Africa Regional Summary

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1 Africa Regional Summary October 1, 2013

2 2Page Executive Summary The threat of sophisticated and well-orchestrated Islamist militant attacks reemerged on the continent after al-shabaab militants attacked Nairobi's Westgate Mall and held dozens hostage during a four-day siege. The incident left at least 67 people dead, hundreds wounded and prompted bolstered security against potential attacks throughout Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. Meanwhile, Islamist insurgents in West Africa made a clear signal that they still constitute a threat to regional stability, as al-qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) conducted a suicide bombing in Mali's northern city of Timbuktu, while Tuareg rebels and Malian soldiers clashed in Kidal. Furthermore, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has retained their ability to inflict major casualties against civilian and government targets, indicated lastly by the killing of at least 70 students in Yobe State, despite an intensive and persistent government crackdown against the group. Highly anticipated legislative elections were held in Guinea for the first time in over one HIGH decade RISK following numerous postponements; however, the polls were overshadowed by incidents of unrest and politically motivated violence in the lead-up to the vote. Despite a peaceful election day, the E.U. observer mission's confirmation of electoral irregularities elevates the potential for protests and subsequent violence from October 2, when provincial results are expected. Moreover, Cameroon conducted peaceful parliamentary and local elections, in which President Paul Biya's ruling party CPDM is expected to win a landslide victory. The volatility surrounding political demonstrations in nations under more authoritarian regimes became evident as Angolan police dispersed protesters and arrested foreign journalists covering the event in Luanda. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, 2 opposition P a g e rallies by both the emerging Blue Party and the main opposition faction Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) were subjugated to harassment, detainment of senior members and forceful disruptions by police. Elsewhere, following a reduction in the restrictions against public gatherings in Ghana, several civil society groups and opposition parties have announced their intent to protest in Accra during the month of October against issues ranging from government corruption to utility increments. In addition, peaceful demonstrations were continued in Tanzania by dissident factions against the Constitutional Review Bill, and further rallies are slated to be held over the coming weeks.

3 3Page The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past two weeks. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name below. HIGH RISK DRC... 4 Mali... 6 Nigeria... 8 South Sudan MEDIUM RISK Angola Cameroon Ethiopia Guinea Ivory Coast Kenya South Africa Uganda LOW RISK Ghana Tanzania Zambia Notable Dates for the Period of... 39

4 4Page HIGH RISK DRC On September 19, Kinshasa announced that 100 of an estimated 1700 fighters in the rebel M23 faction are not considered eligible for amnesty or reintegration in the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). Suspected rebels affiliated to the M23 reportedly killed at least ten civilians in Bukoma, close to Rutshuru in North Kivu. The militants are reported to have been carrying out raids against Nyatura militia when the killings took place. On September 21, two Chinese mining managers and a police officer were killed by armed assailants in an attack on a mineral and gold transport convoy, in Orientale Province, south of Bunia. We advise against travel to outlying rural areas, particularly North Kivu, given ongoing volatility and criminality, while restricting essential travel to Kinshasa. ASSESSMENTS Developments with M23 Negotiations between the M23 and Kinshasa are ongoing and slated to conclude at the beginning of October. However, vast divides persist between each side's demands. The M23 hinges its disarmament on the neutralization of the Hutu rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the repatriation of Congolese nationals currently living in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the DRC's announcement that 100 largely highranking M23 fighters could face severe penalties, including capital punishment and long term jail sentences could serve as a disincentive for the group to finalize an agreement. Furthermore, should further allegations of M23 attacks in the eastern provinces emerge, there is a credible possibility that Kinshasa may cancel the ceasefire and instigate further FARDC offensives against the M23. In the event that hostilities renew, Rwanda, an alleged backer of the M23, is likely to increase its rhetoric against Kinshasa. Given the recent deployment of Rwandan soldiers to the border, regional states have become concerned over a near-medium term conflict between Kinshasa and Kigali. Threats to mining sector in east The convoy attack follows a similar attack on a mineral transport convoy in which another Chinese miner died in June, also in Orientale. Meanwhile, the Simba Mai-Mai group recently killed eight local Congolese hostages captured from the Nyanga and Kumu tribes, who often work for mining operations in Orientale. The fact that both foreigners and locals cooperating with mining companies have been targeted underscores a wide range of threats for various groups related to the lucrative sector. The incidents underscore volatility throughout Orientale Province in relation to the mining sector. Mining and other business operations in DRC s eastern regions face

5 5Page persistently volatile conditions due to a variety of security threats including: attacks by rebel groups and rogue Mai-Mais, criminal operations to abscond with materials and resources, and aggrieved locals who allege that outside companies do not promote local community development. Local communities in mining regions have previously been engaged in land disputes with mining companies, claiming land infringement as well as environmental damage to the areas around mining operations. This prevalent disgruntlement with outside mining ventures exacerbates threats, as locals may be more likely to hinder the continuity of business operations while also gaining monetary benefits from the theft of the mineral resources. Given the lack of security, persistent criminality and militancy, and widespread arms proliferation, such attacks on mining operations are likely to continue. Additionally, although mineral convoys are accompanied by Congolese policemen, there is a possibility that members of local security forces are complicit in the attacks. There is a potential that these policemen, in addition to local informants who may be engaged to follow the movements of convoys, likely provide details to assailants that allow them to attack convoys at the most vulnerable point on their routes Corruption is rampant throughout the bureaucracy and all branches of security forces, including the military and police, in the DRC. Low wages and scant monitoring or transparency provide little incentive for such state employees to crackdown on this trend, which is likely to continue to lead to inside job attacks on mineral operations in the east. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We advise against travel to outlying rural areas, particularly North Kivu, given ongoing volatility and criminality, while restricting essential travel to Kinshasa. 2. If traveling or residing in DRC, it is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient facility security personnel. At-risk persons are advised to retain security personnel when conducting all overland travel in both urban centers and outlying areas. 3. In the case you are confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence. 4. It is advised to employ sufficient numbers of security personnel to monitor business operations. In order to mitigate the risk of significant monetary losses from attacks on mining operations, contact Max Security Solutions for on-site planning and security consulting, which includes security infrastructure and security personnel. 5. In light of a persisting doctors strike in Kinshasa, Equateur, and Katanga, we advise to avoid state-run establishments in favor of private clinics and hospitals with more stringent regulation procedures. Check with your healthcare provider to see which clinics and hospitals within your coverage are still operating at full capacity. 6. Those traveling overland in rural DRC are advised to consult with Max Security for itinerary based planning and consultation before undertaking such a journey.

6 6Page HIGH RISK Mali Several attacks in the north targeting government targets underline the resurgence of militant, Tuareg rebel activity; additional attacks likely as instability to continue. Tuareg rebel groups suspend participation in negotiations, as ministers are attacked in Kidal; underscores ongoing tensions, challenges to national reconciliation. We continue to advice against nonessential travel to Mali at this time. If essential, it is advised to limit travel to Bamako. ASSESSMENTS Renewed northern militancy Several armed attacks have taken place in the northern regions of Mali in the last week of September, including a suicide attack by four militants targeting a military base in Timbuktu on September 28, which resulted in the death of two civilians. A firefight between members of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and military forces was reported in the late night hours of September 29 in Kidal reportedly caused by a disagreement between military forces and a Tuareg resident. On September 27, two grenades were thrown towards Malian soldiers guarding a local bank in Kidal. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for the suicide attack in Timbuktu on September 30. This marked the first suicide attack in that city in six months. Additional reports indicate that members of the MNLA were involved in the grenade attacks. The suicide attack in Timbuktu, which we assess was carried out by one of the Jihadist movements, highlights the continued activity of such elements in the area. Additionally, the incident underscores their persistent ability to successfully attack sophisticated and strategic locales, despite ongoing security efforts, and their supposed weakened state, following the military intervention. Furthermore, we assess that with a resurgence of militant activity by jihadist organizations, the existent risk for kidnappings as well as the targeting of Westerners in northern Mali has increased. Additionally, we assess that lowscale localized attacks by MNLA members, in particular in the Tuareg stronghold of Kidal, are likely to continue as an effort to pressure the central government to yield to rebel demands, by demonstrating the potential consequences of an inability to find a negotiated solution. Tuareg rebel groups suspend participation in negotiations On September 26, Tuareg and Arab groups, including the MNLA, High Council for Azawad Unity (HCUA) and Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), announced the suspension of talks with the Bamako government. The groups citied the government's non compliance with the June Ouagadougou agreement. Initial dialogue sessions began on

7 7Page September 17, despite an attack by supporters of the MNLA on ministers in Kidal. The assailants attempted to prevent the ministers airplane from landing in Kidal, following which they reportedly pelted their convoy with rocks. These incidents serve to underscore increasing tensions in the north with the central government. On September 18, MNLA vice president, Mahamadou Djeri Maiga, announced that the group would negotiate with the government only if the stipulation for northern autonomy is met. This came a day after President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) stated that federalism, independence and autonomy are not options and will not be part of negotiations. Furthermore, the MNLA, the HCUA, and the MAA announced that they adopted a joint stance, presenting a stronger position in talks with the government, increasing the pressure on the IBK government. The militia agreement could also indicate a solidification of the resolution of armed groups to resist relinquishing their arms or political aspirations, which is likely to aggravate tensions with the central government in Bamako. The suspension of talks therefore highlights the significant gap that exists between government, Tuareg and Arab demands and expectations. We assess that in the near term there remains a significant potential for additional localized low scale attacks by Tuareg militia groups in the north, such as the grenade attack reported in Kidal on September 27 that resulted in two injured soldiers. Moreover, already heightened tensions in the northern regions are likely to increase following the suspensions of talks, suggesting that the potential for an uptick in clashes with security forces is likely. That said, the request for an emergency meeting by Tuareg and Arab groups suggests that a return to negotiations remains likely. Thus, we assess that negotiations will resume in the near term, as both sides are set to gain from a peace agreement in addition to being pressured by the international community to find a lasting solution that would result in long term stability. Such an agreement is likely to include economic and social development projects in the north, some of which may be supported by neighboring countries such as Morocco. In the medium term, a peace agreement would require concessions by the central government, especially in relation to demands for independence in the northern area. The important nature of this demand is highlighted by it being the main reason for the suspension of talks with the Bamako government. As such, despite having announced that there would be no autonomy, federalism or independence in the Tuareg areas, IBK is unlikely to successfully mitigate demands by Tuareg groups who continue to serve an important role in ensuring security in the northern areas. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We continue to advice against nonessential travel to Mali due to the volatile security situation at this time. If travel is necessary, refrain from leaving Bamako due to the increased security risks. Practice heightened vigilance at all times. 2. If in Mali, avoid all political demonstrations and large gatherings as a general security precaution, given the possibility of potentially violent unrest erupting.

8 8Page HIGH RISK Nigeria Tensions between Ombatse militia, government forces, and other ethnic groups are on the rise in Nasarawa State. Boko Haram has achieved major successes against security forces, despite government efforts. Police in Port Harcourt dispersed a gathering of teachers, accusing them of planning to protest against the government, leading to labor unions threatening strike actions. Travel to Nigeria can continue with stringent security protocols. We advise against nonessential travel to the northern and Middle Belt regions at this time. ASSESSMENTS Ombatse militia revives clashes with Alago youth in Nasarawa Youth of the Eggon and Alogo ethnicities clashed in villages near Lafia, the capital of Nasarawa State on September 13 and 14. It is suspected that the clashes were initiated by the Eggon Ombatse militia, who began attacking the Alogo. The fighting consumed several towns, leaving at least 60 dead and forcing 30,000 residents to flee to other towns and into neighboring Benue State. The militia also set fire to over 1,000 homes in the towns. As a result of the incident, Nasarawa State lawmakers have expressed support for the implementation of a state of emergency in Nasarawa, stressing that the state borders the Federal Capital Territory and thus insecurity poses a threat to Abuja. The Ombatse militia is religiously inspired, believing that they are required to rid their state of vice. As such, we assess that this is not simply an ethnic clash, but has broader implications. Nasarawa State lawmakers accuse the government security agencies of doing too little to combat the threat posed by this group. Nasarawa State is ruled by the opposition All Progressives Congress (APC), which may explain the Federal Governments inaction in combating these groups. The Federal Government has in turn accused the APC for its failure to contain the Ombatse, thus highlighting the potential for the politicization of this conflict. Security forces tracked down and killed the Ombatse leader in Adamawa state and killed at least 12 other members in Nasarawa on September 17. The Federal Government followed this by sending several hundred soldiers to the state to prevent further eruptions of violence. These forces arrested at least 40 suspected Ombatse members, and placed a partial ban on motorcycle use in surrounding areas. Despite the recent successes of security forces in combating the militia, local lawmakers are still calling for a state of emergency. The presence of security forces may lead to additional confrontations as the Ombatse militia will likely target them in the coming weeks, in retaliation for the assassination of their leader.

9 9Page Boko Haram carries out several successful attacks in northeast In recent weeks, the Boko Haram Islamist militant group has carried out several successful attacks in the northeast of Nigeria. Most prominent of these was in the town of Benisheik on September 17, where a group dressed as Nigerian soldiers and arrived in military vehicles, setting up checkpoints and assassinating oncoming motorists, killing at least 160 before burning down over 100 homes. In addition to this and other smaller attacks, on September 20, Boko Haram militants in Borno attacked a bank's armored car and escort van, killing three police escorts, the drivers and eight additional people, and stealing the cash in transit. Boko Haram has shown its ability to operate effectively in the northeast despite a state of emergency, lack of telecommunications, a newly-created army division and an active vigilante group. Additionally, the group appears to be using attacks to procure funds, weapons and ammunition, and even armored vehicles. Thus we assess that Boko Haram is successfully increasing its arsenal as well as its funding, which is likely to enable it to continue its activities in the medium term. In its attacks, the militants usually set fire to government buildings, schools, homes, and police posts, in a strategy to drive residents and the local administration out of towns with strategic values as they are located on main roads in Borno. This tactic is likely to permit the militants a hold over the logistical infrastructure and thus gain a stronger grasp over the region Unions involved in Rivers State conflict, calls for Police Commissioner to resign Tensions between labor unions and the Federal Government came to a head on September 26 in Port Harcourt, the capital of Rivers State, when police dispersed a crowd of at least 13,000 teachers that had gathered to pick up their letters of deployment. The police claim that the teachers were receiving placards and preparing to protest. The placards allegedly called on President Jonathan to honor a 2009 agreement between the Federal Government and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and called on Rivers State Governor, Rotimi Amaechi, to for president in On the same day as the incident the Nigerian Union of Teachers' (NUT) declared support for the ASUU, calling on the government to honor the 2009 agreement or face a shutdown of the national education system. Thus, we assess that it is likely that the teachers were, in fact, gathering to protest. Amaechi, is a central figure in a feud with President Jonathan and the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), which led to the emergence of the new PDP (npdp) faction. It is likely that Amaechi and the above unions are utilizing this opportunity to pressure a common foe, President Jonathan. As such, it is likely that Rivers State will continue to witness protests in the near term. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We continue to advice against travel to Nigeria's northern states at this time due to the ongoing violence and the persistence of the state of emergency in the northeast. 2. If travel to the north is essential, it is recommended to procure executive protection and safe travel services.

10 01Page 3. As a general security precaution, avoid all large gatherings and labor demonstrations in Nigeria given the increased potential for such incidents to turn violent with little to no prior warning. Date October 1, 2013 October 14-15, 2013 Short Summary Independence Day Commemorates the autonomy of Nigeria from British rule. Eid al-adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ismael. Assessment and Recommendation The security forces are on high alert during this holiday. Given the potential for a militant attack on this day, security forces are giving special attention to popular public areas and key infrastructure installations throughout the country. As businesses and government offices will be closed, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to potential for militant attack and/or civil unrest. Heavy security will be placed around prayer sites nationwide. Expect travel congestion as Muslims throughout the country travel to visit family homes. Probable travel delays and service disruptions are expected due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

11 00Page HIGH RISK South Sudan On September 13, Sudan s Co-Chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, al-khair al- Fahim reportedly announced Khartoum s complete rejection of holding a referendum on the status of the disputed, oil-rich Abyei Region in October. Residents of Abyei have staged three protests since mid-september to demand that the previously suggested deadline to hold a referendum on the status of the region be upheld. On September 18, President Kiir alleged that the army has engaged in graft and other illicit activities. President Kiir announced that general elections, scheduled for 2015, may have to be postponed due to a lack of funds to conduct a census and complete the constitution. We advise against nonessential travel to all outlying areas outside of Juba, especially Jonglei State and the northern border regions with Sudan. ASSESSMENTS Growing tensions over Abyei The status of Abyei is one of the most controversial, unresolved issues between the Sudans, both of which are unwilling to relinquish control over the region s petroleum reserves. As the majority of the voters in Abyei are from the pro-south Sudan Ngok Dinka tribe, a referendum vote would likely grant sovereignty to Juba. Demonstrators in recent protests have called upon the African Union (A.U.) to halt oil flows from Abyei until Juba and Khartoum hold the referendum. Despite the likelihood for further protests by Abyei residents, we assess that Khartoum is likely to continue to use stalling tactics to postpone a referendum. In the past, as pressure has increased to resolve Abyei, cross border attacks in the region have increased. Many of these attacks have been blamed on Khartoum, who is alleged to instigate sympathetic groups, such as the pro-sudan, Misseriya tribe who lives part of the year in Abyei, to launch attacks on pro-south residents. These attacks serve to escalate tensions between the Sudans to such an extent that discussions to resolve the status of the land are postponed. Throughout October, we assess that there is a risk of increased volatility in Abyei and elsewhere on the border. In the event of a cross border incursion by either country that results in a high number of casualties or the deaths of prominent individuals, there is a possibility that oil flow could be interrupted again. President Kiir's actions The allegations against the army are notable as the first instance in which Kiir has accused the SPLA of corruption since the country s foundation in In contrast to Kiir's silence, many human rights monitors as well as South Sudanese nationals have

12 02Page criticized the SPLA, as well as the political branch of the army, the ruling SPLM, of corruption and ethnic discrimination. Kiir has launched a series of steps to crack down on rampant corruption within the government and the police force in the last few months. We assess that a partial impetus for this anti-corruption campaign has been international pressure due to threats to withdraw aid and funding. In August, Kiir called for an investigation of allegations that several officers in the SPLA have engaged in human rights violations and ethnic killings. As the SPLA is simultaneously the ruling political faction and the power entity within South Sudan, a potential crackdown on the army could have significant repercussions on Kiir s power base. Potential political rivals, such as ex-vice President Riek Machar, who maintains a strong following in the SPLA, could seize upon feelings of betrayal in the SPLA to create a faction of loyalty for his previously announced intention to run in the elections in It has been speculated that some of Kiir's recent investigations and removals of members of the SPLA/M may be a move to weaken political rivals. In September, Kiir has threatened to dismiss unspecified senior members of his cabinet, in addition to permanently suspending former party Secretary General, Pagan Amum. Meanwhile, Kiir's statement that 2015 elections may be suspended could indicate another means by which the president could entrench himself in power. Kiir's targeting of rivals could give impetus to these individuals to cement a potential power bloc. Allegations of corruption, crime, and other violations against these individuals could also be a tactic to try to delegitimize them. That is not to say that the allegations may not be based on fact. However, as similar allegations are prevalent against many individuals associated with the government, Kiir may be trying to turn his rivals into scapegoats against whom the population may target their frustration against the government. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. We advise against nonessential travel to all outlying areas outside of Juba, especially Abyei, Jonglei State and the northern border regions with Sudan. 2. If traveling or residing in South Sudan, it is advised to properly vet and hire sufficient facility security personnel. At-risk persons are advised to retain security personnel when conducting all overland travel in both urban centers and outlying areas due to rising levels of criminal activity in the capital. 3. In the case you are confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence. 4. Those traveling overland in rural South Sudan are advised to consult with Max Security for itinerary based planning and consultation before undertaking such a journey.

13 03Page MEDIUM RISK Angola Police dispersed a protest on September 19, and arrested foreign journalists covering the event; further underscoring the lack of political freedoms. Necessary travel to Angola can continue as usual, while adhering to basic security precautions. ASSESSMENTS Police disperse protest, arrest journalists On September 19, Angolan police reportedly dispersed an anti-government protest in Luanda that was organized by the Revolutionary Movement of Angola. The group failed to obtain permission from authorities and was warned that any acts contrary to public order and security would be repelled. The police arrested at least 23 protesters and threatened to use force against four foreign journalists. There has been a small protest movement in Angola since 2011, inspired in part by the revolutions of the "Arab Spring." The movement has routinely attempted to hold protests to call for democratic reform and a more equitable distribution of the country's oil wealth. The government has consistently accused the opposition movement of attempting to "incite war." Angola has a history of brutal civil war and so accusations of this nature have the affect of inciting a deep dread amongst the population which is already war weary. This in part may explain the hardships that anti-government movements face in drawing supporters. While the protest itself failed to draw significant numbers, it did manage to gain the support of various unions and opposition parties. We assess that the low support was likely in part due to the threat of a police crackdown, which was openly expressed by a police spokesperson in a televised warning. Despite the extremely low turnout, the police arrested three of the activists on grounds of disturbing the peace. This heavy repression is thus a demonstration of the extent to which Angolan authorities are unwilling to accept any level of dissent. On September 20, as journalists were interviewing released activists, police surrounded the group and arrested six of the activists and three journalists. The journalists were released shortly afterwards, but the activists remain in detention. The arrest of journalists and activists was immediately criticized by Human Rights Watch, who demanded that the detainees be released and the police held responsible. Human Rights Watch also criticizes the conditions under which the protesters and journalists were detained, with insufficient holding cells and reports of physical abuse. This condemnation demonstrates that there is an international acknowledgement of the lack of democratic rights in Angola. However, we assess that this condemnation is unlikely to

14 04Page translate into any concrete concessions on behalf of the Angolan government or security services. Angola has a poor record of press freedom, and at 130 out of 179 countries is the worst placed Portuguese speaking (Lusophone) country in the Reporters Without Borders ranking. We assess that the events of September 19 and 20, demonstrate that the press freedom in Angola is not likely to improve in the near term. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Necessary travel to Angola can continue as usual, while adhering to basic security precautions. 2. As a general security precaution, avoid all public gatherings and demonstrations in Angola, due to the heightened risk for unrest and violence. 3. Avoid the vicinity of all political gatherings, whether conducted in public or in private.

15 05Page MEDIUM RISK Cameroon The parliamentary elections in Cameroon were held on September 30, following a peaceful campaign, interrupted by isolated incidents of crackdown on opposition rallies. Political stability is likely to remain intact as the ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) is expected to achieve a landslide victory. On September 18, approximately 4,000 public sector employees marched in Yaounde over unpaid governmental dues. The incident highlights growing civil discontent with socio-economic hardships. On September 19, Cameroonian security forces arrested a prominent dissident leader from the Central African Republic (CAR), suspected of using Cameroon as a rear-base to destabilize the ruling Seleka alliance government. Travel to Cameroon's major urban centers may continue while it is advised to refrain from all nonessential travel to outlying areas, particularly the Extreme North, due to volatile security conditions. ASSESSMENTS Election campaign On September 16, it was reported that the Cameroonian security forces forcibly cracked down on opposition rallies in the city of Makenene, about 150 km northwest from Yaounde. Thereafter, on September 19, several injuries were recorded as security forces forcibly dispersed supporters of the primary opposition faction, the Social Democratic Front (SDF), who clashed with activists of the ruling CPDM in the township of Nkambe in the Anglophone Northwest region. Both incidents underline the security forces intolerance towards opposition actions and the consistent anti-government sentiment in the Anglophone areas. Notwithstanding, it highlights the government's ability to push opposition actions from the urban centers towards the nation's outlying areas. President Paul Biya deliberately chose to hold the elections during the rainy season, with forecasted inclement weather conditions nationwide. Bad weather conditions are likely to keep many away from the voting stations, especially in rural areas where roads are not maintained properly. Thus, the president's ability to manipulate the polls increases. We assess the polls are held only as a measure to mitigate domestic tensions and allow Biya to easily alter the power balance to his benefit within his own faction, the CPDM. An indication of the President's methods surfaced on September 13, as Biya increased the amount of monthly allowances paid to traditional Chiefs across Cameroon, a step that assures the latter's loyalty to Biya. Meanwhile, the SDF already raised complaints against the Electoral Committee (Elecam), alleging that the voter ID-cards have been falsified by Elecam and the CPDM. That being

16 06Page said, the SDF and other opposition factions are likely to claim rigged polls in a bid to attract international attention thereby exert pressure on Biya. Domestic tensions The public employees' protest took place in downtown Yaounde along Avenue Konard Ardeneur to Rue Lamido Rey Bouba from the national radio station towards the Ministry of Finance. The marchers accused the government and banks of fraud and that funds that were pledged to them by a presidential decree were partially blocked for unclear reasons. The protest was notable for the large turnout, given the fact that the Biya regime's entrenchment over the years has led to a prevalent apathy towards social mobilization. The event underscores of growing civil discontent with socio-economic hardships and dissatisfaction with the national administration s perceived inability to improve social conditions. Civil discontent is likely further exacerbated by rampant corruption in the governmental sector. The opposition seems to have failed to capitalize on the event in order to garner political support ahead of the polls, which, in turn, underscores of the opposition's limited ability to commence large protests. There is a vacuum in Cameroonian politics, which is emphasized as disgruntled individuals seek ways to manifest their discontent by turning to workers unions, rather than political parties. Altogether, we assess that additional demonstrations could be staged in the near-medium term, accompanied by heightened security measures. Security situation Cameroon's chronic insecurity along the northern and eastern borders with Nigeria and CAR, respectively, persists accompanied by an underlying threat of violent spillover. In northeastern Nigeria, state security forces continue to clash with the Nigerian jihadists, Boko Haram. As long as the Nigerian internal conflict persists, Cameroon's Extreme North is prone for an additional influx of refugees and potential infiltrations by Nigerian Islamic militants. Meanwhile, the political stability in the CAR is constantly jeopardized by supporters of ousted president Francois Bozize and elements who deserted the Seleka alliance following the successful coup d'état last March. Abdoulaye Miskine, who was arrested in the city of Bertoua by Cameroonian troops, is the leader of a restive CAR faction, the Democratic Front of the Centrafrican People (FPDC). It is likely that Miskine followers and other adversaries of the newly formed regime in Bangui will continue to operate from bases in Cameroon's East region in bid to topple President Michel Djotodia. Thus, clashes between CAR rebels and Cameroonian security forces are possible, in addition to reprisal attacks on Cameroonian territory by Seleka rebels. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to Cameroon's outlying areas, in particular the Extreme North region bordering Nigeria and the border areas with the CAR, due to volatile security conditions.

17 07Page 2. Avoid the vicinity of polling stations nationwide on September 30, due to elevated potential for politically motivated outbreaks of violence. 3. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to the periphery of Douala and Yaounde due to elevated threats posed by criminal activities. 4. Those traveling in Cameroon are advised to contact Max Security Intelligence for itinerary-based consultation and on-ground support. Date October 1, 2013 October 14-15, 2013 Short Summary Unification Day Marks Independence of Anglophone Cameroon in the south and its unification with French Cameroon. Eid al-adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael. Assessment and Recommendation Given simmering tensions with Anglophone Cameroonian factions who strive for autonomy, this day could witness limited unrest and demonstrations in Anglophone regions in the Northwest and Southwest Provinces. We advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Anglophone Cameroon given the potential for unrest.as this is a public holiday, anticipate interruptions to business continuity as government offices and many businesses will be closed. No special security concerns. Likely travel delays and service disruptions due to the public holiday. Take necessary measures to insure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest.

18 08Page MEDIUM RISK Ethiopia Demonstrations held by the two most vocal and prominent opposition groups, the Blue Party and Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ), were forcefully disrupted in Addis Ababa over recent weeks. Ahead of the UDJ's September 29 protest, at least 26 senior leaders were detained by police, as the government utilizes a law that restricts public demonstrations. Heavy fighting was reported between ONLF rebels and government forces in Ogaden during the month of September, underscoring persistent volatility in the region. Business travel to Addis Ababa can continue while avoiding the vicinity of protests, and deferring from non-essential travel to outlying areas given potential for militant attacks. ASSESSMENTS Political crackdown against dissidents persists The arrests of more than 100 Blue Party members and the detainment of 26 senior leaders of the opposition UDJ prior of their September 29 march underscores the potential for unrest ahead of and during rallies organized by dissidents. The government has elevated the pressure against the factions to postpone their rallies on multiple occasions, and has banned all opposition parties from holding protests at the central Meskel Square, a move fiercely criticized by both the Blue Party and the UDJ. The ruling Ethiopian People s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has recently increased its utilization of a legislation that imposes restrictions on public demonstrations. This became evident on September 22 when a Blue Party rally was blocked 100 meters from the party headquarters in the Ginfele Area, and protesters were returned to the starting point, where they were allowed to picket. A similar police action was recorded when approximately one thousand UDJ activists held a peaceful rally against the controversial anti-terror law and demanding the release of all political prisoners. The restrictions against freedom of assembly are further indicated by the numerous arrests of dissidents made in recent weeks. The government has in recent months increased it use of harassment, detainment of dissidents and forceful dispersal methods against opposition protesters. Therefore we assess that the peaceful atmosphere from which the Blue Party emerged in June 2013 through a mass demonstration, when authorities allowed opposition movements increased freedom, has been replaced by a more authoritarian approach by the EPRDF. Opposition movements activities in Ethiopia have for years been inhibited by political pressure from the government, perceived unequal parliamentary representation, and harsh police crackdowns. Given that security forces are continuing its police to forcefully suppress rallies, it is likely that any future rally will be met with further police aggression.

19 09Page Ogaden hostilities Reports indicate that several instances of hostility have taken place between rebels of the secessionist Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Ethiopian government forces over the course of September. According to local sources, at least 150 ONLF fighters attacked a military camp near Jijiga in the eastern Ogaden region in mid- September, leading to dozens of deaths on both sides. Neither the government nor the ONLF has confirmed nor refuted the incidents. Since there is no independent media outlet operating in Ogaden due to government restrictions, the claims cannot be corroborated nor the death toll confirmed. However, the claims will likely exacerbate the already heightened tensions between the ONLF and the government. The African Rights Monitor (ARM) recently issued a report alleging that the Ethiopian government has intensified its extra-judicial killings, and that reported instances of torture, rape and land grabbing in Ogaden have increased significantly. The ARM claims that government forces are increasing its use of "scorched earth" tactics, to forcibly move locals from an area. In light of these allegations and the heightened tensions between the parties, we assess that continued hostilities is likely to transpire in the Ogaden region over the near term. As several rebel factions are active in Ethiopia s outlying areas, including the ONLF and the Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF), which both have conducted deadly attacks against government installations and officials in their respective areas of operations, there is an underlying threat of militant attack in Addis Ababa as well. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. While business travel to Addis Ababa can continue, it is advised to contact Max Security to receive itinerary based consultation and on ground support options for travel within the capital and in outlying areas. 2. As a general security precaution, avoid all large gatherings and political protests in Addis Ababa, given the potential for unrest at such events. 3. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas, in particularly the Ogaden region, areas adjacent to the Somali border as well as the western Gambela region, due to threat of militant attacks.

20 21Page MEDIUM RISK Guinea Legislative elections transpired peacefully on September 28 although numerous anomalies were reported, including a lack of voting ballots. The heightened political tensions are likely to increase ahead of and on October 2 when provincial results are expected, and protests remain likely over coming days. We continue to advice against all nonessential travel to outlying regions of Guinea at this time due to the persistence of elevated ethnic tensions, while avoiding all protests in Conakry given heightened potential for unrest. ASSESSMENTS Legislative elections The first legislative elections in more than one decade took place on September 28, with a reported 80% voter turnout, following yet another postponement on September 24. Numerous anomalies were reported, including a lack of voting ballots, as well as allegations that many residents were being prevented from voting because their names did not appear on voter registration lists. These electoral irregularities have been partially confirmed by the E.U. observer mission. That said, there were no significant reports of unrest or violence, aside from localized heightened tensions between opposition and government supporters in the Kaloum area of Conakry, which serves as the city's central business and political district. While the elections largely transpired peacefully, politically motivated violence persisted throughout Conakry and nationwide in the lead-up to the polls. In Conakry, both opposition and government supporters erected road barricades and burned tires, blocking traffic circulation throughout many areas of the capital, including in the Ratoma commune and Route Le Prince between Hamdallaye and Cosa. The pre-election unrest resulted in the death of one policeman and a reported 70 injured. On election day, main opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo threatened that dissidents would return to street demonstration if incidents of fraud would be detected. This statement underscores the continued potential for unrest over the coming days. Therefore, despite final results not having been released yet, we assess that the outcome, whether in favor of incumbent President Alpha Conde's government or the opposition, is likely to result in mass demonstrations and likely ensuing unrest. As previously witnessed in Guinea, such gatherings possess a high likelihood to devolve into violence, with politically motivated unrest often spreading quickly throughout Conakry and along ethnic lines nationwide. The aforementioned tensions are likely to be mirrored on the domestic political arena, with opposition and government officials expected to continue adopting a confrontational rhetoric, which in turn is likely to exacerbate the potential for violence.

21 20Page In the near term, we assess that given elevated political tensions in the wake of the legislative elections, there remains a potential for protests and unrest throughout the country, particularly in Conakry. Additionally, as the country is slated to celebrate its 65th Independence Day on October 2, the same day that official election results are expected, the risk for such unrest is particularly high in the vicinity of celebratory events deemed political, due to possible participation of government ministers or officials. RECEOMMENDATIONS 1. We continue to advice against all nonessential travel to outlying regions of Guinea at this time due to the persistence of elevated ethnic tensions, while avoiding all protests in Conakry given heightened potential for unrest. 2. We continue to advise maintaining heightened vigilance throughout Conakry due to the possibility of general, politically related unrest. 3. As a general security precaution, avoid large gatherings and political demonstrations in Guinea given the highly elevated potential for possibly violent unrest to erupt with little to no warning. Date October 2, 2013 Short Summary Republic Day - Guinea will be celebrating 65 years of Independence with a public holiday on October 2. Assessment and Recommendation As this is a public holiday, take necessary measures to assure business continuity in anticipation as government offices and many businesses will be closed. On October 2, we advise to maintain heightened vigilance if conducting travel in Guinea given the heightened potential for unrest.

22 22Page MEDIUM RISK Ivory Coast Persistently high criminal activity was recorded, particularly in Yamoussoukro, amid growing tensions with the Dozo hunter community; additional clashes are likely as security forces bolster presence. While talks between the government and the opposition FPI resume, a political party was created by moderate Gbagbo supporters indicating a potentially new political landscape. Those operating or residing in the Ivory Coast, are advised to avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas given the heightened security risks. ASSESSMENTS Criminal activity Security incidents related to continued criminal activity and road blocking resulted in several deaths over the past few weeks, with a particular uptick in such activity in the Yamoussoukro region. Sources suggest that most of the criminal activity in the capital is related to increasing tensions between the military and the traditional hunter community, known as Dozo. The initial incident reported occurred on September 12, when two Dozos were killed by security forces after they attempted to arrest them. That said, Dozo community representatives have blamed the military for targeting their members, after having denied accusations of criminal activity, indicating that additional hostilities are likely in the near term. Rampant criminal activity was further highlighted by reports indicating an increase in operations of an armed street gang that looted shops and conducted robberies at gunpoint during night hours in the Abobo area, situated in Abidjan s north. Additionally, an Ivorian soldier was killed during an ambush in Agboville, also located north of Abidjan, on September 21. Immediately following the attack, reinforcements arrived to several surrounding villages, sending locals fleeing out of fear of additional violence. Some locals claim that the soldiers attacked youths in the village, injuring several individuals. Criminality remains a major problem throughout Ivory Coast in both rural and urban areas despite a recent bolstering of security forces presence. In spite of alleged police crackdowns, widespread arms proliferation, corruption and incompetence among police officers will likely continue allow criminal networks to thrive relatively unabated. Political developments The dialogue between the government and opposition Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) resumed on September 24, following a hiatus of several months. The FPI, formerly led by ex-president Laurent Gbagbo, who is currently being indicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for human rights violations, is represented by returning leader

23 23Page Pascal Affi N Guessan. N Guessan was released from prison in the beginning of August and is believed to be the reason for the more confrontational tone adopted by the party in recent weeks. The uncompromising nature of the FPI is highlighted by the continued demand for the release of all pro-gbagbo prisoners as well as the return of exiled supporters of the party, despite the fact that the government is highly unlikely to meet these demands at this time. Therefore, we assess that although negotiations have resumed, the potential for an agreement to be reached in the near term remains low due to the wide discrepancies between the parties. In the near term, we assess that the existing cleavages between pro-gbagbo factions and the government, which are mirrored within society, are likely to increase as negotiations continue. These differences are likely to manifest themselves through virulent political rhetoric and possibly violent confrontations. Meanwhile, thousands of activists from the pro-gbagbo League of Movements for Progress (LMP) coalition, of the FPI is the main party, have left LMP to establish the National Forum for Peace (FNAP). The new political faction was officially launched during a rally held on September 24 in Yopougon, Abidjan. The newly established FNAP will be led by Toure al-moustapha, former leader of the Young Patriots Movement, which supported former President Gbagbo and his FPI. FNAP calls for increased peace and reconciliation with incumbent President Ouattara and his administration. Although FNAP leader al-moustapha is known as a pro-gbagbo activist, the new group s call for reconciliation with President Ouattara may lead to heightened tensions with other LMP parties, particularly the FPI. This is particularly true given that the FPI has been associated with violent activities in the past and maintains a strong support base in Yopougon. As such, there remains a potential for violent acts and possibly clashes between FNAP activists and FPI supporters in the near-medium term. Recommendations 1. Those operating or residing in the Ivory Coast, are advised to avoid nonessential travel to outlying areas given the heightened security risks. 2. If travel to outlying regions is necessary, maintain vigilance and utilize properly vetted on-ground support. 3. As to mitigate the risk against illegal security checkpoints, do not pull over for any unmarked vehicles. In the event of an unmarked vehicle attempting to pull you over, drive directly to the nearest police station 4. In the case you are directly confronted by armed assailants, it is advised to cooperate fully and not engage in any behavior that could raise tensions and lead to violence.

24 24Page MEDIUM RISK Kenya A prolonged siege and hostage situation took place at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi conducted by al-shabaab militants; the attack left at least 67 people dead and hundreds injured, highlighting Kenya's inability to avert and combat a well-coordinated militant attack. Police in Mombasa were put on high alert on September 27 and dispatched additional security contingencies throughout the city following reports of an imminent attack by al- Shabaab militants. The U.S.'s re-issuing of a travel advisory from July 5 following the Westgate attack met harsh criticism from Kenya, but the U.S. move underlines that the threat of additional attacks remains viable. Travel to Nairobi and other urban centers can continue while adhering to standard security protocols against militancy and crime. Be aware of suspicious persons and unattended bags and packages. ASSESSMENTS Westgate Mall attack The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) took full control over the Westgate Mall in Nairobi s affluent Westlands neighborhood on September 25, following four days of siege and a prolonged hostage situation conducted by Islamist militants belonging to the Somalibased al-shabaab militant group. More than one dozen assailants wearing camouflage uniforms and equipped with bullet proof armor, rifles and hand grenades, assaulted the Westgate Mall during the afternoon hours of September 21. Five attackers were reportedly killed by security forces, and the death toll, currently standing at 67, is expected to rise and forensics continue searching the partially wrecked building. Reports have indicated that several of the attackers fled through tunnels or among civilians as they were escorted away from Westgate just hours after the initial stages of the attacks. In light of this, in addition to alleged poor coordination between security agencies leading to several operational failures, fierce criticism has been directed at the government and the security establishment following the attack. The developments underscore the high level of incompetence among the Kenyan security forces in combating such a well orchestrated attack as well as the lack of hierarchy and communication between the different security agencies. As more details surface concerning laxity by security forces during the Westgate incident, the pressure against President Kenyatta and his cabinet to act decisively against militancy is likely to grow. Given that al-shabaab has recently issued additional threats against several targets in the region, the risk of further attacks in Kenya remain viable in the near term. However, given the significantly heightened security measures implemented throughout Nairobi, Mombasa and the Somali border regions following the Westgate incident, we assess

25 25Page that the chances of a second major attack on this scale by al-shabaab in Kenya s urban centers remains lowered at this time. As al-shabaab has maintained a strong long-term presence inside Kenya, waging a series of low-level attacks primarily in Nairobi s Eastleigh district and the nation s eastern regions. Thus, more up-scale areas such as Westlands have been under persistent threat from militant attack since the 2011 Kenyan intervention in Somalia and will continue to be. Therefore, the Westgate siege is only representative of the ongoing security threat that Nairobi is facing and not indicative of an increased threat. Mombasa alert of imminent attack Beginning on September 27, central Mombasa experienced a heightened state of alert as police was stationed throughout the city as several locales in Mombasa s Central Business District (CBD) and other areas of the city have reportedly received threats from al-shabaab. These include the TSS Tower, Electricity House, Mombasa Law Court, Mombasa Trade Center, transportation hubs, Likoni Ferry, in addition to churches and mosques. The police urged all residents to exercise caution, avoid the areas of the aforementioned locales and report any suspicious individuals or packages to security officers. Al-Shabaab draws large support from Mombasa s predominantly Muslim population and enjoys the support of several radical Islamic clerics. The group is therefore believed to have access to safe houses and bomb making facilities in and around the city. Moreover, given the sophistication and detailed planning of the Westgate attack, any enhanced security measures implemented at potential targets may be deficient in repelling a coordinated attack similar in nature to the Westgate siege. The reports indicating that numerous foreigners participated in the Westgate attack highlights a possible change in modus operandi by al-shabaab. As the group may increasingly utilize Western born Muslims or converts to conduct major and wellorchestrated attacks in the near term, security forces will likely have impaired ability to halt such actions in advance. This is particularly true given that the Kenyan security apparatus has predominantly focused on anti-militant operations in Nairobi and Mombasa against Somali expats and Kenyan sympathizers of al-shabaab in recent months. Thus, security forces may have neglected militant sleeper cells led by Westerners. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the Westgate attack, the Kenyan government as well as its security and intelligence services has been strongly criticized for not preventing the attack as well as acting unprofessionally and reacting slowly as the attack occurred. Thus, there remains a possibility that the security establishment may respond disproportionally or forcefully to any potential indication of militant attacks over the coming weeks, as to not repeat these alleged mistakes. U.S. travel advisory As the U.S. State Department re-issued its travel advisory from July 5 in the aftermath of the Westgate Mall attack by al-shabaab militants, the move was fiercely condemned by the Kenyan government. The Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the move

26 26Page unnecessary and uncalled for as terrorism is a global problem and the U.S. itself has suffered terror attack before. The U.S. travel advisory urged its citizens planning to travel to Kenya to evaluate their personal security in light of continuing and recently heightened threat from terrorism and high rate of crime in some areas. Despite previous calls by both President Kenyatta and opposition leader Raila Odinga aimed at international community not to issue travel advisories in light of the Westgate attack, the U.S. disregard for these calls underscores that the threat of additional attacks remains real. As the Kenyan government has called the U.S. move "unfriendly," the travel advisory could be the beginning of a diplomatic row that could take months to mend. This is particularly true in light of Kenyan criticism against U.S. intelligence services for not alerting Kenyan authorities of the Westgate Mall attack, as well as Kenya's increasing lenience eastward toward China, demonstrated by major development loans and infrastructure deals recently signed in Beijing. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Travel to Nairobi and other urban centers can continue while adhering to standard security protocols against militancy and crime. Be aware of suspicious persons and unattended bags and packages. 2. Avoid nonessential travel to the vicinity of locales frequented by foreigners, such as shopping malls, entertainment venues, in addition to Western embassies, and government and security installations such as police stations and military barracks, due to their likelihood to become targets for militant attacks. 3. Travelers in Kenya are advised to avoid all nonessential travel to outlying areas, particularly to the northeastern border region with Somalia and Ethiopia, due to the high level of insecurity. 4. It is advised to avoid nonessential travel within Nairobi s working class neighborhoods during the evening and night hours due to elevated security risks posed by criminal activity.

27 27Page MEDIUM RISK South Africa The South African crime statistics for were released on Thursday, September 19, demonstrated that for the first time in eight years there has been an increase in serious and violent crime, including murder. The infamous leader of the "Hard Livings" gang, Rashied Staggie has been released from prison on day parole fueling fear that there will be an increase in gang violence in the Western Cape. Business travel to South Africa can continue while avoiding all demonstrations and practicing heightened vigilance against crime. ASSESSMENTS Crime statistics reveal increase in violent crimes including murders Murder rates have increased by 6.5% in the past year, with an average of 43 murders a day throughout the country. There were also increases in attempted murders, assaults, residential burglaries, commercial crimes and drug related incidents. It was also recorded that sexual offences have declined slightly over the past year. Murder is the most easily measurable statistic, and as such is the most accurate gauge of the crime situation in the country. This year's increase in murders comes against nine years of consistent decreasing numbers, a point which the police expressed at length. While sexual crimes did decline slightly, there are many who believe that this decline is partially the result of decrease in reporting of incidents. An increase in assault and violent crime does not match a sudden decrease in sexual violence, and so it is probable that there is underreporting of cases of sexual violence. This may demonstrate that victims of these crimes fear reporting them or do not feel that anything can be gained through reporting such incidents. Statistics reveal that more than half of the murders in the country occur in only 13% of the police precincts, and that murder rates in low income areas are significantly higher than in high income areas. This may demonstrate that the majority of murders are not premeditated or committed as part of a crime, but are more likely the result of arguments or domestic violence. Contrary to this police precincts in areas with an extremely high average income, such as Sandton in Johannesburg or Table View in Cape Town, have extremely low rates of murder and in some cases did not record a single incident in the period The highest murder rates were recorded in the informal settlements and lower income areas that surround Cape Town. This region has witnessed a major increase in drug related crime and gang violence, which may be the basis for this statistic. Central Business Districts (CBD) are the most at risk areas for violence in general, including robberies, rapes, attempted murder and hijackings. Johannesburg remains the

28 28Page most dangerous CBD in the country, but Durban, Pretoria and Cape Town all reported significant crime rates. Violent crime rates grew besides an increase in the in the police force of 70,000 additional officers. This, coupled with the trend of murders in low income areas, may demonstrate that crime in South Africa is rooted in societal shortcomings and poverty. Thus the affliction of violent crime may not be solved by effective policing alone. It is for this reason that we assess that crime, and especially violent crime is likely to remain a major stumbling block to South African progress. Rashied Staggie released from prison on day parole Rashied Staggie, together with his twin brother Rashaad, who was murdered in 1996, is the infamous leader of the Hard Livings gang which fought a vicious gang turf and drug war in the 1990's. Staggie was arrested in 2004 on charges of rape and aggravated robbery, but received day parole on grounds of good behavior. As part of the day parole, Staggie will be allowed to leave the Pollsmoor Prison during the day hours provided he has a job to attend to. Gang violence has steadily increased in the Cape Flats region, especially in Manenburg, from where Staggie hails, over the past half a year. Many attribute this rise in violence to Staggie's imminent resurfacing, as gang members maneuver to claim positions or display allegiance to the old leader. Furthermore, the vigilante organization responsible for the lynching of Rashaad Staggie, People Against gangs and Drugs (Pagad) has reemerged, and become increasingly visible in the region. It is possible that Pagad and Staggie's "Hard Livings" gang may once again clash. Staggie has claimed that he will not re-enter the crime world, and has been employed by a church as a full time motivational speaker. However, we assess that due to the already rampant violence as well as the reemergence of Pagad, Staggie's release is likely to result in an increase in gang and drug violence both directly linked to Staggie and indirectly resulting from his presence on the streets. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. As a general security precaution it is advised to avoid all mass gatherings and public protests in South Africa, due to the potential for violence at these events. 2. It is advised to avoid the rural areas of South Africa. 3. It is advised to avoid all unnecessary travel to the informal settlements throughout South Africa, and especially outside of Cape Town. 4. Visitors to South Africa are advised to practice heightened vigilance against crime.

29 29Page MEDIUM RISK Uganda The Ugandan security forces were put on high alert following the Westgate Mall militant attack in Nairobi, and increased border security was implemented, underscoring the increased threat of militancy. President Museveni may face several retired generals in the contest for Presidency in 2016, as newly retired Maj. Gen. Benon Biraaro has indicated his willingness to run for President. While business travel to Uganda can continue, we advise avoiding the vicinity of protests due to the potential for unrest, as well as government and security installations given the possibility for militant attacks. ASSESSMENTS Security forces on high alert In light of the attack and siege on Nairobi s Westgate Mall, Ugandan security forces have beefed up their deployment in and around potential targets of militant attacks in Kampala and nationwide. These include shopping malls, major supermarkets, Western embassies, public spaces as well as government and security installations. Furthermore, border security has been bolstered in the Malaba and Busia areas, as a step to block possible infiltration of militants into the country. Inspector General of Police, General Kale Kayihura, called on all Ugandans to remain vigilant against suspicious individuals or objects, and reminded its citizens that Uganda remains high on the list of targets by al- Shabaab and other militant groups. Uganda was targeted by Somali-based militant group al-shabaab in 2010, when a twinsuicide bombing killed at least 70 people at an entertainment venue. Thus, in light of the Westgate attack and recent increased threats by al-shabaab and other regional Islamic radical groups, we assess that the threat against Uganda is viable. This threat is increasingly feasible given the reported increased cooperation between al-shabaab and the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), currently operating in eastern DRC with approximately 1,000 fighter under its command. Thus, heightened security measures are likely to remain in place over the coming weeks, particularly in light of the prominent role that Uganda has played in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in combating al-shabaab and ousting the group from its former strongholds. Moreover, President Museveni held a high-profile meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in Pentagon, Washington D.C., mainly discussing the implication of the Westgate attack and future efforts to combat al-shabaab. Museveni, who has proven to be a committed U.S. and Western ally in the fight against Islamic extremism in East Africa and against rebel groups operating in central Africa, was commended by his host for his and Uganda's persistent efforts against militancy in the region. Uganda was

30 31Page the first country to commit troops to AMISOM in 2006, and currently has more than 8,000 forces stationed in Somalia under A.U. command. We assess that following the Westgate attack, Uganda, Kenya and other countries in AMISOM will be more determined and likely receive increased international financial and military support in a renewed effort to completely rid Somalia of al-shabaab. Retired generals challenge President Ahead of the Presidential elections in 2016, speculation is rife for who President Yoweri Museveni, or possibly his son Brigadier Muhoozi, will contend against for the highest political office in Uganda. Apart from retired Gen. Mugisha Muntu, who is set to lead the main opposition Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), reports indicate that newly retired Major Gen. Benon Biraaro is considering running for president. The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), which is commonly referred to as the "Movement," is expected to be led by either Museveni or his son Muhoozi, whose rapid rise within the ranks of the army has fueled speculation of his political ambitions. The potential challenger Gen. Biraaro is a senior officer who rose in the ranks of the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF) from the Bush War days, and is believed to be a former close confident of the outgoing Chief of Defense Forces Gen. Aronda Nyakairima. Biraaro's possible participation in the presidential elections is notable as it comes at a time of alleged increased division within the army following Gen. Sejusa publication of a controversial letter pertaining that Museveni aims to have his son succeed him as President. The political and military establishments in Ugadna are highly interconnected and dependant of each other, and it is widely assumed that only high ranking ex-military officers are able to vie for the Presidency. Given that President Museveni has secured between 60-70% in the past two previous presidential elections and that his NRM holds a comfortable majority in Parliament, NRM is expected to emerge victorious of the 2016 election as well. However, under increased pressure against opposition movements from the government, dissidents are beginning to find common ground against the NRM. Thus, we assess that there will be increased domestic calls for self-exiled renegade Gen. Sejusa as well as Gen. Biraaro to challenge Museveni's power, who has held the Presidency since The elevated restriction on freedom of assembly has decreased the frequency and size of opposition demonstrations in recent weeks. These restrictions became particularly evident through a legislation stipulating the ban for unauthorized political gatherings with more than three people, and the law heightens the potential for unrest during opposition demonstrations. Nonetheless, as opposition factions are reportedly cooperating more intensely than before, we assess that dissidents' tactic of spontaneous as well as planned protests are likely to resurge over the coming months. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. While business travel to Uganda can continue, we advise avoiding the vicinity of protests due to the potential for unrest, as well as government and security installations given the possibility for militant attacks.

31 30Page 2. If confronted by security checkpoints or police officer, make sure to comply and cooperate with their demands as to not raise suspicion that could lead to violent use of force. 3. Avoid all nonessential travel to outlying regions given the activities of rebel groups, particularly in western Uganda at this time. 4. Given the persistent threat of militant attacks through the activities of militant factions in Uganda, we advise avoiding nonessential travel to the vicinity of government and security installations, Western diplomatic institutions, and crowded public areas at this point in time. 5. As a general security precaution, avoid the vicinity of all large gatherings and demonstrations due to the potential for clashes with police and incidental risks to bystanders. Date October 9, 2013 Short Summary Independence Day Uganda will be celebrating 51 years of independence from British rule. Assessment and Recommendation Uganda will celebrate their independence with likely military parades and other events in public spaces in Kampala and nationwide. As there is an elevated threat of militant attacks by Islamists at this time, avoid all large gatherings and public events. As this is a public holiday, many businesses and government institutions will be closed. Take necessary measures to mitigate disruptions to business continuity.

32 32Page LOW RISK Ghana Government increases utility tariffs, which has led to increasing calls for demonstrations, as authorities are easing the restrictions on public gatherings. Travel to Ghana can continue as normal while avoiding nonessential travel to the nation's outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions. ASSESSMENTS Political Developments The Ghanaian Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) announced a 78.9% increase in electricity and 52% increase in water tariffs to take effect on October 1. The decision for increasing the water costs was allegedly made to help the Ghana Water Company meet key operational costs, and make investments that will help ensure better service delivery. The Electricity Company of Ghana (EGC), for its part, argues that they are losing money for their services and thus cannot pay its suppliers. Additionally, Ghana is making substantial investments in electricity-generating infrastructure that will eventually lower production costs, but in the meantime requires greater financing to make these projects feasible. Energy generation in Ghana is heavily reliant on imports of relatively expensive crude oil from Nigeria and the government is seeking to substitute this with natural gas. This dependency is partly due to the incomplete West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) project, which is to bring gas to Ghana via pipeline from Nigeria. To address this expensive dependency, the government is working on other projects, such as the Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Project (WCGIP), which will transport gas from West Ghana to the Takoradi Power Stations in Aboadze. The WCGIP is currently 72% complete and will lead to a halving of the USD 3 million currently spent in purchasing crude oil for daily power generation. Ghana also plans on setting up the infrastructure for using imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). In order to realize these goals, the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoEP) in collaboration with Quantum Power Ghana Gas Limited held an international LNG workshop from September The country plans to shift to using LNG to power all thermal plants throughout the country by 2016, and the government claims that tariff costs will then decrease. Ghanaians are naturally unhappy with the new costs. The country struggled with spiraling inflation rates below-trend economic growth in recent years. As Ghanaians struggle with rising living expenses the new utilities prices come at a particularly unwelcomed time. Various parties and groups have come out against the tariff increase. The People's National Convention (PNC) minor opposition party of Ghana criticized the government for this measure and stated that they will employ all means available to protect the

33 33Page welfare of informal sector workers and Ghanaians as a whole. The Committee for Joint Action (CJA) pressure group also voiced disappointment and announced plans to hold an emergency meeting to consider steps to counter the PURC move. Meanwhile, the Truth and Accountability Forum (TAF) has suggested that they will organize massive demonstrations in protest of the increasing utility costs. The group attempted to take the PURC to court in June, but the case was dismissed. The group plans on holding protests in Accra and nationwide if the government and the PURC does not reverse its decision by October 3. In addition to demonstrations, the TAF plans to use all means within available, including appealing the earlier court decision, to block the tariff increase. Similar statements came from the Alliance for Accountable Governance pressure group as well, which called on all opposition parties, especially the main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) to organize mass actions. The NPP, for its part, hinted that the party will work to organize street protests against the tariff increase. Given the assortment of opposition to the new, we expect to see large demonstrations within the coming weeks, particularly following the October 3 deadline from the TAF. The PURC was initially planning a 150% increase in electricity price increases and only lowered this increment on September 25; as such, it is unlikely that the government will significantly reduce the price increases, if at all. That being said, the Ghanaian government and President Mahama in particular have been relatively successful in procuring foreign investments in various infrastructural and development projects in Ghana and given the above mentioned international LNG workshop, there exists a chance that the government will seek to balance the tariff costs with investments from abroad. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Travel to Ghana can continue as normal while avoiding nonessential travel to the nation's outlying areas and Greater Accra suburbs due to volatile security conditions. 2. As a general security precaution, avoid the vicinity of all large political gatherings and demonstrations throughout Ghana due to the potential for violence between security forces and demonstrators. Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation No special security concerns. Probable travel delays and service disruptions due to the anticipated public holiday. Take necessary measures to assure business continuity in advance. Avoid large public gatherings due to elevated potential for civil unrest. October 14-15, 2013 Eid al-adha (Festival of Sacrifice). Muslim holiday, commemmorating willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son, Ishmael.

34 34Page LOW RISK Tanzania On September 21, thousands of political opposition activists from various parties attended a rally at the Jangwani grounds in Dar es Salaam to pressure President Kikwete to refrain from signing the Constitutional Review Bill into law. Opposition parties have called for further demonstrations, including nationwide rallies on October 10, related to the same issue. Police have arrested 15 individuals, including suspected al-shabaab militants, in relation to an acid attack on a Catholic priest on Zanzibar on September 13. Tanzanian security forces have announced that they are investigating threats allegedly issued by al-shabaab via social media outlets since the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi on September 21. Business travel to Tanzania can continue while adhering to basic security guidelines. ASSESSMENTS Debate surrounding Controversial Review Bill Opposition to the bill, also known as the Katiba Draft, is mounting, led by three main dissident political parties, Chadema, the Civic Union Front (CUF), and the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR)-Mageuzi. The various opposition parties' solidarity on the issue is notable given their previous inability to form a concrete bloc against the ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM), which has held onto power since independence in The political opposition's union reflects a reportedly widespread dissatisfaction with the bill, as civil society groups and academics have also expressed their disagreement. Those who decry the bill claim that the amendment would bestow an unfair amount of power on the president and the ruling party. The amendment would give the head of state the prerogative to appoint 166 out of 604 members of the Constituent Assembly. The opposition also calls for 792 members to comprise the Constituent Assembly, with 50 percent of the representative from Zanzibar. The amendment's current form stipulates 36 percent representation for Zanzibar. Given the large turnout at the Jangawani rally, we assess that the planned October 10 demonstrations are likely to be well-attended. A heightened security presence in the vicinity of the demonstrations is likely, and these forces may use force should demonstrators become unruly. Meanwhile, the bombing of the Chadema political rally in June suggests other threats to these rallies. Furthermore, in the event that Kikwete ignores the opposition s demands and signs the bill, we assess that protests are likely to increase. Meanwhile, should Kikwete bend to political and popular pressure and refer the bill back to the Constituent Assembly for further discussion, it is likely that tensions will decrease and the demonstrations will be suspended.

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