THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HYDROCARBON REVENUE CYCLING IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Transcription

1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HYDROCARBON REVENUE CYCLING IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Richard Auty (Lancaster University) 1. Rent Cycling Theory and Growth Collapses 2. Initial Conditions Render T+T Vulnerable 3. Legacy of the and Energy Windfalls 4. Deployment of the Energy Windfall 5. The Political Economy of the Windfall 1

2 1. RENT CYCLING THEORY AND GROWTH COLLAPSES 1) High rent elicits political contests for its capture that strongly impact the: i) Incentives of the elite ii) Economic trajectory 2) Low-rent motivates the elite to create wealth by growing the economy, which cycles rent via markets rather than patronage networks so: i) The economy adheres to its comparative advantage in competitive export manufacturing that propels rapid structural change ii) Early industrialisation brings early urbanisation + rapid demographic transition that raises the I/GDP ratio + drives rapid and egalitarian GDP growth iii) Rapid structural change proliferates social groups that strengthen sanctions v. anti-social governance to give incremental democratisation 2

3 LOW RENT COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIALISATION MODEL Elite Incentives Development trajectory Main Outcomes Low rent Competitive industrialisation Sustained rise in PCGNI Wealth creation > rent deployment Political Low GINI Rapid social group formation Strengthened sanctions v. anti-social governance Incremental evolution to a consensual democracy Rent -> markets not patronage cycling Social Early urbanisation Rapid demographic transition Low dependent/ worker ratio Rapid PCGDP growth due to high + efficient investment Adhere to comparative advantage Economic Early labourintensive manufacturing Rapid removal of surplus labour Rapid up-skilling + diversification Strengthening economic resilience 3

4 RENT CYCLING THEORY AND GROWTH COLLAPSES (continued) 3) High-rent motivates the elite to redistribute rent at the expense of wealth creation so it expands patronage cycling and relies less on markets i) Deflects economy from comparative advantage, which: (a) retards structural change; (b) cuts investment efficiency + (c) slows GDP growth = growth collapse ii) Slows demographic transition + labour absorption so inequality rises + govt reacts by subsidising new jobs iii) Slows proliferation of social groups + weakens sanctions v. anti-social governance iv) Renders economy increasingly vulnerable to shocks + a growth collapse, which is protracted because once established rent-seeking exhibits strong inertia and resists economic reform (because it shrinks rent-seeking options) 4

5 HIGH RENT STAPLE TRAP MODEL Elite Incentives Development trajectory Main Outcomes High rent Staple Trap Protracted Growth Collapse Rent deployment > wealth creation Political Rising GINI Slow proliferation of social groups Weak sanctions v. anti-social governance Predatory political state + erratic political change Rent -> patronage cycling > markets Social Slow demographic transition Persistent labour surplus Subsidised employment creation Rent seeking inertia lifts subsidies > rent Economic distortion Economic Tardy + subsidised structural change Falling investment efficiency +growth Private sector overtaxed + weakened High risk of protracted GDP growth collapse

6 2. INITIAL CONDITIONS AND SUBSEQUENT RENT STREAMS 1. Rent cycling theory explains that the potentially adverse impact of high rent worsens in the presence of: a) Point source rent (like minerals) that concentrate rent on government c.f. disperse rent across many economic agents (as with peasant agriculture) b) Bias towards statist policies, which T+T exhibited through the 1970s when it greatly expanded public sector activity c) Ethnic diversity feeds rent-seeking contests: T+T population is split 2/5 Afro-Saxon + 2/5 East Indian d) Democracy tends to favour targeting public expenditure at projects for specific voters > broader public goods like schools, which benefit all e) Youthful democracy where political parties lack voter trust is more susceptible to public expenditure on projects 6

7 3. LEGACY OF THE AND ENERGY WINDFALLS (32-38% NEGDP) 1. Cautious start, then absorbed windfalls too rapidly a) Boosted consumption, which entrenched rent-seeking interests through middle class subsidies + union wage rises (expanded civil service + state-owned enterprises) b) Pursued gas-based industrialisation through state-owned firms in steel, fertilizer and methanol: i) Steel incurred massive cost overrun + losses ii) Capital-intensive projects = few jobs + failed to trigger private investment in labour-intensive downstream activity iii) Dutch disease effects eroded competitiveness 2. As the rent shrank , successive governments: i) Struggled to cut public expenditure + exhausted sizeable reserves + accumulated debt ii) Faced growth collapse that halved PCGDP 7

8 4. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ENERGY WINDFALL 1. The estimated windfall = 59% NEGDP/yr a) Two-thirds saved through increased reserves, stabilisation fund + higher private sector saving b) One-sixth absorbed through higher consumption as: i) Used rising energy taxes to cut non-energy taxation share in GDP and thereby boost private consumption ii) Expanded subsidies + transfers + boosted public sector wages that triggered demonstration effect: wages outstripped productivity c) One-sixth absorbed via higher investment: i) Three-fold rise in public investment, probably inefficient because so rapid ii) Subdued non-energy private sector investment persisted (since early-1980s), aggravated by renewed Dutch Disease effects d) PCGDP doubled but public expenditure unsustainable 8

9 ESTIMATED ABSORPTION OF ENERGY WINDFALL (% NEGDP) Total windfall 59.3 Extra consumption 10.4 Private 4.8 Public 5.4 Extra investment 10.4 Private -1.7 Public 12.1 Extra Saving

10 5. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WINDFALL a) Key pro-growth political constituency = IFIs since domestic political factions focus on rent cycling to sustain coalitions (favour business, unions and middle class) b) Governance indices deteriorated (despite doubled PCGDP), notably governance, rule of law and control of graft as governments sought to maintain ruling coalitions c) IMF estimates need to cut non-energy public deficit from 13% of NEGDP to 4% to achieve sustainable application of energy rent stream (gas production is forecast to terminate by 2022 and oil two decades later). d) So far oil has unsophisticated linkages to the domestic economy: e.g. catering c.f. geological mapping, specialised equipment supply. Economy remains strongly rent-reliant. 10