Opportunities for defenceindustrial

Transcription

1 Opportunities for defenceindustrial collaboration after Brexit Douglas Barrie June 2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

2 Key takeaways The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combataircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and subsystem levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence. The United Kingdom s security is inextricably linked to that of the rest of Europe. Minimising the defence and security impact of the UK s decision to leave the European Union and using this as one signal to reassure its continental partners of its continuing commitment to collective security, including through supporting the development of EU military capabilities is important. Sustaining and bolstering defence-industrial cooperation would be one means of reinforcing the security bonds between the UK and its EU partners. Difficulties, however, are already apparent and should not be underestimated: the relationship will require nurturing and depend on flexibility by all parties. Cooperation provides many advantages, though simplicity has never been one of them. While national programmes circumvent many of the problems that collaborative projects inevitably face, for the most advanced military systems, a cooperative approach is increasingly attractive. In the European context, political, industrial and economic factors have all contributed to this impetus. The EU increasingly supports the defence-capability development and military capacity-building of its member states. A variety of mechanisms, of which the most relevant here is the European Defence Fund (EDF), are being tried and implemented to fulfil these aims, including the support of defence-related research and development (R&D), and identifying common requirements as a basis for cooperation. Both the research and capability windows of the EDF provide vehicles for continuing cooperation between the UK defence sector and EU member states industries, if there is political willingness and flexibility. There is mutual benefit in ensuring that the UK is able to contribute to and participate in such programmes. Potential paths to continuing collaboration Such cooperation stands the best chance of success when it is led by the technology or requirements, rather 2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

3 than being driven primarily by politics. Sustained political support, however, will be required from both the UK and within the EU if a challenging transition period is to be negotiated successfully. Collaborative routes could include direct UK-funded participation in EU projects, indirect involvement through partnerships with one or more participating EU members and wider defence-industrial cooperation outside of the EU but in alignment with the Union s broad defence and security aims. The successes and challenges of European defence cooperation are most evident in the aerospace sector. Combat-aircraft development has been increasingly undertaken collaboratively. The UK was a key partner in Europe s two most significant combat-aircraft projects: the tri-national Panavia Tornado and the fournation Eurofighter Typhoon. Germany and Italy were London s partners in the former programme, with these three joined by Spain in the latter. The British decision to leave the EU has made it considerably more difficult in the near term to see London as a full participant in a European combat-aircraft programme built around present Franco-German collaboration. Meanwhile, cooperation in the maritime and land domains has been more sporadic, and less successful, while in terms of military space London has long enjoyed privileged access to, and relied upon, United States-derived geospatial intelligence. Defence aerospace is the strongest of the UK s industrial domains in terms of sovereign capability among EU partner states, only France has the same critical mass and technology base. The UK does also possess some high-end maritime capabilities; however, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have substantial naval manufacturing industries. In the land-vehicle sector, the UK has suffered from an erosion of its national industrial base. Taking these factors into account would suggest that the UK s high-end technology capabilities in the military air domain, and to a lesser extent the maritime arena, should be central to London s efforts to sustain European cooperation, given its relative strengths and the EU s lack of depth. Conversely in the land domain, the UK s comparative lack of strength could provide the impetus for London to seek cooperation as a junior partner. Cooperating across the domains Air domain British cooperation with European partners has been particularly strong, and successful, in the air domain. The Tornado strike aircraft and the Typhoon multirole fighter were collaborative developments, while MBDA, which Britain helped found, is Europe s guided-weapons champion. The UK is in the process of concluding a Combat Air Strategy, and this should not close any doors on potential European cooperation. Given that France and Germany are now partners in exploring development of a nextgeneration fighter, the UK s strategy needs to look at options in the medium to long term. An effort by London and Paris to pursue the joint development of an Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) has lost impetus, leaving relations between the two countries in this area strained in the near term. A four-nation European medium-altitude long-endurance UAV project, by comparison, is making progress. There remains, however, the potential for cooperation on R&D at the systems level on a next-generation crewed combat aircraft, and also uninhabited systems. Radar, engine and avionics R&D could provide routes to cooperation, while an agreed common baseline for the types of air-launched weapons to be developed and integrated on future combat aircraft would offer benefits. At least some of these areas are suitable for support from within the EDF, if included in future research windows. Furthermore, the UK has considerable experience in UAV operations, and could support training and doctrine development. Land domain European cooperative efforts in the land arena have been fewer in number and met with patchier success, of which London s on-off-on participation in the Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle is an example. France, Germany and the UK are now all considering future heavy-armour requirements to replace their respective main battle tanks. France and Germany are already cooperating on this, and London could look to participate as a means of satisfying its national requirement. These states indirect-fire-support needs could also provide a path to cooperation. Opportunities for defence-industrial collaboration after Brexit 3

4 Even if full participation on the part of the UK does not transpire, there is ample room to collaborate at the technology level: from fundamental R&D at the materials level for armour protection, to technology work looking at the possibility of a common main armament and munitions. R&D into active defensive aids for armoured vehicles also presents an opportunity for joint work, with the benefits of commonality. Land-based air defence, and in particular improving European ballistic- and cruise-missile defences, also provides areas that offer the potential for collaboration across the spectrum of technological maturity. There is the potential to support cooperative efforts both in the European Defence Industrial Development Programme and at the EDF-level with regard to ballistic- and cruisemissile-defence needs. Maritime domain There have only been sporadic European attempts at cooperation at the naval platform level, with better results at the systems level, for example the Aster airdefence missile. Weapons R&D may again offer a path to successful cooperation with candidate areas including the use of lasers for close-in ship defence, and in the use of naval platforms for ballistic-missile defence as a complement to land-based systems. Mine countermeasures, including the use of uninhabited underwater vehicles, are also ripe for further collaboration, from technology research to the application of systems. France and the UK identified this area as part of the Lancaster House Anglo-French defence treaties. Again the research and capability elements of the EDF could be applicable to cooperation in the maritime domain, assuming the mechanisms can be identified and the political will found to enable this. Space domain The difficulties posed by Brexit, and its impact on defence collaboration between the UK and the EU, are all too apparent in the space arena. The Galileo satellitenavigation system spat is the result of a lack of flexibility and willingness to accommodate by both parties. While the British decision to leave the EU is the cause of the problem, Brussels and London now need to navigate the apparent lack of flexibility on the part of Brussels, and what seems an overly bureaucratic adherence to the rules that has compounded the difficulty with Galileo. British posturing that it could develop a rival satellite-navigation system has served as a further irritant. Nonetheless, military space does remain a good opportunity for further cooperation, if the present difficulties can be overcome. Cooperation on future military-satellite-communication needs, as well as exploration of the potential for technology collaboration in geospatial reconnaissance, offer promise. Indeed, London is already considering a successor to its Skynet-5 military-communication constellation, and the Ministry of Defence continues to show interest in the ability to gather geospatial intelligence. Presently, London is dependent on privileged access to US capabilities for this. It is worth noting the UK is a significant contributor to the European Space Agency, financially and in terms of technology. There are no fundamental reasons why the UK defence industry should not contribute to and benefit from the EU s increasing interest in developing its military capabilities. With the political will, structuring mutually beneficial access is achievable and desirable in supporting the stated aims of Brussels and London. It will, however, require vision and ambition. 4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

5 The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide variety of sources. The IISS would like to thank the various individuals who contributed their expertise to the compilation of this report. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole. IISS and DGAP work on the defence-policy and defence-industrial dimensions of Brexit has been supported by grants from a consortium of privatesector companies in the defence and aerospace sector, as well as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies UK Arundel House 6 Temple Place London wc2r 2pg UK t. +44 (0) f. +44 (0) e. iiss@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Americas 2121 K Street, NW Suite 801 Washington, DC USA t f e. iiss-americas@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia 9 Raffles Place #51-01 Republic Plaza Singapore t f e. iiss-asia@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Middle East 14th floor, GBCORP Tower Bahrain Financial Harbour Manama Kingdom of Bahrain t f e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org