MIAMI UNIVERSITY. The Graduate School. Certificate for Approving the Dissertation. We hereby approve the Dissertation of. Katherine Wynn Mitakides

Transcription

1 MIAMI UNIVERSITY The Graduate School Certificate for Approving the Dissertation We hereby approve the Dissertation of Katherine Wynn Mitakides Candidate for the Degree: Doctor of Philosophy Director (Dr. John Rothgeb) Reader (Dr. Venelin Ganev) Reader (Dr. Warren Mason) Graduate School Representative (Dr. Sheldon Anderson)

2 ABSTRACT STAYIN ALIVE: A MIXED-METHODS STUDY OF THE INCONSISTENT EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS by Katherine Wynn Mitakides The purpose of this sequential mixed methods study is to provide policymakers with a morecomplete understanding of the varying effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism technique. To this end, my central research question asks, why do certain terrorist groups endure despite experiencing leadership decapitation?. Drawing on previous studies of terrorism and theories of organizational behavior, I suggest that a high degree of bureaucratization and the provision of social services reduce the destabilizing effects of leadership decapitation by decreasing a group s functional dependence on any single individual to secure the resources necessary to survive. The first phase of this study is a qualitative exploration of two existing explanations of organizational endurance, bureaucracy and incentivebased organizational maintenance, that should, prima facie, explain leadership decapitation s varying outcomes. I use a deviant case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, one of the oldest and most important politically-violent groups in history, to illustrate existing explanations weaknesses and to find evidence linking my proposed characteristics to the outcome of survival. Based on my qualitative findings, I generate a set of hypotheses about the relationship between select organization-level factors and the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. I then test these hypotheses on a unique dataset of 138 terrorist organizations using both descriptive and binary logistic regression statistical analyses to determine their applicability to a wider class of cases. The quantitative results indicate that my hypotheses are partially supported by the data: While providing social services is by far the strongest predictor of an organization s likelihood of surviving leadership decapitation, the relationship between bureaucracy and survival was found to be non-significant. After discussing the implications of these findings, I present a preliminary set of counterterrorism strategies that target terrorist organizations means of organizational maintenance rather than their leaders, and then conclude with suggestions for future research.

3 STAYIN ALIVE: A MIXED-METHODS STUDY OF THE INCONSISTENT EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science by Katherine Wynn Mitakides Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2017 Dissertation Advisor: Dr. John Rothgeb

4 Katherine Wynn Mitakides 2017

5 Table of Contents Chapter One... 1 Introduction... 1 Previous Research on Leadership Decapitation... 3 Research Question and Argument... 5 Research Design... 5 Chapter Outline... 7 Summary... 8 Chapter Two: Literature Review Terrorism Studies Approaches: Structural, Psychological, or Rational Choice Structural Theories Psychological Theories Rational Choice Theories How Terrorism Ends Common Themes Leadership Decapitation Organizational Endurance The Missing Piece Existing Explanations of Organizational Endurance Weber s Theories of Authority and Bureaucracy Incentives and Incentive Theory Terrorist Organizations and Social Services Conclusion Chapter Three: Methodologies Introduction vii

6 Objectives Research Design Mixed-Methods Research Specific Advantages of the Sequential Exploratory Model An Organizational Approach Phase One: Qualitative Analysis Phase Two: Quantitative Analysis Dataset, Population, and Sample Instrumentation Statistical Tests Chapter 4: A Case Study of the Society of Muslim Brothers (Egypt) Introduction A Note About the Muslim Brotherhood and Terrorism Organizational Attributes of Interest The Society of Muslim Brothers, Background The Founding of the Brotherhood The First Dissolution and Death ( ) Restoration and Succession The Brotherhood under Nasir ( ) The Great Mihna Reorganization: Organizational Structure Bureaucratic Development The Role of Social Services viii

7 Types of Social Services The Function of Social Services Conclusion Chapter Five: Quantitative Analysis Introduction Variables in the Equation Dependent Variable: The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation Key Independent Variables: Bureaucracy Score and Provides Social Services Other Independent Variables Hypotheses and Tests Findings Model One: Bureaucracy Score & Provides Social Services Model Two: The Nature of the Group Model Three: Ideology Model Four: Founder and Multiple Decapitations Model Five: Collective Effects H3: Model One Chapter Six: Conclusion Introduction: The (Flawed) Logic of Leadership Decapitation Knowledge Gaps This Study s Contribution Research Design Advantages Qualitative Analysis Quantitative Analysis Discussion ix

8 Implications and Recommendations for Counterterrorism Policy Questioning the Utility of Leadership Decapitation Suggestions for Future Research Conclusion Bibliography x

9 LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 AVERAGE LIFESPAN OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BY EXPERIENCED LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION TABLE 2 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR VARIABLES UNDER INVESTIGATION TABLE 3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR H1 AND H TABLE 4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR H xi

10 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION FIGURE 2 CODING FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEADERSHIP DECAPITATION xii

11 Acknowledgements I am fortunate to have had the support of many wonderful individuals throughout the duration of this dissertation and I am forever indebted to all of them for seeing me through to its end. First, I would like thank the members of my committee for their endless patience. My chair, Dr. John Rothgeb, was my rock throughout this process. He was always there to remind me of what was most important (getting it done!) and, when necessary, to prevent me from going a bridge too far. To my first reader, Dr. Venelin Ganev: Thank you for reading and offering feedback on every version of this project. Your words were always encouraging and enlightening. I would also like to thank Dr. Warren Mason, whose support of this project came at a critical time. I am forever grateful that you agreed to sit on this committee; it was both a pleasure and an honor to have you as a reader. Finally, to Dr. Sheldon Anderson: thank you for being willing to go above and beyond to ensure the completion of this dissertation. Additionally, throughout my academic career, there have been many individuals without whom I could not have made or completed this journey. I would like to first recognize and thank Dr. Martha Crenshaw, whose work served as the inspiration for this dissertation. To Dean Thomas Mesner at Hollins University: Thank you for never giving up hope, and for never letting me give it up, either. I would also like to acknowledge Dr. Christopher Bradley. What started as a simple advisor-advisee relationship has turned into a full-fledged friendship. I could not have finished this dissertation without you. To my colleagues Diana Liu and Trey Orndorff: Thank you both for countless hours of statistics tutoring. You were there for me even after we had all gone our separate ways. Lastly, I would like to give special recognition to Dr. Donna Schlagheck. When people ask me why I chose to study terrorism, I always say, It chose me. The truth is, Donna, you chose me. It was in 2003, in your office, as your research assistant, that this project was born. On a simple post-it note, I jotted down a single phrase, effects of identifiable leader? Ten years later, this dissertation is my answer to that question. I cannot thank you enough for all you have given me. You are more than a mentor; you are a role model and a friend. Finally, I would like to thank my family. To my parents: Without you, nothing in my life would be possible. Your unwavering, unstoppable support, love, and faith have been the driving force behind my success, from my first day at Dr. John Hole elementary, to my last day at Miami University. It was you who taught me what it means to work, to achieve, and to succeed, and it is on your shoulders I will stand when I accept my degree. I love you both. Lastly, I would like to thank my son, Hutt: This, like everything else I do in life, is for you. xiii

12 Chapter One Introduction What explains the inconsistency of leadership decapitation as an effective counterterrorism technique? Why do some organizations collapse after the death or capture of just one man, while others show increasing resolve in the face of repeated high-value target losses? The death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 once again raised questions about the highly controversial yet increasingly common practice of leadership decapitation, which is the killing or capture of a terror group s leader or leaders. The strike against bin Laden was an undeniable victory for the United States; nevertheless, it produced disparate responses about what his death will actually mean for the future of al-qaeda and, consequently, for the United States. Many senior government and military officials hail bin Laden s death as a decisive blow to al-qaeda by noting that his absence cripples the group s operational capacity and puts it on an irreversible path of decline (The White House 2011). Other analysts, largely outside the government, disagree with this position and instead claim that the event s significance is largely symbolic and not likely to impair al-qaeda s 1 ability to continue their attacks (Haass 2011). The uncertainty about the effects of bin Laden s death is due in part to the inconsistent record of leadership decapitation 2 as an effective means of collapsing terrorist organizations. The policy and practice of leadership decapitation is grounded in the belief that leaders are critical to the formation, operation, and survival of terrorist organizations. Conventional wisdom on the topic has been that if the leader is removed, the organization will (eventually) dissolve. In practice, however, this has not always been the case. For example, whereas Peru s Sendero Luminosa (Shining Path) suffered severe organizational disintegration following the capture of its leader, the Palestinian group Hamas remained active and, in fact, made significant gains in strength and popularity, despite repeated losses of leadership including the group s founders. Even with its spotty record, the practice of targeting leaders has been a common counterterrorism policy that has been employed for decades. Israeli Defense Forces began openly targeting Hamas leaders in the 1990s, though it is widely speculated that the IDF have been using this tactic since the 1970s. Spain, Great Britain, Turkey, Russia, and Peru have also openly 1 This includes al-qaeda and its acting affiliates. 2 This term is used interchangeably with targeted killings, and leadership targeting. 1

13 targeted suspected terrorist leaders, though the effects of these operations on the groups themselves vary widely. After the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. government and military officials made leadership decapitation one of the primary methods for combatting transnational terrorist organizations. Targeting terrorist leaders was listed first among the four central tenets of the 2003 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (The White House 2003). Nevertheless, it was clear even then that policymakers were aware of the practice s unreliability. The loss of leadership can cause many organizations to collapse. Some groups, however, are more resilient and can promote new leadership should the original fall or fail, (Bush 2003, 6). Other reports echoed this uncertainty; the 9/11 Commission Report revealed that many government agencies remained unsure what effect, if any, removing a leader would have on a terrorist organization (Kean et al. 2004). Indeed, the 9/11 Commission noted that, in some instances, removing a leader might exacerbate the situation. Irrespective of these misgivings, leadership decapitation remains the cornerstone of America s counterterrorism policy (Obama 2010). From a political perspective, this decision is understandable, given that targeting the leaders of terrorist groups is a tangible means of appearing decisive and dynamic to a public that quickly disfavors leaders who seem soft on terrorism. Yet the public can also grow weary of long, expensive, and seemingly unproductive wars. As such, removing a high-profile terrorist leader gives a president that rare high-five moment or clear win in the Global War on Terror, a conflict that is often covert and lacks the overly simplistic markers of success that resonate with the American public. In the host country, a successful strike against a commonly defined enemy, such as a feared terrorist leader, can often endear an occupying force to its host population. Conversely, too many failed attacks can carry high costs. Repeated misses can make a president appear incompetent, undermining his authority at home and abroad. Furthermore, with each strike, the risk of creating backlash among the local population increases. Repeated strikes can engender frustration among those who are already suffering disrupted lives, and may turn members of a local population into terrorist sympathizers, or in the worst case, terrorist recruits. Recognizing there may be various motivations for continuing to use leadership decapitation as a part of an overall counterterrorism strategy revenge, political perception, 2

14 tangible markers to gain operational funding the current inability to explain the inconsistent outcomes of the practice calls for further and more nuanced study of the problem. Previous Research on Leadership Decapitation Research on leadership decapitation is relatively young and still very much in the developmental phase. Early research on terrorism focused on the psychology of individual terrorists and terrorist leaders. From this early research a consensus emerged that, like many other illegal, clandestine, and violent organizations, terrorist groups were built and held together by a charismatic, albeit psychotic, leader and, consequently, would collapse if these leaders were removed (Oots 1986; Post 1991; Mayer 2001). Several recent quantitative studies, however, show no clear pattern of either success or failure for group collapse due to leadership removal (Jordan 2009; Mannes 2008; Price 2010). In fact, these recent studies are themselves inconsistent insofar as they contain contrasting and often conflicting results that ultimately leave the question of the technique s efficacy unresolved. 3 One inherent weakness of existing leadership decapitation research is an overreliance on Max Weber s charismatic authority model (M. Weber 1947). According to this model, members recognize the authority of an individual because of exceptional, extraordinary, and/or super-human character traits (Dow 1978; Gerth and Mills 1946; M. Weber 1978). As opposed to Weber s other types of authority (these being traditional and rational/legal authority), charismatic authority rests entirely on the personal relationship between a leader and his followers. In fact, it is the followers perception of the extraordinariness of his skills, attributes, or characteristics that give the leader his authority. Should their devotion cease, however, the charismatic s source of authority would vanish and he would no longer be recognized as a legitimate leader. Thus, according to Weber, charismatic authority is inherently unstable and organizations built around it are prone to collapse following the loss of their leader (M. Weber 1978). This is the logic underlying the counterterrorism policy of leadership decapitation. As such, however, it is inherently flawed because, as the evidence shows, not all terror groups end after losing a leader. There are two interrelated explanations for this. First, as will be argued in this dissertation, not all terrorist organizations are organized in the same way. There are important distinctions among terrorist organizations and, as the mixed success of decapitation reveals, few 3 More will be said about the leadership decapitation literature in chapter 2. 3

15 are completely dependent upon a single, charismatic, or perhaps more appropriately, critical leader. Even among religious terrorist groups, which many authors assume are the most likely to be organized around a charismatic leader, there are variations in structure, recruiting methods, and generating income, all of which may affect how or if leadership decapitation will result in organizational collapse. Second, even if a group was founded on charismatic authority, Weber notes that it is possible for it to survive the loss of its leader by fundamentally changing the nature of its authority, namely, by becoming either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both (Weber 1997, 379). Weber calls this process the routinization of charisma (Toth 1972; M. Weber 1947, 1978). The routinization of charisma involves not only the institutionalization of a leader s vision, mission, and/or purpose for the organization, it also, and more importantly, requires that standard operating procedures (i.e. routines) be established, especially for generating the resources necessary to operate (M. Weber 1947). While these are sometimes enacted by the founder, it is often left to his immediate successor to design and implement these plans (Toth 1972). This is one reason why the initial leadership transition is by far the most critical and often determines the fate of the organization (Rubenson 1996). Nevertheless, the vast majority of research on leadership decapitation continues to rely on the key man assumption. To date, only two studies suggest alternative theories for the unpredictable effectiveness of leadership decapitation (Jordan 2009; Price 2010), and none offer a viable explanation for organizational endurance. This dissertation attempts to fill that gap by starting with the assumption that while a charismatic leader may be critical to the formation of the organization, as the mixed record of decapitation shows, his role may diminish over time. Moreover, research indicates that terror groups recognize that the centrality of a single leader may be antithetical to their survival; this would account for the proliferation of decentralized, network -structured terrorist organizations. Thus, understanding when leaders even highly visible ones such as Gerry Adams or Yasir Arafat are not critical to their organization s operations can lead to more effective and more efficient counterterrorism policies. Furthermore, by correctly identifying the factors that are critical to an organization s survival, policymakers can formulate counterterrorism strategies that have a greater likelihood of achieving the goal of collapse without risking civilian or military casualties or backlash from the host state or population. 4

16 Research Question and Argument The existing research on leadership decapitation leaves serious gaps in policymakers understanding of the efficacy this unreliable and potentially counterproductive practice. While previous studies, both qualitative and quantitative, have illustrated that the technique of leadership decapitation can be effective, they have failed to explain why it was effective in some cases but not in others. I believe there are two reasons for this: First, existing studies overemphasize the concept of the leader and thus, focus almost exclusively on successful cases, i.e., those where leadership loss led to organizational collapse. Second, most of these studies fail to consider the organizational differences among terrorist groups. Much of the research on terrorism, and especially of counterterrorism, assumes that terrorist organizations are uniform entities. Just like other legitimate organizations, however corporations, universities, and governments there are notable differences in the ways in which terrorist groups are organized, e.g., their structure, size, modus operandi, etc. What is needed to explain the variation in outcomes is an organizational-level study of leadership decapitation that focuses on groups that endured despite the loss of a leader. This dissertation directly contributes to filling this gap by asking, why do certain terrorist organizations endure despite experiencing leadership decapitation? Drawing on previous studies of terrorism and counterterrorism as well as theories of organizational behavior, I suggest that two factors a high level of bureaucratization and the provision of social services reduce the destabilizing effects of leadership decapitation by decreasing a group s functional dependence on any single individual to secure the resources necessary to survive. Research Design While the purpose of all political science research is to acquire knowledge about important problems, it is also meant to have real-world implications that can be used in the practice of solving those problems. Nowhere is this truer than in the areas of terrorism and counterterrorism. Heeding Alexander George s call to Bridge the Gap between the government and academia, the primary goal of this project is to provide policymakers with a more complete understanding of the varying effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism technique. My aim is to contribute to both the academic study of terrorism and to better counterterrorism policy-making by producing a theory-driven, policy-oriented study of leadership decapitation. 5

17 To do this, I use a sequential mixed methods research design. The first phase of this study is a qualitative exploration of two existing explanations of organizational endurance, bureaucracy and incentive-based organizational maintenance, that should, prima facie, explain leadership decapitation s varying outcomes. Using a deviant case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, one of the oldest and most significant political opposition groups 4 in history, I illustrate the weakness of existing explanations, namely their inability to account for endurance, and find evidence of the causal mechanisms that link my proposed organizational characteristics with the outcome of survival. Based on the findings of my qualitative analysis, I generate a set of hypotheses about the relationship between select organization-level factors and the effectiveness of leadership decapitation as a counterterrorism technique. In the second phase, quantitative analyses are used to build on the findings of the case study, specifically to test the relationships observed in the case study to determine their applicability to a wider class of cases. I use two types of statistics, descriptive and binary logistic regression, on a unique dataset of 138 terrorist organizations to determine if the relationships I suggest are significant. I conclude the study by discussing the policy implications of both my qualitative and quantitative findings. I then present a preliminary set of counterterrorism strategies that target terrorist organizations means of organizational maintenance rather than their leaders, and close by offering suggestions for future research. The unit of analysis in this study is the organization; thus, throughout my data collection and analysis, I employ an organizational approach. 5 This approach is grounded in theories of Organizational Studies and, as such, makes certain fundamental assumptions about terrorism, 6 terrorist groups, and how best to analyze both. 7 Most importantly, this approach assumes that terrorist organizations are organizations. While terrorist organizations have some distinct characteristics that define them as a type, they also have several characteristics that are 4 The question of the Muslim Brotherhood s status as a terrorist organization is addressed in chapter 4. 5 Other works employing the organizational approach to the study of terrorism include: (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Crenshaw 1985, 1987; Gates 2006; Mayntz 2004; Oots 1986, 1989; Shapiro 2005). 6 While there have been instances of "lone wolf" terrorism (i.e., the Unabomber ), these are the exception and not the rule. Overwhelmingly, terrorist acts are carried out by small groups of individuals. Some groups are part of (or backed by) larger movements or political or social organizations, but others are freestanding units and isolate themselves from legitimate political activity. 7 These are discussed at length in chapter 2. 6

18 common to all non-state organizations. Accepting this facilitates generalizability, thus allowing the researcher to compare terror organizations (which are notoriously difficult to study) with other types of more-transparent organizations and to apply existing theories of organizational behavior to terror group behavior (Oots 1989). In this way, the organizational approach contributes to the development of theory and, consequently, to cumulative knowledge, both of which are important and historically difficult tasks for terrorism researchers (Silke 2004; 2009). Such comparisons must be made with caution, however, because generalizing about the characteristics of terrorist organizations should not lead to the false assumption that all such organizations are identical (Crenshaw 1985, 467). Rather and this is a central argument of this dissertation different combinations of organizational characteristics and the degrees to which these characteristics vary affect the behavior of terrorist groups, including how they respond to leadership decapitation. Chapter Outline The first chapter of this manuscript provided a scope for the nature of this project. In the next chapter, I review the literature most relevant to this study. I begin with a general review of terrorism studies, outlining the progression from the question of how terrorism begins to the question of how terrorism ends. I then review the current research on leadership decapitation, emphasizing the major gaps within this body of work and suggesting where my work fits in the current agenda. In chapter three, I present my research design. First, I review my research question and restate my argument. Then, I outline my objectives for this project and explain why a sequential mixed methods research design is the most appropriate methodological technique to meet them. I also present the organizational approach and discuss its inherent assumptions. Next, I discuss my qualitative analysis strategy, focusing specifically on the role deviant case studies play in theory building and my decision to use the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to generate new hypotheses about organizational endurance. Lastly, I discuss the quantitative portion of my analysis, reviewing how I constructed my unique dataset and describing the specific statistical tests I use to test my hypotheses. I then treat the Society of Muslim Brothers (Egypt) as a deviant case study of leadership decapitation in chapter four. After reviewing the proposed organizational characteristics of interest a high level of bureaucratization and the provision of social services I present the 7

19 prima facie evidence supporting why each should reduce a terrorist organization s vulnerability to leadership decapitation. Then, using an organizational approach, I give a structured, focused analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has withstood nearly four decades of state repression, including multiple counts of leadership decapitation. The purpose of the case study is threefold: 1) illustrate the primary weakness of existing theories, i.e., the inability to explain an outcome of survival; 2) to find evidence of causal mechanisms linking my proposed characteristics to the Society s ability to withstand repeated exposure to leadership loss, and; 3) to guide data collection and analysis in the subsequent quantitative phase, primarily by identifying important variables. In chapter five, I present a set of hypotheses about the relationship between the organization-level factors identified in my qualitative analysis and the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. I use two types of statistical analyses to test these hypotheses on a unique dataset of 138 terrorist organizations. With SPSS software, I use descriptive statistics to examine the data, and identify basic patterns among the variables that are used in the subsequent multivariate analyses. I then use binary logistic regression analysis to assess the significance of key independent variables on the effectiveness of leadership decapitation. In the final chapter, I summarize both my qualitative and quantitative findings. I discuss the extent to which the latter validated important conclusions drawn from the case study and offer possible explanations for instances where proposed relationships were found to be nonsignificant. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings for current counterterrorism policies, presenting a preliminary set of alternative strategies, and offering suggestions for future research. Summary Despite a history of mixed results, leadership decapitation remains a key element of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Several recent studies have attempted to explain the conditions under which leadership decapitation will be successful. To date, however, none of the existing research reveals any clear pattern that policymakers might use to identify which groups will be susceptible to this counterterrorism practice. In contrast to these previous works, this study attempts to develop an understanding of why leadership decapitation has collapsed some terrorist organizations but not others. Essentially, I suggest that bureaucratized organizations that provide social services have made themselves less dependent upon specific leaders by finding alternate 8

20 means of securing the resources necessary to survive. This is not to say that bureaucratized terrorist organizations that provide social services are without leadership ; to the contrary, there may be several tiers of leaders, each with functionally different roles. Rather, I suggest that these groups have successfully bureaucratized away from the highly centralized cult of personality -type leadership that characterizes many other terrorist organizations. In this way, these groups are not dependent upon any single leader to perform the functions that are critical to a group s survival. Recognizing that a one-size-fits-all approach, such as leadership targeting, is not a realistic counterterrorism strategy is the first step to preventing the unnecessary expenditure of blood and treasure on measures that are aggressive, alienating, and ultimately unproductive. Moreover, by revealing the factors that are critical to terrorist groups survival, this project can be used to construct a new set of counterterrorism policies that not only minimize backlash, but also have the potential to improve society-government relations while simultaneously weakening the bonds between terrorists and their support base. 9

21 Chapter Two: Literature Review Terrorism Studies Prior to September 11, 2001, the study of terrorism was a marginal and multidisciplinary endeavor to which a small group of individuals from a variety of academic fields dedicated their research efforts (Ganor 2008). Occasionally, single publications were added by random and often interloping contributors, usually in reaction to the latest terrorist attack. These offerings, however, added little to the field s development and often created confusion within the literature because the findings of these works were largely based on popular myths rather than empirical evidence (Reid 2007). This first wave of terrorism scholarship (i.e., those studies published before September 11, 2001) produced a body of knowledge that was rich in methods, frameworks, and approaches. This wave of scholarship was also disparate, segregated, noncumulative, and overwhelmingly preoccupied with finding the origins of specific cases of terrorism. Although these efforts gave us many of the most familiar explanations of terrorism used today, their explanatory power was inherently limited because they examined only one or two variables (Pape 2009). In the decade since 9/11, the volume of published material about terrorism has increased exponentially. Within the past three years alone, over 13,750 non-fiction English-language documents were published with terrorism as a self-identified subject term. 8 In fact, one review finds that post-9/11 studies account for over 90% of all terrorism research (Silke 2008). Professor Andrew Silke suggests that this increase in attention has proven tremendously beneficial to the study of terrorism. In a series of papers examining the state of the field, he identifies a positive trend in the quality of terrorism research, noting improvements in data collection and data analysis, as well as increases to the numbers of devoted terrorism scholars and collaborative research projects (Silke 2001, 2004, 2008). Professor Robert Pape, Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism at the University of Chicago, echoed this in his 2009 analysis of the field. Pape claims that second wave scholarship on terrorism is more complex, sophisticated, and academic in its analysis of terrorist phenomena (Pape 2009). 8 Based on WorldCat.com statistics. I did a simple search for English language, non-fiction printed material (books, reports, theses and dissertations, etc.) published between 1/1/2008 and 12/31/2011 with terrorism as keyword. Checked as of 1/22/

22 Unfortunately, despite the many advances in second wave research, there appears to be little progress in the area of theory development with respect to terrorism. Whereas other bridging fields, such as Foreign Policy Analysis, have developed their own explanatory frameworks, scholars of terrorism are hamstrung by conceptual issues (i.e., the lack of a consensus definition), and thus remain dependent upon theories and methods from other disciplines (Silke 2004a). Approaches: Structural, Psychological, or Rational Choice Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the field today, recent studies of terrorism and all of its subtopics have examined the phenomena both qualitatively and quantitatively via an array of theories at every level of analysis. Within the academic study of terrorism, 9 research can be generally classified into one of three broad categories: structural, psychological, or rational choice. 10 The choice of approach largely depends on the preferences of the researcher. In fact, almost every topic has been examined using at least two, if not all three, perspectives. For example, explanations of who becomes a terrorist and why might seem best suited for a microlevel analysis using a psychological approach. However, explanations have also been given at macro levels by scholars using economic, sociological, and political theories (Berman and Laitin 2008; Burgoon 2006; Waldmann 2005). What follows is a brief review of the three major approaches and examples of studies that employ them. Structural Theories Structural theories assume that the cause(s) of terrorism are found in the environment in which the terrorist group operates (Krieger and Meierrieks 2010; Ross 1993). For example, some of the most commonly examined structural variables for the causes of terrorism include economic factors (Blomberg and Hess 2008; Freytag et al. 2010; Gurr 1970; Piazza 2006; Sandler and Enders 2004), military/political occupation (Pape 2005; Wheeler 1991), and regime type (Li 2005; Piazza 2008). Other structural factors thought to affect terrorism include modernization/development (Laitin and Shapiro 2008; Tavares 2004), global political and/or economic order (Crenshaw 2001, 2008; Cronin 2003), and ethnic, religious, or national fractures (Berman and Laitin 2008; Huntington 1996; Katz 2009; Leman-Langlois and Brodeur 2005). 9 As opposed to studies by journalists, government officials, or terrorism experts (non-governmental analysts) 10 Recently, some scholars have produced critical analyses of terroristic phenomena; these, however, are few and are not yet considered part of mainstream research. See for example (Franks 2009; R. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009; D. M. Jones and Smith 2009). 11

23 Structural approaches are popular with policymakers because the relevant variables are easily identifiable and (relatively) malleable. These approaches are also inherently limited for three reasons. First, structural approaches entirely ignore the human factor. Theories that reduce terrorist activity to purely environmental factors cannot explain why only a small group of those affected ever engage in terrorist activities. Second, while structural variables may be easily identified, determining their actual causal effect on terrorism is far more difficult due to problems of collinearity. For example, Krieger and Meierrieks (2010) show that poverty, which was once believed to be a primary source of terrorism, has little causal significance when one controls for the role of political institutions. Finally, structural explanations cannot account for important exceptions. For instance, if poverty is the principal cause of terrorism, why is it still found in the wealthiest, most developed countries in the world such as Germany, Japan, Israel, Spain, or the United States? Psychological Theories In contrast to structural explanations of terrorism, psychological explanations focus on the personality, beliefs, motivations, and attitudes of the individual (Victoroff 2005). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the belief that terrorists were mentally ill dominated this area of research (Ferracuti and Bruno 1981; Kellen 1982; Post 1990). According to this view, terrorism is not a choice made for instrumental or strategic reasons. Rather, terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as consequence of psychological forces (Post 1990, 25). For those adopting the psychological viewpoint, the cause is not the cause...[rather, it is] their special psychologic...constructed to rationalize acts [terrorists] are compelled to commit (Post 1990, 25). This line of thinking led to the decades-long search for the terrorist personality, which is an identifiable set of abnormal psychosocial characteristics shared among those engaged in terrorism (Russell and Miller 1977; Strentz 1988). What came of this search, however, were overwhelming amounts of empirical evidence 11 indicating the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality (Crenshaw 1981, 390). Psychological approaches to the study of terrorism have changed significantly over the past two decades. One important contribution made by psychological theorists 12 is the concept of 11 For an excellent critical review of this work, see Victoroff (2005). 12 This category includes psychologists, psychiatrists, and other scholars employing a psychological approach. 12

24 terrorism as a process (Horgan 2008). Other contributions of psychological theorists include analyses of terrorist group dynamics (Alderdice 2007; Gates 2006; Gupta 2005; Rapoport 2001), group belief systems and decision-making (B. A. Jackson 2009; McCormick 2003), and the disengagement from terrorism (Bjørgo and Horgan 2009; Horgan 2010). Although the psychological approach has unquestionably advanced our understanding of terrorism, it nevertheless suffers from considerable limitations. Access to the type of data required for psychological studies, e.g., first-hand interviews, diaries, memoires, or detailed biographies, is extremely limited and highly unreliable. Furthermore, understanding the motivations of individuals (much less thousands of individuals, en mass) will never explain fully terrorism because terrorism is, fundamentally, a group activity. This also limits its use to governments seeking practical counterterrorism options because, as has been shown by several recent studies, the dynamics of the group are greater than the sum of its individual members (Alderdice 2007; Crenshaw 2000; Kruglanski and Fishman 2009). The fundamental flaw of both structural and psychological explanations is the failure to recognize that, though analytically useful, distinct levels of analysis do not really exist, in any approach. Explanations of terrorism, like all other socio-political phenomena, cannot be reduced to a single cause or set of causes operating in isolation. While it may be a cliché, the maxim terrorism does not occur in a vacuum is also a fact. Terrorism must be understood as the consequence of both human and environmental factors. For researchers, this renders deterministic findings impossible and probabilistic findings difficult, for while cases of terrorism may similar, they will never be identical. To borrow Charles Tilly s metaphor about democracy, terrorism is like a lake in that A lake a large inland body of water can come into being because a mountain stream feeds into a naturally existing basin, because someone or something dams up the outlet of a large river, because a glacier melts...because people deliberately dig an enormous hole and channel nearby watersheds into it, or for a number of other reasons. Once it exists, nevertheless, a lake nurtures characteristic ecosystems and maintains characteristic relations with its surroundings... [Terrorism] behaves like a lake; although it has distinguishing properties and a logic of its own, it forms in a variety of ways, each of which retains traces of its singular history in the details of its current operation (Tilly 210). 13

25 Rational Choice Theories Whereas psychological and structural theories view terrorism as the unintended outcome of psychological or social factors (Crenshaw 1990, 4), rational choice theories assume that terrorism is the result of a calculated, deliberate, and strategic choice. According to this perspective, an actor 13 selects terrorism as the best means to achieve his political goals based on a calculation of the available options expected 14 costs and benefits, which are measured primarily in terms of efficacy. Thus, terrorism is viewed as the result of a decision-making process that can be discovered and explained once the actor s perceived opportunities, constraints, and incentives are identified. Chief among the benefits of this approach are three ways in which it is applicable to counterterrorism policymaking. First, because rational choice theory assumes that actors respond to perceived opportunities and constraints, it integrates both psychological and environmental variables, thus giving policymakers more options for countermeasures. 15 Second, because it assumes that actions follow from relatively stable decision making processes, this approach allows analysts to establish a baseline of behavior so that deviations can be identified, measured, and most importantly, compared (Crenshaw 1985). Finally, by assuming that an actor s choice includes a consideration of efficacy (something that can only be measured ex post-facto), this approach allows for theories of organizational learning and adaptation. Whereas first wave scholarship focused on the irrationality of terrorist behavior, second wave scholars have embraced the rational choice approach. For example, in one of the most successful applications of rational choice modeling, Enders and Sandler (2006) predicted how terrorist groups should react to various counterterrorism practices. Another groundbreaking, albeit more controversial, use of rational choice theory is Robert Pape s Dying to Kill, in which he explains what he calls the strategic logic of suicide terrorism (2005, 3). Iannaccone and Berman (2006) use a rational choice framework to explicate what they call the economics of religion, a framework which analyzes why individuals join religious extremist terror groups 13 As will be discussed intra, the actor can be either an individual or a group. 14 Most rational choice models assume some type of bounded rationality. See for example Victoroff (2005), Berrebi (2009), and McCormick (2003). 15 In contrast, if terrorism were the result of psychosis, then the only option open to policymakers would be a worldwide round up of individuals believed to match the terrorist profile. 14

26 versus their more secular alternative(s). Other topics examined using rational choice models include terrorists choice of targets (Berman and Laitin 2005; Brandt and Sandler 2010), the timing of terrorist attacks (Berrebi 2009; Berrebi and Lakdawalla 2007), the effects of terrorism on the economy of the target state (Satloff 2006), and the success of terrorism as strategy to achieve territorial goals (Pape 2005). Despite their obvious advantages, rational choice theories are often deemed inappropriate for the analysis of terrorist behavior primarily because of the first wave s emphasis on the irrationality of terrorists and terrorism (Post 1990). Despite abundant evidence to the contrary, some terrorism scholars remain dubious about the rationality of terrorist actors. For example, authors have argued that suicide terrorism is unquestionably irrational because the cost of the behavior clearly outweighs any individual benefit (Caplan 2006). Another issued frequently raised is free riding; the goods terrorists frequently claim to seek are public, 16 so why would otherwise risk-adverse individuals join a terrorist group when benefits are not contingent upon participation? Advocates of rational choice models respond that these critiques are based on narrow and inappropriate conceptions of self-interest and utility (Abrahms 2008; Bray 2009; Crenshaw 1990; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Pape 2005). Advocates of rational choice models instead argue instead for a flexible form of utility function that could include satisfaction from perceived altruism and intangible psychological or social rewards, including expected rewards in the afterlife (Berrebi 2009, 170). Other authors claim that because terrorism is fundamentally a group activity, rational choice models must be expanded to include organization-level factors (Crenshaw 1981; Gates 2006; Oots 1989; Rapoport 2001). Crenshaw, for example, maintains that individuals use collective rationality when making the decision to join an existing terrorist group (Crenshaw 1990). Crenshaw and her like-minded colleagues understand that the strength 17 of the group affects the likelihood of its success, and that individually rational actions (in this case nonaction) may lead to collectively irrational outcomes. Recent interview-based studies support this 16 Terrorist group typologies often determined by the type of public goods they seek, i.e., nationalist/separatist= independent state; economic change = leftist/marxist; religious equality or superiority= religious/right wing (US), etc. 17 Strength is often measured exclusively in terms of group size, however, other factors, such as increases in funding, communal support, or military capabilities can enhance a group s power and resilience. 15

27 position by presenting evidence that individuals identify the group s goals as their own; thus, seemingly irrational individual actions that benefit the group can be considered rational because the actor s goals and the group s goal are one in the same (Alderdice 2007; Gupta 2005; Kruglanski and Fishman 2009). Organization-Level Studies of Terrorism Though not as widely used as micro or macro level of analysis approaches, organizationlevel studies of terrorism are becoming increasingly popular, especially within the counterterrorism literature. This is not to say that organizational analyses are new to terrorism research, as they are not (Crenshaw 1985, 1987; Mullins 1988; Oots 1986, 1989, 1990; Zawodny 1978, 1981). Rather, the paucity of early organization-level studies is simply a reflection of the first wave s bias toward individual and or structural level variables. Of the few first-wave studies that went beyond noting basic organizational differences (i.e. size, age, structure) to using any organizational theory to explain the causal processes between the characteristics noted and group behavior, the most important are those of noted terrorism scholar (and goddess) Martha Crenshaw (Crenshaw 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992). In addition to Crenshaw, other standout exceptions to this were Kent Layne Oots, who used political organization theory to explain the behavior including the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups, and J.K. Zawodny, who used his personal experience as a member of the Polish Underground movement during WWII to explain the internal dynamics of and the importance of leaders to terrorist organizations (Oots 1986, 1989; Zawodny 1978, 1981). In the years following 9/11, however, organization-level analyses have become more sophisticated and more theory-driven (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Cronin 2009; Helfstein 2009; B. A. Jackson 2006; Shapiro 2008). Scholars have used organizational theories to explain how organizational properties affect the lethality and/or success rate of terrorist attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Helfstein and Wright 2011), target choices (Brandt and Sandler 2010), and the decision to enter or exit negotiations (Cronin 2009; Wither 2009). Other studies use organization-level variables to examine differences in recruiting patterns (Gates 2006; Gutfraind 2009), the types of activities/operations used (Cobb 2007; Feinstein and Kaplan 2010; Heger, Jung, and Wong 2008), and group mortality (Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer 2009; Rowlands and Kilberg 2011). 16