Can information that raises voter expectations improve accountability?
|
|
- Lily Beasley
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Can information that raises voter expectations improve accountability? A field experiment in Mali Jessica Gottlieb Stanford University, Political Science May 8, 2012
2 Overview Motivation: Preliminary studies showed voters uncertain about more than just previous government performance Question: Does voter uncertainty about what their governments can and should do undermine democratic accountability? Strategy: Field experiment manipulates this type of information and explores effects on political behaviors Findings: Increased performance-based voting in hypothetical simulations, increased likelihood of openly challenging leadership, and decreased transparency of leaders
3 Overview Motivation: Preliminary studies showed voters uncertain about more than just previous government performance Question: Does voter uncertainty about what their governments can and should do undermine democratic accountability? Strategy: Field experiment manipulates this type of information and explores effects on political behaviors Findings: Increased performance-based voting in hypothetical simulations, increased likelihood of openly challenging leadership, and decreased transparency of leaders
4 Overview Motivation: Preliminary studies showed voters uncertain about more than just previous government performance Question: Does voter uncertainty about what their governments can and should do undermine democratic accountability? Strategy: Field experiment manipulates this type of information and explores effects on political behaviors Findings: Increased performance-based voting in hypothetical simulations, increased likelihood of openly challenging leadership, and decreased transparency of leaders
5 Overview Motivation: Preliminary studies showed voters uncertain about more than just previous government performance Question: Does voter uncertainty about what their governments can and should do undermine democratic accountability? Strategy: Field experiment manipulates this type of information and explores effects on political behaviors Findings: Increased performance-based voting in hypothetical simulations, increased likelihood of openly challenging leadership, and decreased transparency of leaders
6 Effects of information asymmetries on accountability Theory explains link between information asymmetries and democratic failure (Lipset 1959; Almond & Verba 1963; Ferejohn 1986; Besley 2006) Relative consensus among non-experimental studies that access to information reduces corruption, increases responsiveness of government (Brunetti & Weder 2003; Ahrend 2002; Besley & Burgess 2002) Experimental studies generate mixed results (Chong et al 2012; Banerjee et al 2010; de Figueiredo et al 2011)
7 Missing piece: low voter expectations If voters underestimate the value of government, they will care less about government performance than they should Performance information vs. relative performance information Argument Information that raises voter expectations of what government can and should do will make performance-based voting more likely, thereby improving accountability.
8 Missing piece: low voter expectations If voters underestimate the value of government, they will care less about government performance than they should Performance information vs. relative performance information Argument Information that raises voter expectations of what government can and should do will make performance-based voting more likely, thereby improving accountability.
9 Context: Mali s troubled democracy Good example of state with robust democratic institutions and weak accountability - Democratic since 1992, often hailed as beacon of West African democracy (with exception of recent 3-week coup) - Still one of the poorest countries in the world; Malians twice as poor and half as literate as average sub-saharan African - Anecdotal evidence of poor governance: corruption, nepotism, poor public service provision Conducive to within-country study - In 1996, decentralization reform created 703 communes with elected councils controlling budget for local public goods Generalizability issues - Highly rural 80% of population - No systematic civic education
10 Linking information and expectations Evidence of low voter expectations in Mali: Afrobarometer shows a majority thinks the national rather than local government is responsible for local public goods Half of people in my survey incorrectly believed the local government couldn t afford small public goods projects Two types of information can raise voter expectations: 1 information about what governments should do, or are legally responsible for doing 2 information about what governments can do, or what resources they have at their disposal
11 Linking information and expectations Evidence of low voter expectations in Mali: Afrobarometer shows a majority thinks the national rather than local government is responsible for local public goods Half of people in my survey incorrectly believed the local government couldn t afford small public goods projects Two types of information can raise voter expectations: 1 information about what governments should do, or are legally responsible for doing 2 information about what governments can do, or what resources they have at their disposal
12 Overview of research design Among 95 communes in Mali, randomly assigned a 2-part civics course (31 control communes) - All rural communes across 5 districts in Mali - Stratified by incumbency, poverty, and geographic location 2 treatment variations: 1 In 32 communes, provided information about local government capacity and basics of democracy/decentralization 2 In 32 communes, provided the same plus information about relative government performance Evaluation strategy: - Household surveys - Town hall meetings - Chief and leader surveys
13
14 The intervention 2-part course in which T1 receives only first component and T2 receives both: 1 Component 1: expectations of local government - Responsibilities of local government to provide public goods - Annual budget of a rural commune with examples of line items - Basics of democratic accountability 2 Component 2: relative government performance - Regularity of town meetings - Concentration of public goods financed in the commune seat - Number of projects financed by the commune in each village - Rates of tax recovery Policy motivation for separating components in this way
15 The intervention 2-part course in which T1 receives only first component and T2 receives both: 1 Component 1: expectations of local government - Responsibilities of local government to provide public goods - Annual budget of a rural commune with examples of line items - Basics of democratic accountability 2 Component 2: relative government performance - Regularity of town meetings - Concentration of public goods financed in the commune seat - Number of projects financed by the commune in each village - Rates of tax recovery Policy motivation for separating components in this way
16 Motivation Research design Theory Data analysis Conclusion
17 Formalizing a new type of uncertainty A representative voter is uncertain about whether or not the politician has a budget for a public good in the village; the politician knows whether the funds are available. The voter can either condition re-election on gifts or on gifts and public goods. If the probability of there being a budget for public goods is low, or if the voter thinks it is low, then the politician gets sanctioned even when he is acting responsibly. This makes it more attractive for the incumbent to shirk, leaving the voter with nothing including gifts. Comparative static The more uncertain a voter is about whether the government has a budget for public goods in their village, the less likely they are to ever condition their vote on the provision of public goods.
18 Hypotheses H1 Increasing voter information about potential government performance will increase the cut point at which poor-performing candidates are sanctioned. H2 Increasing voter information about potential government performance will increase the likelihood of voting along the performance dimension. H3 The more public the information signal, the greater the treatment effect on voter behavior.
19 Econometric specification for survey data Average treatment effects account for blocked randomization: ATE ˆ j = 1 N N (y Tj i y Ci ) where i is the block assigned to each commune in randomization, N is the total number of blocks (31 or 32), y Ci is the average outcome in the control group in block i, and y Tj i is the average outcome in treatment group j in block i. i=1 When comparing T to C, y Tj i = y T 1 i +y T2 i 2.
20 H1: Poor-performing candidates sanctioned more often
21 H2: Increased likelihood of performance-based voting Mean vote share for Candidate A Control T1 T2 Baseline Kin Chief support First differences Control T1 T2 Difference (Kin - Baseline) 0.132*** 0.090** * (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) Difference (Chief - Baseline) 0.088** (0.039) (0.036) (0.044) Difference-in-differences T1 - C T2 - C T2 - T1 Kin condition *** *** (0.053) (0.055) (0.051) Chief condition ** ** (0.051) (0.057) -(0.053)
22
23 Impact on behavior: challenges to leadership at town halls Mean number of challenges by group Control T1 T2 Challenges N Mean differences Difference p value (2-sided) exact p T1 - C T2 - C T - C Example challenge from a woman in a treated village Since decentralization the village of Gombala has paid their taxes at 100%, but they have never received any investment from the commune. What is the reason for this?
24 Mechanism I: Raised expectations Mean effects analysis: index of respondent expectations Variable Coefficient M1 M2 M3 T * 0.087** (0.036) (0.028) (0.041) T * 0.104** (0.036) (0.028) (0.043) Majority party (0.066) Majority party x T ** (0.084) Majority party x T *** (0.082) Intercept (0.026) (0.111) (0.029) N 31 5, Controls N Y N
25 Mechanism II: Coordination Mean squared error around true vote share for Candidate A Baseline Kin Chief Control mean T1 (ATE) (0.020) (0.013) (0.016) T2 (ATE) ** (0.019) (0.011) (0.015) N
26 Differential effects H3 Treatment effects are stronger when a majority of villages in the commune are treated. Treatment effects are stronger the lower is baseline civic knowledge (measured by outlying villages vs. commune seat). Treatment effects are stronger in more politically competitive villages, providing support for complementary relationship between information and political competition.
27 What kind of information works? T1 and T2 have effects in the same direction, but effects of T2 are generally stronger and more significant: No significant difference between T1 and T2 in level of knowledge/expectations, even among participants T2 has bigger/stronger effect in voting simulations, on ability to coordinate One interpretation: an additive effect of information Information about government capacity (T1) works to raise expectations, but is not sufficient to induce changes in behavior. For that to occur, information about government performance (T2) is required.
28 Cautionary tale: Incumbent response Survey administered to councilmember in 95 sample communes finds suggestive evidence of a decrease in transparency of elected officials 1 A list experiment finds there is a nearly significant decrease in the proclivity of councilmembers to say they will campaign on transparency in the next election. 2 The number of public meetings held in the few months between the intervention and the survey decreases from an average of about 7 in the control group to about 4 in the treated groups.
29 Take-away Even with a very small-scale, brief treatment, we observe effects of information that raises voter expecations on both citizen behavior and on how voters make decisions in hypothetical situations. But there may also be an adverse effect on behavior of elected officials, at least in short run.
Publicizing malfeasance:
Publicizing malfeasance: When media facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico Horacio Larreguy, John Marshall and James Snyder Harvard University May 1, 2015 Introduction Elections are key for political
More informationEvidence from Randomized Evaluations of Governance Programs. Cristobal Marshall
Evidence from Randomized Evaluations of Governance Programs Cristobal Marshall Policy Manager, J-PAL December 15, 2011 Today s Agenda A new evidence based agenda on Governance. A framework for analyzing
More informationWhen Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Experimental Evidence from Brazil Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo UC Berkeley F. Daniel Hidalgo MIT Yuri Kasahara University of Oslo CEGA Research Retreat UC Berkeley November 4, 2012 Project Overview Research
More informationEthnic Diversity and Perceptions of Government Performance
Ethnic Diversity and Perceptions of Government Performance PRELIMINARY WORK - PLEASE DO NOT CITE Ken Jackson August 8, 2012 Abstract Governing a diverse community is a difficult task, often made more difficult
More informationWho, Where and When?
Purpose A comparative series of national public attitude surveys in Africa on Democracy, Markets and Civil Society Social scientific project dedicated to accurate and precise measurement of nationally
More informationSIERRA LEONE 2012 ELECTIONS PROJECT PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INTERVENTIONS
SIERRA LEONE 2012 ELECTIONS PROJECT PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL INTERVENTIONS PIs: Kelly Bidwell (IPA), Katherine Casey (Stanford GSB) and Rachel Glennerster (JPAL MIT) THIS DRAFT: 15 August 2013
More informationElectoral Rules and Public Goods Outcomes in Brazilian Municipalities
Electoral Rules and Public Goods Outcomes in Brazilian Municipalities This paper investigates the ways in which plurality and majority systems impact the provision of public goods using a regression discontinuity
More informationDecentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes
Decentralized Despotism: How Indirect Colonial Rule Undermines Contemporary Democratic Attitudes Evidence from Namibia Marie Lechler 1 Lachlan McNamee 2 1 University of Munich 2 Stanford University June
More informationRESEARCH BRIEF 1. Poverty Outreach in Fee-for-Service Savings Groups. Author: Michael Ferguson, Ph.D., Research & Evaluation Coordinator
Updated August 2012 INNOVATIONS RESEARCH BRIEF 1 Poverty Outreach in Fee-for-Service Savings Groups Author: Michael Ferguson, Ph.D., Research & Evaluation Coordinator Project Background & the PSP model
More informationDfID SDG16 Event 9 December Macartan Humphreys
DfID SDG16 Event 9 December 2015 Macartan Humphreys Experimental Research The big idea: Understanding social processes is very often rendered difficult or impossible because of confounding. For example,
More informationWomen as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India Chattopadhayay and Duflo (Econometrica 2004) Presented by Nicolas Guida Johnson and Ngoc Nguyen Nov 8, 2018 Introduction Research
More informationThe role of Social Cultural and Political Factors in explaining Perceived Responsiveness of Representatives in Local Government.
The role of Social Cultural and Political Factors in explaining Perceived Responsiveness of Representatives in Local Government. Master Onderzoek 2012-2013 Family Name: Jelluma Given Name: Rinse Cornelis
More informationEfficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics Evidence from India
Efficiency Consequences of Affirmative Action in Politics Evidence from India Sabyasachi Das, Ashoka University Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay, ISI Delhi* Rajas Saroy, ISI Delhi Affirmative Action 0 Motivation
More informationVermonters Awareness of and Attitudes Toward Sprawl Development in 2002
Vermonters Awareness of and Attitudes Toward Sprawl Development in 2002 Written by Thomas P. DeSisto, Data Research Specialist Introduction In recent years sprawl has been viewed by a number of Vermont
More informationIncumbency as a Source of Spillover Effects in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design.
Incumbency as a Source of Spillover Effects in Mixed Electoral Systems: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design Forthcoming, Electoral Studies Web Supplement Jens Hainmueller Holger Lutz Kern September
More informationEgypt s Administrative Corruption Perception Index February 2018
Egypt s Administrative Corruption Perception Index 2016 February 2018 Egypt s Administrative Corruption Perception Index Definition of Administrative Corruption The term of administration corruption is
More informationPolicy Deliberation and Electoral Returns: Evidence from Benin and the Philippines. Léonard Wantchékon, Princeton University 5 November 2015
Policy Deliberation and Electoral Returns: Evidence from Benin and the Philippines Léonard Wantchékon, Princeton University 5 November 2015 Two decades of sustained economic growth in Africa But growth
More informationWP 2015: 9. Education and electoral participation: Reported versus actual voting behaviour. Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig VOTE
WP 2015: 9 Reported versus actual voting behaviour Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig VOTE Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) is an independent, non-profit research institution and a major international centre in
More informationDoes Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia
Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia Rema Hanna, Harvard Kennedy School Joint with: Vivi Alatas, World Bank; Abhijit Banerjee, MIT ; Benjamin A. Olken, MIT
More informationTen Things That May Control Corruption
Ten Things That May Control Corruption None of the initiatives below work all the time. An important research agenda concerns identifying the conditions under which any single item is more or less effective.
More informationCharacteristics of migrants in Nairobi s informal settlements
Introduction Characteristics of migrants in Nairobi s informal settlements Rural-urban migration continues to play an important role in the urbanization process in many countries in sub-saharan Africa
More informationInsiders and Outsiders: Local Ethnic Politics and Public Goods Provision
Insiders and Outsiders: Local Ethnic Politics and Public Goods Provision Kaivan Munshi University of Cambridge Mark R. Rosenzweig Yale University The under-supply of public goods is a hallmark of underdevelopment.
More informationAppendix for Citizen Preferences and Public Goods: Comparing. Preferences for Foreign Aid and Government Programs in Uganda
Appendix for Citizen Preferences and Public Goods: Comparing Preferences for Foreign Aid and Government Programs in Uganda Helen V. Milner, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael G. Findley Contents Appendix for
More informationExpertise and Efficacy in Elite Political Decision Making
Expertise and Efficacy in Elite Political Decision Making Peter John Loewen Lior Sheffer Stuart Soroka Stefaan Walgrave Tamir Shaefer October 6, 2014 Democracy assumes the delegation of decision making
More informationExposing Corrupt Politicians:
Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effect of Brazil s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes Claudio Ferraz University of California, Berkeley and IPEA Frederico Finan University of California,
More informationJob approval in North Carolina N=770 / +/-3.53%
Elon University Poll of North Carolina residents April 5-9, 2013 Executive Summary and Demographic Crosstabs McCrory Obama Hagan Burr General Assembly Congress Job approval in North Carolina N=770 / +/-3.53%
More informationInternational Remittances and Brain Drain in Ghana
Journal of Economics and Political Economy www.kspjournals.org Volume 3 June 2016 Issue 2 International Remittances and Brain Drain in Ghana By Isaac DADSON aa & Ryuta RAY KATO ab Abstract. This paper
More informationAppendix for: The Electoral Implications. of Coalition Policy-Making
Appendix for: The Electoral Implications of Coalition Policy-Making David Fortunato Texas A&M University fortunato@tamu.edu 1 A1: Cabinets evaluated by respondents in sample surveys Table 1: Cabinets included
More informationPolitical Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity
Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity James Habyarimana 1 Stuti Khemani 2 Thiago Scot 3 June 25, 2018 1 Georgetown 2 World Bank 3 UC Berkeley 1 Motivation: understanding local state capacity
More information6Political Participation
6Political Participation The economic transformations that over the past decade have changed the dynamic of international trade and development are matched by a global movement toward democratic government.
More informationCITIZEN ADVOCACY CENTER. Congressional Redistricting What is redistricting and why does it matter? A Moderated Discussion
CITIZEN ADVOCACY CENTER Congressional Redistricting What is redistricting and why does it matter? A Moderated Discussion LESSON PLAN AND ACTIVITIES All rights reserved. No part of this lesson plan may
More informationPolicy Deliberation and Electoral Returns: Experimental Evidence from Benin and the Philippines
Policy Deliberation and Electoral Returns: Experimental Evidence from Benin and the Philippines Leonard Wantchekon IGC Growth Week LSE Fall, 2014 Leonard Wantchekon (LSE) Policy Deliberation and Electoral
More informationImproving Government Accountability for Delivering Public Services
Improving Government Accountability for Delivering Public Services Stuti Khemani Development Research Group & Africa Region Chief Economist Office The World Bank October 5, 2013 Background and Motivation
More informationAn Experimental Impact Evaluation of Introducing Mobile Money in Rural Mozambique
An Experimental Impact Evaluation of Introducing Mobile Money in Rural Mozambique Cátia Batista Univ. Nova de Lisboa CReAM, IZA, and NOVAFRICA Pedro C. Vicente Univ. Nova de Lisboa IGC, BREAD, and NOVAFRICA
More informationIs the Internet an Effective Mechanism for Reducing Corruption Experience? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries
Is the Internet an Effective Mechanism for Reducing Corruption Experience? Evidence from a Cross-Section of Countries Jamie Bologna College of Business and Economics West Virginia University Morgantown,
More informationSupporting Information for Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment
Supporting Information for Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment Alan S. Gerber Yale University Professor Department of Political Science Institution for Social
More information8 5 Sampling Distributions
8 5 Sampling Distributions Skills we've learned 8.1 Measures of Central Tendency mean, median, mode, variance, standard deviation, expected value, box and whisker plot, interquartile range, outlier 8.2
More informationCongruence in Political Parties
Descriptive Representation of Women and Ideological Congruence in Political Parties Georgia Kernell Northwestern University gkernell@northwestern.edu June 15, 2011 Abstract This paper examines the relationship
More informationSecondary Towns and Poverty Reduction: Refocusing the Urbanization Agenda
Secondary Towns and Poverty Reduction: Refocusing the Urbanization Agenda Luc Christiaensen (World Bank) and Ravi Kanbur (Cornell University) The Quality of Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Workshop of JICA-IPD
More informationForecasting the 2018 Midterm Election using National Polls and District Information
Forecasting the 2018 Midterm Election using National Polls and District Information Joseph Bafumi, Dartmouth College Robert S. Erikson, Columbia University Christopher Wlezien, University of Texas at Austin
More informationHow Coethnicity Moderates the Effect of Information On Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Benin
How Coethnicity Moderates the Effect of Information On Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Benin Claire Adida Jessica Gottlieb Eric Kramon Gwyneth McClendon September 13, 2016 Abstract Scholars
More informationONLINE APPENDIX: DELIBERATE DISENGAGEMENT: HOW EDUCATION
ONLINE APPENDIX: DELIBERATE DISENGAGEMENT: HOW EDUCATION CAN DECREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Variable definitions 3 3 Balance checks 8 4
More information2. Participation and Governance
2. Participation and Governance The period since the mid-1970s has witnessed a significant democratization of governance structures across the globe, a fact that is often described as the third wave of
More informationSurviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory, and Post-Election Repercussions January 11, 2016
Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory, and Post-Election Repercussions January 11, 2016 Appendix A: Sub-National Turnout Estimates... 2 Appendix B: Summary Data... 9 Appendix C: Robustness
More informationPolicing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda Preliminary Analysis
Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda Preliminary Analysis Macartan Humphreys Columbia University Jeremy M. Weinstein Stanford University April 19, 2012 Abstract
More informationImproving Electoral Engagement: A Narrative on the Evidence. Tavneet Suri November 5 th 2015
Improving Electoral Engagement: A Narrative on the Evidence Tavneet Suri November 5 th 2015 Democracy Expanding Rapidly Across the World Since 1800 In Africa Governance Remains a Challenge Corruption Safety
More informationPolitical Reservation and Substantive Representation: Evidence from Indian Panchayats
Political Reservation and Substantive Representation: Evidence from Indian Panchayats Esther Duflo (based on joint work with Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova October
More informationVote-Buying and Selling
The Political Economy of Elections in Uganda: Vote-Buying and Selling Presented during The National Conference on Religion Rights and Peace convened by Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC) School of
More informationMigration, Poverty & Place in the Context of the Return Migration to the US South
Migration, Poverty & Place in the Context of the Return Migration to the US South Katherine Curtis Department of Rural Sociology Research assistance from Jack DeWaard and financial support from the UW
More informationFinancial disclosure and political selection: Evidence from India
Financial disclosure and political selection: Evidence from India Ray Fisman Boston University with Vikrant Vig (LBS) and Florian Schulz (UW) 6/26/2018 1 Holding politicians to account: asset declarations
More informationZimbabweans see corruption on the increase, feel helpless to fight it
Dispatch No. 25 5 May 2015 Zimbabweans see corruption on the increase, feel helpless to fight it Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 25 Stephen Ndoma Summary Transparency International consistently ranks Zimbabwe
More informationDo Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment
Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment Catia Batista Trinity College Dublin and IZA Pedro C. Vicente Trinity College Dublin, CSAE-Oxford and BREAD Second International
More informationCorruption in Kenya, 2005: Is NARC Fulfilling Its Campaign Promise?
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No.2 January Corruption in Kenya, 5: Is NARC Fulfilling Its Campaign Promise? Kenya s NARC government rode to victory in the 2 elections in part on the coalition s promise
More informationWhat Democracy Does (and Doesn t do) for Basic Services
What Democracy Does (and Doesn t do) for Basic Services School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections Robin Harding and David Stasavage New York University May 4, 2012 Robin Harding and David Stasavage
More informationGender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US
Gender preference and age at arrival among Asian immigrant women to the US Ben Ost a and Eva Dziadula b a Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 South Morgan UH718 M/C144 Chicago,
More informationEvidence from a Voter Awareness Campaign in Pakistan
Evidence from a Voter Awareness Campaign in Pakistan Xavier Gine World Bank Impact and Policy Conference, Bangkok Motivation Over the 20 th century, women have acquired de jure rights to participate in
More informationReturns to Education in the Albanian Labor Market
Returns to Education in the Albanian Labor Market Dr. Juna Miluka Department of Economics and Finance, University of New York Tirana, Albania Abstract The issue of private returns to education has received
More informationL8: Inequality, Poverty and Development: The Evidence
L8: Inequality, Poverty and Development: The Evidence Dilip Mookherjee Ec320 Lecture 8, Boston University Sept 25, 2014 DM (BU) 320 Lect 8 Sept 25, 2014 1 / 1 RECAP: Measuring Inequality and Poverty We
More informationParticipatory Governance in Transition States
Participatory Governance in Transition States Theory and Research Question Definitions of democracy tend to lean more towards Dahl s participatory democracy than Schumpeter s procedural version. In a definition
More informationRemittances and Poverty. in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group (DECRG) MSN MC World Bank.
Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Remittances and Poverty in Guatemala* Richard H. Adams, Jr. Development Research Group
More informationOnline Appendix: The Effect of Education on Civic and Political Engagement in Non-Consolidated Democracies: Evidence from Nigeria
Online Appendix: The Effect of Education on Civic and Political Engagement in Non-Consolidated Democracies: Evidence from Nigeria Horacio Larreguy John Marshall May 2016 1 Missionary schools Figure A1:
More informationMigration, remittances and development: African perspective
Migration, remittances and development: African perspective Flore Gubert, IRD, DIAL and PSE Improving Migration, Remittances and diaspora data: SDGs and the Global Compact on Migration, Paris, January
More informationPoverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr
Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr Abstract. The Asian experience of poverty reduction has varied widely. Over recent decades the economies of East and Southeast Asia
More informationPoverty and Migration in the Digital Age: Experimental Evidence on Mobile Banking in Bangladesh
Poverty and Migration in the Digital Age: Experimental Evidence on Mobile Banking in Bangladesh Jean Lee, Jonathan Morduch, Saravana Ravindran, Abu Shonchoy, Hassan Zaman April 26, 2017 1 Context Migration
More informationGender and Ethnicity in LAC Countries: The case of Bolivia and Guatemala
Gender and Ethnicity in LAC Countries: The case of Bolivia and Guatemala Carla Canelas (Paris School of Economics, France) Silvia Salazar (Paris School of Economics, France) Paper Prepared for the IARIW-IBGE
More informationEXTENDED FAMILY INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION IN RURAL CHINA
EXTENDED FAMILY INFLUENCE ON INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION DECISION IN RURAL CHINA Hao DONG, Yu XIE Princeton University INTRODUCTION This study aims to understand whether and how extended family members influence
More informationClassical papers: Osborbe and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997)
The identity of politicians is endogenized Typical approach: any citizen may enter electoral competition at a cost. There is no pre-commitment on the platforms, and winner implements his or her ideal policy.
More informationWill Urban Migrants Formally Insure their Rural Relatives? Accra, 10 May 2018 Towards Agricultural Innovation in Ghana: An Evidence-Based Approach
Will Urban Migrants Formally Insure their Rural Relatives? Harounan Kazianga Oklahoma State University Zaki Wahhaj University of Kent Accra, 10 May 2018 Towards Agricultural Innovation in Ghana: An Evidence-Based
More informationBarbara Koremenos The continent of international law. Explaining agreement design. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Rev Int Organ (2017) 12:647 651 DOI 10.1007/s11558-017-9274-3 BOOK REVIEW Barbara Koremenos. 2016. The continent of international law. Explaining agreement design. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
More informationTrade, employment and gender: the case of Uganda. Eria Hisali Makerere University
Trade, employment and gender: the case of Uganda by Eria Hisali Makerere University Introduction Classical trade theory suggests that trade liberalization induces a shift of production activities (and
More informationReport on Issues in Education and Health: Policy Insights from Evidence Based Research a seminar organized by the International Growth Centre
Report on Issues in Education and Health: Policy Insights from Evidence Based Research a seminar organized by the International Growth Centre Prepared by M. Mehrab Bin Bakhtiar The research seminar titled
More informationNATIONAL FORUM ON CHILD POVERTY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN MALI: REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF 4 CONSENSUS BUILDING SCOPE OF WORK
NATIONAL FORUM ON CHILD POVERTY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN MALI: REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF 4 CONSENSUS BUILDING STUDIES AROUND STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS May 12 through 14, 2009 at the International Conference Center
More informationTransparency Against Corruption. A Cross-Country Analysis.
Transparency Against Corruption. A Cross-Country Analysis. Catharina Lindstedt, Ph.D. Cand. Department of Political Science, Goteborg University Catharina.Lindstedt@pol.gu.se Daniel Naurin, Marie Curie
More informationAbstract for: Population Association of America 2005 Annual Meeting Philadelphia PA March 31 to April 2
INDIVIDUAL VERSUS HOUSEHOLD MIGRATION DECISION RULES: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN INTENTIONS TO MIGRATE IN SOUTH AFRICA by Bina Gubhaju and Gordon F. De Jong Population Research Institute Pennsylvania State
More informationAfricans Views of International Organizations
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. August Africans Views of International Organizations Africans live in a globalized world. But are they aware of the United Nations and other international organizations?
More informationMETHODOLOGY. ! Sample size: 2014 n=1040, 2013 n=1060. ! Data collection method: Face-to-face at the respondent's houshold
A U D I T O F P O L I T I C A L E N G A G E M E N T I N S E R B I A 2 0 1 4 As part of the initiative Open Parliament, the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA) conducted its second
More information14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency
14.770: Introduction to Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9: Political Agency Daron Acemoglu MIT October 2 and 4, 2018. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Political Economy Lectures 8 and 9 October 2 and 4, 2018. 1 /
More informationMeasuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure
Public Disclosure Authorized WPS4099 Measuring and Reducing the Impact of Corruption in Infrastructure Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Charles Kenny 1 Abstract This paper examines
More informationGlobal Corruption Barometer 2010 New Zealand Results
Global Corruption Barometer 2010 New Zealand Results Ben Krieble TINZ Summer Intern www.transparencynz.org.nz executive@transparency.org.nz Contents Executive Summary 3 Summary of global results 4 Summary
More informationShock and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso (Report on Pre-Research in 2006)
Shock and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Burkina Faso (Report on Pre-Research in 2006) Takeshi Sakurai (Policy Research Institute) Introduction Risk is the major cause of poverty in Sub-Saharan
More informationUnequal Recovery, Labor Market Polarization, Race, and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Maoyong Fan and Anita Alves Pena 1
Unequal Recovery, Labor Market Polarization, Race, and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Maoyong Fan and Anita Alves Pena 1 Abstract: Growing income inequality and labor market polarization and increasing
More informationElectoral forecasting with Stata
Electoral forecasting with Stata Four years later Modesto Escobar & Pablo Cabrera University of Salamanca (Spain) 2016 Spanish Stata Users Group meeting Barcelona, 20th October, 2016 1 / 18 Introduction
More informationSummary by M. Vijaybhasker Srinivas (2007), Akshara Gurukulam
Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm 1 Joseph E. Stiglitz Participatory processes (like voice, openness and transparency) promote truly successful long
More informationWomen s Education and Women s Political Participation
2014/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/23 Background paper prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all Women s Education and Women s Political Participation
More informationWho says elections in Ghana are free and fair?
Who says elections in Ghana are free and fair? By Sharon Parku Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 15 November 2014 Introduction Since 2000, elections in Ghana have been lauded by observers both internally
More informationBy Any Means Necessary: Multiple Avenues of Political Cycles
By Any Means Necessary: Multiple Avenues of Political Cycles Andrew 2014 EITM Summer Institute University of Houston June 22, 2014 Motivation Are Political Budget Cycles (PBCs) the only tool an incumbent
More informationThe WTO Trade Effect and Political Uncertainty: Evidence from Chinese Exports
Abstract: The WTO Trade Effect and Political Uncertainty: Evidence from Chinese Exports Yingting Yi* KU Leuven (Preliminary and incomplete; comments are welcome) This paper investigates whether WTO promotes
More informationWhat does the U.K. Want for a Post-Brexit Economic. Future?
What does the U.K. Want for a Post-Brexit Economic Future? Cameron Ballard-Rosa University of North Carolina Mashail Malik Stanford University Kenneth Scheve Stanford University December 2016 Preliminary
More informationIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA Mahari Bailey, et al., : Plaintiffs : C.A. No. 10-5952 : v. : : City of Philadelphia, et al., : Defendants : PLAINTIFFS EIGHTH
More informationDownloads from this web forum are for private, non commercial use only. Consult the copyright and media usage guidelines on
Econ 3x3 www.econ3x3.org A web forum for accessible policy relevant research and expert commentaries on unemployment and employment, income distribution and inclusive growth in South Africa Downloads from
More informationStrategies of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Survey Experiments. Kevin Croke. World Bank
Strategies of Single Party Hegemony in Tanzania: Evidence from Survey Experiments Kevin Croke World Bank Abstract: How do single party regimes maintain enduring political dominance in developing countries
More informationComparing Foreign Political Systems Focus Questions for Unit 1
Comparing Foreign Political Systems Focus Questions for Unit 1 Any additions or revision to the draft version of the study guide posted earlier in the term are noted in bold. Why should we bother comparing
More informationEthnic minority poverty and disadvantage in the UK
Ethnic minority poverty and disadvantage in the UK Lucinda Platt Institute for Social & Economic Research University of Essex Institut d Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC, Barcelona 2 Focus on child poverty Scope
More information2. Money Metric Poverty & Expenditure Inequality
Arab Development Challenges 2. Money Metric Poverty & Expenditure Inequality 1 Chapter Overview Kinds of poverty lines Low money metric poverty but high exposure to economic shock The enigma of inequality
More informationVote Buying and Clientelism
Vote Buying and Clientelism Dilip Mookherjee Boston University Lecture 18 DM (BU) Clientelism 2018 1 / 1 Clientelism and Vote-Buying: Introduction Pervasiveness of vote-buying and clientelistic machine
More informationExperiments in Election Reform: Voter Perceptions of Campaigns Under Preferential and Plurality Voting
Experiments in Election Reform: Voter Perceptions of Campaigns Under Preferential and Plurality Voting Caroline Tolbert, University of Iowa (caroline-tolbert@uiowa.edu) Collaborators: Todd Donovan, Western
More informationPoverty, Livelihoods, and Access to Basic Services in Ghana
Poverty, Livelihoods, and Access to Basic Services in Ghana Joint presentation on Shared Growth in Ghana (Part II) by Zeljko Bogetic and Quentin Wodon Presentation based on a paper by Harold Coulombe and
More informationInstitutional Obstacles for Doing Business
Institutional Obstacles for Doing Business Data Description and Methodology of a Worldwide Private Sector Survey 1 Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko and Beatrice Weder Abstract This paper presents the data
More informationDOES THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN LEGISLATURES ENCOURAGE WOMEN S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION?
DOES THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN LEGISLATURES ENCOURAGE WOMEN S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in
More informationNo Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Political Incentives for Education Reform in Tanzania
No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Political Incentives for Education Reform in Tanzania James Habyarimana, Ken Opalo, and Youdi Schipper September 13, 2018 Research Question Do competitive elections create
More information