The Making and Unmaking of a Transnational Coalition

Transcription

1 The Making and Unmaking of a Transnational Coalition THE STATE AND TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN ECUADOR S YASUNÍ-ITT INITIATIVE A dissertation submitted by Mauricio Andrés López Rivera (32027) to the Department of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Global Politics 1 September 2014 Word count: 10032

2 Abstract Ecuador s Yasuní-ITT Initiative presented an unprecedented global environmental mechanism promoting environmental justice. This government-sponsored proposal became known worldwide and garnered transnational activist support. However, after failing to achieve its goals, the project was terminated, thereby generating activist contestation. Based on this case study, this paper uses transnational collective action as an analytical framework to trace complex interactions involving state and non-state actors in the course of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and its subsequent termination. The analysis focuses on framing processes involving (international) norms. The paper highlights the importance of normative and ideational dynamics in transnational contentious politics. In particular, it points to key factors that affected the common frames of meaning underlying the Yasuní transnational network and coalition. Keywords: transnational network/coalition, international norms, collective action frames, Yasuní-ITT Initiative. 2

3 Contents Abstract... 2 Abbreviations Introduction Literature review Transnational Collective Action: An Overview Conceptualizing Transnational Networks and Coalitions Struggles over Meaning: Framing Processes and Norms Methodology Research design Data Analysis The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, Network and Coalition The Origins of the Yasuní Network The Yasuní Network and the Live Yasuní Campaign The Yasuní-ITT Initiative Phase A: Norms and Common Frames of Meaning The Ecuadorian State as International Norm Entrepreneur Leading by Example: the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador Buen Vivir as Master Frame Indigenous and Environmental Frames (De)Alignments Phase B: Norms and Divergent Frames of Meaning Terminating the Yasuní-ITT Initiative: Who is (Co-)Responsible? The Pollution of Oil vs. the Pollution of Poverty Now You see Them, Now You don t: the Tagaeri-Taromenane Affair Epilogue: The Dirty Hand of Chevron and Yasunidos

4 5. Conclusion References Appendix Appendix

5 Abbreviations CESR CONAIE CONFENIAE GIZ ILO INGO ITT IO IR MDG NAWE NGO ONHAE RAN UN UNDP YNP Center for Economic and Social Rights Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation International Labor Organization International Nongovernmental Organisation Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini Intergovernmental Organization International Relations Millenium Development Goal Waorani Nationality of Ecuador Nongovernmental Organisation Organization of the Huaorani Nation of the Ecuadorian Amazon Rainforest Action Network United Nations United Nations Development Programme Yasuní National Park 5

6 1. Introduction On 25 September 2007, Ecuador s president Rafael Correa announced before the UN General Assembly the launch of a pioneering global environmental governance mechanism, the Yasuní Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) Initiative. This consisted in the non-exploitation of the ITT oilfield, which is located in the Amazonian Yasuní National Park (YNP) and contains about 20% of the country s petroleum reserves. In exchange, Ecuador demanded an international compensation of at least US$3.6 billion, half of the revenue that would generate the extraction of the oil (UNDP, 2010a, p.1-5). The two main purposes of the Initiative were to protect the environment following a logic of co-responsibility and to secure the livelihood of indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (UNDP, 2010a, p.5-8). In case that the financial compensations did not attain the stated goal within a given deadline, the government of Ecuador would proceed to exploit the ITT field. After six years of an unsuccessful campaign, Correa announced the termination of the Initiative on 15 August 2013, thus enabling oil drilling in a zone that is considered to be one of the areas with the largest biodiversity in the planet and home of the Huaorani 1 indigenous people (Oilwatch, 2005, p.34). The Yasuní-ITT Initiative generated widespread national and international activist support. Domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), networks, and activists coalesced in order to both support and monitor the Ecuadorian government s initiative (Martin, 2011). This resulted in two parallel and in some respects intersecting campaigns: one promoted by transnational civil society actors and one sponsored by the Ecuadorian state. However, the interactions between non-state actors and the Ecuadorian government shifted dramatically after the termination of the Initiative. A social movement against the government s decision to drill the ITT field emerged on the basis of the previous transnational civil society coalition. This generated conflict between the state and civil society actors. Thus, in the course of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, the state appeared as an ally; following its termination, it became an adversary. The Yasuní-ITT Initiative and its subsequent termination provide an interesting case study to examine transnational collective action involving international norms. Indeed, 1 This paper uses the spelling Waorani instead of Huaorani as it is more common in the present (Finer et al., 2009). 6

7 it presents a case of a transnational mobilization that first accompanies and then opposes a government-sponsored international project dealing with existing (and promoted) international norms of environmental justice and indigenous rights. The aim of this study is to trace the struggles over meaning involving the Ecuadorian state and civil society actors before and after the termination of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. In so doing, the present study addresses the following questions: How are frames of meaning involving norms conceived and reconceived in a transnational coalition involving the state as an international norm entrepreneur? In particular, How were the common frames of meaning underlying the Yasuní-ITT Initiative formulated, and subsequently reformulated, following the Ecuadorian government s decision to terminate the Initiative? The paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, section 2 expounds the literature on transnational collective action and establishes a theoretical framework to analyze complex interactions within transnational networks and coalitions. Secondly, section 3 presents the methods and data used for the study. Thirdly, in section 4 the case study is analyzed in three steps: in section 4.1the formation and consolidation of the Yasuní network/coalition and project is assessed; in section 4.2 the normative and ideational basis and dynamics of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative are analyzed; and in section 4.3 the normative and ideational dynamics of interaction following the termination of the Initiative are examined. Finally, the theoretical implications of the analysis and its limitations are discussed in section Literature review 2.1 Transnational Collective Action: An Overview The transnational dimension of collective action is increasingly studied in International Relations (IR) and social movement literature (della Porta, Andretta, Mosta, and Reiter, 2006; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, 2002). Transnational collective action refers to a type of social mobilization that transcends borders linking and permeating local, national and international spheres (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2002). It is a recently conceptualized phenomenon that has been ignored 7

8 or underexplored by state-centric IR theory and predominantly domestically-oriented social movement research (Khagram et al., 2002, p.5-6). The level of analysis is rescaled as collective action (or contentious politics) and international norms are apprehended along the lines of trans-state dynamics, rather than interstate or intrastate analytical frameworks. Thus, in general terms, the idea of transnational collective action points to the blurring distinctions between domestic and international politics, which is emphasized by global governance and globalization scholars. Transnational collective action is not historically unprecedented; however, it is increasingly noticeable and expanding. A primary indicator of this process of transnationalization is the increasing number of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) since the second half of the twentieth century (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p.10-2). As Sikkink and Smith (2002, p.42) note, INGOs promoting social change provide an organizational infrastructure for global activism. However, this phenomenon did not take place in a political void. The transnationalization of nonstate actors has paralleled the development of multi-scalar public (and private) governance (Scholte, 2005, p ). In this sense, it is related to the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations and other forms of supra and sub-state governance entities. The historical dimension of transnational activism is, therefore, key to understanding its contemporary relevance and increasing importance in the context of globalization. 2.2 Conceptualizing Transnational Networks and Coalitions The form or type of transnational collective action varies along two dimensions: the degree of interaction and the nature of actors involved. Khagram et al. (2002, p. 6-10) identify different types of transnational collective action based on dominant modalities of interaction: international/transnational nongovernmental organizations, transnational advocacy networks, transnational coalitions and transnational movements. These are not mutually exclusive. Networks, coalitions and movements may appear simultaneously or evolve from one form to another. Based on the case study under examination, this paper identifies transnational networks and coalitions as the core forms of transnational collective action present in the Yasuní-ITT campaign. International nongovernmental organizations are considered as actors within networks and transnational movements are not part of the study as the campaign did not involve joint transnational mobilization. 8

9 Transnational networks are informal configurations of actors that are primarily based on information exchange as a means to promote causes, principled ideas and norms (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 8). Transnational coalitions or campaigns, on the other hand, require a higher level of coordination in order to device common strategies or sets of tactics (Khagram et al., 2002, p.7). A network may give rise to a coalition and viceversa. In the case of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, a transnational network expanded and was reconfigured through the vicissitudes of the campaign. Aside from the levels of interaction, the "nature" of actors involved determines the form of transnational networks and coalitions. Even if these are usually defined as being constituted by non-state actors, states and intergovernmental organizations may also be involved by promoting social change in a given issue area. Shaw (2002; quoted in Khagram et al., 2002, p.9) refers to these as "mixed actor coalitions". In this case, the state is not necessarily antagonist to transnational activism. In fact, the government may become a crucial ally (Thomas, 2002, p.76-8). This reaffirms the ambivalent position of the state vis-à-vis collective action as it is simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as the organizer of the political system and the arbiter of victory (Jenkins and Klandermans; quoted in Della Porta and Diani 1999:208). The Yasuní-ITT Initiative fits partly in this category as it provides an example of a transnational coalition that develops around a government-sponsored initiative. It is, then, a pertinent case to explore in order to determine the role of the state within and/or in interaction with transnational networks and coalitions. The type of actors involved in a network has an influence on the modalities of interaction. Networks are formally defined as "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p.8). However, informal asymmetries are an important dimension of interactions within networks (Sikkink, 2002, p ). For instance, some NGOs may be more influential than others. The asymmetric character of networks is even more relevant if other actors such as corporations or states are included. In sum, complex interactions within networks generate asymmetric relations that vary depending on the characteristic of actors involved. 9

10 2.3 Struggles over Meaning: Framing Processes and Norms A crucial element concerning complex interactions with(in) networks is the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings (Snow and Benford, 2000, p.613). This aspect of contentious politics is grasped by the concept of collective action frames which is defined as ʻschemata of interpretationʼ that enable individuals ʻto locate, perceive, identify, and labelʼ occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Snow and Benford, 2000, p.614). Thus frames provide an interpretative basis for (de)mobilization which may appear in a generic form (master frame) and/or in a movement-specific fashion (frame). Nevertheless, frames are not static. They are constituted through a dynamic process which is referred to as framing or frame alignment. This consists in meaning constructions which are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.198). There are multiple types of framing processes (Snow and Benford, 2000, p ). For the purposes of this study, four are distinguished. Firstly, frame articulation refers to the way in which ideas and experiences are linked to form a coherent interpretative framework. Secondly, frame amplification consists in giving more relevance to some issues or ideas than others. Thirdly, Frame bridging consists in linking two previously unconnected frames. Fourthly, counterframing refers to a form of framing that is intended to oppose and undermine other frames. In short, frame generation and development involve discursive, strategic and contested processes. In transnational collective action framing processes may involve international norms. These are defined as standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity in world politics (Thomas, 2002, p.71). Norms can be used to construct collective action frames, and these, in turn, may be used to promote new norms (Khagram et al., 2001, p.15-17). In the latter case the actors involved are often referred to as moral entrepreneurs or norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The point being made here is that transnational networks and coalitions use, among other things, framing processes for the creation, institutionalization and monitoring of norms (Khagram et al., 2002, p.12). Focusing on ideas, norms and frames, this theoretical framework establishes a dialogue between constructivism in IR and constructionism in social movement theory (Brysk, 10

11 2000; Khagram et al., 2002). Furthermore, it links rationalist and constructivist/constructionist approaches, as it considers strategic calculations in meaning-making processes involving norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p ) refer to this as a strategic social construction. The notion of frame alignment follows the same logic. In sum, this theoretical framework draw[s] upon sociological traditions that focus on complex interactions among actors, on the intersubjective construction of frames of meaning, and on the negotiation and malleability of identities and interests (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 4). The Yasuní-ITT case is relevant insofar as it presents an international campaign involving transnational networks and coalitions in which the state plays a central role as an international norm entrepreneur. In addition, it sheds light on the effects that the shifting positions of a central actor may have on the meaning-making activity of coalitions and networks. In other words, the case is relevant to analyze the effects of both asymmetric complex interactions and shifting meaning-constructions in transnational collective action. 3. Methodology 3.1 Research design Based on an exploratory case study (Yin, 2002), this paper seeks to identify the effects of complex interactions among purposeful social actors both strategic and valuedriven. More specifically, the aim is to identify the norms, ideas, and strategic calculations that guided framing processes in the course of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and its subsequent termination. This study does not seek to explain why the campaign failed; or what was the decision-making process that led to the Initiative s termination. Rather, its aim is to trace shifting constructions of meaning over time. Accordingly, this study analyzes variation (with)in a single unit diachronically (Gerring, 2004, p.343). To this end, two phases in the Yasuní-ITT campaign are identified: Phase A spanning from the initiation of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative until its termination, and Phase B referring to the aftermath of its termination. Framing constructions in Phase A and Phase B are contrasted in order to examine the underlying patterns of this process. 11

12 In so doing, this study examines the way in which the selected case adapts to general interactional patterns described by transnational collective action studies. In order to trace interactions, two main sets of actors are distinguished: the Ecuadorian government and actors in transnational networks, in particular non-state actors. The interactions among (and within) these are traced and contrasted establishing the termination of the Initiative as a turning point which affects interaction patterns and the configuration of coalitions as well as the common frames of meaning upon which the Yasuní-ITT campaign was based. The contested constructions of meaning over time are traced through documentary research (May, 2001, p ).The documents selected are analyzed through qualitative content analysis. This method considers the social context of production of the document as well as the author s intentions in addressing an audience. In this sense, it enables the researcher to consider not only the ways in which meaning is constructed, but also the way in which new meanings are developed and employed (May, 2001, p.193). On this basis, the frames and norms whereby meaning is constructed and/or contested are interpreted and analyzed. 3.2 Data The data used for this paper consists of a wide variety of documentary sources: official and legal documents produced by governments and intergovernmental organizations (IOs); open letters, manifestos, reports and petitions produced by NGOs; political speeches; and newspaper articles. This corpus was constituted based on the following criteria: relevance, significance and accessibility. Documents 2 are accessible through the websites of the organizations and institutions involved (see References). Annex 1 presents a complete list of the documents classified by the type of institution/organization that produced them. Primary and secondary documentary sources were analyzed in two different manners. Official/legal documents have been used to identify (codified) international and national norms and to determine the actors normative and ideational positions. Political speeches, reports, manifestos, declarations, petitions and open letters were examined to trace framing processes and shifting positions vis-à-vis existing or promoted norms. 2 Most documents are originally in Spanish. Translations to English are the author s own. 12

13 Finally, newspaper articles were used to determine the shifting contexts in which actors interacted and changed their original positions. 4. Analysis 4.1 The Yasuní-ITT Initiative, Network and Coalition The Origins of the Yasuní Network The emergence of environmental and indigenous rights networks in Ecuador followed the influx of multilateral development banks and multinational companies from the1960s onwards (Brysk, 2000, p. 90; Moog Rodrigues, 2004, ch. 6). Oil drilling in the Ecuadorian Amazon (known as Oriente) and its concomitant social and environmental impacts became one of the key issues of concern for transnational non-state actors. Located in the tropical Amazon rainforest, the Oriente is a unique reserve of both biodiversity and oil. In addition, eight different indigenous ethnic groups inhabit the region 3. Hence, the extractive activities that multinational and national oil companies carry out in the Oriente affect primarily indigenous populations and the nature. These overlapping issues guided the anti-oil transnational network that emerged in the 1980s/90s. The anti-oil transnational network initiated locally in 1989 as a broadly conceived campaign, Amazonía por la Vida (Amazon for Life), led by the Ecuadorian environmental group Acción Ecológica (Ecological Action). International NGOs such as Oxfam America, the Rainforest Action Network (RAN), and the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) as well as individual activists from abroad supported the initiative. Indigenous populations, by contrast, did not fully participate in the network. The organization of each ethnic group, as well as, regional and national indigenous confederations represented indigenous populations independently. Only the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin was directly involved through a non-officially indigenous NGO created for this purpose, the Amazon Coalition. In this sense, the network presented an environmental bias and cleaved 3 The Amazonian ethnic indigenous groups or nationalities are: Shuar, Quichua, Achuar, Huaorani (or Waorani), Siona, Secoya, Cofan and Záparas. 13

14 relations with the indigenous movement. These network cleavages (Moog Rodrigues, 2004, p ) persist to the present day (see section 4.3.3). The pinnacle of the network activity was the campaign against Texaco (now Chevron), which was launched in Texaco was mainly accused of an oil spill, which U.S. attorney, academic, and activist Judith Kimerling described as being even greater than that of Exxon Valdez in Alaska (Martin, 2011, p.42). The advocacy actions carried out by the network consisted in occupations, marches, demonstrations and media campaigns along with a lawsuit filed against Texaco in 1993 (Moog Rodrigues, 2004, p ). The campaign lasted several years and garnered significant international support. In fact, it is possible to argue that this campaign continues under a different guise particularly since the Ecuadorian government reinitiated a campaign against Chevron- Texaco in September 2013 (see section 4.3.4) The Yasuní Network and the Live Yasuní Campaign The transnational network that developed alongside the Yasuní-ITT Initiative built upon these pre-existing anti-oil networks and the Amazonía por la Vida campaign. The core nodes of the Yasuní network were national and international NGOs. The leading Ecuadorian NGO involved was, as in preceding campaigns, Acción Ecológica acting as a coordinator of the Live Yasuní campaign. Among the INGOs involved in the network were longstanding partners linked to the preceding campaign such as Oxfam America, RAN and CESR. Others were INGOs that had been active in Ecuador or the YNP specifically since the mid-1990s such as Amazon Watch, Finding Species, Save America s Forests, Oilwatch and the Pachamama Alliance. These contributed to the diffusion of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative while providing technical support and scientific information. In fact, academic circles were involved in the network through these NGOs (Martin, 2011, p ). Based on this configuration of transnational civil society actors, the longstanding Amazonía por la Vida campaign was reconceived in 2007 under the name Vive Yasuní/Live Yasuní. Thus the Yasuní became the symbol of the anti-oil movement as the campaign against Chevron-Texaco in the past. The significance of the Yasuní stemmed from its status of protected area or, more specifically, as a compound of protected areas (Annex 2). Indeed, under different schemes the Yasuní is simultaneously a UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Reserve, and a National Park. In 14

15 addition, it contains the Waorani Ethnic Reserve and the Intangible Zone. The latter is of particular importance as it overlaps the ITT field. The Intangible Zone was established as an area off limits to extractive activities in January 1999 in order to protect the last indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation 4 remaining in Ecuador, the Tagaeri and Taromenane 5 (Finer et al., 2009, p. 9). All these elements were highlighted to forge the Yasuní as a symbol of the anti-oil struggle. Nonetheless, continuing the patterns of previous campaigns, the indigenous organizations involvement with the network was intermittent and ambivalent at times. In most cases, these acted autonomously and separately as they failed to agree upon a common position (see section 4.3.3). The main indigenous peoples concerned by the prospect of drilling in the ITT field were the Waorani, the principal inhabitants of the YNP. The organization Waorani Nationality of Ecuador (NAWE; formerly OHNAE) represented the interests of this community. However, a dissident Waorani organization called Ome Gompote Kiwigimoni Huaorani Ome Yasuní (We Defend Our Huaorani Territory) emerged in parallel generating divisions within the community. In addition, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) were also involved. IOs and state actors were part of the network. The German International Cooperation (GIZ) agency was the main third-state governmental actor involved. Its participation in the policy process was critical in the elaboration of strategic and technical plans particularly in the early stages of the Initiative (Martin, 2011, p. 89). In a similar vein, the UNDP provided external support to the Initiative often in collaboration with GIZ. Most importantly, the UNDP constituted an organizational platform from which the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was internationally promoted. Nevertheless, the role of these actors is secondary in the meaning struggles that followed the termination of the Initiative. Therefore, this paper focuses on the role of one state actor, the Ecuadorian 4 Indigenous peoples in isolation are defined as indigenous peoples or segments of indigenous peoples who do not maintain or have never had regular contacts with the population outside their own group, and who tend to refuse contact with such outside persons (IWGIA-IPES, 2013, p.8). 5 The Tagaeri and Taromenane are semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers which derive from the Waorani, the main indigenous ethnicity inhabiting the Yasuní (Finer et al., 2009). 15

16 government, as it constituted a target, sponsor and arbitrator of the transnational collective action generated by the Initiative The Yasuní-ITT Initiative The Yasuní-ITT Initiative originated mainly from the environmental organizations and academic circles that joined the Yasuní campaign. Three concrete events were particularly salient in this sense. First, in 2000, the NGO Acción Ecológica published the book Ecuador Post-Petrolero with Alberto Acosta in which the viability and necessity of an oil moratorium in the Ecuadorian Amazon was expounded (Acosta et al., 2000). Second, in October 2004 a group of scientists organized the Yasuní Day Research Symposium in order to prepare a technical report entitled Scientists concerned for the Yasuní National Park. The report pointed to the global conservation significance of the YNP due to its extraordinary value in terms of its biodiversity, cultural heritage, and largely intact wilderness (SCYNP, 2004, p. 2). Third, in 2006, a forum on human rights, oil and reparation was conjointly organized by the NGOs Acción Ecológica and Oilwatch. The forum discussed and formulated alternatives to extractive activities in the Oriente (Martin, 2011, p.43). The technical, normative, and moral ideas that were produced through this type of events contributed to elaborate the proposal of an oil moratorium in the YNP. The oil moratorium proposal reached the government in 2007, when Rafael Correa was elected president of Ecuador and Alberto Acosta was appointed Minister of Energy and Mines. Shortly after the election, Acosta prepared an official proposal for an oil moratorium in the ITT field in collaboration with the leader of Acción Ecológica, Esperanza Martínez. Rafael Correa accepted the proposal in March 2007, despite the opposition of the executive president of Ecuador s national oil company (Petroecuador) (Martin, 2011, p.44). However, Correa s support was not unconditional. A caveat was added to the original project, namely, the co-responsibility of the international community. In other words, the oil moratorium would proceed only if Ecuador received a compensation for leaving the oil in the soil. This opened the possibility of drilling in the ITT field as a Plan B. The constraints on the Yasuní-ITT Initiative multiplied in the following months (Martin, 2011, p ). President Correa established June 2008 as a deadline to raise US$350 million for the project. These funds were to be collected through the selling of 16

17 carbon bonds. After several reconsiderations, the deadline was extended twice until finally the Yasuní-ITT Initiative became a permanent environmental and foreign policy in February 2009.As a result, the Yasuní-ITT UNDP Trust Fund was created in July 2010 to collect the funds. The amount of the international compensation for the nonexploitation of the ITT field was fixed in at least 50% of the income that the state would receive if it extracted the oil US$3.6 billion (UNDP, 2010a, p. 3). The total amount was expected to be collected in no more than 13 years (UNDP, 2010a, p. 13). However, three years after its inception, the fund only received around US$ 10.5 million 6 (UNDP, 2010c). This led to the liquidation of the Yasuní-ITT trust fund in August 2013 and the consequent termination of the Initiative. The Yasuní network/coalition emerged in tandem with a governmental initiative. It follows that the network included the state (or parts of it) insofar as its involvement coincided with transnational actors advocacy. In other words, it appears that the Yasuní network and coalition can be conceived as a hybrid or mixed actor formation including the state. Nevertheless, the hazards of the Initiative and its subsequent termination cast doubt on this assumption. Despite the fact that the project was directly inspired and informed by civil society, the Ecuadorian government s actions distanced it from its source. The hazards of the Yasuní-ITT initiative and especially its termination affected the patterns of interaction between the Ecuadorian government and the Yasuní network. In the next sections, these complex interactions involving norms are analyzed diachronically along two main periods, Phase A and Phase B. 4.2 Phase A: Norms and Common Frames of Meaning The Ecuadorian State as International Norm Entrepreneur The Yasuní-ITT Initiative was presented by the Ecuadorian government to the international community as a pioneering proposal for global environmental justice. The normative content of the proposal revolved around three issues: co-responsibility, post- Kyoto logic, and indigenous rights. Thus, at this stage, it is possible to conceive the Ecuadorian government as an international norm entrepreneur (Finnemore and 6 The main contributors were Italy, Spain, Luxembourg and the Regional Government of Wallonia (UNDP, 2010c). 17

18 Sikkink, 1998). The UN and the UNDP were the main organizational platforms from which the norms were promoted. The first normative objective of the proposal was to promote co-responsibility with the world in the mitigation of climate change. Ecuador would forgo 20% of its confirmed oil reserves if the international community contributed to this effort. President Rafael Correa (2007a; emphasis added) presented the case before the UN General Assembly in these terms: We are willing to make this immense sacrifice, but we demand the coresponsibility of the international community (especially developed countries, the main predators of the planet) and a minimum compensation for the environmental goods that we generate. Thus, the proposal highlighted North-South cleavages in relation to environmental issues and promoted co-responsibility as an international norm or principle through a concrete environmental governance mechanism. In so doing, it advanced a new cooperative model between developed and developing countries (UNDP, 2010, p.3). However, the co-responsibility condition was a governmental add-on to the initial proposal which originated from civil society. The Live Yasuní campaign did not include this principle as an indispensable condition for the oil moratorium in its advocacy activities. The second normative objective of the project was to establish an alternative environmental compensation logic, based on the concept of net avoided emissions (Correa, 2010). The latter was intended to compensate the generation of value in addition to merchandises (Correa, 2011). In this sense, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative appeared as a way to surpass the economic logic upon which the Kyoto Protocol was based. However, this was a contentious issue. The Live Yasuní campaign argued that conceiving non-extraction in terms of carbon emissions and environmental goods undermined the revolutionary post-extractivist character of the initial proposal (APLV, 2009; 2011). On the other hand, the government insisted in the fact that this mechanism established a new economic logic beyond Kyoto (Correa, 2010; 2011; 2012). Even though the normative rationale of the Initiative was primarily environmental, indigenous rights appeared as a normative objective as well. Indeed, another motive to leave the oil underground was to protect and support the livelihood of indigenous 18

19 peoples living in voluntary isolation 7 in the Oriente (Correa, 2011; 2012; UNDP Fact Sheet, 2010). There is no international norm specific to the rights of these vulnerable groups. However, the universal and inter-american human rights systems the ILO Convention 169, among other legal sources, provide an incipient legal framework for their protection (OAS, 2013, p.14-26). The non-exploitation of the ITT field, which overlaps the Tagaeri-Taromenane Intangible Zone, would have established an international precedent in the protection of indigenous peoples in isolation Leading by Example: the 2008 Constitution of Ecuador In 2007, Ecuador established a Constituent Assembly in order to draft a new Constitution. Occupying 74 out of 130 seats, Rafael Correa s political movement, Alianza País, dominated the constituent process. Among its members were key figures of the Yasuní-ITT initial proposal. Alberto Acosta, former Minister of Energy and Mines, presided over the Constituent Assembly from November 2007 until June 2008 and served as a representative at the development committee throughout. Acosta s assistant at the committee was the leader of Acción Ecológica, Esperanza Martínez (APLV, 2010). Not surprisingly, the 2008 Constitution adopted a number of principles and norms that the Ecuadorian government promoted internationally through the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. Three are especially relevant: the buen vivir (good life) principle, the rights of nature and the rights of indigenous peoples in isolation. First, the concept of buen vivir, or sumak kawsay in Kichwa, appears as a guiding principle in the Constitution. This concept refers to notions of inclusion, equity and harmony between the nature and humankind (Constitution, 2008, VII). It is inspired by indigenous thought or cosmovisión and embodies an alternative approach to economicbased development as it seeks to establish a peaceful coexistence and harmonious relations with the Pacha Mama (mother nature) (Constitution, 2008, Preamble). In sum, the principle of buen vivir embodies the holistic idea of post-extractivism upon which the anti-oil movement is based. Second, the Constitution established an unprecedented legal framework for environmental justice instituting the rights of nature (Consitution, 2008, ch. 7). Under this scheme, nature is entitled to rights including its preservation and restoration. Article 7 Indigenous peoples in isolation are defined as indigenous peoples or segments of indigenous peoples who do not maintain or have never had regular contacts with the population outside their own group, and who tend to refuse contact with such outside persons (IWGIA-IPES, 2013, p.8). 19

20 73 is particularly relevant for the Yasuní-ITT as it stipulates precautionary and restrictive measures for any activity that could affect the environment. In essence, these provisions limit the possibility of extractive activities, thereby addressing the issue of oil extraction in the Oriente. Third, the Constitution extends indigenous rights to populations in voluntary isolation. Article 57 forbids extractive activities in the areas inhabited by these groups. Furthermore, it indicates that any violation of their rights will be considered as ethnocide. These provisions applied to the ITT field as it overlaps the Intangible Zone. All these principles and norms that were promoted internationally through the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, and adopted domestically through the Constitution of 2008, appear as cornerstones of the framing processes underlying the Yasuní campaign(s) Buen Vivir as Master Frame The Yasuní-ITT Initiative materialized the buen vivir principle insofar as it promoted an alternative to extractivism and economic growth-oriented development. Network actors and government representatives referred to this principle constantly to justify their positions and contest opposing arguments. Thus the concept of buen vivir provided a common frame of meaning for the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. As a shared ideal, buen vivir encompassed the principles and goals that founded and guided the Yasuní coalition and the Ecuadorian government. It is possible, then, to conceptualize buen vivir as a master frame insofar as it provides an overarching interpretative frame for the Yasuní-ITT intitiative. The government s framing of the proposal referred to buen vivir as an underlying principle. Indeed, in the international presentation of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, president Correa (2007) put forth buen vivir as an alternative to current international development agendas, in particular the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs): the MDGs suffer from a vision of development that is attached to consumption criteria and a strategy that is linked to the process of economic liberalization. Our vision of development is very different: we conceive development as the accomplishment of the good life (buen vivir) of everyone, in peace and harmony with nature and the indefinite prolongation of human cultures. On this account, the Initiative appeared as a project that materialized this alternative conception of development and social life. It was based on harmonious relations with 20

21 nature and the cultural survival of indigenous groups (Correa, 2011; 2012). Thus the buen vivir master frame subsumes and includes environmental justice and indigenous rights. In a similar vein, the principle of buen vivir constituted the ethical underpinning of the Yasuní coalition. Its holistic nature substantiated the Yasuní-ITT Initiative as a comprehensive mechanism towards a post-extractivist transition (APLV, 2011). In other words, the good life is the underlying principle in the idea of a post-extractivist society, and the Initiative a first step towards it. The Live Yasuní campaign refers to it constantly; albeit often to question governmental decisions (APLV, 2010; 2011; 2013a). Similarly, the national indigenous confederation resorted to the principle in its declarations (CONAIE, 2013). In sum, the Yasuní coalition framed the Initiative in terms of post-extractivism understood as buen vivir Indigenous and Environmental Frames (De)Alignments Beyond the buen vivir master frame, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was framed in terms of environmental justice and indigenous rights. The Yasuní coalition and the Ecuadorian government presented these as core issues from the initial conception of the project until its termination. Thus the articulation of the Yasuní-ITT campaign resulted from a frame bridging process insofar as it linked an environmental justice frame with an indigenous rights frame. However, this frame bridging was imperfect as the environmental frame was dominant from the outset. On the one hand, the rationale of the Initiative was presented as being primarily environmental. On the other hand, the Yasuní network did not fully integrate indigenous organizations. Yet, despite these limitations, the proposal mobilized adherents in defense of the rights of nature and indigenous peoples. The Ecuadorian government and the Yasuní coalition converged in this respect; albeit only in a precarious way. The principle of co-responsibility was a point of contention. The co-responsibility caveat qualified the environmental-indigenous framing of the proposal in two critical ways. Firstly, it introduced a distinction between environmental justice as non-exploitation and environmental justice as co-responsibility. Secondly, it implied the dispensability of the rights of indigenous peoples in isolation. Indeed, by opening up the possibility of drilling in the ITT field as a Plan B, the Ecuadorian government denied the intrinsic value of non-exploitation. In the official discourse, leaving the oil in the soil was a sacrifice (Correa, 2007), since the income that 21

22 Ecuador would forgo could be used to alleviate poverty (Correa, 2010; 2012). Therefore, in the absence of an international compensation, non-exploitation was not viable. By contrast, according to the Yasuní network, keeping the oil in the soil was not only viable but also necessary with or without international compensation in order to preserve protected areas and those who inhabit them (Acosta et al., 2000; Oilwatch, 2007; Yasunidos, 2013). These discrepancies marked the interactions between the Yasuní coalition and the Ecuadorian government in the course of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. The coalition mobilized in support of the rights of nature and indigenous peoples (and coresponsibility), whereas the government campaigned for co-responsibility (the rights of nature and indigenous peoples). The bracketed frames were (quasi-)dispensable commitments for each side. The government insisted in the fact that environmental protection is only sustainable if it improves the living standards of the population (Correa, 2010) and it underestimated the issue of indigenous peoples in isolation 8 (Correa, 2011). On the other hand, the Live Yasuní campaign instigated the government to clearly and categorically state that the main purpose of the Initiative was the nonexploitation of the ITT field (APLV, 2011) and to incorporate other oil fields to the Initiative (APLV, 2009). These frame de-alignments increased as the fund-raising campaign stagnated and the Plan B loomed. 4.3 Phase B: Norms and Divergent Frames of Meaning Terminating the Yasuní-ITT Initiative: Who is (Co-)Responsible? On 15August 2013, president Correa announced the termination of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative. In the government s view, the Initiative had failed. The financial compensation for the oil moratorium did not remotely attain the anticipated US$ 3.6 billion. Since July 2010, the UNDP Trust Fund received only 0,37% of the total amount expected (Correa, 2013). In other words, the co-responsibility condition was unfulfilled. Consequently, the government did not assume responsibility for the Initiative s failure. Correa mentioned a number of factors that hindered the realization of the project such as an unfavorable global context of economic crisis and the unprecedented character of the 8 Following a precautionary measure granted to the Tagaeri-Taromenane by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, president Correa (2011) commented ironically: we cut a small tree 200 km away from where the Tagaeri and Taromenane transit and we are [accused of] causing genocide. 22

23 Initiative; however, the failure of the Initiative was attributed to the international community. [T]he world has failed us, claimed the Ecuadorian president (2013). Furthermore, Correa denounced the world as a great hypocrisy, where the logic that prevails is not that of justice, but the logic of power. Following this argument the Plan B was adopted. The hitherto untapped ITT field was now open to exploitation. This decision and its underpinning arguments confirmed the government s attachment to international compensation as an indispensable condition for keeping the oil underground. In the government s framing of the issue, the normative and moral rationale of the Initiative appeared primarily as one of environmental justice conceived in terms of mutual and differentiated responsibility along North-South cleavages. Therefore, the decision to end the proposal was not only consistent with the government s co-responsibility caveat, but it also reflected the government s normative position vis-à-vis the oil moratorium. In contrast, the Live Yasuní campaign imputed the Initiative s failure to the Ecuadorian government. In an open letter addressed to the National Assembly on 14 August (APLV, 2013b), the members of the campaign made the following statement: [I]f the initiative did not receive the expected funds, it is the exclusive responsibility of the government as it could not avoid the publicization of the Plan B and its progress and it did not achieve a coherent response. But this does not authorize the government to exploit the oil in the Park. Thus Live Yasuní pointed to inconsistencies and errors in the governmental promotion of the Initiative as the main cause for its failure. In other words, the international community was not to blame. The governmental promotion of the co-responsibility norm failed and not the norm itself. Furthermore, the campaign s letter asserts that failing to raise sufficient funds is not a reason to drill in the ITT field. This is consistent with the Yasuní coalition s environmental justice frame. Indeed, the co-responsibility proviso never appeared as an indispensable condition in the coalition s conception of the issue. Leaving the oil in the soil was an end in itself The Pollution of Oil vs. the Pollution of Poverty You don t like oil. I assure you that I don t like it either, but we should all dislike poverty even more (Correa, 2013). In these terms, the Ecuadorian president justified the decision to drill in the ITT field. As a result, the Yasuní-ITT Initiative was reframed. 23

24 The environmental justice frame was incorporated into a broader social justice frame by bridging environmental conservation and poverty. This association that portrays poverty as an environmental threat is referred to as the pollution of poverty (Dauvergne, 2005). It has been present in the discourse of developing nations since the first international conferences on global environmental governance 9. The Ecuadorian government resorted to this social justice frame in order to justify the adoption of Plan B. In the official discourse, Ecuador needed the oil revenue to fight poverty and finance development programs, but at what environmental cost? The governmental response to the issue of environmental impacts consisted in avoiding a tragic choice between nature and oil. Indeed, Correa (2013) contended that the choice to make is not between petroleum and Yasuní, but rather: 100% of Yasuní and no resources to satisfy the urgent necessities of our people; or, 99,9% of Yasuní intact and nearly US$ millions to overcome misery, especially in the Amazon, paradoxically the region with the higher incidence of poverty. Thus the governmental reframing of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative consisted in minimizing the issue of environmental impacts and in highlighting poverty alleviation as a moral imperative. The government guaranteed that only a minimum area of the YNP would be affected and that the extractive activities would be carried out with social and environmental responsibility. Part of the argument was that Petroamazonas, a subsidiary of the national oil company and not a multinational oil company, would undertake the operations. Once the dilemma was established in these terms, opting for Plan B appeared as a reasonable or even logical decision. Any other option was discarded. Hence Correa (2013; emphasis added) denounced radical conservationism as morally untenable, stating that [t]he greatest violation of human rights is misery and the biggest mistake is to subordinate those human rights to the alleged rights of nature. At the same time, the Ecuadorian president argued that social justice contributed to environmental justice since poverty also affects the Pacha Mama (Correa, 2013). On these grounds, the Ecuadorian president affirmed that the Plan B did not hinder, but, on the contrary, 9 The phrase pollution of poverty appeared for the first time in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on human environment (Dauvergne, 2005, p. 376). 24

25 promoted the governmental plan of buen vivir. Thus the master frame on which the Yasuní-ITT campaign was founded was reformulated. The government s presentation of the Plan B as social justice and buen vivir did not convince the main actors of the Yasuní network. A number of (I)NGOs opposed the government s social justice via oil exploitation argument proposing instead social justice via redistribution (CONAIE, 2003; CESR, 2013; Yasunidos; 2013). This proposal was formally presented by CESR (2013) in an article entitled Plan C: Wealth Redistribution to Avoid Exploitation in the Yasuní and safeguard Indigenous Peoples in Isolation. Thus the government s argumentation was conterframed by civil society actors in the Yasuní network. At the same time, network members remained faithful to the initial framing of the Initiative linking environmental justice and indigenous rights. Live Yasuní, for instance, questioned the possibility of exploiting oil with minimum environmental impacts (APLV, 2013b). In parallel, the issue of indigenous rights gave rise to another counterframing dispute Now You see Them, Now You don t: the Tagaeri-Taromenane Affair In the speech announcing the official termination of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative, the Tagaeri and Taromenane are not mentioned at all. There is only one single reference to indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in general and it is linked to the poverty discourse: Our ancestral peoples and ethnic minorities live in poverty and some intend to maintain them in that situation in the name of the preservation of their cultures, as if misery, the biggest insult to human dignity, was part of the folklore (Correa, 2013). The critique of the preservation of cultures is the only allusion to the issue of indigenous peoples. Following the social justice frame, the poverty frame is stressed and counterposed to collective/cultural rights. On this basis, one of the normative objectives of the initiative, to support the livelihood of indigenous peoples in isolation, is neglected. The government bridged environmental justice and social justice frames, but, at the same time, it removed the bridge that joined the former to indigenous rights. As a result, indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation disappeared from the official discourse. The Tagaeri and Taromenane were obliterated. 25

26 The Yasuní coalition reacted to this seemingly deliberate omission by amplifying the indigenous rights frame. In an open letter to the National Assembly, Live Yasuní asked how the life of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation would be protected (APLV, 2013b). Oilwatch (2013) claimed that the rights of indigenous peoples in isolation were being denied. CONAIE and Yasunidos cited Article 57 of the Constitution to defend the rights of the Tagaeri-Taromenane (CONAIE, 2013; Yasunidos Maifesto). In the same vein, academic circles linked to the network criticized and condemned the government s omission. The Critical Geography Collective and the Collective of Anthropologists of Ecuador (CGC, 2013) denounced the myth of the Amazon as a demographic void and accused the government for altering official maps in order to present the ITT field as uninhabited. Furthermore, these scholars stated that the Plan B entailed a high risk of ethnocide (CGC, 2013). Rather surprisingly, the main Waorani organization, NAWE, did not contest the government s position. Despite the fact that CONAIE opposed the government s decision to exploit the ITT field, NAWE supported the Plan B (El Telégrafo, 2013). NAWE s support confirmed its historical incapacity to represent the interests of the Waorani (Ziegler-Otero, 2004). By contrast, this decision was not backed by the dissident Waorani organization, Ome Yasuní (2014). However, as a continuator of ONAHE, NAWE was the main interlocutor between the Waorani and the government. This reflects the distance that a number of indigenous organizations maintained vis-àvis the Yasuní network/coalition Epilogue: The Dirty Hand of Chevron and Yasunidos On 17 September 2013, the Ecuadorian government launched a campaign called The Dirty Hand of Chevron (Hoy, 2013). The aim of the campaign was to publicly denounce the pollution caused by Chevron-Texaco in the Oriente. As mentioned in section 4.1.1, the Chevron-Texaco case was a pinnacle of the 1990s anti-oil movement and it involved indigenous peoples and the environment. In this sense, the launch of the Dirty Hand of Chevron campaign only a couple of months after the termination of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative appears as an attempt by the government to restore its normative and morale position, by reaffirming its commitment to environmental protection and indigenous rights. However, this did not convince the key actors of the Yasuní network as they did not join the campaign and mobilized in opposition to the government. 26

27 In the wake of Plan B, the Yasuní network was reconfigured and the campaign transformed. The core nodes of the network supported, collaborated with, or joined Yasunidos, a social movement that emerged following the annunciation of the termination of the Initiative. The main proposal of Yasunidos (2013) was to hold a popular consultation 10 on the exploitation of Yasuní. The movement referred to this as the Option C. The key (I)NGOs that supported Yasunidos and/or the Option C were Acción Ecológica, CONAIE, Amazon Watch, Oilwatch and the Pachamama Alliance. The Ecuadorian NGO Amazon Coalition did not join Yasunidos and collected signatures separately (El Comercio, 2014a). In the end, the only group that actually presented a petition to the National Electoral Council was Yasunidos. The political confrontation between the state and the movement increased when the petition for a popular consultation was rejected on the grounds that a critical number of signatures were not valid (El Comercio, 2014b). Yasunidos contested this decision and mobilized through various forms of protest that provoked violent confrontations with the police (Yasunidos, 2014). Furthermore, on 14 August 2014, the movement held a symbolic tribunal on the rights of nature and accused the Ecuadorian government of the violation of: the rights of nature, the rights of peoples in voluntary isolation, rights to effective judicial protection and legal certainty, and the rights of political participation (Yasunidos, 2014). These accusations were based on codified principles and norms enshrined in the Ecuadorian Constitution. Thus, in essence the contestation of Plan B was based on the norms and frames that underpinned the government-sponsored Yasuní-ITT Initiative. 5. Conclusion The Yasuní-ITT Initiative presents a case of a transnational network/coalition that emerges in tandem with the state, but opposes it after the termination of the project. Based on this case study, this paper traced the struggles over meaning underlying complex interactions in the course of the Initiative and its subsequent termination. Using transnational collective action as an analytical framework, it focused on framing processes involving (international) norms. These complex interactions were grasped 10 Under the Constitution of 2008, ordinary citizens have the right to solicit a national popular consultation on any issue (Art. 104). 27

28 diachronically establishing the termination of the Initiative as a turning point between Phase A and Phase B. This paper finds that the common frames of meaning underlying the Yasuní-ITT campaign were precarious from the outset, i.e. Phase A (section 4.2). The state and different network actors had varying conceptions of and degrees of commitment to principles, norms and frames. However, these precarious or superficial common frames of meaning sufficed to generate a transnational coalition involving the state as international norm entrepreneur. Following the termination of the Initiative, i.e. Phase B, these unstable frames of meaning were reformulated through frame realignments by the Ecuadorian government and these, in turn, were counterframed by non-state actors (section 4.3). In this process the interactional dynamics between the state and non-state actors in the Yasuní network were substantially altered. In Phase A interactions were predominantly collaborative or competitive, whereas in Phase B these were predominantly conflictive. As a consequence, the position of the state vis-à-vis pro-yasuní civil society actors changed dramatically. In Phase A the state appeared as an international norm entrepreneur and a promoter of norms domestically. By contrast, in Phase B the state was accused of breaking these very norms (i.e. rights of nature and indigenous rights). In other words, at the outset, the state appeared as an ally; in the end, it became an adversary. In sum, the Yasuní-ITT case study casts light on the interactions between state and nonstate actors involved in transnational collective action. The study examines how the underlying normative and ideational dynamics of interaction between state and nonstate actors affect transnational collective action over time. On this basis, this paper finds that the common frames of meaning underlying the Yasuní-ITT campaign were formulated on a precarious or superficial normative/ideational basis and reformulated through divergent or conflictive framing processes following its termination. Thus the analysis confirms the importance of struggles over meaning in transnational contentious politics and points to the necessity of distinguishing the state from civil society actors in hybrid or mixed networks/coalitions. However, the findings of this study are limited by the foci and scope of the analysis. This paper focused on the interactions between the state and non-state actors within a 28

29 transnational network/coalition. Therefore, the role of other actors involved in the Yasuní-ITT Initiative and its termination, especially oil companies, was not considered. A thorough account of the dynamics underlying the Yasuní-ITT project would require integrating these other actors into the analysis. At the same time, this study traced only general patterns of interactions among key actors. A methodical analysis of these would require additional data beyond the documentary sources collected for this paper. Lastly, as it reflects only a single case study, the implications of this analysis cannot be generalized. Therefore, it would be analytically useful to integrate this case study into a comparative analysis in order to generate theoretical generalizations. 29

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36 Appendix 1 Documentary sources classified by type of organization/institution. Organization/Institution Documents Government Official/Legal Constitution of Ecuador 2008 Speeches Correa 2007 Correa 2010 Correa 2011 Correa 2012 Correa 2013 IOs Official UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples UNDP 2010 UNDP 2010b Reports OAS 2013 NGOs Reports Oilwatch 2007 CESR 2013 IWGIA 2013 Manifestos / Declarations Yasunidos 2013 Yasunidos 2014 SCFY 2004 Waorani Proposal Colectivo Geografía Crítica 2013 CONAIE 2013 Open Letters / Petitions APLV 2009 APLV 2010 APLV 2011 APLV 2013a APLV 2013b Ome Yasuní 2014 Oilwatch

37 Appendix 2 Yasuní s Protected Areas and Oil Blocks (ITT and 31) Source: Oilwatch,