tightly linked to the contemporary circumstances. The question now is: has there already been an instating moment in opening up the necessity to create a EU-identity? (3) In the discussion about the subject we have pointed at the necessity of the subject s decision and her relation to the feeling of self-creation. For the EU-citizens this means that they have to experience a kind of autonomy in deciding for this project and constructing a collective identity. We can conclude that there are three crucial steps to create a precariously closed political entity: first, the instruments for transnational communications that enable the collision of traditional discourses need to be provided. Second, the gaps arising from these collisions in the social have to be closed/filled by creating new common EUropean metaphors or vocabularies. Third, this healing of the structure or filling of the gap has to be done by the EUropeans themselves. They have to realise/experience it as an autonomous act of selfdetermination. From the empirical analysis it seems as if articulations on the EU are, so far, spread upon many different discourses, that there is no EU-discourse, which has transformed the different elements into moments. Rather, we can label the EU as discursivity, from which 14

15 different discourses take advantage by integrating certain elements into their respective system. We have to recall that the field of discursivity is not external to discourse in the sense of resting beyond the borders of the discourse. Rather, the field of discursivity is an inherent characteristic of any discourse, an internal element of the discourse it constantly subverts. The already mentioned example of the the field of discursivity as a wave could be paraphrased with the ocean or the water. The wave is not only surrounded by the water, rather it constantly becomes exchanged by its elements. Nevertheless from a certain perspective it appears separated from it. Transferred to the European Union we could apply the image in the way that the EU represents the ocean. The waves that emerge in and move through it are national, regional or issue related discourses. Still, there is nothing observable like a single EU wave and for that reason nothing common to identify with. Corresponding to Wittgenstein we would have to modify national grammars 3 in the sense that they are equally referring to a common horizon. One possibility, I would like to imagine, is to articulate the European Union as a community to come, always open to changes and tolerating all differences within, giving them all the chance to be universalised from their perspective. Like Rorty delineates the ideal vocabulary for democratic societies we could transfer this image to the European Union. It should be a vocabulary that revolves around notions of metaphor and self-creation rather than around notions of truth, rationality, and moral obligation. (Rorty 1989: 44). The common horizon then would consist of the consciousness of the EU as a community à venir always in front of us and thus unattainable. 3 For Wittgenstein grammar is the rule for the use of words. It cannot be correct or incorrect. 15

16 7. References Butler, Judith; Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek (2000): Contingency, Hegemony and Universality. London. Davidson, Donald; Richard Rorty (2005): Wozu Wahrheit? Eine Debatte. Hg. von Mike Sandbothe. Frankfurt/Main. Derrida, Jacques (1978): Writing and Difference, trans. with an Introduction by Alan Bass. London. --- (1988): Afterword: toward an ethic of discussion, in: Limited Inc.: Limited Inc. Evanston. Gasché, Rodolphe (1986): The tain of the mirror: Derrida and the philosophy of. Cambridge. Howarth, David; Aletta J. Norval and Yannis Stavrakakis (eds., 2000): Discourse Theory and Political Analysis. Manchester. --- (1998): Discourse theory and political analysis. In: Research strategies in the social sciences. E. Scarbrough, Tanenbaum, Eric (ed.). Oxford, p Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985): Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London. --- (1990): New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London. --- (1996): Emancipation(s). London. Mouffe, Chantal (ed., 1996): Deconstruction and pragmatism. London. Norval, Aletta J.: Hegemony after deconstruction: the consequences of undecidability. In: Journal of Political Ideologies 9:2 (2004): Rorty, Richard (1989): Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge. Thomassen, Lasse (2005): From antagonism to hterogeneity: discourse analytical strategies. Essex Papers in Politics and Government. Sub-Series in Ideology and Discourse Analysis, No.21. (April 2005). Torfing, Jacob (2005): Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments and Challenges. In: David R. Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds.): Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity, Policy and Governance. Basingstoke, Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2003): Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt a. M. Walkenhorst, Heiko (2004): The Construction of European Identity and the Role of National Educational Systems - A Case Study on Germany. Essex Papers in Politics and Government, No. 160 (May 2004). 16